

Reminiscences of the University of Sydney psychology department's discipline-focused education of young John (1958-65) under O'Neil's god professorial reign (1945-65): Academic freedom, fairness in evaluation, and educational integrity

John Furedy

Abstract This paper is a modification of and some additions to an oral paper given in 2008¹ to philosophers and psychologists most of whose current thinking is along the lines of a post-modern, instrumentalist approach to knowledge and higher education. The paper's (long) title shamelessly plagiarizes from the title of the book by the much more eminent Donald Horne. The approach I advocate, and look back to (perhaps with glasses that are somewhat rose tinted) is one that characterized O'Neil's department. The approach was pre-modernist in a number of differentiating respects that included complete academic freedom, education rather than indoctrination, and fairness in the evaluation only of academic performance rather than of personal beliefs and attitudes. These conditions, rather than those of such features as "inclusiveness", I argue, are necessary for integrity in higher education. These are also the conditions which are largely satisfied in competitive elitist sports and games, especially in Australia.

Discussion Question 1 If the competitive, elitist approach is good enough for sports and games, why is it not good enough for those who volunteer to engage, either as students or teaching staff, in higher education?

Discussion Question 2 In higher education, should we aim for equality of opportunity or equality of outcomes?

Introduction

The pre-colonic part of my long title refers to the relevance of philosophy for scientific psychological research. I would like to begin with my thoughts on how things seem to have changed between two periods: the first period was 1958-65, when I received my Sydney University education, and was also the last 8 years of Bill O'Neil's 20-year headship of the psychology department; the second period is the first 8 years of the present century.

It seems to me that from the first to the second period, the relevance of philosophy in general has decreased, along with a decrease in its academic

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status, although I have to add that this impression is not based on systematic research or even expertise in the discipline of philosophy. This is because the formal part of my philosophical education ended when I completed the philosophy part of an Arts double-honors degree, opting to become an experimental psychologist rather than a philosopher.

Nevertheless, I have continued to have an interest in philosophy, and especially in the philosophy of science, and my impression is that philosophy as a discipline has lost general relevance and status. I think that not only outsiders but also philosophers feel a loss of intellectual status.

This was brought home to me at the end of 2007 when I attended a debate at the University of NSW where the philosopher Peter Slezak argued for the proposition that "There is no philosophy: there is only science and bullshit". Peter's position, in my view, is a post-modern one, and he and I had had journal debate concerning the post-modern approach in the late eighties when we were separated by 12,000 miles more than we were in 2007.¹

Actually, I think I have more extensive, though still anecdotal, evidence that there has been a decline of the relevance of philosophy for scientific psychological research. This evidence comes from the changed nature of psychology departments' curricula here and in North America.

When, in 1965, I left Sydney University, philosophy's logical relevance to psychology was in the form of a philosophy of science referred to as "theoretical psychology". Theoretical psychology was a central part of the education of even the most empirically-oriented research programs.

The central purpose of theoretical psychology for psychological researchers was a prescriptive sort of philosophy of science, such as advanced by Sir Karl Popper, who proposed falsifiability as the central criterion of the scientific. In other words, the task of theoretical psychology was to educate researchers in ensuring that their research was more like science than like bullshit.

Even in North America in the 1960s, where what has been referred to as "dustbowl empiricism" was dominant, undergraduate and graduate programs contained a number of so-called "history and systems" courses. And there were active and influential theoretical centers of psychology such as the one in the University of Alberta psychology department.

By the turn of the century, this sort of relevance of philosophy to psychological research had markedly declined. History-and-systems courses have essentially disappeared from North American psychology curricula.

Alberta University's theoretical psychology centre has ceased to exist, having, in my opinion, been killed by the psychological researchers of the Alberta psychology department. And asking psychological researchers to reflect publicly on their own philosophy of science is akin to asking them to talk openly about their sexual failings.

In contrast, when I now look back on my education at Sydney University, I think that the relevance of philosophy for research psychologists was at its height in Sydney in the department that Bill O'Neil headed from 1945-65.

Before I come to justify my position in greater detail, let me make some more factual and less controversial some observations on the nature of the psychology and philosophy departments and their heads during the 1945-65 periods.

The term “headed” at that time in Australian (and British) academia was more significant than it is today. The professor (and there was usually only one) was in charge not only of all funding for research, but also of the areas to be covered in the curriculum.

Moreover, he (rarely she) was in a position to shape relations with other disciplinary departments. He was referred to as a “god professor” for these reasons.

In the philosophy department at that time there were actually two professors, but John Anderson was the *de facto* god professor. This was because, as professor of metaphysics in which he held to a clear realist position, he dominated the ethics professor G.F. Stout, who had been appointed as a counterweight to Anderson’s influence, but who had proved quite unequal to that task. Anderson was also very much taller than Stout.

Anderson, as is well known, was often at loggerheads with his colleagues at large. His pronouncements on the nature of the university were not always welcomed, as when he said that only arts and science disciplines should be taught in a university, the rest like medicine, engineering, and agriculture properly belonging to trade schools!

What underpinned the relation of the philosophy and psychology departments was that Bill O’Neil respected Anderson, although he was not so impolitic as to publicly consign professional departments to trade schools. So, strong relations developed between the two departments. O’Neil’s psychology department, as I will detail later, included more emphasis on theoretical psychology or philosophy of science in its curriculum than, I think, any other psychology department then or now. More generally, as James Franklin has nicely summarized in a paragraph on page 207 of his 2003 book called “Corrupting the Youth”², the discipline of philosophy had a very clear conceptual niche in O’Neil’s psychology department.

O’Neil himself did practically no empirical research, unlike virtually all other psychology departmental heads, even of the time. Rather, his publications were in theoretical psychology, as well as a book called *Method and Theory in Psychology*, which was used as a psychology text from the mid fifties.

Although virtually all of the teaching staff (about 15 during my student days) and research students (about 10) focused on empirical research, there was at least one staff member, John Maze, of whom more below, who was what we might call a pure theoretical psychologist. He never did any empirical research whatsoever.

My argument, then, is that during this 20-year period at Sydney University, philosophy was extraordinarily relevant to scientific research psychology.

The rest of this paper will consider the four influences mentioned in the title first with reference to the general relation between philosophy and psychology, and then with reference to O’Neil’s psychology department.

1. The four influences on the relation of philosophy to psychology

I see four influences in this relation, which are briefly described below.

1.1 The pre-Socratic influence

The critical feature of those 6th century Ionians is the introduction of the principle of disinterestedness, which is the attitude of being ready to consider issues for their own sake, rather than in relation to religious or political considerations. The pre-Socratics were the first to adopt this principle as a group, and I think it is the reason why the Greeks developed the science of astronomy, even though their observations of heavenly bodies were less precise than those of pseudo-scientific Babylonian astrologers.

And the principle of disinterestedness, what John Burnet characterized as “thinking about the world in the Greek way”,³ is still relevant to 21st century politics, as it is conducted in free societies. The principle is behind the demand that any committee of inquiry comprise of *independent* experts who have no conflicts of interest.

A corollary of the principle of disinterestedness is the concept that conflicts have to be among ideas, rather than among persons or rival groups of persons. Again it was the pre-Socratics, with their arguments about what was common to all things, who were the first to set up this sort of conflict-of-ideas approach.

1.2. The Socratic influence

On the Socratic influence, I think it is best to summarize this by considering the conflict between the approach of Socrates and that of his contemporary Protagoras who, as leader of the Sophists, proposed the *homo mensura* (man-is-the-measure) principle. My wife Chris and I have argued that this Socratic-Sophistic distinction or continuum is critical and relevant today⁴.

Three features of the Socratic approach are relevant here. The first feature is the readiness to question all assumptions, which is what got Socrates into a spot of political trouble.

The second feature is to treat one's followers as students rather than disciples. This is best illustrated in the *Phaedo*, which is an account of Socrates' last few hours of life, when he decides to die partly because he believes that he has an immortal soul. In this dialogue, Simmias and Cebes, acting as students rather than as disciples of Socrates, argue tactlessly against the soul's immortality.

The third feature is the concern with definitions of fundamental terms as the starting point for understanding and discourse. This is best illustrated by the *Euthyphro*. Here, for the first time, we see a method that tests definitions by counter-example arguments, rather than by appeal to authority, which is a Protagorean *homo mensura* method.

1.3 The Aristotelian influence

As to Aristotle, I think that his critical contribution is the concept of an orderly taxonomy, which can be viewed as a refinement of the Socratic concern with definitions. Aristotelian taxonomy is orderly in the sense that it provides rules for how to decide set membership for a large majority of phenomena,

without any appeals to a superior authority, or to what many current philosophers refer to as “hand waving”.

1.4 Andersonian realism

Finally, regarding influence of the realist philosopher John Anderson: I see him as one of the most thoroughgoing exponents of the legacy of 18th century enlightenment, and in particular the Scottish version. Has been recently expounded in 2007 on the ABC Radio National's *Philosopher's Zone*⁵. As I am not a professional philosopher, I will not go into Anderson's realist contributions to philosophy. Rather, I will only refer to what I think is the most significant contribution that he made to psychology as a science, conceived by him as having the same logic or methodology as any other science. In a 1945 paper on political theory, he wrote that science, any science, involved “the formulation and testing of hypotheses by their consequences, these consequences being determined by observation”⁶. This core idea he expressed on many occasions.

2. How the four sorts of influences operated in O'Neil's department

Now let me illustrate how these four influences seem to me to have operated on O'Neil's psychology department, with some asides on the current situation as I see it. My memories of that department are based my 1958-62 experience as a student in the honors programs of both departments of psychology and philosophy, and my 1963-5 experience as a research student in psychology. I shall discuss the pre-Socratic, Socratic, Aristotelean, and Anderson sources of influence in turn.

2.1 Pre-Socratic influences

There are four distinguishable influences in this pre-Socratic category.

2.2.1 Disinterestedness

The principle of disinterestedness, or of a scientific interest in phenomena for their own sakes, meant that for students in psychology, most were more interested in experimental psychology than psychology's applications such as clinical psychology. This preference for experimental over clinical was apparent in a number of honors students when I was an undergraduate. So students who learned about the phi-phenomenon (the phenomenon of apparent movement) as a diagnostic tool for mental illness in the clinical psychology course would develop a curiosity about the phi phenomenon itself. This curiosity would lead them to become experimental rather than clinical psychologists.

Today, students are more likely to be concerned with their future job prospects, so many wish to move from experimental psychology to clinical psychology, because clinical offers much better prospects of employment, and, at least in North America, a student has to have better grades to get into a clinical graduate program than into an experimental one.

2.1.2 *The conflict of ideas*

My undergraduate experience included the pre-Socratic concept of the conflict of ideas both in my courses, and with the staff member who supervised my undergraduate empirical thesis research. During our seminar courses two 3rd year seminars were taught, respectively, by a radical stimulus-response or S-R Skinnerian behaviorist and a mentalist with a strong bias toward Freudian theory.

An important feature of our education during those courses was that we argued with one lecturer using points made by the other in a previous class, so that, in effect, we were participating in a conflict of ideas provided by teachers with opposing points of view.⁷

When I arrived in USA (I spent 1965-67 at Indiana University) I found that this sort of conflict-of-ideas approach to higher education was contrary to an American quasi ethical academic code, according to which faculty disagreements about fundamental issues in the discipline should not be publicly aired before mere students.

I had an even more marked and sustained experience with the conflict-of-ideas education with Dick Champion, the supervisor of my BA experimental thesis. Dick was a radical behaviorist, whose position I have detailed elsewhere⁸. He adhered to the stimulus-response — S-R behaviourist — position that was dominant at that time in experimental psychology, as promulgated by Ken Spence and his followers.

The central tenet of Spence's S-R position was that the science of psychology could provide explanations of all behavioral phenomena without the use of so-called mentalistic, cognitive concepts (that were advocated at the time by Tolman and his students). My experiment, later published with Dick in the *American Journal of Psychology*⁹, produced results that even Dick had to admit favored Tolman over Spence.

However, the extent to which my experiment was really a decisive refutation of Spence's S-R position remained a bone of contention between us right up to Dick's death in 1999. But despite that disagreement, we continued our successful collaboration during my MA and PhD research.¹⁰

2.1.3 *The principle of "Saving the appearances"*

Another pre-Socratic corollary is the principle of having to "save the appearances". So explanations should be justified in terms of their ability to account for observed phenomena, rather than for their consistency with received expert opinion or authority.

In other words, what mattered was the truth of the proposition that was being criticized, rather than the power that the proposition maker could command to punish critics of the proposition. Socrates formulated the same sentiment when, in the *Crito*, he made the elitist assertion that "just because the many could kill us is no reason for setting their opinions on a level with the knowledge of the wise". Or, Anderson put it, "though they have a certain power over life and death, that they have any power over truth".

2.1.4 Focusing on the proposition

The principle of focusing on the proposition rather than the proposition maker was evident throughout my experience as a student in O'Neil's department, where criticisms of positions always took the form of appealing to logical or empirical considerations, rather than to those of authority.

In this connection I recall the guidelines that O'Neil provided to his tutors and research students for how to discriminate between 1st, 2nd, and 3rd class honours work when marking undergraduate essays. 1st class honours essays constantly challenged the reader; 2nd class work sometimes challenged the reader; 3rd class work, although it diligently contained most of the relevant facts, never challenged the reader.

Some of my fellow students took this principle of ignoring the status of those with whom they were arguing to extremes. I recall my experience with fellow 3rd year student, Arthur Harris, with whom I shared a cab back from Broughton Hall, then Sydney's mental hospital, where we had just been, not as patients, but as part of our clinical practicum.

Lacking good public transport, we shared a cab down to Circular Quay, and happened on a driver who had a low opinion of university students that he did not hesitate to express in language punctuated by the usual Australian swear words that I will not repeat, except by their first letters, B and F. Arthur, perhaps wanting to demonstrate the practical uses to which his intellect and university education could be put, informed the driver that he had a fool-proof system (now we would call it a mathematical model) for betting on the horses.

He then attempted to explicate his system to the driver, who countered that he could do just as well by sticking a B pin into an F list at random. I happened to agree with the driver, and still do. However, I kept out of the discussion which proceeded at an ever increasing rate of speed and loudness, with the driver swearing more and more, but without any increase in the diversity of his swear words.

At one point during the yelling I heard Arthur say to the driver: "But you have not distinguished between possibility and probability", to which the driver countered with another stream of curses. Still later, I heard Arthur say: "But you have not distinguished between causation and correlation".

As he dropped us off at the Quay and departed in a cloud, or rather a thunderstorm, of curses, I said to Arthur: "Are you crazy? Why are you arguing with an ignorant cabbie?" He replied: "But he was wrong."

2.2 Socratic influences in O'Neil's department

In this section I'll refer to three examples that respectively illustrate: the readiness to question all assumptions, the students vs. disciples distinction, and the concern with definitions of fundamental terms.

2.2.1 The Socratic questioning of assumptions

On the questioning of fundamental assumptions, I have already mentioned that my supervisor, Dick Champion, assumed that cognitive or mental functions were completely unimportant in determining behavior. This was the ruling assumption or, if you like, paradigm, in American experimental psychology.

The paradigm was particularly strong in the Iowa psychology department, where the S-R behaviorist Ken Spence reigned (I use the word advisedly). It was also under Spence, as the Americans put it, that Dick had been a graduate student.

And in Spence's department, it was only half a joke that students had to ask "What's on your behavior" rather than "What's on your mind". But at Sydney, of course, Dick's fundamental assumption was questioned not only by me in my BA thesis experiment, but also by other staff members like John Maze, who argued that cognitive psychological functions are a fundamental feature of psychology, and play a critical role in determining behavior.

2.2.2 The Socratic students vs. disciples distinction

As to the student vs. disciples distinction, this was sharply illustrated for me soon after, when, having written my PhD thesis, I arrived as a new faculty member at Indiana University in 1965, and first encountered the uniquely North American expression "X student" where X referred to the individual who was one's PhD supervisor. This expression implied that if one was a "Spence student", one agreed, disciple-like, with Spence on all fundamental assumptions and approaches in the discipline.

Moreover, as illustrated in the more recent, 2005 letter¹¹, the disciple-like status of students in psychology has, if anything, been strengthened in North America, with students referring to their *training under their mentors* rather than *education with supervisors*.

In contrast, consider what O'Neil had to say about the style of teaching he favored in a 1987 letter he wrote to me. In this letter he referred to his preference for realism over idealism, but thought that students should be exposed to both positions in what he viewed as education rather than indoctrination. As Bill put it:

"Let them see what the circus is capable of before arguing on the basis of both logical and observational evidence about which horse to ride. You may prefer the bay and I may prefer the grey, but if we are serious scholars we must justify our preferences."

2.2.3 The Socratic concern for definitions

The Socratic concern for definitions was also much more marked in O'Neil's department than elsewhere at that time, or anywhere today. Both I and my wife Chris (who also did Psychology I in 1958) recall that Dick Champion in those lectures would say "let's have a definition" at least twice in each lecture, and would proceed to write up a precise definition that he would be prepared to defend either during or after his lecture.

So we both had much clearer idea, for instance, of what learning was, and how it differed from maturation and even sensitization than most current PhD psychological researchers have. No current post-modern philosophical hand waving in those days, and in that department, to get over difficulties with defining one's terms.

2.3 Aristotelian, orderly taxonomy

In my view, the Aristotelian concept of an orderly taxonomy is one of the essential marks of a genuine science. So in chemistry, because there is an orderly taxonomy for distinguishing between various metals, one can determine whether a particular metal is lead or gold. On the other hand, in alchemy this determination depends on the authority of the alchemist, and his ability to persuade others that he has turned lead into gold.

In psychology, there was a similar level of clarity concerning psychological functions. Take the main point of dispute in experimental psychology of the time: the dispute between the cognitive Tolman camp and the non-cognitive Spence camp, where Spence and his followers held that cognitive psychological functions could not be part of a scientific explanation of behavior.

In this dispute, the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive psychological functions was as clear, at least in the Sydney department, as the distinction between gold and lead. Cognitive functions were propositional, to which the true/false distinction was applicable; non-cognitive functions were not propositional, the application of the true/false distinction to them being, in Ryle's terms, a category mistake.

Contrast the taxonomic chaos among current cognitive psychologists, for whom the term "cognitive" has become so broad as to encompass all psychological functions. The result is that current cognitive psychologists cannot clearly distinguish cognitive and non-cognitive psychological functions, so that they cannot distinguish thinking from feeling.

2.4 Influences of Andersonian realism

Finally, I see three ways in which Andersonianism influenced O'Neil's department. The influences (on my education) I'll refer to are that of John Maze, O'Neil's honours programme, and perhaps most importantly, academic freedom.

2.4.1 John Maze

John Maze was the resident theoretical psychologist in the department during my student days. He was a graduate of the philosophy and psychology honours programs, a student of Anderson's and was appointed by O'Neil to the department in 1951.

I think Maze was essentially Anderson's guiding voice for psychology in its striving to move toward the hard end of the hard-soft science continuum, or, to

use my earlier parallel, to move from being more like alchemy to more like chemistry. The culmination of Maze's work is in his 1983 book entitled "The Meaning of Behavior", which I and Diane Riley (also former student of both Maze and Champion) reviewed¹², and consider to be Maze's main and most systematic contribution to the discipline of psychology. I will not try to summarize that contribution here, but shall just note that I think what John wrote about current research psychologists "bravely hurl [in] themselves into venerable philosophic blunders" applies *a fortiori* a quarter century after he wrote those words.

Those blunders, which are documented in John's book, are the main reason why psychology, in my view, has actually moved in the alchemical direction, and has failed both to provide genuinely testable explanations of behavior, and to develop techniques of control that really work to reduce undesirable behaviors like smoking, obesity, and even violence.

2.4.2 O'Neil's honours program

O'Neil himself was not as thoroughgoing an Andersonian realist as Maze, but in terms of bringing the logical relations between philosophy and both education and research in psychology closer, he provided what to me still seems an ideal worth striving for. He did this by setting up an undergraduate honours program where, in the crucial final year when the stamp of class of honours was to be determined by the department, every student had to write a theoretical thesis which was worth as much as the empirical or research thesis.

This theoretical thesis had to be much more than basically a literature review. O'Neil insisted that it should be potentially publishable, and, at its best, a contribution to the philosophy of science in psychology.

O'Neil's theoretical-thesis component, which has since been watered down in the Sydney department, and which, to my knowledge, has not been a part of any North American or even British psychology honours program, provided at least the potential of a lasting relationship between philosophy and psychology, even for that vast majority of student who passed through the honors program and went onto to be empirical researchers or practicing professionals. This is because, through having to write a theoretical thesis, they had all been forced to engage in the philosophy of science, and to reflect on the scientific status of their psychological research and/or profession.

Contrast the current scene, where theoretical psychology viewed as the philosophy of science applied to psychology plays virtually no part either in teaching or research in North American departments. These departments also have begun to drop the term "psychology" in their nomenclature in favor of such names as "cognitive science", "behavioral neuroscience", and "cognitive behavioral neuroscience".

And theoretical psychology or even the history of psychology plays virtually no role in current North American departments. In my own Toronto department about 10 years ago, the faculty voted 4/1 against the requirement that an undergraduate psychology honors program require a half-year course in either psychological theory or the history of psychology. Also, these sorts of courses have disappeared from Toronto's graduate program—you will recall that graduate programs in North America have many more courses than those in Australia.

2.4.3 Academic freedom

The third strand of Andersonian influence is that of academic freedom. Anderson himself was probably the most active and visible practitioner of the principle of academic freedom, as when he wrote unpatriotic papers during the war years, or when he organized the boycott of Tasmanian's department of philosophy in defense of Professor Orr's academic freedom.

With respect to academic freedom, Anderson did not practice what he preached inasmuch as he did not allow the sort of intellectual deviation that O'Neil encouraged in the psychology department. So it is especially as a graduate of O'Neil's department and his provision of student academic freedom that I have developed the concept of the enlightenment university as a unique institution of a community of scholars whose prime function is to further knowledge through the conflict of ideas.

After going abroad (for a 40 year period that I sometimes think of as my time in the wilderness), I found that academic freedom became more and more constrained in North American institutions of higher education. As a student here I had taken academic freedom for granted. The essence of academic freedom, as I argued elsewhere¹³, is the right to be evaluated only in terms of one's academic performance, and not in terms of conformity with some ideology, lifestyle, or even conformity with a particular "school" favored by the majority of the department's teaching staff.

Now as an undergraduate, I was an active member of the Evangelical Union, who also didn't happen to like alcohol, and, perhaps because my parents had rescued me from the joys of Hungary's Stalinist workers paradise, I held conservative political views. In these respects I differed from the majority of the psychology teaching staff, who held libertarian views about so-called "free love" and put these views into frequent practice, drank hard, and were generally far to the left of me on the political continuum. Despite these differences, the only thing that mattered when it came to evaluate me was my academic work.

The notion that not only students, but also faculty, should be evaluated only in terms of their academic performance and not in terms of conformity with some ideology was tested in 1961 in the Gough case, in which, I played a bit part.

That year, the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, an English appointee named Gough, preached a sermon in which he condemned Professor Anderson's teaching of "free love" to the students of Sydney University.

"Free love" in this sense was, of course, contrary to the teachings, or, if you like, the ideology, of the Anglican Church. I was, at the time, an Anglican and an active member of the Evangelical Union, so I wrote a letter to the *Honi Soit* in which I said that as a Christian I thought that the Archbishop should stay out of university affairs, and should not try to, as I put it, "legislate morality". It was a sentiment widely supported by all the members of the academic community, ranging from 1st year undergraduates to full professors, and from members of the Libertarian Society to those of the EU.

Astonishingly, I and the then president of the Student Christian Movement, Bob Lockhart, also a psychology student¹⁴, were invited by the Archbishop to afternoon tea, where we spent half an hour talking to him about academic freedom.

After the considerable brouhaha in the press and public fora, the archbishop chose other topics for his sermons, and ceased to lecture university staff and students on morality. A few years later he resigned, apparently because he was practising free love with the spouse of one of his clergy, or, as one source put it, "spicing his orange juice with passionfruit". *Sic transit gloria mundi*.

There is a section on my web site¹⁵ that lists my efforts to reason with abusers of academic freedom, mostly in Canada, but also in the UK and, more recently, in Australia. One thing that seems obvious is that these abusers have been a lot less receptive than the Archbishop, perhaps at least partly because I did not have most of the academic community behind me. And none of the university presidential abusers of academic freedom has ever invited me to afternoon tea...

Conclusion

I would like to end by referring to one of Anderson's last papers written in the early sixties. In the paper entitled "Classicism", he contrasted the traditional, enlightenment view of higher education with what he referred to as intellectual barbarism.

My last web reference¹⁶ provides what I think is the relevant extract from this paper. That extract refers to the classicist having to "work against the stream, as culture in all ages has had to work".

I suppose I see myself at an age which has already passed Anderson's age by a few years, as working against the stream of post modernism that, from my perspective, has barbarized the disciplines of psychology and philosophy, as well as weakening the logical relation between these two disciplines.

So for this "Integrity in Education" conference, the approach I advocate, and look back to (perhaps with glasses that are somewhat rose tinted) is one that characterized the honours program of O'Neil's department. The approach was pre-modernist in a number of differentiating respects that included complete academic freedom, education rather than indoctrination, and fairness in the evaluation only of academic performance (which, however, was constantly and precisely evaluated so as to produce clear winners and losers in that 3-year duration competition among some 20 people), rather than of personal beliefs and attitudes. These conditions, rather than those of such features as "inclusiveness", I suggest, are necessary for integrity in higher education. These are also the conditions which are largely satisfied in competitive elitist sports and games, especially in Australia.

Endnotes

1. For this debate on traditional vs. post-modern conceptions of philosophy and of scientific psychological research, see <http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/Papers/ra/releva88.doc>.
2. For the conceptual status of philosophy in O'Neil's psychology department, see Franklin, J. (2003). *Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia*, Mackay Press, p. 207.
3. See Burnet, J. (1920). *Early Greek Philosophy*. London: A & C Black Ltd.
4. For the Socratic-Sophistic distinction and continuum, for one paper see <http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/Papers/te/On%20Strengthening%20the%20Socratic>

[te.doc](http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/teach_edu.htm); for some other relevant papers, see
http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/teach_edu.htm

5. For a recent account of the Scottish 18th century enlightenment, see
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/philosopherszone/stories/2008/2346761.htm>
6. Anderson, J. (2007). Lectures on Political Theory 1941-5. Cole, C. M. Ed, Sydney University Press.
7. For more details of this conflict-of-ideas education: account of my two 3rd year seminars taught, respectively, by a Skinnerian radical behaviorist (Keehn) and a Freudian realist mentalist (Maze) in 1960, see <http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/Papers/ob/keehn4.doc>
8. For Dick Champion's Hullian (rather than Skinnerian) scientific (rather than political) anti-mentalist position, see: <http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/Papers/ob/dickpav7.doc>
9. For this 1963 journal article, see
http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/Papers/ra/Cognitive_SR.doc
10. Dick's different attitudes toward my undergraduate and post-graduate research was vividly illustrated in 1963, when, as a neophyte conference and first year research student, I gave two papers at the annual conference of the (then) British Psychological Society (held, as I recall, in Melbourne).

The first paper was on what I later realized was on my MA, PhD, and post-doctoral research on contiguity-reinforcement theory in human Pavlovian autonomic conditioning. Thinking I was in a seminar on learning theory, I filled a couple of blackboards with various diagrams and symbols like CS, US, etc. to an audience who could not follow what I was trying to communicate. For me the experience was a nightmare as well as a learning experience for conference. Dick sat moodily throughout this disaster.

The second paper (for which the text is: <http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/Papers/ra/Cognition%20and%20fractional.doc>) was my interpretation of the undergraduate research I had done under Dick's supervision. Perhaps partly because this was more cognitive than planned research-student work, but mainly because the audience could understand what I was talking about, the paper was a great success. After several audience members, including those of Dick's teaching-staff colleagues, had come up to offer their enthusiastic congratulations, Dick finally turned up and said: "Why is it that you can talk so well about bullshit, but not about real science?"

11. For this recent criticism of the North American student-as-disciple concept, see:
http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/Papers/te/mentor04_3.doc
12. Review of Maze's *Meaning of Behavior* (1983) and 1950s *Psychological Review papers* as prescriptive philosophy of science for the science and applications of psychology:
<http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/Papers/ra/Extendc.doc>
13. Academic freedom as the right to be evaluated only on academic performance, and not at all on conformity with some ideology, or some particular "school" in a discipline:
<http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/Papers/af/seven.doc>
14. Bob, who was a year ahead of me at Sydney, and later (by coincidence) joined me on faculty at the University of Toronto, is the R. S. Lockhart of current cognitive psychology's levels-of-processing fame. He is the coauthor of a 1972 paper on Levels of Processing with F.I.M. Craik, which has become cognitive psychology's most widely cited paper (and a science citation classic). Another famous cognitive psychologist or cognitive neuroscientist is Max Coltheart, who was a classmate and who turned at my talk and disagreed (cogently, and at times for me uncomfortably) with almost everything I had to say. The one thing Max agreed with (and I'm sure Bob would also) is that we received an excellent education (and not indoctrination) in O'Neil's department.
15. For my recent (1989-2009) efforts to reason with high-level university-administrator abusers of academic freedom (i.e., shit-disturbing activities), see
http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/academ_free.htm Extract from John Anderson's paper on "Classicism", with two comments on the relevance of this extract from the early 60s to the current culture-of-comfort, *homo mensua*, post-modernist view of higher education:
<http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/classicmods.doc>