Miriam Solomon, "Lap-tops against communicative democracy: international non-governmental organisations and the World Bank", in Brian Martin (ed.), Technology and Public Participation (Wollongong, Australia: Science and Technology Studies, University of Wollongong, 1999), pp. 61-81.
This chapter draws from case study material from campaigns by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) against the World Bank during its 50th anniversary to outline the democratic tensions inherent in global activism and the way these tensions are manifested in the differential usages of technology. It schematically describes the complex matrix of World-Bank-related INGOs along two intersecting axes: the ideological orientations towards abolition or reform, and the North-South hierarchy. A model of communicative democracy is presented--a feminist reframing of deliberative democracy--which incorporates three primary aspects of justice: recognition justice, distributive justice, and political or representational justice, projected onto the global field of INGO structures. The model emphasises the expression and representation of differences, while at the same time calling for equality of access to material, social and political resources and opportunities. I reflect on the constraints to realising such a model through the usage of computer technologies, due to their rationalising, homogenising and exclusory tendencies. They reflect and consolidate social, economic and political inequalities, and are encoded with the cultural horizon of instrumental rationality and efficiency, centralisation and hierarchy. This highlights the limits to the democratising potential of computer-mediated communications within the global public sphere, and the contradictory demands on INGOs to both remain within the machine of rationalised modernity and yet at the same time to subvert it.
International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) frequently invoke arguments for the democratisation of the institutions they are attempting to influence. However, in their own organisational structures they themselves find that following democratic principles is very challenging. Furthermore, their work is vitally dependent on communication technologies, but these technologies are not independent of their social context, for they reflect and consolidate unequal power relations, and in certain senses exacerbate the already enormous obstacles for democratic participation in the global public sphere. In this chapter I outline a model of communicative democracy and describe a matrix of power relations amongst INGOs campaigning against the World Bank, to ask two questions: what does a model of communicative democracy have to offer for interpreting this case study material, and what does a study of the role of technology in global participation reveal about the model?
Background: INGOs and the World Bank eyeball to eyeball
With this goal the INGOs launched a global campaign to publicise their objections during the entire year of the World Bank's fiftieth anniversary. It consisted of protest actions, conferences, seminars, meetings, numerous ongoing computer conferences, and a concerted media campaign throughout the world. The campaign was to culminate in a flurry of activities surrounding the World Bank's own 50th anniversary celebrations in Madrid, coinciding with its 49th annual meeting.
Thus we see the dark face of "development," the level of protection deemed necessary by our global masters against any who would dare to challenge their legitimacy. The state comes out in violent force against its own unarmed citizens and international visiting activists. The vested interests of the World Bank and the IMF, the financial markets and transnational corporations who are the real beneficiaries of "aid" and the global economy, must after all be protected. The stakes are indeed high, as high as they get.
Enter our INGOs, putatively as representatives of "global civil society." They occupy, it is said, an intermediary role between "the people" (of the world) and the major global (governing) institutions. However neither are the leaders of any of these official institutions nor their opposing INGOs actually democratically elected. The INGO members are mostly either self-appointed voluntary workers or salaried professionals.
During the year of the fiftieth anniversary, thousands of activists around the world joined the campaign to condemn the Bank and to demand change. But what change? Who exactly has the formula for eliminating global injustice, for devising an alternative to global capitalism, and the crisis of "the new world (dis)order"? And what political strategies might the INGOs most usefully adopt? These are some of the difficult questions INGOs confront. What might contemporary democratic theory offer to assist INGOs in making such decisions?
Iris Young has proposed an idealised model of communicative democracy. It suggests procedures for communicative exchanges in relationships in which others are recognised and acknowledged on their own terms, in their specific and particular needs, perspectives, feelings and desires. Appropriate decisions can become clear when this kind of understanding becomes available from all who will be affected by them. This can only truly occur under ideal conditions, with the elimination of domination and oppression.
Young's model is aimed at including all social and cultural groups, regardless of their backgrounds. Her starting point assumes difference and distance. Because power sometimes enters the form, the style and the content of speech itself, the more marginalised groups usually tend to be excluded or silenced. To counter this Young proposes "an equal privileging of any forms of communicative interaction where people aim to reach understanding." This involves speaking and listening across wide differences of culture, social position, need and commitment, recognising others in their particularity. To facilitate the participation of multiple voices in decision-making, she advocates the entry of multiple modes and styles of communication, in an open process with no predetermined outcomes, but through which opinions, preferences and perspectives are transformed.
Communicative democracy expects conflict and difference, and rather than presuming criticism and dissent to be dangerously disruptive by creating divisions that need to be overcome, this model celebrates difference, disagreement and challenge, regarding them instead as resources to draw on for increased understanding.
Communication is integral to this theory of democracy. Young writes of the need for "a broad and plural conception of communication that includes both the expression and extension of shared understandings, where they exist, and the offering and acknowledgment of unshared meanings." This supports less conventional (by Western rationalist standards) modes of communication than critical argument alone, affirming "the culturally variant ways that humans produce and make use of multiple representations," including such things as greeting, rhetoric, story-telling, and gesture. "Our task," Joan Landes argues, "is surely not to resort to texts in place of images, but instead to comprehend and deploy all means of representation in a counterhegemonic strategy against established power wherever it resides."
These suggestions primarily focus on the recognition of difference. But as Nancy Fraser's formulation of justice emphasises, equitable distribution of social, economic and political resources (distributive justice) may be just as crucial as the recognition of differences (recognition justice) for democratic communication. Unequal access to resources and cultural misrecognition both impede democratic participation by disadvantaged groups, who suffer differentially from the effects of domination, oppression and isolation due to material, structural, social, political and cultural constraints. I thus include redistribution also in my model of communicative democracy.
Can this model be extended to the global field? From my research I conclude that decision-making in global organisations, as in national and local entities, absolutely requires personal contact where relationships of trust, mutual respect and solidarity can begin to develop. Especially for the hard decisions on contentious issues, there is no substitute for face-to-face contact, whatever logistical, financial and other difficulties this entails. To this extent a communicative model of democracy can provide valuable guidelines for global organisations, since difference is even more pronounced in the global setting, as is maldistribution. The vexed question of who gets to participate in these meetings raises the problem of representation.
Below I examine my case study findings using a model of communicative democracy, revised to include recognition, redistribution and representation, as they affect participation in face-to-face meetings. Of course any model of global democracy will always be highly contestable and for good reasons, but I regard such proposals as a tactic for addressing present day concerns. There is already a de facto system of global governance that is entirely undemocratic, to which the INGOs rightly draw our attention. While these institutions exist, there is no escaping the importance of challenging them, such as by calling for their democratisation, abolition or replacement with "genuinely" democratic structures. It is clear that in their present form they could not survive radical democratisation. As will be clear from the foregoing, neither would the current structures of INGOs remain unchanged by radical democratisation, for they themselves tend to mirror this undemocratic global hierarchy.
The matrix of INGOs against the World Bank
The INGO world is pervaded by hierarchies of power, resources and influence in a matrix along several intersecting axes. Here I focus on two of these. The first depends on the philosophical approach to change of the World Bank, roughly divided between "reformists" and "abolitionists." The second I loosely describe as the North-South hierarchy, arguing that power relations and hence participation among INGOs reflects the international hierarchy among nation-states. I suggest that the dynamics of these relationships, and hence their communications and the technologies associated with them, are preconditioned by, but also reinforce, these power differentials.
The reformists are primarily the leaders of NGOs in industrialised countries and, here in Madrid, a very small number of representatives from the South (and fewer from Eastern Europe). They have the education and resources necessary for gaining access to officialdom, and their prominence, international reputation and influence are often substantially facilitated when they are effective electronic communicators. These lobbyists have worked relentlessly for over a decade, battling on in an unremitting word war, fax machines at their sides, and lap-top computers in their arms as they traverse the globe in search of information and networks of support. Their campaigns against the Bank have delivered some serious blows. By invoking the arguments for democratic legitimacy, they have obtained some significant concessions in recent years from the Bank. But in the words of one of my interviewees, a key figure in the bureaucratic NGO lobbying centre of Washington: "We got what we wanted. Now what?"
Lobbying power in relation to the Bank is however not equally distributed. It parallels the governing structure and influence within the Bank itself. NGOs in the wealthy countries, led by the United States (the Bank's major shareholder with the highest voting rights in the Bank), have the greatest opportunities for exerting direct pressure. They understand the bureaucratic language of "development" and bear down hard on the Bank with the full force of their critique. They have a sophisticated understanding of political processes which they use to full effect. They assess the full range of political contingencies impacting on the Bank, and effectively manoeuvre to take advantage of its vulnerable points. They strategically gather, process and disseminate information and resources. Information is often leaked to them, particularly those in Washington where the World Bank is based, by anonymous sympathetic officials with whom they cultivate a trusting relationship.
But conflicts inevitably arise. Assessments of what is deemed to "work" in terms of political influence in the United States (influence that is crucial for decision making within the Bank) or in terms of broad longer term goals, at times differ from assessments by people directly affected by these decisions in the here and now. How may these differing perspectives and opinions be reconciled? What is the effect of this matrix of power relations on the scope for democratic communications between the groups, and what role do communication technologies play in these dynamics? The next section examines these questions through the application of distributive and recognition aspects of the model of communicative democracy presented above, and their impacts on participation and representation.
Technology for communicative democracy?
Distribution and representation
Consider the abolition-reform axis in terms of distribution. The abolitionists are a highly diverse and complex group, consisting of the more radical NGOs and their social movement constituencies. In the Alternative Forum there was a multitude of mostly poorly resourced groups from disparate backgrounds (mainly Spanish and other European), most of whom either had a disdain for high technology (associating it with the "dominant paradigm") or limited access and skills for using it.
The principal media of communication by the abolitionists are the microphone at large meetings, the megaphone at mass actions, the written word conveyed in their newsletters, and of course the telephone and the fax machine. They also make use, where possible, of cameras, videos and tape-recordings. Many groups do have access to computers, some with email facilities, but they are not dependent on them for the greatest part of their work. Their power lies in their capacity to mobilise masses onto the streets.
The principal tools for campaigning by the lobbyists are the lap-top computer and the fax machine. They strategically employ the internet and produce instantaneous press-releases (often pre-planned) for high speed dissemination to national and global publics. In the current geopolitical context, these technologies, particularly the fast and efficient usage of fax and email, are indispensable for the effectiveness of their campaigns.
The Foro Alternativo was organised primarily by the abolitionists, and in evidence at Madrid were deep tensions between them and the Northern lobbyists, so much so that the abolitionists received limited financial and practical support from the lobbyists for the organisation of the conference. As a consequence, they did not have the resources to create an organisational structure that would promote ease of communication between the organisers and the delegates. The conference was plagued from the outset by logistical problems and confusion of the program and agendas. This was in evidence in the availability of technical facilities and of resources for follow-up documentation. Gaining access to email was difficult. For the thousands of delegates present, there were in fact only two computers available publicly with the facility for email.
The Northern lobbyists, however, had no need for them, having brought with them their lap-tops which gave them 24-hour access to document, fax and email facilities, and having computer facilities available to them in the NGO room of the World Bank. Communications by the abolitionists to the local Spanish media was predominantly via fax messages and press conferences, while the reformists made representations to the outside world via the internet, to the international media via press releases and personal contact in the media room at the World Bank Annual Meeting, and directly to Bank officials via lobbying. Here we see the impact of the distribution of resources on representation, across the abolition-reform axis.
The North-South axis also affects representation. Madrid was an opportunity to bring NGOs together from around the world to jointly consult on goals and priorities for future campaigns. There were vital and controversial decisions to be made in the coming months. To achieve this would have required funding for Southern representatives to travel to Madrid, in time to overcome the considerable political and logistical obstacles to such travel.
But this funding and logistical support was minimal. Few Southern INGO representatives were in fact present. In practice, the dependence of Southern NGOs on Northern NGOs means that the people from the South who receive funding to attend these conferences tend to be those who are preferred by their Northern partners. For those Southern lobbyists who gained accreditation to the World Bank Annual Meeting from the few Southern governments that granted it, the Northerners went to enormous lengths to provide the support necessary for their effectiveness at lobbying. Nevertheless, they were still in the minority amongst the larger number of Northerners, and were still working in a socially and culturally unfamiliar environment, and still constrained by the conditions in their home countries.
Southern NGOs who are involved in international activist networks often find themselves deluged by excessive quantities of information often coming at prohibitive costs, and usually already filtered by their Northern colleagues. They have limited resources with which to interpret, translate and further filter it so as to make it accessible, comprehensible and pertinent for their local context.
Thus along the North-South axis, the distribution effects severely limit the opportunities for representation of the poor, as do problems with recognition, discussed below. The resource and access constraints of poorer groups, particularly those in the South, including their difficulties with the English language as well as with computer technology, and with often highly inadequate infrastructural support in their host countries, limit their capacity to make full use of computer technologies, or to participate in any other way. But presumably they have a better understanding than the Northerners of their own needs and justice claims. These cannot often be adequately communicated by technological means alone, nor even by the written word, for it requires face to face contact in an atmosphere of cooperative problem-solving, under conditions of "free and equal participation."
Recognition and representation
There were many advocacy NGOs from the South concerned with the World Bank but not present in Madrid. This was partly due to a lack of funding and other support, but more interestingly due also to a conscious decision on their part to boycott the kind of global activism that involves travel to exotic conferences. I travelled to the Philippines and Thailand to interview some of them. Whilst many of them agreed that global networking and campaigning is important, they prioritised work at the local level, largely because of their frustrations in operating in Northern dominated global arenas so distant from their local base. Many of them spoke about the difficulty that Northerners have of listening to them and respecting their preferences of agenda-setting and actions. They were keenly aware of the limits of resources available to them and their financial and political dependence on Northern NGOs, particularly for information. On the other hand they felt frustrated that Northern NGOs rarely acknowledged their dependence on their Southern partners for other kinds of information and support. Without support from their Southern counterparts, and information about their circumstances and their perspectives, Northern NGOs cannot claim to legitimately represent their needs.
I contend that the lack of distributive justice both promotes the conditions for a lack of recognition justice, and is also rooted in this same lack of recognition justice. The two are thoroughly imbricated with each other. I am suggesting then that the full potential for redistributive support for participation by Southern NGOs is not realised in practice in large measure because of the cultural factors that interfere with the capacity of the dominant groups to seek out, hear and respond to a diversity of other voices. While Northern groups tend to place high value on rational arguments expressed through the written word, Southern cultures are often more orally disposed, and less exclusively oriented towards "rational" argument. Furthermore, it is clear that communication technologies, particularly the lap-top in this case, are inextricably tied to these social structures of domination and dependency. They "lock into institutional arrangements and social forces; they link up with those perennial structures of power and hierarchies of class, ethnicity, race, and gender that have dominated much of the substance of politics in history."
Not only is the South disadvantaged in terms of economic and political resources, but the few Southerners who do manage to overcome this to the extent of being able to attend international meetings are also disadvantaged by the difficulty of finding a suitable avenue for expressing their needs and perspectives. In Young's terms, power entered speech itself. It particularly privileged those who were most proficient at producing rational discourse on their lap-tops.
And what they produced on their lap-tops largely determined the content and agendas for the global lobbying and media campaigns. They used them to produce influential press releases and other documents, many of which did not address needs and priorities of groups outside their own circles. This regularly happens at international conferences, despite the occasional requests from Southern groups to raise different agenda items. When they at times do so, it commonly occurs by the appropriation of the Southerners' ideas as their own. Here we see an example of conflict suppression by the exclusion of disadvantaged groups.
In the Alternative Forum of Madrid, conflict suppression manifested itself by the confusion of the program and agendas at the Forum, so that different factions held separate meetings without notifying the public (that is "outsiders") of them. In lobbying meetings the little conflict which was aired appeared limited both by the unrepresentativeness of those present and by the domination of the discussions by the more numerous Northerners using "rational" discourse. Lobbyists from the North, particularly the men, were very comfortable with their lap-tops, but their receptiveness to alternative modes of communication appeared limited. The poor, by contrast, had little access to this technology, and were often not comfortable expressing themselves by a "rationalised" Western procedure.
It is widely recognised that during consultations, even within the INGO community, Northerners commonly do most of the talking. Perhaps less widely discussed, however, is that another inhibitor of intercultural communication occurs when the ambience of a meeting is pervaded by the sound of the most influential among the Northern lobbyists pounding on their lap-tops, hardly lifting their gaze towards the others in the room. Here the primary relationship is not between the typist and the other people present but between the typist and his lap-top, and unknown distant audiences of the future. Arguably their effectiveness at campaigning hinges on such efficient usage of time and resources, and on a pragmatic acceptance of the unequal distribution of these resources, lamentable as this reality may be. Equally, however, it may be that their effectiveness, far from being compromised, would be instead enhanced by promoting the conditions for mutual recognition through reciprocal listening aimed at encouraging mutual understanding. For this would be an effectiveness grounded in satisfying interpersonal relationships and solidarities-in-sameness-and-difference, freed from the effects of suppressed resentments.
I have adapted Young's model of communicative democracy to address Fraser's concerns, projected it onto the global public sphere and used it to examine the role of communication technologies in participation in INGO decision making. Through this lens, the ambivalence of the lap-top for these INGOs becomes apparent. Tensions emerge as they employ communication technologies while articulating with hegemonic powers. In their lobbying work they are forced, as they challenge the legacies of modernity, to be inside the machine created by it. Although technology cannot be said to be determinative, neither is it neutral. It is socially and normatively biased to favour hegemonic interests and exclude difference. Its influence is by structural, socio-economic and cultural means, all of which tend to be mutually reinforcing. "Once introduced, technology offers material validation of the cultural horizon to which it has been preformed." This is a cultural horizon of instrumental rationality and efficiency, centralisation and hierarchy. "The technical object," Feenberg argues, "is fully accommodated to a particular culture, the culture of the West. The planetary triumph of that culture results not so much from superior rationality as from the fantastic accumulation of political and military power in the long networks built by congruent design."
Lap-tops are thus revealed as a double-edged sword for international activists. While their usage of communication technologies is subversive of global power relations, it is also simultaneously reinforcing of hierarchical relations amongst their own networks. These technologies undoubtedly enhance effectiveness and influence, being well suited for campaigning purposes and for sharing information--these aspects themselves reflecting democratic aspirations of INGOs vis-a-vis the World Bank--but they are ill suited as mediators for communicative democracy within INGO networks. Their unintended consequence is that they reflect and augment unequal power relations across the globe amongst INGOs, symbolically and practically. Far from offering a solution to the difficult task of democratic decision making, they facilitate diffusion into the NGO context of those obstacles to democratic functioning inherent in the wider context of economic, social, political and cultural injustices, locally and globally. They can easily stifle relationships of solidarity, even as they facilitate the effectiveness of campaigns based on the solidarities that do exist; they affect, and are affected by, the distributive and recognition aspects of INGO interrelationships, both of which limit democratic representation and participation.
Viewing the model through the impact of technologies on communication amongst INGOs, distributive aspects of participation emerge as equally significant for participation as recognition aspects, but the interdependence between the two also becomes apparent. The findings also bring to light yet another critical factor, that of political representation, not reducible to the other two. Inequitable distribution of resources profoundly distorts the representativeness of participants present at meetings, and this occurs in conjunction with historical and ongoing misrecognitions which also exclude many who might otherwise participate. Once present, marginalised people can feel inhibited by the difficulty others have of listening to them in diverse modes and styles of communication (often due to the fears of conflicts that might surface), and this is further exacerbated by inequitable distributive effects such as the ways in which lap-top computers are used, even during consultative meetings, and their non-recognition effects.
Communicative democracy is about creating the conditions for speaking, listening and hearing different others on their own terms and through their own modes of expression, to open up the scope for enhanced mutuality and trust, and hence for democratic approaches to the most difficult decisions. It depends on respect for the plurality of needs, perspectives, interests and desires and their expressions through diverse cultural forms of communication. Despite their effectiveness for lobbying, lap-tops perform badly at these tasks. At best, they can only be tools for campaigning on predetermined goals, or adjuncts as one among many forms of human communication, each of which expresses something unique and important that needs to be heard.
The implications of this for INGOs are two-fold. Firstly, it suggests that computer technology should be regarded as both invaluable for achieving strategic goals, but also hazardous due to their rationalising, homogenising and exclusory tendencies. Reliance on Western procedures for "rational" discourse--so thoroughly inscribed in the usage of the lap-top--are indispensable for campaigning purposes, but it can also have the effect of suppressing other modes of expression, and in this way fostering the exclusion of a diversity of other voices from participating in deliberations. The result is a tendency to homogenise the outputs towards the preferences of those with the greatest opportunities to participate in this manner. Secondly, I propose that to improve the opportunities for more participation and more appropriate representation, these tendencies could be countered with concerted efforts towards enhancing distributive, recognition and representational justice in INGO interrelationships, to the extent that this is possible. Ideally this would entail redistribution of economic, social and political resources, and a commitment to recognising others in their differences as well as their commonalities, to create the conditions in which relationships of respect and solidarity can flourish.
The ideal of communicative ethics urges participants toward agreement on procedural rules and commitment to internal justice and equal respect. However theory alone, in my reading, has not provided adequate guidance as to how such agreement and commitments may be obtained within a context of pre-existing structural inequalities. If anything, it presents a pessimistic view of such possibilities, and the long history of distributive and cultural injustices everywhere indicates that the obstacles are indeed massive and should not be underestimated. This indicates that the inevitable obstacles to representation and participation will always remain, since conditions will always remain non-ideal. But it is precisely through ongoing practical struggles of groups such as INGOs working on the ground, engaging with the multiple dilemmas that confront them, that advances in the theory will occur. A model of democracy thus revised must acknowledge these dilemmas and must acknowledge that any agreements that are made necessarily remain provisional, pending new and emerging interpretations and needs from interests hitherto unrepresented. Crucially, more inclusive and hence more representative decisions will be facilitated when space is created for disadvantaged groups to openly express difference, dissonance and conflict.
Once again, lap-tops (and computer technologies generally) perform contradictorily in this regard. While they can in limited ways assist in revising decisions among those who have access to these avenues of communication, they do not easily lend themselves to challenges by those excluded from them. Moreover, in rationalised structures of governance, the specific powers of the written word often endure long after non-written communications have been forgotten.
Technology can too easily become a safe refuge from the fears of dealing with interpersonal conflicts, and yet still uphold a feeling that we are working for justice. The hardest questions still need to be addressed in face-to-face meetings. No technology can substitute for human relationships in which all parties feel that they have exercised their voice, been listened to, heard and respected, and that others are prepared to institute structural changes to support their justice claims.
our time on policy decisions and having organisations with
resources and offices and travel budgets are by far the minority
of the world's population and the majority world is rarely
represented in our thinking and our contacts and the networks
we operate in."
Acknowledgments: I thank Jim
Beatson, Sharon Beder, Johan Frijns, David Germon, Therese Kutis,
Brian Martin, Ilana Solomon, Vivienne Porzsolt, Wendy Varney and Ben
Weiss for helpful comments on a draft of this chapter.
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[*] Miriam Solomon (B.Pharm, M.C.H.) is currently completing a PhD at the Australian National University. She has previously taught and researched in Physiology, Health Sociology (Community Health and Health Promotion), and Development Studies, and has several years experience in activism.
. These are primarily advocacy and activist organisations, not aid groups that did not participate at Madrid.
. Feenberg describes modern societies as encoding the cultural horizon of instrumental rationality and efficiency, which are often prioritised over social values. Andrew Feenberg, "Subversive rationalization: technology, power, and democracy," in Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay (eds.), Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).
. On INGO responses to the World Bank, see Kevin Danaher (ed.), 50 Years is Enough: The Case Against The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Boston: South End Press, 1994); John Cavanagh, Daphne Wysham and Marcos Arruda, Beyond Bretton Woods: Alternatives to the Global Economic Order (London: Pluto Press, 1994); Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment and the Crisis of Development, (London: Earthscan Publications, 1994); Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli, Faith and Credit: The World Bank's Secular Empire (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994); "The Madrid Declaration Resolution of the Alternative Forum: Other Voices of the Planet conference," Eco (Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Autónoma of Madrid, 1994).
. Laszlo Andor, "Stabilisation and structural adjustment in Hungary," paper delivered to Alternative Forum: The Other Voices of the Planet, Madrid, 1994.
. Michel Chossudovsky, "IMF and World Bank and the Rwandan holocaust," Aid/Watch Newsletter (Sydney), No. 5, February 1995, p. 7 (reprinted from Third World Resurgence, No. 52).
. Accountability is to the board of executive directors, bureaucrats who are appointed, in many cases, by undemocratic regimes.
. The number of votes each country has reflects its financial contribution to the Bank.
. This was the camp of the Spanish 0.7 movement, campaigning for Spanish foreign aid to be increased to 0.7% of gross national product.
. Iris Marion Young, "Justice and communicative democracy," in Roger S. Gottlieb (ed.), Radical Philosophy: Tradition, Counter-Tradition, Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993); Iris Marion Young, "Communication and the Other: beyond deliberative democracy," in Margaret Wilson and Anna Yeatman (eds.), Justice and Identity: Antipodean Practices (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995).
. In her model, Young draws on, but modifies, Habermas's communicative ethics. See also Jodi Dean, Solidarity of Strangers: Feminism after Identity Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Johanna Meehan (ed.), Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse (London: Routledge, 1995), especially chapters by Johanna Meehan, Jane Braaton, Georgia Warnke and Joan Landes.
. Young, 1995, op. cit., p. 139.
. On democracy and difference, see Chantal Mouffe (ed.), Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community (London: Verso, 1992); Anne Phillips, Democracy and Difference (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Susan Bickford, The Dissonance and Democracy: Listening, Conflict, and Citizenship (London: Cornell University Press, 1996).
. See also Dean's (op. cit., p. 29) discussion of Uttal's concept of "getting messy."
. Young, 1995, op. cit., p. 149.
. Joan B. Landes, "The public and the private sphere: a feminist reconsideration," in Meehan, op. cit., pp. 91-116, at p. 109.
. Young, 1995, op. cit.
. Landes, op. cit., p. 101.
. Ibid., p. 110.
. Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition (New York: Routledge, 1997), chapters 1, 7 and 8.
. See Iris Marion Young, "Unruly categories: a critique of Nancy Fraser's dual systems theory," New Left Review, Spring 1997, for a critique of Fraser's dichotomous "redistribution/recognition dilemma."
. David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
. The group of seven countries with the largest industrialised economies, as it was known in 1994, has now been converted to the G8 with the inclusion of Russia.
. This is of course a somewhat simplified dichotomy. The terms abolitionist and reformist are in some senses misnomers, as they conceal both internal differences within each group, the overlap between them, and alternative categorisations. See Paul Nelson, "Conflict, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Who Speaks for Whom in Transnational NGO Networks Lobbying the World Bank?" Occasional Paper No. 17, Harrison Program on the Future Global Agenda, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/harrison/papers/paper17.htm, also published in Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, Winter 1997.
. For example, the Bank installed an ombudsman-like complaints mechanism called the Inspection Panel, which was invoked to withdraw its support for the Arun III dam in Nepal. The Bank has subsequently further curtailed the power of this already constrained body. But see Shripad Dharmadhikary, "Large dams--the beginning of the end?" Aid/Watch Newsletter, No. 13, November 1997.
. Alternative Forum--"The Other Voices of the Planet."
. "50 years of creating misery and destroying the planet."
. "Fifty years is enough!"
. See Nelson, op. cit.
. This expense is compounded by the large volumes that are often sent indiscriminately.
. Communicating between rural and remote areas in Southern countries can take weeks. They may not have a telephone at all, the cables may be faulty, there may be poor service support, a lack of training facilities, and language problems. Fax machines are dependent on telephone lines, and even mail is not always reliable.
. On the difficulty of acknowledging mutual interdependence, see Jessica Benjamin, "The shadow of The Other (subject): intersubjectivity and feminist theory," Constellations, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1994, pp. 231-254.
. Fraser, op. cit., chapter 1, admits this, despite her dichotomous treatment of them. See Young, 1997, op. cit.
. Majid Tehranian, Technologies of Power: Information Machines and Democratic Prospects (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1990), p. 242. Tehranian suggests that for technologies to assist democratic world development and augment public discourse and democratic will formation, they have to be interactive, universally accessible and linked to participatory, democratic institutions and networks.
. Iris Marion Young, Justice and The Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 15, makes this same point which I consistently heard from my interviewees.
. Judy Wacjman, Feminism Confronts Technology (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), pp. 141-142, discusses gender differences in the use of computer technologies.
. "We do far too much talking and not enough listening." Northern INGO member.
. Judith A. Perrole "Conversations and trust in computer interfaces," in Charles Dunlop and Rob Kling (eds.), Computerization and Controversy: Value Conflicts and Social Choice (Boston: Academic Press, 1991).
. Feenberg, op. cit., p. 12.
. Andrew Feenberg, Alternative Modernity: The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 230.
. Accordingly, I am currently adapting this model further in my "global cacophonous democracy."
. Northern NGO interviewee.
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