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Articles published in PSA are indexed in *Sociological Abstracts* and in *The Philosopher's Index*.

Articles, communications, discussions, reviews and other items published here express the views of their authors and not necessarily of the Establishment.

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EDITORIAL

Resisting State Violence

Brian Martin

Resisting state repression is of central importance in the quest for a better world. A great deal of the unnecessary suffering and death in the world is due to the actions of military and police forces, both through wars and through action against a country's own population. This occurs especially in military and other dictatorships, but also in constitutional democracies. It should not require very many examples of intimidation, imprisonment, torture and killing to emphasise the importance of this topic.

The direct effects of state repression are clear. Also crucially important are the indirect effects: the inhibition of democratic impulses and the stifling of attempts to create a more just and peaceful world. Just the threat of surveillance, dismissal from jobs, harassment and beatings is often enough to thwart grassroots initiatives.

There is considerable documentation of the effects and causes of state repression, though less than one might expect considering the significance of the topic. More disappointing is the lack of theoretical analysis of how to oppose state repression and assessments of practical efforts to do so.

In 1990 I had the opportunity to meet Steve Wright, one of the world's leading authorities on the technology of repression. (A good example of his work is included in this issue.) I asked him what had been done on how to use nonviolent action to oppose the technology of repression. Wright hadn't come across much on this topic. He did, though, give me a list of some of the world's leading researchers on state repression and refer me to some publications.

Shortly afterwards, I wrote to several of these researchers, including Richard Falk, Ted Gurr, Edward Herman, Michael Klare and Michael Stohl.¹ They were kind enough to suggest references and send copies of their papers on the topic of state repression, including some insightful analyses of the origin and dynamics of the phenomenon. But there was relatively little that they could offer to suggest how to resist state repression.

Of course, their own works are a vital part of this resistance. Documenting the problem alerts others to its significance and provides guidance for those who take direct action. To repeat, considering the

significance of this issue, it is surprising how few scholars have tackled it.

But documenting the problem is only one strategy. What insights were there in all this writing for activist groups or mass movements confronting a repressive state? The answer: very little. The most useful suggestions came from Robert Irwin (see later).

The first paper in this issue of *Philosophy and Social Action*, by Keni Mbingu (a pseudonym), outlines the problem of state repression in Kenya and the closely linked repression of indigenous Kenyan culture. Although the author does not present a programme to oppose state repression, his analysis highlights some of the main threats to the repressive state, such as critical intellectuals.

Jörgen Johansen tells about a playful yet remarkably effective campaign against imprisonment of total resisters to national service in Norway. Since a continual focus on the dreadful impacts of state repression can be debilitating, the sort of positive approach delightfully described in this article deserves much more emphasis.

Steve Wright tackles the grim issue of the technology of repression. His article documents the technologies and methods used, the massive trade in this area and the complicity of numerous governments. One obvious implication of his analysis is that governments — including liberal democracies — are unlikely candidates to stop repression: after all, they are either engaging in it or fostering it elsewhere through their policies, or both.

Wright's article concludes with a careful consideration of approaches for non-government organisations to help halt the repression business. He considers legal, research and campaigning approaches. Each of these deserves much more attention and effort.

Many of the efforts against state repression — by peace groups, Amnesty International, Campaign Against the Arms Trade and numerous others — rely entirely on nonviolent methods. On the other hand, many liberation movements have sought to oppose state repression by including armed struggle in their repertoire of methods. The question arises, can nonviolent methods alone be successful? Alternatively, does the use of violence create the seeds of future repression by the armed liberators? Maduabuchi Dukor in his article takes the view that, in a country such as Nigeria, nonviolent methods are often ineffective whereas riots have actually changed government policies. This is a contentious issue which needs to be regularly addressed both by proponents of nonviolence and by those who accept some use of violence against state repression.

Whether the opposition to state repression is violent or nonviolent, there is no doubt that the resisters will commonly be confronted by violence on the part of the state. That is, of course, the essence of state repression. One of the most challenging questions is

what to do if a government undertakes massive killing in order to subdue its opponents.

Gene Keyes emphasises the importance of this question in his paper on heavy casualties and nonviolent defence. He shows, through citation of classic works in the field, that leading writers on nonviolent defence have avoided or downplayed the issue of heavy casualties. His analysis is not an attack on nonviolent defence. After all, the issue of heavy casualties should be even more acute for advocates of guerrilla warfare, though it is discussed just as rarely. Rather, Keyes plays the role of the sympathetic critic who raises the most difficult issues. For readers who are not familiar with the concept of nonviolent defence, I have provided a short introduction to his article.

In addition to material on resisting state repression, in this issue there is an article by Valentine Bazhanov on corruption in the higher levels of Soviet science. Bazhanov describes how some people are able to obtain high degrees not on the basis of their work but on the basis of connections. He calls this phenomenon 'shadow science'. This sort of corruption is known also in other countries, but has received remarkably little public attention.

I will conclude this introduction by mentioning some other initiatives against state repression. Probably best known of all organisations campaigning against repression is Amnesty International. It is most well known for its letter-writing campaigns to governments in support of prisoners of conscience. But at least as important are Amnesty's research efforts and documentation of abuses of human rights throughout the world. This work has great impact because of its high degree of accuracy, its non-partisan commitment to exposing repression due to governments of all political complexions, and its strong network of local groups. Amnesty's brief is limited to only certain types of action, but its impact extends much further, since activists inside and outside Amnesty often rely on Amnesty's reports for information and are stimulated by its exposure of human rights abuses.

A more direct form of intervention is taken by Peace Brigades International. PBI trains teams of nonviolent intervenors, who travel to places of intense conflict such as Guatemala and Sri Lanka. There, they may attempt to apply conflict resolution techniques, accompany people threatened by violence, or simply seek to inhibit violence by their calm presence.²

In addition to the approaches of Amnesty and PBI, there is great scope for people in one country, to oppose repression in another country. Methods that can be used for this purpose include publicising the issue, organising consumer boycotts, promoting trade union boycotts of shipments of goods, communicating with resisters in

other countries (through the post, short-wave radio or personal contact), providing haven for refugees and refusing to be a tourist. Organised actions of this sort have been taken in the case of some countries, such as South Africa. Currently there are attempts to set up networks to foster more systematically this sort of action in other parts of the world.³

Since Western governments frequently support repressive regimes in other parts of the world, these same Western governments commonly use surveillance and harassment against home-grown activists, including those who oppose repression in client regimes. A very useful manual for opposing such surveillance and harassment is Brian Glick's book *War at Home*.⁴ It documents covert action by the US government against activists in the US and, more importantly, offers commonsense guidelines for response.

I mentioned earlier that, in response to my queries about how to oppose the technology of repression, the most useful suggestions were from Robert Irwin. Irwin is the author of *Building a Peace System*⁵ and other writings, and an experienced practitioner and analyst of nonviolent action. He began by emphasising the need to categorise the problem. For example, there is the problem of stopping summary executions, the problem of encouraging noncooperation among those who maintain or retrieve records on "subversives", and the problem of stopping exports of repressive technologies. Another set of categories involves technologies: for destruction, torture, surveillance, propaganda, etc. A convenient set of categories is a solid beginning for examining solutions.

Irwin also suggested a range of references and ideas, for example on liberatory or convivial technology and on methods of nonviolent action that involve the use of technology. Finally, he suggested that the weakest link in the technology of repression can sometimes be the people who use it. In such cases, winning them over is a crucial task.

In my opinion, one of the most encouraging initiatives in recent years is the founding of PIOOM in the Netherlands. PIOOM stands for Project Interdisciplinair Onderzoek naar Oorzaken van Mensenrechtenschendingen. In English, this means Interdisciplinary Research Project on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations. PIOOM was set up in 1988 at the Center for the Study of Social Conflicts, University of Leiden, The Netherlands,⁶ to undertake and promote research and analysis into gross human rights violations. One of the key figures in this operation is Alex P. Schmid, who has carried out penetrating research into the possibilities and limitations of nonviolent struggle.

The work at PIOOM is exciting because it goes beyond the usual documentation of the problems and also because it avoids the unrealistic optimism found in many activist circles. There are enough

possible research projects in this area to keep a large research team occupied for years.⁷

But, of course, research on state repression is not an end in itself. Analyses such as those carried out at PIOOM need to be linked to a programme of action. That is something that everyone should be able to be involved in:

This issue of *Philosophy and Social Action* is a small contribution towards the big issue of resisting state violence. It will serve its purpose well if it encourages further research, writing and social action against state repression.

NOTES

- 1 Some representative publications: Richard Falk, *Revolutionaries and Functionaries: The Dual Face of Terrorism* (New York: Dutton, 1988); Ted Robert Gurr, "War, revolution, and the growth of the coercive state", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1988, pp. 45-65; Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda* (Boston: South End Press, 1982); Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (eds.), *Low-intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties* (New York: Pantheon, 1988); Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez (eds.), *The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1984).
- 2 Peace Brigades International, International Office, Woolman Hill, Keets Road, Deerfield MA 01342, USA.
- 3 For more information, contact Schweik Action Wollongong, PO Box 492, Wollongong East NSW 2520, Australia.
- 4 Brian Glick, *War at Home: Covert Action against U.S. Activists and What We Can Do about It* (Boston: South End Press, 1989).
- 5 Robert A. Irwin, *Building a Peace System* (Washington, DC: ExPro Press, 1989). He can be contacted c/o Sociology Department, Brandeis University, Waltham MA 02254, USA.
- 6 PIOOM, c/o COMT, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden, The Netherlands.
- 7 Alex P. Schmid, *Research on Gross Human Rights Violations: A Programme* (Leiden: Center for the Study of Social Conflicts, University of Leiden, second edition, 1989).

Article 19 Publications available :

INFORMATION, FREEDOM AND CENSORSHIP : THE ARTICLE 19 WORLD REPORT 1988 (London : Longman, 1988; New York, Times Books, 1988) £ 16.95.

BULLETIN : The ARTICLE 19 Newsletter. Published 6 times per year. Free to Members

JOURNALISM UNDER OCCUPATION : ISRAEL'S REGULATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PRESS (The Committee to Protect Journalists and ARTICLE 19, New York 1988) £ 4.95.

IN THE SHADOW OF BUENDIA : CENSORSHIP AND THE MASS MEDIA IN MEXICO (ARTICLE 19, New York 1989) £ 4.95

THE YEAR OF THE LIE : CENSORSHIP AND DISINFORMATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1989 (ARTICLE 19, London 1989) £ 3.95

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A State of Siege: Repression and Cultural Emasculation in Kenya

Kenji Mbingu

The incorporation of Kenya into the global economy and the imposition of European cultural values could not have taken place without the application of force by the British through the colonial state. The coercive apparatus of the state utilizing the British forces and collaborative Africans often used naked violence against the local populace when and if it refused to "cooperate". There is no doubt that without repression classical colonialism would never have succeeded in Kenya. Repression by the state becomes important to maintain the *status quo* — the whole gamut of economic, social, political and *cultural* values. Without it, the cultural emasculation of a people is impossible.

Nowhere in Africa did the masses of the people fully accept or welcome colonialism and the cultural ramifications that went with it. For instance, Kenyan history is punctuated with all forms of popular protest and resistance throughout the colonial period. The heroic *Mau Mau* struggle waged by the workers and peasants of that country to regain freedom and land climaxed resistance to colonial rule in Kenya. The combatant wing of the *Mau Mau*, the Kenya Land Freedom Army, inflicted substantial damage on the colonial state and by weakening it forced the British to realize that the sun was setting fast on that portion of their empire. With nationalism sweeping across the colonies, the British started to groom local leaders to whom they would *hand over* colonies intact as "independent nations". The late Harold Macmillan, the then British prime minister who presided over the disintegration of the British Empire, lamented local nationalism in the famous "Winds of change" speech in 1960. Speaking in Cape Town, South Africa, the prime minister talked about the need to coopt African nationalists and keep them away from communism.¹ Sir Andrew Cohen, the one-time Head of the African Department of the Colonial Office, also urged cooperation with nationalists by "guiding" their energies into "constructive" channels. According to him, nationalists were the greatest bulwarks against Marxism in Africa.² Cooperation with liberation movements would keep them friendly to the

western world so that, once independent, they would remain within the western sphere of influence.³

The need to "guide" and control the nationalist movements became extremely important: thus, the movements came under the influence of the western world and objectively worked hand in glove with it. In Kenya, the British cultivated the two largest political parties (KANU and KADU) after the disorganization of the more radical *Mau Mau*. Constitutional conferences between western governments and the political parties were then arranged in London or Paris to make sure that the friendly movements would retain the colonial social and economic systems once they were allowed to sit at the high table. All these conferences came out with constitutions which, in essence, guaranteed the retention of the colonial social and economic fabric. The Western European powers ensured a smooth transition from colonialism to flag independence. The "independent state" did not undergo any fundamental transformation: all the social, economic and political institutions that linked the colonial state to the west were left firmly in place. Students of African history have observed that:

Flag independence was only legal but not economic. Therefore, independence made no change, it signalled a continuity and entrenchment, the changing of personnel comprising government. It was a tactical withdrawal of direct control by the real dominant class — the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The colonial bureaucracy was withdrawn and a neo-colonial petty-bourgeoisie took its place as the "watchdogs" or the "caretaker committee" if you would like to call them. A necessary adjunct to this changing of "guards" is that politics were transferred from Westminster to Dar-es-Salaam.⁴

The "independent" governments retained the colonial state machinery and the colonial legal structures; effectively the economic structures remained the same: an export-oriented economy based on the production of raw materials was stressed. There was little industrialization and even that was not industrialization proper as it was mere import-substitution. The economies were now open to foreign economic interests, which have on many occasions been at odds with national priorities. *Underdevelopment* and *dependency* thus became the lot of many of the emergent states. This is the phenomenon referred to by Nkrumah as neo-colonialism in which outward trappings of sovereignty do not tell the whole story of economic bondage.⁵ In 1976 in a celebrated speech, the former Tanzanian President described to a convocation at Ibadan University the "meaning" and "practice" of neo-colonialism.⁶

The Kenyan state, under the governorship of the late Jomo Kenyatta, provided (and still does) a classic study of neo-colonialism. Upon his release from detention in 1961, just before he ascended to the

throne, Kenyatta assured the foreign business community that the African government would respect and maintain the structures then in place; he appealed for calm promising that this would not be a "gangster" government that would not respect private property.⁷ If any doubts remain about the aspirations of the independent Kenyan state, let us allow the first Kenyan African Minister for Finance, the late James Gichuru, speak for it:

I have said before, and I have no doubt I shall say it again, how much importance this government attaches to new investment, and if any doubts still remain I believe that new measures under consideration (legislative guarantees for foreign investment) will make even the most skeptical potential investor realize how much we indeed welcome any project which genuinely contributes to our economic well-being . . . You do not have to go far in Nairobi today to become aware of people in our society, with new tastes, frequently with the money to satisfy them, and themselves creating a demand among their fellows for the better things of life — in fact creating a new market. This development will not be confined to Nairobi. At the same time I hear too frequently of the inadequacy of our distribution system, or the cost of reaching much of the potential market, and incidentally stimulating consumer demands and setting in train the urge "to keep up with the Joneses" which can contribute so much to our productivity. I suggest that the best way of making good these deficiencies is through the African businessman.⁸

The Minister in question here was addressing the settler and foreign business community in Kenya. In a nutshell his speech left no doubt that the colonial economic policies would be continued into the new era; that the "new" state would receive as many investors as cared to invest; that the state would endeavor to create a large consumer market for manufactured goods; that the distribution system would be improved; and finally that the state would pass the necessary legislation to protect aliens and their property. His speech contained only one demand — if one can even call it that — that African businessmen should be allowed more access into the distribution system. This "demand" for the inclusion of the African businessman into distribution represented an attempt by the emergent state to create an African elite that would benefit itself from association with multinational corporations. It is this fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie which, through its marriage with foreign capital, continues to facilitate the exploitation of the working people of Kenya through underdevelopment and dependency.

How then does underdevelopment relate to cultural issues? In what ways is an underdeveloped society like Kenya culturally dependent and emasculated? Governing classes in underdeveloped

societies live in the image of their creators, powerful western economic concerns. Their ideology — be it economic, political or cultural — is predicated upon the reproduction, albeit in crude forms, of the values of their masters. Educational systems, religious institutions, theater and drama are usually poor imitations of western standards. This is what governing classes impose on the general populace. Individual members of these societies have no choice but to live within the "legitimate" bounds of these values as defined by the state. Non-compliance is usually defined as "failure" or simply outlawed. Some forms of cultural domination are obvious whereas others may be subtle. I remember how as a kid I was addicted to Pepsi which I thought was a great Kenyan drink! Or how the names Jane or David sounded so normal to my African ears. Even being bedecked in a three-piece suit in sometimes steaming sun! Or how we used to read English pieces of literature about winter and the snow. All these are cultural values which are imported and in subtle ways forced upon the people. These images of self on the part of Kenyans have produced a citizenry that is receptive to even the most undesirable western cultural values. Any attempt to question these values or their socio-economic bases is met with brutal repression by the state. In Kenya the state has played a crucial role in suppressing popular and authentic attempts by the people to shake off the yoke of cultural dependency and evolve values that reflect the harsh conditions of their existence. To this development we now turn.

Like any other dictator, President Daniel arap Moi uses iron and blood to suppress human rights in Kenya. Western human rights organizations and the media have done their part in exposing the violations of basic freedoms going on there. In 1987, when Moi made an official trip to Washington the American media greeted him with documented cases of these blatant abuses. I shall now attempt to establish how state repression stifles the evolution of genuine and authentic popular cultural values.

The curtailment of basic freedoms and the general suppression of the people by unpopular regimes cannot be divorced from the domination and exploitation of the people by foreign capital in alliance with local elites. One more "fallout" from this marriage has been the ruthless and systemic suppression of the people by the ruling cliques, as these regimes have desperately tried to remain in control and create appearances of *stability* which is essential and crucial for the reception of foreign capital. Governing classes through the use state, power and backed up by the coercive apparatus — the armed forces, the courts, etc. — strive to suppress the aspirations of the people for a better *lifestyle* and *self-identity*.

At the base of the repression and the denial of basic democratic rights is the struggle to maintain the *status quo*. Such regimes do not,

and cannot have, a popular base in the people, hence the use of totalitarian and repressive methods to maintain and perpetuate the exploitation of the working people. Instruments of state power, which are at the disposal of those who govern, have therefore been employed unsparingly to safeguard the existing conditions. Those who have dared to criticize government development strategies and political choices have found themselves behind bars or have been denied the means to a professional livelihood. In some cases struggles for power between the governing factions have escalated to the countryside causing floods of refugees. Those who have remained inside the country, intimidated by the power of the state, exploited and hungry, have been disorganized. In these dire circumstances a *culture of silence* and *muted acceptance* of the powers that be have become the norm. At the level of socialization, the mass media and the educational system continue to imbue the people with false hopes while justifying their conditions of existence.

The local agents of foreign capital, themselves benefactors of the system, have left no stone unturned in stifling the people's consciousness. It is true that when these states have felt seriously threatened, they have resorted to the use of naked violence to suppress the people, but less visible, and equally effective, has been the use of legislative processes and the single party machinery to impose their will on the people under ostensibly legitimate auspices and the "general good of all."

The general picture painted above for emergent nations applies to Kenya as I shall presently endeavor to show. When Kenya became independent in 1963, it inherited intact all the structures — economic, political, legal and cultural — of the colonial state. The transition from colonialism to flag independence was remarkably smooth. Different sectors of the society expected the new era to bring with it social, economic and political benefits for the African population. But not all sectors agreed on how these benefits would be created, let alone shared. Among the petty-bourgeoisie within the ruling party, KANU, two distinct viewpoints emerged. While both factions basically agreed on the "appropriateness" of a free market economy, they nevertheless disagreed on the manner in which benefits would be distributed and the degree and pace of indigenization of the economy. There were those (represented in the persons of Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia) who favored sweeping nationalizations and strict constraints on foreign capital, and others (headed by Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya) who advocated an unrestricted "open door policy" and the *gradual assimilation* of African businessmen into certain sectors of the economy, particularly in agriculture, commerce and transportation. Simply put, KANU was divided between the more radical, nationalist elements and the more collaborative comprador faction. The

compradorial faction which in the main controlled the ruling party was favored from the very beginning in this conflict and, as William Atwood, the American Ambassador to Kenya at the time, tells it, adopted all manner of tactics and tricks to elbow out and discredit the nationalists.⁹

The struggle for supremacy within the party continued until 1966, when Odinga resigned and formed the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU). The KPU, which constituted the official opposition in parliament, soon published its manifesto and attacked government policies which promoted a small privileged class of Africans. It deplored foreign control of the economy and called for nationalization and land redistribution.¹⁰ Thereafter the party began to attack and expose the practices of multinational corporations. By addressing issues of landlessness, widespread poverty and the domination of the country by foreign capital, the KPU struck a familiar chord in the dispossessed masses and drew widespread support. The state felt threatened and resorted to tactics of terror and repression. KPU officials were generally harassed and jailed. The state employed the ideology of tribalism, describing the KPU as a "tribal" organization whose support, it argued, was mainly among the Luo people. The issues the KPU raised were trivialized and painted as parochial, tribal, irrelevant and anti-development. At this time the state started to show signs of increased reliance on coercion to suppress dissent among those who questioned foreign capital and the state's development strategies. In this volatile and confrontational atmosphere, Kenyatta visited Odinga's region in 1969. What came to pass is *indelibly* imprinted in the minds of Kenyans:

The centerpiece of the visit was the opening ceremony of a hospital. The crowd was hostile and when Kenyatta in his speech launched a bitter and offensive attack on Odinga, who was present, the atmosphere became extremely tense. As Kenyatta's car left, the crowd pressed toward it; his body-guard fired into the people, killing ten and wounding seventy. Five days later the KPU was banned and all its major leaders detained.¹¹

The banning of the KPU marked the end of official opposition, making Kenya a *de facto* one party state. This marked the disintegration of liberal democracy which the British had attempted to impose on Kenya after their physical withdrawal. In 1982, amidst the talk of the formation of another party by Odinga and other Kenyans, the state amended the constitution, declared KANU the sole political party and institutionalized Kenya as a *de jure* one party state.

The erosion of basic liberal democratic rights like free speech, the right of assembly and association and the accumulation of enormous power by the state has been so total that members of parliament have

had to think twice before speaking up in the "august" house. The state has not hesitated to detain them when they have "spoken out of turn."

The Kenyan parliament which in the past had been given some credit for being vocal has become a rubber stamp for unpopular government policies. The latest example of the nature of the parliament captured international attention in August 1988 when it approved, without debate, two troubling constitutional amendments. The first amendment extended from 24 hours to 14 days the period during which the police may detain those suspected of committing capital offenses incommunicado without recourse to judicial scrutiny. The second amendment removed security of tenure from senior judges and from the members of the Public Service Commission, which is responsible for the appointment and discipline of civil servants. The subordination of the parliament to the executive has become so total that only *sycophantic candidates can be elected*. To insure this the government introduced the "queuing" elections requirement. During the February 1988 party nominations to contest national parliamentary elections in March, party members were required to indicate their preference by publicly standing behind photographs of the nominee of their choice. The same procedure was used in September during the elections of KANU officials at the local and district levels. This measure — ending secret ballot — had the effect of intimidating voters who were supporting candidates critical of party and government policies. None of the parliamentarians who previously had been critical of government or party policies was re-elected.

Since 1976 vocal members of parliament have been regularly detained or forced into lonely exile. Some, like J. M. Kariuki, the populist representative, have not been that lucky: they have been assassinated. Apart from parliamentarians, the other organized social group — the working people — has long been muzzled through the government-sanctioned Central Organization of Trade Unions, the sole and official trade union. Any other vocal expression of discontent in the form of rallies and "unlawful assemblies" is likely to be dealt with by the General Service Unit, a mobile paramilitary force, which has been employed constantly to coerce university students, remove squatters and deal with all forms of opposition. This leaves the peasantry and the progressive intelligentsia.

The position of the peasantry, who constitute the bulk of the nation's populace, is well known and unenviable. Relegated to an underdeveloped and deteriorating countryside, they are only useful to the state as long as they produce crops for export and provide a market for consumer goods. Impoverished and disorganized, they constitute the silent majority which produces to support the elite while the remainder of their surplus is exported abroad. At present, these poor souls carry the country on their tired backs as the corrupt and

exploitative governing class continues to marginalize their existence. In the meantime, they watch on, trying to perform the miracle of five loaves and two fishes. Theirs is a *culture of survival*, in disappointed resignation and silence. Every now and then they burst into acts of animated and confrontational protest, but they lack the organizational skills to articulate and coherently channel their grievances in a manner that would present a credible challenge to the neo-colonial state.

The progressive intelligentsia in Kenya has, however, remained a thorn in the flesh of the repressive state. Over the years the institution of the university has proved to be an important forum for discussion both by teachers and students of important national issues and government policies. Under the rather thin cloak of academic freedom students, a great number of whom have rural, peasant and working class origins, have criticized government policies, called attention to the control of the economy by foreigners and suggested that reforms — and sometimes fundamental changes — are badly needed. In a country where criticism of the state is taboo and intolerable, students and teachers have refused to be completely silenced, choosing instead to lock horns with the powers that be. During these countless popular struggles against the state, students have had to face the coercive apparatus of the state. Expulsions and some killings of students have been reported in the past. One of the latest victims of the harsh treatment that the government metes out to critical students was Titus Adungosi, who died of serious hemorrhaging stomach ulcers in January 1989. Adungosi, a former university student leader, was serving a ten-year jail sentence imposed after his conviction on charges arising from the 1982 abortive coup attempt. The government had charged Adungosi and numerous other university students of meeting with members of the Kenya Air Force, who attempted the failed coup. The state usually blames these popular protests, which are rooted in the country's material conditions, on foreign ideologies and cultures, which is a euphemism for Marxism. The truth of the matter is the student struggles are not inspired by foreigners or Marxism, but seek to address the problems of dictatorship, underdevelopment, cultural dependency and state unaccountability.

University professors who are progressive or critical have not been spared either. The cases of Ngugi wa Thiong'o and many others who have been forced into exile because of daring to tell it like it is, are well known. Since the attempted coup of 1982, the university has come under close *scrutiny* and *supervision* from the state and the last pretensions of academic freedom and honesty have been discarded. Even the press, which was never free or progressive anyway, has been silenced. Writing on the aftermath of the 1982 abortive coup attempt

(brought on by contradictions within the governing clique) Ngugi wa Thiong'o had this to say:

The August 1 attempted coup came as a God-sent opportunity for the regime to root out and silence its critics. The same pattern of repression it had embarked upon has since been intensified and accelerated. More lecturers and students and critical politicians have been arrested; detained without trial or else imprisoned in the same dubious legal circumstances. More students have been killed. Many Kenyan Air Force members were killed or imprisoned after the coup attempt was crushed. Now American and British Royal Air Force personnel fly Kenyan planes. More American and British advisers have been added to the neocolonial think-tank of the regime.¹²

In 1986 the state uncovered what is alleged was an underground political movement called *Mwakenya*¹³ which was planning to overthrow it. Another spate of arrests, trials and outright detentions of teachers, lawyers, students, workers and even peasants started and, as of this writing, these acts of repression are still going on. In 1987 a law lecturer at the University of Nairobi, Gibson Kamau Kuria, was detained for nine months the day after he announced a suit on behalf of individuals who claimed to have been tortured by the government while in detention. Following his detention in 1987, Kuria had his passport withdrawn, effectively preventing him from traveling. In 1988, the government refused to return it to him, thereby preventing him from coming to the United States to accept several human rights awards, including the Lawyers Committee's Third Annual Human Rights Award in October and the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Award in November 1988.¹⁴ Kuria's lawyer, Paul Muite, who received the Kennedy Award on his behalf, also had his passport confiscated upon his return to Kenya in November. The significance of the government's harassment of Kuria and Muite and other lawyers (some, like Mirugi Kariuki¹⁵ and Wanyiri Kihoro,¹⁶ have been in detention since 1986 without charge or trial) is testimony to the state's restriction of political and civil liberties. In Kuria's case, the state could not even tolerate honest legal representation!

The effect of state repression on the people has been to create a terrorized population which lives in fear, unable to *freely create* its own cultural values out of its conditions of existence. A culture of fear and silence reigns supreme. State repression extends to activities by the people which seek to re-educate and correctly re-interpret history from the point of view of those who live it. Any attempt by the people to understand and express their social conditions of existence is perceived as seditious or treasonous by the state because it would depict their impoverishment under the current regime. The Kamiriithu Educational and Cultural Center situated in Kiambu raised

alarm in government because it was the theater through which local people would perform and act out plays and songs which they had written about their existence. The themes of these plays and songs were deemed subversive and dangerous. The state responded by demolishing the structure:

On March 12, 1982, the regime sent three truckloads of armed policemen to Kamiriithu Community and Education Centre and razed the Open Air Theater to the ground. Kamiriithu Open Air Theater was built by the peasants and workers of the village. The day before, March 11, 1982, the regime had de-registered Kamiriithu Education and Cultural Centre and banned all drama and theater activities in the area.¹⁷

This naked state brutality and repressive practice has muzzled nearly all popular and democratic efforts by the people to realize and understand themselves. In contrast the Kenya National Theatre and the cultural centers of foreign missions continue to stage plays and events which are either alien or trivial and do not address the crucial issues facing the country. These do so without state interference; in fact approving government officials are often found in the audience.

Over the last decade, autocracy has been on the rise in Kenya. Surrounded by an increasingly impoverished population but determined to maintain political stability in order to attract more foreign capital, Kenya has become a police state. Howard E. Wolpe, a member of the United States House of Representatives, while on a two-day visit to Kenya in January 1987, noticed increased totalitarianism on the part of the state:

Wolpe said he saw evidence during his two-day stay in Kenya of a "drastic increase in intimidation of individuals in Kenya who may be critical of government policies." Wolpe said meetings scheduled for the weekend with church leaders, development organizations and a member of parliament were either called off or broken up at the last minute by "state interference."¹⁸

An aide travelling with Wolpe recounted how a clergyman who is critical of the Kenya government was pulled aside by a plainclothes police officer while talking to Wolpe and warned that "it was not in the interest of the state to continue the meeting."¹⁹ The point here is that even a casual visitor unfamiliar with the terrain, like a United States Congressman, could not but notice the climate of fear fostered by the state. If the Kenyan state can dare restrict the freedom of association of a United States Congressman (particularly given the strong US presence there), what will it not do against its own citizenry?

Under these adverse circumstances the bulk of the Kenyan population has been unable to evolve cultural values which reflect the strains and stresses of its existence. In the place of authentic cultural values, cultural dependency (reflecting the dependent nature of the

state) has been fostered by the governing class. It is thus acceptable to gyrate to the "Coca-Cola Culture" and "break-dance" but it is illegitimate to write songs about the heroic struggles of the *Mau Mau* or to write literature that reflects and depicts our dependency in most spheres of life. Such is the impact of state repression on culture in Kenya today.

To sum up, in most African countries, and Kenya is not an exception, there is a great deal of talk about *African culture* by the state. This is evidenced by the presence of a Minister for Culture in almost every African cabinet. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. The talk of "African culture" by African leaders has been used to legitimate and validate unpopular and repressive regimes. In rejecting the applicability of "alien" economic models to Tanzania, the state, under the governorship of Julius Nyerere, resorted to *Ujamaa*, a philosophy that held that African cultures and traditions were *socialistic* by nature. This philosophy denied the existence or evolution of social classes in Africa and provided that *African*, and not *scientific*, socialism would be constructed in Tanzania. As Mohamed Babu²⁰ and countless other scholars have shown, African socialism or Kenneth Kaunda's humanism are simple apologia for economic dependency.

In Kenya, in 1965, the state passed Sessional Paper No. 10 which was described by the late Kenyatta as Kenya's economic Bible! In validating Kenya's unregulated free enterprise system, the paper rejected the applicability of Marxism to Africa and promised to build African socialism. Here too there was talk of African culture and traditions knowing no social class. When one considers the title of the Paper — "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya" — and then ponders its central thesis, one must wonder what was African or socialist about it. Essentially it reads like blueprint for the legitimation and validation of the incorporation of Kenya into the global economy. It represented the local articulation by the governing class of its surrogate and client status. It heralded, under the guise of promoting African cultural values, the ideological maturity of Kenya as a neocolonial state. The validation of political and economic policies under the cloak of African culture is but one of the many uses that African states have made to justify economic, political and social policies.

What, then, is left of African culture under these circumstances? Frankly, not much. The Minister for Culture has reduced the meaning of African culture to only include "traditional" dancing troupes who either perform for state officials (in particular the President) or visiting foreign dignitaries. The *Bomas of Kenya* (institutionalized "traditional" dancers) form the nucleus of "African culture" in Kenya

today. Concerned Kenyans have bitterly assailed this fossilization of culture in the following words:

A national culture is not something static, for display only. It is not a fossilized museum piece. Instead, it must be seen as a dynamic process, involving *people* and their creative capacities. What we call culture is the representation of the meaning and values which people give to life and society. It is produced by a complex reciprocal relationship between the community and its entire environment — physical, social and political. It is something vital: a living, ever-changing process of self discovery.²¹

State limitation on cultural growth is also fostered by the state-owned *Voice of Kenya* (VOK) radio and television which has been in the forefront of "westernizing" the tastes of the Kenyan public. Apart from being the media by which the public is tantalized and mesmerized by manufactured goods (both local and foreign) through advertisements, the VOK decides what the public will listen to by virtue of monopoly. The two most important VOK radio stations (the English Language General Service and the Kiswahili National Service) banned music in so-called vernacular languages from getting airtime. Music in African languages (Kenyan except Kiswahili) will only be played in the vernacular service in this "fight against tribalism".²² It must be stated that tribalism was not created through music and the banning of local music will not eradicate it. Tribalism as a phenomenon was a creation of the colonial policy of "divide and rule" which emergent states regimes have continued to utilize to keep the people divided. It was used to, for example, discredit the KPU. This suppression of popular local music by the state must be seen as yet another mechanism of denying the people all the options of expression in languages they understand well. It is another nail in the coffin of popular culture. This move also means that foreign music (namely English and American) will receive more airtime. This in turn will bring about deeper cultural dependency and emasculation.

In taking all these measures, the state does not bat an eyelid. Filling the airwaves with Boy George, Michael Jackson, Bruce Springsteen, banning tunes in national languages and outlawing "Solid Gold" in the name of African culture, while promoting Coca-Cola, Ngong Horse races, Johnson Baby Shampoo and Toyota makes a mockery of African culture. But I guess cultural emasculation and state repression go hand in hand.

NOTES

1 Harold Macmillan, Speech to the House of Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa, 3 February 1960.

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- 2 Sir Andrew Cohen, *British Policy in Changing Africa* (London, 1959), p. 61.
 - 3 *Ibid.*, p. 114.
 - 4 Odeke and Panduka, "Can Law Bring Social Change", *University of Dar-es-Salaam Law Journal*, Volume 7, April 1978, p. 174.
 - 5 See Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (London: Nelson, 1965).
 - 6 *Daily News*, 17 November 1976.
 - 7 Jomo Kenyatta, *Suffering Without Bitterness* (Nairobi: EAPH, 1968), p. 147.
 - 8 Speech to the Nairobi Chamber of Congress, 28 October 1963, NCC files, quoted in Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism* (London: Heinemann, 1975), pp. 61-62.
 - 9 See generally William Atwood, *The Reds and the Blacks* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).
 - 10 Leys, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-225.
 - 11 *Ibid.*, p. 1.
 - 12 Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Barrel of a Pen: Resistance to Repression in Neo-Colonial Kenya* (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1983), p. 2.
 - 13 Mwakenya stands for Muungano wa Wazalendo wa Kukomboa Kenya (Union of Patriots for the Liberation of Kenya).
 - 14 Kuria fled the country in July 1990. He is in exile in the United States.
 - 15 Kariuki was released in 1989. He was rearrested in October 1990 and charged with high treason. He is in prison awaiting trial.
 - 16 Kihoro was released in 1989. He fled the country in 1991 and is now in exile in London.
 - 17 *Ibid.*, p. 1.
 - 18 *Boston Globe*, 22 January 1987, p. 5.
 - 19 *Ibid.*
 - 20 Mohamed Babu, *African Socialism or Socialist Africa?* (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1981).
 - 21 Journal of African Marxists, *In/Dependent Kenya* (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 69.
 - 22 *Weekly Review*, 13 February 1987, p. 27.

Scientific Knowledge in Controversy

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Brian Martin

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Humor as a political force, or how to open the eyes of ordinary people in social democratic countries

Jörgen Johansen

One form of state violence is punishment and imprisonment of opponents of the state. This is a case study, described by one of the participants, from a country which is always eager to criticize inhuman treatment in other parts of the world.

Norway is one of the most democratic countries in the world. No matter which definition you use, no states have the combination of democratic freedoms and rights as do the Nordic countries. That has some very important implications.

Background

First of all it is easy to believe that the struggle for democracy could end when a country is "on the top of the list". But that is not at all the case. The struggle has gone on the last four hundred years with two main characteristics: nonviolence and civil disobedience. The Norwegian history of the development of democracy is exceptionally free from violence. The few cases involving violence you can find are situations when the groups demanding freedom and democratic rights were met by armed forces, not vice versa. Through nonviolent actions and disobeying the law when the law was found to be unfair, the people in opposition have, step by step, taken the path to the relatively democratic system we have today.

The second implication is that the social security system and high wages have created an overflow of material goods. People who are "drugged" with Volvos, videos, spiritually "empty" weekly magazines, hamburgers and American soap operas do not care to struggle for others and cannot see the need to fight for a meaningful life for themselves. Like alcoholics, their main interest is to ensure their access to more of their drug.

One reason why Norway has a leading position is the miserable situation in the rest of the world. In a social democratic country the majority always gets its way. But the parliamentary system doesn't give any power to minorities. Homosexuals, the Samic people (the native

people living in the north of the country) and those who refuse to accept any form of conscription are examples of groups which have few if any possibilities to let their voices penetrate the wall of the decision-making bodies. These individuals and groups still have to fight for their human rights. No one in the parliament speaks on their behalf and there is no other group supporting them.

Until few years ago, Samic children were forbidden to speak their own language at school. Homosexuals still have problems in getting jobs. Total resisters get 16 months in prison without a trial.

Total resisters

I will in the following pages concentrate on the small, but growing, group of total resisters in Norway and their struggle to get their demands recognized as fair.

Total resisters are persons who refuse to accept any form of conscription. Even in the cases in which they are offered the opportunity to do civil service outside the army they refuse to accept that service. The reasons for their stands vary, but most of the resisters look at the system of conscription as having the main function of creating discipline. From that point of view it doesn't matter if the system includes weapons or not. They refuse to serve a modern form of slavery or accept a hard labor camp.

Their behavior has always been and still is a threat to the power of the state. If people refuse to do as they are told the parliamentarians will lose their power. In order to secure their obedience the Parliament passed a new law in 1965 stating that individuals who refused civil service should "serve their service in a special camp or in an institution under the administration of the Prison Authorities". The special camp is only accepted by members of Jehovah's Witnesses. They serve 16 months there. All the other total resisters "serve their service in an institution under the administration of the Prison Authorities". That is a somewhat complicated way to say that they have to go to prison.

The reason for this way of doing it is the unwillingness to accept that Norway has political prisoners. By defining the imprisonment as "serving the civilian service" they avoid the terms "punishment", "prisoner" and "trial". The state hopes that the image will hide the reality.

In practical terms the individual who refuses is called up to a court. The judge asks if he¹ is the right person and if he really refuses to do any form of service. When that ceremony is over it is up to the

1 In Norway as in all countries with a system of compulsory conscription, except Israel, only men are called up.

Department of Justice to send him to prison for 16 months. He is never accused of anything, and whatever he or his lawyer says, the result is always the same. He is not called a prisoner or even a criminal! What he does is not illegal! The Government just makes sure that he does his service, if not by free will, then by locking him up. The prosecutor has quite an easy job in these cases. In the beginning of the eighties they even began to stay in their offices during the trial. Whatever happened the result always was 16 months in prison.

Every other prisoner has done something illegal. The total resister only serves his duty. Since many of the total resisters in Norway are anarchists they often tell the joke that anarchists in this country have to sit 16 months in prison as a duty to the government. Other prisoners in Norway normally get out after 2/3 of their sentence. Total resisters, since they are not prisoners, don't get that early release.

Since the law was passed in 1965 very few individuals refused conscription. Just a handful was known when the Campaign Against Conscription (KMOV)² was started in 1981. The group was a small minority of war resisters in Norway who themselves were a minority of those undertaking national service. No one outside the very inner circle knew anything of their situation or their demands. Even among war resisters, knowledge of the situation of total resisters was almost nonexistent. Among the political left the demands for a better civil service and for the abolition of the "test" of each individual conscience were well known, but few had ever heard of those who refused the whole system.

Laughter as a tactic

A group of 20 individuals, most of them anarchists and critics of parliamentary democracy, had the task of putting total resisters on the agenda of the majority of parliamentarians in Norway. What to do? Few know about their existence, even fewer would ever support their case. They were sent to prison after a short trial with no possibility to defend themselves.

The Norwegian media are eager to write headlines on spectacular actions. But their willingness to inform people about *why* the actions are done is not on the same level. Journalists in the evening papers look at information as an evil that is hardly necessary; their main interest is to write articles which will sell well.

Activists in KMOV knew that they could do actions which would be spectacular enough to create headlines on the front pages, but how could they combine this with information? If the message on how total

2 Kampanjen Mot Verneplik

resisters are treated did not come through, the actions would be meaningless.

One of the few topics of interest in the media, besides sex and violence, is entertainment. People living a typical western lifestyle are willing to pay for excitement and laughter. Could radical political questions create the same interest as conventional entertainment? Would it be possible to use humor as a political force? Could information be spread and a debate started by getting people to laugh at the crazy system of treating total resisters in Norway?

In 1983 lawyer Öyvind Solberg was called to the City Court in Oslo for refusing to do his civil service. As one of his friends I was asked if I could help him to use the case to promote a discussion on total resistance. The idea Öyvind had was to impersonate the prosecutor. As mentioned earlier the prosecutors now and then didn't appear in the Court, mainly because they were not needed there. Whatever happened during the trial the result was the same: 16 months in prison.

The plan was for me to dress like a prosecutor and to tell the judge that I came because the "accused" was a lawyer. We wanted to use a video camera in order to make a documentary of the action and on how the opposition are treated in Norway. What looked like a normal trial was just a play where everyone knew the result. If the State wanted to play, we wanted to take part on our own conditions!

We wanted to show the country the illusion of justice in these cases. We planned to "wake" the people by laughter and make them to think about what they saw. We hoped to get a balance of spectacular play and political arguments in order to, via headlines, put the whole question of conscription on the political agenda.

Early in the morning I dressed properly to look as serious as possible. With the large black coat it was difficult to see me as an anarchist preparing for direct action. We had planned what to do when the judge understood what was going on. The video film should document the retreat and end up in some political statements on the conditions of total resisters in Norway. To take photos or film in the courtroom is forbidden, but a friend of ours did it by hiding the camera. To have asked for permission would have been suspicious and probably not allowed.

When I went to the judge and presented myself as the prosecutor for the day he only asked if I was new. I admitted that I was quite new, before he asked me to take my place. A little astonished, I sat down and took a look at all my friends smiling from the public bench.

Asked by the judge to present the case, I relied on my experience from my own cases. Since the early seventies I have been involved in a lot of civil disobedience and as a consequence several times spent time in the courtroom as the accused.

This was the first time as prosecutor. I decided to overplay the part and behaved like a rude, hard and old fashioned prosecutor. "When we today have a man of law as the accused, a lawyer refusing to do his service to the country, we cannot have any leniency. The punishment must be the hardest possible!" and things like that. The judge nodded as if he agreed.

After some hours the trial ended and the judge had still not understood what was going on. We left the courtroom and waited one week before we told the media what had happened. It was like an explosion. The national radio interviewed me on a direct line from my workplace three times during the day, the television news bought parts of our video and made a main news item out of it, and almost every national paper had the story on the front page.

Everyone laughed. Even old conservative lawyers had to smile after the modern charade. A lot of people asked how it could be done. Where is the justice within our judicial system? Could anyone just walk in from the street and play prosecutor for a friend? Where was the real prosecutor? Why hadn't he bothered to come?

After the interviews with me and Öyvind Solberg the questions were slightly different. Who are these total resisters? Why don't they get a real trial? How could it be that the state doesn't look at 16 months in prison as punishment? Do we really have political prisoners in Norway?

The debate started and seven years later the situation is quite different. KMV has been in contact with more than 200 people who have refused their service in recent years, everyone interested in peace issues has some knowledge about total resistance and the government has made a proposal for a new law. The new law proposes that there be a real trial, with possibilities to argue and get shorter imprisonment, that total resisters get the advantages of being "real" prisoners (like remission after 2/3 of the sentence) and that the maximum imprisonment be far shorter.

The judge was one of those loyal lawyers who had worked in the Department of Justice most of his life. Before ending his career he wanted to be a judge for a few years. In one of his first cases this happened to him. Every colleague, "the person on the street", most journalists, his friends, everyone suddenly saw him as a representative of a very unjust system. As if that were not enough, they laughed at him as an idiot for not realizing the play acting going on in his court case.

The way he was treated was not intended but unavoidable. No one in the group doing the action saw him personally as the "enemy", as responsible for the evil system. It was like kicking the man not the ball in football.

One of the very few negative reactions from the peace movement was from a pacifist calling the action "a non-Gandhian behavior". He was probably right, but the action was still a success!

In a system of state violence, the next step after the trial is the imprisonment itself. Could humorous actions be used here too? That was a question for KMV after the success in court.

Once more the aim was to open a debate through the mass media. But how to put the prison in a humorous context? Few institutions are less humorous than the prisons: locked doors, barred windows, isolation, high walls and loneliness.

We decided to plan for a "jail-in" action. Our friends sat in prison as a result of their attitudes against the state; we had the same attitudes. What would be more just than us sitting in the same place? With ladders and ropes we climbed over the walls and demanded either to let all war resisters be free or imprison all of us! The guards looked very surprised when one after another of us jumped down on the inside of the prison and demanded to be imprisoned! The alarm bells rang, dogs and police arrived, the prisoners encouraged us with shouts and songs, the guards scratched their heads and we had a good time.

After hours of discussion with the director of the prison, a press conference with one of the war resisters and heavy media coverage all over the country, we were arrested when we went out of the gates of the prison. To be carried from the outside in is not that uncommon, but police carrying activists out of the prison once more brought smiles to thousands of people.

We were charged over the action. The case was dismissed after one year of investigation. The reason is quite obvious: What could the judge threaten us with? Imprisonment?

In one way we had resisted state violence by making ourselves unpunishable. The means was humor and fantasy. No media outlet could avoid reporting the actions without losing in the competition with other outlets. None of the activists was punished as a result of either of these two actions.

An evaluation

A modern democratic society of the Norwegian type does not listen to minorities. One of a minority's few ways of being heard is by creating public support for their case through the mass media. Since the main media are all owned either by the state or large corporations and are dependent on selling their product, freedom of speech is an illusion. In addition a large majority of the population do not care about much else than how to increase their own wealth.

Total resisters in Norway tried through humorous direct actions to break the media walls, establish support for their case and in the end force the Parliament to write a new law giving them a fair trial,

accepting them as prisoners and giving them a punishment which is in proportion with similar "crimes" in the country.

The form of humor was new in left political struggles in Norway. The media reacted strongly and mainly in favor of the activists. The means was both strong enough to reach the headlines and politically potent enough to create a wave of debate within the broad political movements. The actions enabled a very small minority to be heard. The humor was also an important reason for not taking the activists to trial. It would have been too embarrassing for the court and prison authorities if the media had once more concentrated on what had happened. They had had enough of laughter.

By fantasy, humor and direct actions, minorities can spread their message widely. We have the freedom to act. The challenge is just to start using it!

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
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The New Technologies of Political Repression: A New Case for Arms Control?

Steve Wright

Despite the lofty rhetoric in which world leaders pay lip service to human rights and development, the stark truth is that many so-called liberal democracies are helping tyrannical regimes industrialise repression. Future historians will be able to label the twentieth century as the dark age of torturing states rather than the relatively amateurish Spanish Inquisition in the sixteenth century. This paper explores technical ways that governments of major liberal democracies have actually backed state terror and state repression. It focusses upon a trade in special equipment meant to protect unpopular, illegitimate and authoritarian governments in the Third World against upheavals and insurrection.

Until the 1980s, most political scientists tended to ignore the realities of current procedures and techniques of state terror and repression and deny any connection of such practices with Western liberal democracies. There are few government or academic grants to be awarded to those willing to probe the murkier realms of national security ideology and state terror. For an excellent discussion of why the social and political sciences have seemed blind to political repression see McCamant (1984).

The issue of another arms trade built on the state security industry has also been generally underexplored by the peace research community to date, apart from a few notable exceptions such as Michael Klare (1972, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1985; Klare and Arnson, 1981), Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez (1984, 1985), Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1979), Michael Randle (1980), Richard Falk (1977), and Miles Wolpin (1981, 1986). Thankfully, in the last few years substantial progress has been made to develop new critical theory in this field. Some of the first concise theoretical overviews

and approaches to conceptualising and measuring state terror were provided by Stohl (1983) and Stohl and Lopez (1984, 1985).

The US 'Contragate' scandal revealed some of the machiavellian ways that government can independently back state terrorism in other countries. Such episodes, and the suspicion that the facts on many more have been either covered up or creatively shredded, have understandably increased public nervousness about these issues. Indeed the last few years have seen a gradual blurring between military weapons and equipment sold to the police, intelligence and paramilitary formations.

What is presented below is a series of snapshot summaries of research undertaken in this field, explaining what repression technology is and the 'state of the art'; trends in research and development in the police-industrial complex; the main role and functions of the technology of political control; the dominant patterns of trade and who the key suppliers and recipients are. Using case examples from Britain and other NATO countries who supply the torturing states, there is also an attempt to explore the connection between this secret trade and what Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1979) have called the political economy of human rights and Johan Galtung (1971) has called structural imperialism.

The paper examines some methods used by companies within NATO's police-industrial complex to market the technology of political control and analyses case studies of collusion, particularly in regard to the 'multi-national merchants of repression.'

Many of the technologies discussed below are and will be used to threaten, harass and torture those who speak and promote humanitarian programmes for a more equitable form of development. They will provide technical fixes to supplant more peaceful and visionary alternative approaches to development. Currently such technologies and their associated operating logics are either removing forever the voices of conscience which can build better ways forward, or transforming socio-political development into a more militaristic and violent form.

If all the voices arguing for 'thinking in a new way' are brutally squashed by the secret police and torture squads of the old praetorian guard, what chance progress? The conclusion examines whether or not the trade in technologies to quell internal dissent is a proper matter for professional arms controllers. Alternatively, do non-government organisations, trade unions, peace and disarmament groups, the churches and Amnesty International have a more important and effective role to play in making sure that all future exports of state security supplies are subject to full democratic accountability and control?

The Technology of Repression

Repression technology is the broad term used to describe the hardware, software and liveware (human) components of manipulative programmes of socio-political control. The modern technological 'hardware' of political control includes area-denial technologies such as concertinas of barbed razor wire used to seal off selected zones; helicopter-mounted crowd monitoring equipment; surveillance and night vision cameras; telephone-tapping systems; public order vehicles used either to disperse or capture; riot weapons (for example, shotguns, watercannon, plastic bullets, chemical irritants CN, CS and CR,¹ electroshock devices, optico-acoustic field systems, injector weapons); advanced communications and automatic vehicle tracking systems; human identity recognition technologies; computerised data and intelligence banks with remote access terminals (in police vehicles, border checkpoints, etc.); prefragmented exploding ammunition, silenced assassination rifles and precision infrared nightsights; image intensifiers; restraining and prison technologies, including leg shackles, thumb cuffs, blunt trauma inducing drugs, gallows, guillotines, execution chambers, interrogation and torture technologies.

All such equipment is used to speed up processes of socio-political control and make them more efficient in targetting and removing dissident elements who question the status quo.

Apart from this hardware, there are also numerous standard operating procedures which form the 'software' components of the trade. Examples supplied to authoritarian regimes are riot and counter-insurgency training, advisory support, technical assistance including teaching of scientific methods of interrogation, torture and the more brutal forms of human destruction.

In any bureaucracy of repression, there are personnel schooled in the ideological attitudes necessary to keep such systems in operation. They include the various technical advisors; counter-insurgency strategists; paramilitary, intelligence and internal security police training officers; the merchants who actually supply the equipment as well as the 'white collar mercenaries' who act as key technical operators in the bureaucracy of any repressive system. This 'liveware' category includes all the people who are conditioned to actually put into practice the software and hardware components of a particular policy of repression.

¹ CN stands for 1-chloroacetophenone; CS stands for 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile; CR stands for dibenz(b:f)-1:4 oxazepine.

Research and Development for the New Technologies of Repression

As technology of political control, all this equipment is carefully designed to fulfill certain control functions, the power and scope of which are determined by the political context and which change with it.

For example, modern riot technology — the so-called 'less-lethal' weapons — can be used to disperse, harass, kill or punish crowds. In the 1970s it formed the politician's dream technical fix — a non-lethal weapon. For example US Congressman James Scheur (1970) commented in awe: "We can tranquilize, impede, immobilize, harass, shock, upset, stupefy, nauseate, chill, temporarily blind, deafen or just scare the wits out of anyone the police have a proper need to control."

Yet some of these weapons, such as the plastic bullets used to suppress the intifada on the West Bank and Gaza, can kill. A key design criterion is that they should *appear* rather than actually *be* safe. The new technologies of political control have been designed with this public relations requirement in mind. Military scientists at the US Army Human Engineering Laboratory have commented in this regard: "It is preferred that onlookers not get the impression that the police are using excessive force or that the weapon has an especially injurious effect on the target individuals. Here again, a flow of blood and similar dramatic effects are to be avoided." (Wargovitch et al., 1975)

Of course the effects are the same, but the intent is masked. As a result, the media barely mentions the application of modern riot technologies overseas.

Information on such weapons is shared between US research laboratories and Britain's Porton Down, which scan pure scientific research undertaken at universities for profitable new options. The next generation of incapacitants was discovered in this way. For example, the evolution of CR as the next riot control irritant began from a chemical curiosity innocently mentioned in the scientific literature by two Salford College of Technology chemists, precipitating a full investigative research programme by Porton Down (Wright, 1987a).

Similarly, work has been undertaken on armoured internal security vehicles to mask their coercive appearance. Individual companies undertake their own research to sanitise their product's image and the public relations merchants sell them as 'Discreet Operational Vehicles' (Savage, 1985). The latest vehicles such as the electrified AMAC riot tank and CRAYs look like ambulances and hence excite less public interest when on standby (although they still carry an armoury of riot weapons to deliver organised violence).

Therefore, while these technologies must be effective, many clients require wares which are not provocative in appearance, so as not to alert the media and generate either a greater crisis or a further erosion in international confidence. Repression is most effective when it is ubiquitous yet invisible.

A new generation of computerised surveillance technology, vehicle-tracking, identity recognition and night vision devices have come on to the market to cater for such demands. For example the new JAI camera can take several thousand pictures of a demonstration within a few seconds — freeze-framing individual participants for later arrest. One system recently patented called WIZARD digitalises human faces so that individuals can be recognised in crowds by a suitably programmed camera.

The general trend in research is to move towards integrating several technologies into one. An example is the creation of semi-intelligent area-denial intruder-detection zones. In weaponry, the research drift is towards flexible response. The result is weapons such as the Arwen Ace which can fire gas, dye, smoke or plastic bullets and the Sky-media FRAG-12 (or 'Hamburger gun') which can fire gas followed by a prefragmented finned torpedo filled with high explosive which makes human hamburgers from all the occupants of a room or car. On sale for the first time at the 1988 Copex exhibition, it was presented as a police rather than a military weapon despite having the explosive power of a 40mm grenade.

Many companies design solutions looking for problems. A classic example is the Synchro-fire system which is advertised with the logo: "When negotiations fail you still have a viable alternative". It is, in effect, a radio-controlled automated firing squad. One firemaster automatically shoots all the guns currently on target without anyone touching a trigger, taking a bit more of the guilt out of state-sponsored executions.

Not all of the technology is commercial in origin. For example, the riot techniques which comprise the colonially based counter-revolutionary operations of the British Army (Army Land Operations Manual, 1969) were adapted along the lines of the Hong Kong police riot procedures to make the British police national riot manual of 1981 entitled 'Public Order: Tactical Options'. Using previously restricted US government documents, Michael McClintock (1985a, 1985b), a senior researcher with Amnesty International, revealed how the standard US Army field manuals on counter-terror were transferred from Vietnam to Latin America virtually word for word.

The overall outcome of these research and development efforts to build new state security supplies is to reproduce the same processes of vertical and horizontal proliferation which are typically associated with other forms of arms races.

Structure, Role and Function of the Repression Trade

The unprecedented acceleration in total world military expenditures over the last 40 years has become a growing concern and source of apprehension for all those in the peace research community. Global military expenditure during 1989-1990 is expected to reach an all time record of \$1 trillion. Military expenditure in the Third World has increased twice as fast as in the so-called developed world between 1960 and 1986, and its share of arms spending has risen from 8% to over 20% during the same period (Sivard, 1988). In 1983, Third World governments imported nearly \$25 billion worth of armaments from the major industrialised nations (Grimmett, 1984). The structure of world military expenditure and the geographical location of arms suppliers and recipients succinctly summarise the prevailing patterns of dependency and domination between North and South. The major arms exporters are the industrialised countries — United States, Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, Italy and France — whilst the importers are predominantly in the Third World.

The world arms trade has led to a rapid global militarisation since 1960 (Falk, 1977; Kidron and Smith, 1983). Accompanying this process of militarisation has been a series of wars, predominantly involving nations in the South, yet largely funded and serviced by industrialised states in the North. Most of these wars were internal state security conflicts, involving revolts, coups d'etat, counter-insurgencies, insurrections, states of emergency, counter-terror operations and revolutions against the status quo (Kende, 1971, 1978).

In 1984, Amnesty International prepared a global survey of torturing states. If the torturing states are mapped, it quickly emerges that these states are virtually identical with the most militarised nations in the Third World. Since highly militarised regimes are almost continuously engaged in conflicts with their own peoples, coercive internal security patterns of control predominate and these create an ever increasing demand for more powerful tools for mass repression.

Consequently, whilst the lion's share of the international arms trade consists of large weapon systems such as aircraft, submarines, tanks and artillery for waging external conflicts (see the *SIPRI Yearbook on World Armaments and Disarmament*), it also includes a trade in specialised technologies, tactics, training and weapons specifically designed for quelling internal dissent.

In Britain, this trade in the tools of repression only received widespread public attention following the exposure by the *New Statesman* of 8 July 1983 that the government was selling execution ropes, leg shackles, etc. At about the same time it also emerged (*Observer*, 13 May 1984) that a firm of British architects (Richard Sheppard, Robson and Partners) were bidding to design prisons and

multiple execution chambers for Libya in high quality steel. (In the end, after several modifications, the Libyans still rejected the firm's plans.)

Leg shackles and other medieval restraining technologies are merely the crudest component of what Michael Klare (1979) has termed 'the international trade in repression.' The more sophisticated police technologies referred to above, once allowed to be used indiscriminately, become advanced tools of socio-political control.

They are most likely to be used when a highly authoritarian or militarised regime is least popular or undergoing a period of destabilisation.¹ Topical examples include the Pinochet regime in Chile, the Apartheid regime in South Africa, the Chinese approach to the destroying Tibetan nationalism, Yugoslavian attempts to thwart the Kosovo demands for a homeland and the Israeli approach to crushing the Palestinian intifada. What often characterises such conflicts are ethnic differences between the elites, including the military and police, and their opponents (Enloe, 1980).

The actual monetary value of this international trade in internal security technologies, perhaps \$4 to 5 billion if paramilitary equipment, counter-insurgency armoured vehicles and computer systems are included, is small when compared with the arms trade as a whole (Klare, 1979). Yet the fact that over 50 Third World governments are now controlled or actually run by the military makes this trade in repression a critical factor in the overall political economy of human rights.

Its effect of enhancing the operational efficiency of human rights violators means that the transfer of repressive technologies probably has a greater *direct* impact on more people's lives than the rest of the arms trade put together. This is because whilst major weapons systems contribute to massive structural violence in the Third World by locking up much needed capital, they are deployed in combat for only a small fraction of their lives — if at all. Repressive technologies are used virtually continuously by the many illegitimate governments locked in struggle against their own peoples. The export of repression technology increases the operational capacities of repressive states. Transfers of such equipment speed up their efficiency in targetting and punishing those who either question or dissent from the status quo.

The repression trade can enhance every stage of producing a new generation of prisoners of conscience: capture; interrogation; torture and extra-judicial execution. Recognising this trend towards

¹ Much of this section has been previously published in Wright (1983, 1984).

industrialising the entire process of repression, Amnesty International decided to include the campaign against the repression trade within its mandate during the early 1980s.

Here I am concerned with a number of basic questions. What exactly is the technology of repression? How does its transfer facilitate a direct transmission of repressive capacity? Why does this trade occur and who is responsible? Who actually controls the supply of political control technology and what criteria are used to limit its export? Answering such deceptively straightforward questions is an arduous undertaking, not just because of the complexity of the issues involved but also because of the official secrecy surrounding all aspects of this trade.

The international trade in repression may simply be conceptualised as just one of the more concrete manifestations of structural and cultural imperialism. Yet it plays a key role in maintaining what Galtung has defined as structural violence within and between nations (Randle, 1980). Even so, there are still problems in actually conceptualising this trade since only a few of the items which comprise it actually fit neatly into a straightforward weapons category. Some of these exports such as communications equipment and computers are considered to have a 'dual role', in that they have potential civil as well as internal security applications. Computerised communications networks, for instance, can be used by the police for legitimate law enforcement purposes in democratic societies, yet when such equipment is transferred to unaccountable, militarised or tyrannical regimes, its role in enhancing the forces of oppression becomes perfectly clear.

Of course the centre nations are not immune from repression. As in the nations of the periphery, state coercion is likely to increase in a similar way, should government legitimacy decline. This process has been described schematically by Marjo Hoefnagels (1977). Over the last several years many examples have emerged in European liberal democracies of such a rapid switch in tactics (for example in Northern Ireland, mainland Britain during the 1984-5 miners strike, and anti-nuclear demonstrations in West Germany and France) (European Group, 1982). Whether state repression occurs in centre or periphery nations, what clearly emerges is that the highest levels of coercion are always directed at the most significant political opponents in any given time period.

The Export of Repression

The leading exporters of what have been euphemistically termed 'security supplies' are the same countries that are primarily responsible for the arms trade as a whole, namely the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France and Italy. Other major suppliers include

Belgium, Germany and Czechoslovakia. A more recent trend, however, is for sub-imperial powers in the Third World, such as Brazil, Israel, Argentina, South Africa and Singapore (see SIPRI Yearbooks; *Jane's Weapon Systems*; *Jane's Infantry Weapons*; Dewar, 1979), to become exporters of this equipment in their own right (Klare, 1979). The predominant flow of exports for socio-political control is from the industrialised countries to the Third World, although transfers of these technologies take place increasingly within existing power blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and to their respective allies and client regimes.

There are also curious exceptions, as in the case of the supply of French surveillance equipment to the Soviet Union for policing the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The Soviet Union has had sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment manufactured by Tektronix smuggled in from the US (*Guardian*, 3 July 1986). Another example is the Chinese thumb cuffs on sale at the 1986 MILIPOL exhibition in Paris (documented by photographer David Hoffman).

Since 1978, the flow of major weapons to Third World nations has actually declined, largely due to their enormous costs. However, demand for the much cheaper and often more urgently required internal security technologies has mushroomed. As the ruling elites of the Third World have increasingly militarised their societies, international debt problems have correspondingly risen with all the associated pressures on ordinary people as their needs are marginalised. Factors such as increasing prices of food and basic necessities, expensive or nonexistent health care and decreasing amounts of money to live on whilst prices rise, irresistibly lead to vociferous demands for political change to break the external imposition of economic apartheid. Instead of initiating structural reform which may undermine their own position and alliances, the elites in many nations seek technical fixes to buy time through enhanced political repression. The ratchet effect of poverty, repression and militarism can then accelerate with renewed force.

In many Third World states now, revolution and massive social upheaval are the norm with only the army, the police and the state intelligence agencies protecting corrupt regimes from collapse. In this context, new policing technologies become the lifeblood of repressive regimes and allow them to create what are in effect human rights exclusion zones. The repression trade highlights the mutual dependence of repressive regimes and their supplier nations — a symbol of the real relationship behind the mask of what is presented as co-operation in law enforcement.

The Merchants of Repression

Who then are the key NATO manufacturers of state security supplies? Many of the companies in the police industrial complex are well known for other consumer supplies including cars, fireworks, electronics, telephones, hi-fis and computers. To name but a handful, some of the larger suppliers include:

Belgium: Fabrique National of Herstal;

France: Panhard, Saviem;

Germany: Heckler & Koch, PK Co., Mercedes-Benz, Rheinstahl;

Italy: Fiat;

Netherlands: Phillips;

Switzerland: Mowag;

United Kingdom: Alvis, Daimler, GKN Sankey, Glover, Hotspur, Short Brothers, Plessey, Shorrock, Racal, Rank, Marconi, Feranti, ICI, ICL, Royal Ordnance, Schermuly, Brocks, Pye Telecom;

US: Cadillac Gage, Federal Laboratories, Motorola, Rockwell International, Chubb, E Systems Inc; General Ordnance, Smith & Wesson, Fargo International.

There are in fact now thousands of companies involved in this business.

Suppliers and Recipients

It is generally agreed by researchers in this field that the United States is the biggest supplier of repression technology and expertise, followed by Great Britain (Klare, 1977, 1979). The predominance of the US can be attributed to its superpower status and associated imperial centre nation role with extended global interests and dependencies. Its technological preponderance and superiority demand a high level of resource extraction from the nations in the South.

Popular aspirations towards a more equitable lifestyle have been subjugated, often in the most brutal fashion, to the dictates of geopolitics in the nations of the periphery. This has been accomplished through various US operations, projects, schemes and programmes of 'technical assistance' which have served as bridgeheads to promote wider US interests. These have included the Military Assistance Program (MAP); the Foreign Military Assistance Program (FMSP); the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET); the International Narcotics Control Program (INCP); and the now defunct Office of Public safety (OPS) set up by the Kennedy Administration in the 1960s. Indeed the massive counter-insurgency research and development programme, which grew out of the Vietnam War era, proved instrumental in generating much of today's repressive hardware (US House, 1964). The associated counter-terror doctrines were formulated and refined to become the new standard operating

procedures of 1980s-style state terror, the so-called 'low intensity conflicts' (McClintock, 1985).

Britain too has a well developed state security industry, because of its colonial history in general and the ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland in particular. Britain's war in Ireland has spawned a whole new generation of police and paramilitary technologies. (The Ministry of Defence, in a letter to me dated 1 June 1977, said, "We do make considerable sales of equipment for internal security. As a result of the Northern Ireland operations we have something of a lead in this field".) Indeed the US and Britain actively co-operate in exchanging information relating to internal security wares. An example is the Quadrapartite Agreement of 1963, which facilitates the exchange of information on less lethal riot weapons such as the chemicals CN, CS and CR and kinetic energy weapons such as rubber and plastic bullets. Other agreements cover developments in electronic surveillance, signal intelligence, etc.

Yet whilst the procurement process between suppliers and recipients may involve governments, states are far less likely to be involved in the manufacture and distribution of political control technologies than they are with major weapons systems. The dominant trend that distinguishes the repression trade from that in major weapons systems is that it is conducted directly through the commercial sector. Here the role of government in the supplier country might be limited to facilitating any deals made and helping to maintain secrecy where appropriate. Thus governments in the supplier nations assist with advertising the wares, granting export licences where necessary and, quite frequently, turning a blind eye. These aspects are best illustrated by example. Some typical transactions are considered below to illustrate the role of the United States, Germany and Great Britain as exporters of repression.

The US Connection

Some excellent work has been accomplished by US researchers, particularly Michael Klare who managed to extract from the State Department minutely detailed breakdowns of overseas shipments of repressive technologies. Klare (1977, 1979, 1981, 1985) and Klare and Arnson (1981) also helped formulate the conceptual basis for understanding the repression business. Later work on Latin American transfers, done as part of the Institute for Policy Studies militarism project, has yielded an invaluable source. More recently, the US Congress (1988) has examined the implications of some of this technology for the US constitutional protection of civil rights.

The German Connection

The main thrust of German police and paramilitary transfers to Third World nations is to African countries and includes internal security vehicles, communications technology and training (Burgerrechte and Polizei, 1985; Busch, 1988).

The British Connection

Historically, it is Britain's colonial conflicts, especially those in Ireland, which have been responsible for generating much of the world's counter-insurgency tools, software, etc. (Ackroyd et al., 1980). Today Northern Ireland has become the key factor in explaining Britain's exceptional prominence in the international repression trade. Of course Britain continues to provide assistance and advice to Commonwealth member states, former colonies in Africa, Asia and the West Indies (see *Hansard*, 1 December 1980, written answer no. 110).

But it is because of the ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland that the British police-industrial complex has been able to evolve such an extensive and comprehensive range of state security supplies. The province has been used by private industries as a focus for their research and development programmes in police and paramilitary equipment. It has also allowed the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary to test the efficacy of these wares, under the quite stringent conditions of urban combat which currently prevail. Thus the Northern Irish conflict has and continues to act as a laboratory for testing new state security equipment and enables the suppliers to claim their wares have been blooded by combat and withstood the test.

The fact that many firms specialising in security hardware have military or police personnel on their management staffs facilitates an unusual degree of intimacy between these firms and government agencies throughout the procurement process. This co-operation is particularly evident in the advertising of repression technologies, where neither the Ministry of Defence nor the private sector are slow to capitalise on the operational use of their equipment in Northern Ireland to promote sales.

However, there is no public kudos attached to these transfers for either the supplier or the recipient. Usually neither side in the repression trade publicises its transactions since there is nothing of the jingoistic pseudo glory and pride we have come to see during the export of major weapons systems. Therefore only rarely do British transfers of political control technology become public knowledge. They are not normally the stuff of news broadcasts unless there is a leak, a journalistic investigation or a discovery of British equipment in torture chambers after a doomed tyrant falls, as was the case in Uganda. Nevertheless, the following transactions in the 1970s help to illustrate the kind of exports associated with the British supply of

repression. They alerted a wider public about what their recipients were using British technology for.

8,000 anti-riot guns, 26,000 CS gas cartridges and 20,000 mini-smoke grenades were cleared for export to the late Shah of Iran in the summer of 1978. Additional clearance was given to Schermuly for the further export of 20,000 anti-riot helmets, 20,000 gas masks, 20,000 anti-riot shields, 20,000 baton rounds and 5,000 anti-riot guns. As the internal situation in Iran destabilised, the Iranian government requested that the delivery of 2,000 more anti-riot guns and 250,000 rubber bullets be speeded up (*New Statesman*, 28 September 1978). Marconi sold \$16 million worth of tropospheric scatter communications equipment to the South African authorities to help them police the illegally occupied Namibia (Duncan Campbell, *New Scientist*, 17 June 1976). The British government also allowed Marconi to sell a national police communications system to the police of Bangladesh at a cost of \$1,440,000 (*Ochrisa Comment*, May 1977).

The computerisation of apartheid in South Africa, through the automation of the hated pass law system, was facilitated by the export of computers from the British firm, International Computers Ltd. (ICL). In fact, of the total number of 1,436 computers in South Africa at the end of 1977, 588 had been supplied by ICL (for full details see *Computing Weekly*, 10 August 1978; Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1978).

The British sold powerful communications equipment to Idi Amin's regime in Uganda. Pye Dynamics, for example, sold Amin Mascot radio sets costing \$146,555 plus four fixed station transmitters and 30 dash-mounted mobile transceivers, antennas and battery chargers valued at \$99,000. Another British firm, Contact Radios, secured contracts worth \$180,000 to supply Amin's notorious State Research Centre with communications equipment.

Also permitted for export to Uganda were Landrovers equipped with radio detection systems and Range Rovers fitted with powerful communications equipment for Amin's personal use. An Isle of Man firm, Security Systems International, sold nightvision equipment and telephone tapping systems to Amin's regime. One of Security Systems International's former employees also managed to negotiate a computerised fingerprint identification system which would have introduced a national pass law network covering every person in Uganda (Harriman, 1979; *Guardian*, 31 October 1978).

Landrovers were also used in Soweto, South Africa, where the ICI subsidiary African Explosives provided the riot gas used during the uprisings there (Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1985).

On the software supply side, the British Special Air Service (SAS) have established themselves as the world leader in the training techniques of counter-revolutionary warfare (Davies, 1981). Several ex-SAS employees have set up private security companies such as KMS,

SAS and John Donne Holdings to provide training in silent killing and other SAS-style expertise (Gordon, 1987). Indeed, in December 1984 reporters from the *Observer* exposed an offer by the AMAC company to provide a 44-week training course for 17 Libyan security personnel. Their subjects for hire included kidnapping, poisons, bugging, explosives and killing (Bailey and Leigh, 1984). The contract reportedly fell through after the Libyan killing of a British police officer. Ironically, the weapon used in the assassination was a British-made Thomson sub-machine gun. It was later traced to a lot sold by Frank Terpil from the Interarms warehouse in Hulme, Manchester. Another British company, Consolidated Gold Fields, was responsible for organising, administering and training the security police of most of South African gold and platinum mines (Pallister, 1986).

More recent examples include a case where a Mr Chris Bryant, a young English cleric on a visit to Chile, was gassed by the security forces — he was stunned to catch a glimpse of the cartridge that landed near his feet. It was clearly marked "Made In England". Chile also took possession of a Pye Telecom message switching system. The parent company Phillips flew five secret police to Manchester to see a similar system functioning there. The then beleaguered deputy Chief Constable, John Stalker, refused to give them access (Stalker, 1988). The Chilean police bought the system anyway after the company arranged a viewing elsewhere.

Having listed just a few of the kinds of transactions which have been permitted by Her Majesty's Governments, it is worth examining the question of regulation.

British Government-sponsored Exports of Repression

Most of the police and paramilitary equipment produced in Britain is manufactured by private industries. Even the once government-owned Royal Ordnance factories, which manufacture riot and other public order equipment, have now passed to private hands, namely British Aerospace. The production of state security supplies by Britain's private sector is just another strand of what is the largest segment of national research and development expenditure swallowed by military and paramilitary applications of any state in the world, including the United States.

Where successive British governments have played a part, indeed a vital role, is in the promotion of repressive technologies. This is done through a number of agencies including International Military Services (IMS) and the Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO), which since 1976 has organised the British Army Equipment Exhibition (BAEE) — a significant number of which are given over to internal security supplies. The DESO often negotiates directly with overseas customers on behalf of private suppliers. It will also help

such clients to obtain any necessary export licences and so forth. These exhibitions take place every two years and officials from all over the world are invited to attend. Many more governments and their security agencies are sent copies of the detailed catalogues of equipment on show at each exhibition. They are urged to contact the DESO for advice on anything which may be required. DESO appear to have no qualms about dealing with human rights violators who swarm to these exhibitions. The cynicism and hypocrisy associated with the business can be gauged from the fact that whilst the 1982 BAEE took place, the British government was simultaneously attending the UN Special Session on Disarmament. As in the previous UN Special Session, the British Government peddled arms whilst paying lip service to peace.

Once a transaction has been agreed, the Crown Agents (a government procurement agency subsequently privatised) can smooth the way to getting the wares safely into the hands of foreign repressors, without any embarrassing public knowledge or comment.

The producers of repressive technologies also have their own channels to advertise their wares, including *Defence Materiel* ("the worldwide journal for promoting British defence equipment"), specialist magazines such as *SITREP*, and catalogues such as the one produced by International Law Enforcement. Others advertise in *International Defense Review*, *Jane's Security & CO-IN Equipment* catalogue, *Police Review* or *International Police Chief*. Other British manufacturers of equipment at the paramilitary end of the spectrum have banded together to protect their collective interests by forming the Defence Manufacturers Association.

Much of this police and paramilitary gear is in fact directly exported via private deals in the international marketplace. But any transaction may still require a British export licence under the provisions of the Control of Goods Order 1985 — Statutory Instruments (which are periodically amended). The inadequacy of these controls can be gathered from the leg shackles episode previously quoted.

Government Control of the Proliferation of Repressive Exports?

How did any of these sales manage to get through the supposed regulatory net? If Britain will allow the export of equipment with repressive potential to be exported to the likes of Amin in Uganda and the apartheid regime in South Africa, who won't it export to? Why are such sales allowed to continue when in many cases it is clear that the recipients are abrogating human rights in the most despicable ways?

In some instances there appears to be a straightforward trade-off between a buyer's desperate need for political stability at any price and the British government's need to maintain its political, trade and

economic investments in that country. The example of the fall of the torturing Shah of Iran's dynasty comes to mind, with subsequent events surrounding the rise of the Khomeini regime illustrating just how shortsighted and futile such a policy can be.

Resource considerations are another important factor which persuades successive British governments not to implement their much flaunted concerns about freedom and human rights. One striking instance involved the then biggest computer sale ever by a British firm (Scicon) to a foreign government (Saudi Arabia). Could it be just a coincidence that Scicon happens to be a subsidiary of the oil company British Petroleum, which has substantial investments in Saudi Arabia? (Campbell, 1979).

A similar rationale probably underlies the refusal of any British government to cut off the supply of computers to South Africa by companies such as ICL. The problems can be seen to lie in the terms of the provisions of subsequent control orders as they apply to implementing the United Nations embargo on trade with South Africa. They are narrowly defined to cover only military and nuclear equipment and not 'grey area' technology like computers.

Other countries have applied a less parochial interpretation of the UN embargo. The US interpretation under the terms of the so-called Frazer Amendment are far more strict. These prohibit the export of computers and even computer programmes to South Africa, under section 301 of the Security Assistance Act 1976.

A survey sponsored in 1980 by the Parliamentary Human Rights Group has indicated that without a far tighter set of controls, and vigorous enforcement, British business with repressive regimes will continue as usual. Tyrants will obtain the tools of their trade, whilst suppliers will continue to deny any moral responsibility with the mealy-mouthed claim from their public relations departments that they are acting within the law as it now stands (Devine, 1980).

In other words, the British merchants of repression have acquired either the active compliance or the deliberate collusion of British governments to continue their trade. For example, the former Labour premier James Callaghan chose to be wilfully ignorant of the realities of this nefarious trade when the sale of British Landrovers to Uganda came to light. He is quoted as judging that they were going to be used to catch TV licence dodgers (Harriman, 1979). This was a comment made in 1979 when the scale of the genocide perpetrated by Amin in Uganda was known. Even so, there was some small effort to pay lip service to human rights considerations. The following Conservative government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has shown even fewer scruples when international business is at stake.

Thus on 10 March 1981, Lord Strathcona, the Minister Of State at the Ministry of Defence, when asked about the supply of arms to

regimes where there are "proven abuses against human rights", replied, "We would not export arms to a country which is guilty of torture." (*Hansard*, 10 March 1980, col. 540-545).

Yet barely more than one month later, Lord Strathcona was rapidly requalifying his government's previous apparently unequivocal position. Not only was the previously unambiguous refusal to sell to the torturing states retracted, torture itself was now seen merely as a matter of semantics. Now a number of factors, "political, strategic, in the world sense and in the economic sense", would be taken into account when considering arms sales (*Hansard*, 23 April 1980, col. 780-818). Nothing here about security as if people mattered.

Shortly afterwards, Prime Minister Thatcher herself took this U-turn even further when she exhorted British companies to export even more arms to the less sophisticated bracket of the weapons market. In short, far from preventing repressive expertise and equipment being supplied to military dictatorships of the worst kind, the present government has actively encouraged the trade in repression.

Put quite simply, the political control of the proliferation of repressive exports can't be trusted to government. There are clearly just too many vested interests. Successive governments have shown what is tantamount to a criminal lack of imagination, when considering how such exports are actually used. If this view is accepted, can the matter of controlling the supply of repressive technologies to authoritarian regimes be left to quiet diplomacy? Or is it more a matter for formal arms control, a set of procurement processes best left to the considerations of the strategic studies communities with their direct lines of communication to governmental decision makers?

The lead taken by the Carter Administration in the US shows that legislation can be formulated to limit the repression trade. The 'Frazer Amendment', already referred to, had a provision which required that "No security assistance be provided to any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights." (See Conrad (1981, 1985, 1986) for a thorough critique of the efficacy of this ban.)

This included not only grants but also sales of equipment to police, domestic intelligence or similar law enforcement agencies. There were many loopholes in the US legislation, but at least an historically significant step was taken by the United States towards controlling its lead role as an exporter of repression.

Nevertheless, the ways that such controls were eroded towards the end of the Carter were instructive. Michael Klare (1977) quotes the case of President Carter continuing to authorise training in counter-insurgency operations, urban counter-insurgency, military intelligence interrogation, and military explosives and detonators for

officers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Morocco, Zaire, Haiti and El Salvador. In 1980, when insurgent forces increased their attacks on the military-civilian junta in El Salvador, Carter approved a crash programme in counter-insurgency training. In an Orwellian attempt to disguise the repressive nature of this programme, administration officials labelled the course, 'Human Rights Aspects in International Defence' and argued that it would help promote respect for human rights on the part of Salvadorean officers.

The Reagan administration wasted no time in setting to dismantling these controls once the issue of human rights was dismissed as irrelevant rhetoric. The situation has changed so much since President Carter's time that, although the current regulations still pay lip service to human rights considerations, the Contragate scandal showed how little notice was taken. Indeed the Reagan administration during its second term specifically permitted the export of implements of torture to any NATO country — including Turkey — without a licence (set out in Controls for ECCN 5999B, 15 June 1984). This is the first time to my knowledge that any so-called civilised state has admitted that it trades in the implements of torture, not to mention actually sanctioning that trade. It remains to be seen whether or not the Bush administration will continue to condone such a policy stance.

A New Case for Arms Control?

The British public were kept largely ignorant that the international arms trade also includes specialised technologies, tactics, training and weapons specifically designed for quelling internal dissent, until an internal government memo leaked in 1983.

The memo emphasised the need to avoid ministerial embarrassment when handling sensitive items such as execution ropes and leg irons. It first appeared as a story in *The New Statesman* of 8 July 1983. The story spurred two journalists, John Merritt and John Lisners from the *Daily Mirror*, to investigate a company in the West Midlands named Hiatt & Co. The then manager of Hiatt, a Mr. Hart, offered the reporters (who were posing as buyers from the South African secret police) leg shackles, gang chains and other specialised restraining equipment made to order, "providing the tooling is not too difficult" (Merritt and Lisners, 1983).

Even more surprising was the response of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Norman Tebbit, when questioned in parliament by Alf Dubs: "If this country did not export them someone else would" (*Hansard*, 14 December 1983). Such official attitudes have done nothing to deter the growing supply of repressive technologies to human rights violating regimes. Indeed, the government refused to ban such exports outright, relying instead on the whimsical fiction that

they will only allow their export henceforth for theatrical performance. The issue is still a live one, given that a subsidiary of the building firm Laings (company motto: "We build for people") was reported in 1987 to be selling 12-foot high gallows for executions in Arab countries (*Daily Mirror*, 8 June 1987). Mr David Mellor, the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, kindly clarified the position of such exports in a reply to a member of parliament, Mr Ken Eastham: "But my understanding is that the manufacture of execution equipment in the UK is legal and its export is not subject to any form of licencing control." (letter from Mellor to Eastham, 17 March 1988).

Just so. However, the issue is much broader than merely seeking a means of limiting the export of new policing technologies, no matter how obnoxious. It is essentially the controversial question of the political control of technological innovation and proliferation. Yet because of the spine-chilling consequences of repression technology, it might be imagined that a consensus for the need for tight control would be much easier to achieve. Nothing could be further from the truth. Even the so-called democratic nations have been unable to resist the technological imperative pushing them towards adopting the new technologies of repression.

How much more tempting these wares are then for the many illegitimate regimes facing intractable resistance because of their inability or unwillingness to tackle the much more severe structural problems of poverty, underdevelopment and rocketing international debt. Given this context, what measures can be attempted to control the repression trade?

It would clearly be naive to expect the companies involved in the repression trade to exercise voluntary restraint. The trade is too lucrative for the merchants of repression to take moral considerations too seriously. Indeed, a more cynical perspective would suggest that it was positively against their commercial interests to have peaceful social development and political change in Third World nations. Riots, revolutions and wars are much more profitable in creating demand. If the use of repression technologies by state security forces actually promotes dissent and rebellion, then so much the better. The authorities will require more equipment to crush it and so the vicious cycle is maintained.

The exception to this rule occurs if the cosy secrets of a nasty transaction are publicly exposed. This is particularly potent if the manufacturing firms have a higher profile in the public mind regarding more innocuous products.

In theory, the policy vagaries of the various supplier governments might best be controlled by international organisations like the United Nations. If the United Nations were able to create and

impose effective embargoes on countries guilty of gross violations of international trade in repression should be adopted. In 1982 the UN recognised that a trade in repression exists, when the Secretary General of the UN made a statement (United Nations, 1982).

Currently, if one country stops trading, another mercenary nation comes forward to exploit the opening in the market. Britain and France the Frazer Amendment. Of course a major obstacle to such international solidarity against repression is the working practices of the United Nations. Apart from the power bloc voting

client regimes, one third of the constituent member countries of the UN have been designated as torturing states. Whilst this situation continues, any progressive measures would almost certainly be vetoed.

where only the rich could see, those subject to repression are only targets, not human rights negotiators. Yet could professional arms control experts and strategic studies academics be trusted to ally

The question is whether it is possible to have a Schmidt-Galtung debate. Herman Schmidt argued that peace researchers had aimed their values too closely to those of the decision makers in the international system, in order to get their policy value free was orientated towards maintaining a stability based not on peace but on injustice, inequality and exploitation. Schmidt advocated research to change the dominant structures responsible for response, broadened the definition of violence, to include inequalities brought about by the configuration of the power structures in the inter and intra-national systems. Paul Smoker point for peace research which has led to a turning of conflict from cultural studies of war violence and aggression to analyses of dominance systems, dependency structures and a strategic studies or simple arms control approach to

Without any adequate framework of control which is proof against the superpowers and associated international protection agencies operated by their client states, the best hope may lie with

Non-government Organisation Approaches to Halting the Repression Business

Whilst the efforts of groups such as Amnesty International (AI) and the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) can only be a catalyst towards a longer term solution, their supporters have been effective in achieving results in specific cases. CAAT for example prevented the sale of GKN Sankey's AT105 advanced internal security vehicle to El Salvador. The vehicles went instead to the Malaysian security forces — a preferable but still far from perfect solution.

Currently non-governmental organisations operate what is essentially a 'twin-track' approach, designed to put pressure on both the supplier companies and their governments. The first track involves consistent campaigning for a change in the laws surrounding the export of potentially repressive equipment. The second track involves discovering what is going on in relation to particular countries, companies, exhibitions and deals and focussing the spotlight of publicity on all the parties involved. I will consider each of these approaches in turn.

Legal Approaches to Halting the Repression Business

Certainly a change in the laws governing the export of this type of equipment would be one of the first steps towards effective control. Britain currently has no legislation which specifically provides safeguards which prevent sales of equipment to authoritarian regimes which could contribute to torture and other forms of political repression.

What does exist is a set of statutory instruments known as the Export of Goods (Control) Orders which were last updated in 1989 and came into effect on 14 February 1990. These prohibit export of certain classes of military and police equipment unless a licence is granted by the Ministry of Trade following consultation with both the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Yet they do not include technologies with civilian as well as military applications such as telecommunications equipment and computers, which all too often are plugged in to act as the nervous system of a torturing state.

These regulations are inadequate for a number of other reasons, not least of which is that these agencies are also charged with increasing British arms markets. Neither do they have to account to Parliament for any policy decisions that are made and these are rarely if ever made public. Secrecy and commercial considerations get top priority and there are not even any categorical restrictions on the sale of medieval equipment like execution ropes, gallows, and restraining equipment like leg irons and gang chains, all outlawed by the UN convention on slavery. Such items are merely subject to licence and no one is ever told which countries will not receive a licence and which

ones will. So for example in January 1983, the government refused to indicate whether or not it would or had granted licences for the export of electric shock prods to South Korea where Amnesty International had reported the practice of torture (Amnesty International, 1986).

A good example of what can be done to rectify this situation is provided by Amnesty International's approach in recent years. In an unusual departure from their past campaigns, the British Section of Amnesty International started a parliamentary campaign in 1979 to pursue the necessary changes. Their campaign suggested:

1. That a more thorough supervision be exercised over the export of security equipment and training where these are destined for repressive regimes.

2. The inclusion of categories of sensitive exports not at present subject to licencing controls, where there is evidence that such exports are being used in the violation of human rights.

3. A redefinition of the status of South Africa in respect of the export of repressive technology so as to ensure that all such technology be subjected to export licencing controls.

Amnesty International recognised the correlation between governments importing repressive technologies and those guilty of murdering and torturing their political prisoners. The government made no immediate concessions, but Prime Minister Thatcher felt obliged to reply to Amnesty's request. She said that a widening of the scope of existing controls would exert an excessive degree of control over British exports, adding greatly to the burden of government and of exporters at a time when British export industry already faced serious difficulties (Amnesty International, 1980).

Amnesty has subsequently campaigned consistently around seeking a new law which publicly discloses in advance all military, security and police transfers, that requires that regular reports be issued to the government on the human rights situation in the receiving country and that effective channels be established so that the government can receive information from non-government organisations. Amnesty wants the new law to specifically prohibit the transfer to other countries of military security and police supplies and training where these can reasonably be assumed to contribute to human rights violations. Any such law should certainly prohibit the manufacture of any equipment which can only be used for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of prisoners. Thus gas chambers, guillotines, thumbscrews, leg irons and gang chains would definitely be prohibited items. It is also looking at using the statutory procedures to deny repressive equipment a patent, for example on the grounds of invalidity — that it is socially objectionable — or that the invention would be 'generally expected to

encourage offensive, immoral or anti-social behaviour'. Such procedures are currently being pursued in relationship to the FRAG12.

Organisations like CAAT are now campaigning more to get the European Parliament to effect such changes and this initiative may prove instrumental in changing the British government's intransigence (CAAT Newsletter, No. 95, February 1989).

Research Approaches to Halting the Repression Business

Getting to know what is being traded and between whom involves a specific set of skills and research techniques. Hard information is of course required before any direct challenge by grassroots organisations can be made. In the repression trade this has been much harder to obtain than on the arms trade as a whole. For obvious reasons, neither governments nor the merchants of repression wish to give the public access to information on the full extent of their involvement. Obtaining details of the British supply of repression is particularly difficult since research is hindered by the terms of the Official Secrets Act. Potentially, the government, at least at ministerial level, has access through official agencies like the obscure Monitoring of Sensitive Services Committee of Crown Agents (since privatised). However, Parliament is currently denied this information which is only available at Cabinet level, if at all. Such secrecy is often used as a selling point since the suppliers use it to guarantee their more shady customers anonymity. Until Parliament finally gets the equivalent of the US sales list, human rights researchers can make an invaluable contribution to exposing the sort of deals which typify this nefarious trade.

The preliminary work to actually conceptualise the structure of the repression business was first begun in the early 1970s. Although information was limited, theoretical models suggested patterns of control which might be empirically analysed. Sometimes this took the form of investigative journalism. In other cases it involved detective work following the discovery of police equipment in situ or spotted on news coverage of a Third World conflict. In these early days the technique was essentially jigsawing together disparate pieces of information so that the broader processes could be revealed. The more technical researchers have for example established simple but effective means of identifying and exploring electronic spying and telephone tapping networks geared for socio-political control. (A successful application of such approaches led to legal action against several researchers in the UK and Norway when they used open sources to reveal a worldwide telephone tapping network using voice and automatic word recognition and transcription facilities.)

Researchers adopt a variety of different approaches, dependent to a large extent on the conditions relating to freedom of information in

their respective countries. Some of the technical sources have already been referred to above. There are many good introductory sources of information on repressive technologies. Fuller technical information on the equipment mentioned here can be found for example in Ackroyd et al. (1980), Applegate (1969), British Society for Social Responsibility in Science (1985), Drummond (1975), *Defence Materiel* (April-June 1979), International Law Enforcement Catalogue, and Wright (1977, 1978, 1983, 1987a,b,c). More technically detailed information is carried by *New Scientist*, *Computing*, *New Statesman*, and *Police Review*. Relevant material is also covered in the radical magazines *State Research Bulletin*, *RAMPET* (both now defunct) and *Lobster* (which is still going strong). More general surveys are contained in Dewar (1979), *Jane's Infantry Weapons* and *Jane's CO-IN* and *World Police and Paramilitary Forces* (Andrade, 1984) and in-house periodicals such as *SITREP*, *International Law Enforcement* and *National Security*.

Of course the manufacturers and suppliers of repressive technologies are in business and need to advertise their wares. Consequently, a key means of obtaining information on the police-industrial complex is through existing commercial channels. Trade magazines, advertising literature and exhibition catalogues all provide technical details and contact addresses, telephone, telex and fax numbers.

An excellent source for this purpose is the annual Buyers Guide of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, advertisements in magazines for the police such as *Police* and *Police Review*, military magazines such as *SITREP* and *Defence Materiel* and even magazines for mercenaries such as *Soldier of Fortune*.

One of the most promising means of discovering who is active in the state security supply business is to attend the special internal security and paramilitary exhibitions and get hold of their equipment catalogues. In the past such literature has proved to be of crucial significance. For example, an advertisement by Schermuly in one British Army Equipment Exhibition let slip the existence of hand-held CR SPAD sprays for the first time. An exhibition called Force 85 saw the presence of South African buyers from ARMSCOR who were soliciting new sources of riot equipment. The invitation lists for both IPEC exhibitions also included Iran, South Africa and Israel. Other key regular exhibitions are Essen Security, Force and Copex. The trend is for specialist companies to set up exhibitions in the Third World such as ASEAN (organised by MILIPOL, which runs an annual exhibition in Paris) or to target a particular continent such as the Copex exhibition held in Miami during February 1991 and targeted at Latin American countries.

Other means available for researching repressive technologies include field work, personal contact, or para-political work. As noted earlier, field work simply involves going out and discovering what exists — a particularly rewarding pastime in the case of communication and state surveillance networks. Field research by journalists in various conflict zones has also paid off in uncovering unexpected channels for the repression trade. Examples include the discovery of Hiatt leg shackles in Rhodesia and the discovery of British communications equipment in the State Research Centre of the deposed Ugandan dictator Idi Amin. Personal contacts take a variety of forms in this research and include information leaked by members of the state security services as well as tip-offs from trade union workers in factories supplying repressive equipment. Also vital is the co-operation of researchers in other countries. In recent years a number of key conferences have taken place (CILIP, CAAT, Anti-State Repression, International Peace Research Association, Amnesty International and the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control).

Conferences such as these have led to extremely useful exchanges of both knowledge and research techniques, and have yielded a variety of approaches and publications for consolidating the material available to researchers in this field. The initiative of groups such as TNI in Holland, State Research in Britain, CILIP in Germany and others to form the Anti-State Repression Network has also been useful in this regard.¹

This form of international research co-operation is likely to become even more important in the years ahead as the pace of authoritarianism and technological change in this area increases. State agencies worldwide are currently orchestrating their research efforts to produce even more efficient means of socio-political control. Countervailing research is necessary even just to discover the level and extent of the horizontal proliferation of repressive technology.

In the long term, it is possible that such research will have to play an active role in defending human rights from direct attack by authoritarian forces. Indeed it might be considered the duty of peace researchers to direct their efforts into such work so that social defence

¹ TNI, Paulus Potterstraat 20, 1071 DA Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Institute for Policy Studies, 1901 Que Street NW, Washington DC 20009, USA; Campaign Against the Arms Trade, 11 Goodwin Street, Finsbury Park, London N4 3HQ, UK; CILIP, Bürgerrechte & Polizei, c/o FU Berlin, Malteserstr. 74-100, 1000 Berlin 46, Germany; European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control, c/o Paddy Hillyard, Social Policy and Social Planning, University of Bristol, Alfred Marshall Building, 40 Berkeley Square, Bristol BS8 1HY, UK.

mechanisms of the future do not merely reinforce the extant patterns of repressive power and dominance. All repressive technologies and systems have basic flaws which permit their effects to be countermanded, if sufficient determination and skill are applied. To quote Galtung (1967:461-462): "The social scientist should have at his disposal concepts and insights that enable him to construct worlds that have never existed, societies nobody dreamt of, and even indicate the condition that may lead to them".

The use of advanced state repression technology might make any future resistance to internal repression even more difficult without prior preparation and aforethought. Thus future research should address the challenge of understanding the hidden as well as the direct consequences associated with the use of repressive technology. Such knowledge may serve to avoid falling into the trap of using social resistance methods which merely reinforce the power of any regime which is serviced and sustained by repression. This in the longer term must be the objective of the collective efforts of all peace researchers working in this field.

Campaigning Approaches to Halting the Repression Business.

Now that the relationship between these sales and repression has become more clearly understood, more and more political, religious, humanitarian and peace groups are willing to study or oppose the repression trade. This surge of concern has facilitated the development of quite effective methods of tracking sources of relevant information. This in turn has created some good resource material to teach others about the trade and begin campaigning together around the issues.

With the substantial growth of the peace movement, further direct action against the merchants of repression seems likely to exert further pressure on the government towards reforms. Already, various European groups have co-operated against international security exhibitions set up to promote arms sales and in some cases managed to bring them to a halt or ensure their future cancellation. Increasingly such demonstrations make the connection between structural and direct violence in the Third World and the arms trade. It is a trend which is destined to continue and become more effectively planned as further experience is gained.

Indeed, in several cases companies either manufacturing or supplying riot equipment have either ceased manufacturing or exporting because of such means. For example, Allegheny International stopped its subsidiary Schermuly in Britain from manufacturing plastic bullets because of external pressure (Williams and Dobbie, 1983). More recently, the US company General Ordnance

halted supplies of riot munitions to Israel because of popular outcry following the brutal repression of the intifada.

Throughout the 1980s, public concern about Britain's role in repression abroad grew. Religious bodies, including the Society of Friends, the Synod of the Church of England and the British Council of Churches, have adopted policies expressing their concern to prohibit military and security exports which contribute to human rights violations overseas.

In 1984, the conference of the Trades Union Congress condemned the making of instruments which can be used for torture and repression as "an affront to human decency and the dignity of labour" and called on the government to withdraw export credits and other government-provided assistance to British firms engaged in this inhuman trade. A wide range of church groups, medical practitioners and others have spoken out against this trade. The next step being undertaken at the Richardson Institute is to expand the work of a company in Manchester known as TRACES,¹ which tracks companies across the world which are involved in the repression trade and helps human rights organisations to expose their dealings.

To have an impact on the growing number of ethnic and nationalistic conflicts, we need to find means of directly intervening in the sickening cycle of poverty, repression and militarism. If we are to learn from the past, our work must recognise that torture, detention without trial, summary execution — the hallmarks of state terror — make the work of non-governmental terrorists look like amateurs in both scale and impact. Yet still, most of the teaching and most of the theory is about non-state actors: governmental terror for the most part vanishes from the equation. The white collar mercenaries near where we live and work and the low-intensity-conflict apologists for legitimating state terror deserve to be called to account. Our findings need to be directly applied in a form which is recognisable to those who are on the receiving end of past failures.

¹ Transnational Analysis and Company Enquiry Service, 13 Paton Street, Off Piccadilly, Manchester M1 2BA, UK.

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Resisting State Violence in Nigeria

Maduabuchi Dukor

State violence, manifesting itself in fascist and dictatorial rule, press censorship, and physical and psychological intimidation of the citizenry, is rampant in the Third World. History has shown that forms of protest like civil disobedience, legal challenges, sit-down strikes, sit-ins, hunger strikes, self-immolation and cessation of public activities are either not applicable or ineffective in resisting state violence in Third World countries like Nigeria. Instead, militant demonstrations on the part of students, traders, workers and armed resistance may be the only viable way of resisting state violence. The relationship between the state and the population in Nigeria buttresses this assertion.

It is significant that the present Nigerian socio-economic formation is one of conflict between the state and civil society. The state, instead of being a means of executing the will of the people, becomes a representative of selfish, ethnic and narrow interests and, inevitably, becomes a coercive machinery. The coercive and violent nature of the state suggests that there is an inherent weakness in the concept as bequeathed to us by the colonial master.

The concept of the state does not seem to reflect the true indigenous values of Nigeria. The people of Nigeria do not understand the sanctified institution of the state, nor do they have any commitment to it. The modern Nigerian state and its socio-economic formation lack an organic relation with the traditions of the people; it has not vibrantly integrated individuals, groups, and institutions in such a way as to create a polity expressing the aspirations of the people.

Before the emergence of the capitalist socio-economic formation, the epoch of communalism in Nigeria — and Africa in general — was characterised by kinship ideology. While the peasants and the masses in Nigeria interact among themselves and live their lives in participatory and comprehensible ways, in frustration they view the colossal machinery of the state as a god or divine in the Hegelian sense, and so would not dare to question its authenticity except when the occasion warrants mass resistance or riot. It seems that there is a

gulf between the communal, holistic and integrated African society and the artificial western society conceptualised in the name of the state. The state has accentuated conflicts between managers and their workers, employers and employees, and legitimised and systematised violence.

The good-willed and conscientious Nigerians are beginning to realise that the notions of liberalism, democracy and the free world presumed in the constitution are rhetorical mirages. While poverty and misery are social realities, alienation has accentuated the cauldron of conflicts in modern Nigeria.

The civilian or constitutional regimes in Nigeria have many covert and overt ways of wreaking violence on individuals and groups. Apart from systematic and subtle means of violence on the masses, these regimes often engage in naked and open violence through the use of police and armed forces. But most peculiar to civilian regimes is the use of subtle means of violence like political intimidation, divide and rule, bribery and entrenchment of unpopular politicians in political posts, and the mischievous division of constituencies to favour the government in power as well as bending the laws, as circumstances demand, to favour the ruling class and their compradors.

Military regimes in Nigeria and elsewhere are as unjust as civilian regimes in Nigeria in their paraphernalia and mechanisms. A military regime, both in its orientation and evolution, has a propensity to dictatorship and fascism. The Machiavellian dictum that the end justifies the means is always its motto. The fascist nature of military regimes is shown by their propensity to enact one decree after the other to protect the interest of the government against the popular wishes of the masses. Decree as one of the positive laws of the state is an aspect of legal positivism which is a doctrine that implicitly agrees that the end justifies the means. As a result of its unpopular orientation and evolution, the military regime finds legal positivism a ready-made instrument or doctrine for rationalising an endless enactment of decrees.

The state of Nigeria is, in large part, a state of military dictatorship with a lengthy chain of decrees in its law book. Decreeism was born as soon as the first Nigerian military government emerged at the point of the crisis that rocked the first civilian government in 1966. The first military head of state, General Aguiyi-Ironsi, immediately after he came to power, surrounded himself and the state with protective decrees. For example, State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree 1966 or Decree No. 3 of 1966 was meant to authorise the detention of certain politicians of the first republic. The succeeding regime of General Gowon also operated with similar decrees with at least four state security (detention of persons) decrees on the country's statute book. After the assassination of Murtala

Muhammed, the Obasanjo regime promulgated Decree No. 11 of 1976 (Public Officers' Protection Against False Accusations). When the Buhari/Idiagbon regime emerged, this decree was reformulated as Decree No. 4 of 1984 as an instrument of coercion. In the same year, the regime enacted State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984. It is believed to be a decree that "protects the government at the expense of the nation because, except for the government, every one of us is endangered."¹ When the Babangida administration came to power in 1985, it amended Decree No. 2 by Decree No. 12 of 1985 to rest the power of detention previously exercised by the Chief of State, Supreme Headquarters in either the Chief of General Staff or the Inspector General of Police. The regime also enacted Decree No. 47 which is a decree against student unionism and related activities like student demonstrations. In addition to all these decrees there were often supplementary police and military laws and orders ranging from the ones meant to pre-empt peaceful and violent protests to the ones that require any individual or group engaging in any form of protest to obtain police permission beforehand. But more often than not, when such permissions were sought by either students or trade unions, they were not given; instead, the prospective civil disobedient would be rounded up and detained by the police.

It has been strongly argued that in societies where inequities and injustices are systemic, and where laws and decrees are fabricated to serve the interest of the few, militant resistance or revolution could be the answer. Barry Hindess and Roy Bhaskar argued that "a non-violent protest may not be effective unless civil disobedients can be allowed to register their protest in ways potent enough to drive the point of the protests home."² Earlier, classical liberal theorists of government like Locke and Rousseau considered revolution or militant resistance as the viable and effective alternative politics.

Some have argued, to the contrary, that nonviolent protest is more ethical and that in a showdown between a dissenting group and the government, violence is likely to be ineffective because the government would use all available instruments of law and order like the police and the armed forces to crush the dissenters. This school of thought argues for nonviolence, including a willingness to accept the legal consequences of civil disobedience to demonstrate their sincerity. This school, in arguing the workability of the theory of civil disobedience, cites the nonviolent resistance led by Martin Luther King in the United States and the one by Gandhi in India. But it is easily forgotten that the politics in these two countries more nearly approximated a just and democratic ideal where nonviolent protest and fidelity to law could be justified. In the United States, for example, things happen to a reasonable extent according to the ideals of the constitution, the law and the judiciary.

India, both under British rule and as an independent country, is a very different society from Nigeria in terms of the rule of law and the polity. The British imperial rule in India was relatively modest and rational in response to the wishes and aspirations of the masses. Therefore, Gandhi's technique of civil disobedience, called satyagraha, could be successful, in contrast to the present situation in Nigeria.

In the face of the moral and ideological pitfalls confronting civil disobedience in the Third World, one might be tempted to consider self-immolation and hunger strikes, but for the fact that they equally require moral sensitivity and human conscience on the part of the adversaries and spiritual intensity on the part of the protesters. Both forms of protest are intended to stimulate sympathy in the managers of state affairs and possibly to galvanise the public to action. But African consciousness, in terms of religion and culture, is not favourable to these modes of protest. The lack of these types of protest is related to the lack of any history of religious martyrs in Africa.

Cessation of public activities is an old form of protest resorted to only upon the failure of all other avenues for seeking what is construed as justice by the seeker. "It is not merely to record one's protest or anger that cessation of public activity is resorted to, but it is to seek to get a wrong righted, to enable the doer of wrong to see justice in the demand and arrange a noble rectitude."³

In Nigeria and in some other countries in the world, cessation of all activity in the public services or higher institutions has long been a way of resisting state violence, irrespective of the fact that the governments have not always given it a legal backing, but instead have consistently and strongly repressed it with the state apparatus. Cessation of public activities, including sit-down strikes and sit-ins, is often undertaken by trade unions, like railway workers, motor transporters, primary and secondary school teachers, service workers and university lecturers.

In South Africa, sit-ins and sit-downs are a common phenomenon as a result of state violence backing apartheid. There have been many boycotts of stores and sit-ins in Vaal Towns and Johannesburg. In Marxist Poland in August 1980, Lech Walesa led about 16,000 workers in staging a sit-down strike in an effort to win a wage increase from the communist bosses, who capitulated to virtually all demands of the workers. There have been similar nonviolent protests in many troubled spots in the world such as Palestine, India, Fiji, Yugoslavia and China.

In Nigeria, boycotts and sit-ins are common but, as in most areas, they are ineffective. The general body of Nigerian trade unions, known as the Nigerian Labour Congress, sometimes tries to resist state violence by announcing the cessation of public activities, but this has

always proved ineffective because the government has had ways of destabilising the Congress or proscribing it.

The Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) has been most critical of Nigerian government policies. The protest of academic staff usually takes the form of a court proceedings, boycotts and sit-down strikes. Consequently, in the past, lecturers who were critical of governments were either dismissed from their jobs, harassed or jailed. In 1978, several university staff had their appointments terminated. Dr Patrick Wilmot and Dr Bala Usman of Ahmadu Bello University had their appointments terminated in 1986 and 1989 respectively.

Commenting on the history of ASUU relations with the government, Dr Uzodinma Nwala, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, says that the intrusion of government in university affairs and the erosion of academic freedom "have systematically eroded the status, integrity and effectiveness of the university system, demoralised and antagonised the academics and fuelled tension within the system."⁴ This same ASUU was proscribed in 1988 by the Babangida regime until late 1990.

All in all, cessation of public activity either in the form of sit-in or sit-down strikes has not been an effective mode of resisting state violence. This is precisely because of the awesome state machinery for repression.

Considering the fascist and dictatorial tendencies of governments in the Third World, a doctrine of appeal to force to reform society or to challenge government policies is becoming increasingly popular. Bertrand Russell, disagreeing with the use of force to bring about change, said that an appeal to force "is naturally met by an appeal to force on the other side . . . Persuasion is a slow process, and may sometimes be accelerated by violent methods; to this extent, such methods may be justified. But the ultimate goal of any reformer who aims at liberty can only be reached through persuasion."⁵ It is true that the use of force has been met by equal or greater opposite force in the relation between a people and the government, but where and when the state is unfeeling and undemocratic, it is only natural to resist violently with the ultimate aim of winning. Persuasion is the principle behind all nonviolent protests which have hitherto been ineffective in the Third World.

Against the background of undemocratic, unfeeling and irresponsible governments in the Third World, student militancy, violent demonstrations and armed resistance are becoming fashionable. Student militancy has a long history in Nigeria. In 1962, students and workers jointly demonstrated against the Anglo-Nigerian defence pact because it was perceived as a continuation of British colonialism. In 1978, the National Union of Nigerian Students protested violently for the removal of the Minister of Education. This was precipitated by

escalating student food prices and anomalies in state education policies. The harsh reaction of the Obasanjo regime included the sacking of many lecturers and the proscription of the National Union. In May 1989 a violent riot was carried out by students and the masses chiefly of southern Nigeria. It seemed that after the riot, the Babangida regime gradually started responding to the demands and grievances articulated in the riot. Since the riot, the government has embarked on the subsidisation of prices of basic commodities, transport fares and prices of motor spare parts, increased basic salaries and allowances of workers, and more recently awarded a bursary to all Nigerian students in federal universities. It seems that this is the first time in Nigeria that a violent resistance drew the government's attention to its inequities.

In Nigeria and most African states, armed resistance would be possible in the form of a coup d'etat. Guerrilla warfare might not be possible in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society like Nigeria where it would be difficult to muster the support of all ethnic groups and religious denominations. Coup d'etat could be a viable mode of resisting state violence if it were carried out by purposive and conscientious army personnel or even civilians. The plotters of the 22 April 1990 abortive coup against the Babangida regime defined the Nigerian problem of perennial state violence against minorities, ethnic groups and individuals through their leader and spokesperson, Major Gideon Okar, who announced on radio: "Fellow Nigerian citizens, on behalf of the patriotic and well meaning people of the middle belt and southern part of the country, I, Major Gideon Ugwazo Okar wish to happily inform you of successfully ousting the dictatorial, corrupt, drug baronish, inhuman, sadistic, deceitful, homosexually centred, oligarchic and unpatriotic administration of General Ibrahim Babangida."⁶ This armed resistance might have resulted in the overthrow of the government. Suffice it to say that armed resistance by civilians or the armed forces or militant demonstrations may be justified in the face of an unfeeling, repressive and underocratic regime.

It is not surprising to see that when nascent African states enact laws and decrees to protect their class interests, the masses and the underprivileged take to militant resistance to effectively improve their class position. Various riots and resistances in the world, like the pro-democracy movement in China in May 1989 and the riot in Nigeria in the same month, are classic examples of clashes of interests. Marx and Engels argued that the bourgeois state is born not out of benevolence but because of the pathological fear and interests of the ruling classes. It seems, therefore, that as long as the state does not perform and there exist conflicts among classes in society, militant

and violent action will continue to be the only realistic and pragmatic alternative to normal politics.

NOTES

- 1 Etim Anim, "The scourge of the people, frequent use of Decree 2 casts a pall of fear over the land", *Newswatch*, 31 July 1989, p. 4.
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- 3 Bakesh Bharadwaj, "The state has withered", *University Today*, Vol. IX, No. 22, 1 November 1989, p. 3.
- 4 Uzodinma Nwala, "Industrial crisis in the Nigerian university system", text of a lecture presented to a seminar organised by the Committee of Registrars of Nigerian Universities at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, 21 October 1988.
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NECESSARY ILLUSIONS

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विनय प्रकाशन

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Introduction to Gene Keyes, "Heavy casualties and nonviolent defense"

Brian Martin

What can be done about the threat of attack from military forces? This is a crucial question, since wars and military repression have resulted in millions of deaths this century. One solution for a country is to have its own military forces to be used for defence. This sounds good, except that one country's defensive army may be considered a dangerous threat by rulers of another country. The result is military races and, all too often, wars.

But is there any alternative to military defence? Some researchers and activists think that the answer may be nonviolent defence, which means defence by the people using nonviolent methods such as petitions, rallies, strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, fraternisation, alternative institutions, and perhaps sabotage of property. With a complete system of nonviolent defence, there would be no military forces at all. Nor would defence be something run by a small, professional body. Instead, all members of the population would be encouraged to participate. Nonviolent defence is also known as social defence, civilian defence and civilian-based defence.

The idea of a nonviolent alternative to military defence developed gradually, drawing on the ideas of pacifists and experiences in campaigns led by Gandhi in South Africa and India. Many of the early advocates of nonviolent alternatives had a religious orientation. But since the 1950s, leading Western researchers on nonviolent defence — including Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, Theodor Ebert, Johan Galtung, Stephen King-Hall, Johan Niezing, Adam Roberts and Gene Sharp¹ — have taken a more pragmatic direction, arguing that nonviolent action is a more effective method than violence.

Part of the argument is that in an age of weapons of mass destructions, including nuclear weapons, all-out war between highly industrialised societies has become counterproductive for any rational purpose. Also relevant is the role of military forces in repression within countries. Militaries in today's world are more often a threat to their own people than a protection against attack from the outside. Finally, the attention to nonviolent defence reflects increased understanding and experience with the methods of nonviolent action.²

Although knowledge about nonviolent defence has increased greatly in the past several decades, there is still much to be learned. Historical examples of nonviolent action do provide some insight, but a

serious programme of nonviolent defence requires a great deal of planning, preparation and training.

No country in the world has yet even begun a conversion to nonviolent defence. The reason seems simple: governments, militaries and arms manufacturers have strong vested interests in the military system. Furthermore, most people, through education, the media and cultural traditions, believe there is no alternative to military defence. Since hardly any money is devoted to developing alternatives, scepticism about nonviolent defence becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Nevertheless, interest in nonviolent defence has continued to grow. There are supporters in countries around the world and a continuing production of articles.³

Because the proponents of nonviolent defence regularly encounter scepticism from those who first hear of it, there has been a tendency to adopt a position of advocacy. This means that there have been relatively few tough critical assessments from within the ranks of those treating it as a serious option.⁴

The following article by Gene Keyes is an exception to this pattern. Keyes has carried out some insightful and innovative studies of nonviolent defence.⁵ In examining the issue of heavy casualties, Keyes draws on writings by many of the key figures in the early development of ideas about nonviolent defence. In confronting this issue, he does nonviolent defence a service. All too often, the difficult issues and moral dilemmas are swept under the carpet. After all, that is the usual pattern in discussions about military methods, in which the gory details are hidden from public consumption.⁶ It might be argued that if nonviolent defence is to gain public acceptance, then it has to be utterly honest and realistic — unlike military defence. Judge for yourself — after reading Gene Keyes' article.

NOTES

1 Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, *War Without Weapons: Non-violence in National Defence* (Frances Pinter, London, 1974); Johan Galtung, *Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research, Volume Two* (Christian Ejlert, Copenhagen, 1976); Gustaaf Geeraerts (ed.), *Possibilities of Civilian Defence in Western Europe* (Swets and Zeitlinger, Amsterdam, 1977); Stephen King-Hall, *Defence in the Nuclear Age* (Victor Gollancz, London, 1958); Johan Niezing, *Sociale Verdediging als Logisch Alternatief* (Van Gorcum, Assen, Netherlands, 1987); Adam Roberts (ed.), *The Strategy of Civilian Defence: Non-violent Resistance to Aggression* (Faber and Faber, London, 1967); Adam Roberts, 'Civil resistance to military coups', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 12, 1975, pp.19-36; Gene Sharp, *Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defense* (Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass., 1985).

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XIX

ARTICLE 19

Kuwait

Death sentences

On June 15 1991 death sentences were imposed by Martial Law Courts in Kuwait City on six journalists who were sentenced as a result of publishing the newspaper *al-Nida* during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Ten other individuals on trial received ten year prison sentences for similar offences.

According to reports received through the Kuwaiti News Agency the courts convicted the defendants for "deliberately contributing to the dissemination of inciting and false news, deliberately helping the Iraqi forces and accepting money from the enemy authorities." The six sentenced are:

Ahmad Fadi al-Hussaini, a Lebanese who served as *al-Nida*'s editor-in-chief, and who was tried in absentia; **Ibtisam Berto Sulaiman al-Dakhil**, a Kuwaiti woman journalist accused of writing articles for *al-Nida* and for attempting to recruit journalists; **Fawwaz Muhammed al-Awadi Bessisso**, a Palestinian with Egyptian travel documents and an editor on *al-Nida*; **Usamah Suhail Abdallah Husseln**, a Jordanian, who was allegedly responsible for layout on *al-Nida*; **Abd al-Rahman Muhammed As'ad al-Hussaini**, a Jordanian who allegedly wrote article for *al-Nida* and **Ahmad Abd Mustafa**, a Jordanian accused of writing articles for *al-Nida*.

Reports received by ARTICLE 19 indicate that the trials, which have taken place since May 19 1991, failed to comply with international standards, in particular Articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which guarantee to everyone charged

with a serious criminal offence the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and also the right to appeal. Furthermore, the trial procedures appear to violate Article 34 of the Kuwait Constitution which guarantees similar protections.

ARTICLE 19 also expressed its concern at reports that some defendants may have been tortured and had confessed under duress. ARTICLE 19 believed that the conduct of the trials and the excessive nature of the sentences were causes for great concern, and maintained that any government wishing to respect human rights and to be responsive to the will of its people cannot claim to do so unless international standards of justice are seen to be put into practice.

ARTICLE 19 therefore called on the government of Kuwait to review these verdicts and sentences passed and to ensure that the trial procedure was halted until court procedures were established which comply with international legal standards. The organization also called for an immediate commutation of the death sentences.

- The Kuwaiti government subsequently announced on June 26 1991 that all death sentences had been commuted.

Heavy Casualties and Nonviolent Defense

Gene Keyes

This paper establishes a principle of strategic nonviolent defense called "sacrifice": *Expect the worst and tolerate heavy casualties.* It chides a tendency in nonviolent defense literature to underestimate potential loss of life, were indeed a Polity to wage serious unarmed struggle against a ruthless Foe-Polity.

Nonviolent defense planning must be imbued with worst-case analysis regarding the possible duration and magnitude of suffering. A populace must be ready to overcome exemplary terrorism and brutality, including nuclear extortion. It is more prudent for defenders to *assume* that casualties *will* be heavy, rather than *admit* they *might* be. Such a posture raises moral questions and religious ultimates which have been discounted by modern exponents of nonviolent defense. But extreme consequences and moral wherefores cannot be wished away.

Preface

For the ultimate question is always this: What do we do if the passive resistance ends by really getting on an adversary's nerves and he takes up the struggle against it with brutal strong-arm methods? Are we then resolved to offer further resistance? If so, we must for better or worse invite the gravest, bloodiest persecutions. — Adolf Hitler, 1926¹

. . . the point . . . to consider is not how to avoid the extreme penalty, but how to behave so as to achieve the object in view. — Mohandas K. Gandhi, 1939²

If a nation disarms, can it wage strategic nonviolent defense against a ruthless foe? In discussing this issue, I use the general terms *Polity* and *Foe-Polity*. A Polity can be thought of as a nation-state, but it could also be a city-state, a non-state nation, a region, an

alliance, the United Nations, a world government, or the like. A Foe-Polity is any of the above, and one that threatens, invades, or occupies another Polity.

Elsewhere, I have identified *morale* as the center of gravity in the combat between a Polity and a Foe-Polity; *national integrity* among the preeminent *political* goals of a nonviolent defense effort; and *dislocation/demoralization/departure* as the sequential wartime purposes of "us" versus "them".³ The Foe-Polity, the Polity, and its Strategy of nonviolent common defense could each be discussed in terms of their respective Particulars, Parties, Principles, Purposes, Policies, and Programs. I have sought to identify some dozen Principles for the Strategy of nonviolent common defense, in seven words each. For example, "Defiance": *There is no surrender in nonviolent defense*. This paper will consider a concomitant Principle called "Sacrifice":

Expect the worst and tolerate heavy casualties.

Argument

In the first place, this is not an advice only to a commander, a general, a chief of state. This is a Principle addressed to the entire Polity, to be fully assimilated and appreciated by all its members. It is nauseating to hear leaders or strategists talk about "accepting" casualties of any magnitude, *if they are not talking about themselves as well*. All too often "accepting casualties" means you and you and you are going to die; and all too often, "you" means youth.

In the second place, we have another deadly principle here, only this one is more so. Presupposition of deaths in the course of struggle has always been a part of nonviolent defense thinking — to an extent. Some writers on nonviolence bravely steel themselves to admit that hundreds, yes, even thousands, may perish. Beyond that, they may vaguely cite casualties of less than a nuclear holocaust. In my opinion, this reality, although frequently given its due, nonetheless tends to be understated and underestimated.

(Of course that is a common political shortcoming; leaders will seldom want to announce or even face up to how many might die — or will have died — in any war: limited; protracted; nuclear. Sometimes there are exceptions, as in Middle-Eastern-type braggadacio.)

I say that the twentieth century, being what it is, requires the nonviolent war strategist to move the decimal point four or five places,⁴ so as to entertain casualty figures anywhere from five to nine digits; possibly ten if there is nuclear insanity by others.⁵ This leaves some nations out of the running; therefore percentage figures might be a more meaningful index of potential sacrifice. Two digits should suffice.⁶ Let us say that *in principle* a nation must be prepared to pay

very, very heavily in lives to preserve its freedom. This holds true whether your nation is influenced by Joseph Stalin or Herman Kahn, Mao Zedong or Mohandas Gandhi.

It is in the nature of risk that the worst doesn't necessarily happen, and so risk often partakes of bluff, imprudence, hubris, or paranoia. However, when these elements are filtered out, we must still anchor the risky principle of Sacrifice on three sepulchral assumptions:

- 1) A high order of magnitude for potential deaths;
- 2) Worst-case planning for possible duration, extent, and amount of suffering;
- 3) Readiness to ride out exemplary terrorism.

That said, we do not forget that strategic nonviolence does its utmost to inhibit violence by the adversary and exerts all efforts to minimize casualties. But the Polity using strategic nonviolence will not shrink from withstanding the most awful degree of death and desolation. How can it differ in that respect from what happens in the real world? Take, for instance, the words of Pham Van Dong, Premier of [North] Vietnam, who told James Cameron in December 1965:

But it is costing us terribly dear. I'm not acting when I say that I am obliged to cry — literally cry — at the suffering and the losses. And they will get worse, make no mistake . . .⁷

What I am proposing is to remove any taint of utilitarianism from the question of casualties in nonviolent defense versus those of nuclear and conventional war. We would accept *in principle* that unarmed defense may result in body counts exceeding any in ordinary war. Thus, as Gandhi put it in April 1939, while urging the British to undertake a nonviolent defense against Hitler, ". . . the point. . . to consider is not how to avoid the extreme penalty, but how to behave so as to achieve the object in view."⁸

Even that is a somewhat pragmatic viewpoint for Gandhi, who was an eminently pragmatic person. His larger perspective is more apparent in this comment which he made the following month:

It is highly probable that . . . "a Jewish Gandhi in Germany, should one arise, could function for about five minutes and would be promptly taken to the guillotine." But that would not disprove my case or shake my belief . . . I can conceive the necessity of the immolation of hundreds, if not thousands . . . Sufferers need not see the result during their lifetime.⁹

Granted; but as I was saying, add a few more zeroes to that.

In the nonviolent defense literature, here is how some of the writers have treated the problem of what we could call the logical consequences of the non-surrender principle. Elihu Burritt in 1852:

Now, then, let us suppose the same people, with the same deep sense of right and the same unanimous *will* to maintain it, *at the cost of any amount of suffering*, shake off the yoke of the oppressor, and oppose to his power the mere moral or passive resistance of that will. Simultaneously, as at the declaration of war, every man, woman and child *secedes from obedience* to the despotic Government, and *prepares for the consequences* . . . National independence! 'tis more than gained and guaranteed; . . . Democracy! that term falls below the dignity of this people's prerogative and power, even while the . . . block drips with the blood of their patriots and heroes, in every town and village of their land.¹⁰

What gorgeous rhetoric, misplaced in just one particular: he estimated only "dozens" of hangings per sizable town. Oh well. As Stalin was saying, "A single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic."¹¹

In 1909 Gandhi exhorted India:

. . . no nation has risen without suffering; . . . even in physical warfare the true test is suffering and not the killing of others, much more so in the warfare of passive resistance; . . .¹²

In 1924 Gandhi warned that a people waging nonviolent struggle must "possess the capacity for unlimited suffering for any length of time . . ."¹³ In 1934 Richard Gregg warned that:

If the struggle is against a powerful . . . government, and is prolonged, the resisters may have to suffer horrible tortures and bestial treatment. "War is hell," and in a big long struggle soldiers and police abandon all restraints.¹⁴

This offsets somewhat a preceding statement he made that nonviolent resisters face a "fair probability" of "sooner or later" having "to suffer hardships, and *perhaps* wounds, imprisonment and *even* death."¹⁵ What I ask is that we rub our hard noses a little harder into that "fair probability".

In 1939, Jessie Wallace Hughan stated the following as one of her four "Principles of Unarmed Defense": "4. All public officials pledged to die rather than surrender."¹⁶ Although later writers scorned the over-simplicity of some of her ideas, this one has been retained by them to a greater or lesser extent. (Lesser, in my case. I have discussed the idea of a "sacrificial goat" authorized by a Polity to sign pro-forma surrenders, until repudiated by the Polity.¹⁷)

In 1955, a Quaker panel, addressing themselves to the realities of power politics, made this point about nonviolent resistance:

. . . readiness to accept suffering — rather than inflict it on others — is the essence of . . . nonviolent defense . . . we must be prepared if called upon to pay the ultimate price.¹⁸

Again, "if called upon" sounds distantly iffy. But the pamphlet continues, in phraseology from A.J. Muste:

Obviously, if men are willing to spend billions of treasure and countless lives in war, they cannot dismiss the case for non-violence by saying that in a non-violent struggle people might be killed!

(*Might be? No, will be!*)

It is equally clear that where commitment and the readiness to sacrifice are lacking, nonviolent resistance cannot be effective.¹⁹

In fact, this pamphlet, *Speak Truth to Power*, was a serious effort to launch a dialogue on nonviolent resistance with foreign policy realists. Among its prime movers was Robert Pickus, a "realist" pacifist par excellence. He and Stephen Cary defended the pamphlet in a symposium published in the October 1955 issue of *The Progressive*. Among the critics were George Kennan, Hans Morganthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Norman Thomas, and Dwight Macdonald. Oddly enough, in the *original magazine*, Pickus and Cary sidestepped an oft-heard criticism, here voiced by Macdonald, that Communist invaders "would not shrink from whatever measures of extermination seemed necessary."²⁰ But in a *reprint version* of the symposium, four paragraphs were added, coming to grips with that poser. As part of the addendum, Pickus and Cary conceded:

This is not to suggest that non-violent resistance could be carried out without suffering. Against a totalitarian opponent it would clearly receive a far sterner test than against one imbued with an ethical tradition of the sacredness of human life. Indeed, the prospect of suffering that would be involved is appalling to contemplate.²¹

Compare that to Pham Van Dong's 1965 premonition quoted earlier²².

Cecil Hinshaw was another member of the 1955 Quaker panel. In his own pamphlet the following year, he made this assessment about the consequences of U.S. nonviolent defense against Soviet occupation:

At the worst, it would be a long and costly struggle over a generation or two, hurting the economy of the country badly . . . and resulting perhaps in the liquidation of thousands of our best people.²³

Thousands . . . ? Perhaps . . . ? That's almost nothing, next to U.S. traffic deaths, Vietnam losses, etc.

In 1958, Bradford Lyttle looked the Gorgon a little more closely in the eye, and made a somewhat higher forecast:

If, under a nonviolent resistance defense program, the United States . . . were invaded, it is likely our casualties would be considerable before the invaders withdrew. I . . . estimate . . . our total killed would not exceed our military losses in the Second World War.²⁴

These were in the vicinity of 300,000. (Lyttle also used the picturesque phrase "eugenic insanity" for characterizing the casualties of World War I, and war in general. It is said by him and others of nonviolent defense that the burden of dying would not be skewed to the healthiest classes of youth, but would be more generally shared, especially among older leadership groups.)

Without referring to death totals, Richard Gregg in the 1958 edition of his book did make this significant point:

If freedom is worth anything, it is worth fifty or a hundred years of unstinted effort in rigid adherence to the nonviolent method.²⁵

Ralph Bell has been one of the more funereal analysts of what may be expected in the ordeals of nonviolent combat. He offered this prognosis in 1959:

I fully realize that a struggle with Russia fought out by Active non-violent Resistance methods would be a costly business, calling for moral courage, rigid discipline and a willingness to die for the cause, but I am not prepared to say it is unworkable It would mean heavy casualties, possibly very heavy casualties . . .²⁶

Yes; but only "possibly"? In 1966 and 1968, Bell devised a plan for British and Commonwealth intervention in the Rhodesia struggle, including these provisos applicable to unarmed defense generally: "Casualties ought to be *expected* and *planned for*," he wrote.²⁷ He also cautioned as follows:

It is no part of nonviolent tactics to provoke the opposition to violence so that political capital can be made out of the deaths of nonviolent volunteers. But a nonviolent force must expect some casualties and cannot hope to be successful unless its members have trained themselves to accept those casualties without bitterness and without retaliation It is when

casualties are suffered that the nonviolent force has within its grasp the satisfactory solution of the conflict . . .²⁸

"Some" casualties — but here Bell was discussing a limited conflict.

In 1967, Adam Roberts mentioned that "readiness to face . . . repression must be a central feature of civilian defence policy."²⁹ In 1973, Gene Sharp put it this way:

Facing repression with persistence and courage means that the nonviolent actionists must be prepared to endure the opponent's sanctions without flinching.³⁰

Then in a later passage, Sharp echoed Gregg's semi-acumen: citing the hazards, but downplaying them with connotations of rarity:

There must be no illusions. In *some* cases nonviolent people have not only been beaten and cruelly treated but killed, not only accidentally or as isolated punishment, but in deliberate massacres.³¹

You don't say! And in only *some* cases?

In 1962, Mulford Q. Sibley put a similar veneer of improbability on otherwise harsh consequences:

At all points, it would be emphasized that actual physical suffering and *even death might* be entailed.³²

Sibley was also on a subsequent Quaker panel whose study of nonviolent defense appeared in 1967, and this one too seemed to have it both ways:

The number of casualties *could* be large, though certainly far less than in the event of a thermonuclear war.

We must be prepared for ruthless reprisals. . . .³³

My point is this: Without getting trapped in self-fulfilling prophecy, I think it is more prudent to *assume* that casualties *would* be extremely heavy, instead of *admitting* that they *might* be.

Should events turn out not so bad after all, let that be a pleasant surprise. But let there be no unpleasant surprise when worst comes to worst. Consider the non-surrender principle, and a nuclear ultimatum. Now what? *If* these principles, non-surrender and sacrifice and all of them, are accepted as the determinants of nonviolent common defense strategy, the implication must also be accepted that thousands and millions of deaths must be anticipated, either at one fell swoop, or in a very protracted struggle. Does that sound lugubrious, fatalistic, and fantastic? Let me just ask:

Where were you on October 24, 1962, when the United States and the Soviet Union nearly engaged in

nuclear war over missiles in Cuba?

So far I have dwelled on the first two aspects of this principle: staggering casualties and maximum suffering. They lead to a third aspect, which is a prediction, a hope — I will not say a certainty — that *if* the Polity can bear with and ride out such extreme mass terrorism (and *if* the slaughter is less than 100%), *then* the storm may subside, and the battle will have been won. Hinshaw phrased it like this in 1956:

... an invading army as we have posited would have instructions to use cruelty and even barbarity on a considerable scale if necessary and if it appeared to offer any hope of breaking the resistance . . . hostages would be tortured and killed . . . For the tyrant, the chief value in such killing . . . is the expectation that others will obey more readily thereafter. If the brutality does not accomplish this intended result, the danger of its indefinite continuance is not as great as it first appears.³⁴

In 1964, Theodor Ebert construed this expectation still more explicitly:

In so far as nonviolent resistance steels itself for the initial Machiavellian wave of terror and is prepared to meet the second onslaught, there must be a limit to further terror because of a dwindling belief of the invaders in the invincibility of their ideology and its capacity to bring happiness to all mankind.³⁵

That is good news, but it is not the key part of the principle; suppose indeed a foe aims at a 100% wipe-out? Such a situation would have be examined for the *particulars* of a given Polity and Foe-Polity. The "Sacrifice" Principle only says that heavy casualties must be expected — not how to prevent them. Also, without evading this kind of worst case, I think it can be said that total extirpation is an exceptional — yes, extremely exceptional — political aim. It *has* been tried. We should beware. But attempted subjugation via extravagant brutality is the far more common danger.

We do not want to inculcate a national death-wish. We do not expect the populace to be lambs for slaughter. What is important here is the Polity's stoicism and morale — that it not be caught off balance when the Foe-Polity goes all out with those "brutal strong-arm methods". Or much less than all out. Ill-prepared resistance can be deflated by a whiff of grapeshot. Consider the massacre in Sharpeville, South Africa in 1960, the effect of martial law in Poland on Solidarity in 1981, or the Tiananmen Square crackdown in China, 1989.

With this principle — as well as the others — I have stressed that

nonviolent defense must entail a readiness to bear with massive suffering and dying, and that personal death or national annihilation must in the long run be viewed in a philosophic or religious context. But a certain type of commentator — sometimes an apostate pacifist, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Dwight Macdonald, or Norman Thomas — will argue against this: against what Macdonald called an "ultimatist" perspective, or against what the Quaker group in 1955 called "the politics of eternity"³⁶. A statesperson (or revolutionary) must make here-and-now decisions, and cannot, rhetoric aside, rely on divine assistance, or so the argument goes. The gun is almightier than God. (Meanwhile, a cross-fire is set up by those [e.g., William F. Buckley] who sneer at peace activists for supposedly seeking 'mere biological survival': hardly the case in this paper. Such critics would be aghast at laying down so many lives without shooting back.)

Obviously it is unfair to assume that only a nonviolent defense strategy would risk megadeath and destruction. The nuclear facts of life today are not so shocking as in the late 1950s when Herman Kahn scandalized audiences by mentioning out loud how many million deaths would be "acceptable" in order to, say, prevent the "loss" of Berlin. Now that is all but taken for granted.

At the same time, nonviolent strategy options are the least known and the least tried, or else tried with the least tenacity. Let there be a minor massacre at Sharpeville, something less than a hundred dead, and that is said to be the end of the line for nonviolence. No more Mr. Nice Guy.

So the moral value of nonviolence is liable to be scorned not only by rebels and nuclear strategists. It is also dismissed by ex-pacifists who say we cannot count on God to bless the self-sacrifice of a nonviolent nation. And, as we shall see, modern exponents of nonviolent defense themselves tend to downplay the moral element of their argument.

But there is no need to derogate a *moral* concern about killing, and the consequences of refusing to do so. In the totality of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, it may have been the *moral* issue, as insistently voiced by Robert Kennedy, that provided the tiny and momentary margin of safety whereby armageddon was avoided. Arguing against Dean Acheson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, et al., Robert Kennedy protested that he

could not accept the idea that the United States would rain bombs on Cuba, killing thousands and thousands of civilians in a surprise attack . . . This, I said, could not be undertaken by the U.S. if we were to maintain our moral position at home and around the globe. Our struggle against Communism throughout the world was far more than physical survival — it had as its

essence our heritage and our ideals, and these we must not destroy.

We spent more time on this moral question during the first five days than on any other single matter . . . We struggled and fought with one another and with our consciences, for it was a question that deeply troubled us all.³⁷

After President John F. Kennedy had decided to defer (to *defer*) a surprise attack in favor of the blockade, Robert Kennedy concluded that:

The strongest argument against the all-out military attack, and one no one could answer to his satisfaction was that surprise attack would erode if not destroy the moral position of the United States throughout the world.³⁸

By no means am I saying that Robert Kennedy was a pacifist! Only that he raised just enough of a moral argument for just long enough to perhaps have been the Dutch boy at the dike. Also, according to Theodore Sorenson, Robert Kennedy, in his unfinished memoir, had intended

to add a discussion of the basic ethical question involved: what, if any, circumstance or justification gives this government or any government the moral right to bring its people and possibly all people under the shadow of nuclear destruction?³⁹

This is good as far as it goes, but even Robert Kennedy's fellow dove Sorenson has minced words here. "Bringing under a shadow" is rather abstract and euphemistic. Sorenson and Robert Kennedy and the other crisis managers in both countries were *themselves* just an eyeball away from pouring nuclear fire and brimstone on more people than all mass murderers in history combined.

Therefore, it is appropriate to measure these principles against the extremity of nuclear war, as well as all the lesser degrees of organized killing. Then if any Principle of strategic nonviolent defense seems hard to swallow, seems to require too much human sacrifice, we need only let our minds momentarily ponder October 1962; or a "rational" nuclear war; or an ordinary protracted war with merely millions of casualties; or a miniscule war in a vest-pocket country such as Lebanon or Ulster, with "miniscule" casualties, and religious consolations. Sacrifice, real and potential, gushes all around us in tragically wasteful cloudbursts. Like fire and flood, this human energy must be voluntarily — repeat, voluntarily — channeled to the benefit and longer run survival of the world community and human posterity.

Postscript

We should at this point pause to reflect on whether divine assistance is still operative or essential, in reality, or in nonviolent defense theory. We cannot risk and write off so many lives without asking whither and why.

Is God real, or helpful? That is for you to decide. Personally I am a Quaker, but I have my doubts; and most of my eggs are in a rational basket. Therefore I do not say that nonviolent defense is contingent on a Supreme Ally. But neither do I want to disregard a providential influence in worldly power politics, whether exemplified by the life of Gandhi, the survival of Israel, or the twin emergence of Solidarity and a Polish Pope.

Until about the late 1950s, the strategy of nonviolent defense was reinsured by God. Since then it has become almost totally secularized. For Gandhi, in his day, nonviolence without God was impossible; and death is merely an intermission. A. J. Muste (1885-1967), a pioneer theorist of nonviolent defense, shifted the tone of his argument increasingly in later years from Christian advocacy to political analysis with a more generalized morality. As we have seen, the 1955 Quaker case for nonviolent resistance adverted to the "politics of eternity". But its 1967 sequel omitted a Quaker/moral epilogue which was in the 1965 draft.⁴⁰ The younger Gene Sharp was a fervid Gandhian, but his 1973 masterwork, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, does not even list "God", "truth", or "morality" in the index. More recently, Sharp has tended to scoff at such preoccupations as "halo-polishing".⁴¹ This is indicative of a decision he and others made in the early 1960s, for nonviolent defense strategy to fly on its own without coming back to its earlier nest of religious pacifism and Gandhism.

An essentially strategic doctrine for nonviolent defense is all to the good. — indeed, one of my own specialties. But I suggest it is not halo-polishing to correct the ultra-pragmatic tilt a little, in order to reconsider first principles and extreme consequences and moral wherefores and divine solace. The average soldier and the chief of staff, the dedicated terrorist and the implacable tyrant, must each operate from *some* philosophic or religious starting point. The moral premises of nonviolent defense strategy cannot be evaded by undue striving toward a pseudo-pragmatism.

That said, I will water my own wine. I have argued the "Sacrifice" Principle in its most stringent and dogmatic form. But reality and real people will have their own priorities. Signing up for heavy-casualty lists is not one of them. Personal and national ambivalence about heroism is an old story. Pragmatic nonviolent resistance planners will have declaratory as well as action policies, balancing public resilience and the art of the possible.

The steadfast Polity will indeed *Expect the worst and*

tolerate heavy casualties — but this is a principle to be husbanded very carefully; to be saved for a very rainy day. High national endeavor can be galvanized by the likes of Thomas Paine, Carl Mannerheim of Finland, or Ho Chi Minh; to say nothing of Napoleon, Stalin or Churchill. Like them, astute leaders of a nonviolent common defense effort will discern those uncommon situations which enable uncommon personal and national sacrifice.

Me, I'd rather be somewhere else.

Notes

- 1 Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Ralph Manheim, translator (London: Hutchinson, 1969; orig. 1926), p. 625.
- 2 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Nonviolence in Peace & War*, Vol. I, Mahadev Desai, editor (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1962; orig. 1942), p. 217.
- 3 Gene Keyes, "Strategic nonviolent defense: the construct of an option", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1981, pp. 125-151.
- 4 This means that the casualty figures should be multiplied by 10,000 or 100,000 — *ed.*
- 5 Five digits literally means a number in the range 10,000 to 99,999. Nine digits means 100,000,000 to 999,999,999. Ten digits is 1,000,000,000 or more, given that the world's population is about 6,000,000,000 — *ed.*
- 6 10% to 99% — *ed.*
- 7 James Cameron, "'Let U.S. go, and the war is over'", *New York Times*, 11 December 1965.
- 8 Gandhi, *op. cit.* (note 2).
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 219.
- 10 Elihu Burritt, "Passive resistance", in Staughton Lynd (ed.), *Nonviolence in America: A Documentary History* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 106-108. I have emphasized places where Burritt suggests some of the principles codified in my list.
- 11 George Seldes (ed.), *The Great Quotations* (New York: Pocket Books, 1967), p. 255.
- 12 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj, or Indian Home Rule* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1939; orig. 1909), p. 103.
- 13 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1950), p. 184.
- 14 Richard Gregg, *The Power of Non-violence* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1934), pp. 120-121.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 120. Emphasis added.
- 16 Jessie Wallace Hughan, *If We Should be Invaded: Facing a Fantastic Hypothesis* (New York: War Resisters League, 1939).

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- 17 Gene Keyes, *Strategic Nonviolent Defense in Theory; Denmark in Practice* (Toronto: York University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1978), pp. 364-368.
 - 18 American Friends Service Committee, *Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Violence* (Philadelphia: AFSC, 1955), p. 65.
 - 19 Ibid. See A. J. Muste, *How to Deal with a Dictator* (New York: Fellowship, 1954), p. 30.
 - 20 "Is there another way?", a debate on *Speak Truth to Power*, with articles by Robert Pickus, George Kennan, et al., *The Progressive*, October 1955, p. 24. The reprinted edition of this symposium has an expanded and improved version of Pickus and Cary's "Reply to the critics".
 - 21 Ibid., reprint version only, p. 22.
 - 22 Luckily, the U.S. ethical tradition limited the suffering in Vietnam to about a million dead on Pham Van Dong's side — Stalin's "statistic". So it goes.
 - 23 Cecil Hinshaw, *Nonviolent Resistance: A Nation's Way to Peace* (Wallingford, Pennsylvania: Pendle Hill Pamphlet #88, 1956), p. 41.
 - 24 Bradford Lyttle, *National Defense Thru Nonviolent Resistance* (Chicago: Shahn-ti Sena, 1958), pp. 56-57.
 - 25 Richard Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence* (New York: Fellowship, third edition, 1959), p. 119.
 - 26 Ralph Bell, *Alternative to War* (London: James Clarke, 1959), pp. 59, 61.
 - 27 Ralph Bell, *Rhodesia: Outline of a Nonviolent Strategy to Resolve the Crisis* (London: Housmans, 1968), p. 13. Emphasis added.
 - 28 Ibid., p. 19.
 - 29 Adam Roberts, "Civilian defence strategy", in Roberts (ed.), *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense: Nonviolent Action Against Aggression* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole, 1968), p. 250.
 - 30 Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), p. 551.
 - 31 Ibid., p. 556. Emphasis added.
 - 32 Mulford Q. Sibley, *Unilateral Initiatives and Disarmament* (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1962), p. 35. Emphasis added.
 - 33 American Friends Service Committee, *In Place of War: An Inquiry into Nonviolent National Defense* (New York: Grossman, 1967), p. 49. Emphasis added.
 - 34 Hinshaw, op. cit. (note 23), pp. 35, 36.
 - 35 Theodor Ebert, "Freedom on the offensive: strategy and tactics of nonviolent resistance to a Communist invasion" (1964), published as several chapters of T. K. Mahadevan, Adam Roberts and Gene Sharp (eds.), *Civilian Defence: An Introduction* (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1967), p. 192.
 - 36 *Speak Truth to Power*, op. cit. (note 18), pp. 71, 72.

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- 37 Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 37-39.
- 38 Ibid., p. 49.
- 39 Ibid., p. 128.
- 40 See note 33.
- 41 Gene Sharp, letter to the editor, *Fellowship*, August-September 1976, pp. 29-30.
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Shadow Science in the Soviet Union

Valentine A. Bazhanov

Science in the Soviet Union has been corrupted by the regular intervention of bureaucracies in decisions about publications and awarding of advanced degrees. Advancement as a Soviet "scientist" is more a means for career benefits than the discovery of truth. The processes by which decisions in science take place for non-scholarly reasons can be called "shadow science".

"In order to get ahead in science one needs not only a lively mind but also a death grip." — Mr Bespalchik

Many Soviet television viewers remember Mr Bespalchik, the hero of a very popular programme a couple of years ago, for his wit and keenness of observation. The quote above belongs to a different Mr Bespalchik who, like his television counterpart, has wit, but in his professional work more deeply reflects on the realities of scientific life, some of which are raised in the quote. Alas, these realities, up to now, have never been discussed by those scholars (at least in the Soviet Union) who do research in philosophy, methodology and sociology of science.

Recently, M. A. Rozov ventured to name these realities explicitly, but only in general terms and in relation to philosophy. As he put it, "for many years there have been factors here which steadfastly wreck our philosophical and scientific communities", resulting in "science that is a sort of imitation of science, philosophy that is a sort of imitation of philosophy".¹ The factors themselves are not analysed in the article, but a rather detailed panorama of these factors and their operative mechanisms might be drawn. This will produce a clearer picture of the means which force science to become an imitation of science.

It is very probable that the core of these factors is universal for scientific activity everywhere, independent of whether it is carried out in Spain, the United States, China or the Soviet Union. Certainly, in every country these core factors are mediated by numerous conditions (national, social and political, etc.), which means that case studies are extremely important.

The factors which promoted the transition of science, considered as a human enterprise, into an imitation of science, have specific features in the Soviet Union. I am going to analyse some of them by describing some case studies which make these features explicit. By realising the sources of shadow science, it may be possible to change the intellectual climate which currently promotes the prosperity of shadow science enterprises.

The shadow science phenomenon

In general terms, the term "shadow science" means those details and sides of scientific activity which exude the image of science without its substance. But this formulation is too general and doesn't reflect the differentiated specifics of shadow science.

Shadow economics means illegal economic activity. Similarly, shadow science might be defined as scientific communities, representatives or activity based on a violation or deformation of ideals, norms and values commonly cultivated in this community.

In the Soviet Union, the academic occupation can provide a comparatively good income, prestige and standard of living, even though all these parameters have rapidly worsened during the past decade. That is why some vigorous people treat academia — both research and teaching — as a comparatively profitable employment. Special social mechanisms are invented to make a scientific career not only possible in principle but to provide quick promotion. An academic degree or rank may serve as a solid basis or even springboard (in the case, for instance, of party officials) for personal aggrandisement elsewhere, such as industry and Communist Party institutions. That is why pursuit of academic degrees is considered to be a very important enterprise, able to ensure quite a good standard of living or as a suitable basis for a career in some other field.

I will now start a concrete assessment of the shadow science phenomenon in the Soviet Union. I would like to stress that it should be apprehended as a critical step or desire to understand, figuratively speaking, "the ideal false world where all is true" (S. E. Lec). The proportions of this world are determined by the culture and traditions of scientific schools, communities, status and their social, political and economic features.

The empirical ground of my reasoning and description of shadow science was formed by my personal experiences during my work in the Higher Education Ministry and the Academy of Sciences, as well as experiences of my colleagues, readily shared with me. Although I have disguised the names of individuals, all case histories and characters are real. As far as they represent typical situations, I will not mention inessential details.

I begin with the situation where, for the first time, I noticed the shadow science phenomenon in full bloom. In the early 1980s I was the Research-Visitor Associate at one of the leading Academy of Sciences Institutes in Moscow. In the Academy living quarters I became acquainted with Mr D from the eastern part of the country. Soon we found that the problems we worked on were similar. Certainly, I tried to determine what ideas and authors were of most interest to D. However, although D was on his one-year probation period, he was not even able to name the titles of works of eminent scholars. He could not even name correctly the title of the book he was reading at the moment. I was surprised by his unawareness of information that he ought to know.

We continued the conversation and I asked about D's personal publications. The answer transformed my surprise into astonishment: among D's papers was a paper in the most prestigious Soviet journal and one more was about to be published! This latter article actually appeared very soon after our conversation. It was not original — it contained no fresh ideas — but was quite professional. Hence, its content permitted me to judge the professional level and skills of the author, and his academic erudition and mental outlook as well.

A question immediately arises: was D able himself, without any assistance, to write these articles? If yes, why did the journal, which firmly insisted on originality of publication, in D's case publish a lengthy article void of any new idea?

I suspected in this and similar cases that some extra-academic factors, having nothing to do with reaching the truth, were involved. Since then, I have paid special attention to results of scientific activity such as books, dissertations and so forth which enable their authors to make quick personal advancement. The D case was intriguing, for the articles that appeared under D's name were at least professionally competent. The results of scientific activity have been described as a "miserable profusion of mishmash and even muddle-headedness, common among academics".² The D case, though, manifests something more than only "mishmash and muddle-headedness".

To sustain this judgement, I'll say that soon after our conversation D successfully passed his Doctor of Science defence. (This is the highest academic degree in the Soviet Union. The second highest is the Candidate of Science or PhD.) But — oh, miracle! — his doctoral dissertation was not approved by the High Testimonial Commission, which has special expertise and the right to reject a dissertation that doesn't fulfil the requirements. After a second defence of the dissertation (even its title remained unchanged) it smoothly passed through the High Testimonial Commission. We see here a sample of the pseudo-academic industry of making PhDs and DScs.

After obtaining a PhD, a scholar acquires a certain weight in the official academic structures. A PhD has for many decades been considered to give its holder success through financial independence, necessary for any adult person.

That is why the criteria for providing people with PhDs are artificially lowered. They are entirely determined by considerations of minimal economic welfare. Besides, the PhD opens the way to further growth (though limited) of salaries and career opportunities.

The DSc degree requires much more skill and effort, and is a more complex process. Nevertheless, as shown by the D case, this complexity can be overcome with some degree of desire and stubbornness. The DSc gives to its holder an appreciable academic weight, affords a sharp rise in salary, public prestige and, more importantly in Soviet conditions, progress up the administrative ranks (in academic or state hierarchies).

The total number of DSc holders in the Soviet Union is 50,000, and there are ten times as many PhDs (Candidates of Science). The traditions of academic activity in the Soviet Union, which are persistently maintained, treat the process of obtaining PhDs and DScs as the cornerstone of scientific life.

There are even special social institutions of postgraduate studies. During the past few years a great number of doctoral "schools" have appeared. What do they teach about how to "make" dissertations? How to write a thesis? Or how to conduct oneself during the defence?

On the basis of my personal experience of obtaining a PhD and DSc, as well as experiences of my close colleagues, I would like to stress that the goal of creating fundamental academic work and the goal of "creating" dissertations are, if not entirely contrary to each other, on different planes of scientific activity.

The orientation of academic activity towards obtaining a degree is one of the conditions favourable towards turning science into an imitation of science. Extra-scientific direction for a scholar's work enters in with the need to obtain the approval of a comparatively small group of academics (perhaps 30 to 40). If real science requires a "lively mind", the dissertation enterprise requires a "death grip", namely an ability to produce a good presentation that satisfies the tastes and psychological preferences of this group. (This doesn't mean that the requirement of public defence of dissertations is totally worthless or harmful.)

The rate of solicitation of academic degrees illustrates the deformation of the self-consciousness of the Soviet scientific community. The public defence of dissertations, to which exaggerated attention has been paid during recent decades, should be only the by-product of academic activity and not its main goal. At the present time, and indeed for many years, a tradition has been cultivated which

makes an opposite emphasis: first of all the dissertation and only then real research activity. Are three years of postgraduate work and three years of doctoral work justified only by the pursuit, by hook or by crook, of an academic degree, when long-term research targets are relegated to the background? Not to my mind. The sources of change for this situation lie mainly within the scientific community. Without such change, the disintegration of scientific communities will go ahead.

Even the "softer" approach to dissertations in the Soviet Union cannot be fully justified. As a matter of fact, the laws governing degrees declare that doctoral dissertations should contain the resolution or generalisation of important, large-scale scientific problems or the creation of a new academic direction of research. In both cases, a dissertation presupposes the systematic account of somebody's standpoint on a particular problem. This demands prolonged concentration and stubborn work, free of any distraction by other problems, even those close to the topic. The scholar must be willing to "cultivate" the topic. A person who, after producing original ideas, loses interest in them and begins to move into new areas to produce further new ideas, has little chance of finishing the strictly systematic research work. Such a rebellious nature has to be restrained. Mastering the dissertation genre is a difficult task for such academics.

Bureaucratic sponsorship of shadow science

The less democratic the society, the fewer reasons to talk about its science in terms of a self-organising, self-governing enterprise. Totalitarian and authoritarian societies possess a feature that can be called "superconductivity": all the subsystems of such societies perceive the commands and instructions produced by party or government officials with little or no resistance. Even verbal requests or indications in the form of cues have the status of commands. This phenomenon is known as the "telephone law" (in the lawless society). In the Soviet Union since 1917, the telephone law conquered vast areas of social life, if not the whole state space, forming a vertical command system.

In such societies, the degree of interdependence is so large that friendship relations and simple acquaintances are often forced to give up all juridical regulations and behave according to the principle, "I am serving you and you are serving me". The implicit horizontal social structures are formal. The society as a whole becomes loaded with numerous ties. In democratic societies we cannot entirely exclude the interdependence of its members but its level is much less.

The following comparison is perhaps possible. The extent of interdependence in democratic societies may be viewed as a minimal

energy phenomenon of quantum mechanics, when the wave function of a certain system is equal to zero but the energy of the system cannot be less than some quantity determined by Planck's Constant. In democratic states the level of interdependence is defined, for instance, by psychological or interpersonal realities, rooted ultimately in human nature.

What about the concrete bureaucratic structures that hold rein over science in the Soviet Union? To begin with, one can name some bureaucratic power structures which represent special units of administration conducting the policy of the Community Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The ranks of the CPSU, from the Central Committee to local committees, contain such units, often headed by persons totally ignorant about the organisation of scientific issues. The official departments are powerless. The power — though decreasing — is still concentrated in CPSU committees. Analogous departments are found in the Ministry of Higher Education (now the State Committee of Education) or the State Committee for Science and Technology, but they are of minor importance.

All major decisions — from official journeys to the so-called capitalist countries, to 5-year renewal rules — are taken only in accordance with the opinions of officials with the CPSU committees. Even in cases when agreement by the party committee is not necessary, the committee may still express its "own opinion" and, more likely than not, the decision will reflect it. During the previous two years, party influence on the scientific media has diminished, but the degree of this diminution is not proportional to the decline of the general authority of party officials among the people due to various perestroika processes. The influence on scholars often remains noticeable. Moreover, this influence is effectively used by scholars who know the ins and outs of the party apparatus.

A two-sided movement has taken place. On the one hand, the apparatus has done its best to recruit loyal (more precisely, obedient) representatives among academics, and the latter readily appeal to party power. The by-product of such collaboration is various "coordinative councils", which aim to usurp rights to rule over science, to become some sort of structure on top of academia.

The party and state officials vigorously exploit the means for obtaining academic degrees more easily than everybody else, for they join the category of practical research workers who possess numerous advantages over pure academics. In addition, they fully use their positions as representatives of power.

A rather typical example is Mr X, who was going to enter the doctorate for three years but was offered a party post and immediately accepted it. In no time after becoming a party official, he initiated a campaign to gain his DSc. Moreover, being young, he chose

the type of public defence available only to elderly and eminent academics. He succeeded without the three years required for finishing his doctoral dissertation.

By the way, I should add that the party apparatus represents, so to speak, a non-classical bureaucratic structure: the classical bureaucracy is known by its red tape, procrastination, and formal instead of informal treatment of various affairs. The peculiarity of the CPSU bureaucratic machine is that its actions strongly depend on the concrete situation and the internal interests of the apparatus. The apparatus can and does use procrastination. Meanwhile, when the apparatus has any interest in an issue, all sorts of problems can be solved in no time, without any formalities. The impossible becomes possible; all channels are opened. All laws and norms of the scientific community are abandoned, and no criticism is accepted. This is the style of action used not only by CPSU officials but by almost all closed state social structures, ministries, committees, etc. This is the style of life of the *nomenclature*.

The scholar L tried to publish his book. It was severely criticised by the publishing company reviewer. He appealed to the apparatus for help. The apparatus appointed new reviewers and organised discussion of the book in the local scientific community. The reviewers and the local community appraised the manuscript as incompetent. Mr L didn't lose his temper. He finally found previously unknown supporters in a high party office, who simply ordered the book published. It was actually published in record time. How did he manage to enlist their support? At this point I collide with one of the characteristic features of shadow science, worth describing in more detail.

The roots of shadow science

As a matter of fact, the publishing of the monograph provides a way to obtain a DSc with all its possible consequences (high salaries, posts, etc.). That's why the struggle to publish a book by any means often is a virtually desperate operation. This to a large extent explains Mr L's desperate undertaking and appeal for CPSU support.

This support is impossible without several features characteristic of shadow science. The first one, already mentioned, involves a high-ranked person exerting power over particular scientific realities. A second one is the piercing force of a certain set of officially certified reviews by some eminent and, if you are lucky, high-ranking academics.

The mechanism of the first feature is quite obvious: the telephone law may do the trick and often does. The same mechanism works when your close colleague expresses a desire and you are forced to act accordingly. Today I'm doing something for you. Tomorrow I wish your favour. If you neglect the request, there is a risk that all kinds of

relations with higher-ups will be broken off. Only a few can escape the process of prudential acquiescence and adopt the course of opposition rather than accommodation.

The proportion of "apostates" amidst the total number of academics is identical to the proportion of science amidst what is only an imitation of science. Nonconformist scholars officially find themselves in the position of inconvenient persons, especially for the administration.

The second factor — officially certified reviews — is perhaps specific to Soviet society. It makes the operation of the first factor easier, or entirely replaces it. Sometimes it is hard not to acquiesce in the face of reviews sanctified by state seals of noteworthy academic institutions. The reviews effectively work in any kind of situation. If the work has only just started on its path to publication, then such reviews ensure that it will pass without a hitch. If the manuscript was already rejected by reviewers, then new reviews enable it to begin another ascent to the printing house.

On another case, one scholar confided the secret for publishing articles: "You ought to get as many 'positive' reviews as you can, for instance ten laudatory reviews for every critical review. As far as I know, no publishing company would fight against such a proportion."³

Let us imagine the following situations. (1) The manuscript of academic N is discussed by official reviewers (and colleagues in general), who are highly critical of the work and think it should be improved. At a suitable moment, the reviews of eminent scholars, obtained beforehand, are extracted. They cause disarray: "We are not able to oppose such eminent names"; "We will not be correctly understood by these figures"; "It is better not to intervene."

(2) A manuscript by Mr N was negatively appraised by 12 members of his department. Mr N collects other reviews. When a sufficient number of these other reviews are obtained, he demands that the decision be reconsidered, although the work remains unchanged. The department members feel spited. The department refuses to reconsider its decision about the incompetence of the work. The additional reviews serve as a pretext for an appeal to CPSU officials on the ground that local academics are ignorant. The officials pass a resolution to publish the book in a roundabout way in violation of common rules of academic publication.

Several years ago the officials offered no explanation for their actions, since they considered themselves sovereign masters of all possible situations. But in the past one or two years they have tried to support their resolutions with the argument that a plurality of opinions is desirable. One opinion cannot be spoken, though: that a party protege is incompetent. They seem oblivious to the devastating and undermining effects of such actions on the ethical norms of the

intellectual community. The person who stands over the community on the basis of external power feels infallible and authorised to do anything.

It is quite possible for real cases of misevaluation to occur due to challenges made to central beliefs. But works able to undermine a paradigm do not appear every day, and they are not under consideration here. Instead, I focus on unprofessional, incompetent works, written with the prior intention of appeal to forces outside the community. Those who are able to produce something really revolutionary are usually quite capable of showing their mastery over the existing paradigm or, at least, to show elementary knowledge. To my mind, a good indicator of professionalism is an openness by scholars to a wide range of problems, especially those adjacent to their main occupation, and an ability to deal with them. It should suffice, however, to return to officially certified reviews and the circumstances of their creation.

Shadow science scaffolds

It is well known that mathematics, due to its nature, is considered to be a citadel of austerity which leaves no place for nonacademic intrigues. I argue that, contrary to this picture, all the mechanisms mentioned above are smoothly working in mathematics as in the rest of science.

The well known mathematician A. D. Alexandrov, a full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was filled with indignation over the following incident.⁴ A mathematics textbook which contained numerous blunders was published in enormous numbers. Such things happen sometimes. The Soviet mathematical community produced many highly critical reviews, for this book was recommended by the Education Ministry as obligatory for teacher-training institutes. Alexandrov complains that the nature of mathematics should prevent such blunders. Far from it! Neither the Education Ministry nor the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences reacted to the negative reviews. The blunders were called "minor instances" which were not essential. This appraisal finds support among some professional mathematicians.

Some time later, a geometry textbook for future teachers was published with blunders, indeed a contempt for accuracy, that taxed the imagination and achieved a sort of record in the mathematical literature. The textbook, once again, was recommended as obligatory for teacher training institutes and all the blunders remained.

One can ask: why exactly was this record-setting book of blunders produced in a system consisting of ministries and bureaucratic state departments? For those who know well Soviet social realities, the answer is obvious: the ministries are fully independent in their behaviour.

Now we are at the point of the holy of holies of shadow science and official reviews. As Alexandrov puts it, "All the critics of textbooks were rejected by the ministry's appointed reviewer, who evidently *didn't read it*. Moreover the criticism was judged inappropriate since it undermined the faith of future teachers in textbooks."⁵ Remarkable argumentation by any standard. But I'm not going to devote attention to this argumentation (it is worthy of special analysis) but to the fact that appointed reviewers "didn't read it" — even after severe criticisms from colleagues of the author, even after a scandal caused by these criticisms.

This is the crux of the matter. The works under review are not read, but at most looked through (for example, to search for a reference to the reviewer's articles). Academics have a severe lack of time, especially in the organisation where the flow of manuscripts, dissertations and so forth is heavy. What sense is there in reading numerous works when they are almost all dull and unworthy of the careful attention that must be given to new ideas? What sense is there in giving criticisms when the author could easily be hurt? (In the state of total interdependence and prudential accommodation, it is not profitable to give criticisms.) If the reviewer feels uneasy in making any critical remarks, then what sense is there in reading?

Here is a very typical picture in an academic organisation: feverish leafing through a manuscript, which in an hour (or half an hour, or a few minutes) will be discussed. This may be the reason why the quality of doctoral dissertations from universities is superior to those from the Academy of Sciences sector.

I have personally seen reviews, with all officially necessary attributes, which must be considered fantastic. Their content — including elementary grammatical mistakes typical of non-Russians — simply demonstrates that they were written by inhabitants of Central Asia or the Caucasus, although the signatures belong to eminent scholars in Moscow. Yet all appropriate certifications were available.

On the other hand, when the review is written smoothly and correctly — and only its content is suspect — it is impossible to prove that its author is anyone but the person whose name appears with it.

The administration in its turn is inclined to unconditionally trust the signatures, as officially certified. They say that false signatories are not placed on reviews easily. Alas, the empirical facts show that they are. Once this fact is admitted, it suffices to stress that it has a devastating effect on the scientific community, including morale, welfare and moral climate.

M. A. Rozov wrote that "at the turn of the 1980s, a well known Soviet philosopher recognised that for a long time he had purchased only books by Western authors. He did not purchase the work of Soviet scholars and did not read them. 'Not without exception. I read your

works,' he said, being polite. 'I am also reading your papers,' I answered. Now I should honestly recognise that I never read them."⁶ If published books are not read, what can be said about the unpublished, namely those on the way to the printing house?

I was told by several mathematicians that during a public defence of a candidate dissertation (for PhD), the author Mr A, supposedly a mathematician, was not able to define a hyperbola, which he had repeatedly mentioned shortly before. This and other evidence suggested that he was virtually ignorant of mathematics. After the secret vote — the necessary procedure for every public defence — the result was half in favour of Mr A and half against. As well as asking how Mr A reached the stage of public defence, we should ask why half the Academic Council voted for him. The reasons probably lie deeply rooted in the psychosocial climate of Soviet-style science management.

I have given evidence of the importance of shadow science within Soviet science — or, should we say, imitation of science? In any case, the result is dull science, and the only product of dull science is more dull science. Rather than producing scientists with lively minds, they are produced with a death grip.

NOTES

- 1 M. A. Rozov, "Is philosophy a part of the scientific community?", *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1988, No. 8, pp. 23-36, quotes on pp. 23, 29 (in Russian).
- 2 V. P. Skulachev, introduction to G. N. Gilbert and M. Mulkay, *Opening Pandora's Box* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), Soviet edition, 1987, p. 4 (in Russian).
- 3 Yu. N. Davydov, "Reflections on philosophical culture", *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1988, No. 3, pp. 57-70, quote on p. 70 (in Russian).
- 4 A. D. Alexandrov, "Truth as moral value", *Science and Values*, Novosibirsk, 1987, pp. 27-43, see pp. 36-38 (in Russian).
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 37.
- 6 Rozov, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

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