

accompanied by massive bombing and guided missile attacks across the Channel with non-nuclear weapons. Faced with imminent invasion, or perhaps with an invasion on the way to being successful, would the British Government decide that as our national existence appeared to be at stake we must abrogate our pledge not to use nuclear weapons (unless they are used by the enemy) by calling on the Americans to launch a nuclear attack on Russia? It is an open question whether we could rely on the Americans to make the war nuclear to save us from an occupation and whether it would be in our best interests to ask them to do so, and I am more sure that the British Government would think twice before taking such a step. My vote would be against it because I am convinced that as between Britain occupied by the Russian army and a Britain a smoking radioactive charnel-house the former is the lesser of two great evils.

In a major war in which for one reason or another nuclear weapons are not used (just as gas and bacteriological weapons were not used in World War II, and I have always believed that the bombing of cities was not initially the policy of either belligerent), the people of the U.K. must recognize that they are liable to invasion to a greater extent than ever before in their history. This is a strange idea to most Englishmen but the notion that one's country is liable to be invaded is familiar to Continental Europeans, Middle Easterners, Africans and Asians. We are unique amongst nations, not in the Western hemisphere, in not reckoning invasion of our homeland as one of the normal hazards of international life. We are no longer amongst the privileged class in this respect and should face this fact and take it into account in our defence plans.

In considering what modifications would be desirable in the military defence arrangements we maintain for the defence of our way of life against military attack, we started with the assumption that we ought to consider abandoning the H-bomb. This policy would inevitably and logically lead to a decision to eschew the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. I believe a number of people would be prepared to take the first step (i.e. abandon the H-bomb). For example the Bishop of Manchester said on 1st June, 1957: "(it is argued that) Russia's conventional arms can overrun us. We must possess some ultimate sanction. But do we intend to use it (the H-bomb)?"

Ought we in any conceivable circumstances to use it? My answer is an unhesitating 'No'. It would be better to be defeated than to engage in H-bomb warfare. For when the last bomb has exploded you have lost what you were fighting for . . . there are risks no matter which way we turn, but is it not better to take a risk which is creative and can lead to no worse than material defeat, than to take one which may lead us into a defeat which has as its only compensation the total destruction of the enemy as well as ourselves . . . for realistic as well as spiritual reasons I believe that the best and wisest course would be unilaterally to renounce the use of the H-bomb."

Senator Morse of the U.S.A. said in the Senate on 23rd March, 1957: "I cannot bring myself to give continued support in the name of defence to a hydrogen bomb policy. . . ."

Concentration of thought on the horrors of the H-bomb has diverted attention from the tactical nuclear weapon which, like the housemaid's baby, may be only a little one, but if ever used will soon lead to the appearance of Big Brother H-bomb. Whether or not the many eminent persons who are prepared to consider abandoning the H-bomb, or who advocate its abandonment, realize that they must also support the abandonment of nuclear energy for military purposes, is unknown to me.

Those who advocate the abandonment of the H-bomb may not appreciate that by a kind of chain reaction in reverse, this decision also means a decision not only to abandon the use of nuclear energy in war but **THE ABANDONMENT OF THE MAINTENANCE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS FOR USE IN MAJOR WARS.**

The reasons are as follows:

- (a) If in a major war the Soviet Union decided to use nuclear weapons, they are so overwhelmingly more effective than conventional weapons that to invite conventional forces to fight forces armed with nuclear weapons is an absurdity.
- (b) If we assume that the U.K. and the western European powers have abandoned nuclear weapons and that the Soviet Union, either for political reasons or because they do not wish to fight a nuclear war with the U.S.A., also decide not to use nuclear weapons, then the conventional forces of the West are so inferior to those of the Soviet Union that defeat is likely.

On the basis of population and industrial resources there is no physical reason why the states of Western Europe and Turkey shall not raise and maintain non-nuclear or so-called conventional forces comparable to those of the Soviet Union, even if we include in the enemy ranks the forces of the satellite states which I suppose are regarded as rather doubtful allies by the Russian general staff.

But the brutal fact must be faced that the democracies of West Europe whose population is approximately 200 millions are unwilling to make the effort to keep more than about 15 divisions in a state of readiness, whereas the Soviet Union has approximately 50 to 70 divisions more or less ready for action. It is because the governments of the West know that they cannot persuade their peoples to arm up conventionally to a figure approaching the Russian level that the issue is evaded by claiming that tactical nuclear weapons will redress the balance. It is also for this reason that in disarmament talks the West refuse to consider abandoning nuclear weapons unless there is also a reduction in conventional forces. To sum up:

In a major war with the Soviet Union we have said we have to use nuclear tactical weapons to make up for our shortage of conventional forces; the use of tactical nuclear weapons is almost certain to see-saw upwards to the largest nuclear weapons; against such weapons we cannot defend the United Kingdom. A defence strategy which is likely to lead to the use of a decisive weapon which will destroy what one is trying to defend cannot be commended, and the argument that our enemy will (we hope) later be destroyed is pointless. It is the basis of the argument of the deterrent that H-bomb warfare is so awful that neither side will use it if the other can retaliate in kind. If the nuclear deterrent works it will do so both after military operations start as well as before. But to use nuclear tactical weapons is to destroy the nuclear deterrent.

If nothing can be any worse than an H-bomb war we ought to make as sure as possible that it cannot happen. The only way to be fairly sure it *cannot* happen (as opposed to hoping one can deter the enemy) is not to have the H-bomb. This involves not having tactical nuclear weapons. This would mean having large conventional forces (in case the Soviet Union also does not use nuclear weapons) were it not for the fact these forces are

useless if they were attacked nuclearly, which they certainly would be if the Soviet Union was losing the conventional war.

We are therefore obliged to recognize that our choice lies between being destroyed in an H-bomb war or accepting the notion that if we contract out of the use of nuclear energy for military purposes we are militarily defenceless against a power using nuclear weapons, and if not absolutely defenceless against the Soviet Union's conventional forces we are in a position of serious inferiority. However gallantly we fought there would always be the risk that the Soviet Union might quickly obtain military victory by giving her superior conventional forces the additional help of a few nuclear weapons.

The situation described above would be that in which the United Kingdom would find itself if we decided to abandon the idea based on the deterrent of the H-bomb. Another of "those harsh and inescapable facts" but not the same one as that mentioned by the Minister of Defence. We should have escaped from the fire of potential H-bomb destruction into the frying-pan of a potential occupation or, if not occupation, surrender to any demands put to us by the Soviet Government. Some will argue that although the fire is obviously hotter and more immediately fatal than the frying pan, the latter would be so unpleasant that there is not much to choose between immediate incineration and prolonged frying. But suppose we can find an idea which if we use it as the basis of our strategy of defence makes the frying-pan choice the key to victory? In that case there is everything to be said for the frying-pan. Moreover as we shall see there *is* such an idea and one which resolutely applied may well cause our enemies to see the danger to themselves of putting us in their frying-pan—or, as I shall show, getting into ours!

CHAPTER TEN

DEFENCE WITHOUT ARMS

IN THIS EXAMINATION of defence in the nuclear age we are now through what I have called the thought barrier and in a mental world which has hitherto been the exclusive area of the Pacifist who asserts for moral reasons that it is the real world. To non-Pacifists it has hitherto sounded like a visionary world, but let non-Pacifists remember that without vision the people perish!

I shall assume that the question as to whether the United Kingdom should forswear the use of nuclear energy for military purposes becomes a political issue in Britain and that the electorate return to power a Government pledged to put this policy into effect.

The first step would be consultation with our allies and, as mentioned earlier, I estimate that the U.S.A. and Canada (and possibly Australia) would not agree with our policy and the two former powers would withdraw their forces certainly from Great Britain, probably from Europe. On the other hand France, Italy, Western Germany and the smaller western powers might welcome our decision and be prepared to form a new defence organization based on the principle of *non-use of nuclear energy for military purposes*; a defence organization which could be called the European Treaty Organization (E.T.O.).

The Continental powers have not (1957) reached the stage of making their own nuclear weapons and, certainly in West Germany and France, there is a very lively appreciation of the fact that in a nuclear war their territories would be in the target area. It has not escaped the notice of thoughtful Germans that in the tactical atomic exercise carried out by Nato called *Carte blanche* some 300 Hiroshima-sized atomic bombs were theoretically dropped on West German territory.

To put the matter bluntly the Continental powers could do no more than protest at our decision and it is certain that substantial sections of their populations would approve it. The

alternative open to these European nations would be an attempt to persuade the U.S.A. to continue to operate in a Nato of which Great Britain was no longer a member. It is not, of course, suggested, nor indeed would it be practical politics, that the U.K. should suddenly take and implement overnight the decision to abandon the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. The fact that this decision was being canvassed would explode a political atom bomb in the whole rather shabby structure of western defence arrangements as at present organized and cause a great deal of "agonizing appraisals".

There would be no reasons against and some for the idea that this decision once made, should be formally registered with the U.N. and that this body be invited to satisfy itself through an international inspectorate that the powers pledged not to use nuclear energy for military purposes were fulfilling this undertaking. The next decision the E.T.O. powers would have to take would be in connection with their conventional forces.

I have shown that theoretically and logically a decision to abandon the use of nuclear energy for military purposes leads to an abandonment of conventional forces intended to win a major war. But this is a matter of degree and to keep this decision within the bounds of practical politics, we should consider the situation of Switzerland.

This country is not protected by Nato and the deterrent and has no intention of getting under that umbrella. Yet it has armed forces (without, to the best of my belief, nuclear weapons) and I conceive the Swiss attitude to be as follows:

"We must accept the fact that if we are presented with an ultimatum from the Soviet Union or U.S.A. backed by the threat of an H-bomb attack we must accept its terms. But if we are faced with an attack by conventional weapons we will fight even though our resistance against the conventional forces of the Soviet Union could not be very prolonged (cf. the case of Finland)."

The European powers organized in a European Treaty Organization might decide that defence plans should be determined by the following principles or statements:

(1) That the strategy of defence of the E.T.O. powers be switched, so far as its main foundation is concerned, from a basis of armed force to one of political and moral force.

(2) That these political and moral forces as mentioned in Chapter VII would be organized for use in three operational theatres, viz.

The home fronts

The uncommitted nations' fronts

The enemy fronts

(3) The object of the operations on the home fronts will be to create a sense of democratic unity amongst the E.T.O. peoples and also to train and prepare them for non-violent resistance in the event of an enemy occupation. Operations on the uncommitted nations' fronts will be designed to win those nations for the free way of life and encourage them to resist penetration by Communist ideology. Operations on the enemy fronts will have as their object the creation of pro-democratic opinion in the Soviet Union and satellite states.

(4) In addition to the establishment of an organization charged with applying democratic political and moral defence policies both domestically and internationally, E.T.O. states shall maintain conventional armed forces (non-nuclear) sufficiently large to maintain internal security.

(5) As an interim measure these conventional forces shall be large enough to provide a collective security force armed with non-nuclear arms of a size capable of putting up a token resistance to Russian non-nuclear armed aggression across E.T.O. frontiers.¹

In a subsequent chapter I shall translate these general directives into suggested practices, but first I will consider some of the consequences which might flow from the adoption of such ideas as foundations of defence.

In considering this question I have made an estimate of Soviet intentions, which are usually and officially described as "world domination". I have never found this a very helpful definition; it is too vague. It is necessary to attempt a closer

¹ I would suggest a total E.T.O. force of about 10 divisions and corresponding air and sea forces. I believe it would gradually be reduced to a frontier guard.

appreciation of Soviet policy for which purpose two sources of evidence are available. They are what the Soviet leaders have said, and what they have done. They have said a great deal and what they have done is writ large in the history of our own times. I believe that Soviet policy is inspired by a mixture of motives, of which the following are the most significant:

(a) A motive of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the Russian homeland by ensuring that neighbouring states are controlled by Moscow. This is analogous to British determination for many years that no great power should control the Low Countries. In this part of the Russian policy is a fear that a united Germany might attack Russia. This is the defensive element in Russian policy and claims that the U.S.A. has encircled Russia with bases for nuclear attack. To this defensive part of Soviet policy should be added a strain of imperialist expansionist policy which has been characteristic of Russian policy for several centuries notably, for example, the Russian designs on Constantinople and expansion towards the Pacific now likely to be blocked by the emergence of Communist China.

(b) A motive based on a realization that in the world of to-day and especially of to-morrow there is not room for two ideologically opposed ways of life and if democracy is not destroyed it will destroy Communism. It is the policy of the Soviet leaders to attack and weaken by a great variety of methods, mostly political and economic, the democratic states and to bring uncommitted nations into the Communist alliance. This is the branch of Communist policy which includes sending arms to Arab states, encouraging foreign Communist parties, conducting world-wide propaganda, fomenting seditious movements and industrial unrest. These are some of the external manifestations of the second main motive in Soviet policy. It has an internal facet which is the efforts to raise the standards of living and productivity of the Soviet bloc so that its economic strength will enable it to out-do the capitalist world in material achievements. If this can be achieved the Soviet leaders will have the advantage of an impressive shop window displaying the benefits of Communism and they will also be able to use their surplus production for international political purposes in world markets.

If for example the Soviet Union were able to equal the economic strength of the U.S.A.—an ambition publicly proclaimed by Khrushchev—they could undertake some economic operations very embarrassing to the western world.

(c) A motive inspired by a genuine crusading spirit in some Soviet leaders, who believe that it is their mission to make a Communist world. How strong this is must be speculative. I find it hard to believe Stalin was a dedicated man and almost as hard to believe it of Khrushchev. There is little doubt that the genius Lenin¹ was such a man and Marshal Zhukov was said to be “an honest Communist” until November 1957 when Khrushchev sent a dog into outer space and the Marshal into outer darkness.

(d) A motive based on the lust for power. This cannot be exactly assessed, but on the testimony of the Communists themselves it was strong in Stalin’s behaviour and may not be absent from Khrushchev’s make-up and that of his enemies whom he recently overthrew. If democratic processes became established in Russia, the present rulers, with whom must be included all party members, would no longer occupy their privileged positions in the state. There is a powerful vested interest in Communism.

After studying the actions which have reflected these motives I conclude that the main idea in Soviet tactics is to proceed by non-violent methods wherever possible and that the use of violence is only looked upon in Moscow as needed in reserve to be used if all else fails. This analysis has the sanction of Lenin’s opinion.

* * *

I now return to the question of: “What consequences would flow from the adoption by E.T.O. of the principles mentioned on page 147.” The consequences will be considered under two headings, those which would be favourable and those which would be unfavourable.

From the favourable point of view we should achieve a great coup in the battle of the brains. Opinions will differ as to the

¹ “It would not matter one jot if three-quarters of the human race perished. The important thing is that the remaining quarter should be Communists”—Lenin writing to Maxim Gorki.

importance of world public opinion in general and in particular of its effect on the Soviet leaders.

The Soviet leaders attach much more importance to world public opinion than do democratic statesmen who are now beginning to discover its significance.

One of the most suggestive passages in General Sir Charles Keightley's despatch on the Suez operations was that: "*In modern days world public opinion is a most important weapon of war.*" Sir Charles ought to know about this and I suspect that he could expand that simple phrase into a book of startling revelations.

I believe that an announcement by Britain that (either unilaterally or with other European powers) she had abandoned the use of nuclear energy for military purposes and had done so as a calculated risk, would have a profound effect all over the world. It would restore her at one bound to that position of moral leadership she enjoyed during the nineteenth century when, we must not forget, she had behind that leadership an overwhelming naval strength. In those days the weapon of violence, if used, was moderate in its consequences. When in the nineteenth century Great Britain engaged in colonial wars she did not use a type of violence which obliterated the people with whom she was at war. The only way she could have produced, in the nineteenth century the consequences of twentieth century nuclear violence would have been by massacring all the inhabitants in every colonial war.

To-day we must replace the gap left by the disappearance of the Pax Britannica, based on our overwhelming naval strength, by leadership based on overwhelming moral strength. A British decision (to abandon nuclear energy for military purposes) would, in some respects, seriously embarrass the Soviet Union whose escape route would presumably be as follows:

"We welcome this move by Britain which, as a peace-loving nation always fighting for peace, we should be happy to emulate, but unfortunately the U.S.A. has not seen fit to follow the enlightened British move and therefore, with the utmost regret the Soviet Union is obliged to continue its tests and stock-piling."

Notwithstanding this Russian excuse, the political warfare opportunities open to Britain in the Middle East and Asia

would be greatly increased through our being able to say: "We had the Bomb and nuclear energy in other military forms and we have voluntarily given it all up. We are taking risks with our eyes open in order to give the world the historic lead needed to show humanity the way out of its present perils, and to demonstrate that nuclear energy shall only be used for peaceful purposes."

The next advantage would be economic. Our present direct annual expenditure on armaments being in the region of £1,500 million, to what would that be reduced to maintain conventional forces able to fulfil the principles listed on page 147?

To make this calculation one must fix a size for our conventional forces. This depends upon the extent to which conventional forces are needed in order to provide internal security and act as a frontier guard for the E.T.O. territories. As an approximate estimate—so far as the United Kingdom is concerned and allowing for a couple of airborne divisions for minor aggressions—I suggest the Royal Navy could be reduced to 30,000, the Army to 60,000 and the R.A.F. to 30,000 men. Civilian staffs directly employed might be cut to 50,000. These figures are probably much larger than are needed for the fulfilment of the E.T.O. principles.¹ Reductions of this character should produce direct savings of between £500 and £800 million a year and nearer the higher figure, bearing in mind that the conventional forces would not be armed with nuclear weapons or designed to undertake offensive operations in a major war. Apart from the direct savings there would be a large indirect saving of manpower and material which would have a profound effect on the economy of the country. For example a saving of £270 million enables a reduction of 1s. to be made in the income tax. But if a saving of £800 million were to be made on our present defence budget at least 50 per cent of this saving and perhaps more should still be allocated to defence. The sum of £400 million should be transferred to the budget of the Political Warfare activities of E.T.O. European powers, where savings comparable in percentages but less in volume to those in Britain would be made, would also have

¹ Captain Liddell Hart has suggested that by creating "New Model" divisions (equivalent in size to Russian divisions) a total force of 127,000 men would suffice for 2 Divisions in Germany, 1 at home, 1 in the Far East and 1 in the Eastern Mediterranean.

immense sums at their disposal for the three types of operation mentioned in principles number two and three, i.e. the use of political and moral forces on the three fronts.

* * *

We must now consider the disadvantageous consequences which must be expected to flow from the new policy of abandoning the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

First I would put a political result. It would mean a basic disagreement between the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. on ways and means of defence. Much would depend in the first instance upon how the British policy were put across in the U.S.A. but, if to abandon the use of nuclear energy for military purposes is the correct policy and is so proved by results, then the Americans will eventually come round to our way of thinking.

There are great issues in the lives of men and nations when decisions must be taken which cause many complications and involve many risks and this would be such an issue and of a magnitude unprecedented in the history of mankind. It would be the claim of those who advocate that we should take this bold step that it holds out a hope of reversing the trend of history and dragging mankind back from the gulf which yawns ahead, and for that a temporary estrangement from our American friends is a small price to pay.

I have for many years preached the doctrine that Anglo-American unity and co-operation must be the foundation of the defence of the free world and harshly criticized, for example, the refusal of the Americans in the post-World War II period to concert a common policy with Great Britain in the Middle East, the American independent policy in the Far East and the British failure even to inform the Americans about the proposed adventure in Egypt. The strenuous attempts which the Soviet Union has made and continues to make to split America from her allies is a tribute to the importance of this alliance. Nevertheless this alliance in the last analysis is a means to an end and not an end in itself. Rightly or wrongly the American people judged it to be in their best interest to remain neutral for a long period in World War I, to withdraw into isolation for some years after 1919 and to remain neutral again in 1939.

To-day this great nation has accepted the responsibilities of being the leader of the democratic world in the struggle of the cold war and has acted on the grand scale with economic and military aid.

But if we believe that circumstances have produced a situation in which the *methods* of the defence strategy of the West are erroneous it is our duty to argue our case with our American allies, endeavour to convert them and, if we are not successful, do what we believe to be right. I have expressed doubts whether the Americans (and Canadians) would go along with us but, although it would take us too far afield to foresee the course of the discussions between the U.K. and the U.S.A., it is possible that just as we have disagreed in a friendly manner on a question of principle in connection with the recognition of Communist China, so we could similarly agree to disagree on this much greater issue of the use of nuclear energy in war. I would say to my American friends: "Britain gave you a lead into violence which you followed in due course. Now we are giving you a lead into non-violence."

What might emerge from the negotiations would be a state of affairs in which the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union would face each other in the deadlock of a nuclear arms race and that the United Kingdom, the Western European states and the Asian and Middle East countries would share the common platform of being non-nuclear energy states for defence purposes.

What influence this non-nuclear group could exert to reduce tension between the two great nuclear powers cannot be foreseen, but on balance the existence of so great a body of world opinion in the non-nuclear camp, a body whose manifest self-interest was to assist in preventing a U.S.A.-Soviet nuclear war, seems better than the present state of affairs in which each of the chief opponents in the cold war is striving to draw the whole world into systems each of which depends for its defence on the nuclear weapon. I would like to make it clear that I am strongly opposed to the ideas of those who picture Great Britain as the centre of a third neutralist force armed with nuclear weapons. That idea embraces the worst of both worlds. Indeed I am strongly against neutralism (nuclear or otherwise) as a policy. We must remain solidly in support of the cause of freedom; but do so with a constructive strategy.

I come now to one of the most serious risks which would have to be faced as a consequence of the policy under discussion which is the possibility that it might lead to a Russian occupation of the E.T.O. territories. This could arise in various ways and I have selected one as being the most drastic. I can imagine the Soviet Union saying in effect: "The U.S.A. has decided to retain nuclear weapons. She has withdrawn from her bases in the United Kingdom and on the Continent but she still has bases in Iceland (perhaps), N. Africa and Arabia. It is necessary for the purpose of defending ourselves against U.S. aggression that we should have bases in Britain and in Western Europe. We demand that such bases be leased to the Soviet Union."

This would be a test case and there can be no doubt that the reply to the Soviet Union ought to be an indignant refusal.

The Soviet Union would then be faced with the following choice of action:

- (a) Threaten to open up a nuclear attack on the West.
- (b) Declare that it would move into Western Europe with conventional forces.
- (c) Accept the rebuff.
- (d) In the case of Britain, threaten or establish a naval blockade.

The choice before the Soviet Union would not be easy. Consider the threat to attack the West with nuclear weapons. It would have to be answered with the reply "Very well, you barbarians. Do it."

The Soviet Union might drop one bomb and, if they did so and were thus forced to translate what might have been bluff into action, we should have to say, before we were completely destroyed: "We accept your terms." But I do not believe that it would be practical politics for the Soviet Union leaders to make a nuclear attack on Britain simply because we refused to grant them bases. World opinion would be outraged and so would public opinion in the Red Empire. Others will say that Soviet public opinion does not count. It may not count for much yet, but it is counting for more than it did ten years ago and the main part of our defences, once we had abandoned nuclear energy, would be to make public opinion beyond the Iron Curtain more effective and informed.

In my opinion, therefore, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would threaten or carry out course (a). But supposing they did? Are we any worse off for living under the threat of a token nuclear bombing than in our present (1957) position when, so far as one can estimate, we are going to be nuclear bombed in a big way before we "retaliate" on Russia if the deterrent fails to deter?

I come to course (b)—a conventional invasion. According to the E.T.O. principles this would meet with a token resistance and then we should be occupied, or have to concede the bases, and my view is that we should do our best to force the Soviet Union to undertake an occupation in order to get the bases. I deal with the problem of occupation in Chapter XII.

Coming now to the third case, where we suppose that the Soviet Union accepts the rebuff, this would be a signal and perhaps decisive victory for the West.

Searching around for other consequences disadvantageous to the West which might flow from our decision to abandon nuclear energy for military purposes, we come to the question of Russian expansion in various directions. It is impossible in a limited space to make a comprehensive list of the soft spots open to Russian aggression, but—at the moment of writing—Syria appears to be at the top of the list as a candidate for the first Soviet satellite¹ not linked by land to the Soviet Union. The significance of what is taking place in Syria to-day and may be in Iraq to-morrow and in Greece the day after to-morrow is that it is a form of Soviet aggression which is immune to military counter-attack.

The policy of military force has worked all right inside Syria as a support for political action; it is useless from outside in the hands of the West. Inside Syria a Communist political offensive supported at one remove by the Army has overthrown such democracy as existed. From outside Syria of what use is the American 6th Fleet perambulating in the Mediterranean with planes carrying H-bombs? None whatsoever, except to demonstrate that a Communist coup can take place under its bows. In what circumstances would there be any object in dropping an H-bomb on Damascus? None. Or what purpose, if troops were available (which they are not), of invading

¹ Excluding Albania and San Marino!

Syria? None. If we had no nuclear weapons we should be no more helpless than we are to-day to combat Russian designs on Syria by the use of force.

We need other methods, because what occurred in Syria in 1957 was an example of the classic Communist method of aggression by winning the battle of brains from within. Against this type of aggression armed force is useless.

Abandonment by the United Kingdom of the use of nuclear energy for military purposes (with all the further consequences I have mentioned) would release large resources for use in the only defence mechanism which can combat this type of aggressive policy, and that is various manifestations of political warfare. E.T.O. policy should make it more difficult for the Soviet leaders to pursue their traditional strategy because we shall be modernizing our defences and moving towards an era in which we should have got a jump ahead of the Communists in the conduct of war (*werre*), an activity in international relations in which armed force is becoming less and less valuable and more and more dangerous if used on a large scale.

Something must now be said of the special circumstances of the United Kingdom with regard to sea communications.

In the case of almost every nation in the world if an enemy (say the Soviet Union) made demands upon it and these demands were refused the enemy, in the last resort, had to move forward and occupy the territory of the nation which had refused the ultimatum. This was true before the arrival of the atomic weapon, but now a power possessing this weapon can destroy a state which has not got it and do so without the paraphernalia of an invasion. The atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki made it unnecessary for the American forces to carry out the costly operation of forcing their way into the main islands of Japan and the "invasion" became an unopposed occupation.

But the United Kingdom is a special case because a state wishing to bring overwhelming pressure on us if we had no armaments of any significance is not obliged either to come and occupy the Kingdom OR drop or threaten to drop an H-bomb on London. There is a third method of bringing pressure to bear on Britain which is a naval blockade. Whether

our small conventional forces would make a token attack on the blockaders or test the reality of the blockade by risking a few ships would be decided according to the circumstances but I can imagine conditions in which it would be our correct strategy to resort to a strictly non-violent form of resistance and thus force the enemy either to threaten to bomb us or, failing this, occupy the United Kingdom.

This resistance would take the form of so organizing our defence arrangements that we could keep going for a long time without any exports or imports. "Keep going" need mean no more than keep alive at a bearable standard of life and the technical problem to be solved is stated in the following question:

"If storage plans are made and the indigenous resources of the nation organized on a national basis, for how long can 50,000,000 people in the United Kingdom maintain the basic needs of health?"

This is an enormous and interesting question beyond the scope of this book, but it ought to be looked into. My estimate is that it should not be too difficult to "keep going" for at least six months if the operation were well planned, including of course large stock-piling of wheat and other commodities; and possibly for 12 months.

It is a fascinating exercise of imagination to picture a besieged Britain living on its own resources, the centre of world attention, the miners performing prodigies of output, the agricultural community extracting every ounce of food from our soil, the whole nation on a basic food, fuel and clothing ration and basic wage, party politics forgotten and a renaissance of national purpose and unity far exceeding those stirring days (never to be forgotten by those who participated in them), when Great Britain stood alone after Dunkirk.

To this picture it is reasonable to add the trailer of a group of perplexed men in the Kremlin debating whether to use an H-bomb or send airborne divisions to resolve this unique and unprecedented development in defence against aggressive demands.

And in Washington? The President might be saying: "I have received an urgent message from the British Prime Minister stating that the whole nation is in excellent heart and

that the plans prepared for this emergency are working well. Above all he urges most strongly that we should not start a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, but he would be glad if we would break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and use our influence in all parts of the world to bring the maximum moral and economic pressure to the support of Britain. I have informed the British Prime Minister that at the appropriate moment, when this astonishing struggle ends, the British Government will be offered an outright gift in the shape of a credit for 5,000 million dollars."

* * *

In case any reader should be asking himself whether some pages from a fictional book have been bound up by mistake in this volume, I ask him the following question:

Strange, extraordinary and incredible as may seem this picture of what-might-be, is it more out of the ordinary than would be a picture with an introduction which began: "It was at 0131 G.M.T. that the first H-bomb ever used in war exploded approximately 3 miles North of Piccadilly Circus. The shock of the explosion was felt throughout the S. Coast towns and the glare was observed at Liverpool . . .?"

* * *

A question which has sometimes been put to me is: "How would your proposals affect the question of Commonwealth defence and that of the colonies?" My short reply to that is as follows:

So far as Dominions are concerned the question of defending India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia, Canada, Malaya, South Africa, Ghana and New Zealand against attack with conventional forces by either China or the Soviet Union is not relevant for the simple reason that we have not the resources to defend them except in a subsidiary manner. Canada in all respects, and Australia and New Zealand in most, now look to the U.S.A. South Africa does not rely on Britain for her defence and the most likely crisis there is an internal one in which British force could play no part.

The fall of Singapore rang down the curtain on the era during which the people of an island in the North Sea could

exercise military might East of Suez. The evacuation of the Canal Zone was a later episode in the great retreat.

So far as the colonial territories are concerned the chief problem is the possibility that force may be needed for the maintenance of internal security and this would be available in the shape of the highly mobile limited conventional forces which I propose should be maintained for non-global, non-nuclear military action against small-scale aggressions and riotous commotions.

In the case, for example of Hong Kong it is fantastic nonsense to suppose that we could defend it against a large-scale Chinese attack, or that we could help S.E. Asia, including Malaya, if the Chinese decided one day to expand their territories by military aggression.

From the military point of view "bases" in places like Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Aden, Singapore and Hong Kong are rapidly becoming useless in nuclear war. The fixed base whose latitude and longitude is known exactly is the rocketeer's dream target.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

E.T.O. IN ACTION

THE FUNCTIONS of the European Treaty Organization (which would consist of those Western European nations as are willing to go along with Britain¹ in her abandonment of the use of nuclear energy for military purposes) would be derived from the five statements set forth on page 147, Chapter X.

One of the jobs to be done on the home front (see statement two) would be the preparation and training of the nations to deal with an enemy occupation. I shall put this important question aside for the moment and deal with it in Chapter XIV.

The other job to be done on the home fronts is educational work to show the peoples of the E.T.O. nations that they share in essential features a common way of life, which they are determined to defend notwithstanding their abandonment of nuclear energy for military purposes.

The ordinary elector is not interested in abstractions, but he can be interested in institutions. With the exception of Portugal, and to some extent Turkey, all the European Nato peoples (who for my present purpose can be regarded as belonging to the potential home front of E.T.O.) have institutions common to, and essential to their way of life, and certain to disappear if Communist ideas prevailed. In this short study I must limit myself to choosing two important examples; the institution of Parliament and the institution of the free Press.

There is in existence, and has been for seventy years, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, a body composed of legislators from the Parliaments of the world. It was created in 1887

¹ If the U.S.A., Canada and other non-European states decided to follow the British lead, so much the better. But I have thought it more realistic to assume they would not do so. The Asian states might form A.T.O. (Asian Treaty Organization) which could co-operate with E.T.O. The Asian Dominions would certainly approve of the British initiative.

when it never occurred to anyone that a democratic form of parliamentary government was not the ideal. For decades the I.P.U. has been a social gathering of legislators, though of recent years there have been signs of a realization that the I.P.U. could also be a serious body for the improvement of parliamentary government. But also of recent years this body has admitted to its ranks the "Parliamentarians" from the Communist parliaments! There is evidence that the Communists, following their usual tactics, are out to capture the I.P.U. and turn it into a Communist front. They are not—I hope—likely to succeed, but nor do I see much sign that the democratic members of the I.P.U. realize the political warfare value of the I.P.U. and that it ought to be used by them (now that they have admitted the enemy to their councils) as a political warfare battlefield with Communists.

There is also the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government, an unofficial body with a small income from donations. Within the limits of its resources it does do exactly what could and should be done on a larger scale. For example, it has recently carried out a campaign in British schools to spread information about the American system of representative government and the Society would like to carry out projects such as that put forward to the Secretary-General of Nato in 1954. It was that, when a man is called up for national service in any Nato country, he should be given a small booklet of about 12 pages explaining in simple terms that he was not *only* being called up to defend his country, but also had the responsibility of defending the free way of life in all the Nato countries, which included *inter alia* free elections. The booklet would then explain the importance of the vote and be illustrated with pictures of elections in the Nato countries. It was estimated this job could be done for about £50,000-£75,000 but at that time the total budget in Nato for activities under Article II was £30,000!

This is one small example of the innumerable methods by which educational work could and should be done to build up a sense of "*belonging to the free world*". Another proposal also put forward by the Society was that the Speakers of the free parliaments should meet at bi-annual conferences and that these events could be used to illustrate and emphasize the

importance to all Nato countries of the institution of Parliament. If the Hansard Society were endowed it would set up a Parliament House with a permanent exhibition, etc., as a world centre of study and educational work about the institution of parliamentary government and its importance in the practice of the democratic way of life.

The free Press was mentioned above as an institution common to the free countries, which would disappear if the Communist creed prevailed. The newspaper proprietors of the free countries should get together and organize a large mobile exhibition showing people the difference between the free Press and a totalitarian Press.

These examples illustrate some of the many ways in which a climate of opinion could be created favourable to the idea that we all "belong" to a democratic brotherhood and that to create and strengthen this sense of unity in support of a menaced cause would add substantially to our psychological defence potential. The story of the past ten years shows practically no sign that this aspect of defence has ever been seriously considered by the leaders of the West.

A typical illustration of this neglect is the story of United Europe since the idea was first revived by Sir Winston Churchill soon after World War II. The present writer was one of the original Committee of twelve formed in Britain and has seen the whole story from within. It is a sad story, and the record of successive British governments who threw away an unique opportunity to give a great lead to the western world is not a creditable page in our history. Particularly distressing was the fact that Sir Winston, who had done more than any other man to give life to the idea, abandoned it at the behest of its enemies in the Tory Party when he became Prime Minister. This caused sardonic delight amongst the Socialists who had never seen any contradiction between their opposition to United Europe and their claims to represent to a particularly refined extent the doctrine of the brotherhood of man.

If in the 1950's under vigorous leadership from Britain a true United Europe had begun to take shape—and there was a moment when it looked as if the Council of Europe was the foundation of a growing edifice—this achievement would have

been a powerful weapon in the political war against the Soviet Union, for it would have shown that the western nations were prepared to apply to their international relationships the principles of democracy on which they based their domestic arrangements and which they claimed they were defending against Communism.

It is never too late to reform and all these suggestions could be included even in our present defence schemes. Therefore I urge that without delay a large-scale and serious effort be made by Nato governments, as part of our defences against the Soviet political warfare, to build up a democratic psychological front using for this purpose Article II of the Nato Treaty and the Brussels Treaty. The building up of United Europe, politically, economically (free trade area and common market)¹ and culturally (abolition of passports to facilitate travel), should be regarded as a task of importance to defence.

The Council of Europe, it is good to report, is making plans to have exhibits at the 1958 Brussels Universal and International Exhibition: "designed to bring home to the public all that it owes to democratic institutions. Only too often disillusioned remarks are made by those who have already forgotten the evil deeds and crimes of the dictatorships . . . the display will show how primitive man, whose only law was brute force, has gradually progressed from tribal and local meetings through regional, provincial and national assemblies to the level of international and supra-national assemblies."

Efforts of all kinds must be made to create the same spirit of co-operation between the peoples of the western world in the non-military sphere as that which has been achieved between the military forces of the West. All this would be the task of E.T.O. on the home fronts and its slogan should be "It is not enough to believe in democracy, it must be practised internationally."

The second theatre of operations mentioned in the task of E.T.O. concerned the uncommitted nations. It would be one of the tasks of E.T.O. to use a large part of the savings made by the reduction of the armaments of its members for technical

¹ The British, having dragged their feet for years over United Europe, suddenly discovered that six European powers had managed to agree on a common market treaty and that Britain was on the doorstep! Hence the quick conversion to the merits of the free trade area.

assistance to underdeveloped non-committed nations and *ask for nothing in exchange*. The approach should be inspired by the spirit of: "It is our privilege and duty as democratic peoples to offer you assistance. You are astonished we do not seek concessions or lay down conditions? That may be the Communist way (openly or covertly), it is not our way of life. Indeed if it comes to our knowledge that there is famine in Communist China we should regard it as our duty to offer food unconditionally."

Although too long to quote in full, there appeared an excellent letter in *The Times* of 3rd September, 1957 by a Mr. Ballantyne pointing out (in regard to British influence in the Persian Gulf) "that policies that were adequate when we were able by strength to dominate and dictate have been proved worse than useless"—he went on to ask for "positive proof that we are prepared to work with the Arabs as friends and partners . . . to give assistance or advice when asked for it in their interests and not our own".

The object of the whole operation should be to win the battle of the brains in the struggle with the Soviet Union for the respect and mental allegiance of the peoples of the uncommitted nations. To do this we must not only talk democracy but practise it.

In his presidential address at the 1957 meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Professor P. M. S. Blackett pointed out that 400,000,000 people in the West have an annual income of about £200-£300 per head and that, (excluding China) there are 1,000,000,000 people in Asia, Africa and S. America with an average annual income of £20 per head. He further remarked that "the western world is saving and investing productively some £30 per head in plant and machinery to create more wealth . . . the West is thus saving more per head than the East is spending on everything. . . ."

In India, even if the ambitious plans for development can be sustained, "half a century would elapse before the standard of living in India would climb from one-tenth to one-fifth of that of Europe". Professor Blackett suggested that the west should make a free annual gift of 1 per cent of their income to the underdeveloped nations. This would amount to £1,000,000,000

of which the British share would be £150,000,000 or approximately 10 per cent of the present annual direct expenditure on armaments. It has been Soviet policy to claim that they give "aid without strings" (at any rate visible strings!) and when the Soviet leaders succeed in raising Russian productivity we shall find them using this economic weapon more and more as a means of Soviet penetration into uncommitted areas.

There would be psychological advantage in donating to underdeveloped nations nuclear power stations and explaining that these gifts were related to our decision not to use nuclear energy for military purposes.

The third and perhaps most important of three fields in which the political warfare defence programme of E.T.O. would operate is the attack on public opinion in the Communist states. This is the section of the field of political warfare where recognition of its significance as a weapon of defence has made the most progress since 1945.

We have moved forward from the ante-deluvian notion that nothing should be done to try to weaken the hold of governments on the minds of their peoples until military operations began or even after the shooting started. It is only forty years since there occurred the comic case of the cartoon dropped by aircraft over the German lines. This leaflet showed a picture of the Kaiser and his sons in uniform and bore the caption: "A German family that has had no losses in the War." The Germans objected to this on the grounds that its distribution was an offence against military discipline and threatened severe penalties against airmen captured distributing this propaganda! After an attempt to distinguish between inflammatory and non-inflammatory propaganda, the British War Office gave in over this matter.

Today, both from official and unofficial sources efforts are made to penetrate the psychological Iron Curtain with information about the free world and arguments are put up intended to change the minds of the peoples in the Communist-ruled states or at any rate give them ideas likely to weaken their support of the régime. Broadcasting is the chief method employed and the proof that the pudding is eaten is the refusal of the Communists to abandon jamming of western broadcasts.

My criticism of the western offensive in this department of

the war is that the psychological attack of the democracies on the minds of the peoples beyond the Iron Curtain is still only regarded as a minor and unimportant part of our defence arrangements. In Britain the highest level it reaches in the ministerial hierarchy is that of a junior Minister. Yet in para 3 of the 1956 Statement on Defence it is declared that "peace and prosperity within which the peoples of the world can develop their lives in freedom" . . . depend upon the arrival of "*such time as a true understanding of western policies can make its impact on the Soviet people.*"

This is an important truth and one might have expected the Defence Statement to elaborate how much money was going to be spent and what methods would be used to ensure that "a true understanding" made "its impact on the Soviet people". But the subject is never again mentioned.

Professor Seton-Watson wrote (in *The Spectator*) on 23rd August, 1957 in connection with the Russian service of the B.B.C.

"Presentation of Britain is important . . . but there is a third task: to discuss in terms intelligible to Soviet citizens, the problems of society and politics which affect them in their daily life in the Soviet Union . . . young Soviet citizens are passionately, critically and intelligently interested both in the reality of their own society and in what the west thinks about it. Intelligent discussion of Soviet social problems, intelligent comment on Soviet political affairs which are excluded from the Soviet Press have a potential audience in the Soviet Union . . . the last thing we want is ranting propaganda . . . if it be true that the best hope of national, or even physical, survival for the people of Britain in the next twenty years lies in the movement of Soviet society away from the totalitarian imperialism of the dead Stalin and the living Khrushchev, it is equally true that such movement depends far more on the people of the Soviet Union than on western broadcasting. Nevertheless, the injection of ideas from outside, though it cannot create the movement,¹ can accelerate it. If a politically-minded intelligent and sophisticated B.B.C.'s Russian Service could accelerate it by 1 per cent, it would be worth a good many aircraft and divisions. I hope, Sir, that neither the silence of

¹ Why? Action starts from an idea. S.K.-H.

the Russian Service nor the indifference of our politicians will deter you from your admirable efforts to cast light on this dark corner of our national defence."

Illustrations have already been given in Chapter VIII of what is meant by political warfare operations against the enemy ideas and, in replacement of the meagre and somewhat disjointed psychological activities which are part of our present defence arrangements, I ask for a really powerful E.T.O. assault on the minds of the people behind the Iron Curtain, an assault adhering strictly to sound democratic principles and the truth.

In such an assault E.T.O. would have two great advantages. First it would have the good ideas and the good ideas can be as mentally destructive of bad ones as an H-bomb can be materially destructive. Great is the power of ideas! Who can assess the influence on world history of ideas which came from the minds of Jesus and the great religious teachers, or Lenin the materialist? It is our faith that we have the right ideas and in the long run Truth will prevail, but no harm is done in helping it to spread and this would be the second advantage enjoyed by E.T.O., for it would have all the resources needed in manpower and money.

It has been suggested that E.T.O. would maintain small conventional forces whose purpose would be to provide a trip wire and put the Soviet Union psychologically in the wrong if they attempted non-nuclear armed aggression across frontiers. The E.T.O. conventional force should also be so organized that it could at immediate notice produce an airborne force to be known as the *Rescue Division*. This body, largely composed of technical services, would be sent by the E.T.O. Council to any part of the world which had suffered a great national disaster, e.g. floods, earthquakes, famine, disease, etc. It would be at the disposal through U.N. channels of any state (Communist or non-Communist) which requested its help in an emergency and *there would be no charge for its services*, which would be regarded as the practical application of democratic principles. It would be the duty of E.T.O. to maintain this force as an E.T.O. body and, although to begin with the question of internal security would continue no doubt to be regarded as a reserved subject in the field of national

sovereignty and therefore the national contingents of the E.T.O. force would operate independently in this respect, this should only be for a transitional period. As E.T.O. developed an ever-closer political and economic co-operation between its members it would become obvious that the internal security of each member-state was a matter of common concern.


Even in Nato as it exists to-day it is a manifest absurdity that the struggle in Algeria, or Cyprus (or the Suez adventure) are all labelled national problems with which other members of Nato are not supposed to be concerned, although the effectiveness of Nato is in fact closely affected by such questions. This contradiction is a great handicap to the Nato powers in any campaign of political warfare against the monolithic Soviet bloc.

The improvements in democratic co-operation which it would be the duty of E.T.O. to promote and assist have been suggested as defence measures linked with the assumption that the E.T.O. powers were non-nuclear states. Even if the menace of international Communism did not exist, these extensions into international life of democratic practices are an essential political development if mankind is to remain the master of his scientific achievements.

"Nato"—a Cabinet Minister told me—"is the child of fear." He might have said with equal truth "it was the child of Stalin". He went on to suggest that most progress comes about through fear of the consequences of not moving forward; he was a man of much experience in government.

Accepting—regretfully so far as this author is concerned—the theory that *fear* is a dominating motive in men's actions, one can argue that *fear* of nuclear war may make some states abandon nuclear energy for military purposes and that *fear* of the consequences of this decision may make them come together to concert the alternative means of defence and in doing so learn the reality of the brotherhood of man.

PART THREE



INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE

“WHAT’S HAPPENING on the other side of the hill?” is a question the skilful military commander keeps well in mind and to which his intelligence staff are ceaselessly endeavouring to find the answer.

It is a fact that as a rule subsequent revelations show that the general tendency is always to over-rate the power of the enemy and under-rate the difficulties which he is experiencing “on the other side of the hill”. For example, we now know that in 1914 the German General Staff had an exaggerated idea of the offensive capabilities of the British Navy and imposed an unnecessarily timid policy on the High Seas Fleet. We know to-day that in the early months of the Second World War the German Army in the West was much thinner on the ground than we supposed it to be. We also know to-day that in terms of actual operation the much-feared German invasion of Britain in 1940 never advanced further than the first planning and also that the Germans were not aware how perilously low our fighter aircraft strength was towards the end of the Battle of Britain.

In Chapter X something was said about the possible courses of action open to the Soviet Union if Great Britain (either alone or in co-operation with other western powers) adopted the policy of abandoning the use of nuclear energy for military purposes, but my present purpose is to make an assessment of the extent to which I believe this policy would create grave difficulties for the Soviet leaders in the carrying out of their long-term strategy.

I start with an assumption, shared by all those who have made a close study of Communism, that the basis of their strategy is ideological. It is a profound error to suppose that the kind of world domination they are seeking to obtain is analogous to that of the Empires of the past such as the conquests of Alexander the Great, the Persian Emperors, the Romans, or—(with some reservations) Napoleon Bonaparte, the Kaiser’s Germany, Hitler or the British Imperialism in its

pre-Boer War manifestation. If a parallel is to be sought from the past, seek it in the Mohammedan offensive against the Christian world; but the truth is that the Communist offensive is something new in history although this is not to deny that in it are to be found elements of the nineteenth-century Russian Imperialism—but this is not the dominant element.

It will illustrate my conception of the nature of the Communist policy if we take note of the fact that all over the world there are people who criticize what they regard as the undesirable penetration into their natural cultures of various manifestations of what is called "the American way of life". I am not arguing whether certain American materialistic interpretations of the western way of life are good or bad, but that what is sometimes called *Coca-Coloism* has spread all over the world, is a fact.

If one can imagine that it were the policy of the American Government to use every possible method to Americanize the world (including the threat of force), and that the American people supported this policy because they sincerely believed (and those who doubted it were suppressed) that the rest of the world, if not Americanized, would be able to fulfil an ambition of destroying the American way of life *in America*, then I think we have a picture illustrative of Russian policy.

The Communist leaders must have behind them, if their policy is to be effective, the support of the mass of the Russian people and, in order to retain their support, it is essential for the Soviet leaders to be able to persuade the Russian people of three things:

First, that the Communist régime in Russia, with its present hardships (e.g. great shortage of housing, indifferent standard of living) is the only road to better conditions in the future.

Second, that Russia is surrounded by wicked capitalist powers who are jealous and afraid of the wonders achieved by the Communists and would like to bring them all down in ruin. From this catastrophe the Russian people are protected by the wisdom, energies and devotion of the Communist Party.

Third, that apart from the domestic importance of Communism to the welfare of the Russian people, the C.P. is also engaged—on behalf of the Russian people—in a great missionary task to rescue colonial and backward peoples from the

tyrannies of the Imperialists. Some authorities believe there is a messianic strain in the Russian character. (cf. The American dream. See page 51.)

It is essential, if these three ideas are to make sense to a Russian public opinion, which is rapidly becoming better educated in a technical sense, *that an atmosphere of crisis be maintained.*

"Peaceful co-existence" is a double-talk slogan. Tensional co-existence is what the Communists must have to maintain the climate of a struggle. There must be the "fight" for peace; the "battle" of the virgin lands; the class-struggle and so forth.

The adoption by the E.T.O. powers of non-violent resistance as a basis for defence would make it much harder for the Soviet leaders to maintain the *essential tensions* between Russia and the West European powers.

The most difficult of all the problems which face the Russian leaders is how on the one hand to educate their people, raise their standards of living, etc., and yet keep them mentally monolithic. It is our business to do all we can to make this insoluble problem burst wide open at the earliest possible date.

It is my belief that the adoption of the policy outlined in this book, when viewed from all angles, would be regarded by the Communist leaders as a master stroke of political warfare likely to do enormous damage to the hold of the Communist Party on the Russian people.

A radical change in the basis of our defence policy would not alter the fundamental nature of the "war" between Communism and Democracy, but it would profoundly change its character by transferring the centre of gravity of the difference between the two ways of life from the sphere of violence to that of ideas. If this could be achieved the Soviet leaders would have to decide whether they would openly declare that it was their intention to use their superior force physically to occupy Western Europe, the Middle East and perhaps some Asian countries by force.¹ I believe that it would be impossible for them to follow this policy and retain the essential support of the Russian people. On the contrary, my supposition is that the Soviet leaders' reaction, realizing the extreme dangers to their whole strategy of the move of the E.T.O. powers to contract

¹ The Chinese might have something to say about this.

out of violence as a means of attack and defence, could be epitomized in the following assessment which I have taken the liberty of attributing to Khrushchev at a meeting of the Presidium:

“Comrades, we all know that J. V. Stalin committed a grievous error by putting so much emphasis on the element of force in our over-all strategy. This had the serious effect of so alarming our enemies that they overcame their internal contradictions sufficiently to create Nato and even bring the Germans into it. Now we are faced with a most dangerous development in which a substantial section of the Western world has contracted out of the use of force. We are left in the posture of a boxer whose opponent had slipped under the ropes and left the ring.

“Fortunately, most fortunately, the U.S.A. has remained in the atomic ring, otherwise the situation would be catastrophic. As Stalin was to the Western World, so are the Americans to us—the provider of the essential of fear which will enable us to maintain the climate of crisis.”

What *would* happen on the other side of the hill in the Kremlin (and beyond the Iron Curtain) is speculative but what has been happening since the famous denunciation of Stalin is as clear as daylight. There is a ferment of ideas amongst the intellectuals. Heretical books explode like tactical nuclear weapons, there is tension amongst the leaders and a mass of evidence that the “home front” all over the Communist world is in a sensitive and politically active condition and seeking the mirage of a reformed and more libertarian expression of Communism. Most important, Moscow has lost its monopoly as the only centre of Communist dogma. This presents the democratic world with a great opportunity, and to change the basis of our defence policy as suggested in this book is the best way to exploit and make fatal the dilemma of our mortal enemies.

CHAPTER TWELVE

PROBLEMS OF OCCUPATION

IT WAS MENTIONED on page 141 that the people of the United Kingdom during the past five or six hundred years have not shared with the majority of mankind a realization that the occupation by enemy forces of a people's homeland is an event which may occur once in a generation.

The British, secure behind their moat and guarded by a powerful fleet, thought of the act of invasion as a phenomenon from which they were immune. They were the invaders; never the invaded.¹

In 1940 this attitude changed almost over-night as the British were warned by their Government that an invasion by the German army might at any moment be launched. We now know that this attack was never so imminent as was thought at the time and up to date (1957) the United Kingdom still holds what must be a world record in freedom from invasion period.

It has also been stated that one of the consequences of changing the basis of our defence strategy from material force to moral and psychological forces would be that in certain circumstances it would not be possible to deny our enemy access to the Kingdom and that this event would—in the new defence arrangements—have to be considered as a continuation of the battle and not the end of the war.

Before examining some of the problems—from both sides—of an occupation the reader must be reminded that in terms of conventional warfare the United Kingdom is more liable to invasion to-day than at any previous period in her history; a fact of present-day life which has nothing to do with any question of changing the basis of our defence strategy.

No one knows whether the H-bomb will continue to deter:

¹ "We fight our wars in other peoples' countries. France, the Low Countries, Germany, the Crimea, Africa, India, the Pacific and so on. We prefer it that way. It is inconvenient when you have to fight in your own country." (Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, 21st October, 1957).

whether if it does not, strategic nuclear weapons will be used in the opening stages of a third world war, or whether there would be a period of "phoney war" (in nuclear terms) during which neither side would initiate nuclear strategic bombing but only use tactical nuclear weapons.¹ Therefore, one of the contingencies for which we must prepare is a struggle between conventional forces using tactical nuclear weapons so far as possible strictly for military purposes, i.e. attacks on enemy formations, military bases, ports, airfields, etc. The forces of the Soviet Union for this type of semi-nuclear war are superior to those of the Democracies.² The prospects of preventing the Soviet forces from reaching the Atlantic seaboard are not comforting and, with Western Europe in their grip, an invasion—possibly airborne—of the U.K., supported by a massive submarine attack and air-bombing with tactical nuclear weapons, is something we should take into account in our existing defence plans. Only wishful thinking will assume that such an invasion is bound to be repulsed.

In short, even if the policy of abandoning the use of nuclear energy for military purposes is rejected out of hand, I ask the question: "As matters stand, what plans exist to cope with the contingency of an enemy occupation of the U.K.?" Some say that it would be a mistake to have such plans. They base this opinion on two arguments:

(a) As such plans would have to be made known to the public it would lower national morale if it seemed that the Government were not certain an invasion could be repulsed.

(b) Preparation of plans to meet an occupation (not the same thing as plans to repel an invasion) is senseless because if the United Kingdom were occupied, the war—so far as Britain is concerned—is lost, and we could only hope to be liberated.

The validity of these arguments depends on (b) and this depends upon whether or not the thesis put forward in this book about what—in the last resort—we are defending is

¹ The near-certainty that this policy would build up into H-bomb operations is discussed on page 106.

² The Soviet Union are believed to have ten airborne divisions (1957).

accepted. This thesis is that in the final analysis we are defending our way of life and fundamentally the *ideas* which give immortality to our way of life.

If this objective be accepted, then to believe that an enemy occupation of these islands is the end of the struggle is defeatism; it is treachery to democracy. People who think like this should think again and desert from the mental fifth column.

If this objective is not accepted, there is no more to be said except to ask the materialists what military plans they have to ensure that an occupation of the U.K. is a virtual impossibility. The only answer they can produce is—paradoxically—the *idea* of the deterrent of the H-bomb since there are no signs that the British or any other nation of the West are prepared to raise and maintain conventional forces at least as strong as, and preferably stronger than, those of the Soviet Union as an insurance policy in case H-bombs are not used. Our weakness in conventional forces is particularly noticeable in relation to the Russian submarine menacè.¹

The sinister implications of nuclear war seem to have caused everyone except professional sailors to overlook the fact that, even if we assume no one will use nuclear weapons, Great Britain, dependent for her normal existence upon sea communications, is rapidly becoming most gravely menaced by the Soviet submarine fleet, whose activities would be supplemented by conventional bombing activity and air-minelaying against our ports. To this we must add bombardment of our ports by intermediate rockets. My view is that with modern weapons (non-nuclear if you like) the United Kingdom is virtually indefensible if powerful Russian forces were established on the Atlantic sea-board and 400 plus Russian submarines were operating in the Western Approaches.

* * *

No plans exist to meet the contingency of an enemy occupation, for if they did they would have to be published. If I am wrong and they exist in a safe, they are useless whilst secret. Plans—probably of an embryonic character—may exist to deal with repelling an invasion but this is not the same thing.

It would be interesting if personalities such as the Governor

¹ See Chapter VI, page 89.

of the Bank, the Chairmen of the Big Five, the President of the T.U.C., the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Editor of *The Times*, the Director-General of the B.B.C., the Chairman of I.C.I. and the Chairmen of a couple of nationalized industries appeared in a television series and answered three questions:

(1) Have you had an indication from the Cabinet about what policy you are to pursue if this country is invaded and we fail to repel the attack so that we are occupied?

(2) If the answer is in the negative, what ideas have *you* got as to the policy *you* would pursue?

(3) If you *have* some ideas, what steps have you taken to make them known in the organization of which you are the chief personality?

I feel that the programmes would be brief and embarrassing to performers and viewers.

Even if no attention is paid to the possibility of basing our defence on the alternative to discarding nuclear energy for military purposes, the absence of any plan to meet an occupation under any circumstances is a weakness in our defences.

II

The problems of an occupation which might be one of the consequences of the new strategy need examining, for it would not be a normal or traditional type of occupation because it would not be preceded by great or prolonged violence. In World War II four cases of occupation which were of this character come to mind. One was the negotiated occupation of Iceland by the Allies; another was the German occupation of Denmark (preceded by slight armed resistance) and the third, a somewhat exceptional case, the extension of the German occupation to the Southern half of France. The fourth was the occupation of the Channel Islands.¹

Although the U.K. came no nearer to being occupied than being threatened with invasion, it is of some interest to see what

¹ There was some criticism in the U.K. of what was regarded as the collaborationist attitude of some Channel Island residents. This does not seem to have affected post-war popularity of the islands as a tourist resort or bolt-hole from British income and sur-tax. One of my constituents said: "Eh lad! Bad news today. Bloody Channel Islands liberated." He was a grower of tomatoes.

plans existed for each contingency—bearing in mind that it would have been an occupation *after* resistance—they ranged from the purely comic to the ludicrous.

In his book *Invasion 1940*¹ Mr. Peter Fleming has some information which indicates that plans for the conduct of civilians were amateurish and belonged to the anti-invasion plans and not to the possible post-invasion or occupation period. The same author collected information from the German archives about what the Nazis intended to do with an occupied Britain. The result of his researches are that: “no clear picture survives of how they proposed to govern the U.K. after they had subdued it” and Mr. Fleming could only find some rather slapdash plans for military government during the invasion period.

From conversations with officials such as Chief Constables, who realized in 1940 that they might be faced with an occupation problem, I conclude: that no instructions were received from Whitehall on this matter; that at the local or regional level some took the view that the Police, as members of the civilian population, should accept the invasion and do what they could to assist the German authorities in the maintenance of law and order; others decided to go “underground” and told their men they could do what they liked. One senior officer who had decided to go “underground” informed me that: “I told the older constables who were in villages that it was probable that they would not be arrested by the Germans as they would be required to act as police officers on their behalf. This was what I believe happened in the Channel Islands.” The available evidence indicates that on both sides there was very little planning or thinking concerned with the situation after the fighting had ceased due to a German military victory.

The same answer applies to the question “Did the West European governments have any plans for how to deal with a possible German occupation?” The case of France provides plenty of evidence that there were no plans. As the victorious armies pressed forward, members of the French Government sat in Bordeaux disputing amongst themselves whether or not the seat of government should be transferred to N. Africa, a reasonable move which should have been planned at the latest

¹ *Invasion 1940* by Peter Fleming. Rupert Hart-Davis.

during the months of the phoney war. Nothing illustrates more dramatically the absence of any planning, than the amazing *ad hoc* offer by the British Government of complete union with France, an idea which, according to information given to me by one of its authors, was very much an off-the-cuff decision.

From the point of view of the occupying powers the most complete study which has come to my notice has been written by Mr. A. Dallin. His book¹ is a huge volume of nearly 700 pages, weightily documented and an astonishing revelation of the internal rivalries in the Nazi party and between the army and the party, which led (in addition to fearful brutalities) to a hotch-potch of contradictory policies often simultaneously applied. This book also shows that the Nazis had a tremendous chance to win over the support of a population which in the Ukraine and elsewhere first welcomed the German army as liberators.² Most interesting from the point of view of our present purpose is the evidence in this book that it is impossible to get any profit out of an occupied country without the assistance of the inhabitants and that, however brutal and indifferent to any moral considerations the occupiers may be, in the long run they have to take account of some of the desires and wishes of the occupied people.

When the Allies occupied West Germany after the enemy had unconditionally surrendered, although the leading Nazis were seized and tried as criminals, the occupying powers were obliged, *faute de mieux*, to make use of many former Nazi officials so that the administration could function and order be brought out of chaos.

The two difficulties which the occupying authorities have to surmount are first, the need to keep the economic life of the conquered territories in working order if the conquerors are to acquire any economic benefit, and the more complex the society of the occupied people, the less easy it is to impose some rough and ready alien administration without the whole apparatus breaking down.

The second problem facing an occupier is of recent origin.

¹ *German Rule in Russia 1941-45* (a study of occupation policies). Macmillan.

² "We are enthusiastically welcomed on all sides" (July 1941). "The basic attitude is one of deep resignation" (August 1942). "In truth the bulk of the population is hostile" (October 1943). Extracts from German intelligence reports.