

CHAPTER TWO

THE OBJECT OF DEFENCE

THE DIRECT COST of defence for the year 1956-57 was estimated at £1,483,000,000. This figure, in the region of 10 per cent of the gross national product, compares with estimates, subsequently reduced, of an average of £1,600,000,000 per annum for the period 1950-53. Figures of this size have been judged to be more than the economy of the country can stand. The Government rightly insists that part of the defence potential of the nation is a healthy economy and, from the strictly economic point of view, direct defence expenditure is an unproductive activity only justified on the grounds that it is a premium for an insurance policy against the contingency of war.¹

Much of the expenditure on defence is normally devoted to the manufacture of potential "free exports". These are explosions to be delivered free of charge on enemy territory. Experience shows that a great deal of the destruction they cause will ultimately be restored at the expense of the exporter—provided he "wins the war".

Apart from the direct expenditure shown in the estimates, there is a very large indirect expenditure represented by the loss of wealth which would have been available for non-military purposes if all the labour and material absorbed by an armaments programme and the maintenance of armed forces with their establishments were not so used. Some 7 per cent of the working population of the U.K. in 1957 were either in the Services or supporting them. One-eighth of the output of the metal-using industries was devoted to defence. What is the purpose of this formidable effort?

We are trying to defend something against a potential aggressor. *But what are we trying to defend and against whom and*

¹ In his famous book *The Great Illusion*, Sir Norman Angell pointed out that in modern conditions it was an error to suppose that war could be a worthwhile economic enterprise. The story of German reparations after World War I proved his wisdom.

against what sort of aggression are we defending it? This is a deep question and clichés such as “Queen and Country” do not get us far below the surface. But it is a question which should not be evaded and to which we must find an answer in order to judge whether this great defence effort in the military sphere is the right kind of defence policy and whether there is enough of it.

It seems reasonable to assume that what we are trying to defend must be something closely associated with the polity, i.e. the whole social organization and mode of government of the nation, and there are two parts which make up the whole of what we mean when we speak of the British Nation (U.K.).

There are the visible and outward manifestations of the nation such as the 50 million people, their towns and factories, ports and mines; in short the physical assets of Great Britain. That is one part of the nation. The other part is the national way of life, which has emerged from the historical evolution of the nation. This way of life is expressed in practices which in their turn need certain institutions for their proper functioning. The existence of the mechanisms of the institution does not guarantee the proper functioning of the institution. The practice of a free press requires newspapers, but the existence of newspapers does not ensure a free press.

The most important of all the institutions which exist to express the British way of life is Parliament.

What we are trying to defend is a combination of the material and the spiritual; of physical goods and properties and ideas which, for their full expression, require the free functioning of various institutions. This statement leads to certain questions.

What part, if any, of the various factors which make up our way of life should be regarded as more vital than any other? Looking back over our history during the past few hundred years, has the object of our defence changed in its emphasis? As regards the first question my answer is given in the next chapter which is devoted to an analysis of our way of life and, for reasons set forth in that chapter, the conclusion is that it is an IDEA, that of the freedom of the individual, which is the basic foundation and most significant feature of our way of life.

The second question is best approached by considering the nature of our foreign policy, because this policy and defence policy are opposite sides of the same medal.

Although it is impossible in the space available to deal at any length with the evolution of British foreign policy over the centuries, enough can be outlined to provide reasons for supposing that it has altered substantially *in character*.

When men are organized into a tribal system the warriors are expected to be able to defend the material property of the tribe; the land, the cattle, the women.

Wars between tribes are conflicts of ideas about who should own wealth; the purpose of defence is to safeguard property. Another relatively simple purpose of defence is the case in which it is intended to safeguard the personal authority of a ruler or his dynasty.

It is unlikely that at the Battle of Hastings the English forces had any advanced ideas about freedom and democracy. They lived in a feudal system and their man was Harold. The Normans also lived in a feudal system and their man was William. The Norman barons were interested in conquering England, not in order to introduce social reforms or spread French culture amongst the inhabitants of this island, but in order to acquire real estate. The English nobility fought to hold what they had and no doubt appealed (so far as any appeal was necessary) to their followers to aid them in repelling the Norman bandits, who must have been regarded as the latest and most formidable examples of a long succession of continental would-be conquerors of Great Britain.

History moved on and the European peoples began to crystallize into national states. The Renaissance led to the sea-voyages and explorations and the wars of the sixteenth–eighteenth centuries were basically caused by differences of opinion as to which nation—the Spanish, the Dutch, the French or the British—should have the major share of influence and commercial monopoly in Asia and America. In making this simplification it has not been forgotten that dynastic and religious considerations also came into the picture.

These were the empire-building wars and their principal purpose was material gain. They were acquisitive wars.

At that time the principal medium of communication from one part of the globe to another was the surface of the sea, so military victory depended upon sea-power and this was the cause of the final triumph of Great Britain when Napoleon was

caged on St. Helena. During this period the British were engaged in a war with the people of their N. American colonies and, although material considerations were certainly well to the fore in the minds of the British Cabinet, the war had a strong ideological content in the thoughts of the Americans, whose case was supported by the Opposition in the British Parliament.

Having established their world supremacy—except for the misfortune, so it then seemed, of the loss of the American colonies—the British during the nineteenth century embarked on operations designed to extend the Colonial Empire. But, though Governments believed that to extend the Colonial Empire was desirable as a means of adding to the military¹ and economic strength of the mother country, there was also a feeling that it was Britain's destiny to spread the Christian gospel and good (i.e. democratic) government. This was the White Man's Burden and there were considerable differences of opinion amongst white men of various nationalities as to which group should bear the heaviest burden. This was particularly noticeable in Africa where France, Germany and Britain were "at war" with each other about their respective shares of Africa. These African "wars", which reached a degree of considerable tension in the 1890's, never degenerated into military operations between the great powers but it was a very near thing between France and Great Britain when the Fashoda incident occurred on the Upper Nile in 1898. The Agadir incident in Morocco in 1911 between Germany on the one hand and France and Britain on the other was another of many incidents of the war for colonies and spheres of influence in Africa.

A comparable process took place in Asia, where China was assumed to be in a state of disintegration. In this part of the world the competing European powers were faced with a non-white competitor in the shape of Japan. When the latter defeated Imperial China at the end of the nineteenth century the European powers led by Russia combined to prevent the Japanese from garnering the full fruits of victory. This caused the Japanese to plan for their successful war against Russia in 1904-5. It is interesting to note that the U.S.A., which had begun to become interested in Far Eastern affairs, was already

¹ Especially through the creation of a powerful Indian Army.

taking up an ideological and moral attitude towards European and Japanese designs on China. The Americans (in those days) were disposed to regard themselves as the protectors of the Chinese against the wicked Europeans.

The Boer War, followed by the establishment of the Union of South Africa, marked a turning point in British foreign policy and hence in Britain's defence policy. It marked the end of imperial expansion by force and the beginning of a strictly defensive policy. The growing power of Germany and her demand for "a place in the sun" caused the British to regard their defence arrangements as being necessary to guard their possessions from German imperial ambitions. The British method of doing this was to conclude an *entente cordiale* (plus private staff talks) with the French, who were themselves allied with Tsarist Russia out of a common fear of the modern Germany which had been born of France's defeat in the 1870 war. The Germans were allied with Austro-Hungary and Italy.

This was the notion of the Balance of Power. The theory was that, provided the armed forces on each side were kept at about equal strength, it would be manifest that neither side could "win the war" and so there would be no war.

It was frequently pointed out that, as there was no superior supra-national authority acting as an umpire, each side was the judge of what it deemed to be necessary to have in order to produce a balance. The result of this state of affairs was bound to be—and history proved it to be so—an armaments race, with each side leap-frogging the other.¹

This meant that there were bound to be periods during which one side was temporarily superior to the other and therefore tempted to attack.

Moreover, questions of national character, organizational ability, military skills and industrial capacity were all relevant to the national war potential and could not be accurately taken into account in endeavouring to decide whether or not a balance existed.

It is significant and perhaps rather ominous that in the language of 1957 the balance of power idea of 1900-14 (or

¹ A contemporary example of the practical difficulties of applying this policy in the absence of a supreme authority is the arms race between Israel and the Arab States.

earlier) could have been talked about as the *deterrent idea*! Since military victory was theoretically impossible in a conflict between equals they were supposedly "deterred" from making war.

In addition to reliance on the balance of power the British made great efforts to retain a margin of naval superiority over Germany; so our naval forces were concentrated in Home Waters. There were people who pointed out that the writing about the future of Britain's position in a world of power politics was beginning to be outlined on the wall of history for, whereas during the nineteenth century—the era of the Pax Britannica—a two-power or even a three-power standard of naval strength had been publicly stated as essential to the security of the British Empire on which the sun never set, now in the first decade of the twentieth century Britain was bargaining for a 1.6 to 1 standard of superiority over Germany.

After World War I the British were obliged to concede parity to the U.S.A. and in 1957 the famous British Navy, behind whose shelter the Americans had been able to make a reality of the Monroe doctrine and build up their great country in a peace only broken by their own civil war, is a very small affair compared to the naval forces of the U.S.A.

With wisdom which comes after the event it seems likely that as Britain's strength, relative to that of the U.S.A., Japan and Germany began to decline, her correct policy of defence should have been to work whole-heartedly for collective security and the establishment before 1914 of some kind of a League of Nations. Whatever may have been the advantages of the enforcement of British ideas and policies by allowing war (*verre*) to develop into violence during the period 1600-1900 there were, in 1900, overwhelmingly strong reasons why Britain should wish for peace. The maintenance of the *status quo* or, if that were impossible, its alteration as slowly and peacefully as possible was her manifest interest; the reverse consideration so far as the rate of change was concerned was Germany's interest and so interesting to her rulers that they were prepared, as 1914 showed, to endeavour to bring it about by force.

Some recognition of this British overriding interest is to be found in a speech made by Sir Edward Grey in the Commons

on 13th March, 1911¹ in which he referred to the need for some form of collective security: "Some armies and navies would remain no doubt, . . . not in rivalry with each other, but as the police of the world . . . the great nations of the world are in bondage, in increasing bondage, at the present moment to their armies and navies . . . they may discover, as individuals have discovered, that law is a better remedy than force." President Taft of the U.S.A. had made some proposals which caused Sir Edward to make this speech. Nothing came of this American initiative.

It can be argued with much force that World War I was the first mainly moral war waged by the British people. It was a war which began to reflect the change which took place after the Boer War. *Autres temps autres mœurs*. No doubt our naval ancestors felt that Napoleon was a bad man. But I judge that they thought that the particular wickedness of the French (which was epitomized in the person of Napoleon) was their desire to take something away from the British. Ideas that the Napoleonic wars were ideological struggles between British conservatism, monarchy and Parliamentary government on the one hand, and French agnosticism, republicanism and left-wing revolutionary ideas on the other, soon faded away as Napoleon showed clearly that he was a Corsican turned into a French Imperialist.

When the assassination of the Austrian Archduke at Sarajevo precipitated a crisis which was to prove that the balance of power was not in equilibrium, it was, as I have pointed out on page 24, the German invasion of Belgium which brought Britain into the war. I am not pretending that considerations of power politics and the fear that a victorious Germany supreme on the Continent would be a menace to Britain² did not weigh heavily with the Cabinet, but there was also a moral feeling that the war was necessary to fight and defeat militarism and the doctrine that Might was Right.

It was a war for a principle, even if during its conduct and at the peace settlement the principles were largely forgotten. It was called: "the war to end war" and some of us believed this.

¹ *Hansard*, Vol. xxii, Col. 1988. The whole speech is well worth reading to-day (1957) and very apt to our present situation.

² Antwerp—the pistol pointed at the heart of England.

We were young. The creation of the League of Nations enshrined that principle.

In 1914 the U.K. Government declared war on behalf of themselves and the Dominions; the latter, sitting as sovereign states at Versailles, were not going to stand for that again and the Statute of Westminster was the result. The Commonwealth was born and Commonwealth military policy so far as it could be said to exist could only be defensive, it could not be acquisitive.

Another result of World War I was the emergence of Communist Russia with its anti-capitalist ideology. A half-hearted attempt by the allies to translate the conflict of ideas between themselves and the Bolsheviks into military operations failed and this violence strengthened the local standing of Lenin and his associates. The military operation conducted by the victorious allies against the Bolsheviks immediately after World War I provides an interesting example of the use of force not only failing to change the mind of the enemy but actually strengthening the ideological hold of the enemy government on its people.

The rise of Hitler and the totalitarian policies he introduced created a situation in which the difference of opinion (or war) between the British and the Germans (at least those who supported Hitler) was ideological. But just as some Germans resisted Hitler, whilst others supported him without realizing the implications of their action, so in Britain some people saw the true meaning of the Nazi danger whilst others believed he could be appeased and might become law-abiding.

The rape of Czechoslovakia and Munich opened the eyes of most of the British and the assault on Poland caused Britain to use force for reasons more comprehensively ideological than on any previous occasion in her history.

Some realization—but much too little—that this was so appeared from time to time during the war but, for reasons already described (see page 28) military considerations soon overshadowed all else.

There was, however, an interesting and significant difference in one respect between World Wars I and II and that was the small amount of hatred evinced by the British people and Press towards the German nation in World War II as compared with World War I.

Why was this? Why was it that during World War I it was impossible to play the music of German composers in London (though the Germans listened to British music and played Shakespeare in Berlin) and almost necessary for British people with German names to anglicize them? In World War I, the First Lord of the Admiralty was hounded from office because his name was Battenberg, and I saw a lady, anxious to avoid her dachshund from being stoned, fasten a small Union Jack to its tail before she took it for a walk! It will be within the knowledge of any middle-aged reader that this kind of hatred for everything German did not exist during World War II. German refugees were well treated and there was no rush to anglicize German names or ban Wagner from concert programmes. When visiting bombed-out families from Liverpool who had fled northwards to my constituency, I found that it made no appeal to them to be told that our bombers were destroying German cities. One woman, destitute and with a small family round her, said: "Why should I want some poor — German woman to go through what I've been through?"

At the end of World War I there was a vociferous demand for the "hanging of the Kaiser" and for the Germans to be "squeezed until the pips squeaked". At the end of World War II there was little enthusiasm for the Nuremberg trials of war criminals although Goering and Co. were far more responsible for German policies, especially the slaughter of the Jews, than had been Kaiser Wilhelm II, who died at Doorn a well respected figure.

I suggest that the difference between the popular attitude in the U.K. towards Germans in World War I and World War II was due to a kind of vague and perhaps subconscious feeling that the Prime Minister had been talking sense in his broadcast (see page 25) and that common people in both countries were victims of forces beyond their control and were not enemies of each other.

Although outwardly and, as the war developed, in the speeches of the war leaders the struggle was depicted as a clash between the armed forces of the contestants, it is my personal impression that many people felt that World War II was "something rather different" in character from World War I, and I guess that a man of World War I felt that there was more

of a moral principle at stake in that struggle than would have been recognized by a man of the Napoleonic wars.

Another indication of this changing attitude by the nation towards the object of war is provided by the respect with which conscientious objectors were treated in World War II compared with earlier wars. Also, in this struggle there was a greater degree of national political unity than in any previous war and the basic cause of this was agreement on the *principle* that democracy was battling with totalitarianism.

After the end of the war the course of events gradually made it clear that it was the Soviet policy to promote by all possible means the extension of Communism. The Communists had long realized that it was often more appropriate in war to subordinate military force to subversive ideas and their technique in this respect was abundantly illustrated in the first decade after World War II. It soon became common form all over the world to talk about the cold war, meaning the ideological struggle between the upholders respectively of the democratic and Communist practices and principles.

Immediately after World War II the balance of physical power between the two warring groups was as follows: The free nations possessed, or were believed to possess, a monopoly of nuclear weapons, whereas the Soviet Union possessed a great superiority in conventional weapons.

The menace to the free world of the Soviet policy so alarmed most of the nations on the freedom side of the iron curtain that they joined together to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949). Its original purpose and plan was to create conventional forces of such size (e.g. 90 divisions), that they would be sufficiently strong to repel a conventional armed attack by the Soviet Union and satellites on Western Europe. This hope was never realized even though, in an endeavour to re-enforce the Nato potential, the West Germans were welcomed back into the camp of free nations and pressed to re-arm.

The cold war has, on the whole, been a political and economic struggle between the Communist Soviet Union and the democratic nations. On several occasions the temperature of this cold war nearly reached the point of boil when "the war" (werre) degenerates into violence and on one occasion it did

reach this point. I refer to the Korean campaign. Before the Korean War there was the interesting case of the blockade of Berlin. When the Soviet leaders decided to endeavour to force the Allies to leave Berlin by cutting off land communication between the West and the city, the Western powers had to decide whether to retaliate violently or non-violently. It is common knowledge that one school of thought advocated sending an armoured column down the road to Berlin and seeing what happened. In the event a more subtle and fundamentally non-violent *riposte* was adopted, that of the famous airlift. This placed on the Russians the responsibility for starting up a war if they shot down the civil planes carrying out the airlift. This baffled the enemy although one must recognize that there may be much force in the argument that as, *at that time*, the allies had the monopoly of the nuclear weapon this was probably a powerful deterrent in the mind of Stalin.

The Korean War was most clearly a war about ideas and not about things. It may have been a landmark in history. President Truman recognized that this was Communist aggression expressed in violence and he reacted immediately in—as we shall see in a moment—the traditional spirit of American policy. Thanks to the fortunate absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council, the Korean War became a U.N. war and the British Commonwealth contributed its brigade.

Then came Suez which, unlike the Berlin and Korean episodes, was not strictly speaking part of the cold war. The Suez episode was an astonishing and almost mysterious throw-back to the pre-Boer War policy and was so archaically out of harmony with the developments of intelligent thought in Britain since 1900 that its abject failure was a foregone conclusion.

The Suez episode also revealed that a great many people, perhaps the majority of the nation, were living in a dream-world and did not know that the Victorian era was in the history books. Their voice was that of the lady who wrote: "It was nice to hear the British Lion roar if only for a short time." The Suez episode was of an educational value to the nation comparable to that received by our ancestors at the hands of the American colonists.

II

The British—whose changing values about what they have wished to defend I shall summarize in a moment—were not the only nation who evolved in this respect and a few words about American and French ideas of defence and foreign policy will not be out of place.

The French, bled white by World War I, then made a desperate and logical effort to transfer real power to the League of Nations and a businesslike scheme of collective security. Locarno and all that. In this matter the British were not helpful. They were not as weak as the French, they still held India and the Indian Army, they were supreme in the Middle East and had a Navy as large as that of the U.S.A., a power with whom it had by then been officially declared "war is unthinkable". The phrase really meant that military operations between the U.S.A. and Britain had become unthinkable. We have only to turn our minds back to Suez to observe that a conflict of ideas (war or *verre*) between Washington and London is still quite thinkable.

When World War II broke out the French had inwardly lost the will to defend anything by violence. They were too weak and possibly too civilized to wish to make large-scale war.

The Indo-China struggle, so prolonged and yet so suddenly abandoned, and the Algerian struggle—which seems almost certain to end in some form of Algerian independence—are hangovers from France's attempt to rebuild her Empire after the defeats of the Napoleonic wars. To-day the Nato Commander must often have anxious thoughts about what may happen to his lines of communication through France in the event of a major war.

Of France it can be said that she is lost in a world of naked power politics (as indeed we all are now that power has become nuclear), and would be no less lost and trailing along behind if nuclear weapons did not exist.¹

Her future can only be bright in a peacefully organized world and then it would be dazzling for, though she is in permanent political and financial disorder, she occupies an

¹ Yet in October, 1957 the French were saying that if the disarmament talks at the U.N. failed, France would have to make atomic weapons.

unique and indispensable position and influence in Western civilization. I have often said to my French friends: "What annoys me about you is that in your heart of hearts I know you feel that provided one Frenchman and two women are left alive on earth, Western civilization is safe and I have to admit you are right, even though you collapsed in 1940 and shrugged off a German occupation."

And now the Americans. The American attitude towards defence has been interesting and in many respects unique. It is significant that the strongest power in the world to-day began its history so much later than most other Western powers, and thus built up its traditions during the past 200 years. America was founded to provide men with an escape from what were regarded as the evils of European civilization, particularly the tyranny of Kings and ecclesiastical potentates.

It was the American dream that across the Atlantic Ocean a new kind of society should be created, and it is the inescapable destiny of every American citizen to inherit this noble ideal and unattainable ambition. This has influenced their defence policy.

The British, having passed through the empire-building stage are now (1957) busily divesting themselves of colonies; indeed the granting of self-government to dependent peoples has become one of Britain's principal preoccupations. The Americans have not been inspired by the empire-building urge (the Philippines and dollar diplomacy in S. America were minor falls from grace) though there is no certainty that they might not become interested in it in economic form.

The Monroe Doctrine reflected a desire by the Americans to isolate themselves from the rest of the wicked world. Compelled in 1917 by their urge to be on the side of the angels they intervened (temporarily as they thought) in World War I and then most lamentably retreated again towards the mirage of isolationism when they refused to become members of the League of Nations and disowned the moral leadership of President Wilson. In World War II President Roosevelt worked assiduously and with greater political skill than Wilson to bring the U.S.A. into the battle against the evil ideas, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour clinched the argument between isolationists and interventionists.

After World War II the inescapable reality of the ONE WORLD was accepted by the American people who welcomed the headquarters of the United Nations to New York and committed themselves to its policies. The fabulous aid (military and economic) which the U.S.A. has poured forth to the free world since 1945 has been unprecedented in history. This extraordinary and novel behaviour by a sovereign state has not been sufficiently appreciated by the beneficiaries who have been (and still are) constantly irritated by the short-term tactical political errors of the State Department learning by experience how to deal with the many and perplexing problems consequent upon America's assumption of leadership of the free world. The Americans are also having to learn a lesson well known to the British that "do-gooders" are invariably unpopular.

To sum up: All the American wars have had a strong ideological content. The first a fight for democratic independence; the second a fight for the freedom of the seas; the third a civil war over slavery and the right to secede, and then World Wars I and II, and Korca.

The Americans have always fought in defence of an idea and the idea behind their crusades has been the American dream. Up to and including World War I it seemed natural to Englishmen to expect some tangible gain from winning a war, be it annexation or reparations; that is how it had always been. To the Americans it was equally traditional not to exact reparations because wars were fought to do good or at any rate chiefly to punish and prevent evil. By World War II the British had come round to that way of thinking and all they asked of a Germany which had surrendered unconditionally was that some Nazis should be hanged and that Germans would try very hard to be democrats and eschew militarism.¹

If we look back over the centuries and consider the objects of the many wars which have splashed the pages of history with blood since the national state idea became commonly accepted as the normal social arrangement, a development is to be observed which can be summarized as follows and is illustrated by the examples outlined in the preceding pages.

¹ It was awkward that Soviet activities obliged the British to ask the Germans to re-arm whilst the Germans were still sitting in sackcloth and ashes contemplating the ruinous consequences of militarism. "*Ohne mich*" was a natural reaction by young Germans.

It is a development which indicates that the differences of opinion or wars (*verre*) between sovereign states have tended to become less about "things" and more about "ideas".

It must be recognized that this is only a tendency, a kind of political drift of the centre of gravity of war-purposes and that it is easy to find plenty of examples in the past where the difference of opinion was largely about ideas, and examples to-day where the difference of opinion between the contestants is chiefly about "things".

Nor would it be right to say that any struggle either in the past or at this time has been exclusively about ideas or things. Furthermore, in a given struggle the balance of emphasis between ideas and things as the chief root of the difference between states may not be the same on each side.

Consider the Algerian war. From the French point of view the emphasis is on "things" such as the properties and homes and businesses of the 1,000,000 French residents and the potentialities of the oil and mineral deposits in the N. Sahara. I doubt whether the French Government or people have any strong feelings about the preservation of the French way of life amongst the Arabs. This is not to deny that there also exists in the France of 1957 a feeling that the retention of control of Algeria is bound up with the question of French prestige as a great power.

From the Arab point of view the prime motive of the rebels is the idea that they would like to govern themselves. The simple idea—but history shows that it is a potent idea—that self-government may be preferable to good government. To this must be added a certain weight of opinion amongst N. African Arabs who, *when* they have achieved political independence, wish to retain French cultural contacts and influences.

Coming now to the attitude of the British it is my belief that we have reached a stage in our historical evolution when we are concerned more with the defence of ideas we cherish than with things. As a boy I was told we "owned" a great Empire on which the sun never set and was shown maps of a world largely coloured red. The idea of "owning" the Empire, inaccurate even in 1900, is now dead except amongst the lunatic fringe and there is a good deal of uncertainty as to what the Commonwealth adds up to. I believe the nation feels that, on the whole,

it fought two world wars in defence of the democratic idea and that Russia is the enemy to-day because of its exploitation of the Communist idea, whereas in 1880 Russia was a potential enemy because she was expanding in Central Asia and getting close to the N.W. frontier of "our" Indian Empire, the "brightest jewel in Queen Victoria's Crown".

There is no single and simple explanation for this change in the character of our values. It is a mixture of a great many developments which all fall into two main categories, one a credit to our common sense, the other a credit to our ideals.

In the common-sense category is the fact that we are physically incapable of holding by force, or against the will of other people, possessions or positions which we once regarded as essential to our well-being or our security or our dignity or our pride. From the loss of Calais in 1558 to the enforced evacuation of Suez in 1957 there are plenty of examples of our ability to recognize the facts of life. On the side of morals we have the evolution of the Commonwealth and in particular the grant of independence to the Asian Dominions, and to other colonies such as Ghana and Nigeria. To concede independence to India was inevitable and non-violent resistance in India helped to speed the process, but it was not absolutely or urgently necessary in 1947. If we had been foolish or more wicked than we are it might have been delayed till 1950 or 1955.

I will tell you a short story:

"There was once upon a time a burglar called John Bull who was—according to foreigners—very expert at entering and robbing other people's houses. John Bull was often very puzzled by foreign criticism for, although it was true that he went into other people's property, he often felt that it was in the true interest of the residents as well as of himself that he took this action. He would—once he had taken over the property—open the windows, instal sanitation, teach the owners English and self-government and carry on other beneficial activities from which he could hardly help deriving certain economic advantages, and why not? The 'civilizer' (as he regarded himself) was surely worthy of his hire? As a result of two world wars in which he fought tenaciously and to the point of exhaustion against a very bad type of robber, who had no understanding of what should or should not be done and wished to destroy

John Bull, the latter was informed by his medical adviser that he had a hernia: 'No more drain-pipe entrances for you, my boy.' In these circumstances John Bull decided to turn over a new leaf and become an active supporter of the forces of international law and allow all the good side of his character to govern his behaviour. He was by nature quite a good man and was almost as astonished as anyone else when in a moment of excitement and the raising of his blood-pressure by Nasser he forgot his hernia and his morals for a few weeks."

I do not want to push the parable too hard but it illustrates the change which has come over our policy and the combination of reasons which have motivated our action.

I remind you that the question was: What are we trying to defend, and against whom and against what are we trying to defend IT?

My conclusion—for reasons set forth in this chapter—is that IT is an IDEA comprehended in the phrase OUR WAY OF LIFE, and that we are trying to defend it against policies of the Soviet Union which (and here at least there is no room for doubt) are designed to secure world domination for the Communist way of life. This great ideological struggle for the soul of man and the allegiance of his heart and mind is a turning-point in human history. The world in my life-time has shrunk amazingly in terms of the time space factor; it is—with the exception of the ocean depths—fully explored, and men's thoughts are reaching out towards the planets before they have come to terms with each other about their arrangements on this globe. But come to terms they must and without much delay, because at the present rate of "progress" the world has become ONE for war as well as for peace.¹ World government is now technically possible even if psychologically we have perhaps three generations to go. In the functional sphere we are moving fast because the complex nature of our modern, mechanized and economically intertwined society, forces us to rationalize our emotional nationalism and—let it be remembered—the national-state idea has only been in existence for a few centuries. It has served its purpose and is on the way out. World Wars I

¹ At the Conservative Party Conference in 1957, Mr. Duncan Sandys, Minister of Defence, said that ultimately "a world authority with a world police force" was essential.

and II were the beginnings of its end. Whether it will disappear in a final cataclysm is a question whose answer is beyond the horizon of time, but not beyond our power to influence.

To those who doubt we are moving towards world government I recommend the exercise of making a list setting forth the number of international organizations of an official character which existed in 1900 and another list of those operating, some well, some badly, to-day.

We are coming to terms with each other notably in the non-political aspects of our lives; but, as man is a political animal, it is politics which have the last and decisive word.

What are to be the political terms? A democratic or a communist form of world government? That is what the present war is about; that is the great discord and clash of ideas. The World *verre*. We are defending an IDEA expressed by our way of life. This is the IT. To defend it successfully is not only to our self-interest but to the interest of the future of mankind; and *how* we defend it may be an equally important matter. We must now examine the nature of this way of life and describe it, for without this knowledge (and knowledge of the ways it can be attacked) how can we decide which is the best way to defend it?

CHAPTER THREE

OUR WAY OF LIFE

THE CONCLUSION was reached in the last chapter that what we, the people of the United Kingdom, wish to defend is an IDEA which should be described as *our way of life*. Before we consider to what extent our present defence arrangements fulfil this purpose, more must be said about this way of life; its theory and its practice.

Our way of life is rooted in the idea that MAN the individual is the most important element in society. This conception is expressed in the phrase that "the state exists for Man and not Man for the state".

"I think; therefore I am," said Descartes. The significance of the human personality is bound up with the conception of freedom, since without freedom this personality cannot express itself.

The question to be considered is whether Man is naturally freedom loving? An affirmative answer must to some extent be based on faith, but history is often the story of the ceaseless struggle of groups of men to liberate themselves from what they conceived to be unreasonable control by others.

In recent times the world has witnessed the operation of the Fascist, Nazi and Communist dictatorships. It was believed by some people that, if a generation of a nation had never known freedom, had never been taught what democracy was, nor what the individual's duty was in a democracy but had, on the contrary, been taught that the Communist creed and practices were the true expression of democracy, then it was impossible to expect a generation thus conditioned would want true freedom or make any move to obtain it.

For how, it was argued, could a man want something he knew nothing about, or feel the absence of privileges he had never known? But 1956 saw the Hungarian rising against the Communist tyranny, a revolt of which the students, the writers and other intellectuals were the mainspring of what became a national rising and, even after it was suppressed by Russian

brutality, a psychological resistance continued to be maintained by the youth.

"Liberty"—wrote Professor Massimo Salvadori, in *Liberal Democracy*—"is free choice, each individual's own decision concerning his course of action; it belongs to man himself, not to the external world which surrounds him."

But since MAN does not live alone, account must be taken of the personalities of other men and, unless we accept the doctrine of Anarchy, the individual must give weight to the desires and personalities of others, recognize that they are no less important from the point of view of the maintenance of freedom than his own and also realize that he must develop his own personality and ability in harmony with the development of other men.

This social need leads to what at first sight appears to be restrictions on liberty, but restrictions in some directions are necessary in order that there shall be freedom in others.

A simple but practical example is provided by the need for traffic control. Restrictive rules, regulations and penalties for infractions are essential if men are to be free to move from place to place in an orderly and speedy manner. The problem of determining the correct balance between control and freedom is the continuous problem confronting those peoples who believe as we do that a kind of society we call democratic is the best way of ensuring the maximum possible and practical degree of personal freedom.

The essence of a democratic way of life is that the people as a whole should determine the extent and degree to which, in the interests of the liberty of the individual, the State, representing the whole community, should control the freedom of that individual. In order to achieve this purpose democratic institutions have been created and they should be judged by the extent to which they maximize the liberty of the individual to develop his personality in harmony with those of others. Democracy must not be thought of as something which can be achieved once and for all. It is a system or way of life in which the individual has responsibilities as well as rights and in which growth is needed if achievements are to be preserved and enlarged. Democracy demands the loyalty and services of the individual who must of his own free will and from inner

conviction accept the personal responsibility of making democracy "work"; of preserving its principles; of defending it against internal and external enemies. Unless buttressed by acceptance of personal responsibilities which put content into rights, the latter will disappear.

Above all it must be remembered that democracy is not created or given life by constitutions or the machinery of government.

Democracy must and can only thrive if its roots go down into the hearts and minds of individuals. Unless democratic institutions are themselves inspired by democratic principles they can become not the servants but the masters and even the destroyers of democracy. This may be because such institutions tend to develop a corporate personality, and indeed require to do so in order to be efficient, and the body corporate has an instinctive hostility towards the body personal.

To the Government Department "the public" is to be esteemed because collectively it has a consumer value from the angle of the department's activities, but the individual can be a nuisance.

Furthermore the body corporate will always take the "larger view" which on technical grounds enables it to make out a good case for ignoring the just claims of individual or minority interests. However specious the technical argument may be that some individual point of view be brushed aside it will often be found that the apparent gains in efficiency have been made at the cost of whittling away the reality of an important democratic principle.

Where the balance lies in particular cases must be a matter of personal judgment but, when in doubt—and doubts should be always alert—it is wisest to give liberty the benefit of the doubt.

II

It has been said that a democratic society is like an elephant; it is hard to define but easy to recognize when one sees it. Some of the outward and visible signs which demonstrate that we are living in a democracy in the United Kingdom are described below.

First there is the institution of Parliament. It is not always

understood, even by M.P.'s, that the purpose of Parliament is not to make laws but to prevent the executive (which is or should be the creature of Parliament) from being given more power (through legislation) than it requires to do its job of governing the nation. *As much power as is essential; but no more*, and in theory every backbench M.P. should adopt a critical attitude to the demand of the Executive for more power.

This is not the place to discourse about the function of Parliament, but this institution is undoubtedly the central, most conspicuous and—one might add—world famous of all the outward and visible signs of the ideas which inspire our way of life in the United Kingdom. But, when later on we shall come to a consideration of the methods of defence of our way of life and whether it can be done by more than one method, we must not forget that even Parliament is only the crowning summit of a series of discussions about government of which not the least important may be heard going on most evenings in the village pubs.

A free Press is another generally accepted characteristic of a democratic society, though again it would exceed the limits of this book to attempt to describe its functions in a free society. Freedom to believe in and practise any religion or none; freedom of association and speech; all these are amongst the generally accepted features of a democratic society.

But it can hardly be over-emphasized that these freedoms will not exist, and if once established can easily wither away and die and be replaced by tyranny, unless the majority of the individuals in a society believe in these freedoms and are prepared to be vigilant and take appropriate action if the freedoms are in jeopardy from enemies within and without.

I remarked earlier that a democratic way of life can easily be recognized when it is seen or experienced and the same applies to a totalitarian régime.

In Britain, for example, it is only necessary for a visitor to spend an hour during question time in the House of Commons to have ample proof that the British Parliament is a free institution. A few hours listening to radio programmes in the U.S.A. provides a striking contrast to a study of Russian radio.

No claim is being made that the free way of life as we know it in the U.K. and other democratic countries has achieved

perfection; very far from it. For instance racialism in the U.S.A., telephone tapping in Britain or (a Cypriot might say) British policy in Cyprus, French policy in Algeria are all matters providing ammunition for critics; but the fact that all these activities are the subject of public debate in the countries concerned is proof of the democratic nature of the social climate.

Recently I asked a senior Russian official why the B.B.C. broadcasts to Russia were jammed. After some evasions he said with a smile: "Britain jammed the Athens radio in Cyprus." My comment, to which he had no reply, was: "I agree, but I was able to write an article in England criticizing this policy; could anyone write an article in *Pravda* criticizing your policy?"

Obviously all human endeavour must fall short of perfection but of the free way of life, of which the expression of the wills of the people through some form of freely elected parliamentary institution is an imperfect feature, it can be said in words Sir Winston Churchill once used: "It may have its defects but no one has yet been able to invent a better one." I am not, however, concerned in this book with an examination of the merits or short-comings of the free way of life. My purpose must be limited to setting down a sufficient account of what it is to enable the reader to assess it in terms of understanding what has to be defended; what in short is the nature of the object of our defence expenditures? In terms of a military appreciation our way of life as an object to be defended falls into two inter-related parts.

First there is the IDEA and this idea, this conception of the significance of the individual, is the foundation of the whole business and its face, house, citadel, fortress or centre is the mind and personality of the individual. *If this is lost to the enemy all is lost. If this citadel can be denied to the enemy hope must not be abandoned: victory is still possible.*

It will be remembered that when in Chapter I we discussed the nature of war it was argued that in the last analysis war (werre) was a conflict of ideas and that total victory as contrasted with military victory was not achieved until, through one means or another, the enemy had changed his mind and genuinely accepted the views to which he had been hostile. In an ideological struggle between (say) democratic and Communist ideas the ultimate and decisive battlefield is to be found

in the minds of the contestants and the action of the governments must be supposed to reflect the collective opinion of the nation. It is of the essence of democracy that this must be so in a democratic state and the extent to which this is true in a totalitarian state must depend upon the degree to which the people have been misled and/or terrorized into supporting the actions of totalitarian government.

Therefore I assert that in considering the defence of the British way of life *it is the freedom idea which is the ark of the covenant* and for this to survive at least one man or woman must continue to cherish it and hold on to it *at all cost*. But to be practical one must say that for the freedom idea to survive in terms of real politics there must exist a substantial part of the nation, and preferably a majority thereof, composed of individuals who believe in the idea and are prepared to support a government which will do something about defending it.

Secondly, our way of life is also composed of the institutions such as Parliament, the Press, the law courts applying democratically made laws, the B.B.C. and television, the Churches, and the multitude of free institutions and societies which include world famous bodies and the smallest village club or regular gathering of friends in the local.

This way of life we desire to defend can be summed up in these words: it has a spiritual basis which can be thought of as millions of roots each nurtured and deriving life from an individual's consciousness. These roots rise up to support a great tree of which the central trunk is Parliament and the branches, twigs and leaves are the institutions of our free society. Two pamphlets which contain much wisdom on the great subject touched upon in this chapter are *Education for Liberty*,¹ and *The Meaning of Freedom*.²

When all is said and done the most practical way by which the average citizen can appreciate what we mean by our way of life and what it means to us, is by studying conditions in totalitarian states, by reading objective reports about those conditions, talking to people who have escaped from tyranny and projecting himself into the atmosphere of such social conditions; then contrasting it with conditions in a truly democratic country.

¹ By Massimo Salvadori, 3s. 6d. ² (A symposium) 3s. 6d. Pall Mall Press.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ATTACK ON OUR WAY OF LIFE

A SOUND PLAN OF defence must be related to the anticipated nature of the attack. In the wide definition of war (*werre*) to which we must accustom ourselves, i.e. a clash of ideas between sovereign states, the attack does not begin when and if the ideological struggle degenerates into military operations. It starts earlier. Therefore in considering the nature of the attack against which we must defend our way of life we can distinguish two problems; one political and the other military. (Battle of Brains and Battle of Bodies.) The emphasis which the enemy will place on each of these two methods will vary from struggle to struggle.

Few will deny that Hitler and the Nazi movement were a menace to our way of life. But the Nazi attack was more associated with violence than with political operations. It is true that there were Nazi-type organizations outside Germany, such as Mosley's Black Shirts in Britain, the Croix de Feu group in France and the Fascist régime in Italy, but according to Mussolini "Fascism was not for export"; he had other ideas about Italian Imperialism. The Nazis never made much effort to build up satellite Nazi parties in foreign countries. The "fifth columns" were treacherous organizations rather than political parties. The Nazi menace to our way of life was principally expressed in the form of territorial expansion and hence the strengthening of the military resources of the German Reich which carried with it (wherever it obtained control) totalitarian ideas and practices and anti-semitism. This policy of expansion was promoted by force or the threat of force.

The Communist menace has followed a different policy. Political activity in order to obtain adherents to an international organization controlled and directed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been the spearhead of the offensive against democracy. Force has been used as a supporting and consolidating influence. This is the policy laid

down by Soviet Communist leaders as the theoretically correct strategy and it has usually been followed in practice.¹ It has been remarkably successful, partly because the potential victims (the democratic states) were not prepared for or organized to deal with this kind of war. They have been as ill-equipped to cope with what they have come to call the cold war as they were to deal militarily with the Nazi blitzkrieg into Western Europe in 1940.

This policy of "peaceful" persuasion and infiltration is well adapted to operations in uncommitted states who, at an early stage in their development, cannot be classified as being in either the democratic or Communist camp. Communism has some attractive features to the rulers of these countries because it supplies the excuse for authoritarian government which has technical advantages in an undeveloped country and at the same time claims to be ultra-democratic—a label which has great prestige value. I cannot think of any government which boasts that it is *not* democratic.

Our defence policy to deal with the attack on our way of life must therefore be capable of dealing with two types of tactics, the political and the military, of which the political is Moscow's favourite child.

II

The political attack (in which I include the economic) by Russian leaders on our way of life in particular and the free way of life in general is conducted by two methods, both directed towards the same objective. The first method includes all the measures appropriate to building up in the society of the prospective victim a strong Communist Party; the second part of the business is of a more general character designed to produce an international opinion favourable to the Soviet Union and the Communist doctrine.

The local Communist Party takes its orders from Moscow and operates above and below ground. It will fight elections and endeavour to capture the Parliamentary system; it will seek to penetrate all forms of organizations especially the Trade

¹ See *The Communist Conspiracy* by S. King-Hall (Constable). A book based on the statements of Communists.

Unions, the Civil Services and associations of intellectuals and youth movements. It will also operate at various levels underground from the depths of espionage to the fomentation of industrial unrest and various degrees of sabotage.

The second method of political attack includes the creation of world wide organizations ostensibly ultra-democratic but actually agencies of the Soviet Government.¹ Also in this department of the political attack are the anti-imperialist political and economic activities amongst the Middle Eastern, Asian and African peoples, activities which aim at exploiting the emotion of nationalism, so that a belief in nationalism and a belief in Communism seem to be the same thing.

The military attack on the free way of life has not as a rule taken the form of armed intervention. The Soviet Union has maintained extremely powerful military forces and has not hesitated to use them in cases when, as in East Germany and Hungary, servile Communist governments called for outside assistance against a population in revolt. But it seems that the controllers of Soviet policy are aware of the difficulties which arise in attempts to impose ideas by force and that, unless one is careful, such operations may defeat their own ends by rallying the people against the foreign invader.²

Since World War II Russian conventional forces have been and still are far superior to anything which could be mustered by the West, and therefore since 1946 a Russian conventional invasion of Western Europe would have been a fairly easy operation. Whether or not any ideas they had about this method of extending the Western frontier of Communism during the period 1945-51 were set aside because of the—at that time—Western monopoly of the atomic bomb must be a matter of opinion.

My own guess is that they preferred to rely on the hope that Communist parties would by more or less legitimate means gain control of France and Italy, a development which might well have occurred but for Marshall Aid.

I believe the proceedings of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party indicated that it had become recognized in

¹ They are numerous. The World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Peace Council are typical examples.

² See page 46.

Moscow that Stalin had made a serious tactical error by allowing a military situation to develop which so alarmed the West that they were scared into creating Nato.

At the moment of writing I detect no change in the general strategy of the Communist attack and no obvious reason why it should change from being primarily a political or subversive form of attack into direct military attack.

The White Paper on Defence 1957 says in para 15 that "the free world is to-day mainly dependent for its *protection* upon the nuclear capacity of the United States" (*italics mine*). The authors of the White Paper could claim that the word "protection" is only meant to refer to physical attack, and that they are not so foolish as to suggest that the nuclear capacity of the U.S.A. protects the free world from political attack.

My comment on this would be that according to para 3 "the Communist threat remains, but its nature has changed". Changed from what into what? We are not told. There is however a reference in para 27 to "Communist encroachment and infiltration" in the Baghdad Pact area, followed by the observation that British forces "*including Bomber Squadrons based in Cyprus capable of delivering nuclear weapons*" would be made available to support the Alliance. It is not clear to me how the Cyprus based bombers prevent Communist infiltration in the Baghdad Pact area.

In writing a book of this kind its author is necessarily several months behind events but, whilst this chapter was in first draft, two events occurred which illustrated in a striking manner the Communist technique of using military potential to support political and economic penetration.

The first was the news that the Soviet Union had "penetrated" Syria, providing arms, technicians and economic aid. Before this could take place effective power in Syria had to be in the hands of Communists or near Communists, or non-Communists who did not see the dangers of an embrace by the Russian Bear. As part of the whole operation a plot was "discovered" purporting to be an American plan to dominate Syria. The news that the Russians had leap-frogged the Baghdad Pact seems (as usual) to have taken the Western powers by surprise, and it became painfully obvious that there was nothing they could do about the Russian coup. The two

instruments of defence in their hands were useless. One was the American 6th Fleet with nuclear weapons; the other was the R.A.F. at Cyprus with planes that could carry nuclear weapons. It was apparent to the world in general, and the Middle East states in particular, that the Eisenhower doctrine and the statement in the Defence Paper which I have italicized were devoid of substance.

The conclusion is inescapable that in this typical case the defence arrangements of the West were unrelated to the nature of the Russian attack.

The second illustration was the timing in connection with the disarmament talks in London of the Russian announcement that they had tested an inter-continental guided missile. It was a masterly stroke of political warfare.¹

In endeavouring to estimate the correct answer to this question about the type of attack or attacks on our way of life, against which we must have appropriate defences, the first consideration is that the life-force of our way of life is the *IDEA* (freedom, etc.); we must therefore suppose that from the Soviet point of view their offensive will be concentrated against the decisive point which is the *IDEA*. It is axiomatic that the most potent weapon with which to attack an idea is another idea and this supports the expectation that it is in the sphere of political warfare that we should expect to find the weight of the Soviet attack, and that our defences must take account of this fact. When I write *defences* it is assumed that attack on our part is recognized as being an essential part of our defence.

It is within this context that Soviet military force is an important factor in the general strategy of their attack, in which it is—on the whole—used indirectly. We must therefore examine what place our military force should occupy in the over-all picture of our defence arrangements.

¹ An even smarter coup was the sudden launching of the first Russian satellite. This was a great tactical victory in the Battle of the Brains. The despatch of an even larger satellite containing the dog also made a great impression. We are now living under a new and sinister sign of the Zodiac, number 13: "The sign of the Dead Dog" (1957).

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ROLE OF MILITARY FORCE

I HAVE ARGUED that at this time in our history the prime purpose of the defence policy of the United Kingdom (in association with like-minded peoples) is to defend a way of life.¹ This conception of defending a system of government, a free way of life, has recently emerged historically as an addition to the traditional notion that the chief purpose of defence was to safeguard things material, in particular the integrity of the homeland. Our way of life is a combination of institutions and ideas and, although the existence of the institutions (Parliament, free Press, etc.) is almost indispensable to the practice and application of our way of life, it is the IDEA itself which is the heart of the matter. Because this idea has its shrine in the heart and mind of the individual, the IDEA of the free way of life is indestructible so long as there are individuals who are determined not to surrender morally and therefore refuse to abandon their beliefs.

It is the purpose of this chapter to enquire what contribution military force can make to this conception of the defence of a way of life. The last chapter outlined the methods by which we may expect our way of life to be attacked and it was shown that they fell into two inter-related categories, the political and the military. What role can military force play in our defence policy against each of these types of assault? First consider political attack.

The use of armed force by anti-democratic powers in the sphere of political warfare is usually of a supporting and exploiting character. At some stage, when political warfare operations have created a political climate in the democratic country so that a non-democratic group has seized power, either through apathy of the democratic section of the nation or by resolute action culminating in a *coup d'état*, armed force

¹ The objective of defending our way of life is specifically mentioned in the Defence Statement of 1955 and by implication in the 1956 Statement.

from outside can be used as a means of supporting the totalitarian régime or, as in the case of the riots in East Germany and the Hungarian rising, be used to rescue an already established régime if it is in danger of losing control.

Nevertheless the use of armed force by a Communist state in an ideological struggle with democratic elements has disadvantages from the point of view of the Communists since it is a public confession of failure to win the battle of ideas. One must await the verdict of history in order to determine exactly whether the Russian decision to go with armed force to the support of their Communist agents in Hungary was a wise move. It is true that within a few weeks the rising was crushed and a subservient Communist government re-established in full tyranny but, on the other side of the balance sheet the utmost confusion was created in the ranks of the Communist parties in the democratic countries, world public opinion was outraged and the duplicity of Russian peaceful propaganda was exposed.

Furthermore the Hungarian rising (and the more artfully operated Polish liberation movement) must have made the Russian general staff acutely aware of the difficulties they would have on their lines of communication through the states of Eastern Europe in the event of a Russian invasion into Western Europe.

The blow to the non-Russian Communist parties (already shaken by the denunciation of Stalinism) was very severe when sincere Communists discovered that Russian armed forces had shot down workers in Hungary, and all over the world there were desertions from the C.P. of persons who could not accept the view that the Hungarian rising was a Fascist plot. In exposing the truth the U.N. report played an important role and the frantic efforts of the Communist régime in Hungary to counteract it by all kinds of devices was evidence of their realization that it was a very damaging document.

We are inclined in the West to pay too much attention to our domestic difficulties and overlook those of the enemy, which is perhaps evidence of the success of their political warfare strategy. If we imagine what it would mean to our cause if, in every Communist state, we knew there were an organized and legally recognized democratic party of dedicated men and women taking their line from (say) the Council of Nato, one

would begin to appreciate the importance to Moscow of foreign Communist parties (especially in France and Italy) and that the confusion into which these parties were thrown by the Hungarian affair, a confusion from which they will find it hard to recover, is something for which Hungarians have not died in vain.

Before we leave the question of the utility of armed force as a defence mechanism in the political warfare battle it is right to point out that the conclusion reached that military force is not of great significance in this aspect of the defence of our way of life applies particularly to Britain and to other nations where the Communist party is of small significance.

Although one must be careful not to be too sure that anything "cannot happen here", it seems unlikely that in the United Kingdom conditions in any foreseeable future will favour the rise to power of a British Communist party relying at some critical moment upon the support of Russian armed force. It is not a danger for which we need large armed forces. In France and Italy, where there are large and well organized Communist parties, the supporters of democracy feel that they have to take into account the possibility of a *coup d'état* and that democracy must have considerable armed force with which to deal with a revolution.

This may be true but calls for two comments. First the more certain way of defending the democratic way of life in such countries is to find out what are the reasons which cause tens of thousands of citizens to support Communism and remove those reasons; secondly, that the strength and character of armed forces required to maintain law and order and protect the democratic nature of the state against internal revolutionary elements is quite different from those armed forces intended to operate internationally.

Tactical atomic weapons have not *yet* become conventional weapons for the suppression of riots!

The second line of attack on our way of life, viz. physical assault by the enemy armed forces, is an assault which can be anything from hostile economic pressure to all-out nuclear war.

Although it has been agreed that this type of assault on our way of life is not regarded by Communists as the most desirable tactic, we cannot exclude its possibility. Internal political

problems might make Soviet leaders feel that an armed assault on the West, described as a preventive war to forestall the aggressive intention of the Imperialist powers, would be a necessary move to distract the attention of their people from internal troubles. Furthermore there may be something (I should guess not much) in the argument that if large forces exist, Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals have a feeling they would like to try them out. In my experience senior serving officers are sometimes more pacifically-minded than politicians.

There is also the ever-present danger—and, as we shall see later on the existence of nuclear weapons adds weight to this particular danger—that the Soviet leaders may be emboldened to pursue or encourage an aggressive political or economic policy because they believe they can go a very long way before passing the point of no return which causes the dispute to become military in character. A very aggressive Soviet political policy in the Middle East might so stir up nationalist passions that a local war involving Turkey and Syria or Israel and Arab states might become military with unpredictable consequences.

There can be no disputing the fact that if nation A has a way of life which nation B is endeavouring to destroy and nation A has no armed force, or a force manifestly inferior to that of nation B, the latter can impose its will on nation A in all material matters. Nation B can occupy the territory of nation A and then endeavour to impose upon its nationals the way of life believed in by B and abhorred by A.

The occupation of a democratic country by the forces of a totalitarian state is a serious matter for the occupied nation. There is a sense of humiliation and defeat and morale is lowered; the institutions of the free way of life are suppressed; Parliament is abolished or replaced by a façade; the freedom of the Press and radio disappears; free speech becomes dangerous; individuals, perhaps many thousands of individuals, are deported, imprisoned, tortured and perhaps executed. In short, the enemy is in a powerful position from which to destroy the organization of its opponents' way of life and, unless long and careful efforts have been made to prepare the nation to grapple with this novel situation, many individuals, perhaps the majority, will despair, will lose faith in their way of life and even come to the conclusion that the enemy's way is, after all,

the best, or one to which there is no practical alternative.

All the hardships mentioned above have usually followed upon the military defeat of the forces of the occupied territory; but not always. Iceland was occupied by the British and Americans in World War II, although the island had declared for permanent neutrality in 1918, and Denmark was occupied by the Germans after negligible military action. But these were exceptional cases. When an enemy occupation takes place as a result of military defeat it requires great resolution on the part of the people and its leaders not to suppose that all is lost. Indeed, since it has hitherto usually been considered that the integrity of the homeland was the be-all and end-all of defence, it is not surprising that an occupation has usually been regarded as the end of the war and, at the best, most of the occupied people have only thought in terms of being liberated. They hoped that some other power, using armed forces, would drive out the occupier.

A military force capable of denying to the enemy the ability, either through an occupation or blockade, to impose his terms on the democratic nation is a very useful asset in the business of defending one's way of life and an essential requirement for the maintenance of the normal institutions of the free way of life. It is possible to live in a state of near nakedness in almost any climate if trained and prepared for the job, but adequate clothing and shelter make living much easier, and if a person accustomed to these amenities is suddenly stripped naked in a harsh climate and has *not* been trained to meet this contingency, then he will probably die. So it is with the practice of our democratic way of life. Its material coverings can be helpful to its security, but it should not be assumed that it cannot continue to live without the institutions, if it is sufficiently well established in the hearts and minds of individuals. Indeed unless the free way of life *is* solidly established in the minds of individuals the existence of material prosperity does not guarantee the security of the free way of life; it can jeopardize it.

Although a good case can be made for the use of force to protect the institutions and public practice of our way of life, its use inevitably carries with it certain disadvantages. First there are the political and psychological consequences of using force *on a large scale*. Such force on the scale used in a world

war (as contrasted with police operations) demands that the nation be organized in a total manner. The executive rightly insists that it must be given powers of control in the national emergency far exceeding anything normally considered reasonable according to our way of life. Individuals are imprisoned without trial; the operation of Habeas Corpus is suspended; all property is at the disposal of the state; the Press is censored; the lives and labour of the citizen are subject to the direction of the state. In defence of this abandonment of the principles and practices of our way of life it was argued for example in Britain in World War II, that it was necessary temporarily to put freedoms into cold storage in order to preserve them for posterity, and that the abandonment of freedoms and the granting of dictatorial powers to the executive was a voluntary act undertaken by Parliament, the sovereign body. This was quite true and nothing illustrates more clearly the deep-seated attachment of the British to their way of life than the immense efforts which were made, and on the whole successfully, to give the executive all the power it required whilst at the same time not abandoning the final authority of Parliament.¹

No more impressive example exists in British history of the reality of our free way of life and what we mean by it in practice than the historic occasion in 1940 when a Parliament (of which the writer had the honour and privilege to be a member), changed the executive. On the other side of the balance sheet some of us thought that we were getting rather near the point of no return when an M.P. could be (and was) incarcerated without trial on the *fiat* of the Home Secretary. Nor was the stupid treatment of aliens in a panicky period in 1940 creditable, but, as mentioned on page 47, in general the British people's attitude to the enemy people was very sane in World War II.

By and large "our way of life" was maintained to an extraordinary degree from 1939-45 and, as the Prime Minister was the first to proclaim, this was a source of great inner national strength. In the U.S.A. the record in World War II was not so good; one has an impression—confirmed by the career of the late Senator McCarthy—that when our transatlantic friends

¹ See *Emergency Powers and the Parliamentary Watchdog: Parliament and the Executive 1939-51* by John Eaves, Jr. (Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government).

get alarmed about any threats to the American way of life they are not over-particular as to how far they deviate from the principles of that way of life (the American Constitution and all that) when they apply defensive measures. Their treatment of American-born Japanese was discreditable.

The use of armed force to defend a way of life against armed attack from without (or within) inevitably carries with it a danger that the remedy may become as obnoxious as the disease; in Britain this danger has hitherto been recognized and kept under control.

A second disadvantage is inherent in the use of armed force as a means of defence against a military attack on the institutions of our way of life. We have seen that its use has certain political risks and we must now enquire into its material disadvantages. The political and material disadvantages are interdependent to the extent to which the effort needed to produce the necessary force is significant in the political and economic life of the nation.

In days when the amount of armed force required for the defence of Britain was provided by small professional armies and navies, a war, even of the magnitude of the struggle against Napoleon, did not involve a tremendous upheaval in the normal life of the nation. But World Wars I and II were of a different order and produced serious effects on the U.K. economy. Apart from the loss of life which was very heavy in World War I, much of the capital accumulated during the nineteenth century was expended and by 1945 the British had paid a heavy material price in defence of liberty. France, already exhausted by her efforts in World War I, was revealed in 1940 as being incapable of supporting the burden of another, but Britain was still able to face up to one more world war. By 1956-57 the facts about Britain's military strength, which had long been obvious to thoughtful people but ignored or evaded by the bulk of the nation, were publicly exposed both by Suez and by the government decision to make substantial cuts in our defence expenditure.

The White Paper on Defence 1957 says with candour: 'Britain's influence in the world depends first and foremost on the health of her internal economy and the success of her export trade . . . it is therefore in the true interests of defence

that the claims of military expenditure should be considered in conjunction with the need to maintain the country's financial and economic strength" (para 6).

The phrase "in conjunction with" should have been "in subordination to the need to maintain the country's financial and economic strength" upon which, according to the opening sentences of the paragraph, British influence (and by implication, the maintenance of our way of life) depends *first and foremost*. Therefore the use of military force to defend our way of life is of dubious value if, in order to produce effective force against a possible military attack on the institutions of our life (i.e. an invasion of our homeland or a blockade), we have over-strained our economy to breaking point.

We must guard against the danger of going bankrupt because we have taken out a policy against death duties which demands a premium exceeding our income. Although there are good reasons for supposing that the Soviet leaders are finding the economic strain of the present armaments race a considerable handicap in their efforts to raise the standards of living of the people, we should not ignore the possibility that they calculate that to put the screws of military defence expenditure on their peoples is easier for them than it is for the governments in democratic nations. They may therefore feel that an endurance test in armaments expenditure may properly be considered a tactic in the cold war which would produce dividends in the shape of political tensions in the democratic countries, especially those in which there are strong Communist parties who are by definition "peace-loving" and "fighters for peace".

The two disadvantages so far mentioned which are inherent in the use of force as a means of defence are not novel but have been becoming more significant as the scale and tempo of violence between states at war has increased and the area of the battlefield has extended towards world-wide dimensions.

If the amount and equality of force which has to be used to counter the force of the enemy exceeds a certain magnitude, we approach a state of affairs in which the destruction produced by the clash of forces is so immense that once again our cure may be worse than the disease. If, for example, in order to prevent any enemy occupation of the homeland and consequent destruction of the institutions of our way of life, we

must accept a clash of force of a magnitude likely to destroy the institutions *and* a large number of individuals as well, perhaps 30 per cent of the nation, or even 60 per cent, then there does not seem to be much purpose in the operation. It may be true we should not be occupied, but then neither should we exist in order to benefit from not being occupied.

* * *

To complete this examination of the role of force in the defence of our free way of life we must consider the offensive use of force which, in the hands of our enemies, is employed as a kind of reserve to their political warfare operations. For example, many observers detected in September 1957 a relationship between the upsurge of toughness in the Soviet's diplomacy and their claim to have fired an intercontinental rocket.

How can force be of use to the democracies in their counter-offensive; in their attack on the enemy?

We cannot use force for the purposes of a preventive war without compromising our democratic principles, and this greatly handicaps our freedom of action.

Before the nuclear age force could be used to counter violent aggression without necessarily running a grave risk, or incurring the certainty that the remedy would be worse than the disease; but we had to wait till the enemy used it first.

We could have rescued Abyssinia from Mussolini and Czechoslovakia from Hitler if our forces had been so superior to the aggressor that he would have suffered an immediate military defeat and *if we had had the will to use force*. Quite apart from the size of our forces, the will to go further than economic sanctions (less oil) against Mussolini, and even to go as far as that against Hitler, was lacking. Why? Because between the world wars the shadow of the bomber was causing men to reflect upon the growing violence of military operations and the certainty that in "the next world war" they would extend into civilian life.

The nuclear age has immensely increased these apprehensions. If the Hungarian revolt had occurred in 1950 when the democracies had a monopoly of atomic weapons, would we have threatened (and meant it) the Soviet Union with atomic attack if they did not keep out of Hungary? I doubt it.

In considering what role armed force can play in our political

warfare operations against the enemy people, there is this to be said: Democratic political warfare can only depend on the free conversion of men's minds for its victories, the use of force by the democracies must be limited to ensuring—in appropriate circumstances—that free discussion can take place. When the German nation surrendered unconditionally to superior force it was absurd to suppose that we could *impose* a democratic form of government, and still less a democratic mode of thought, on the German people. We could and did hang the principal personalities associated with the ideas and practices we regarded as evil, but whether this was a wise use of force in support of a campaign to convert the Germans to the free way of life, is a matter of opinion. It seems to me that the Nuremberg trials were a mistake because they were based on the non-democratic procedure of retrospective legislation. It is easier to be fairly confident that the Treaty of Versailles was a mistaken use of the dominant position provided by superior force.

As mentioned above, a preventive war (military phase) by a democratic state is politically indefensible and the democracies have to suffer the disadvantage (in the realm of force) of waiting to be attacked. If they are able to muster sufficient force to beat back and defeat the totalitarians and thus find themselves in possession of the political initiative, their policy should be closely related to democratic principles. They should say in effect: "We have used force but it was against our will because we believe it is an undemocratic manner of settling disputes; we only did so in self-defence against the aggression of your government. We have destroyed your force and now we shall show you by our conduct towards you what democracy means and how different it is from what your totalitarian government would have done to us if its force had prevailed." In brief, the force of the victorious democracies should only be used to ensure that the people of the defeated totalitarian nation are free to develop democracy.

How else can our armed force be useful? Can it help in the struggle for the allegiance of the uncommitted nations? The use of armed force to counter Soviet political attack in these countries seems to have very limited possibilities and involves very grave risks since, if our enemy is conducting a political and/or economic offensive in such a country, the use of armed

force from outside is likely to enable the Communists to raise the cry of foreign aggression and capitalize the forces of nationalism. In this connection I had a talk with a Minister of Defence in a European democratic country in which there was at that time a real apprehension that the numerous Communist Party which was known to have stores of arms might attempt to seize power. In that country were considerable American forces and the Minister said that in the event of trouble it was essential that the Americans should not "come to our rescue, or nine out of ten of our people will become Communists overnight."

The conclusions I have reached after examining the problem of what contribution armed force can make to the defence of our way of life in relation to: (a) the political attack against the IDEA, (b) the military attack against the institution and integrity of the homeland, and (c) our political offensive against Communism are these:

First, that so far as Great Britain is concerned, large-scale military force capable of taking part in global war serves no useful purpose as a defence against Soviet *political attack*. That in states where the free way of life is less well established an adequate armed force of police character may be needed to prevent an attempt by domestic totalitarians to seize power by violence.

Secondly, that subject to conditions being fulfilled which are listed below, armed force can protect the institutions of our way of life against military attack.

The conditions are these:

(1) The force required to do the job must not be so costly that its maintenance brings economic ruin to the nation, an event which would probably lead to the collapse of the institutions of the free way of life.

(2) We must take care that we do not have to so transform our institutions in order to use the force needed to protect them that they lose their fundamental purpose of expressing the idea of our way of life.

(3) The force required must not be so enormously destructive that (assuming, as we must, that the enemy is using force of comparable size) the net result is chaos in which the institutions disappear and a chaos so grave that the elemental urges of

individual survival overcome any desire or hope of preserving the idea of our way of life. There is a fundamental difference between a situation in which for example Parliament cannot function because London is in ruins and one in which Parliament does not function because its members have been arrested.

Thirdly, that whereas the Communist can use force as a backing for the spearhead of his political attack if this attack runs into trouble, because the Communist (even if he prefers to do it psychologically) is in fact imposing his way of life on his victims, the democracies cannot "impose" democracy on anyone and remain true to their principles. They can do no more with force (and this was revealed in the pre-nuclear age) in a country they have subjugated than use such force as may be needed to ensure a state of affairs in which democratic ideas can take root and grow up. The victorious democratic power can, as it were, act—probably only for a short time—as an alien policeman. It can within rather narrow limits punish the guilty, but it is better if this is carried out by the nation which has suffered military defeat. It cannot, under modern conditions, exact reparations, but on the contrary is more likely both on grounds of humanity and self-interest to come to the economic rescue of its defeated enemy.

Those who find some of these arguments difficult to accept, should consider the following facts. In 1946-47 Western Germany was in a state of catastrophic chaos and mental despair unequalled in the history of modern times. She had surrendered unconditionally and lay prostrate amidst the ruins of her cities. Ten years later the £ sterling was fighting for its life; the D Mark sat at the High Table with the \$ and the Swiss franc. Without the promised contribution of armed force from W. Germany, Nato was unable to attain even the modest degree of military strength accepted as the minimum (with tactical nuclear weapons) in 1958.

As a friend of mine put it, with a puzzled look on his face: "Dammit, am I dreaming, or did we beat them in 1945? It simply does not add up!"

Now comes the great question. How do our military forces to-day measure up to the roles which it is within the power of armed force to play in the cause of defending our way of life?

CHAPTER SIX

OUR MILITARY DEFENCE

FEW PEOPLE, IF asked: "For what chief purpose does the U.K. spend £1,500 million annually on defence?" would reply: "To defend our way of life." Many would reply: "To defend this country and its overseas possessions."

There is an underlying assumption in all defence talk and thought that the integrity of the homeland is an essential feature of her defence. In the case of Britain, owing to her dependence upon sea communications, the control and defence of the sea routes are essential to the defence of our island home.

If the fundamental purpose of defence is something material, a necessary act of defence is the operation of denying the enemy access to the island kingdom, or preventing him from blockading its ports.

Blücher, on visiting London for the first time, is supposed to have said: "What a city to sack!"

If we are to regard the looting of Britain or the carrying off into slavery and forced labour of a large number of its inhabitants as the only contingencies against which we must defend ourselves, an enemy occupation of Britain will mean that our defences have failed. But material considerations are not the only, or even the most important, object of defence.

Whether it is easier, harder or impossible to defend our way of life if we were to be occupied, is a very important question which will be discussed in a later chapter.

For the moment I am only concerned to point out that for one reason or another the notion that the enemy must be prevented from occupying the homeland or controlling our sea communications is at present the basic thought in defence policy.

In examining our military defence we must relate it to the nature of the most probable enemy at the time. Just as it, or what we have been trying to defend, has varied with the circumstances of the day, so has the potential or actual enemy.

In 1914 the enemy was the Kaiser's Germany and what we were trying to defend (plus a certain amount of morality) was what we held. We were not greatly concerned about the danger of having inflicted upon us the German way of life from which our first social services were partly copied.

In 1939 the enemy was Hitler and the Nazi movement, which had managed to secure control of the resources of the German people. By this time—as I have pointed out on page 46—the issue had become less material and more spiritual. We were concerned to prevent our way of life in particular and the democratic way of life in general from being replaced by the anti-semitic, anti-religious, police state totalitarian Nazi system.

Since about the end of World War II the enemy has been Communist Russia. The Communist Party in the Soviet Union, having obtained control of all the resources of that nation, has enormously increased its material power and, if the speeches and actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union are to be taken as a guide, it is their intention by a variety of ways to create conditions in which Communism will be the only permitted way of life all over the world.

It is to prevent this development in world history that we are maintaining in co-operation with other nations large scale military forces.

The price of liberty is continual vigilance and it may be that in years to come the enemy of freedom will be China or perhaps a great African Empire but, for the time being, it is the Soviet Union and this is the ball from which our eyes must not stray.

The Soviet menace is characterized by a number of novel features or, if some of them are not strictly novel, they have been developed by the Russians to an unprecedented degree of magnitude and efficiency.

One of these is the extreme intelligence with which the Russian Communists have understood that—to use my terminology (see page 23)—WAR is WERRE (the ideological conflict of minds) and not only military operations or violent bodily clashes. They have been further ahead in their thinking on this subject than the democratic statesmen who have been neo-Victorian in this respect. Because of their appreciation of the significance of the ideological struggle or, to use a common

phrase, *political warfare*, the Russian leaders have worked out a very nice and, as a rule, an exact and often profitable balance and co-ordination between political and military forces in the operation of their over-all strategy.

The correct defence against political warfare operations, whether directed by Fascists, Nazis or Communists (the cleverest of the bunch of totalitarians), is discussed in Chapter X. Here we are concerned with the military side of the Soviet strategy and the efficacy of our military defence against that part of the Soviet aggression.

Our military defence, as soon as we woke up to the fact after World War II that Marshal Stalin was up to no good, was based on the theory that Russian armed forces might move into areas controlled by democratic governments. Influential Communist parties taking their orders from Moscow existed in France and Italy and it was believed that—as happened in Czechoslovakia—if these Communists succeeded in gaining power either by electoral means or a *coup d'état*—they would be supported by Russian armed force.

The post-war settlement with the states of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria included a limitation in their armaments. These conditions were never fulfilled and, as these states with the addition of Poland and Czechoslovakia became Russian satellites, their armed forces were greatly increased. The Soviet Union retained very large forces on a war footing and began actively to increase their strength and efficiency especially in the creation of a large air force, a great fleet of submarines, a large mechanized army and the development of nuclear weapons.

There was a period soon after World War II when it looked as if the Western European economy would collapse into chaos and thus create conditions suitable for a take-over by Communist parties. This peril was averted by massive and generous U.S. economic assistance. A desire on the part of some of the satellite states to take advantage of this offer was promptly squashed by instructions from Moscow. This was an obvious tactical move by the Soviet Union in the economic section of the over-all strategy of the cold war. By 1947-48 there was great tension between the Soviet Union and the Western World and the Western World began to see that if the Soviet Union,

whose master at that time was Marshal Stalin, decided to send its armed forces westwards there was nothing of substance to prevent them rapidly reaching the shores of the English Channel and Atlantic Ocean *except* the fact that at that time the Americans, and to a lesser extent the British, had a monopoly of the atom bomb, the fission nuclear weapon first used in 1945 against Japan.

Sir Winston Churchill and others who have access to much unpublished information are on record as stating that the possession by the Allies of this weapon probably saved Western Europe from a Russian invasion.

Whether or not this is true it was obvious that the A-bomb monopoly would not last for long, and a number of incidents involving the betrayal of scientific secrets by western scientists to the Russians indicated that the latter were hard at work catching up with the West in the field of nuclear weapons. In these circumstances the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being on 4th April, 1949.

It was originally a military alliance of twelve nations (later fifteen) designed to produce a mobilized shield of conventional forces, sufficiently powerful to hold a Russian-cum-satellite invasion of Western Europe for a period of a month or two whilst the main reserves were mobilized. In short, the thinking in 1949 was in terms of a slightly up to date version of World War II in anticipation of a Russian blitzkrieg westwards.

Mention should also be made of the existence of the non-military Article II in the Treaty which says:

"They (the member states) will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

Up till now (1957) little attention has been paid to Article II, which was introduced into the Treaty in order to facilitate Canadian membership of the club. That Article II has a defence value will be shown in the next chapter and I mention it here both to record its terms and to emphasize that it

has not been regarded as a significant fact of our defence.

In 1952 a meeting of the Nato powers was held at Lisbon in order to determine, in the light of the Soviet Union's strength in conventional forces, what should be the size of the Nato forces. The military experts advised that their requirements were: "Approximately 50 divisions in combat readiness and 4,000 operational aircraft in Western Europe."

At the time the West German Republic was not regarded as a potential member of Nato. It seemed to me: (a) that the electorates of the member states would refuse to make the sacrifices required to maintain forces of this size, and (b) that to exclude the West Germans from the calculations of the potential available for the physical defence of Western Europe was to still further increase the immense difficulties of the task.

It would be superfluous to record the story of Nato in any detail during the years 1951 to 1957. The fact is that by 1957 the military position of the West in terms of conventional weapons had steadily deteriorated relative to that of the Soviet Union.

The following extracts from successive British White Papers on Defence illustrate developments.

1951. "(There is) an urgent need to strengthen the defences of the free world. H.M.G. has decided to increase and accelerate their defence preparations . . . the total strength of the armed forces will by April 1952 reach 800,000 men as compared with 682,000 in the last White Paper on defence . . . expenditure on production for the Services in 1951-52 will be more than double the rate for the current year . . . by 1953-54 it should be more than four times as great . . . the total defence budget for 1951-54 may be £4,700 million . . . though the burden will be heavy, it is not more than we can bear . . . this (is) a national effort to make ourselves strong enough to deter any attack upon our freedom and our way of life."

1952. This statement was an explanation of why there had been delays in implementing the 1951 programme. It was devoid of strategical or tactical thought except that it contained an announcement that in order "to combat the risk of invasion" it had been decided to re-establish the Home Guard and that "numerous training schools" had been told to "acquire a

combatant value". The statement added that "this development has greatly increased our ability to defend ourselves against attack".¹

1953. The introduction explained why the programme must be reduced. "Our objectives have not changed; it is the means of achieving them and the rate at which we can progress . . . to which the Government has given much close attention."

1954. "Provided that our defence effort is maintained and that we continue to conduct our diplomacy with patience and resolution, it is the Government's view that the continuation for a long period of the present state of cold war is now more likely than the outbreak of a major war at any particular date . . . the Government propose to continue the policy foreshadowed last year and for the next few years to maintain our defence effort at the maximum which our economic capabilities permit." This statement on defence was noteworthy for its remarks about the "broken-backed war" and that "if, by some miscalculation in Communist policy or by deliberate design, a global war were forced upon us, it must be assumed that atomic weapons would be used by both sides."

"The principal aims of the country's defence programme" were "briefly expressed" as follows:

"First we must maintain our resistance to world Communism and to Communist adventures and discharge our peacetime obligations overseas. Secondly, we must with our allies, build up the most effective possible deterrent against a major aggression which would lead to global war. Thirdly, we must do all we can, within the limits of our resources to be prepared to meet such an aggression should our efforts to prevent it fail."

The statement recorded the theory that "our active forces must be able to withstand the initial shock. Our reserve force must be capable of rapid mobilization behind the shield . . . and be ready to perform their combat tasks at the earliest possible moment." "Civil Defence is an essential, integral and continuing part of our defence preparation for any future war."

¹ I rate this one of the most optimistic remarks ever made in the name of defence. S.K.H.

1955. "Overshadowing all else in the year 1954 has been the emergence of the thermo-nuclear bomb. This has had, and will continue to have, far reaching effects on the defence policy of the U.K." After describing the effects of an H-bomb, the statement continued "Public morale would be severely tested. It would be a struggle for survival of the grimmest kind." For the first time in these statements we see a reference to "other" means of defence in the sentence "The deterrent to aggression does not consist in military strength alone. The political unity and resolution and the economic strength of the free world must be maintained."

The statement included long passages on the cold war and the deterrent, and on the first subject it made the important remark: "Political unity and armed strength would be of little value *if the will of the free peoples to maintain, and if necessary defend their independence and way of life were in doubt*"¹ and the impression from the passage on the deterrent is that the centre of gravity of defence had shifted to the deterrent. But one also reads in paragraphs 22 and 23 the clear statement that as we are and must remain outnumbered in conventional forces: "With their aid (nuclear weapons) and with the German contribution we can adopt a forward strategy on the ground in Europe and so defend the Continent, instead of contemplating again the grim process of liberation. If we do not use the full weight of our nuclear power, Europe can hardly be protected from invasion and occupation . . . the consciences of civilized nations must naturally recoil from the prospect of using nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in the last resort, most of us must feel *that determination to face the threat of physical devastation, even on the immense scale which must now be foreseen, is manifestly preferable, to an attitude of subservience to militant Communism with the national and individual humiliation that this would inevitably bring.*"

1956. This statement was significant because it elaborated in greater detail than ever before the political and strategic factors in our defence policy as seen by H.M.G. Under the political heading we read:

"There is no change in Soviet long-term policy which fundamentally aims at world domination. The Soviet Government continue to believe in their right, indeed in their mission,

¹ Italics mine in this chapter.

to impose political and economic systems on other nations and to withhold from them the right to choose their own future . . . their policies are openly directed to achieving this end (world domination). . . . The aim of the democracies is to establish peace and prosperity within which the peoples of the world can develop their lives in freedom. The military forces of the democracies must be designed to support this aim . . . it therefore remains necessary for the western powers to hold their own in the world by their defensive strength *until such time as a true understanding of western policies can make its impact on the Soviet people.*"

This statement also announced that the manpower in the forces would be reduced to 700,000 by March 1958.¹

This defence review had "regard to probable developments over the next seven years".

1957. "The time has now come to revise not merely the size *but the whole character of the defence plan.* The Communist threat remains, but *its nature has changed* and it is now evident that on both military and economic grounds, it is necessary to make a fresh appreciation of the problem and to adopt a new approach to it." The statement was silent as to how the nature of the Communist threat (which remains) has changed. This is a very extraordinary omission as I pointed out in Chapter I, p. 37.

As a supplement to the 1957 White Paper one should note the Minister of Defence's statement in Australia in August 1957 in which he went a great deal further in stating Government policy than anything which had been said in debate in the Commons. Mr. Sandys said that, notwithstanding the merits of the latest type of British fighter, some enemy bombers would get through with hydrogen bombs; then he said: "*That is why we have taken a very bold step in deciding not to do the impossible. We decided not to defend the whole country, but to defend only our bomber bases. I must pay tribute to the people of Great Britain for the readiness with which they have accepted these harsh but inescapable facts.*"

This statement is the latest pronouncement available at the moment of writing and should be considered carefully by every citizen, even if he is not quite clear as to how he has earned the tribute paid to him by Mr. Sandys. For this statement could be reworded as follows, without, as I see it, altering its meaning:

¹ cf. the 1951 Statement.

"Our defences will be concentrated on defending against sudden attack our airfields from which retaliatory action will take place. We cannot defend the great cities, but you may rest assured that whilst you are being destroyed, or at any rate very shortly afterwards, a like fate will be the lot of millions of Russians. Thank you for accepting this harsh fact, but we have no other suggestion to make to you." The American public may not know it, but they are in the same embarrassing posture, and likely to be in it for a long time.

A close study of the succession of White Papers, from which extracts have been reproduced, leads to some conclusions. They are that defence thinking has been almost completely confined to the military sphere. From time to time, like gleams of sunlight in a dark and stormy sky, there is a sentence or two indicating that more comprehensive thinking about defence has inspired the mind of the author of the paper. There is a reference, for example, in 1955 to "our way of life" as being an object of defence, but it is hard to find any remark in these documents suggesting that there is any alternative to military force as a means of defence. In 1956 we read that we must hope for a day when "a true understanding of western policies can make its impact on the Soviet people". But immediately preceding this sagacious remark is the statement that until such time as the Soviet people are in this desirable frame of mind the West must rely on its "defensive strength".

Bearing in mind the premise of the White Papers that defence means military defence, it is unreasonable to criticize them for this narrow approach. It is as if the B.M.A. were to publish a paper on orthodox medical practices in relation to health and then be blamed for not considering unorthodox methods such as faith healing.

Since the White Papers stick to their brief, they inevitably reveal the confusion of thought and changes of policy which culminate in the statement made by a Minister of Defence (and an able one) that the Government has taken "the *very bold step* in deciding *not to do the impossible*".

Let us now return, after this examination of military defence policy, to the situation which this policy has produced in the military sphere.

II

The conventional military position of Nato *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union in 1957 was approximately as follows:

The Soviet Union was believed to have approximately 170 divisions exclusive of reserves, 2,000 bomber aircraft, 4,000 fighter aircraft and between 400 and 450 submarines, by far the largest submarine force ever known to naval history.¹

The Nato Supreme Commander could theoretically call on the services of about 15 divisions but, owing to the Algerian rebellion most of the French Army was in N. Africa, and only 5 out of a target figure of 12 German divisions were on the ground; these were partially trained. In the air the Nato forces were probably about equal in strength to those of the Soviet Union. Particulars of the Nato anti-submarine forces were difficult to obtain but, in the light of the experience of dealing with a far smaller number of U-boats during World War II, an experience which taxed the resources of the Allies to the utmost, the scale of defence required against 400 (plus) Russian submarines is enormous. I should be astonished to learn that the Board of Admiralty have the slightest hope of persuading any government to authorize the gigantic naval estimates which would be necessary to ensure with reasonable certainty that the activities of this enormous Soviet submarine fleet could be mastered, especially as the Russian blockade of Britain would be accompanied by intense aerial activity.

My guess about the inadequacy of our naval defences had hardly been committed to paper when Admiral Sir John Eccles said, on 27th September, 1957: "We have not got anything like enough forces with which to carry out our primary task, either in the air, under the sea or on the sea. We are desperately short. . . . I say as a professional man with over 40 years experience I cannot carry out my task as given to me at the moment without more forces . . . to enter a war with the forces at my disposal . . . (would be) running a very, very grave risk." He added that the underwater threat had increased to a much greater extent than the defences' capability. The Admiral's remarks were strongly supported by his Air

¹ At the outbreak of the 1939-45 War the German Navy had about 50 submarines in operation.

Force colleague, Air Marshal Sir Bryan Reynolds. These officers are the Joint Commanders Eastern Atlantic. All in all, and confining our attention for the moment to conventional weapons, the Nato forces in 1957 were greatly inferior to those of the Soviet Union and probably more so than at any time in the history of Nato.

This inferiority being known to all, political leaders had to adapt policies to means and find some other justification for Nato to replace its original object, which as mentioned earlier had been to have sufficient conventional forces on the ground in Western Europe, in the skies and on the ocean to hold a Russian invasion and ultimately break it with a counter-attack. When it became clear that this purpose had not been achieved the trip-wire theory became popular. This school of thought argued that Nato conventional forces should be regarded as being more or less of a token character or trip-wire which, if overwhelmed by superior Russian forces, would automatically bring into action the American strategic airforce armed with nuclear weapons.

The trip-wire theory was not in favour for long probably because the general staffs pointed out that, if carried to its logical conclusion, conventional forces could be reduced to a line of sentries armed with rifles.

It was replaced by the tactical atomic shield theory, the supporters of this idea argued as follows:

“It is true that in terms of man-power, tanks and perhaps tactical aircraft, Nato forces are inferior. But if our numerically inferior forces are armed with tactical nuclear weapons their fire power can be enormously increased and the ‘Russian masses’ may become a handicap instead of an advantage to the enemy.”

The theory of the tactical atomic shield was and is an attempt to get back to the idea, implicit in the original formation of Nato, that the free world must have enough military strength to hold and repel a Russian attack on Western Europe.

The White Paper on Defence 1957 said: “The frontiers of the free world, particularly in Europe, must be firmly defended

on the ground" (para 20), and went on, "Britain must provide her fair share of the armed forces needed for this purpose" (para 21).

There was no mention in the White Paper of what size these armed forces must be, but we know from other sources as well as one's common sense that an absolute minimum of 30 divisions ready for action is required. My own opinion for technical reasons connected with the need to be able to stage a counter-offensive into the satellite states, is that 50 divisions is a more realistic figure.

The population and resources of the Nato countries are such that 50 divisions with appropriate tactical aircraft is a force within the capacity of these countries to produce and maintain if the governments and peoples thought it worth while to make the effort. It seems that they do not, and nowhere is this more evident than in the United Kingdom. This—apart from one's general knowledge of public opinion and the widespread dislike of conscription and increased taxation—is shown by paras 22 and 23 of the White Paper on Defence 1957.

For, having stated in para 21 that Britain must bear her "fair" share, the next two paragraphs explained that Britain's forces on the Continent will be reduced from about 77,000 men to 64,000 men within 12 months, and by more later on, whilst the second tactical airforce in Germany will be cut by 50 per cent. This reduction to be offset by providing some of the squadrons with nuclear bombs. The reduced army will have "atomic rocket artillery".

There was also the rather odd statement that this reduction will be accompanied by a re-organization which "will increase the proportion of fighting units". This seems to indicate carelessness up to date.

These reductions by the British Government (which, determined to economize on armaments, unilaterally decided what its "fair" share should be), spread dismay and alarm on the Continent.

It will be surprising if the Nato command does not find that other countries give thought to what their "fair" share should be, and it will be more surprising if it is not less than it is at present! Both the trip-wire theory of the function of Nato and the tactical atomic shield idea, which seem to be

fashionable at the moment of writing, aroused misgiving amongst the Continental members of Nato who felt in the trip-wire theory they would be over-run and have to await liberation and in the shield idea that the tactical atomic weapons would be falling on their homelands.

Indeed in all thinking on defence against Russia by military means one can distinguish three modes of thought. (a) The American and Canadian, (b) the British, and (c) the Continental. Each mental climate is conditioned by the distance of the homeland from the point of impact of the two belligerents.

Up till now I have limited discussion to the military organization of Nato, but this does not stand alone. It is buttressed by the American strategic air command which is *not* part of Nato. Before discussing the role of this formation it should be recorded that, notwithstanding the wide gap which exists between Nato as it was planned and Nato as it is, the Nato soldiers, sailors and airmen have done a remarkable job with the means at their disposal. In joint training and planning and in the creation of common services, i.e. air-fields, lines of communication, etc., there has been achieved a degree of co-operation at the technical level between nationals of many states which has hitherto rarely been attained in allied military operations and never in so-called peacetime.

III

If Nato collapsed the U.S.A. strategic airforce would remain. It consists of the most powerful force of bombers in the world and is equipped with nuclear weapons. It is an independent command controlled from Omaha in the U.S.A. and maintained at an astonishingly high degree of readiness. It operates from bases in the U.S.A., in the North polar regions, in Britain, Spain, North Africa and Arabia. By the use of tanker planes its latest bomber the B58 can reach all parts of the Soviet Union, and it has been officially stated that all the targets have been pre-selected so that at very short notice the Soviet Union could be heavily saturated with nuclear bombs. I have been told on good authority that some of its planes, fully armed, are always in the air.¹ This is certainly true of its aerial radar stations.

¹ This was officially confirmed in December 1957.

Although the Soviet Union is believed to have caught up in quality with the American jet bombers and may be on the point of exceeding them in quantity, the Americans have the edge on the Russians for the time being because the American bases are closer to Russian targets than the Russian bases are to American targets such as New York and Chicago.

This is not an advantage enjoyed by Britain. On the contrary a great many Russian targets are further from British bases in the U.K. than London, Liverpool, Glasgow, etc., are from Russian bases.

Why have the Russians built such an enormous fleet of submarines? The reason seems likely to be the perfectly sensible one of being able to disrupt sea communications between N. America and Europe. This plan made particular sense in the days when Nato was pictured as a force sufficiently powerful (without nuclear weapons) to hold a Russian conventional offensive for a period of two or three months. It was assumed in those far-off days—about six years ago!—that, during this period, the reserve divisions of the Nato powers would be mobilized and enter the battle in a comforting and increasing stream.

Some people think that the present purpose of the large Russian submarine fleet is that of providing a large number of mobile concealed stations from which to project nuclear weapons on to the U.S.A. This would effectively counter the disadvantage the Russians are temporarily enduring by being surrounded at distances of from 2,000-5,000 miles by the bases of the American strategic bombing force.

This theory makes a good story, but guided missiles and their launching apparatus are at present (1957) large and heavy units and I should be astonished to learn that the Russian submarine fleet could be fitted to carry and launch the big ones.¹ More probable reasons for the large fleet are:

- (a) The Russians made a mistake in 1945 and planned for World War III too much in terms of World War II.
- (b) They may think (and be right) that until one side is near defeat nuclear weapons will not be used and, in a

¹ But in September 1957 the American Commander of the 6th Fleet declared he had submarines capable of launching missiles.

non-nuclear war, they will exercise command of the sea by submarines.

- (c) They foresee submarines using guided tactical nuclear weapons and are planning for this development by training a large number of officers and men in submarine warfare.

But technical advances are taking place so rapidly that it would be imprudent not to visualize atomic powered submarines of large displacement armed with guided missiles.

The master weapon of the lot, the Queen of Destruction, is the ICBM (the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile); it does not yet exist in production, but millions are being spent by the U.S.A. and Russia on its development and it may be operational by 1963, if not earlier.

The above paragraph was out of date within a week of being written, when the Russians announced the first successful flight of an ICBM and soon afterwards startled the world with their satellite. I have let the paragraph stand but perhaps the date 1963 should have three years lopped off it.

Some formidable technical problems have yet to be solved. The Intercontinental Missile carrying an H-bomb of megaton proportions will probably travel to a height of about 600 miles and at a speed of Mach 20, i.e. in the region of 14,000 miles an hour. In August 1957 the Russians claimed this result.

This kind of thing makes the V2's which fell on London in 1945 seem like Chinese fire-crackers lobbed over the garden wall. It has been officially estimated that a dozen large H-bombs would "inflict widespread devastation" on Great Britain and that "there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of an attack by nuclear weapons".¹ From such studies as I have made of the data available it is my personal conviction that the phrase "widespread devastation" is official English for "a smoking radio-active charnel house". Although the Intercontinental Missile is not yet what an American general described as "operational hardware" its older brother, the Intermediate Range B.M., is just passing out of the experimental stage and seems to be in production in the Soviet Union.

¹ Defence Paper 1957, para 12.

It has a range of 1,500 miles and carries the H-bomb to the target at the relatively slow speed of about 2,000-3,000 miles per hour.

Its significance to Britain is considerable because we are now, or very shortly will be, within striking range of the Intermediate Missile launched from Russian bases. It will take about 25 minutes for this rocket to travel from Leningrad to London. The short-range guided missile with a range of a few hundred miles is almost a conventional weapon.

According to Press reports on 27th September, 1957 the Midland Regional Director of Civil Defence, speaking to a national conference of industrial civil defence officers, said that in the event of an atomic attack it was the Government's official view that we should get five minutes' warning. He also said that the Government was planning, should another war break out, to evacuate 40 to 45 per cent of the population of the highly industrialized areas leaving only the able-bodied men and childless women!¹ I find it impossible to take seriously these vague plans for enormous evacuations, although I believe that if it appeared that there was a serious risk of nuclear attack developing there would be an immense and chaotic unofficial evacuation of large cities. This is one of the risks which makes it so difficult for any government to take precautionary measures—such as they are—in the nuclear age comparable to the various stages of mobilization in the pre-nuclear age.

Furthermore there is a new defence problem which seems to have escaped attention. In 1957 there was an accident at the Windscale atomic energy plant which caused the escape of injurious radio-active substances. Millions of pounds are now being invested in the construction of atomic power stations in many parts of Great Britain. They are enormous fixed installations whose precise distance and bearing from rocket-firing bases in the Soviet Union can be exactly computed. What would happen if one or more of these vast structures, housing within their massive protecting walls immense lethal forces, were struck by an H-bomb or even rocked on their foundations by an H-bomb explosion within 10 miles of their site? If an

¹ I am in some doubt as to how the wives of the able-bodied men would react to this part of our defence plan. S.K.-H.

atomic power station in the West of Britain was disintegrated with a prevailing south-west wind, might not 30 per cent of the country be contaminated? According to the Russian statements their ICBM was accurate to within 6 to 12 miles of the target.

Something must now be said about so-called tactical nuclear weapons.

We have seen that the ability to produce small nuclear weapons—the so-called tactical weapon—has been used as an excuse or an argument to justify reduction in conventional weapons. My information is that at this time (1957) the baby of the tactical nuclear weapon is a shell which can be discharged from a mortar and has a radius of destruction of about 1,000 yards. From this little bang one moves up to a nuclear bomb able to be carried in one aircraft (soon to be replaced by rockets) which, in the words of a senior U.S.A.F. officer, has an explosive force equal to all the explosives dropped on Germany in World War II.

The tactical weapon seems to have exceedingly dangerous possibilities. Suppose a clash occurs in Europe and begins conventionally. It has now become conventional to use tactical nuclear weapons. Nato—or the American forces therein—has got them and will use them. It is reasonable to suppose that the enemy will retaliate in kind and with larger tactical nuclear weapons. It will only be of historic interest which side is the first to counter an atomic kiloton bomb with an H-bomb in the megaton range. Everything will have remained strictly tactical.

Much has been written and said by members of a school of thought who believe that it is possible to have limited nuclear wars. The most famous spokesman of this doctrine is an American, Mr. H. A. Kissinger, whose book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* was widely discussed.

This school of thought, who sometimes refer to their idea as that of the graduated deterrent, start from the sound basis that if the only method we have of using violence in defence is that of all-out nuclear war, which is suicidal, we shall never use it first. Therefore the Russians will be able to make successive aggressions, which will not be sufficiently monstrous to call for an all-out nuclear attack. I agree with this and hold the view it