

is most unlikely that the West will ever launch an H-bomb attack except in retaliation for one they have endured. The limited war school of thought then proceed to argue that a kind of gentleman's agreement must be worked out and known to exist in advance, which will limit the war. It is suggested, for example, that each side is to treat the other's strategic air base as a "sanctuary" immune from attack and only military installations within the battle zone (whatever that may be supposed to be) are to be bombed. I believe such ideas to be fallacious and their authors are bogged down in a desperate attempt to square the circle. For what they are trying to do is not only to confine nuclear energy for military purposes into the strait-jacket of conventional war, but even restrict that strait-jacket and revive the formal rules of war which had some validity in some wars of the Middle Ages and the pre-total war era. They may not know it, but they are trying to conventionalize nuclear energy for military purposes; one might as well endeavour to sanctify the Devil. You either use him or you don't! You cannot enlist him in the firm as a sleeping partner or technical adviser.

There is something else to be said about the tactical nuclear weapon—and I owe this thought to an interjection made at a meeting by a stranger—it is that, even if in certain circumstances the tactical nuclear weapon can be limited in space, *it cannot be limited in time*. The radio-active consequences of nuclear war and weapon tests on future generations through harmful mutations, about which we know little (but none of which is nice), are not limited.

IV

I will now consider the deterrent; the Great Deterrent.

Both sides have got H-bombs, and I might as well try to keep this book up-to-date by assuming that the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile is available. If you feel this is cheating, then for the very large missile substitute the jet bomber forces of American B58's, British Valiants and Vulcans and Russian Bisons and the medium range missile.

The theory of the deterrent as expounded by the free world runs as follows:

"The Russians have been told that any major act of aggression on their side, and in particular a nuclear attack by them on us, would be followed by instant and massive nuclear retaliation. If therefore the Russians wish to commit suicide this is the way to do it."

That—put I hope with fairness and moderation—is our official position. I cannot help wondering whether unofficially the free world leaders say under their breath: "We hope to goodness the Russians believe this."

Do they?¹ I hope we shall never have to find out by practical experiment. But some questions must be asked.

(a) Is it not true, or at any rate highly probable, that the free world will *not* be the first to drop an H-bomb? Apart from one's inner sense of what democracies do and do not do and the unlikelihood (I hope) that any H-bomb would be dropped by the U.S.A. or Britain without mutual consultation²—all of which takes time—the White Paper 1957 says that so far as Britain is concerned "the only safeguard against major aggression is *the power to threaten retaliation with nuclear weapons*" (italics mine). It also writes of "the initial nuclear bombardment and *counter-bombardment*" (para 24). Although it is not clearly stated who is to make the initial bombardment, I believe it unlikely that the White Paper supposes it to be ourselves. If I have misread the White Paper, and it means we are to take the initiative, what are we to make of the further statement that: "It may well be (the two bombardments) would be so crippling as to bring the war to an end within a few weeks or even days."

(b) If it is true or probable that we shall not initiate H-bomb war, then is there not a danger that the Russians may also reach this conclusion? If *they* are prepared to initiate it (and we take it for granted that they will not be inhibited by moral scruples), is there not a danger that they will argue something

¹ Many recent quotations could be cited from Khrushchev and Russian marshals intimating they are satisfied that, though all-out nuclear war would be highly destructive, the Soviet Union would survive and the West would not. One would expect them to *say* this sort of thing and no one can be sure whether or not their appreciation of a major nuclear war is correct or false, but my hunch is that they do believe what they say.

² H.M.G. has received an undertaking from the U.S. that American aircraft carrying H-bombs based in East Anglia will not be used without British permission.

as follows: "We shall—perhaps after a conventional opening—suddenly launch a nuclear attack on the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom. In the era of Intercontinental Missiles the enemy will have a few minutes of warning that the missiles have been launched. Even to-day the British might have only a few minutes' warning by radar that the missiles are en route. It is inconceivable that by any method of organization in a democracy anyone can order a counter-bombardment in five minutes. If nothing happens during those minutes much of the United Kingdom will be pulverized and there may be no counter-attack or only a partial one."

In connection with this hypothesis, what arrangements do exist or could be imagined to exist in Britain to enable a counter nuclear bombardment to be launched on the sole basis of radar evidence (if radar can deal with ICBM's) that missiles ex-Russia are in the stratosphere?¹

The only arrangement I can conceive is that *after* the nuclear missiles have fallen, some survivors in some deep shelter will endeavour to set the counter-bombardment in motion if its organization has not been destroyed. And, even should it be possible to launch a blow of revenge, what good will that do if we are already destroyed?

Does not the same argument apply to the U.S.A.-Soviet situation?

Probably not at the moment because the U.S.A. is not at present (1957) quite so open to sudden attack as is the U.K. But it will apply to the U.S.A. as soon as the ICBM is developed.

(c) But, granted that under (b) above, the Russians may lean on that argument, are they not also likely to feel that, even if they knock out Britain in the way described, there will be instant retaliation from the U.S.A.?

That is the theory but how sure are we that there is and always will be unanimity of thought between London and Washington as to when an H-bomb is to be dropped? Are we sure that each country is committed irrevocably to join the

¹ According to a report presented to W.E.U. by Lord Stonehaven, M.A.: "An electronic computer used to intercept an attacking guided missile would have to perform nearly 3,000 calculations, feed the information to the defending missile and guide it to the target in a little over 2 minutes." *Manchester Guardian*, 14th October, 1957.

other in nuclear war irrespective of how and why each country becomes involved in hostilities? Why does the British Government keep on saying that Britain *must* have H-bombs so as to preserve its political independence *vis-à-vis* the U.S.A.?

Reflections of this nature have been engaging the attention of the leaders of the West and one of them, a very intelligent man of wide experience, has spoken out on this matter. I refer to some remarks made by Mr. Lester B. Pearson. He wrote:¹

“Who decides that all-out aggression has begun? Who decides when to press the button which brings about air retaliation through nuclear strategic bombing? Certainly not any Nato command or council in so far as the U.S. strategic airforce is concerned. This problem of such decisive importance remains to be solved . . . an attempt to force a solution would be unwise because it would not be likely to result in agreed and clear-cut decisions and might well result in dissensions and trouble inside the alliance.”

Since the Russians can read and write as well as encircle us with artificial satellites, the above passage will be known to them. Is it fanciful to suppose that Khrushchev must be thinking: “They talk about the Great Deterrent and yet they know that we know that for fear of falling out amongst themselves they dare not even try to solve the problem of who presses the button and when? I do not feel very deterred.”

V

The purpose of this chapter has been to examine our military defence arrangements and consider to what extent they are likely to be effective against large-scale Russian military aggression against the institutions of our way of life, arrangements which are epitomized in the deterrent of the H-bomb.

It is interesting to reflect that in relying on the deterrent we are (maybe unconsciously) operating in the field of ideas. We are relying on a belief, or wishful hope, that if we possess H-bombs—or even if we do not, but are sure the Russians believe we have them—this will produce a thought in the minds of the

¹ In *Western World*, September 1957.

Russian leaders which can be summed up as: "It (our contemplated aggression) is not worth the consequences."

It is said officially that however intense and elaborate physical defences against enemy bombers may be, a percentage of them will get through. In other words "Nothing is 100 per cent sure". The same observation applies to our estimate of what is going on in the minds of the Russian leaders. We have no grounds whatsoever for being *sure* that the fear of a counter-bombardment is *the* restraining influence on Russian minds contemplating military aggression. It is impossible to be *sure* about anything (with one exception) in this baffling exercise in international thought-reading. A distinguished member of the Labour Party told me that he objected to my idea of an enquiry into the possible value of non-violent resistance as a basis of defence strategy, because the mere fact of a few people round a table in Britain discussing the pros and cons of N.V.R. as a defence strategy might cause the Russians to think: "These British are not 100 per cent sound on the obvious value of their deterrent."

My comment was that I did not think he could have the faith he claimed to have in the unassailable character of the deterrent argument if he feared the effect upon its psychological value of an intellectual exercise on the subject of a possible alternative. "Would you feel happier," I asked, "if the enquiry were labelled Most Secret?"

An interesting point in connection with the deterrent which I have not seen dealt with in public is this:

I assume our leaders are not misleading either us or the Russians when they say that we can blast Russia to pieces, otherwise we are founding our policy on a terribly dangerous bluff. The deterrent depends upon the Soviet leaders *being sure* it is not a bluff.

Therefore part of the deterrent policy should be an invitation to the Russians to attend our tests and see with their own eyes how terrible our bombs can be. Indeed if the Russians have got H-bombs and, without further scientific research, can already produce the largest explosion of any possible use in military operations, and their problem is now one of stock-piling, it is for consideration whether we should not offer to exchange a 20 megaton bomb and thus make quite sure that

each side knows without doubt what each can do to the other, and how horrible it would be.

If this proposal to modify the conventional practice of keeping weapons secret to the needs of a policy based on the deterrent is too radical, I offer the following suggestion:

The Americans have stated that progress is being made with a clean bomb, i.e. non-radio-active fall-out. Surely the scientific information connected with this development should be passed forthwith to Moscow. I see no military advantage to us in a state of affairs in which in nuclear war we drop clean bombs and receive dirty ones. The only argument against the passing of this information is that if the Russians only have dirty bombs they might not use them because of the uncertain consequences of the fall-out. I do not attach importance to this thought.

I wrote just now that there was only one aspect of this whole question about which I thought we could be sure we knew the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. What we know for a fact is this:

That in this year of grace 1957 the main strategy of defence of the U.K. is based on the threat to use a weapon (the H-bomb) which we have publicly admitted would—if ever used—cause the destruction of what we are trying to defend. And this is true, whether or not you agree with my belief that what we are trying to defend is our way of life or whether you prefer the traditional notion that we are only trying to defend our material possessions.

Never threaten what you cannot or will not be sure to perform, is a sound maxim in life.

But—the deterrent school of thought will reply: “We can and we do intend to carry out our threats.”

They must reflect that they have no right to use the word WE, if by that word they mean any body of men who represent the nation. As Mr. Bevan pointed out in a speech in June 1957,¹ the H-bomb business makes it impossible to suppose that Parliament would have time to decide anything. It is very unlikely the Cabinet would be in any better shape and the

¹ In September 1957 Mr. Bevan, who had previously seemed to be against Britain having H-bombs, fell into line with the official Labour attitude that we must have the Bomb.

discussion would have to be very brief, even if Mr. Bevan were in office.

The word WE in practice means (if we—you and I—are prepared to give them the necessary power) two men acting jointly or severally, i.e. the President of the U.S.A. and the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

A heavy addition to the responsibilities of these two over-worked gentlemen and one which, as I shall suggest in Chapter IX, we might usefully relieve our man.

VI

It may help the reader, as it has certainly helped me, if I try to relate some of the reflections set forth in this chapter to a possible episode or conceivable case of aggression:

Let us suppose that there is a rising of the people in East Germany. The East German government calls for help from the Russians who exercise military force. The military forces suppressing the revolt declare that it is being organized from West Berlin (a possible truth) and that, in order to control East Berlin, they must occupy West Berlin. They advance into West Berlin with four mechanized divisions and tactical aircraft. Perhaps they put down an airborne division into West Berlin. They say to the small allied force: "Keep out of the way", or: "You had better evacuate yourselves to West Germany under safe conduct."

What happens next? Here are some possibilities. Assuming agreement between Paris, London and Washington, the allied troops in Berlin (1) retire, or (2) die to the last man. I doubt whether the Allied Commander in Berlin has precise instruction what he is to do. But would there be agreement amongst the Allies? Do not forget what Mr. Pearson has told us on page 100.

As soon as Russian troop movements are reported, the scrambled telephone talks begin between Washington-Paris-London, and, one may be sure, Bonn would expect to be consulted.

Is this a "major act of aggression?" It looks like it even though the Russians are saying: "The occupation is temporary and only to put down illegal activities against the lawful government of East Germany." Do the U.S.A. and Britain, without

warning of any kind, open up a nuclear attack on Russia? I should not think so. Does the U.S.A. announce: "If West Berlin is not evacuated within 6 hours (or 12 hours) we will blast Russia?" Would the Russian reply to this be to blast the U.S.A. and Britain at zero plus 5 hours (or 11 hours) without warning?

What will people be doing in London, New York, Chicago and other large centres when this situation arises? Might there not be a panic evacuation and scenes of indescribable chaos?

Suppose the British Cabinet were simply told by the Americans (with more courtesy than we showed to them over Suez); "We tell you that we intend to have a show-down over this Berlin business. We think we can call their bluff and, if we cannot, we can hurt them more than they can hurt us." What would the Cabinet do?

Would it say to Washington: "We cannot have Britain destroyed by Intermediate Range Missiles. We are telling the Russians your nuclear bombers cannot take off from Britain and we will not drop nuclear bombs on Russia if they do not drop any on us"? Or would we say: "Britain is with you to the last heap of radio-active ashes. If you survive, remember us in the history books." I suggest we can all imagine what the French will be saying, and the Asian Dominions would certainly leave the Commonwealth without delay and loudly trumpet their neutrality.

Another guess—and I admit my guess is no better than yours—is that when the news came through that West Berlin had been seized, the Allies would seek a way out of their hideous dilemma by summoning an emergency meeting of the Security Council where Russia would exercise the veto. "Law and Order" would be restored in East Germany whilst the debate was taking place.

I will go out on a limb and risk being branded as a coward and an appeaser by saying that in the circumstance I have tried to imagine, the governments of the democratic countries will *not* risk starting up a nuclear war and that, if given a chance to express an opinion, a very small proportion of the people of the free world would decide that an illegal Russian occupation of Berlin should lead to the destruction of civilization. I fear the Russians might reach the same conclusion.

Russian action of this kind would be aggression of a serious character and, if they got away with it, they would be tempted to repeat the performance. They might, for example, if circumstances were favourable, renew their attempts to bring Greece into their orbit by a mixture of internal dissension and external Russian aid.

If the Russians got away with it in the case mentioned above, what was missing? What should we have lacked? The answer is: Adequate conventional force. If the Russians knew that in the event of their seizing West Berlin a powerful Nato conventional force would back up an ultimatum to withdraw, they might hesitate. In the last resort the Nato force, if powerful enough, could drive them out of Berlin, and lay the onus on the Russians of using nuclear weapons.

We are now back to the conception of conventional war which was becoming so destructive through traditional operational methods by 1945 that its merits were dubious, but not so destructive that it had become suicidal folly. Indeed, if looked at in a cold-blooded way and in long-term historical perspective, the destruction wrought by conventional military operations by 1945 and the miseries it inflicted on Germany forced this virile nation to re-build its cities and work so hard to live, that by 1957 their prosperity was an international embarrassment. But as things are in 1957 we have not got conventional weapons of sufficient strength to deny the capture of West Berlin to the Russians, or retake it if it were lost.

But we have got Nato and we pretend that our set-up there of conventional forces plus tactical nuclear weapons is a defence for Europe.

Let us therefore suppose that in the case we have imagined the Russians seize West Berlin and both sides declare they will not use the H-bomb.

Nevertheless it is felt in London and Washington that, if the Russians get away with this, what is the object of having Nato? Therefore a conventional war begins. This now begins to look like the limited war discussed on page 96. This school of thought would be saying in broadcasts and articles: "Do not worry too much; remember the Korean example, where in their own interests both sides observed certain conventions, viz. the U.N. forces never bombed the enemy aerodromes

beyond the Yalu River because it was felt this would bring China into the war and so risk starting up a world war and probably a nuclear one, whilst the N. Koreans never bombed our ports because if they had done so we should have had to retaliate on their aerodromes in China."

This school of thought would therefore argue in the Berlin case we are discussing that there might be a limited conventional war. Unfortunately this argument is sunk on the rock of tactical nuclear weapons. The Russians might well not be the first to use nuclear weapons; they would not need to do so as their mechanized divisions poured westwards, but we have *got* to use tactical nuclear weapons from the start in order to compensate for the Russian masses.¹ We have announced officially that we shall do so. The Russian general staff would not allow its troops to be subjected to nuclear attack without retaliating in kind. The retaliation might be limited in the first instance to an atomic bomb(s) on Antwerp, one of the main bases of the Nato forces. This would call for correspondingly heavy stuff on the main Soviet bases. The enemy would then give serious consideration to getting rid of Britain with a dozen H-bombs. This would mean a full-scale nuclear war.

I have dealt with the case of the West Berlin seizure in terms of limited war in order to illustrate why those who back this theory (i.e. that the H-bomb deterrent creates a framework in which limited wars can be conducted) overlook the fact, the truly appalling fact, that tactical nuclear weapons are now conventional weapons.

The West Berlin case is a glance into the future, but this is such an important matter that I will illustrate it with an example of what might have been. Consider the Suez episode and exclude from it all issues of domestic controversy. Strategically the dilemma of the British Government was that it was trying to fight a limited war of a novel character. It was trying to use military force without hurting anyone, though the purpose of military force is, or was up to recent years, to hurt

¹ This is where the Korean analogy would break down. In Korea it was *not* militarily imperative to bomb the Chinese airfields and industries in Manchuria. But if the U.N. forces had been faced with the prospect of surrendering *en masse* or being driven into the sea by the Chinese armies are we sure that we should not have used everything we had, including nuclear weapons, to stave off this disaster? I do not see American troops being abandoned to their fate until *every* effort had been made to save them.

the enemy as quickly and extensively as possible. Militarily the operation was absurd and we either ought never to have started it, or else swooped on Egypt within 12 hours and knocked the hell out of her. Therefore it became a fiasco. We were defeated by Colonel Nasser in the field of political warfare where he won a series of tactical victories which caused our military defeat.¹

At various periods during the slow build-up there were large concentrations of British and French forces at sea. Supposing the Russians had said to Nasser: "You have been bombed; most foully and wantonly stabbed in the back. Three first-class bombers are arriving to help you. Each carries a nuclear bomb. Put an Egyptian pilot in each plane, the crew will be in plain clothes. Send them out to drop one bomb on the naval transports at night and one on Malta. As soon as they have completed their mission the bombers will fly back to Russia. You had better give Malta an hour's notice." Supposing Nasser had replied: "Much obliged for your kind suggestion. I notice that there is one spare bomb and I propose to send Paris an ultimatum that unless a peace-plane arrives in Cairo with accredited plenipotentiaries within 12 hours I shall drop a nuclear bomb on a selected French target. For your private information I think Lyons would be suitable, it is nicely cupped in hills and the result will probably cause the Rhône to be dammed and flood the valley up-stream. I shall report the action to U.N. and have a clear case for acting in self-defence in face of aggressive French and British military action."

Perhaps all this seems fantastic to you, but it only needed two men, Khrushchev and Nasser, to make it not a speculation but a new chapter in war.

VII

Although one of the difficulties inherent in the analysis of the problems discussed in this chapter is that what shall be considered as "maior aggression" has not, and perhaps never can be, defined or even described, there are certain forms of aggression still possible which are clearly not major and belong in a sense to the pre-nuclear age—at any rate for the time being.

¹ "What should we have done?" Briefly, the answer is that Britain should have manœuvred politically to become an U.N. police force separating the combatants and occupying the Canal Zone with the backing of the Assembly.

I am referring to such episodes as the Mau Mau rebellion; or the possibility of an attack by the Yemenites on the Aden protectorate; or an Abyssinian aggression on British Somalis; or even the need to support the civil police in Britain in case of riots. I regard this type of aggression as being different in character from the kind of aggression we have in mind when we think of the Soviet Union.

They are usually robbery aggressions, without much ideological content. I do not rule out an element of robbery in a potential Russian aggression, but experience has shown that in disputes between major states it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for the victor to indulge in large-scale robbery, or to use a more polite term, reparations, without doing himself a lot of damage. The more primitive the victor-state the more economically profitable it is to seize the economic assets of the vanquished.

As regards the lesser aggressions which require police action, it is my view that armed force has a part to play. Armed force required for this purpose would clearly be relatively small and no question of using the H-bomb or any nuclear weapon would arise. The defence requirements for this type of police action should be the responsibility of an international body such as U.N., and I shall welcome a development in which U.N. will have its permanent police force, although there are obviously great difficulties in deciding under whose orders it should operate.

It is not my contention that one can be sure that the strategy of basing our defence on the existence of the H-bomb as a deterrent is bound to be ineffective; *it is my submission that its efficacy must be a matter of complete speculation with the grave disadvantage that if we have guessed wrong, the penalty of failure is the destruction of the nation.*

There are other aspects of the nuclear age which are far from being speculative. They are:

(a) The very grave danger that, unless the whole business of nuclear warfare is placed under firm international control at an early date, it is certain that the number of states owning nuclear weapons will increase. Already the British Minister of Defence in July 1957 stated in the House of Commons that the

Government regard it as unacceptable that Britain should be in an inferior position to the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the technique of manufacturing and producing stock-piles of nuclear weapons. The chances of effective international control seem to be poor. There is the further point that if tactical nuclear weapons are to become increasingly important in Nato they will have to be distributed amongst all the national contingents in Nato. The French (and British) have already used for non-Nato operations weapons supplied by the U.S.A. exclusively for use in Nato.

(b) Therefore the scene is set for a nuclear arms race and the development of the "clean" bomb makes the race seem more reasonable.

(c) Every arms race in the past designed to procure a balance of force has led to an explosion. What reasons have we for hoping that the nuclear arms race will be an exception to the rule? Especially now that tactical nuclear weapons are being looked upon as conventional! I doubt whether, if these nuclear weapons are developed and stock-piled, they will for ever remain in store.

(d) The political tensions which produce the armaments are still there and until they are reduced or eliminated there is the danger that they will degenerate into violence and within a few years "violence", i.e. military operations, will be conventionally conducted with nuclear weapons.

This last mentioned conclusion is the most sinister and alarming. Whatever may be our hopes and the prospects of a reduction of tension between the democratic and Communist camps, it is not likely to take place quickly because it will and can only be genuinely achieved through the acceptance by the majority of mankind of either the Communist or the free way of life.

All nations sufficiently powerful to jeopardize world peace must be in one camp before there can be peace. As long as there are two camps, in each of which the nations base their way of life on *one* of two philosophies, each of which is by its nature basically hostile to the other, there will be no peace, there *can* be no peace, but only an uneasy armistice.

Until the arrival of the nuclear age it was possible to assess

the violence potential of a nation in terms of manpower and industrial strength. But if nuclear weapons become common-form and owned by all or nearly all the nations those criteria go by the board.

If we exclude the question of fall-out, which may be eliminated through using clean bombs, the nuclear weapon is simply an economical (in the military sense) method of obtaining a large explosion in concentrated form. One can suppose, for example, that the smallest tactical nuclear weapon is equivalent in destructive power to what could have been achieved in 1944 by 100 (or 1,000?) planes each dropping 2,000 lb. of bombs, or in 1918 by a concentration of 2,000 (or 20,000?) 6-in. Howitzers. The use of nuclear energy for military purposes has produced a situation in which if *werre* (see page 22) or the conflict of ideas between sovereign states degenerates into violence (i.e. military operations) the violence is bound to be nuclear, and if it be nuclear it will be so violent that it ceases to be a means to an end and becomes an end in itself—the end being total destruction. It is hard to see how in the modern interdependent world any state in conflict of ideas with another state can be advantaged by the total destruction of its enemy. A possible exception—it could be argued—is to be found in the Israel-Arab dispute in which it must be assumed there are Arabs who wish to see the complete elimination of Israel, but this dispute has an exceptional background. Even in this case the Arab propaganda declares that it is the elimination of the state of Israel rather than Jews as such which is needed. Anti-Israel sentiments are not comparable to Nazi anti-semitism.

We must ask ourselves this question: "If the contribution of violence (i.e. military operations) to the settlement of differences of opinion or conflicts (*werre*) between sovereign states has evolved to such intensity that it is totally destructive, has not violence outlived its usefulness in disputes between large states?" It looks to me as if this is the truth. Bearing in mind that in major disputes violence has become equated with nuclear energy violence, I am forced to consider what possibilities are open to us if we exclude violence from our defence plans on the grounds that violence has become our master instead of our slave.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL WARFARE

IN CHAPTER V the possibilities and limitations of the use of military force in the task of defending our way of life were considered. In Chapter VI the degree to which the military force possessed by the United Kingdom and our allies was capable of fulfilling its function was examined. An account of the contribution political or psychological force can make to our defence arrangements must be added.

The use of political warfare operations in a struggle of ideas with another state falls into three categories when the struggle—as is the case in the war of ideas between Communism and democracy—is being waged on a stage of world dimensions.

There are the operations designed to strengthen psychologically our home front, those intended for uncommitted states and those designed to influence the enemy population.¹

Before I consider these types of operation in further detail, mention must be made of one factor applicable to them all.

It cannot be too strongly stressed that all democratic political warfare operations must be inspired by democratic principles. This may strike the reader as an absurd platitude but experience in World Wars I and II showed that, if political warfare operations are (as they were) subservient to short term military requirements, the propaganda becomes confused, contradictory and liable to have a boomerang effect.²

That democratic political warfare must be sincerely conducted is the psychological equivalent of the fact that in the field of military operations democracies cannot launch preventive wars and remain democratic. This limitation of the offensive does not apply to the battle of the ideas because the

¹ Parallel activities drawn from military operations (say) in World War I would be: (a) Home propaganda and recruiting, (b) economic pressure on neutrals, (c) military operations overseas.

² Some interesting observations about political warfare are to be found in three lectures by Mr. Richard Crossman, M.P., published in the *R.U.S.I. Journal*, Nos. 587, 591, 592.

war is already in being. Even if our government had felt convinced in 1939 that Hitler intended to attack Poland and even knew of his decision to do so, it could not either legitimately or morally have launched a military attack on him as a preventive action. But to have waged intense political warfare from a much earlier date than 1939 against Hitler would have been perfectly in order. Furthermore we had not the means to wage a preventive military operation even had it been permissible; we had all that it required to wage political warfare, except the will to do it. The sudden guarantee to Poland was a very feeble psychological blow because it was not apparent to anyone how it was to be implemented, least of all to the British General Staff or to this author who was in Warsaw at the time and was obliged to depress Poles by assuring them that it was most unlikely the British Government intended to send "the great British Navy" into the Baltic. As a deterrent the British gesture was useless.

TRUTH must be the dominating feature of democratic propaganda. The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. It may sometimes seem that to tell the truth is inconvenient and harmful to the cause, but in the long run it is the decisive weapon. It is not a secret weapon.

Democratic political warfare—unlike Communist operations—must be based on a wide foundation in the nation, and the object of the operation on the Home Front must be to ensure that the people understand the nature of the ideological struggle, the consequences of defeat, the values of our way of life and their supreme importance.

Another principle of importance is that democratic political warfare shall be inspired by a sense of mission. A nation which holds that the free way of life is the Truth must wish to see that way of life accepted universally. For democracy is not a static affair devoid of any mission. It is—so I believe—the right way of life and if a man believes this to be true it is his plain duty—quite apart from self-interest—to labour (by all methods compatible with democratic principles) to spread the gospel amongst peoples who for one reason or another are denied its benefits.

We are not entitled as democrats to give a negative answer to the question: Am I my brother's keeper?

The innumerable examples in history of occasions when the democratic peoples have sadly failed in their duty illustrate that the practice of democracy is hard and exacting. The acquiescence during the period 1935-39 by British public opinion and the British Government in the barbarous persecution in Germany by the Nazis of Jews and political opponents of the Nazi régime on the grounds (publicly stated by British Ministers) that it was no concern of ours what went on within the frontiers of Germany, was a grave error of policy as well as a moral lapse.

Whilst it is the duty (often unrealized or ignored) of democrats to promote their philosophy of life, we must understand that it is the duty (always realized and never ignored) of Communists to promote in every possible way their ideas about the right way of life. The Communist who, in contrast to the rather apathetic and static attitude of the democrat, adopts a dynamic approach to his task, has always realized that in a struggle which is essentially ideological the use of violence has its place but *not* the first place.

In a democracy such as Great Britain most people take our way of life for granted. They are so accustomed to its benefits that they regard them as being as certain as to-morrow's sunrise. One must recognize that many citizens would only begin to appreciate our way of life after they had lost it. Nevertheless the more thoughtful members of the community do understand that perpetual vigilance is the price of liberty and the activities of these people should be encouraged.

If we limit our definition of the phrase "the Home Front" to the United Kingdom, the less the Government concerns itself with direct propaganda the better.¹ The role of the Government should be to produce facts, to provide money for education and in general create a framework of law and order within which our way of life can lead a vigorous and intellectually expanding existence. The business of encouraging and assisting our people to feel that our way of life is something of importance to each individual, something which is as indispensable to him as he is to it, is the job of all the institutions which are the apparatus of our way of life. It is impossible in this book to go into details about ways and means of what can be broadly

¹ But see also Chapter XIV.

described as education for citizenship and all that need be said is that those who for one reason or another have some influence over the thoughts of their fellows—i.e., politicians, journalists, teachers, broadcasters, Trade Union leaders, managers, church leaders and elected leaders of all kinds—have at this time a special responsibility and duty of an educational character. If however we extend the meaning of the phrase “home front” to include the associations of democratic nations, of which Nato is the most important example, then governments should come more prominently into the picture, partly because the task, or much of it, is beyond the technical resources of private bodies, partly because the problem is that of creating a common policy between sovereign states.

There is still a place for work by private bodies in this field such as the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government, a supra-national body devoted to the cause of promoting the institution of Parliamentary government.¹ The United Nations Association is another example of the many unofficial organizations which exist to do educational work beyond the frontiers of a single state about the free way of life or some aspect of it. But where the governments should act and are the only bodies which can act is in such matters as making a reality of Article II of the Nato Treaty (see page 83). All the democratic nations are agreed that their way of life is menaced by the Communist political offensive and that however much (and rightly) their ways of life differ in detail—and this is one of democracy’s glories—those ways of life are all based on certain principles common to all. Yet, these nations have hardly begun to understand that if they are menaced by a monolithic Communist doctrine, the democracies must be prepared to operate as a democratic unit and apply democratic principles and practices to their own international arrangements. This means a progressive abandonment of sovereignty and its absorption into a higher loyalty. Because the true nature of war has been misunderstood we have a considerable understanding of the need for close co-operation amongst the democracies, *but only in the military sphere*; and even here in 1957 there was still a nuclear curtain between the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

Although the practical result in military co-operation

¹ See Chapter XI, page 161.

between Nato powers falls short of what it could be, the idea is there and the hideous word *Infrastructure* is evidence of it on the ground; a common naval signal book illustrates it at sea, and the English language is used in the air. The need to have a good knowledge of English is one of the limiting factors in recruiting pilots for the new German Air Force.

But politically the democratic world remains obstinately "sovereign-state-minded" and this is a manifest and serious weakness in the cold war with the Soviet Union. Without attributing the blame to one side or the other it has been unfortunate and harmful that, for the past decade, British and American policy in the Middle East has so often been at cross-purposes, culminating in the Suez quarrel at the very moment when, owing to the Hungarian revolt, a united democratic front was of great psychological importance.

The chief explanation of the striking difference between the measure of unity in doctrine and practice which has been achieved militarily between the Nato powers and the lack of unity in the political field is to be found in the failure of the Nato peoples and their leaders to understand that defence in the present struggle embraces far more than military precautions.

Lord Ismay (then Secretary General of Nato) wrote in his report on the first five years of Nato 1949-54: "... there is a feeling in some quarters that member countries should examine in Nato the methods of combating the massive anti-Nato propaganda made by communists . . . a compromise has been reached whereby Nato can act as a forum for consultation, about psychological warfare. Such consultation is, however, restricted to matters affecting member countries only: Nato, as an international organization, has never envisaged carrying on propaganda to the peoples of the Soviet Union or of the satellite countries."¹

The second category of political warfare operations is the struggle for the allegiance of the uncommitted nations. Here governments must play the major role although (especially in all matters touching racial and colour questions) the individual who has the opportunity of behaving democratically towards a citizen of one of these states can do a lot of good

¹ *Nato, The First Five Years 1949-54* by Lord Ismay, Chapter XIV, page 155.

especially as it must be conceded that the Soviet Union's policy is conspicuously non-racial. Similarly, one example of non-democratic behaviour can do immense damage.¹ A good example of constructive action against Communist propaganda and penetration has been the granting of self-government by Britain to Asian and African nations.

On the other hand the *Apartheid* policy in the Union of South Africa, which cannot possibly be regarded as democratic, is a very definite weakness in the political warfare armoury of the democracies especially if the latter take up the attitude that this is not their business. Economic activities by the democracies in the uncommitted nations *without political strings attached* are of great importance in the over-all political struggle and here again this weapon for combating Communist activities is much more potent if it is wielded in a collective manner by the democratic states.

Finally, there are the operations directed towards the "enemy" public opinion. In this case governmental action, especially when the enemy is a totalitarian state, is essential.

There is an extraordinary delusion prevalent in democratic countries that "public opinion" in totalitarian states is unimportant. On the contrary any dictator or oligarchy which knows its business regards the control of public opinion as a task of urgent and continuous priority. The totalitarian régime has a double problem. It must not only indoctrinate its own people with its ideology, but it must take measures to prevent its public hearing what the opponents of the régime have to say.

The domestic public opinion of a totalitarian régime is the Achilles' heel of the régime and the Soviet Union is no exception to this rule.

This therefore is the most important category of political warfare operations since a victory on this battlefield will "win the war" and could do so without a shot fired or a bomb dropped.

The truth of these observations is well illustrated if we examine what has happened in the Soviet Union. I will take youth as my example.

¹ e.g. The racial dispute at Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957 was world news and obscured all progress being made in integrating schools elsewhere in the South.

Speaking at the Third Congress of the Komsomol (Soviet Young Communist League) on 2nd October, 1920,¹ Lenin said: "The generation whose representatives are about 50 years old cannot expect to see the Communist society. This generation will die out before then. But the generation which is now 15 years old will see the Communist society, will itself build this society. And it must realize that the whole purpose of its life is to build this society." He pointed out, however, that this could be achieved only through the thorough indoctrination of youth with Communist ideology. "Only by radically remoulding the teaching, organization and training of youth shall we be able to ensure that the results of the efforts of the younger generation will be the creation of a society that will be unlike the old society, i.e. a Communist society." He maintained that the "whole object of training, educating and teaching the youth of to-day should be to imbue them with Communist ethics". Communist ethics and morality were then defined by Lenin as being entirely "derived from the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat". He linked the acquisition of knowledge with four concrete tasks: the defence of Communism, the interpretation of all knowledge from a Marxist viewpoint, the elimination of traces of other ideologies from the mind and the task of making the Soviet Union a mighty industrial country through collective effort.

On 13th April, 1928, Stalin made it clear that the next generation must be educated in such a way as would ensure the perpetual existence of a Communist government. A similar attitude exists in the satellite states. There is no space in which to describe how this indoctrination takes place in practice via the *Young Pioneers* (9-14 years), the *Komsomol* (14-26 years) and the continuation of indoctrination in the Trade Union organization, collective farms, university, etc., and via a host of other bodies. It begins even at the kindergarten stage. The reader who is interested can find ample and fully documented accounts of all this, providing irrefutable proof of the vital importance attached by the Communist leaders to "correct thinking" on the home front and this proof includes the text books which show that correct thinking emphasizes the "role of British and

¹ Lenin, *Works*, 4th Edition, Vol. 31, pp. 258-75 State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow, 1950.

American Imperialism in the war against the forces of peace and democracy"¹ (i.e. the Communist states).

What is of current importance in the Soviet Union and has a direct bearing on the aspect of defence under review in this Chapter is the revolt of Communist youth (and the intellectuals) which has become significant since the upheaval caused by the denunciation of Stalin. By the middle of 1957 there had been authentic news of student unrest in 10 Soviet Union republics. There had been rioting in Georgia, barracking at official lectures, boycotting of indoctrination classes; dissemination of news from outside sources, illegal publications, refusal to volunteer for work in backward areas and so forth.

It would take us too far afield to pursue this subject in detail, but there is plenty of evidence that at no time during the past decade have the possibilities for a constructive political warfare attack on the minds of the young people beyond the Iron Curtain been more hopeful than at this moment (1957).

The denunciation of Stalin and Stalinism set in train a series of events which, from the defence point of view in the field of psychological warfare, are full of promise. All over the Communist world, in the Soviet Union, in Poland, Hungary and the other satellites, in China and in Northern Vietnam and even in Yugo-Slavia, two phenomena or trends had become clear by 1957. First, during the period of relaxation which succeeded the exposure of Stalinism, the intellectuals bubbled up in a ferment of long-suppressed freedom. Startling books began to appear, reflecting the kind of idea which caused so notable a figure as Professor Kantorowitz to confess with bitterness after he had fled from East Germany:

"I can no longer refuse to recognize the tragic paradox . . . that I myself have contributed my mite in helping to bring about the very thing that I meant to fight against; the very lawlessness, the exploitation of the workers, the spiritual enslavement of the intelligentsia, the arbitrary rule of an unworthy clique. . . . Fascism and barbarism had again risen behind our backs—in word, thought and deed in the offices of the Party bureaucracy."

The second phenomenon was the inevitable reaction by the

¹ From the *Programme for Teaching the English Language*.

bosses to this revolt which, in one way or another, was being suppressed towards the end of 1957; suppressed but not destroyed and the counter-revolution beyond the Iron Curtain will rise again. Too many people have had a glimpse of what life could be and it looked good, so they will return to the attack.

Another important feature of this third category of political warfare is that an attack on the minds of the "enemy" population fulfils the requirements of the principle that the best method of defence is to attack.

By a vigorous and sustained psychological offensive against the enemy he can be thrown on to the defensive and obliged to impose restriction on his people, such as jamming of broadcasts, which may cause his public to have subversive thoughts and ask awkward questions.

It is part of our creed or faith that all men are liberty and freedom loving and that if the people of a great nation, be they Germans or Russians, are supporting ideas and practices which are undemocratic it must be due to a lack of knowledge and understanding of the truth on their part and it is both our duty and to our self-interest to endeavour to let them know the truth.

In this chapter I have outlined some theoretical considerations about the role of political warfare operations in the defence of our way of life against political attack. In Chapter VIII some suggestions will be made as to how these principles could be better translated into practice than they are at present, with a consequent strengthening of our defences in the struggle of ideas with the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER EIGHT

OUR POLITICAL DEFENCE

PRECEDING CHAPTERS have been concerned with the nature of the attack on our way of life (the defence of which I have postulated is the prime purpose of our defence arrangements); the role of military force in this task and the capacity of our military force to achieve it; and the part political warfare can play in defence. To complete the picture, our political warfare arrangements must be surveyed in relation to their capacity to fulfil their role.

At the present time (1957) it is recognized that some psychological activity on our part is called for in response to the massive psychological offensive ceaselessly operated by the Communists. But political warfare is not regarded at the highest level as an integral part of defence. The nearest we come to this recognition is a reference in some of the White Papers on defence to "Communist penetration and infiltration" but a careful search of these annual pronouncements fails to reveal any proposals for political warfare. They are all documents dealing with the armed forces and the only reference which seems to connect up with political warfare is a passage in the 1956 statement which reads (in part) ". . . by the goodwill that it engenders in foreign countries, the Navy is a valuable weapon in the cold war against Communism" (para 21).

An outline of the use which has been made of political warfare during the past fifty years is as follows. It provides us with a background to the present situation:

In World Wars I and II (which according to my opinion began about 1906 and 1933 respectively) practically no place was assigned to political warfare in our defence arrangements until the wars degenerated in 1914 and 1939 into military operations.

In World War I it was not until 20th February, 1917 that the Department of Information was created, to be superseded by a Ministry of Information on 4th March, 1918 which

included, under Lord Northcliffe, a directorate of propaganda in enemy countries. Dr. Mitchell who worked in this organization has written that:

“The inspiring principle of the new organization was that propaganda should depend upon policy.”

But he adds:

“If a concerted policy did exist, it was unknown to those who were conducting propaganda. The wiser propagandists . . . endeavoured to limit themselves to a restricted field from which declared ‘war aims’ and ultimate terms of peace were excluded.”¹

In 1933 Josef Goebbels was created Reich Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, and as the German Press, radio and all instruments for disseminating information were under his control and he had immense funds at his disposal in addition to the sanction of the concentration camp, he achieved a considerable success in his task of indoctrinating a nation with Hitler’s ideas.

It has seemed to me most extraordinary that the British Government took no steps to counter the Nazi propaganda—or for that matter to deal earlier with that of Mussolini. It was late in the day for the British Prime Minister to tell the German people on 3rd September, 1939 we were not fighting them but were fighting to free them, when for five or six years we had accepted without protest Dachau and Nazi bestialities or, at the best, emulated the priest who “passed by on the other side”.

It was a good thing that some British Members of Parliament visited Belsen in 1946; it would have been better if some M.P.’s had tried to visit Dachau in 1936.

In the twelve months preceding military operations in World War II some steps were taken to prepare the outline of an embryonic Ministry of Information. I know something about this from the inside and of the pitiful and inadequate plans that were made. At one time the director-general designate was a civil servant and half an hour’s conversation

¹ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 32, page 181.

with this gentleman was enough to convince me that unconsciously he was one of Hitler's secret weapons!

When military operations began, the Ministry of Information sprang into life and, under a procession of Ministers, became both the home of advertising agency personnel and something approaching a public scandal until the Rt. Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P. took charge.

Before the war a Political Warfare Executive (P.W.E.) was established. It was a secret department in the Foreign Office. It was also linked to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In matters of foreign policy it was responsible to the Foreign Secretary but, in the words of Mr. Crossman, M.P., who was a senior officer in the organization, "for all strategic matters there was also continuous control by the Chiefs of Staff to ensure that our propaganda conformed to their strategic requirements". P.W.E. became a very large organization and was responsible for propaganda in leaflet and radio form, both "white" and "black"¹ propaganda. In 1941 the activities of P.W.E. were integrated with those of the two American organizations, the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) and the Office of War Information (O.W.I.). The first was secret, the second public—very public. At the end of the war the main impetus of our propaganda was coming from an Anglo-American staff under the Supreme Commander at Shaef.

A survey of what was done up to the end of World War II leads to the conclusion that political warfare, both in its black and white manifestations, was simply regarded as an activity which, in many different ways, could be of assistance to the military conduct of the war. And it was so regarded by those who worked in this branch of defence. Nothing could be more revealing than a remark of Mr. Crossman's, when he said: "*Psychological warfare is not a substitute for action . . . it is at best an accompaniment to action, something which slightly accelerates the process of military force. . . .*"

The generally accepted and official view of the role of political warfare and the limits which have been assigned to it could not have been stated more concisely. Yet what an absurd

¹ *White* propaganda was official and what it purported to be, the voice of the Allies;

Black propaganda purported to come from inside the enemy country.

statement it is if we remember the simple and irrefutable fact that an IDEA *must* precede action!

Should you see fit to purchase a copy of this book your *action* will be agreeable to author, publisher and bookseller, but none of us are expecting to sell many copies to persons who, with a vacant look on their faces, buy the book without having some thought in their minds related to the subsequent act of purchase.

It is my conviction that, had the true nature of war been understood in the period between the wars, and had proper use been made of all the potentialities of political warfare against dictatorships, World War II could have been won before it degenerated into military action in 1939. Leaving that aside, a proper understanding of the power of political warfare could have greatly shortened the length of the second World War. The greatest psychological stroke in World War II carried out by the Allies was the announcement of unconditional surrender, and it was a stab in their own backs! In April 1944 General Eisenhower, on the advice of his psychological warfare staff, sent a paper to President Roosevelt which said in effect: "We accept the policy of unconditional surrender, but we would like to be able to tell a German General in Normandy how he should surrender if he wants to." A reply came back via Mr. Stettinius that politics were to be left to the politicians!

Though it was a tragedy that political warfare was so neglected from 1914-45, it can at least be said that military operations still had some logic in them and had not become so destructive as to be absurd. But the nuclear age has completely altered the traditional relationship between military and political warfare operations. The subservience of political warfare to military consideration was foolish in 1914, absurd in 1939 and is madness in 1957.

We come now to World War III which began in 1946. During the past decade some progress in the recognition of the importance of political warfare has been made. This is due—I suggest—not so much to inner conviction on the part of democratic governments, but simply because ever since the Communists have been in power, but especially since 1946, they have been so active on the political warfare front that their efforts called forth some reaction in kind from their prospective

victims. But the effort from our side has been meagre; co-operation with our allies is loose and the sums spent are derisory. When in 1957 it became evident that the British position in the Middle East had been successfully dealt a series of body blows by political warfare operations ex-Cairo, of which a typical example was the expulsion of Glubb Pasha from Jordan, the Government decided to step up our political warfare in the Middle East, but in announcing extra expenditure on these services they also made economies in existing services to other parts of the world.

* * *

Some years after the end of World War II, I sought an interview with the Minister of Defence and asked whether he agreed that political warfare was part of our defence arrangements. He did. I then suggested that if we included in the expenditure on political warfare, every activity, public, secret, official and private designed to promote knowledge of and belief in our way of life in contra-distinction to the Communist doctrine, the total annual expenditure might be in the region of £10 million or about 1 per cent of the expenditure on our armed forces at that time. He thought this to be a reasonable estimate. I then asked him whether as Minister of Defence he had any Cabinet responsibility for the allocation of this trivial sum. He said: "No." Finally I suggested that he might consider setting up an inter-departmental committee charged with the task of reporting upon the relationship between political warfare and military operations (including preparations for the use of force) in the over-all strategy of Total War, and that I hoped such a Committee would recommend the creation of the post of a fourth member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, a person to be called the C.P.W. (Chief of Staff Political Warfare).

The Minister seemed quite interested but . . . the rest of the talk must unfortunately remain off the record.

* * *

It is not possible for an unofficial person to obtain a complete account of the whole set-up of our political warfare arrangements at this time (1957) and there are no doubt aspects of it which it would be tactically unwise to discuss in public. But

enough is public property to make it safe to assert that it is all pretty small beer. During the past five years the Americans have attached more importance to this aspect of the Cold War than the British and they have spent (and misspent) a good deal of money on it through official and unofficial channels. Radio Free Europe at Munich is a large semi-official American organization in parallel with the official Voice of America. My impression is that the Americans are less competent operators than the British but that the latter have to function on a shoe string. There is some collaboration between the British and Americans and possibly between Nato powers in general, but in a small way and it is difficult to get details. This collaboration takes place at Under-Secretaries level. In Britain the Foreign Office is the Ministry chiefly responsible for psychological warfare and a junior Minister is in charge.

Another impression I have is that in the whole defence picture, the organizations official, semi-official and unofficial which are engaged in psychological or political warfare against the Soviet Union can be fairly compared to the role played by the army bands and Kneller Hall in the fighting capacity of the British Army. A worthy side line.

What is required without delay is a White Paper on Defence incorporating political warfare and military warfare arrangements in one comprehensive picture. If this is asking for too big a cherry at one mouthful, then may we not have a Political Warfare White Paper? The trouble about this would be that its author would have to ask our Cabinet and other Governments what the policy was, and we have seen in our studies of military white papers how difficult it has been for our Government to make up its mind about policy in military defence.

The policy statement in a Political Warfare White Paper should be much easier to produce, but only if the Cabinet is in a frame of mind which appreciates the true nature of war, and the importance of the battle of ideas, and if there existed a common U.S.A.-U.K. political policy in defence of democracy. Of this there are no signs but plenty of evidence to the contrary.

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I will conclude this chapter by giving some illustrations of proposals for political warfare operations which occurred to me at various times and which were submitted to the appropriate authorities. It is not claimed that they were very wonderful and their father puts them forward with diffidence, but they do illustrate the kind of operation I regard as worth considering in political warfare.

Case I. *Object: The overthrow of Mussolini.*

Time approximately 1934-35. About this time Mussolini was making violent speeches against the democracies and referring to them as dung-heaps. It was proposed that certain discreditable financial transactions in which leading Fascists were involved should be ferreted out by appropriate agencies and, when all the facts were clearly proved, the whole business exposed in a printed document to be posted up in large letters in our Embassy grounds and all consulates-general offices in Italy entitled "News from Italy". The document would also have been circulated all over the world and broadcast to Italy. "The Duce says we are a dung-heap but listen to this. . . ." I anticipated considerable reactions in the industrial areas of Northern Italy. My argument was that since the Italian people had been told by their leader that we were dung-heaps and that Italy must "live dangerously" there was no reason against, and many for, the idea that we should do our best to open the eyes of the Italians to the nature of the cess-pit of Fascism and what "living dangerously"¹ would lead to.

Case II. *Object: To deal with Hitler's demands on Czechoslovakia in 1938.*

It was suggested that:² Czechoslovakia be recommended not to resist German demands by force of arms, but to adopt so far as possible a non-co-operative and passive resistance attitude, as was done by Germans in the Ruhr in 1923. That Great Britain, France and Russia and as many other states as can be persuaded to do so, inform Germany that, although in order to avoid bloodshed, Czechoslovakia has been advised to submit for *the time being* to superior force, Germany will be considered an

¹ Mussolini's slogan for the Italian people.

² Full details are to be found in *News-Letter* 115 of 16th September, 1938.

outlaw state until such time as she abandons her claims on Czechoslovakia and behaves as a civilized state. Concurrently with this announcement it was proposed that Great Britain and France be placed on a war footing. In the U.K. call up reserves. Put A.R.P. into full operation. Rehearse evacuation of cities. Mobilize industry for war. Begin food control. Establish a register of National Service. Limit profits. Broaden the base of Government by the inclusion of Liberal and Socialist ministers. Withdraw diplomats and all British nationals from Germany. Expel all German nationals (other than Jews and refugees) from British and French territories. Break off all commercial intercourse with Germany and restrict trade with neutrals as required to prevent leaks. Forbid access of German shipping to British and French ports. Broadcast continuously to the German people explaining that there is no hostility towards them but only to Hitler and the Nazi régime. Inform Germany that any military action taken by her in consequence of this non-intercourse policy will meet with armed retaliation.

This was an outline of a strategy compounded of psychological war and economic pressure which I recommended should be adopted in preference to starting World War II by military operations (for which we were not prepared) for the rescue of Czechoslovakia. I have been told the full document was considered by a Cabinet sub-committee and, writing nearly twenty years after those tragic and fatal days which culminated in the Munich settlement, I believe the proposals were sound. If violent military operations are considered to be the *only* way to change the enemy's mind, then, in terms of the military forces at our disposal in 1938, "Munich" was the only military answer.

But the "White War" as I called my plan, was another answer which made sense, provided the meaning and object of war are understood. I claimed that some of the advantages of the White War would have been: (a) The onus of retaliating by an armed attack against non-intercourse would have rested on the Nazis and we ought to have been able to ensure that this caused them trouble with the German people. It is difficult to justify an assault on a man because he will not admit you to his society. (b) By adopting this plan we should have avoided the dreadful danger that, in all the confusions and uncertain

developments of a rapidly-launched world war, the fundamental issue of "democracies" versus "totalitarian states" would be obscured, and: (c) Before this issue was decided on the battlefields it was advisable to ensure a preliminary period in which the democracies could organize a world on their own, isolated in every respect from the totalitarian world. Some of these 1938 ideas (quite apart from the nuclear problem) have relevance in 1957.

Case III. *Object: To separate the Nazis from the German people.*

In the summer of 1939, having visited Warsaw and Berlin, I returned to London convinced that, late though the hour was, an effort must be made to open the eyes of the German people to the perils towards which they were allowing Hitler to lead them and mankind. Since Government would take no action, private enterprise attempted this great task. A series of special news-letters in German were sent to thousands of Germans. It is impossible in these pages to spare the space to describe the operational details, but the results exceeded our most optimistic hopes. It was, of course, much too little too late and was no more than a pilot scheme. But it seriously disturbed the Nazi leaders, who mobilized all their resources against this private psychological warfare operation. It caused our Ambassador in Berlin to press our Government to try to stop this activity because it was greatly upsetting Hitler and Goebbels, who were convinced it was sponsored by the British Government. It had many other results, too numerous to specify here, some of which were only revealed after 1945. Amongst the results was the fact that the last paragraph of the last official communication Hitler sent to H.M.G. was solely concerned with abuse of the present writer. I often wonder what might have been achieved with £5,000,000 from 1936 to 1939 when I examine what was done with £5,000 in the last three months of so-called peace.¹

Case IV. *Object: To expose the hypocrisy of Peaceful Co-existence.*

The Bulganin-Khrushchev visit in 1956. The proposal was that the Prime Minister should invite the two Russian leaders

¹ Full details of this operation and the texts of the letters are in *Total Victory* by S. King-Hall (Faber and Faber).

to appear with him on television and say in effect (after giving due notice) "we are all peace lovers and we ought to get to know each other better. I have a proposal to make which I hope will meet with your agreement. I suggest that 100,000 young Russians should come over at our expense and live for a fortnight in English homes. I daresay there are 15,000,000 people looking at this programme and, if you will agree in principle to accept our invitation, I will ask any of these people now looking and listening to us to write at once to the B.B.C. if they are willing to accommodate one or more young Russians. We shall certainly receive thousands of letters. Will you please comment on this?"

B. & K. would not have agreed to this proposal, in which case their refusal should have been given maximum publicity, especially in Russia. "Your leaders will not let you come and see us! Why? Ask your leaders! We are peace loving, we wish to know you better. Please press your leaders to let you come. We may have much to learn from you."

* * *

There are numerous tactical operations of political warfare which could be investigated and carried out at small expense, if once the principle were accepted that political warfare activities are extremely important, perhaps the most important, part of our defence arrangements, and in charge of a Minister of Cabinet rank with a political warfare Chief of Staff in the C.O.S.'s committee. It can be said that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is the Cabinet Minister. My reply is that in the Foreign Office political warfare is a subsidiary activity and I suspect that it occupies the same menial relationship to foreign policy as it did to military operations from 1940-45. Heresy though it is, I want foreign policy to be the servant of political warfare, or if you prefer it that foreign policy should *be* political warfare.

PART TWO

PART TWO

INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO

I SUGGESTED ON page 13, that we must make a great effort to break through the thought-barrier which up till now has limited our mental activities about defence. In the first part of this book, which contains the homework which has to be done in preparation for the break through this barrier, we have reached a speed of Mach one. Now we must no longer be content with these experimental and reconnoitring flights but go all out to burst through the barrier and see what we find on the other side.

But first a brief summary of what has been written in Part One. The nature of war is a clash of ideas between sovereign states, from which it follows that the object of defence is the protection of our ideas against enemy ideas and the inculcation of our ideas into his mind. Our ideas are expressed in our way of life which is composed of principles and institutions. The nature of the attack at this time on our way of life is ideological, backed by force. The role of armed force in the general plan of defence is inappropriate against Soviet political attack, but can be useful to protect our institution against military attack. The extent to which our existing armed force fulfils its functions depends upon the efficiency of the great deterrent. Political warfare in the defence of our way of life must be based on TRUTH and have a sense of mission. Political warfare could be our most effective weapon but has played a secondary role to military force.

In the second part of this book I shall build up a new theory and practice of defence from the conclusions which emerge from Part One.

This is necessary because the broad conclusion which emerges from the factual investigation in Part One of our defence arrangements is that they suffer from some disadvantages, certainly very serious, possibly fatal.

Statements made in the autumn of 1957 by the British Minister of Defence revealed that we were then in a position in which the main role of our defence forces *was to protect themselves*

against a nuclear attack, so that even if the unprotected nation were destroyed the armed forces would survive and be capable of dealing the retaliatory blow. This is almost as if in World War I naval strategists had been reduced (in 1917) to saying: "We cannot protect the U.K. against the U-boats and we must anticipate that the U-boat blockade will bring the nation to its knees. But be comforted by the thought that the Royal Navy has been withdrawn from the U.K. to bases elsewhere in order to ensure that the blockade of the Central Powers will finally be decisive."

But the parallel is not exact, for in the nuclear age one must substitute the words "*the nation will be destroyed*" for the words "bring the nation to its knees". In 1957 we are saying: "We cannot prevent the house being burnt down but we can assure you the enemy pig will be roasted."

CHAPTER NINE

FINDING A NEW IDEA

THE NOTION THAT what we are striving to defend is our way of life would perhaps be accepted by most thoughtful people as a rather academic and theoretically correct statement remote from the practical problems of defence. The same people might agree that my outline of what we mean by our way of life passes muster though it has been done more intelligently by better equipped writers. I agree with that. They might also go a long way with me in my submission that at this time the attack on our way of life has a very large ideological content in it, but I think they would say that the nub of the matter is to be found in the defence of our homeland and those of our allies and that, although it is true that nations can be conquered from within, before we spend time thinking about abstract matters such as the defence of the ideology of our way of life, the first business on the agenda is to make sure that our enemies do not occupy our territories, and that to prevent this occupation is the prime duty of our armed forces. I argued in Chapter V that it is the function of our armed forces to defend our institutions and this is what they have always succeeded in doing up till now.

I was brought up to believe that in the words of the preamble to the Articles of War: "On the British Navy, under the good providence of God, the wealth, safety and strength of the kingdom chiefly depend." This was as true in 1914 as it had been for centuries. Within my lifetime it has become a legend and Rule Britannia is now a folk song. When the newly joined cadets reached Osborne Naval College in 1906 they were fallen in opposite a gallery under which the innocent eyes of these little boys read a sentence set forth in polished brass letters a foot high. It said:

THERE IS NOTHING THE NAVY CANNOT DO.

One small creature shocked his neighbour by whispering "Do you think that's true?" We were both to live to see it become a considerable over-statement.

To-day we must face some new facts. If we assume that when the democratic powers talk about "a major aggression" they mean a movement by Russian armed forces into a democratic state (and I do not find any evidence that the democracies are thinking about major political warfare aggression), then it is a *fact* that our principal defence against such an aggression is NOT the use of a weapon immediately the aggression starts or is threatened, but the assertion that, if the aggression includes nuclear war on the grand scale, we shall retaliate.¹ We have the H-bomb but everything indicates that it is not our policy to use it until it has been used to inflict unimaginable destruction upon us. No other policy is compatible with democratic principles. Were this not so it would have been plain common sense to have said to Stalin after the first Russian atomic explosion: "Unless you immediately cease working on nuclear weapons we will launch a nuclear war on you and *one more test* explosion from your side will unleash our stock-pile of atomic weapons on Russia since we, the democracies, are determined to retain a world monopoly of this decisive weapon."

It is arguable that it would have been proper to have taken up the attitude that God or Destiny, having enabled one nation (the U.S.A.) to acquire this weapon, the U.S.A., in order to atone for using it on Japan and thus inaugurating nuclear war, should have decided voluntarily to declare that it would place the nuclear weapon in the keeping of the U.N.² *However, all such notions are might-have-beens and the present situation is that our defence is founded on an IDEA; that of the deterrent of retaliation.*

II

If the reader is *not* to stay on the orthodox side of the thought barrier he should realize that our defence arrangements are now based almost entirely on an IDEA. The idea of the deterrent,

¹ This is putting it mildly. Some would argue that we have implied that a "major aggression" (whatever that is) will evoke a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

² The U.S. proposals in 1946 were somewhat in this sense (the Baruch proposals).

an idea linked to the physical existence of H-bombs, and the suicidal consequences of a major nuclear war.

There has always been a certain deterrent content in defence thinking and in defence arrangements. In the eleventh century a Saxon chronicler wrote that the Danes: "durst not maintain a fight with King William" who had built up a Navy after the humiliation of having had to emulate Ethelred and bribe a fleet of Northmen not to harry the East coast. There is a deterrent conception in the classical balance of power theory, but the H-bomb deterrent idea has some novel features as we have noted in Chapter VI. One can make a mental picture of the difference between a deterrent idea linked to doing something which may lead to a serious illness and one linked to action certain to lead to death.

The notion that our defence arrangements should be based on an idea, on the creation of a certain climate of thought in men's minds, both on our side and on that of the enemy is perfectly sound, but whether the present idea (which is certainly not the only one available) is the best is something which needs investigating. Each person must make up his own mind about this matter. So far as I am concerned the disadvantages of the nuclear deterrent seem so grave that I have reached the conclusion that there is a *prima facie* case for abandoning this foundation of our defence. In so grave a matter which involves a decision of world wide significance and the adoption of a policy which would be a reversal of all the defence thinking of the past, it would be arrogant for any individual to say: "I know." This is why I plead that the best minds in the country should be brought together to consider this question.

III

I start with the assumption that it is desirable to base the defence of our way of life on an IDEA as is the case at present, but that the H-bomb deterrent idea should be replaced by a better one. Where should we seek this idea? In the military or the political sphere?

The attack on our way of life is being carried out with a spear of which the blade or head is concerned with political attack and the shaft is military force. Another analogy would be a

radio-set on a tank. The radio-set can start operating on the minds of the opponents long before the tank can crush their bodies.

Since it has been suggested that the Communist political attack is the most dangerous aspect of the assault on our way of life, it might seem that in trying to bring our defences up to date we ought to start with proposals for improving our political warfare arrangements but I have come to the conclusion that it will be best to defer this investigation until we have dealt with the military side *because this is where the H-bomb deterrent and all its disadvantages are located*, and if and when we can see how to replace that idea with a better one we shall be in a position to deal with the political side of defence.

The simplest way of considering the complex problem is to make the assumption that the British Government has unilaterally decided not to make, stock or use H-bombs.

We must examine what would be some of the consequences of this decision. An obvious result would be an economy amounting to many millions of pounds a year, but I regard this as only a desirable by-product. Much more important is that it is unlikely that the U.S.A. would follow our example. If the U.K. decided to contract out of the H-bomb business, the feeling in America might be something like this: "The British are sheltering under our decision to maintain H-bombs. This is the beginning of the end. If the British will not defend themselves to the limit of their capacities we had better write them off and retire into fortress America."

Similarly public opinion in Britain, if it refused to have anything to do with H-bombs would feel—at least I hope they would—that we could not take up the attitude that we relied for our defence on American H-bombs.

If we contracted out of the H-bomb business we must contract out of all connections which are associated with H-bombs and this means saying to the Americans: "Unless *you* abandon the H-bomb business the Anglo-American Alliance in its military aspects is at an end."

For example, if we unilaterally abandoned the H-bomb it would obviously be absurd to allow American planes with H-bombs to operate from British territory. If we abandoned the H-bomb I shall show in due course that tactical nuclear

weapons would also have to be abandoned. This done we should be in the same non-nuclear weapon position as the Continental members of Nato and could maintain a military alliance with them on a non-nuclear basis.

The situation which would then arise would be as follows: Two great Powers, the U.S.A. and Russia, would be armed with nuclear weapons; Great Britain and the Continental powers would not have nuclear weapons. Canada would probably go along with the U.S.A.

It is a waste of time thinking in isolation of H-bombs, or clean bombs, or tactical nuclear weapons of 5, 10, 25 kilotons which then start becoming strategical weapons up to 25 megatons. The distinction to be made is between THE USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR EXPLOSIVE PURPOSES IN WAR AND ITS NON-USE. This is the idea we must examine. This idea is clear cut and precise. It is even more so than would have been the case if a decision had been called for in the Middle Ages as between war with gunpowder or without it.

If Great Britain decided as a deliberate act of policy to forswear the use of nuclear energy in war, Nato as it is at present would collapse and we should be left with the responsibility of creating E.T.O. (the European Treaty Organization). Politically it would mean that the European states would be endeavouring to contract out of a nuclear war between the two nuclear using states.

We must recognize that the chances are that war between Russia and the U.S.A. would be nuclear, or become so. It does not follow that the non-nuclear states would be successful in their attempts to keep out of the holocaust but they might have some hope of doing so.

A moral question arises here. We must assume that in any war between Russia and the U.S.A. the latter would be fighting for the right ideas. Are we entitled to be neutral in such a struggle or do we betray our own way of life if we adopt such an attitude?

This raises the whole issue of whether it is either morally right (the Pacifists have their answer to this one) or expedient to use violence in support of one's ideals, if the violence involved is so enormous that it causes such vast destruction that what we are trying to defend will be destroyed. My opinion is that the

invention of H-bombs and guided missiles has made it wrong *and* inexpedient to use or prepare to use this extreme violence. Some people will reply that catastrophic destruction and enormous numbers of deaths, is better than slavery. This begs the question. It assumes that if we contract out of the use of such extreme violence and admit in advance that this is our intention and in consequence are obliged to submit to Soviet demands (which might include an occupation of our country) *all* is lost. Is it? Is our way of life then killed for all time? I shall return to this question in a moment.

Strenuous attempts are being made at this time (1957) to limit or control in some way the use of large scale nuclear weapons. I believe that for many reasons they will fail; one of the chief reasons being the existence of the tactical nuclear weapon.

If a conflict started between the Soviet Union and the West, the Soviet Union might say: "We do not intend to use nuclear weapons of any kind unless they are used on us." It would be to their advantage to say this because they would have a superiority in non-nuclear force, and the Nato powers would be in an awkward position. Are we to suppose that they would reply: "We intend to use nuclear tactical weapons in order to counter-balance your superiority in non-nuclear forces?" This would mean that the West was deliberately making the war a nuclear event and this would have serious disadvantages from the western point of view. First, it would put the West in the wrong with uncommitted world opinion; secondly, it would lead to a split of opinions in the western countries; thirdly, it would open the United Kingdom to nuclear attack and this is a form of attack against which we are defenceless.

My surmise is that if the Soviet Union were clever enough to make a statement about not using nuclear weapons and live up to it we should have to follow suit, even though to-day we claim that *we must and will use* tactical nuclear weapons in a Nato war.

If we decided not to use tactical nuclear weapons this would mean (at least in the opening stages) a non-nuclear war and, as the forces are deployed at this time (1957), it is difficult to see how the Russians could be prevented from overrunning Europe and launching a massive conventional attack with airborne divisions on the United Kingdom, preceded and