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Project report
STS390, “Media, war and peace”

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The report has two parts.

1. A response pack for an actual organisation. This is not an official document and does not necessarily represent the views of the organisation.
2. A dialogue between two students discussing the project. This dialogue is fictional. Pseudonyms were used so that the marker, Brian Martin, would not know the identity of student authors.

Peacebuilding in East Timor: Crisis Report



Prepared for the *OzIndo Project* September 1999

3123595 Monday 2:30

Context of Recent Events



East Timor: The Perpetual Occupation



The former Portuguese colony has endured centuries of occupation and intervention and the tumultuous pursuit of sovereignty. Following the withdrawal of Portugal in 1974 after a 400 year presence in East Timor, the country descended into decades of factional infighting with parties supported by Indonesia. The Indonesian invasion and subsequent occupation of East Timor commences in 1975, with the prevention of communist succession the rationale¹. Conservative estimates suggest that 200,000 East Timorese were directly killed or perished as a result of famine in the subsequent years of Indonesian occupation². President Suharto in 1976 annexes East Timor and declares it Indonesia's 26th Province³. Australia and Indonesia are the only states which recognise Indonesian possession of East Timor. The infamous 1991 Santa Cruz massacre of pro-independence supporters underscored the plight of the East Timorese, and placed East Timor's independence on the international agenda. Australia's *de jure* recognition of Timor as Indonesian territory however endured 24 years with the 1997 *Asian Financial Crisis* the catalyst for revision⁴. Following the IMF incited resignation of President Suharto in 1998, successor B.J Habibe in a dramatic policy shift consents to a referendum as militias simultaneously begin state sponsored terror operations. In response the United Nations authorizes UNAMET, deployed to administer a fair and secure election which took place August 30⁵.



The Referendum



Robinson: UNAMET:

"Even the army officers ended up feeling the Indonesian army is a disgrace to the profession."

"Virtually everyone who was registered to vote was in line."

[Pro-Autonomy T-Shirts below]

"If special autonomy wins, the blood will trickle. If independence wins, the blood will flow" [like a river, Ind. *mangalir*].



In May 1999, Indonesia and Portugal with UN sanction, committed to an East Timorese referendum on independence. The referendum proposed a power sharing devolution whereby Indonesia would remain the sovereign of East Timor with Timor being granted 'special autonomy'⁶. For the 1999 UN-administered referendum, the Indonesian military, TNI, was charged with providing security and preventing militias from intimidating voters. Archived documents, written orders, telegrams, and radiograms however, provide evidence that military authorities and Indonesian police *outfitted* and *directed* pro-autonomy East Timorese militias to commit violence and intimidate East Timor's pro-independence factions⁷. UNAMET established that Indonesia would obscure the referendum with Indonesian sponsored militias utilising rallies, the media and even T-Shirts (see figure left) to disseminate dire warnings of reprisals. Undeterred by militias, 98.6 percent of registered voters submitted ballots on Aug 30 with an overwhelming majority of 78.5 rejecting the concession for special autonomy within Indonesia⁸. An upsurge of violence ensued with an estimated 14 UN personnel killed alongside scores of Timorese. Following international embargoes from the IMF and World Bank and the suspension of weapons exports to Indonesia failing to quell the violence, the UN evacuated beginning September 8 to be replaced by the Australian led INTERFET deploying September 20⁹.





Peacebuilding

Challenges and obstructions

3 Step Proposal for a New Timor-Leste

1. PEACEMAKING

INTERFET, the Australian led international force set to deploy on September 20 have an explicit *peace making* mandate²². Removal by necessary force of threats to peace (chapter 7 UN mission) should occur simultaneous to diplomatic peace making efforts involving negotiation, mediation, official and unofficial or 'citizen' diplomacy.

2. PEACEKEEPING

After achieving its mandate INTERFET must be replaced by a peacekeeping force deployed to observe the established peace and oversee repatriation of refugees (Chapter 6 UN mission.)

3. PEACEBUILDING

Transitional justice and renewing faith in the state is essential to sustainable peace. Ensuring perpetrators are brought to justice and all warring factions coalesce to create a legitimate successive government is essential. Ensuring law and order is achieved and maintained is imperative²³. Successful transnational police building has been successful particularly in the Pacific nations²⁴. 'Person to person' peacebuilding is fundamental to the success of this transitional stage as traditional kinship ties are held in higher esteem than the evolving state²⁵.



Challenges

Reporting of Events **C.1**

Failures of international community **C.2**

Absence of sustainable peace **C.3**

Misperceptions and education **C.4**

Challenging peace building in East Timor

C.1. Reporting of Events

- **Robinson UNAMET** "The media frenzy in Darwin underscored how difficult and skewed storytelling can be."¹⁰
- Vilification of 'Indonesia' grammar of war reporting implicates entire country
- Required press pass to enter East Timor, steadfastly controlled by government; journalists failed to report massacres prior to 1991
- UN announced referendum result on September 4, there was no functioning East Timorese media left.¹¹
- Reports lacked context and analysis and scope, disregarding *Krismon* 12.
- Reports focused upon instances of immediate conflict and failed to elicit public pressure for a peace building mandate

C.2. Failures of the International Community

- Australia's de jure recognition of Indonesian claims to East Timor
- A vast majority (85%) of the human rights violations directly reported to the Commission were committed by Indonesian security forces acting alone or through auxiliaries- however international forces charged TNI with protecting civilians 13
- Evacuation of UNAMET staff September 8 and UNAMET implicated in atrocities
- Ill equipped international force with inappropriate mandate
- The UN consistently failed to take effective action to stop the Indonesian occupation and systemic atrocities¹⁴.

C.3. Absence of Sustainable Peace

- * During times of political transition, a hybrid legal system, which combines local and introduced justice systems; is more likely to promote sustainable peace¹⁵
- * Peace building is unsuccessful if international forces depart prematurely or do not achieve enough while on mission¹⁶
- * Police building and rebuilding institutions essential to sustainable peace¹⁷
- * INTERFET mandated to remove threat, transitional justice required for sustainable peace¹⁸
- * In territories where citizens do not have an confidence in the institution of the state person to person peacebuilding stratagem, like *pasar murah*, are far more effective¹⁹

C.4. misperceptions and education


- * Australian press misrepresented the referendum- the East Timorese by voting 'no' to the proposal for special autonomy voted 'de facto' for independence.
- * Many Australians held the misperception that 'ordinary' Indonesian citizens were responsible for attacks
- * Several Australians canvassed asserted they would be unwilling to contribute to Indonesian affiliated charity for this reason²⁰.
- * Surveyed Australians did not have an understanding of *Krismon* and how it continues to affect Indonesians who are predominantly unaware of the current events²¹.



OzIndo and ensuing challenges



OzIndo will face the challenge of overcoming the rhetoric of media framing and war discourse to elicit support for humanitarian objectives and a legitimate understanding of the crisis in the entire region. The provision of information packs regarding *Krismon* and *pasar murah* may offset this detrimental rhetoric



In order to restore confidence in OzIndo's objectives OzIndo must attempt to;

1. **Demonstrate** commitment to peacebuilding in entire region
2. **Counteract** inaccurate media framing of the conflict
3. **Eliminate** vilification of disenfranchised Indonesian citizens
4. **Augment** grass roots support of people-to-people peace building in Indonesia and subsequently Timor-Leste

INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENTS

Precedents throughout the humanitarian intervention period of the 1990s have produced a 'lessons learned' approach which emphasises 'peacekeeping' and 'peacemaking' in isolation are ineffective. Although the 'dirty little secret' of state building appears to be that nobody knows how to do it, the interventions of the 1990's particularly in the African experience show there is a need to shift the focus from creating and defending peace agreements to post-conflict reconstruction or peace building activities²⁶. Peace building, instead of removing the immediate threats to peace, constructs foundations for *sustainable* peace by addressing the origin of the conflict and by employing confidence-building measures between divided factions and people; for example the aforementioned importance of police-building to uphold law and order²⁷. This course of peace is imperative in Timor-Leste as without stability, law and order and an effective legitimate state peace is structurally unattainable. Until this is achieved, the state is not capable of administering appropriate aid, as was the case in Somalia. The percentage of OzIndo's fundraising diverted to East Timor will provide a sustainable food subsidisation scheme that will alleviate the suffering of those most disadvantaged by the current political climate, as has been the case in the successful *OzIndo pasar murah* strategy in Indonesia ²⁸. International precedents throughout the 1990's have consistently demonstrated peacebuilding is best achieved 'from the ground up' rather than from the 'top down' and this involves a people-to-people peacebuilding approach²⁹. OzIndo is at the forefront of such efforts in Indonesia and Timor-Leste. Scrupulous public relations management and public education campaigns for the remainder of the journey will correct any bias caused by media framing and evoke the innate humanitarian spirit of ordinary Australians.



With the evacuation of the UN on Sept 8 and the deployment of INTERFET scheduled for Sept. 20, the abandonment of refugees will become a situation which underscores a need for individual contributions in the wake of international neglect



Protesting Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste in Melbourne (figure left) paralleled in Jakarta (figure right)





Endnotes

Photographs Courtesy Of:

Cover: David Dare Parker:
<http://www.warshooter.com/news/2006/12/07/david-dare-parker-a-return-to-east-timor>

Page 2: Sydney Morning Herald
www.smh.com.au/.../2005/02/17/1108500195349.html

Map: CIA fact book

Page 3: Election T-Shirts : David Dare Parker Op.Cit.

Page 4: David Dare Parker Op.Cit.

Page 5 : Protest Photograph
<http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/photo/timor2/6.html>

Boycott Bali:
www.takver.com/history/timor99/timor.htm

UN leave Timor in Helicopter:
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/uns-legacy-of-shame-in-timor/2006/07/21/1153166587803.html?from=rss>

INTERFET troops and Timorese: David Dare Parker, Op.Cit.

1. Goldsmith, A. & Dinnen, S., Transnational Police Building: Critical lessons from Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, Iss. 6, 2007. Jan also mentioned this in the interview. Several sources cite the fear of the 'domino effect' as a catalyst for the West's support of the oppressive Suharto regime.
2. Laakso, J.L., 2007, 'Justice Order and Peace: Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding in Timor-Leste', University of Queensland Press. Estimates, including the recent Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) report suggest this figure was 10% of East Timor's population
3. Clark, M., 1996, 'Imagining East Timor: Post Colonialism and Identity', November, Sydney.
4. Op.Cit., Goldsmith & Dinnen. The Asian Financial Crisis was also the rationale for the creation of OzIndo.
5. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1257, 3 August 1999.
6. Richmond, O.P. & Franks, J., 2008, 'Liberal Peackeping in Timor Leste: The Emperor's New Clothes?', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, Iss. 2, p185-200. It wa attested that the concession of 'special autonomy' was an affront to the East Timorese independence movement.
7. Op. Cit., Lasko. The CAVR report has also founded significant evidence of the state sponsoring of militias.
8. Peacebuilding in East Timor, Paper Prepared for the Fourth Annual Peacebuilding Consultations, February, 29, 2000, *Asia Pacific Working Group of Canadian Council for International Co-operation*. [available at: http://www.ccic.ca/e/archives/apwg_2000-02_peacebuilding_in_east_timor.pdf]
9. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1262, 27 August 1999.
10. Shah, A., 2006, Records of East Timor 1999, UCLA International Institute, available at: [<http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=53444>] Jan also made mention of inaccurate media framing of the issues.
11. Op.,Cit., Shah
12. Asian Financial Crisis
13. Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation report, in Shah, A., *Records of East Timor 1999*, UCLA International Institute, available at: [<http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=53444>]
14. Op.Cit., Richmond & Franks. Robinson, representative of UNAMET in Shah documents the consequences of the UN scale back. CAVR reports and UN Lessons Learned commission have also found evidence implicating UN personnel.
15. Barungi, B. & Mbugua, K., 2007, From Peacekeeping to Peace Building: Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa, *Accord*, Durban, [available at: <http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/>]
16. Op.Cit, Goldsmith & Dinnen
17. Ibid
18. UNSC 1257
19. In provinces such as East Timor, as has similarly been the case in Bougainville, 'top down' peacebuilding approaches are unsuccessful as citizens who do not invest in the state either because of systemic disenfranchisement or cultural affinities cannot rapidly enter a symbiotic relationship with the imposed institution of the state.
20. When members of the general public were interviewed by 3123595, a hesitance to commit funds to Indonesia in the context of the 1999 referendum was affirmed.
21. Upon imparting information about the disenfranchisement of ordinary Indonesians however, attitudes generally shifted as was the precedent experienced by the OzIndo project.
22. Op. Cit., UNSC1257
23. Op.Cit., Goldsmith & Dinnen
24. Ibid.
25. As aforementioned in communities such as Bougainville, kinship ties are often observed and held in a higher esteem than individual relations with the state. For this reason citizen diplomacy or people to people peace building has entered the recent 'lessons learned' discourse of the international community.
26. Ravenal, E.C., 'An Autopsy of Collective Security', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 90, Iss. 4, 1976, p697.
27. Op. Cit., Goldsmith & Dinnen
28. The pasar murah food subsidisation strategy.
29. people to people peace strategy
30. Doyle, M.W., 1997, 'Authority and elections in Cambodia,' in MW Doyle, I Johnstone & Orr, Robert C (eds.), *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, Cambridge University Press, New York, p134.



STS390 'Media, War and Peace'
Project Report: Dialogue
Science Technology and Society
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Oliver, Amy, and Rebel discuss: 'Peacebuilding in East Timor: The Crisis Report Prepared for the OzIndo Project'

Pseudonyms have been used.

[Oliver and Amy meet in the library foyer]

Oliver: You look a bit bleary eyed Amy!

Amy: Gee thanks! Wait till you see Rebel, she just messaged me and she hasn't even finished yet! I know we've finished the report but I just can't stop reading!

Oliver: I know how you feel! I'm actually really glad we've finished the report because I'm going to honestly tear my skin off with frustration if I read one more article on the failures of UN peacebuilding¹. I can't believe the volume of literature which meticulously details how the international community failed to foster sustainable peace in Timor-Leste. What's more frustrating is it's not the precedent!

Amy: Yeah, I did read that when I was looking into peacebuilding theory. The 'lessons learned' commission, is that what you're referring to?²

Oliver: The 'lessons learned' commission?! To me that just reeks of a scapegoat for the permanent five members of the Security Council! That's what interested me in East Timor to begin with and that's why I chose this case study, because if this 'lessons learned' commission is actually effective in improving

¹ Barungi, B. & Mbugua, K., 2007, From Peacekeeping to Peace Building: Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa, Accord, Durban, available at: <http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/>

² United Nations Charter, available at [<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>]

approaches to sustainable peace building, why does the international community continue to make the same mistakes?

Amy: I don't know, although I didn't actually focus so much on that in my research. I was more interested in whether 'peacebuilding' as a theory itself is actually achievable³. This is why I love group work! I'm glad I haven't handed my project in yet, haha! No I'm just kidding I won't steal your idea... Tell, me more about your approach!

Oliver: Ha, the way I see it, peacebuilding theory itself sounds perfectly legitimate and attainable right? First you make peace; remove threats, restore and maintain law and order, create and observe treaties, absolve tensions etc⁴. Enter the challenge of keeping the peace without the use of force or interposing between factions and then you move onto building sustainable peace⁵. Can you think of one example where peace making and peace keeping have paved the way for successful peacebuilding? It's great in theory and only in theory. Anyway, so you know your dimensions of sustainable peace-

[enter Rebel]

Rebel: -yep, victors peace, constitutional peace, institutional peace and civilian peace⁶.

Amy and Oliver: Ha, hey Reb, you've obviously been up late too!

Rebel: I have actually... Question, the four dimensions of sustainable peace, I didn't actually address them in my report, I just talked about their practical application, you know like police-building, nation-building, civilian diplomacy, the top down approach or grass roots approach etc, because I think at different stages Timor was all four...?

Amy: I agree, the 'victors peace' in terms of Jose Ramos Horta eventually assuming the leadership, 'constitutional peace' in terms of its eventual sovereignty, 'institutional peace' because of Australia's

³ Petrovsky, V., 2007 'Searching for Peace in the Asia Pacific: An overview of conflict prevention', *International Journal on World Peace*, September 2007, Vol. 24, Iss. 3, p117.

⁴ Doyle, M.W., 1997, 'Authority and elections in Cambodia,' in MW Doyle, I Johnstone & Orr, Robert C (eds.), *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, Cambridge University Press, New York, p134

⁵ Richmond, O.P. & Franks, J., 2008, 'Liberal Peackeeing in Timor Leste: The Emperor's New Clothes?', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, Iss. 2, p185.

⁶ Shah, A., 2006, Records of East Timor 1999, UCLA International Institute, available at: [<http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=53444>]

police building mandate particularly and ‘civilian peace’ because of projects like the *OzIndo Project* that were encouraging grass roots diplomacy.

Rebel: Far out Amy I’m always glad to be in your group..! Where did you get all your information from? I found it pretty difficult actually, because we were focusing specifically on the referendum for the *OzIndo Project* in the actual report, to find information about peacebuilding during that tumultuous time was near impossible!

Amy: I was really lucky actually; Jan gave me some really great literature when I interviewed her about her trip and what was happening in Indonesia at the time. A student had passed on his PHD to her which coincidentally was about the possibility of a successful referendum in Timor-Leste so that was useful reading to give me some background⁷. I also contacted the ABC and looked through their archives, I used the war memorial to find photographs and you know, more succinct information, and then the academic articles that we shared, particularly Richmond and Frank’s article, obviously formed the crux of my report. I watched a documentary on YouTube too-

Oliver:-I saw that too um...

Amy: *The Bullet and the Ballot?*

Oliver: Oh no I watched a different one- go on

Amy: Yeah, well that talked about the deterioration of security in Timor Leste- especially following the scaling down of the UN- and how it was imperative to get basic supplies into the country, which I thought tied in really well with the endeavors of *OzIndo* and I put that into my report. You know, the idea that no matter what ‘peacebuilding’ exercise is theoretically going on, at the end of the day people are unable to plant crops, the next harvest wont be there, people can’t just go to the pharmacy and pick up medical supplies; diplomacy isn’t going to feed you and that’s where people to people relief, civilian peacebuilding is effective⁸.

Oliver: Well. The clip I watched was all about how the Howard government ignored intelligence that Indonesia was arming militias in June the year of the referendum⁹-

Rebel: [*taking notes ignoring Oliver*] - sorry Oliver, but just a thought what did Jan say during the interview about diverting funds to East Timor?

⁷ Clark, M., 1996, ‘Imagining East Timor: Post Colonialism and Identity’, November, Sydney

⁸ <http://au.youtube.com/watch?v=0zaNJjfeP7w>

⁹ <http://au.youtube.com/watch?v=zdfn09Yw94s>

Amy: Oh I have that in my notes, hang on- here it is, because OzIndo operated under the auspices of the Uniting Church and they allowed the project complete independence it was able to divert some funds raised later on in the trip to East Timor¹⁰.

Oliver: I didn't know how to incorporate it but I loved that story Jan told us about the ocker bloke in Camooweel. That is a top story, amongst all the horror and the frustration...

Rebel: Oh no, you know what I found fascinating, those photographs of Fiona, a cyclist for OzIndo, on her bicycle passing the INTERFET trucks going the opposite direction heading towards Darwin as OzIndo were heading for Townsville. That sent shivers up my spine.

Amy: Mm. Me too. That story about the Aussie ocker bloke was great though Oliver and you can incorporate it I think because it really proves that the pack we have made will work, and it backs up the bottom line of peacebuilding, fostering individual relationships, civilian peace, is sustained peace¹¹.

Rebel: I don't remember that story?

Amy: No, you do! Remember Jan was telling us she didn't have access even to a radio- so we changed our minds and made a brochure instead ha-ha- so by the time they had reached Camooweel the post-referendum upsurge of violence had been escalating for a few days and the *OzIndo* crew didn't even know until they picked up a newspaper¹². Here, I have it in my notes, Jan said '*we sunk into a state of total depression; we didn't know how we were going to convince people to give us money now*'. A while later she said, and she set the scene so well, a bloke with stubbie shorts, a singlet, a towling hat, thongs and a beer knocks on the caravan and says '*g'day love, what's all this about?*' and Jan said '*you're probably going to throw your beer at me when I tell you,*' and she explained the premises for the OzIndo Project from the start, and explained that despite the media framing of the violence, the impoverished in Indonesia were not to blame for the crisis in East Timor and in fact most of them would have no idea there was a crisis in East Timor because of the extent of press control-¹³

Oliver: - Yeah and then the bloke ruffled around in his pockets and produced a \$50 note and grabbed Jan's hand and said '*there you go love, get the poor buggers some tucker and good on you.*' The whole project

¹⁰ Lingard, J., October 5, 2008, Interview, Glebe Sydney.

¹¹ Goldsmith, A. & Dinnen, S., Transnational Police Building: Critical lessons from Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, Iss. 6, 2007, p1093.

¹² Op.Cit., Lingard.

¹³ Op.Cit., Shah.

felt this great sense of relief that if the public were given the correct information, they could still raise money from compassionate individuals.

Rebel: That's so awesome, what a cool story. Sorry I'm still getting my notes together, I have '*pasar murah*' scribbled in my interview notes, what on earth is that!?

Amy: The *OzIndo* trip raised money for a food subsidisation program and that strategy was called '*pasar murah*'¹⁴. The group had student representatives on the ground who would go to the market and purchase food which due to inflation because of the Asian Financial Crisis was too expensive for families to purchase and the food would then be taken to another market where it would be sold at a subsidised price and the money made at this market would in turn be used to buy more food and so on and so on. Sustained peace.¹⁵

Rebel: You know what really frustrated me so much about what I read? How ill informed Australians and the Australian media were about Indonesia and East Timor, especially considering you could pretty much swim there!¹⁶ That actually conflicted with what I read about peacebuilding too because the Richmond and Frank article asserts without understanding you can't create self sustaining peace!¹⁷

Oliver: In the clip I watched it articulated that all Australia was interested in was securing a share of Timor's natural resources and at one stage preventing the spread of communism.¹⁸ I don't think all Australians were ill informed about Indonesia or East Timor, I actually think it benefited the elite to keep as many in the dark as possible.

Amy: Oliver the conspirator ha-ha.

Oliver: Well, no there's an element of truth in that, as ominous as it sounds. Look at the Timor Gap Treaty in 1991, the same year as the Santa Cruz massacre is taking place and we're concerned about shoring up our oil interests!¹⁹

¹⁴ Op.Cit., Lingard.

¹⁵ Peacebuilding in East Timor, Paper Prepared for the Fourth Annual Peacebuilding Consultations, February. 29, 2000, *Asia Pacific Working Group of Canadian Council for International Co-operation*. [available at: http://www.ccic.ca/e/archives/apwg_2000-02_peacebuilding_in_east_timor.pdf]

¹⁶ Op.Cit. Robinson in Shah

¹⁷ Richmond, O.P. & Franks, J., 2008, 'Liberal Peackeping in Timor Leste: The Emperor's New Clothes?', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, Iss. 2, p187.

¹⁸ *Bullet and the Ballot* Op.Cit.

¹⁹ Ajidarma, S.G., 1995, 'Eyewitness: Protest Stories from Indonesia', HarperCollins, Sydney.

Rebel: Here in my notes I actually have a quote from Jan too about how ill informed people were she encountered, she said '*one boy in Darwin asked if we were going to war with the Indonesians and a little girl cried because her dad had gone to fight for Australia in the war against Indonesia!*'²⁰

Amy: far out, it just goes to show though how far a little bit of clarification can go. I mean what happened to the OzIndo crew in Charters Towers too was an example. They weren't even going to let the group in to speak after violence broke out in East Timor!

Oliver: Yeah, exactly and once the team were given the chance after much coaxing, Charters Towers made its first charity donation to a cause outside Charters Towers ha-ha.

Rebel: That's the angle I'm going with in my report actually more than anything is the reshaping of perspectives. It wasn't '*those bloody Indonesians*' (as was uttered ever so articulately more than once when we were canvassing the general public²¹) who were to blame, it was a select group of elites, an oppressive regime that was responsible for the atrocities in East Timor and the plight of Indonesians was much the same as the Timorese. They weren't to blame for the crisis and the *OzIndo Project* had no reason to cease its fundraising because of the outbreak of violence.

Amy: For someone that is still scrambling to get their project together that sounds like you've nailed it!

Rebel: Jan said it herself; she said '*Information is the best way to break down prejudices*'²². Peacebuilding theory backs this up too. It's more than rebuilding institutions and rebuilding the police force, although that's all important too. It's about restoring this idea of a 'nation'. Not in the sense that an individual enters into a symbiotic relationship with the state but the idea that the individual enters into a relationship with other individuals based on nothing other than the common pursuit of goodwill²³.

Oliver: That's what I find fundamentally implausible about peacebuilding, how can you base a theory about rebuilding states and world order solely on ambiguous rules and goodwill?! I mean the case studies back me up!²⁴

²⁰ Lingard, Op.Cit. and Thayer, C., 1994, Australian Perceptions and Indonesian Reality Lecture to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Hocken Hall, The University of Otago, Dunedin, May 12 [Transcript]

²¹ Student is referring to interviews conducted concerning attitudes to charity donations in the context of the 1999 referendum.

²² Lingard. Ibid.

²³ Barungi, B. & Mbugua, K., 2007, From Peacekeeping to Peace Building: Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa, Accord, Durban, available at: <http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/>

²⁴ Ibid.

Rebel: Fiona, Jan and Timur cycled around Australia having had no previous cycling experience, other than riding to the shops to buy milk²⁵. They managed to raise a lot of money for the poor of Indonesia, wresting it from Australians who had blacklisted Indonesia following the upsurge of violence in Timor. That *is* rebuilding world order solely on goodwill. Peacebuilding is not only possible but plausible.

²⁵ 'OzIndo puts politics aside to help RI's impoverished', The Jakarta Post, 29. April, 2002, p20.

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