

It has been considered in the past that if a state were invaded and occupied, this event marked the end of the war and that the nation as represented by its government had no option but to capitulate and accept the terms of a "peace" settlement, which might amount to annexation of the conquered territory. This, however, was a short-term view because there are many examples in history which show that military defeat, occupation and annexation did not result in the disappearance of the nation and its way of life. A classic example is provided by Poland, frequently partitioned and eventually abolished as a state. It was resurrected in 1919, passed under Russian control again after World War II and at the time of writing is endeavouring to regain a measure of independence. Eire, Czechoslovakia, Finland—and Israel—are also examples of the indestructibility of national ways of life. The history of China—which in the past has been a civilization rather than a nation—is often the story of how the Chinese absorbed their conquerors.

That there is nothing new in the idea that all is not lost if the homeland is occupied or even annexed, is an oversimplification, but during the past few decades the application of the principle has taken on a significant new development.

In the past a state which occupied another could expect a certain amount of underground resistance which, if the occupation became an annexation, was reflected in an independence movement usually centred in refugee groups operating from a neutral territory. The United Kingdom, with its tradition of political freedom, has provided asylum for numberless groups of refugees. But the bulk of the population in the occupied territory has usually taken up the attitude that, with the defeat of their armed forces and the capitulation of their government, there was nothing much the conquered people could do about the situation.

A change has taken place in this attitude.

The problem of occupying a country now includes a new factor of growing importance which is that many of the so-called civilian population may not be disposed to accept the defeat of their armed forces as the end of the struggle. In a lecture to service officers I remarked: "This audience has been taught that, when carrying out military operations in the

Middle East, it is necessary to be careful to respect the special position of Moslem women and not to go into mosques with your shoes on! But who has ever been taught what to do in a situation when a Moslem woman lobs a bomb at you from the roof of a mosque?"

The growth of significance of non-official-military and passive resistance is due to several causes, viz: The technique of the use of arms has become widespread owing to training received by millions of men in two world wars; the development of small-sized bombs and automatic weapons has greatly facilitated terrorist activities; the masses have become more politically educated and apprised of what seems to them to be the importance of *ideas* such as nationalism.

This last-mentioned development is the most significant because it is an ideological force. All over the world the common man, whatever kind of government he endures, has become more politically conscious during the first half of this century. In particular the emotion of nationalism has become one of the most potent forces in the world and the cause of much tension. As mentioned earlier, the Communists have always understood the importance of this development and work hard to equate nationalism with Communism. The growth of nationalistic feelings amongst the masses is one of the reasons for the general tendency of war to become more and more ideological in its purpose.

The Soviet leaders were quick to exploit Russian nationalism in World War II and called it "the patriotic war" and during the war years various Russian national heroes of the Tsarist régime were dragged out of the dustbin and temporarily restored to their pedestals.

At the present time nationalism is probably the most potent force in the Arab world and our American allies sometimes find it hard to believe that neither dollars nor parades of force can anaesthetize nor defeat it.

However, this conception that the struggle is not to be regarded as at an end if the armed forces of the state are defeated is in an early stage of its evolution and has not yet become an officially recognized part of national defence policies. Therefore no thought has been given to the problem of what sort of resistance to occupation should be planned.

Should it be violent or passive, or a combination of the two? And how should the nation be trained for the selected method?

The phenomenon discussed above is important from the point of view of the subject of this book because its existence indicates that national groups are becoming psychologically attuned to the notion that a war is not ended when the armed forces lay down their arms. The masses do not yet realize that in modern war if the armed forces have been defeated the chances of a successful continuation of the struggle by *violent* civil resistance against an organized military force are slight. But the important development is the awareness of the people that the struggle is still in being and in due course it will become more widely understood that, with the defeat of the armed forces, violent methods have been exhausted and the new battle must be conducted non-violently.

There is not much of value for the purposes of this study to be learnt from the German occupation of Western Europe. We are considering a situation in which an occupation of the United Kingdom (and/or the E.T.O. nations if E.T.O. were formed) would be regarded as a continuation of the war and even—as we shall see—a state of affairs providing in the psychological sphere an intensification of the war. But the Nazi occupation of Europe was the sequel to a military victory *not* the prelude to a psychological struggle and the peoples of the occupied countries were still thinking of the war in military terms since they based their hopes on a liberation by allied armies. This is the important difference between what I conceive to be the background of an unopposed or only tokenly-opposed occupation and that of the European occupations of 1940-45.

From a general survey of what happened during World War II in a number of countries it seems that three parallel developments can be traced. First, each occupied territory had a government in London claiming to be the authority in exile. These governments, recognized by the British Government, collaborated with the British in organizing sabotage, intelligence work and guerrilla warfare resistance of various kinds in the occupied territories. The object of these activities was initially to make administration as difficult as possible for the

German authorities, and later on, as the plans for the invasion of the Continent matured, to help it forward by the provision of intelligence and sabotage of enemy communications.

Another of the developments was the behaviour and attitudes of the average man. I shall return to this in a moment.

Finally there was the third development, found to a greater or less extent in each occupied territory, that of the collaborators or Quislings.

The first phenomenon, that of underground anti-German active resistance, encouraged some people by making them feel that the spirit of national resistance was not dead; but on the other hand—as I discovered when soon after the war I travelled slowly through France looking into this matter—there were many people who did not approve of *La Résistance*, partly because they thought it useless if not harmful to the national interest and partly because a considerable number of criminals and bandits promptly joined up with the movement.

Near Briançon in the home territory of the Chasseurs Alpains regiment, I was told that some partisans had ambushed a small German convoy killing two Germans. As a result the Germans went to the nearest village and shot a number of men as reprisals. My informant asked me what good this attack on the convoy had done and assured me that the countryside had been anxious to see the partisans subdued. I heard similar stories in Belgium, where a whole village had been destroyed as a reprisal.

Although the violent resistance movement in the occupied territories provided many examples of extreme heroism and towards the end of the war were valuable as sources of intelligence, neither the German administrative authorities nor the German General Staff regarded them as being much more than a nuisance during the occupation. An exception to this existed in Russia, where the immensely long lines of communication of the German armies offered great scope to guerrilla warfare activities behind the fighting line and, as I know from first-hand information, the German Army which surrendered at Stalingrad had the greatest difficulty in keeping open its supply communications with Germany. But this was not the same as the case we are considering, because a war of movement was in progress, whereas in Western Europe it

had come to an end with the capitulation or flight of the Government.

Furthermore the violent form of resistance we are considering is a reflection of a moral resistance, it is not a military campaign to expel the invaders by force. The active resisters who carry on the struggle by violence after the regular forces have capitulated are dependent for their existence on the collaboration in various degrees of intensity of thousands of non-terrorists. For example, the Mau Mau rebellion was only brought under control when large numbers of the Kikuyu tribe who were anti-Mau Mau were allowed to co-operate in the struggle and the toll of over 10,000 loyal Kikuyu dead shows that the Mau Mau leaders realized who were their most dangerous enemies. E.O.K.A. in Cyprus would not have lasted a month had it not received widespread support partly through fear, partly through sympathy, from the mass of the Cypriots.

Another aspect of the resistance movements question is this: their object is to create a political situation favourable to the occupied country.

A violent resistance movement goes into action, undertakes sabotage, shoots up prominent enemy individuals and generally creates what the occupying power would call a terrorist movement. The occupying power retaliates with collective punishments, executions, curfews and counter-terrorism. A situation may then build up in which the government of the occupying power finds itself under pressure from public opinion either at home or abroad or both. British Governments in my lifetime have had this experience in the cases of Palestine, Eire and India, and to a lesser extent in Cyprus. The French Government experienced this technique in Algeria.

World public opinion as echoed at the United Nations is becoming of significance, and in a democracy what the opposition thinks may be of decisive importance.

But the value to the occupied nation of the psychological effect on public opinion outside the occupied territories such as the creation of martyrs in the cause of liberty, etc., depends upon the political character of the occupying country. Hitler was quite indifferent to the reactions of world opinion to his anti-semitic policies and barbarities, and Communist governments show a like indifference when it is tactically expedient to

do so. British Governments on the other hand have always been sensitive to terrorist or even political pressure from people under their control.

I come now to the second development in the occupied countries, the attitude of the average citizen to the German occupation. It is impossible to do more than generalize about this aspect of the subject. It would be of great value if a large-scale and scientifically organized enquiry were made into what thousands of ordinary people thought should be their behaviour *vis à vis* an occupying power. The result of enquiries made from a limited number of individuals in the Nazi-occupied territories is summarized below.

I. The average citizen had faith in varying degrees that he would be liberated. This hope, at a very low ebb in 1940, increased as the war proceeded.

II. In these circumstances there was a feeling that the right thing to do was to make the best of a bad business, carry on with one's daily life and await liberation.

III. There was no prepared policy or plan in any occupied country giving the citizens any guidance as to what their behaviour should be if the country were occupied.

IV. The mass of the people in the occupied territories who were not either active resisters or open collaborators seem to have varied in their attitude between that of "keeping ourselves to ourselves and having as little to do as possible with the enemy" and "life has to go on and business is business even if the customer is an enemy".

V. I can find little evidence that any attempts of significance were made either to organize any form of non-violent resistance or any form of political warfare against the occupying forces.

A partial exception to the above generalization is provided by the story of events in Norway where, after the defeat of the Norwegian forces, the resistance was of two kinds. From 1940-43 it was principally non-violent, but from 1943 to 1945 there was the growth of violent resistance organized from Britain and carried out by units parachuted into the country.

The first phase is of most interest from the point of view of this study.

When the Nazis invaded Norway they expected that so

genuine an Aryan and Nordic race would welcome them and their doctrines and at the end of the military campaign the Germans issued instructions to the occupying troops to be careful not to antagonize the people, and all administration was left in the hands of Norwegians. It was only in their attitude to the Storting that the invaders were tough, but the majority of Members of Parliament refused to function and after abortive negotiations the Germans issued decrees on 25th September, 1940 which turned Norway into what was virtually a German province administered by pro-German Councillors of State under the control of a Reichskommissar (Terboven) and backed by the Hird, a kind of Norwegian version of the German S.S.

Sustained efforts were then made to secure support of the judicial system, but the Supreme Court resigned in a body. Students' Unions were dissolved and replaced by Nazi unions. They were boycotted and collapsed. The Bishops refused to obey attempts to use the Church as an instrument of government and pastoral letters containing the correspondence between the Minister of Church Affairs and all Bishops were read in all churches.

In the winter of 1940-41 decrees were issued making it compulsory to display Quisling's portrait in schools, to eliminate the teaching of English and to teach history on Nazi lines. A nation-wide strike of teachers backed by parents and the Church was successful. Doctors and actors were two other professions which managed to defeat the Quisling Government.

By October 1941 the pro-German Government decided to adopt more violent methods and in March 1942 a great struggle began with the teachers, of whom 12,000 out of 14,000 refused to join a government-organized Teachers' Confederation. They were supported by the parents. 1,300 teachers were arrested and the schools were closed. By August 1942 the Government had to retreat and the schools re-opened. In April 1942 93 per cent of the clergy "disestablished" themselves from the state church and declared they were only in spiritual relation with the people.

A. K. Jameson, the author of *New Way in Norway*, a *Peace News* pamphlet on this subject, writes:

"If the question is asked whether the Norwegian experience goes to prove that the technique of non-violence offers an

efficient substitute for violence and can be successful in producing the desired results, the answer would appear to be that it does and can in the moral and ideological realm. That is to say, the occupying authorities completely failed to impose their new order on Church, education, professional and sporting organizations. These organizations were, with their funds and buildings, taken over by the authorities and handed to the 2 per cent of the population who collaborated with them; but it was only the material shell which was handed over. As regards the spirit, that was kept untouched and untouchable and to the end Church and schools continued to preach and teach on the same lines as before the occupation. It was a magnificent demonstration of faithfulness to an ideal and of staunchness in face of physical suffering carried out over a period of years during which the occupying authorities seemed to be all-powerful and almost unchallenged in their career of conquest. The moral and physical strain must have been intense and the steadfastness displayed is worthy of the highest praise."

* * *

The conclusion I have reached after studying the Norwegian story is that for many reasons the non-violent resistance movement was operating in favourable circumstances which would not often be repeated. What the Norwegian experience indicates is that if the favourable circumstances are ignored and replaced by a prolonged and careful training of the nation in the tactics of non-violent resistance, very powerful and indestructible moral forces can be mobilized against an occupying power.

Finally there was the third development, the collaborators or Quislings. Now that war emotions have subsided it is possible to take a more objective view of this subject than was possible at a time when it was normal to regard all collaborators as double-dyed traitors.

It is certain that amongst collaborators were men and women whose principal motive was one of self-advancement or protection. They were the Vicars of Bray. But it would be a gross oversimplification to lump into this category every Western European in an occupied territory who co-operated in any way with the occupying forces.

A French friend of mine had a factory which made aircraft propellers. The Germans ordered him to keep in production and manufacture to their specification. He has said to me: "Should I have said 'To hell' and been shot? The factory would have remained in production. And what about my work-people? It is true I was an armaments factory, but the principle would have been the same had I been making boots and been ordered to supply them to the German troops."

"What did you do?" I asked.

"I quickly tore up your News-Letters," he replied, "and then made a plan to keep production as slow as possible. The Germans became very suspicious; I managed to deceive them. I sent my chief engineer to the Messerschmidt factory in Germany with the excuse that we needed more know-how. I told him to stay as long as he could and spin out matters. As a result of all this, when France was liberated, I and my chief engineer were arrested and damn nearly shot as collaborators. It was impossible for me to produce documentary proof that some of my actions, apparently of a most collaborating character, had the secret purpose of hindering the German war effort."

To come to simpler cases:

Were a postman, an engine driver, an electrician at a power station, a dairyman, a policeman, a butcher, a newspaper reporter, Uncle Tom Cobley and all who carried on their jobs in Brussels, Amsterdam, Oslo, Copenhagen, Paris or in the villages COLLABORATORS? What about this case, known to me: Mlle. X in a French village near Amiens became the mistress of the German Major whose reservist troops occupied this area for two years until, to the distress of themselves and the locals, they were ordered to the Russian front. Visiting the village in 1945 I was astonished to see Mlle. X living a normal life and apparently having no trouble. The village barber explained to me that she had rendered a most useful service to the people, for the Major invariably followed her advice in all questions affecting the welfare of the villagers. If troops had to be billeted, Mlle. X knew which families could take them with the least hardship. The same barber informed me that when it was heard that the S.S. troops might pay a visit to the area, the local French and the German reservists connived against the

S.S. How does Mlle. X stand up to the charge of collaboration?

The conclusion I draw from these episodes, reflections and estimations is that in general no plans had been made at the national level in the West European countries, or probably at any other level, as to what should be the correct course of action of a citizen in the event of the national territory being occupied. It was assumed that the national armed forces would prevent the occupation taking place.

Perhaps it is too much to expect that plans should have been made, because plans must be related to a purpose and all defence thinking in 1939 and before was geared to the notion that the only way to win or lose "a war" was by the actions of military force, a delusion—as I have pointed out in Chapter I—which was the child of a misunderstanding about the real nature of War (*verre*).

But if, as I argue in this book, there is another and perhaps a better way of winning a war or even preventing a war from degenerating into violence than the use or threat to use force, then plans can and must be made well in advance to deal with all contingencies of which a possible occupation by the enemy is certainly one of the most serious.

It seems to me obvious that a defence system of non-violence against violence must be as carefully planned, both tactically and strategically, as an attack which will be carried out by trained men, fortified by military tradition and directed by a highly intelligent general staff. The fact that the whole conception of defence (and attack) by non-violent methods is strange to most people makes long and thorough training and planning essential.

What those plans might be and how the nation should be trained to implement them will be discussed in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

RESISTANCE WHEN OCCUPIED

IN WAR THE WILL to win is the first essential. In a war to defend our way of life our object must be, if Great Britain is subjected to an enemy occupation, not only to retain the essentials of our way of life, but to do so in such a manner that we change the enemy's mind and either convince him that he should leave us alone to pursue our way of life or, better still, convince him that our way of life and our ideas are superior to those he holds and which he wishes to force upon us.

Therefore in the struggle between democracy and Communism the first step in preparing the nation for an occupation and how to deal with it, is to instil the conviction into our people that an enemy occupation is only an episode, a battle in a campaign, a continuation of the struggle in a new form and not an event which must be regarded as a hopeless disaster only to be retrieved by a forceful liberation from outside (likely in any future war to be nuclear in character) or negotiations involving loss of territory, indemnities, reparation and other material concessions.

I go further and say that notwithstanding the miseries, hardships and deaths likely to be associated with an occupation, the event should be regarded as providing means whereby the enemy is inevitably brought into close contact with a way of life which he wishes to destroy, but which we believe has inherent advantages over his. It was interesting to notice that according to the U.N. report on events in Hungary, the Russian authorities could not rely on troops which had been stationed in Hungary and had to use Asiatic troops who believed that they were fighting French and British imperialists in connection with Suez! It is certainly a fact that the rulers of the Soviet Union take a good deal of trouble to prevent any number of their citizens making informal and personal contacts with the free way of life.

In military operations it is an ordinary occurrence for

territory to be deliberately abandoned to the enemy as a strategical measure in order to lure him into a disadvantageous tactical situation. Anyone who has had experience of operations in mountain country knows the dangers of the easy advance down the valley unless the peaks on either side are simultaneously occupied.

If therefore I write that an enemy occupation of Great Britain by a power energized by a totalitarian way of life can be regarded as a strategical opportunity to engage the enemy more closely in the psychological battle, as well as a tactical defeat in the military battle, I trust I shall not be told that I am advocating that we should at all costs seek to bring about an occupation. This would be asking rather too much—at any rate in 1957.

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The answers to the problems of how a people and especially the people of the United Kingdom shall carry on the struggle when their homeland is occupied by the enemy has never been worked out in advance by the best minds of the country as a deliberate part of the defence plans of the nation. The most an individual can hope to do in tackling this novel and complex question is to suggest ideas which may be thought worthy of further discussion.

To be effective this resistance must be organized in advance and not expected to spring out of the occupation in an *ad hoc* manner, any more than armed forces are expected to be created when military operations begin. A soldier of sorts can be trained in three months; to train a fairly competent non-violent resister might require three years.

I shall return to the question of planning resistance.

The second principle is concerned with the strategy and tactics of the resistance because, until this is determined, planning and preparations cannot take place.

Resistance under an occupation can be of three kinds:

- Violent
- Non-Violent
- Combining violent and non-violent

Which of these three methods should be the foundation of our defence?

The reasons which lead me to suggest it should be non-violent are as follows:

1. A violent resistance, i.e. sabotage, terrorism, etc., is only a continuation of organized military resistance or an attempt to create military resistance where no military forces exist and it has been argued in these pages that nuclear energy in war has created a situation calling for a revision of our ideas about the use of violence in defence.

2. Our object is to defend our way of life. It is evident that the institutions (see Chapter III) which are the framework of our way of life cannot continue to function in their normal form during an occupation. We are therefore left *with the idea or spirit* of our way of life which is what we have to defend.

Writing on this subject in the *Eastern Economist* on 30th August, 1957, "Odysseus" observes:

"Civil resistance with violence must seriously affect the social fabric of the nation adopting it. Organized fighting in armies is disciplined . . . the practice of violence in, as it were, an orderly and responsible manner by bodies of men subject to discipline does not undermine the Rule of Law and social fabric of the nation as partisans practising guerrilla warfare do . . . in France after World War II as many as probably 100,000 'traitors' were executed in the name of justice. Most of these cases were in fact private vendettas or acts of irresponsible haste carried out by the rival parties of the French resistance."

The same author points out that "Gandhiji insisted at first that mass civil disobedience should not be initiated until a 'non-violent' atmosphere had been created" but that he yielded to pressure and agreed to give it a trial, but called off civil disobedience in February 1921 after excesses by a mob.

The author whom I am quoting (it is fair to state) was writing against the idea that non-violent resistance was possible in Britain "where only a decimal fraction are attuned to pacifism, of whom the majority are ordinary flesh and blood".

3. A plan whereby the people of the United Kingdom substituted a national scheme of violent "civil" resistance for

conventional military resistance would have no moral effect either on world public opinion or that of the enemy, and the efficacy of the defence depends upon the extent to which it can generate this moral force.

In February 1957 I was in Johannesburg during the extraordinary boycott of the bus services by Africans. The impressive and, to many non-Africans, alarming feature of this affair was its non-violence. To stand at the outskirts of an African township and witness thousands of Africans who were walking 15 miles a day to and from work as a matter of principle and to see this black tide of humanity move past over a hundred police as if the latter were non-existent created an eerie feeling. Not a look at the police; not a gesture of defiance or word of abuse and everyone knew that the police were ready at the slightest provocation to go for the crowd. But the police stood there baffled and in a curious way were publicly humiliated. It was the astonishing and patient self-discipline of the boycotters which impressed many observers with a sense of the tremendous force of the African resistance to racial policies.

A highly educated African leader said to me: "If our people will remain non-violent, and we must trust the authorities to back this state of affairs by retaining all the arms, we are bound to win. We have only to sit still for a week and the Government will sue for peace."

An accurate and detailed historical study of conflicts between groups in which non-violent resistance played an important part does not seem to exist.

Non-violent resistance in various forms was conspicuous in the Hungarian struggle against Austrian rule from 1850-67 led by the great patriot Deak whose policy was entirely along non-violent lines.

From 1919-22 in Egypt during the struggle for Egyptian independence there was a non-violent aspect of Egyptian policy particularly the successful boycott of the Milner mission. In India there was Ghandi's policy of non-violence and the German passive resistance against the French occupation of the Ruhr from January to September 1923. A study of such movements would also include some account of non-co-operative policies by Sinn Fein in the Irish struggle, in the course of

which it was said: "We have two governments in Ireland and neither can protect us from the other."

In the Ruhr episode the German government: (a) Prohibited all German citizens from rendering any assistance to the invaders: (b) Guaranteed financial compensation to any German who lost his means of livelihood. German officials acted as if the invaders were non-existent; post offices, telephone exchanges, newspapers and establishments of all kinds refused to have any dealings with "the enemy". The French retaliated by expelling 150,000 Germans from the Ruhr, cutting off the area from the Reich, seizing public buildings and private property. The French were obliged to take over the coal mines and had to import 12,000 railwaymen to keep communications in operation. The occupation of the Ruhr resulted in a Pyrrhic victory for the French. They ruined German credit and made it still more impossible for her to pay reparations. There was also a violent side to the Ruhr episode and several hundred fatal casualties on both sides. Violence also occurred in parallel, as it were, with the non-violent policies, in the Hungarian, Egyptian, Irish and Indian struggles and the same duality of policy was to be observed in the Palestine conflict between the Israelis and the British mandatory power.

It is interesting to note that men like Deak (in Hungary), Redmond (in Ireland), Dr. Weizman (in Palestine), Ghandi (in India), the outstanding leaders were always against violence.

A study of the evidence available leads me to the following conclusions:

(a) That the non-violent side of all these struggles invariably presented "the enemy" with the most difficult and perplexing problems.

(b) That the effectiveness of the non-violent activities were always reduced by violence.

(c) That the value of violence depended upon the political climate inside "the enemy country".

(d) That all the cases of which we have records were combinations of violence and non-violence and (with the exception of certain racial episodes where no arms were available to the

resisters) we have no evidence about a completely non-violent struggle.

(e) That non-violence is much more difficult than violence because it involves a psychological change amongst the resisters towards the enemy. The non-violent resistance ethic can be summed up as defeating the enemy by an internal change on the part of the resister in which "hatred" of the enemy becomes "love and compassion".

This involves controlling the emotions of what Odysseus (see page 193) described as "ordinary flesh and blood".

II

If non-violent resistance and non-violent attack is to be the basis of the strategy of defence, how could this idea be given tactical content? To answer this question we must assume that the nation has accepted and understands the principles of the policy. To the best of my belief there has been very little research on this subject of tactics which is not surprising because a first requirement for research would be accurate information about past experiences which, as mentioned earlier, does not amount to much.

However, even if we knew much more than we do about the previous non-violent resistance movements, I think it unlikely we would discover from these experiences the rules and practices appropriate to the policy in the nuclear age.

There is an important difference between the non-violent resistance movements of the past and the conception which is being discussed in this book. In the past non-violent resistance has always been an adjunct to violence of some kind or perhaps a movement *faute de mieux* because the facilities for violence were not available. Non-violent movements in the past often bore the same kind of relationship to violence as political warfare has hitherto borne to military operations. But in this book we are examining the potentialities of non-violence as the governing policy and one to which as much attention would be paid and forethought given as is regarded normal for military defence plans. In 1942 the American pacifists produced some plans which presupposed:

"A voluntarily disarmed country, an unprovoked invasion of

this country (the U.S.A.) by a foreign power and a government and people who have decided to resist this invasion by non-violent methods".¹ In this pamphlet the author lays down the following four principles of unarmed defence:

1. No service or supplies to be furnished to the invaders.
2. No orders to be obeyed except those of the constitutional civil authorities.
3. No insult or injury to be offered to the invader.
4. All public officials to be pledged to die rather than surrender.

An attempt is then made to translate these principles into an outline of practice.

The following extracts indicate the nature of the author's proposals:

"Meeting with no opposition other than ordinary traffic regulations, the enemy commander . . . enters the City Hall and is received with courtesy by the Mayor . . . who refuses the order to surrender and is taken prisoner. The first Vice-Mayor automatically succeeds, but the invaders exclude him from the City Hall, setting in his place a traitor or officer of their own. Executives and clerks continue to perform their duties until commands arrive from the enemy usurper, when they either ignore the orders or cease work altogether, quietly destroying combinations and documents if opportunity affords. The City departments of fire and the police with the public utility services of telegraph, telephone and electricity, continue to function under their regular heads until these receive enemy orders. At this point they, too, will disregard specific commands or declare an instantaneous strike. Workers in garages, gas stations, airports and railroads will go on serving the civil population until interfered with and resume work if and when pressure is removed. . . ."

The writer faces up to the hypothesis of:

". . . an implacable commander under an unscrupulous government, supported by a political party quite reckless of

¹ *Pacifism and Invasion* by J. W. Hugham.

world or minority opinion" so that "an actual battle is under way, between starvation and enemy violence on the one hand and the will of a selected civilian population on the other."

In general the plan proposed for a non-violent resistance policy in the U.S.A. is that of the scorched earth policy and a kind of sit-down strike on a national scale.

I do not find this idea convincing for several reasons. In the first place it is out of the question to suppose that a nation will go, as it were, on hunger strike to the point of death in order to put the invaders in an embarrassing position *vis-à-vis* world public opinion, or their domestic public opinion if it has any significance.

To mention but one example illustrating the impracticability of this kind of non-violent resistance, no mother will deliberately allow her child to die of starvation for the sake of defending the free way of life. Nor is it necessary or logical that this contingency should occur; in order to defend the free way of life it is neither necessary nor desirable to invite the nation to make a mass exodus from life. We can leave that to nuclear warfare.

A sit-down strike on the part of the nation—if it could be organized—presupposes two conditions: first that the invaders can be made to feel a moral responsibility for maintaining the life of the nation and feel it so strongly that they acquiesce in any conditions the people of the occupied nation demand as the price of continuing to operate the economy. Secondly, and this is a weightier argument, that the occupiers have a manifest self-interest in the maintenance of the life of the nation.

In any circumstance reasonably probable, an occupier would have an interest of a purely selfish character in seeing that the economic life of the occupied nation continued to function in certain respects. I can imagine no circumstance in which an army of occupation *would wish* to be surrounded by millions of desperate and starving civilians.

But the main objections to proposals of the kind made in the American pamphlet is that they are negative in principle. Their object is solely that of making the occupation difficult for the enemy. This is desirable, but it is not the whole story. The

object of non-violent resistance must be to *make the occupation dangerous for the enemy*. It cannot be "dangerous" to him from a military point of view, it must therefore be made dangerous to him from a political warfare angle, for this is the battlefield on which, if victory can be achieved, it will be total.

To put it quite simply, the question is this: "Is it conceivable that as a result of an occupation of the U.K. (and/or Western Europe) by the Soviet Union, Communism would be defeated and overcome by democratic ideas?"

It is conceivable, because anything which is thinkable is possible, but the practical question is how to plan it? One can also imagine a state of affairs in which the leaders of the Soviet Union, contemplating the preparations which had been made in the West to deal psychologically with an occupation might (since Communists are exceptionally well aware of the power of ideas) recoil from its danger.

This would reproduce the idea of the deterrent in another form. To the critic who says: "Are you seriously suggesting that Mr. Khrushchev (or whoever is at any moment in charge in the Soviet Union) would be deterred from an occupation policy by fear of the consequences to Communism?" My reply is: "I am, provided we can so organize ourselves that it is a dangerous psychological adventure for the Soviet Union to occupy the West and as I believe this can be achieved (or at the least the matter should be thoroughly investigated) I have more faith in this psychological deterrent than in the present H-Bomb retaliation deterrent."

The first principle of non-violent resistance in the conditions we are discussing is that it must be psychological. The whole struggle must be kept within the field of ideas. Therefore I rule out any terrorism, sabotage and violence. Terrorism would not baffle the enemy but be welcomed by him as something concrete, easily recognized and a legitimate excuse for violent and bloody reprisals. I have pointed out in Chapter III that the basic root of our way of life is located in the individual and we must therefore start by considering the proper course for the individual and later on see how individual actions can be coordinated.

A guide to individual conduct during an occupation (except in general terms) by the Soviet Union is as impossible to

formulate as it is to particularize how an individual should be a Christian; an infinite variety of circumstances call for as many specific actions.

But general rules suggested as a guide to conduct for the individual are outlined below.

1. The economic life of the country to be maintained, that is to say, transport services, industrial production, agriculture, distribution and all activities concerned with the body-keeping business of the nation should proceed so far as possible in a normal manner or in accordance with directions issued by the occupying power.

2. As regards government, the attitude towards the enemy should be: "We have our well-established administrative arrangements and if you do not like them we await to hear from you what alternative you have in mind."

3. To refuse *at all costs* to say or write anything contrary to the principles of our way of life or to accept denial of freedom of speech and association.

4. To use every opportunity in personal contact with the occupying forces to expose the falacies of Communism and advantages of democracy.

5. In general to behave *vis-d-vis* the occupying forces with dignity and moral superiority. This is the key rule.

To many people these suggestions will seem unrealistic. I can imagine a Berliner who went through the horrors of the Russian occupation of that city rubbing his eyes with amazement at the fifth suggestion and regarding it as fantastic nonsense.

But it must be remembered that the occupation of Berlin was the climax of a battle and I am considering the circumstance of an occupation which has *not* been resisted by military force and of a nation trained (see Chapter XIV) to deal with this hypothesis. The distinction between an occupation as the climax of a military battle and one as the beginning of a psychological struggle is of the utmost importance. It is the difference between the argument of force and the force of an argument.

If it is to be assumed that in the event of an unresisted Russian occupation, which might begin with the arrival of a Russian airborne division at London Airport, all the personnel of this division would emerge from their planes and,

without further ado, proceed to massacre the inhabitants of the neighbouring suburbs, then I must agree that there is not much more to be said. But I see no reason why this assumption should be valid and many reasons against it. I do not regard it as reasonable to suppose that the rulers of the Soviet Union would desire to occupy the United Kingdom for the sole purpose of destroying the population. Unless we are to make the further unreal assumption that Russians *qua* Russians are uniquely desirous of personally killing people, preferably helpless women and children; the elimination of the British population would be more simply and speedily accomplished by the use of H-Bombs.

The reader who finds it hard to take seriously ideas such as those in the five suggestions should ask himself whether he has succeeded in dismissing from his mind the notion that resistance must be violent to be effective that, if regular military operations end in defeat, the only hope is guerrilla warfare and that if this is not practicable or is suppressed, all is lost? And, equally important, has he been able to suppose that far from "all being lost" an opportunity exists in the case of an occupation for an offensive in the psychological field?

If he cannot at least *think* in such terms (the necessary preliminary to action) then he is not yet through the thought barrier!

Let us now look at the five suggestions in greater detail. They fall into two groups: The first two are concerned with material aspects of the life of the nation, the last three with ideas and attitudes of mind. There is some World War II experience of the first two suggestions, both in a positive and a negative form. In France, Norway and the Low Countries, after organized military resistance had ceased, life went on. There were rationing, military requisition, forced labour and other grave inconveniences. Sometimes worse, sometimes not so bad as the inconveniences voluntarily imposed by the democratic peoples on themselves. Even in Nazi Germany the extent to which women participated in the war effort was less than that in Britain. Once the tide of military operations had receded, the shops did business, the peasants tilled their fields, the railways operated, the letters (sometimes censored) were delivered, the newspapers circulated.

It was to the interest of both the occupiers and the occupied that this should be so and it is hard to imagine circumstances in which this would not be the case. An exception might be provided by a case in which the enemy required the land for surplus population, but that argument does not apply to a struggle between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

If one of the purposes of an occupation of Britain by the Soviet Union would be to milk British industry for the benefit of Soviet consumers—as the Soviet Union milked the satellite states for a period until Moscow realized that to overdo this was self-defeating—then the Russians would have to take steps to see that imports or raw materials were somehow maintained. Except for coal the indigenous products of the United Kingdom are of no significance and a demand by the Russians for large deliveries of coal would simply mean that the production of British industry would decline and it is obvious that a Russia determined to milk Britain would prefer capital goods and consumer goods to raw materials. One can imagine a Soviet Government demanding ships, cars, diesel locomotives, machine tools but, to ensure delivery of the goods, workers and machines must be supplied with food and raw materials.

That the Soviet leaders are—as one would expect—realists in such matters was brought to my notice in 1945 at a state banquet in Moscow where my neighbour was M. Maisky, sometime Soviet Ambassador in London. In 1945 he was in charge of German prisoner of war camps and he told me that their labour output had been unsatisfactory and various “measures” had been taken to remedy this state of affairs. I remarked that these “measures” were presumably not very pleasant. He replied that the “measures” had raised difficulties and went on to explain that in order to get more work out of the Germans they had been given incentives in the form of cigarettes and more food and the difficulties arose from the circumstance that the prisoners were getting more than the local inhabitants, who had protested.

What is almost totally lacking is any experience relating to the second group of suggestions, which deal with moral resistance in its relation to the moral offensive.

In most forms of non-violent resistance of which there are records the object of the occupied people seems to have been

chiefly directed towards making the occupation so difficult and inconvenient for the occupiers that they would feel the occupied were being unjustly treated.

In the case of the Irish independence movement there was, of course, the long political struggle at Westminster independent of the active violence of Sinn Fein.

In the hypothetical case we are considering, i.e. a Soviet occupation of Britain, the circumstances would be different from those in Ireland, Palestine, Egypt (at various times) and India, where the issue was not a difference of fundamental ideas, but a difference as to whether the granting of independence to these countries at a certain time (or the interpretation of the mandate in the case of Palestine) was or was not the proper course of democratic action. The Democracy versus Communism clash is of a different order of psychological conflict, it is a conflict of principles. A closer parallel is to be found in the racial question in the Union of S. Africa, or the Negro question in the Southern States of the U.S.A.

We must therefore consider the practical application of suggestions 3, 4 and 5 in terms of principles.

It may help if we select an institution such as the B.B.C. and consider the duty of a member of the staff during an occupation. I assume the Soviet administration would appoint a controller in general charge of policy. I conceive it to be the duty of the Corporation's employees to co-operate in the transmission of straight news and announcements and entertainment, music, etc., but to refuse to co-operate in the transmission of programmes designed to promote Communism. The senior British official allowed to function should make it his business to wage a psychological battle with the Russian controller and be prepared to be liquidated rather than surrender on principles in the knowledge that his successor would continue the battle, down to the most junior member of the staff. Entertainers and broadcasters would continue to function, taking every opportunity by ridicule, inuendo and even tone of voice to denigrate everything to do with the principles and practices of the enemy and to contrast it unfavourably with our way of life. Ridicule is a most potent weapon.

The same technique would be used by the Press. The object of a skilful editor under a Communist occupation should not be

(a) to close down the paper or (b) to be so truculent that the enemy closes it down. His purpose should be to cause differences of opinion in the enemy administration as to whether or not his paper should be closed down. For it is certain that in a complex community the continuation of a Press is as essential to the occupier as it is to the occupied and a situation in which a Communist administration is obliged to close down the whole Press is a victory for the opposition. But better still if the Press can remain alive and be a kind of secret and subtle weapon against the occupier. If during an occupation the B.B.C. and Press were so skilfully handled that in sheer exasperation the Soviet administration closed them down completely then—so far as these two institutions were concerned—the struggle would move into the second phase in which illegal and clandestine news-sheets and bulletins and radio transmissions might come into operation.

Writers and all those persons in the nation who can be broadly described as the intellectuals or intelligentsia would be expected to recognize their special and dangerous duties as leaders in the struggle. They would be expected to put into practice the saying that "the pen is mightier than the sword". Martyrdom might be the fate of many of these leaders.

I have mentioned earlier that whilst the basis of psychological resistance to, and attack on the whole moral position of, the occupier must be the *conduct of the individual whose duty it is to remember that whilst there is breath in his body he must never give in mentally or abandon his right to be a free man, but proclaim his principles and practise them wherever and whenever it is possible to do so*, yet there is strength in unity. Our psychological defence and counter-attack, if ever the United Kingdom were occupied by the forces of a totalitarian power such as the Soviet Union, if it is to be as effective as possible, calls for long and careful preparation and a national organization.

Finally, no one is better aware than this author that the suggestions made in this chapter as to how the five principles should be applied only cover a very small part of the national life and are necessarily tentative in character. Nor have I attempted to consider how these practices would be linked up with similar policies in other E.T.O. countries. It will be remembered that it is proposed that one of the three sections of

E.T.O. at both the national and international levels should be concerned with the organizations of the Home Fronts both from the point of view of building up a stronger feeling of personal loyalty to democracy and its institutions and of training the nations to operate non-violent resistance during an occupation.

The two tasks are inseparable, but "home work" for democracy, or better education for citizenship, is an indispensable preliminary to the organizing of the nation for non-violent resistance. We can find an analogy in the military field where it has long been recognized that in the words of Napoleon the moral is to the physical as three is to one and that technical military training is far more effective if it is given to people who know and believe in the cause for which they are being trained to fight.

As will be seen in the next chapter, the training of the nation in the new policy of defence is not something which can be achieved in a short time and it is in the course of the implementation of this programme of defence training that the techniques of applying the principles, either those mentioned above or improvements on them, would emerge.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE TRAINING OF THE NATION

A POLICY OF TRAINING the able-bodied people of a nation in defence techniques has been accepted as normal in most countries of Western Europe since the Napoleonic wars. In earlier days there was the feudal system, which included defence among the mutual obligations of its members. This was succeeded by the period of the whole-time professional fighter, either nationally-recruited or hired as a mercenary, and then Europe moved into the era of conscription.

It was mentioned in Chapter IX that for centuries the people of Great Britain had good reason to believe that, isolated by the waters of the Channel and protected by powerful fleets, they need not take into account in their defence arrangements the likelihood of a successful invasion.

This happy position began to deteriorate at the beginning of the twentieth century and a change of thought started on the subject of national service, which had been traditionally regarded as non-British notwithstanding the use of the press-gang in the Napoleonic wars.

During World War I there was a gradual extension of compulsory military service as it became clear that God seemed to be on the side of the big battalions¹ and the immense military effort needed could not be sustained by the methods and traditions of "the first hundred-thousand". The revolutionary departure from our three-hundred-year-old traditional strategy which took place when we decided to raise immense armies for use overseas and were thus committed to sustaining a strong navy and army *and* providing economic support for our allies, had profound consequences on our defence capacity; although these were not to be fully revealed until the people of Britain were called upon to shoulder the strain of World War II, which involved an effort to have a large fleet, a large army, make a

¹ He had not then let man into the secrets of nuclear energy.

stupendous arms production effort AND maintain a great air-force and civil defence organization. This achievement crippled the nation as severely as the effort of World War I crippled France so that she collapsed in 1940. In World War II, and indeed a few months before the outbreak of hostilities, the principle of compulsory military service for males was accepted by Parliament and the emergence of World War III (in cold form) in 1946 made it necessary to continue a policy which the British still hoped could be regarded as a temporary measure during hot wars.

At the moment of writing it is official policy to abolish National Service although it remains to be seen whether even our much-reduced military commitments will be satisfied through voluntary enlistment in the forces. Many authorities doubt that it will be possible. After the war, efforts were made to maintain the civil defence organizations, but although authorities such as Field Marshal Lord Montgomery have pointed out that the almost complete lack of adequate civil defence in the European homelands of Nato is a grave, if not almost fatal defect in our defences, the whole theory of civil defence has been severely shaken by the advent of nuclear weapons. The public admission of British Ministers that the civil population cannot be defended against this form of attack has not encouraged people to join Civil Defence in response to the argument that any defence is better than none and perhaps only conventional bombs would be used.

Reference was made on page 179 to some of the quaint ideas about civil defence which have emerged from Whitehall. Nevertheless I wish to say clearly that as things are it is wrong and unpatriotic to suggest that civil defence training is useless. Until it is replaced by the new kind of civil defence suggested in this book it should be supported. It is by far the most logical and sensible aspect of conventional war (and therefore the most neglected) and would certainly do some good—one may be uncertain about how much—in nuclear war.

The outline of events sketched in the preceding pages of this book entitle us to conclude that, albeit with reluctance, the British people have, during the past 50 years, come round to the view—long accepted as normal by Continental peoples—that some form of national training for defence is part, or may

have to be accepted as part, of the duties of a citizen in a democratic state.

This duty, either in its military or civil form, is not in favour at the moment (1957) largely because the ordinary citizen has his doubts whether, even if we broke our backs endeavouring to maintain large conventional forces (which would mean two years' National Service), our defences would be much more adequate than they now are.

If, however, it could be shown to the satisfaction of reasonable people that *national training for a different kind of defence* is a worthwhile activity, they would not object to doing their duty, the more so if they could be convinced that in terms of time and effort and dislocation of civilian life the new training had immense advantages over the traditional form of National Service.

II

It would be necessary for the Government to declare that it intends to work out a policy for the purpose of training the nation to conduct war through non-violent activities and create the national framework within which the behaviour of the civil population (behaviour which was briefly considered in Chapter XII) in the event of an occupation would be co-ordinated and strengthened by co-operative action. In order to consider how such a policy could be implemented I must make the assumption that it is the will of the nation that it should be done.

In terms of practical politics we are to-day (1957) only in the opening phases of the great debate about the practicability and desirability of undertaking this second great revolution in our defence arrangements.

The first great revolution in our defence strategy took place in 1911 when we decided to abandon a strategy of defence which had served us well for three centuries and commit ourselves to raising and maintaining a large army for use in the main theatre of war. This was a very startling and far-reaching decision, the consequences of which are with us to-day. It can be argued that it was a mistake and that we should have stuck to the strategy, which defeated Louis XIV and Napoleon, of basing our military effort on sea-power and finance and using

our small army for secondary campaigns. But the fact is that the United Kingdom was only able to exert military strength of the first order of magnitude when "naval force" had as its only rival other "naval force". The arrival of the aeroplane altered all that and as military strength became more and more a combination of air-sea-and-manpower Great Britain was bound to descend into the ranks of the second league, a movement down the scale of military power previously experienced first by the Spaniards, then the Dutch and later by the French.

Has the time come for the U.K. to undertake a second great revolution in defence strategy?

What follows is no more than an attempt to show what could be done if a positive decision were reached, as a result of the debate, that the second revolution should be launched.

The first thought is that the job would take a long time; perhaps twenty years must elapse before the nation, which is mentally anchored (by a cable of increasingly rusty doubt) to the traditional methods, would be attuned to the idea of defending its way of life by the new methods. The business would have to start in the schools of the country so as to create a generation convinced that training in civil defence meant training in the techniques of non-violent resistance and was part of the normal duties of a citizen. The teaching would apply to the youth of both sexes and the co-operation of the teaching profession would be essential. We should have to be careful not to impose doctrines on teachers, but in fact if the broad principle of N.V.R. were adopted, the teaching required would only be an extension and an increase of attention and effort on the teaching of what is called to-day civics or citizenship. There would be nothing politically controversial about the proposal for more educational emphasis on the true values of our way of life.

It must be emphasized that it would be useless to attempt to train a nation to defend itself, i.e. its way of life (even at the cost of sacrificing material considerations), by psychological methods unless a large proportion of the electorate were in an advanced state of educated citizenship and therefore understood what it was all about. Having had some experience of seeking the support of the British electorate at Parliamentary by-elections

my guess is that about 10 per cent. of the electorate in the United Kingdom are at the required level of political development. The proportion is increasing and in the British electorate as a whole there is an immense capacity for sound solid common sense capable of judging the capacity of leaders and accepting or rejecting their ideas.

If a class in a secondary school to-day is discussing defence, Nato, the United Nations and so forth, an intelligent child is entitled to ask: "What are people supposed to do if this country were occupied by a totalitarian power?" I doubt whether the collective wisdom of the Cabinet could give him a considered reply other than the late Earl of Oxford's classic "Wait and see!"

But whilst the full implementation of the new policy on defence would have gradually to mature through the educational structure of the Kingdom, other measures would have to be started elsewhere.

For example institutions such as the Press, the B.B.C., the Banks and Insurance Companies, through their associations and in consultation with the Unions concerned, should be invited by the British section of E.T.O. to work out what instructions should be given to their staffs in the event of an occupation and what training would be required to enable those instructions to be effectively put into force.

The proposals now being discussed are not only related to the idea for a progressive change-over in our defence policy from violence to non-violence. They are also of practical significance in our present violent defence arrangements, unless we are to believe that we can either rule out an invasion and occupation as being unthinkable or that if it is not unthinkable it is to be accepted as the final defeat.

A government which has to admit that it has abandoned all hope of protecting the civil life of the nation (and in so doing they have been commendably honest) can hardly claim that an occupation is out of the question and to accept that this event must be the end of our national story is unworthy of our traditions. Although the facts would rightly be kept secret, I suppose that in the event of an invasion there must be some plans to deal with such questions as the location of the Cabinet, perhaps an embryonic scheme for regional controllers, the use

of emergency ports, the decentralization of broadcasting and so forth. But if such plans do exist they are—if past experience is any guide—of a sketchy character and are only germane to the period of armed conflict. There is a vast difference between a plan, for example (which may exist), for the removal of Parliament from London whilst hostilities are proceeding, and a plan (which we can be sure does not exist) whereby Members of Parliament, if the country is effectively occupied, proceed to their constituencies to undertake leadership in the continuation of the national struggle in accordance with the five suggested principles mentioned in the previous chapter. It may be that the first act of an enemy occupier would be to seize, deport or execute all Members of Parliament. In that event there must be arrangements for other persons to take their places and others to take theirs.

The parliamentary constituency might both on psychological and practical grounds be the most appropriate geographical unit on which to build up local non-violent resistance centres.

The Communists who, through much thought and years of experience, know a great deal about the practice and theory of political warfare, start with the cell. There is much to be said in favour of the small group of dedicated persons. The only thing objectionable about the Communist cell is that it exists to propagate and support ideas deadly to democracy and does so by wicked actions. "Cells" can be composed of persons who belong to the small minority of a nation who are prepared to be exceptionally zealous in a cause. There is no reason to suppose that a democratic nation is incapable of producing such people who, during a long and arduous psychological struggle with the occupying forces, would be the hard core of the resistance and—at a risk to their lives—would give leadership and example to their weaker brethren.

It is just as noble to die under torture because one has been convicted of activities of a psychological nature in support of democracy and against totalitarianism as it is to be incinerated by an H-bomb if the deterrent does not deter. I reproduce overleaf a poem reprinted from a book called *A Mother Fights Hitler*.¹

¹ Allen and Unwin, 1940.

Thoughts are free,
Who can guess them?
They fly past
Like evening shadows.
No man can know them,
No hunter shoot them:
One thing is sure:
Thoughts are free.

I think what I will
And what rejoices me:
Yet all in silence
As is befitting.
My wish and my longing
Can none forbid:
One thing is sure:
Thoughts are free.

Though they shut me up
In a dungeon dark
All this is vain
Availing them nothing;
For then my thoughts
Shiver the bolts
And shatter the walls:
Thoughts are free!

The hero of the book is Hans Litten, son of the authoress who struggled in vain to save her son's life in the Nazi persecution in pre-war days. He was a brilliant young intellectual and recognized as highly dangerous by the Nazis. He fought them relentlessly at the psychological level in various concentration camps and when in one camp the prisoners were ordered to put up an entertainment, Hans Litten went on to the stage and, to an audience including many Nazis, recited this poem.

This is one small example of non-violent resistance and it was a world tragedy that the groups in Germany which in Dachau and elsewhere were fighting for democracy received no support from the democratic world, which could have been in the form of moral and economic pressure on Hitler.

I have mentioned the Press as being a key institution in the maintenance of the free way of life and suggested that certain tactics might be adopted. But preparations should also be made to deal with the possibility that the enemy, exasperated by the Fabian tactics of a Press subtly encouraging and supporting psychological resistance, would close down the public Press. There should be prepared plans in detail for an underground Press producing leaflets and news-letters with an underground distribution system.

The military authorities in Cyprus could provide some interesting information as to how this has been done by E.O.K.A.

This example of the Press has been chosen to illustrate the argument that all democratic institutions which are concerned with ideas should have plans ready worked out in detail in advance, and practised in the form of exercises, to deal with an occupation by a totalitarian enemy.

The training of the nation in the technique of non-violent resistance would be the over-all responsibility of the Minister representing Britain in E.T.O., the allied organization for the conduct of psychological defence at home and attack abroad. As the whole scheme developed this Minister would be the *de facto* minister of defence. Although it would take us too far afield to go into details it seems probable that the change in national defence policy now being considered would involve a reorganization of our Ministries and in particular a change in the status of the Foreign Office. In the past it has been the business of the defence services to be prepared to implement Clausewitz's theory that war is a continuation of policy by other means. But in this nuclear age and in terms of the definition of War (*werre*) adopted in Chapter I we ought perhaps to think of: "policy being a continuation of war (or the conduct of war) by non-violent means." As things are today the defence policy of the deterrent governs foreign policy, and one is tempted to say *is* foreign policy.

It was suggested in Chapter X when we were discussing the need for an Allied Political Warfare organization that it would have three main tasks viz: home front opinion; uncommitted nations' opinion; enemy opinion. The measures we have been considering in this chapter belong to the home front section of the British part in E.T.O. or, if the conception

of an allied organization does not materialize, the organization would be a British Ministry seeking such co-operation as was practical with other states concerned with the Communist menace.

The first task of the British ministry should be to establish the political warfare equivalents of present-day organizations such as the Imperial Defence College and the service staff colleges. These political warfare colleges and training establishments would produce the whole-time experts who would eventually be attached to institutions which would be of particular importance in a political warfare struggle with an occupying power. For example I picture the T.U.C. the Newspaper Proprietors' Association, the principal industrial associations, the B.B.C., the nationalized industries, having attached to them small permanent staffs of persons trained in the new form of psychological defence and able to give guidance if an occupation occurred, and training in preparation for this event.

At this stage in my argument, and not for the first time in these reflections, I sense the need to launch a psychological counter-attack against doubts, perhaps even ridicule, in the minds of some readers. Do I hear some one say: "Experts trained at Political Warfare Colleges attached to the T.U.C. or to the Press? What fantasy is this?"

My reply is that such critics are still on the wrong side of the thought barrier in defence matters, because I doubt if any of the critics will take exception to the following statement: "In conventional war, as soon as hostilities begin, the T.U.C. and Press (to take two of my examples) are at once brought into the closest touch with the military authorities, whose job it is to mobilize all the resources of the nation in support of the grand strategy of the war. When in World War II men and women were directed into industry, buildings and land requisitioned, farmers directed what to grow, civilians told what to eat and what to wear, etc., all this was based on military necessity. The Press is censored, and this was happily done in Britain in World War II, on a voluntary basis, but the chief censor was an Admiral."

All I am suggesting in my proposals, or to be more exact in my agenda for an enquiry, is that for the words "military

authorities" there be substituted the words "political warfare authorities" and that as World War III in cold form is going on now we should take time by the forelock and make appropriate preparations in case it becomes hot and leads to an occupation of the U.K. as an alternative to being obliterated.

Another objection may be that it looks as if I were proposing the creation of hordes of officials. My reply: "I should anticipate that, taking into account the progressive reduction in the size of the conventional forces, there would be a net saving in man-power."

The trained specialists would be members of a regular service analogous to the Foreign Service, the Fire Service, the Police Service, the Health Service, in which men and women would make their careers. It should be called The Defence Service.

To call it at this stage *The Civil Defence Service* would lead to misunderstanding because *Civil Defence* is at present associated with passive defence against enemy air attack.

In addition to the whole-time personnel of the service, which would be built up to direct the non-violent resistance of the nation, there would be part-time training for every citizen on a voluntary basis.

I attach great importance to this voluntary element in the scheme and I believe that once the general idea of the new policy of defence had been accepted by the nation, hundreds of thousands of citizens would be willing to join the local branch of this organization as volunteers and undertake training in non-violent resistance. "Training?" it may be asked. "What does this mean?" It means, if for the sake of illustration we accept my suggestion that the parliamentary division be adopted as the local unit, that, to take the division I happen to live in, which is Petersfield, the electors would be prepared as to how to behave in the event of an enemy occupation and that in every village there would be a group of people known to be the local leaders and guiding committee of the resistance movement. It is taken as normal that in each constituency there is an organization network to-day for each political party and for civil defence (military form). The political party organizations are in fact bodies engaged in a form of political warfare with each other in a battle of the brains for the allegiance of the minds of the electorate. They conduct the campaign

by means of meetings, the distribution of literature, house-to-house canvass and—whist drives and other social occasions! The civil defence people struggle with the same type of problem, substituting exercises in rescue work for social occasions.

The new Defence Service which I envisage being developed would also hold its exercises and manœuvres. Areas and centres of population would be "occupied" by the forces of the small, non-nuclear armed services in order to test out the plans of non-violent defence service in that area. If E.T.O. came into existence and became well organized, inter-national occupation exercises could be tried out. To those to whom all this sounds as improbable and quasi-absurd as space fiction, I must say that military forces hold manœuvres and exercises and unfortunately pay a price in human life and few give the casualties a second thought, and a man-made satellite is going round the earth as I write these words. Let us keep at least an open mind as to what may become accepted as reasonable.

The picture in my mind is that of a defence organization in the psychological field operating amongst all classes of the community on a voluntary basis, trained, organized and exercised by personnel of a whole-term service.

To sum up:

There seem to me to be three stages in the evolution of a comprehensive scheme for the defence of our way of life by non-violent resistance and positive psychological action against Communism. They are:

Stage I. The public debate which may lead to the decision to adopt a totally new basis for a defence strategy. As an initial step in Stage I, I advocate the immediate setting up of a large-scale public enquiry. Since I first made this proposal the Government has created the precedent of appointing a committee of three to report direct to the public about our economic position. This should be the constitutional status of the enquiry into defence.

Stage II. The announcement by the Government in agreement with the Opposition that the new policy had been adopted. Negotiations with our allies to fix a time-table for the key announcement that we intended to abandon the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. It would at this stage become apparent whether our decision would lead to plans for

setting up the European Treaty Organization or whether we should be left, for the time being at any rate, "to go it alone".

The formation of the non-violent resistance Defence Service; establishment of staff colleges; educational work in schools.

Stage III. The extension of the scheme to the whole nation. If Stage I began now it might be concluded by 1959. If the policy were adopted in 1959-60, Stage II might be well developed by 1963. Stage II would begin before 1963, perhaps in 1961 and would have no closing period, but the nation should be reasonably well organized by 1968.

In the year 1602, the Dutch East India Company was established, and in the year 1604, the first Dutch ship sailed to the East Indies. The company was formed by a group of merchants who had been trading with the East Indies for many years. They had seen the great profits to be made in the East Indies, and they had decided to form a company to trade with the East Indies. The company was given a monopoly of trade with the East Indies, and it was given the right to establish colonies in the East Indies. The company was very successful, and it became the most powerful trading company in the world. It was the company that discovered the Cape of Good Hope, and it was the company that discovered the East Indies. The company was the first to trade with the East Indies, and it was the first to establish colonies in the East Indies. The company was the first to trade with the East Indies, and it was the first to establish colonies in the East Indies.

A PERSONAL CONCLUSION

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IN THE REFLECTIONS on defence in the nuclear age which are recorded in the preceding pages, I approached the problem of defence from the severely practical point of view in order to ascertain whether what the moralists declare to be right may not also be an expedient course of action. A study of this subject would not be complete without some few words about wider considerations than the problem of how to defend our way of life in the United Kingdom. All the signs indicate that man is at a road junction of history, but a junction unlike any he has hitherto reached.

The continuation of the testing of nuclear weapons, a process which shows no signs of coming to an end and will increase as more and more nations are driven to seek possession of these means of defence, may produce deadly consequences to future generations, but, long before the world begins to be peopled by monsters, there will be war and war will be nuclear. A war of this character would end civilization as we know it to-day and do so through unimaginable experiences of human suffering.

The junction which we have reached is unprecedented in character because it marks the point of no return. One road leads to survival, to peace and to a degree of material prosperity and human leisure through the peaceful use of nuclear energy never known to man; the other leads to death and destruction. To-day we are marking time at the junction; perhaps sidling perilously near the turning to death.

Some one, some how, in some way, must change the fatal posture of perilous poise between the choice of route and give a dramatic and inspiring lead towards sanity.

The British people have made notable contributions to the whole content of modern civilization. In government they have done much to develop and spread the institution of parliament; in the production of wealth they were the begetters of the first industrial revolution. By accident—no doubt—they were responsible for the United States of America and, by design,

modern India. In defence of liberty in the pre-nuclear age they made immense sacrifices in two great wars. They are indeed a considerable people whose general influence on human history during the past 500 years has been more significant than that of any other national group.

I find myself increasingly driven to the conclusion that destiny has placed an enormous responsibility on the British people at this time. It is hopeless to expect the U.S.A. or the Soviet Union to take a unilateral decision which will break the tension and deadlock between these two giants. For the moment only one other state, Great Britain, has the capacity to produce and stock-pile nuclear weapons. It may be a brief moment. Great Britain is still in every respect, save that of military strength, a Great Power and in terms of world prestige possibly still the greatest of all the Powers. Whatever one may assess the risks to be, there can be no question that a unilateral decision by Great Britain to abandon the use of nuclear energy for military purposes would make a tremendous impact on the world situation and be recognized by our friends, our enemies and the uncommitted nations as an historic decision of extraordinary importance.

In this book I have endeavoured to examine the arguments for and against the adoption of this policy by my country. It is not a question about which any individual should have the temerity to assert "I am sure the answer is YES (OR NO)". There is nothing technical about the basic elements in this great problem and the opinion of anyone who can read and write and is prepared to think hard about this grave problem is as good as mine.

But I am sure that it is a question which should be urgently examined by some sort of an enquiry staffed by persons with wisdom and imagination and whose standing in the nation will ensure respect for their findings. The enquiry should be in public but as it is important that they should have access to facts known only to government, some parts of its deliberations might have to be held in closed sessions. Whilst reserving my final personal position until the enquiry I ask for has made its report, I have come round to the view that on the facts known to me and after endeavouring to assess the relative dangers of the risks inseparable from our present defence policy and those

which seem to arise from the adoption of the alternative policy, I support the idea of changing the basis of our defence strategy from one of violence to one of non-violence. I therefore advocate the implementation of this policy by a declaration (unilateral if need be, if other powers will not join with us) that the U.K. Government as from a date to be announced, will abandon the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. The thought which gave me the final thrust through the thought-barrier separating the mental world of violent defence (in which I have lived and studied these questions for most of my life) to the new world of thought about defence in which violence has no place in major conflicts, is the reflection that by adopting this new policy my country has a duty to take great risks in a supreme effort to save mankind from its impending doom, and that in the words of our poet Milton:

“Let not England forget her precedence in teaching the nations how to live.”