

Civil Resistance to Military Coups

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If one of the functions of government is to provide for internal and external security, many governments have left themselves and their countries extraordinarily vulnerable in face of the military *coup d'état*. There is substantial evidence that civil resistance may offer a means whereby at least some governments — particularly those which enjoy a high degree of legitimacy — may ward off this threat.

The problem of military *coups* is a serious one. The *coup* is the classic technique whereby military control is extended into civil life; and it is also widely used in international conflicts, for example when a foreign power seeks to gain control of the government of a country. It is of course perfectly possible to envisage circumstances in which a *coup* is justifiable politically and beneficial in its effects;¹ and the increased incidence of *coups* in recent years can quite plausibly be attributed in part at least to the failings of civilian governments. Nevertheless, the *coup* tends to undermine the basis of legitimacy on which governments depend, and to replace it with the open use of force and terror. It can easily lead either to further *coups* or to civil war. Only rarely do military régimes turn out to be better than their civilian predecessors.

The problem of military *coups* is perhaps especially serious for advocates of radical state policies such as expropriating foreign assets, or reaching a peace settlement with a recent enemy, or reducing the size, functions or privileges of the armed forces. Any government embarking on one of these policies may find itself faced with the danger of a military *coup* conducted by its own forces,

with or without the aid of foreigners. The overthrow of the Allende government in Chile in 11 September 1973 was a reminder of this fact.

Governments faced with the possibility of a military *coup* are sometimes, at least in the military sense, defenceless. When an army revolts there may be no one, or at least no guns, to oppose it. And even if parts of the armed forces remain loyal to the government — as is most often the case — they may not wish to take sides in the conflict for fear that the ensuing recriminations and violence would destroy the unity of the armed forces and their subsequent capacity for national defence.

Military *coups* are in fact sometimes prevented or defeated by civil resistance, either on its own or in conjunction with the threat or use of violence. 'Civil resistance' can be defined as a technique of political struggle relying on non-violent methods of action. The reasons for the avoidance of violence can be various, including ethics, habit, law, or prudence. Civil resistance can be used as an alternative to, or in various kinds of conjunction with, more violent forms of pressure or struggle.² Such resistance can be a particularly appropriate response to the *coup*, because it can serve to strengthen any factions within the armed forces which oppose the *coup*; and because it can highlight the dependence of the armed forces, and even more of a newly-established military government, on popular acquiescence and support. Deprived of this acquiescence and support, military governments can fail.

There is no suggestion here that civil resistance is the only, nor necessarily the best,

means by which the problem of the *coup d'état* can be tackled. It is a last resort, of value in some crises, but to focus attention on it is not to deny that prevention is better than cure. A generally acceptable constitutional system, good government, the inculcation in the military of codes of honour or ideological norms forbidding interference in civil affairs, and specific security measures within the armed forces, can all help to reduce the danger of military takeover.

Even if attempts to forestall it fail, and a *coup d'état* does occur, civil resistance is not the only means by which it can be opposed. A variety of more violent methods can be employed, or threatened. *Ad hoc* militias can be formed, or permanent para-military forces whose sole task is to protect the government can be brought into action. Foreign forces can be invited to intervene to preserve the constitutional order. But all of these are doubtful remedies. While they should not be rejected dogmatically, the reasons why they are not likely to succeed in more than a limited number of cases need to be understood.

Sometimes foreign forces may intervene in a state to prevent or defeat a *coup d'état*. The British military interventions in East Africa in the late 1960's were unusual instances of this, as was the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974. But very few governments are willing to make their existence dependent upon the will of a foreign power. There is the additional disadvantage that any outside intervention against a military *coup* could enable *coup* leaders to claim that they were leading a patriotic struggle against foreign attack.³

Para-military formations, whose task is either to protect the constitutional order in general (for example the CRS in France), or to protect a particular national leader (for example Milton Obote's former private army, the General Service Unit), may in principle seem easiest way out of the dilemmas posed by the *coup d'état*. But in reality they do not appear to be much of a protection. Edward Luttwak has gone so far as to

say: 'I have been unable to find a single case in the last twenty years of a para-military police which has actually defended its political masters during a coup.'⁴ This may be slightly exaggerated: the Ton Ton Macoutes in Haiti are perhaps an ugly exception.⁵ But para-military forces are usually reluctant to make a stand against regular forces attempting to seize the government.

In general, to threaten violence against a *coup* is to threaten civil war, and carrying out that threat has in fact often led to civil war — for example in Spain from 1936 to 1939. In that case an actual civil war failed to defeat a *coup*. In other cases — for example in Greece after the *coup* of 20-21 April 1967 — the fear of the civil war, by inhibiting political action, can serve to help those who have seized power. It injects inertia into the situation, which works to the new regime's advantage.

Although there is frequently no military defence against them, it remains true that *coups* often fail. The reason why they fail have been studied all too little. Much of the modern literature on the subject suggests that the *coup* is basically a matter of technique: that armies can overthrow a government provided they have the military resources to do so. Some Marxists, working on the assumption that the state is simply a rule of force, share this view.⁶

An extreme example of the widespread preoccupation with technique was Edward Luttwak's controversial book *Coup d'Etat*. Luttwak wrote that the 'ultimate rationale' of political life is 'sheer force', and S. E. Finer (himself a noted writer on the subject) said in his foreword to Luttwak's book that 'it is necessary to meet fire with fire'.⁷ Such generalizations were belied in Luttwak's own text, where he referred in various unconnected passages to the variety of pressures, far removed from 'sheer force', which can prevent or frustrate a *coup*. A military or bureaucratic machine which does not in fact operate as a machine, which does not obey orders without questioning their content or legitimacy, can make a *coup* 'very

difficult to carry out'.⁸ But there was no coherent discussion of types of resistance or the mechanisms by which they operate.

Failed coups

The cases in which civil resistance has contributed to the defeat of attempted *coups* are numerous. Often it has done so in collaboration with the use or threat of military force. In Russia in August 1917, when the Russian Commander-in-Chief General Kornilov attempted a *Putsch*, a complex combination of factors made it impossible for him to proceed. An armed workers' militia was formed to defeat the counter-revolution. Side by side with this there was an impressive movement of non-cooperation:

The Railway Bureau organized by the Soviet was feverishly at work, crippling the movement of Krymov's troop trains, just as in March it had disorganized those of General Ivanov. Some detachments were sent in the wrong direction and realized it too late. The station tracks were blocked with coaches. The engines were out of repair. In three places the track was torn up, and loaded freight cars overturned. The railway repair battalion was nowhere to be found. The command to advance on foot was blocked by failure to organize a food supply. The soldiers were literally showered with proclamations from the Provisional Government and Soviets. Kornilov's counter-declarations did not reach them. Local Soviets and garrisons, as in Luga, threatened artillery fire. The telegraph and telephone had to be captured by main force. Individual detachments lost touch with each other and headquarters. The Kornilov soldiers began to traverse points where they were in danger of clashing with local garrisons. They began electing committees which demanded explanations of the officers and deprived them of freedom of action.⁹

In Japan in February 1936 there was an attempted *coup*, the defeat of which provides an interesting example of the importance of the idea of legitimacy; it also illustrates the potential complexity of the interrelationship between violent and non-violent means of opposing a *coup*. On 26 February 1936 a group of officers used their forces to seize various strategic points in Tokyo, and to assassinate several members of the government. Their complaints included dissatis-

faction with the naval limitations imposed upon Japan by the London Naval Treaty of 1930. The *coup* was opposed neither by the police, nor by the other parts of the army. But the *coup* leaders failed to establish their own legitimacy. Three important figures escaped the assassins: Count Makino, The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal; Baron Suzuki Kantaro, the Grand Chamberlain; and Okada Keisuke, the Prime Minister. The Emperor, whom the rebels hoped would rally to their cause, turned out to be strongly opposed to what he termed the 'mutiny'. For the first few days the radio and newspapers virtually ignored the uprising, but on 29 February there was a systematic propaganda campaign aimed at soldiers and NCO's. There were radio announcements, leaflets dropped from bombers, and an advertisement balloon over Tokyo carrying a banner with the inscription: 'The Imperial Command Has Been Issued, Do Not Resist The Army Colours!' This was a reference to the fact that the loyal elements in the army and navy were preparing, as ordered by the Emperor, to crush the rebels. The defeat of the *coup* was caused by the superior armaments, psychological warfare, and better claims to legitimacy of the authorities. It was by no means a case of pure civil resistance, but it did illustrate the potential strength of appeals to soldiers and NCO's to refuse to take part in the political schemes of their officers.¹⁰

The general strike in Cuba launched by Castro on 1 January 1959, immediately after Batista fled from the country, was a somewhat different case: this action was designed, not to undermine a *coup* which had occurred, but rather to prevent the possibility of anyone apart from Fidel Castro seizing power. In this, of course, it succeeded. It was thus in part resistance against a threatened *coup*, in part a civilian insurrection.¹¹

The Czechoslovak resistance of 21-27 August 1968 was in part resistance against an attempted *coup*, which was being planned by Kolder, Svestka, Indra and Bilak.¹² In that respect, though not in others, it was rel-

atively successful. It did succeed in preventing the illegal imposition of a conservative and pro-Soviet regime, which had been the clear intention of the invaders. It did not succeed, however, in getting rid of the invaders; or in decisively strengthening the bargaining power of Dubcek and his colleagues; or in preventing the ultimate installation of a conservative regime by legal process through the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

The two most striking cases of successful civil resistance against military *coups* have been the opposition in Germany to the 1920 Kapp *Putsch* in Berlin; and the opposition in France and Algeria to the 1961 Generals' Revolt in Algiers. The two cases were astonishingly similar. As in Germany in 1920, so in Algeria in 1961, sections of the military tried to grab power because after fighting a long war they felt let down by the civil authorities. Both *coups* were lacking in a serious long-term programme. Both were short-lived: the Kapp *Putsch* lasted slightly less than 100 hours, the Generals' Revolt only slightly more. Both occurred in societies with deep and bitter political divisions. In both, there was practically no military action against the illegal insurgents. In both, civilian and military non-cooperation played an important part in defeating the illegal usurpation of power.

The Kapp Putsch 1920

In the early morning of 13 March 1920 Lieutenant-General Von Lüttwitz, with the support of Lieutenant-Commander Hermann Ehrhardt's Marine Brigade Freikorps, carried out a militarily successful *Putsch* in Berlin, establishing the extreme nationalist Dr. Wolfgang Kapp in power as chancellor. His aims included the suppression of communism and the reversal of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

The army remained by and large neutral. Von Seeckt, the chief of staff, decided to wait and see and declared his refusal to de-

fend the republic: 'When *Reichswehr* fires on *Reichswehr*, then all comradeship within the officer corps has vanished.' For their part the police in Berlin were initially favourable to the *Putsch*. All in all, the rebels had quite adequate military force for a *coup*.

Yet even in post-First World War Germany, torn in different directions by nationalism, communism and separatism, resistance to the *coup* was widespread. Civil servants simply refused to co-operate with the new régime: Kapp could not even find a secretary to type his proclamations. Officers in the Ministry of War refused to obey the Kappists' orders.¹³ In Berlin and other parts of Germany there was a complete general strike. The government leaders had succeeded in leaving Berlin a few hours before the insurgents invaded their offices, and they eventually established the seat of the legitimate government at Stuttgart.

This widespread and open defiance of the new regime had the effect not merely of isolating it, but also of undermining such bases of support as it had. On the night of 16-17 March a Guards Engineer battalion 'mutinied' and declared itself for the constitutional government. On 17 March the Berlin security police reversed its previous stand and demanded Kapp's resignation. That same day the *Putsch* collapsed. Kapp fled to Sweden, and the Ehrhardt brigade was ordered out of town less than five days after it had marched in.

After the Kapp *Putsch* one of Ehrhardt's men said: 'Everything would still have been all right if only we had shot more people.'¹⁴ There is no doubt that the leaders could have been more brutal than they were, but it is far from sure that this would have greatly strengthened their position. They did in fact kill many people: several hundred died as a result of the *Putsch*.¹⁵ But this had failed to secure the co-operation they wanted.

Some interpreters of the *Putsch* have suggested that the resistance contained a strong element of armed struggle. Thus Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader, said at a

public rally in Suhl on the fiftieth anniversary of these events:

Half a century ago, on 14 March 1920, the workers of Suhl rallied in this square... and unanimously decided through general strike and armed struggle to quell the reactionary *Putsch* under the leadership of people like Lüttwitz against the Weimar Republic.

In the dark of night the Reichswehr, in agreement with the putschists, had occupied your city hall and other important places in the city so as to paralyse the revolutionary centre of the working class in the south of Thuringia... The workers collected arms from the enterprises and from caches. Armed workers' groups from Zella-Mehlis and other places moved towards Suhl at dawn. Valiantly and courageously the workers attacked the Reichswehr troops.

At that time in Thuringia, in parallel with the Ruhr area, the formation of a workers' army already comprising thousands of fighters was started.¹⁶

Some of the armed struggle mentioned by Ulbricht was not so much defensive action against a *coup*, but rather a violent attempt to overthrow the existing system. Both this aspect of the resistance, and the manner of its suppression, exacerbated the already strained political atmosphere in Germany.¹⁷ In Berlin at the time of the *Putsch*, the legitimate government did not dare to arm the city's population, 'which was ready and even eager to meet the reactionaries, but which might quite conceivably have refused to be disarmed.'¹⁸

In general, non-cooperation rather than armed struggle seems to have been the decisive force which defeated Kapp. As Erich Eyck has said: 'The *Putsch* was defeated by two principal forms of resistance: the general strike of the workers and the refusal of the higher civil servants to collaborate with their rebel masters.'¹⁹ The resistance was aided by the fact that no politician of note came over to the Kappist camp, while most of the provincial governments ignored the uprising. The idea that the general strike alone defeated the *Putsch* is a myth: it was this combination of factors, including the non-cooperation of political and governmental bodies as well as the strikes of the

workers, which made it impossible for Kapp to rule.

It was all very far from being a model *coup*: it was exceptionally badly planned, lacking strategic surprise and political programme. Eyck has called it 'nothing but the work of overgrown juvenile delinquents.'²⁰ Nor can the opposition be regarded as a model. A number of special factors need to be taken into account when assessing the effects of the resistance. The victorious Allied powers, particularly Britain, would hardly have tolerated a *coup* in Germany the central purpose of which was to undermine the Versailles Treaty: thus behind the civil resistance there was an implied but clear military threat. Also, the resistance which defeated the *coup* did not prevent the government, once restored, from making one compromise after another with the right-wing forces which had supported the Kappists. The Freikorps and their likes were not wholly discredited. Both the general strike, and the left-wing violence which was particularly widespread in the Ruhr area, left a legacy of powerful and destructive emotions: suspicion, contempt for the perceived weakness of the government, and belief in an extra-constitutional means of struggle to secure one's end. Non-cooperation was an effective counter to a *Putsch*, but it did little to avert the larger tragedies of inter-war Germany.

The Generals' Revolt 1961

The Generals' Revolt in Algiers in April 1961 was the climax of more than five years of intermittent conflict between the French Army in Algeria and the civilian authorities in Paris.²¹ Some section of the Army had long had a deep suspicion of the civilian authorities — a suspicion which was vastly increased in early 1961 when de Gaulle indicated publicly that he was prepared to enter into negotiations with the Algerian nationalist rebels. There was also, it is true, a strong contrary feeling in the army that soldiers should not meddle in politics, and

that such meddling could only prolong and aggravate the fifteen-year trauma of the wars in Indochina and Algeria: a feeling which was reinforced by the obvious danger than any political involvement would split the army wide open, presenting soldiers with divisions and dilemmas as serious as those in 1940-45, when supporters of Vichy and those of de Gaulle made rival claims for loyalty. But in 1961 many senior officers naturally felt that de Gaulle was abandoning the cause of 'Algérie Française' for which they had been fighting since the outbreak of the Algerian nationalist revolt in 1954. De Gaulle's press conference of 11 April 1961 reinforced the fears. Some officers felt they should do something about this 'betrayal'.

Many sections of the army resented de Gaulle's negotiations policy all the more strongly because it was the army itself which had originally, through its rising of May 1958, placed de Gaulle in power. The May 1958 rising had seemingly demonstrated the ability of the army to determine the shape of government in France. As M.R.D Foot wrote in his book *Men in Uniform*:

The armed forces — the army especially — have just demonstrated that they can overthrow a form of government they do not like; and any system of ruling France in the foreseeable future will have to take account first of all of the army's views.²²

By early 1961 it was clear that de Gaulle was failing to act in accordance with the views of at any rate part of the army. A military conspiracy developed, with Colonels Argoud, Broizat, Gardes and Godard playing the principal part and recruiting whatever support they could get from generals who were sympathetic. The revolt began on the night of Friday-Saturday 21-22 April 1961. In a series of swift moves, the First Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment captured control of the city of Algiers. In the course of their action the paratroops killed one officer, outside the radio station. A number of other military units seized key

points near Algiers. Nowhere was the *Putsch* seriously opposed, and units of the *Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité* 'guarding' one government building actually unloaded their machine guns after they had been ordered to fire at the rebels by General Gambiez, the French Commander-in-Chief in Algeria, who remained loyal to de Gaulle. Shortly afterwards, Gambiez was arrested by the rebels. At least two other generals loyal to de Gaulle were also arrested in the first few hours of the *Putsch*.

On the morning of Saturday 22 April the radio station — now in rebel hands — announced that the 'Military Command' had declared a state of siege; that 'all powers enjoyed by the civil authority pass... to the military authority'; that 'those individuals who have taken a direct part in the attempt to abandon Algeria and the Sahara will be placed under arrest and brought before a military tribunal'; and that 'no disorders will be tolerated. Any act of violence or force will be put down with the utmost rigour... Any resistance will be broken, from whatever quarter it may come.' This order carried the signatures of four recently retired generals — Challe, Jouhaud, Zeller and Salan.

The inclusion of General Challe in this list surprised many people, because he had not previously been associated with right-wing extremist activities. His high reputation was of great value to the *Putsch*, which by Sunday 23 April also enjoyed the support of a number of serving generals — namely General Nicot (acting head of the French Air Staff); General Bigot (commanding the air force in Algeria), General Gouraud (in Constantine), General Gardy (in Oran), General Petit (in Algiers), and General Mentré (joint Services Commander of the Sahara).

The air of success which surrounded the *Putsch* in its early stages was reinforced by the rebels' control of the news media. Not only the radio, but also the newspapers in Algiers were in the hands of people favourable to the *Putsch*. This monopoly of communications enabled the rebels to claim that

their *Putsch* was more successful than was in fact the case.

De Gaulle was faced with a very serious situation.²³ In Algeria, the *Putsch* had clearly a considerable degree of success; and although probably a majority of senior officers remained loyal to de Gaulle — including General de Pouilly in Oran and General de Menditte in Mostaganem — there was no indication that they were prepared to take military action in support of the regime. The situation was aggravated by the fact that many loyal officers — including Generals Gambiez and Vézinet — had been arrested by the rebels.

Nor were de Gaulle's problem confined to Algeria. There was at least a possibility that a parallel *Putsch* might be attempted in Paris, either by right-wing groups in France, or by airborne forces invading France from Algeria. In Paris the police claimed to have found definite evidence that a *Putsch* was being prepared there. Although the generals, at their subsequent trials, naturally denied that they had planned any airborne action against metropolitan France, it is probable that they had hoped to mount some kind of operation, rather than content themselves with a 'Unilateral Declaration of Independence' of Algeria — an action which would have been somewhat self-defeating since the generals claimed to be acting for 'Algérie Française'. At all events, an invasion from Algeria was one of the possibilities with which the de Gaulle regime had to reckon.

Faced with this double challenge — of the *Putsch* in Algiers and of a possible supporting action in France — de Gaulle's military resources were unimpressive. Of the French armed forces, some 500,000 were in Algeria, whereas in France itself there were very few regular operational units. Although the air force was relatively strong in metropolitan France, its acting head supported the *Putsch*, and there was a strong element of doubt at the time as to whether the air force would actually fire against any airborne invasion from Algeria.²⁴ Thus within metro-

politan France de Gaulle was probably most likely to rely for military resistance on the para-military forces, particularly the *Gendarmerie Nationale* and the *Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité* (CRS).²⁵ But the reliability even of these forces was open to considerable doubt. A significant precedent had been set by the CRS forces in Algiers on the night of the *Putsch* when they had openly defied General Gambiez's orders to oppose the rebels.

There were also at the time of the *Putsch* two French Army divisions, comprising in all some 60,000 soldiers, assigned to NATO and stationed in Western Germany. They might, conceivably, have been used to support the regime against the rebels; but many of the officers in Germany were right-wing extremists who had been sent there to prevent them from causing trouble in Algeria. It was not until Monday evening, 24 April, that General Crépin issued a communiqué making it clear that the forces in Germany were loyal to de Gaulle. The following morning, 25 April, it was announced that French troops stationed in Western Germany had finally been ordered by the Government to go to Paris. Even then, their route was blocked at Sierck, where the mayor thought the troops were going to Paris to support the *Putsch*, not to stop it; and some people speculated that the troops in Germany were ordered to move in order to divide them up into small convoys.²⁶

It was not on his limited military and para-military resources that de Gaulle placed his main reliance. Almost two days after the *Putsch* in Algiers, and well before the army in Germany was ordered to Paris, he delivered a nation-wide broadcast which made it clear that he was relying on non-cooperation against the rebels in Algiers. In this broadcast, on the evening of Sunday 23 April, he declared:

In the name of France, I order that all means — I repeat all means — be employed to bar the way everywhere to these men until they are brought down. I forbid every Frenchman, and in the first

place every soldier, to carry out any of their orders.

Later on the same evening the Prime Minister, M. Debré, announced in a broadcast:

Numerous precise and mutually corroborative reports enable the Government to come to the conclusion that the authors of the Algiers *coup*... are envisaging a surprise attack against metropolitan France, particularly in the Paris area. They have planes ready to drop or land parachutists on various airfields as a preliminary to a seizure of power... Orders have been issued to units to repulse this mad attempt by all means, I stress all means... From midnight, take-offs and landings at all airports in the Paris region are forbidden. As soon as the sirens sound, go there, by foot or by car, to convince the mistaken soldiers of their huge error. Good sense must come from the soul of the people and everyone must feel himself a part of the nation.

These were the first clear and unequivocal appeals for disobedience against the rebels issued by the Government since the *Putsch* had begun on Friday night. That the Government had waited so long to deliver these appeals is an indication of how unprepared they were for the *Putsch*; and indeed, their delay in issuing such appeals had undoubtedly helped the rebel generals to consolidate their position in the course of Saturday and Sunday, 22 and 23 April.

It is remarkable, indeed, that in France in the first two days after the *Putsch*, opposition to the adventurers in Algiers had largely come from non-governmental quarters. Political parties and trade unions had joined together at meetings on Sunday to call for a one-hour general strike on Monday as a demonstration of determination to oppose the Algiers *coup*. This strike, which duly took place at 5 p.m. on Monday, 24 April, was joined by some ten million workers, and was the most remarkable demonstration of civilian solidarity in France since the Second World War.

Many other measures against the *Putsch* were taken in France. Article 16 of the constitution, giving the President sweeping emergency powers, was invoked. There were

widespread arrests of right-wing sympathisers; at the airfields, vehicles were put in place ready to block the runways should planes attempt to land; in Paris the police, *Gardes Républicaines*, CRS, and mobile units of the *Gendarmerie Nationale*, were deployed in the administrative centre to protect government buildings and block bridges across the Seine in that area if necessary. In the early hours of Monday the authorities began to form a civilian home guard, though they never issued arms to it (a fact to which the Communists and many socialists strongly objected). On the same day a financial and shipping blockade of Algeria was imposed.

These measures, and particularly de Gaulle's broadcast, had an important effect. If the rebel leaders in Algiers had at any time seriously planned to invade France, it seemed by now likely that they would encounter, if not direct military resistance, at any rate a fairly hostile population and a non-cooperative government machine. It is no doubt a myth that the whole population regarded the revolt as a solemn and serious challenge to the nation. But, with allowances for his characteristic hyperbole and lack of modesty, de Gaulle was basically right when, in his memoirs, he said of the impact of his Sunday broadcast:

Everyone, everywhere, heard my words. In metropolitan France, there was not one who did not watch or listen. In Algeria, a million transistors were tuned in. From then on, the revolt met with a passive resistance on the spot which became hourly more explicit.²⁷

Transistor radios were indeed essential for the rallying of resistance in support of his regime. Although the rebels controlled all the newspapers and main radio transmitters in Algeria, they could not always stop people from listening to broadcasts from France, or from using the small transceivers with which the army was well equipped, or from duplicating de Gaulle's speech on 23 April. The importance of radios was re-

flected in the name sometimes given to this episode — 'la victoire des transistors'.

The actual physical possibility of conducting an invasion of France was drastically reduced by the action of many pilots in Algeria who, in defiance of the rebel regime and of their own senior officers, flew out of Algeria with transport planes which might otherwise have been used to invade France. By 25 April as many as two-thirds of the transport planes in Algeria, as well as a large proportion of the fighter force, had been flown out of Algeria, despite efforts by the Putschists to prevent them from leaving.²⁸ A number of pilots in Algeria refused to fly their planes for the rebels, simulated mechanical failure or blocked airfields.

If the rebel generals wanted to invade France, or indeed to consolidate their position in Algeria, they would need troops as well as planes. Here, too, they had difficulties. Like the air force pilots, many troops in Algeria, especially conscripts, succeeded in listening to de Gaulle's Sunday night broadcast on their transistor radios. In some units, it is true, attempts were made to prevent the soldiers hearing anything but the Algiers radio station captured by the rebels; but large numbers of troops do appear to have heard de Gaulle's appeal, or at least to have heard about it by word of mouth or from duplicated leaflets. In many cases the soldiers demonstrated their opposition to the *Putsch* simply by staying in barracks. There were also many examples of deliberate inefficiency; orders got lost, files disappeared, communications and transport got delayed. The leaders of the *Putsch* had to use forces they desperately needed elsewhere — and might have used in an invasion of France — to keep order in barracks and bases in Algeria, and to keep up some semblance of control and administrative continuity. In the course of two or three days the conscripts in the army began to recognise the strength of a refusal to co-operate.²⁹

Anti-war activities in France appear to have had some effect on the attitude of the national servicemen in Algeria. As one

historian of the French Army has put it:

General de Gaulle's firmness and the vigorous reaction of public opinion in France reminded the draftees of all the major demonstrations against the war that had been organized during the previous year by trade unions, student bodies and youth movements. The young soldiers modelled themselves on the young civilians at home who, after prolonged inactivity, had gradually mobilized in favour of a negotiated peace.³⁰

Consciously or unconsciously, many officers helped the conscripts in their resistance. The basic concern of many officers was simply to prevent internecine fighting among their men. The possibility that the legionnaires and the Harkis (Algerian troops in the French Army) would get into a fight with the conscripts was serious. In some cases, officers kept their units safe from this danger by sending them out on operations against the FLN. Other officers ordered all rifles to be locked away in armouries and kept the keys themselves. Many kept silent about the whole affair of the *Putsch* — an opportunistic course no doubt, but also perhaps a wise one. Thus many troops remained in ignorance of what position, if any, had been taken by their superiors; and an extremely large number of officers did in fact stay on the fence.

The Putschists did get considerable support from the European population of Algeria;³¹ and also, at the beginning, from the Algiers police force, thought it changed its position on Tuesday evening when it saw which way things were going. But among civil servants and local government officials there was considerable resistance to the *Putsch*. In many cases documents were hidden, and officials withdrew so that there could be no appearance of legitimacy for the rebel generals.

By Tuesday, 25 April, it became clear to at least some of the leaders of the *Putsch* that they were incapable of ruling even Algeria effectively. There is evidence of considerable internal disagreement as to what course of action they should take in their weak situation. Some advocated vio-

lence, but eventually it was decided to liquidate the affair. On the night of 25-26 April the First Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment withdrew from Algiers, and government buildings were abandoned by the rebels. Challe gave himself up, and the other three generals at the head of the revolt went into hiding.

The resistance which led to this decisive conclusion had been very largely non-violent in character. At no time was a single shot fired on any of the rebel forces, despite the fact that de Gaulle, in his Sunday evening broadcast, had called for people to resist the rebels by 'all means', and on Tuesday evening, in a further broadcast directive, had actually ordered soldiers to fire at rebel forces. Even General de Pouilly, one of the generals who remained loyal to de Gaulle, was not prepared to commit himself to a fight. When on 23 April Foreign Legion units supporting the rebels moved towards Oran, de Pouilly (the Corps commander of the Oran area) withdrew so as to avoid bloodshed. He had been in the same class at Saint-Cyr as the rebel General Challe, and like many of the soldiers involved on both sides of this affair he clearly felt that the army should not fire on the army. The result of his withdrawal was that in Oran the Putschist Colonels Gardy and Argoud found that they were fighting 'a vacuum rather than an enemy.'³²

In another similar incident, another senior officer loyal to de Gaulle showed himself ready to concede ground rather than fire on the rebels. On the morning of Tuesday 25 April rebel parachute troops moved towards Mers-El-Kebir naval base; Admiral Querville, although he was opposed to the rebels, did not fight, but fled from the base by boat. At the time it was widely reported in France that Admiral Querville had fired against the rebels, and this supposed 'incident' was seen in France as a 'turning point' in the rebellion. But these reports — the only reports of any military action against the rebels — turned out to have been completely untrue.

At his trial after the collapse of the rebellion, General Challe indicated that it had been the various acts of non-cooperation which had made it impossible for him and his fellow generals to rule. He said: 'By 23 April I had already been warned that communist cells were at work on the national servicemen, and General de Gaulle's speech was making the waverers hesitate still further.'

Why were these events conducted so largely without violence? Part of the answer is that there was a general fear on both sides of a civil war, especially at a time when the army was already engaged in the bitter war against the nationalist FLN; and there was also a general feeling that the army should not fire on the army. For those opposing the *Putsch*, additional restraining factors were at work. The broadcast by de Gaulle on Sunday had given their resistance a legitimacy, a unity and a discipline which it would have lacked if they had resorted to violence — even though de Gaulle's Sunday broadcast had contained an implicit plea to use violence, and his Tuesday directive made that plea explicit. Those involved in the widespread and undramatic resistance to the rebels felt that they were 'dans la légitimité', and that they would not have been so if they had used violence. There were indications, too, that it was widely appreciated that non-violent methods of resistance had a better chance of being effective than violence. For example, it turned out in this case to be quite easy to prevent by non-violent means the possibility of an invasion of France.

Perhaps a more difficult question to answer is why violence was not used more extensively by those — many of them ruthless and sadistic people, with few scruples about using terror — who supported the *Putsch*. Of course they did explicitly threaten the use of violence in the radio announcement of 22 April and on other occasions. And they and their supporters could effectively reinforce that threat by pointing out that they had their backs to the wall — which was true enough, and added a touch of desperation to

their efforts. In any case, some limited violence was used by, or in support of, the rebels. On the night of 21-22 April the warrant officer of the guard at the Algiers radio station was shot dead; on the following night in Paris one person was killed and several wounded in plastic bombings; on 24 April at Beni-Messous, in Algeria, six national servicemen waiting to be shipped back to France were wounded by a paratroop NCO's machine gun; there was an assassination attempt in Paris on the family of the loyalist air commander, General Fourquet; and in Algiers on 25 April, in the declining hours of the *Putsch*, three gendarmes were wounded and one civilian killed in an attack by the OAS (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète). Despite all these incidents, de Gaulle claimed in his memoirs: 'without a single shot having been fired from either side, Tuesday April 25 saw the collapse of the whole and disreputable venture.'³³ Of course, it must be conceded that, in the very violent context of Algeria at that time, these events could easily have seemed practically bloodless.

It is obvious that the *Putsch* might have been much more violent than it was, and probably the four rebel generals, particularly Challe, did exert a moderating influence over their more enthusiastic followers. It may be that the generals were restrained precisely because they were confronted with massive non-violent opposition, which gave the rebels little pretext to initiate the use of violence. It may also be true that the rebels would have been less constrained if confronted by violence. The possibility of ultimately being brought to judgement no doubt held them back. Whatever the reasons for their restraint, it undeniably made life easier for the resistance on this occasion. This is not to say that the resistance would necessarily have failed had the rebels been more violent. After the *Putsch*, Challe indicated at his trial that he might have been able to hold out, 'but only by violence'. This claim is not altogether convincing. It is at least possible that such violence might have only served to accentuate the general hos-

tility to the *Putsch*, to increase resistance, and to highlight the illegitimate and desperate nature of the adventure.

The general reluctance to open fire, more marked on the side of the loyalists than on that of the rebels, did in some important respects work to the advantage of the rebels. They were never stopped by even a show of force from entering new territory or buildings, and in a superficial sense the *de facto* cease-fire between the contending sections of the French Army was a *carte-blanche* to the rebels to do as they wished. But this *carte-blanche* concealed the non-violent forms of resistance, which proved to be of such critical importance in the defeat of the Generals' Revolt.

That non-violent forms of resistance were used on this occasion was not the consequence of any ethical beliefs or political theories about 'non-violence'. Indeed, such beliefs and ideas were in France more concerned with personal philosophies than with techniques of political action, and they were wholly irrelevant to and unconnected with this crisis. Although the resistance to the *Putsch* required at times great commitment and courage, these were the outcome of deeply-felt opposition to the revolt, and of long-established political custom. France's democratic traditions, however imperfect, were important in this crisis.³⁴ Even when the central government was inactive and threatened, individuals and independent bodies proved ready and able to act in a decentralized form of defence. But they did not rule out the use of force. The threat of military action against the rebels was unhesitatingly made both by de Gaulle and by the Communists.

That non-violent forms of resistance were used also owed something to a 'wait and see' attitude in the army — an opportunistic desire to avoid any irrevocable violent action. The financial strength of the French government — especially near the end of the month, when the soldiers' pay was due — also contributed to the avoidance of violence: it provided an alternative means of

controlling the behaviour of the French Army. Algeria's dependence on France for various essential supplies reinforced the point.

Non-cooperation was in this case combined with police and legal action against the rebels. During the revolt many right-wing suspects in France were arrested by the police, and afterwards there were further police searches. Trial by denunciation became part of the unhappy sequel of the *Putsch*.³⁵ There was also in the succeeding months and years a series of full-scale trials before the Military High Court of the leading persons involved, many of whom received long prison sentences. No-one was executed for his part in the *Putsch*, and by June 1968 all the prisoners had been released.

The manner in which the revolt was defeated was completely decisive, both for France and for Algeria, which became independent in 1962. Bernard Tricot, of the General Secretariat for Algerian Affairs and one of de Gaulle's close advisers, has written that 'the *Putsch* made more inevitable the outcome it had tried to prevent, while at the same time reducing the chances of attaining it in acceptable conditions.'³⁶ And de Gaulle himself wrote that 'the collapse of this escapade henceforth rid men's minds of the spectre of an Army move to take over the State or at least to force it to maintain the *status quo* in Algeria.'³⁷ After 1961, there were no further attempts by the French Army to seize power. However, the fanatics who opposed de Gaulle over the Algeria issue did not for the most part change their views, thus illustrating that the defeat of the *Putsch* had essentially been a matter of coercion, not conversion. The whole OAS campaign of violence and terror, which had started earlier in 1961, acquired increased momentum in the months after the *Putsch* collapsed. There were frequent bomb explosions in Algiers and Paris, and attempts to assassinate de Gaulle. Tough police methods were used to break the OAS and to capture its leading members. The OAS, however, was not the army, and indeed was

predicated on the entirely false assumption that the army would support it sooner or later. Only once after 1961 was there any hint of a *Putsch*: in May 1968, according to some reports, army units around Paris were poised for a take-over in the event that the situation got out of control and a government that was not constitutionally elected came to power. Also, it was widely thought that the army might intervene if a government — even a constitutional one — contained a significant number of communist ministers.³⁸ It is almost certainly true that the army engaged in some bargaining in May 1968. Army leaders are reported to have made their support for de Gaulle conditional upon certain concessions, including the release from jail of Salan, Argoud, and other OAS ringleaders. These prisoners were in fact freed the following month.³⁹

Like the Kapp *Putsch*, the Generals' Revolt should not be regarded as being a typical *coup*, nor should the resistance be regarded rigidly as a model. The affair was based on a fundamentally mistaken estimate of feeling in the army, and on poor planning. As General Goubard indicated, they should probably have attacked Paris, not Algiers.⁴⁰ But there were precedents for influencing events in Paris by seizing Algiers, and the scheme was not entirely frivolous. Challe's statement on 24 April 1961, repeated later at this trial, that he intended to pacify Algeria in a three-month campaign and then hand it over to France 'sur un plateau', indicated a fairly serious purpose.

The fact that France was a member of a military alliance — NATO — made very little difference either way to the progress of the *coup*. It is very doubtful if NATO countries either individually or collectively would have used military action to oppose the *Putsch*. The attitude of NATO members to the military take-over in Greece in 1967 was one of passivity if not of actual complicity. Their attitude to a French *coup* in 1961 might have been different — but perhaps not very different.

A function for civil resistance

All the examples cited indicate that the *coup* may be particularly vulnerable to non-cooperation. As S. E. Finer has said, referring to Germany in 1920, Japan in 1936, and Algeria in 1961:

In all these three cases — Kapp *Putsch*, February mutiny and the April rebellion — the army, acting alone and in defiance of civilian opinion, was isolated and then defeated by civilian resistances. In all these countries, wherever lawful authority might be thought to lie, there was widespread consensus that it did not lie with the military. In all these countries, therefore, the army was powerless to get its way unless and until it had learned that it must work within the current political formula, within the tradition of legitimacy.⁴¹

Why did these *coups* fail? Partly, no doubt, they failed because their leaders, like so many military insurrectionists, tended to base their plan of action upon the assumption that the public would rally to them. The curious Spanish term for a military seizure of power, *pronunciamento*, itself indicates a belief that the mere taking up of a position, and the pronouncing of a phrase, would be enough to give one charge of a government.⁴² Kapp and Challe both had the common delusion that once they put themselves forward everyone would follow. When people failed to do so and then their own military resources evaporated they lost heart. In cases such as these even token civilian opposition can have a disproportionate effect.

One of the reasons why the *coup* is so vulnerable is that military forces — especially perhaps conscript ones — are susceptible to numerous pressures from the civilian population and from civil institutions. Conscripts come from a non-military background, they maintain numerous contacts with it, and they hope to return to it. Engels' observations on the possibilities of successful internal insurrection apply equally to the possibilities of successful resistance to a *coup*:

Let us have no illusions about it: a real victory of an insurrection over the military in street fight-

ing, a victory as between two armies, is one of the rarest exceptions. And the insurgents counted on it just as rarely. For them it was solely a question of making the troops yield to moral influences which, in a fight between the armies of two warring countries, do not come into play at all or do so to a much smaller extent.⁴³

Engels to some extent underestimated the 'moral influences' to which he referred. He doubted whether they could be so decisive in a future revolution as they had been, at least for a time, in 1848: and for this reason as well as others he viewed a recurrence of insurrections on the 1848 model as being unlikely. But the evidence is strong that armed forces continued susceptible to 'moral influences' from the populations of their own countries. The history of the February 1917 Russian revolution bears this out: the mutinies which occurred that month were an essential preliminary to the successful overthrow of the Tsars.⁴⁴

'Moral influences' have been important in resistance to military *coups*, as well as in insurrections against established regimes. The cases studied strongly suggest that some forces at least can be greatly influenced in their conduct by civilian opinion. The point at which officers disobey superior orders, troops mutiny, or whole units defect, is the point at which armed forces cease to be usable as a reliable machine of repression at the service of a military command. Attempts to win support from members of the insurgents' forces were successful in some degree both in Germany in 1920 and in Algeria in 1961: and in both cases there seems to have been a widespread recognition that this could be done better by resisting a *Putsch* peacefully, than by resorting to armed resistance. Certainly the proposition that non-violent action can effectively undermine the sources of the opponent's power finds some validation in these cases. However, it is necessary to bear in mind Engels' warning that dealing with the armed forces of a foreign country would be a more difficult matter, in which there might be less room for the operation of 'moral influences'.

Even there, however, the possibilities may be greater than Engels indicated.

The very term used by Engels, 'moral influences', is perhaps too restrictive. Non-violent action had in these cases a very strong element of coercion. Although in both the Kapp *Putsch* and the Generals' Revolt, the withdrawal of the rebels from government buildings was voluntary, it was only voluntary in the sense that freedom is the recognition of necessity. The withdrawal was to a large extent forced upon them by their inability to control the situation. The coercion took several forms. They had great difficulty in obtaining money, and indeed largely failed to do so.⁴⁵ The government machinery did not work for them. Some of their own military equipment was denied them — for example by the flying of aircraft from Algeria to France. And their manpower resources — both in the police and in military formations — were reduced. That in both cases the rebel leaders were coerced rather than converted into withdrawing is indicated by the fact that in neither case did they change their basic political ideas: they merely tried to pursue them by different means.

The civil resistance in these cases was not only coercive in itself: it was combined, in varying fashions, with some threat of violence against the rebels; and with some use of police and legal action against them. The threat of military action was probably not very convincing in the case of the Generals' Revolt; but the possibility of an Allied invasion of Germany in 1920 might well have swayed many people into regarding the Kapp *Putsch* as a hopeless venture. At all events, the complexity of the interrelationship between the use of civil resistance on the one hand, and the threat or use of force or legal sanctions on the other, is evident.

These cases strongly suggest that monolithic ideological unity is not necessary to the conduct of civil resistance. Communists, trade unionists, civil servants, joined in a common if temporary cause. If there was a political idea which inspired the resistance

in these cases, it was the idea of legitimacy: but this does not amount to an ideology. What was important in these cases was the pluralism of the societies in which they occurred, their conceptions of political legitimacy and their traditions of industrial action. Independent political institutions, local administrations, political parties, and even rival trade union organisations all showed their ability to act even when the legitimate government gave little or no lead. Many experts on the *coup d'état* have suggested that free and independent political institutions are a powerful safeguard against military seizures of power.⁴⁶ The idea that civil resistance would necessarily require a Goebbels-like control over a population finds no confirmation.

However, these cases do indisputably show that non-violent action, often thought of as an anti-government phenomenon, can in fact be used by governments and even be a key to their preservation in certain crises. For its part, the survival of a government can be an important stimulus to non-violent resistance, since it ensures that there is a source of authority which had a prior claim to people's loyalty, thus enabling them to resist new usurpers more easily and effectively. To ensure the physical survival of government leaders, even if it means some of them withdrawing from the capital, is an important aim of any resistance against *coups*.

Equally, these cases show that contrary to common belief non-violent action can be engaged in by the military themselves, even against violent opponents. The great wealth of modes of resistance used in the French army against the rebel leadership suggests that the view that 'non-violence is what the military do not do'⁴⁷ requires modification.

There is a case to be made for greater reliance on civil resistance as a means of opposing military *coups*. Some degree of advance preparations might give people greater confidence in their ability to overthrow a *coup*, and might also discourage military adventurism into politics in the first

place. As D. J. Goodspeed has written, the best form of deterrence 'is to show potential rebels that they would be faced with an intelligent, politically active and unsympathetic populace. In such cases the mere idea of a *coup* becomes ludicrous, as it is, for instance, in Switzerland, New Zealand and Sweden'.⁴⁸

Some preparations to defeat *coups* in the kinds of way indicated could no doubt be made on the governmental level. But it is not the only possible organizational base. Indeed, it is probable that some plans for opposing a *Putsch* have already been drafted by a number of non-governmental organizations in countries where a *coup* is not inconceivable, possible examples being the Confédération Générale du Travail in France and the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro in Italy — both Communist organizations. What is more important than specific contingency plans, however, is the inculcation of a more widespread awareness in society that, at least in the face of a domestic *coup*, civil resistance has an important and perhaps decisive role to play.

No suggestion is made that civil resistance is bound to be effective in all cases. It is far too dependent on the particular conditions of a given society and the specific international factors of the time for any such generalization to be even entertained. In a recent article, Dr. Ekkehart Krippendorf was right to question whether in Chile in September 1973 'total non-cooperation with the usurpers of political power would have led to their rapid retreat...'.⁴⁹ He was also right to draw attention to well-known instances — for example the suppression of the 1871 Paris Commune, or the US involvement in Vietnam — in which the forces of repression have shown scant regard for human life. Even if these cases are not strictly analogous to the *coup* situation, the point is well made. And it is indeed true that in Chile the army leaders were willing to use extreme repression. Yet even there the *coup* of 11 September 1973 would certainly have been more difficult to carry out if a significant part of the

population had not been willing to accept it after the economic disasters and political polarization during the years of Allende's presidency. As to whether armed struggle could have defeated General Pinochet and his colleagues, there had, in fact, been numerous statements in the preceding months that any such *coup* would be met with armed guerrilla resistance. These statements failed to deter, and the actuality of such resistance failed to materialise, at least in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 1973. In Chile as elsewhere there was a deep reluctance to embark on civil war as an answer to a *coup*. This does not mean that anything else — for example civil resistance — would necessarily be more successful. But it may mean that other modes of facing the problem are worth close examination.

Still less is any suggestion made that civil resistance, if it succeeds at all, is bound to do so in a matter of days. That it can have a quick effect is evident from some of the cases cited. But sometimes — perhaps Greece between 1967 and 1974 is a case in point — opposition to a usurping military regime may take a protracted and complex form, and may be only one of the pressures leading to the withdrawal of soldiers from government. The full story of the collapse of the Greek military regime on 24 July 1974 has yet to be told, but it is clear that among the factors contributing to this outcome were the following: (1) the failure to bring inflation under control; (2) the massacre of demonstrating students at Athens Polytechnic on 16-17 November 1973, which exacerbated a crisis in the regime and led to the Ioannidis coup of 25 November 1973; and (3) the adventurist policy in Cyprus, leading to the *coup* in Nicosia on 15 July 1974, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus on 20 July, and the imminent prospect of war between Greece and Turkey. All this brought the division among the Greek military commanders into sharp focus. The collapse of a regime of torturers was achieved after a great deal of political opposition, relatively little armed struggle within Greece, and the growing realization

within the regime itself that it was incapable of achieving any of the goals it had proclaimed.

The fact that civil resistance may sometimes fail, or be slow in its effects, or be only one of a whole complex of factors, does not mean that its role can be safely ignored. What is now needed is the formulation, on the basis of a wider historical survey, of some theories about the conditions for and dynamics of civil resistance against military *coups*. Such theories might enlarge our understanding of the overall roles of civil resistance in political processes, and illuminate the specific relationships of civil resistance to the threat and use of violence. Such theories might also have a more immediate functional value in contributing to the possibility of survival of certain regimes when faced with the prospect of military usurpation.

NOTES

1. Many would regard the *coup* in Portugal on 25 April 1974, which ended nearly 50 years of dictatorship and opened up some prospect of an end to costly colonial wars, as being such a case.

2. By far the most thorough study of the theory and practice of these types of resistance is Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Non-violent Action*, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1973.

3. As General Amin of Uganda claimed in 1972 when some forces supporting the former deposed President, Milton Obote, entered the country from Tanzania. (Amin had deposed Obote in a *coup* on 25 January 1971).

4. Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook*, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 1968, p. 91.

5. See Bernard Diederich and Al Burt, *Papa Doc: Haiti and Its Dictator*, Bodley Head, London, 1970.

6. Of course many Marxists do recognize the importance of concepts such as legitimacy (as distinct from force or economic domination) as a source of power. And they can find ample justification for so doing in the writings of Marx and Engels. See for example Engels, *The Role of Force in History: A Study of Bismarck's Policy of Blood and Iron*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1968, pp. 65 and 102 ff.

7. Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook*, pp. 109 and 12.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

9. From the account by Victor Chernov, who was Minister of Agriculture under Kerensky in 1917, and a leader of the Social Revolutionary Party, in his book *The Great Russian Revolution*, trans. Philip E. Mosely, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1936, pp. 372-3. Chernov's whole account on pp. 323-383 of the events surrounding this episode is very interesting. See also the briefer account in Joel Carmichael, *A Short History of the Russian Revolution*, Nelson, London, 1966, pp. 110-121.

10. The best English-language source on this episode is Ben-Ami Shillony, *Revolt in Japan: The Young Officers and the February 26, 1936 Incident*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1973. Another useful source is Leonard Mosley, *Hirohito: Emperor of Japan*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1966, pp. 130-148.

11. See especially Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: or the Pursuit of Freedom*, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1971, pp. 1030-1045.

Che Guevara in his account of the Cuban revolution makes some mention of the abortive general strike of 9 April 1958, but says nothing about the much more widespread general strike of early January 1959. See his *Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1969, pp. 225-235.

12. On details of the *coup* plan, see an excellent but little-known article by 'Moravus' (one of Dubcek's advisers in 1968, and still living in Czechoslovakia) in *Survey*, London, vol. 17, no. 4, Autumn 1971. See also Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, *Czechoslovakia 1968: Reform Repression and Resistance*, Chatto and Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1969, pp. 125-6.

13. Herbert Rosinski, *The German Army*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966, p. 161.

14. Quoted in D.J. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d'Etat*, Macmillan, London, 1962, p. 134.

15. Erich Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, Harvard University Press, 1962, vol. 1, p. 152.

16. Walter Ulbricht, speech in Suhl, 20 March 1970.

17. Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. 1, pp. 154-9.

18. Hugh Quigley and R.T. Clark, *Republican Germany: A Political and Economic Study*, Methuen, London, 1928, p. 64.

19. Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. 1, p. 151.

20. Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. 1, p. 150.

21. This section is based principally on interviews with people involved in the events in Algeria and France in April 1961, and on contemporary newspapers published in both countries. I also express my debt to Jacques Fauvet and Jean Planchais, whose book *La Fronde des Généraux* (Arthaud, Paris, 1961) is the only full-length account of these events. Several more recent books have excellent accounts of the coup. See especially Paul Henissart, *Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria*, Hart-Davis, London, 1971; and Yves Courrière, *Les Feux du Désespoir*, Fayard, Paris, 1971.

22. M.R.D. Foot, *Men in Uniform*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1961, p. 40.

23. De Gaulle is reported to have said at the time: 'Ce qui est grave dans cette affaire, Messieurs, c'est qu'elle n'est pas sérieuse.' (Fauvet and Planchais, *La Fronde des Généraux*, p. 157.) But, as his actions at the time and his later memoirs indicated, although he regarded the affair as irresponsible he also took it very seriously. His gloomy private observations on 23 or 24 April on the prospects of a rebel invasion of France are recounted in Bernard Tricot's memoirs, *Les Sentiers de la Paix: Algérie 1958-1962*, Plon, Paris, 1972, p. 143.

24. Fauvet and Planchais, *La Fronde des Généraux*, pp. 201-1.

25. The complex structure of French paramilitary forces requires some explanation. There were three basic groupings of such forces.

The first grouping, which came under the Ministry of Armed Forces, comprised the *Gendarmerie Nationale*. The *Gendarmerie Nationale* consisted of territorial units, mainly responsible for ordinary police duties in the countryside; and of mobile units, which are organized on infantry lines and are equipped with standard infantry weapons.

The second grouping, which came under the Ministry of the Interior, comprised the *Gardes Républicaines*, whose duties were mainly ceremonial, and involved the guarding of important public buildings; and also the much larger force, the *Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité* (CRS), the 'riot police' which operated directly under the *Sûreté Nationale*, the body responsible for policing all the larger towns except Paris.

The third grouping comprised some units of the *Garde Nationale* and the *Compagnie Urbaine de Sécurité*, which came under the control of the *Paris Préfecture de Police*; the latter was a fully independent police system, and until 1968 it was entirely separate both from the *Gendarmerie Nationale*, and from the *Sûreté Nationale*.

George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, pp. 6-7; and Edward Luttwak, 'The Police Endure', *New Society*, London, 30 May 1968.

26. Fauvet and Planchais, *La Fronde des Généraux*, p. 194.

27. Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, trans. Terence Kilmartin, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, [1971], p. 108.

28. Fauvet and Planchais, *La Fronde des Généraux*, pp. 229-31.

29. The conscripts constituted less than half the total number of troops in the French Army in Algeria. — Dorothy Pickles, *Algeria and France*, Methuen, London, 1963, p. 88n.

30. Paul-Marie de la Gorce, *The French Army: A Military-Political History*, trans. Kenneth Douglas, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1963, p. 544.

31. They did not necessarily welcome this support: Challe may well have feared the prospect of his movement being wholly reliant on the local European population and its traditionally racist attitudes.

32. Fauvet and Planchais, *La Fronde des Généraux*, p. 173.

33. De Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 109. See also p. 111, where he says that Challe, Zeller and Gouraud 'had given themselves up to the authorities without there having been any loss of life.'

34. Kelly, *Lost Soldiers*, pp. 323-4.

35. Fauvet and Planchais, *La Fronde des Généraux*, pp. 250-1.

36. Bernard Tricot, *Les Sentiers de la Paix*, pp. 236-7.

37. *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 110.

38. On these reports of possible French military intervention in May 1968, see Charles Douglas-Home, 'Voice of the Generals', *The Times*, London, 23 May 1969.

39. There is a cautious and tentative account of de Gaulle's meeting with French military leaders at Baden-Baden on 29 May 1968 in Patrick

Seale and Maureen McConville, *French Revolution 1968*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1968, pp. 204-5. De Gaulle's memoirs, uncompleted when he died, do not go beyond 1963.

40. Fauvet and Planchais, *La Fronde des Généraux*, pp. 140-141.

41. S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1962, p. 98.

42. This belief was well described by Ortega y Gasset in *Invertebrate Spain*, trans. Mildred Adams, Allen & Unwin, London, 1937, p. 57.

43. In his 1895 introduction to Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France 1848 to 1850*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, no date, p. 28.

44. On this aspect of Russia in February 1917, see Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 672-5. Sharp refers to some of the statements in which Trotsky and Shlyapnikov explicitly recognized the necessity of a political confrontation, and not a violent one, with the troops.

45. On the failure to obtain funds, see Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. 1, pp. 151-2; and Fauvet and Planchais, *La Fronde des Généraux*, p. 211.

46. This has been argued particularly cogently by S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp. 87-109.

47. Johan Galtung, 'On the Meaning of Non-violence', *Journal of Peace Research*, Oslo, 1965, no. 3, p. 229.

48. D.J. Goodspeed, 'The Coup d'Etat', in Adam Roberts (ed.), *Civilian Resistance as a National Defence*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1969, p. 59.

49. Ekkehart Krippendorff, 'Chile, Violence and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, Oslo, vol. xi, no. 2, 1974, p. 96. See also Deodato Rivera's rejoinder in the same issue.

SUMMARY

Military *coups d'état* pose numerous problems, particularly for civil governments attempting to pursue radical policies. There has been too little study of possible forms of resistance to them. The article concentrates mainly on cases of civil (non-violent) resistance to *coups*, for example in Russia in 1917, Germany in 1920, Japan in 1936, and France and Algeria in 1961. Problems of resistance in Greece after 1967 and in Chile in 1973 are also briefly mentioned. The main conclusions are that civil resistance can in certain circumstances contribute to the undermining of military *coups* by, or in association with, a complex variety of pressures. There is a case for greater reliance on civil resistance as a means of opposing military *coups*.