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Introduction to Part One
&
Chapter 1

**INTRODUCTION
TO PART ONE**

Some conflicts do not yield to compromise and can be resolved only through struggle. Conflicts which, in one way or another, involve the fundamental principles of a society, of independence, of self-respect, or of people's capacity to determine their own future are such conflicts. For their resolution, regular institutional procedures are rarely available; it is even doubtful that they could be completely adequate. Instead, in the belief that the choice in these types of conflicts is between abject passive surrender and violence, and also that victory requires violence, people turn to the threat and use of violence. The specific means used will vary: they may include conventional military action, guerrilla warfare, regicide, rioting, police action, private armed offense and defense, civil war, terrorism, conventional aerial bombings and nuclear attacks, as well as other forms. Whether threatened, used with restraint, or applied without controls, these means of violence are designed to injure, kill, demolish and terrorize with maxi-

mum efficiency. Century by century, then decade by decade, and now year by year, this efficiency has grown as people and governments have applied talents and resources to that end.

The fact is, however, that it is not true that violence is the only effective means of action in crucial conflict situations. Throughout history, under a variety of political systems, people in every part of the world have waged conflict and wielded undeniable power by using a very different technique of struggle—one which does not kill and destroy. That technique is nonviolent action. Although it has been known by a variety of names, its basis has always been the same: the belief that the exercise of power depends on the consent of the ruled who, by withdrawing that consent, can control and even destroy the power of their opponent. In other words, nonviolent action is a technique used to control, combat and destroy the opponent's power by nonviolent means of wielding power. Although much effort has gone into increasing the efficiency of violent conflict, no comparable efforts have yet gone into making nonviolent action more effective and hence more likely to be substituted for violence.

And yet nonviolent action has already had a long history, which has remained largely unknown because historians have been so overwhelmingly concerned with other matters. In fact, there was until recently so little awareness of the tradition and history of nonviolent struggle that nonviolent actionists have, by and large, improvised their responses independently of past practice. This situation is only now beginning to change.

That there is a rich lode of material awaiting the analyst and actionist is abundantly clear. Even at the present early stage of investigation, he who looks can find numerous examples, ranging from ancient Rome to the civil rights struggle in the United States and the resistance of the Czechs and Slovaks to the Russian invasion of 1968. By searching diligently through scattered sources, he can find mention of plebeian protests against Rome as far back as the fifth century B.C.; he can trace the resistance of the Netherlands to Spanish rule in mid-sixteenth century Europe. But the history of nonviolent struggle in these centuries still remains to be written. What we have now are only brief glimpses.

In more modern times, however, the picture becomes more crowded. Important examples of nonviolent action and struggle occur in extremely varied settings. For example, to an extent which has on the whole been ignored, the American colonists used nonviolent resistance in their struggle against Britain, refusing to pay taxes and debts, refusing to import, refusing to obey laws they considered unjust, using independent political institutions, and severing social and economic contact with both the British and

pro-British colonists.

Later, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, working people in many countries used noncooperation in the form of strikes and economic boycotts to improve conditions and to gain greater power. The Russian Revolution of 1905 is full of nonviolent responses to the events of "Bloody Sunday": paralyzing strikes, refusal to obey censorship regulations, establishment of "parallel" organs of government—these were only some of the pressures which led the Tsar's government to the promise of a more liberal governmental system. When the collapse of the tsarist system came in 1917 it was because it had disintegrated in face of an overwhelmingly nonviolent revolution—months before the Bolsheviks seized control in October. Nor does nonviolent pressure always have to be "against"; it can also be "for" as was made clear in Berlin in 1920, when the bureaucracy and population, who remained loyal to the existing Ebert government, brought down the militarist Kapp *Putsch* by refusing to cooperate with it.

Gandhi, who was the outstanding strategist of nonviolent action, regarded nonviolent struggle as a means of matching forces, one which had the greatest capacity for bringing real freedom and justice. The classic national Gandhian struggle was the 1930-31 campaign, which began with the famous Salt March as a prelude to civil disobedience against the British monopoly. A year-long nonviolent campaign followed. It shook British power in India and ended with negotiations between equals.

Despite highly unfavorable circumstances, nonviolent resistance sometimes also produced political tremors in certain Nazi-occupied countries during World War II. Occasionally—as in Norway—where Quisling's effort to set up a Corporative State was thwarted by nonviolent resistance—it won some battles. Covert noncooperation and, very rarely, nonviolent defiance even helped save the lives of Jews. During the same period, on the other side of the world, popular nonviolent action was being used successfully to dissolve the power of two Central American dictators. Communist systems, too, have felt the power of nonviolent action in the East German Rising in 1953, in strikes in Soviet prison camps, and in the nonviolent phase of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. In the United States nonviolent action has played a major role in the struggles of Afro-Americans from the Montgomery bus boycott on. And in 1968, one of the most remarkable demonstrations of unprepared nonviolent resistance for national defense purposes took place in Czechoslovakia after the Russian invasion. The struggle was not successful, but the Czechs and Slovaks were able to hold out far longer—from August to April—than they could have with military resistance; even

in defeat, it is a case meriting careful study. The achievements and victories of past nonviolent struggles, although often inadequate, have nevertheless frequently been remarkable, especially when one considers the usually small number of actual participants, and the general improvised, unprepared character of the resistance.

Another characteristic of nonviolent action is its great variety, in degree of success and in purpose and method. Sometimes nonviolent action may be used to achieve reforms or limited objectives (as in the Montgomery bus boycott); sometimes to destroy a whole regime (as in Russia in February-March 1917); sometimes to defend a government under attack (as in Czechoslovakia). Often deliberate efforts may be made to keep the struggle nonviolent, while in other cases nonviolence is not premeditated. Although the range of methods available in this type of struggle is vast, effective utilization of a considerable number of methods in the same case has taken place only rarely, as in the Russian revolutions. Only in a few cases (as in the Continental Association, the nonviolent "battle plan" of the First Continental Congress, and in India's 1930-31 campaign) has there been planned strategic phasing of the development of the struggle. Only once in a while—as with Gandhi—has there been conscious use of both strategic and tactical planning. Only rarely, as in Germany in the 1920s, during World War II in the case of governments-in-exile, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, has there been official government backing for nonviolent resistance to usurpers. Many other variations in nonviolent action exist and will continue.

However, implicitly or explicitly, all nonviolent struggle has a basic assumption in common and that is its view of the nature of power and how to deal with it.

1

The Nature and Control of Political Power

INTRODUCTION

Unlike utopians, advocates of nonviolent action do not seek to "control" power by rejecting it or abolishing it. Instead, they recognize that power is inherent in practically all social and political relationships and that its control is "the basic problem in political theory"¹ and in political reality. They also see that it is necessary to wield power in order to control the power of threatening political groups or regimes. That assumption they share with advocates of violence, although they part company with them on many other points.

Social power may be briefly defined as the capacity to control the behavior of others, directly or indirectly, through action by groups of people, which action impinges on other groups of people.² Political power is that kind of social power which is wielded for political objectives, especially by governmental institutions or by people in opposition to or in support of such institutions. Political power thus refers to the total authority, influ-

ence, pressure and coercion which may be applied to achieve or prevent the implementation of the wishes of the power-holder.³ In this book, when used alone, the term power is to be understood as referring to political power.

WHAT IS THE BASIC NATURE OF POLITICAL POWER?

All types of struggle, and all means to control governments or to defend them against attack, are based upon certain basic assumptions about the nature of power. These are not usually explicit. In fact, so little do people stop to think about these assumptions that people are rarely aware of them and would often find it hard to articulate them. This is true of advocates of both nonviolent and violent action. Nevertheless, all responses to the "how" of dealing with an opponent's power are rooted in assumptions about the nature of power. An erroneous or inadequate view of the nature of political power is unlikely to produce satisfactory and effective action for dealing with it.

Basically, there appear to be two views of the nature of power. One can see people as dependent upon the good will, the decisions and the support of their government or of any other hierarchial system to which they belong. Or, conversely, one can see that government or system dependent on the people's good will, decisions and support. One can see the power of a government as emitted from the few who stand at the pinnacle of command. Or one can see that power, in all governments, as continually rising from many parts of the society. One can also see power as self-perpetuating, durable, not easily or quickly controlled or destroyed. Or political power can be viewed as fragile, always dependent for its strength and existence upon a replenishment of its sources by the cooperation of a multitude of institutions and people—cooperation which may or may not continue.

Nonviolent action is based on the second of these views: that governments depend on people, that power is pluralistic, and that political power is fragile because it depends on many groups for reinforcement of its power sources. The first view—that people depend on governments, that political power is monolithic, that it can really come from a few men, and that it is durable and self-perpetuating—appears to underlie most political violence. (A notable exception is guerrilla war in its predominantly political stages.) The argument of this chapter is that the theory of power underlying nonviolent action is sounder and more accurate than the theory underlying

most violent action, especially military struggle. In contrast to the pluralistic-dependency theory of nonviolent action—to which the bulk of this chapter is devoted—we might call this other view the "monolith theory."

The "monolith theory" of power assumes that the power of a government is a relatively fixed *quantum* (i.e. "a discrete unit quantity of energy"), a "given," a strong, independent, durable (if not indestructible), self-reinforcing, and self-perpetuating force. Because of these assumed characteristics, it follows that in open conflict such power cannot in the last analysis be controlled or destroyed simply by people but only by the threat or use of overwhelming physical might. The opponent's power may increase somewhat in the course of the struggle, or it may be somewhat reduced. But it is almost an axiom that in severe crises a hostile government's power can be significantly reduced, obstructed, or demolished only by destructive power—something like blasting chips or chunks off a solid stone block with explosives until it has been brought down to size or obliterated. War is based on this view of the nature of political power: faced with the actual or potential destruction of men, weapons, cities, industries, transport, communications and the like, the enemy will be forced to accept a settlement or to surrender (unless *he* has the greater destructive capacity). Nuclear weapons are the extreme development of the approach to control and combat based on this monolith view of the nature of political power.

If it were true that political power possesses the durability of a solid stone pyramid, then it would also be true that such power could only be controlled by the voluntary self-restraint of rulers (discussed below), by changes in the "ownership" of the monolith (the State)—whether with regular procedures (such as elections) or with irregular ones (regicide or *coup d'état*), or by destructive violence (conventional war). The monolith view would not allow for the possibility of other types of effective pressure and control. But the monolith view of a government's power is quite inaccurate and ignores the nature of the power of any ruler or regime.

Nor can belief in the monolith theory by the rulers themselves make it come true. That theory can only alter reality when both the subjects and the opponents of a regime presenting this monolithic image of itself can be induced to believe the theory. Then, if the "owners" of the monolith refused to grant concessions, dissidents would either have to submit helplessly or resort only to the destructive attack called for by that theory of power. However, since the monolith theory is factually not true, and since *all* governments are dependent on the society they rule, even a regime which believes itself to be a monolith, and *appears* to be one, can be weakened and shattered by the undermining and severance of its sources of power, when people act upon the theory of power presented in this chapter.

If the monolith theory is not valid, but nevertheless forms the basic assumption of modern war and other types of control, the resulting underlying fallacy helps to explain why war and other controls have suffered from disadvantages and limitations. Relying on destructive violence to control political power is regarded by theorists of nonviolent action as being just as irrational as attempting to use a lid to control steam from a caldron, while allowing the fire under it to blaze uncontrolled.

Nonviolent action is based on the view that political power can most efficiently be controlled *at its sources*. This chapter is an exploration of why and how this may be done. It will lead us to basic questions concerning the roots of political power and the nature of government. It will finally lead us to the distinctive way of looking at the problem of how to control power on which nonviolent action rests. This conceptual framework is both old and new.⁴ It is rooted in the insights of some of the most respected political thinkers concerned with the nature of society and politics.

SOCIAL ROOTS OF POLITICAL POWER

An error frequently made by students of politics is to view political decisions, events and problems in isolation from the society in which they exist.⁵ If they are studied within their social context, however, it may be found that the roots of political power reach beyond and below the formal structure of the State into the society itself. If this is so, it will follow that the nature of the means of controlling power will differ radically from those most suitable if it were not true.

It is an obvious, simple, but often forgotten observation of great theoretical and practical significance that the power wielded by individuals and groups in highest positions of command and decision in any government—whom we shall for brevity call “rulers”⁶—is not intrinsic to them. Such power must come from outside them. True, some men have greater personal qualities or greater intelligence, or inspire greater confidence than others, but this in no way refutes the fact that the political power which they wield as rulers comes from the society which they govern. Thus if a ruler is to wield power, he must be able to direct the behavior of other people, draw on large resources, human and material, wield an apparatus of coercion, and direct a bureaucracy in the administration of his policies. All these components of political power are external to the person of the power-holder.

The situation is essentially that described by the sixteenth-century

French writer Étienne de La Boétie, in speaking of the power of a tyrant: “He who abuses you so has only two eyes, has but two hands, one body, and has naught but what has the least man of the great and infinite number of your cities, except for the advantage you give him to destroy you.”⁷ Auguste Comte also argued in the early nineteenth century that the then popular theory was not correct in attributing to rulers a permanent, unchanging degree of power. On the contrary, while granting the influence of the political system on the society as a whole, Comte insisted that the power of a ruler was variable and that it depended on the degree to which the society granted him that power.⁸ Other, more recent writers have made the same point.⁹

A. Sources of power

If political power is not intrinsic to the power-holder, it follows that it must have outside sources. In fact, political power appears to emerge from the interaction of all or several of the following sources:

1. Authority The extent and intensity of the ruler’s authority among the subjects is a crucial factor affecting the ruler’s power.

Authority may be defined as the “. . . right to command and direct, to be heard or obeyed by others,”¹⁰ voluntarily accepted by the people and therefore existing without the imposition of sanctions. The possessor of authority may not actually be superior; it is enough that he be perceived and accepted as superior. While not identical with power, authority is nevertheless clearly a main source of power.

2. Human resources A ruler’s power is affected by the number of persons who obey him, cooperate with him, or provide him with special assistance, as well as by the proportion of such persons in the general population, and the extent and forms of their organizations.

3. Skills and knowledge The ruler’s power is also affected by the skills, knowledge and abilities of such persons, and the relation of their skills, knowledge and abilities to his needs.

4. Intangible factors Psychological and ideological factors, such as habits and attitudes toward obedience and submission, and the presence or absence of a common faith, ideology, or sense of mission, all affect the power of the ruler in relation to the people.

5. Material resources The degree to which the ruler controls property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, means of communication and transportation helps to determine the limits of his power.

6. Sanctions The final source of a ruler's power is the type and extent of sanctions at his disposal, both for use against his own subjects and in conflicts with other rulers.

As John Austin wrote, sanctions are "an enforcement of obedience,"¹¹ used by rulers against their subjects to supplement voluntary acceptance of their authority and to increase the degree of obedience to their commands. They may be violent or not; they may be intended as punishment or as deterrence. Citizens may sometimes apply sanctions against their governments or against each other (these will be discussed below). Still other sanctions may be applied by governments against other governments and may take a variety of forms, such as the breaking of diplomatic relations, economic embargoes, military invasions and bombings. Violent domestic sanctions, such as imprisonment or execution, are commonly intended to punish disobedience, not to achieve the objective of the original command, except insofar as such sanctions may inhibit future disobedience by other persons. Other violent sanctions sometimes, and most nonviolent sanctions usually, are intended to achieve the original objective; this is often the case in conventional war, strikes, political noncooperation and boycotts. Sanctions are usually a key element in domestic and international politics.

It is always a matter of the *degree* to which some or all of these sources of power are present; only rarely, if ever, are all of them completely available to a ruler or completely absent. But their availability is subject to constant variation, which brings about an increase or decrease in the ruler's power. Baron de Montesquieu observed that "those who govern have a power which, in some measure, has need of fresh vigor every day . . ."¹² To the degree that the sources of power are available without limitation, the ruler's power is unlimited. However, the opposite is also true: to the degree that the availability of these sources is limited, the ruler's political power is also limited.¹³

B. These sources depend on obedience

A closer examination of the sources of the ruler's power will indicate that they depend *intimately* upon the obedience and cooperation of the subjects. Let us, for example, consider *authority* from this point of view. Authority is necessary for the existence and operation of any regime.¹⁴ No matter how great their means of physical coercion, all rulers require an acceptance of their authority, their right to rule and to command.¹⁵ The key to habitual obedience is to reach the mind.¹⁶ Thomas Hill Green

points out that "obedience will scarcely be habitual unless it is loyal, not forced."¹⁷ Because authority must by definition be voluntarily accepted by the people, the authority of the ruler will depend upon the goodwill of the subjects and will vary as that goodwill varies.

If a ruler's need for acceptance of his authority is basic, loss of authority will have serious consequences for his position and power. Just as subjects may accept a ruler's authority because they believe it is merited on grounds of morality and of the well-being of their society or country, subjects may for the same reasons at times deny the ruler's claims to authority over them. The weakening or collapse of that authority inevitably tends to loosen the subjects' predisposition toward obedience. Obedience will no longer be habitual; the decision to obey or not to obey will be made consciously, and obedience may be refused.

If the subjects deny the ruler's right to rule and to command, they are withdrawing the general agreement, or group consent, which makes possible the existing government.¹⁸ This loss of authority sets in motion the disintegration of the ruler's power.¹⁹ That power is reduced to the degree that he is denied authority. Where the loss is extreme, the existence of that particular government is threatened.

A second point to be considered is *the contribution of the subjects to the established system*. Clearly, every ruler must depend upon the cooperation and assistance of his subjects in operating the economic and administrative system. Every ruler needs the skill, knowledge, advice, labor and administrative ability of a significant portion of his subjects. The more extensive and detailed the ruler's control is, the more such assistance he will require. These contributions to the ruler's power will range, for example, from the specialized knowledge of a technical expert, the research endeavors of a scientist, and the organizational abilities of a department head to the assistance of typists, factory workers, transportation workers, and farmers. Both the economic and the political systems operate because of the contributions of many people, individuals, organizations and subgroups.

The ruler's power depends on the continual availability of all this assistance, not only from individual members, officials, employees and the like,²⁰ but from the subsidiary organizations and institutions which compose the system as a whole. These may be departments, bureaus, branches, committees and the like. Just as individuals and independent groups may refuse to cooperate, so too these unit organizations may refuse to provide sufficient help to maintain effectively the ruler's position

and to enable him to implement his policies.²¹ "Thus no complex can carry out a superior order if its members (either unit organizations or individuals) will not enable it to do so . . ." ²²

If the multitude of "assistants" reject the ruler's authority, they may then carry out his wishes inefficiently, or may take unto themselves certain decisions, or may even flatly refuse to continue their usual assistance.²³ In efforts to ensure the desired degree of assistance and cooperation, sanctions may, of course, be applied. But because rulers need more than grudging, outward forms of compliance by this multitude of subjects, efforts to obtain this assistance by compulsion will inevitably be inadequate as long as the extent and intensity of the ruler's authority among these subjects is limited.²⁴

Because, then, of dependence on other people to operate the system, the ruler is continually subject to influence and restriction by both his direct assistants and the general populace. This control will be greatest where his dependence is greatest.

It remains to discuss the relation between *sanctions* and submission. If, in the face of serious unrest, the regime does not make changes to meet popular demands, increased reliance will have to be placed on enforcement. Such sanctions are usually possible despite dissatisfaction with the regime because very often while one section of the populace rejects the ruler's authority another section remains loyal and willing to help the regime to maintain itself and carry out its policies. In such a case a ruler may use the loyal subjects as police or soldiers to inflict sanctions on the remainder of the people.²⁵ However, sanctions, even in such a case, will not be the determining force in maintaining the regime—for several reasons. The ruling group (foreign or domestic) will itself still be united by something other than sanctions.²⁶ Furthermore, any ruler's ability to apply sanctions at home or abroad arises from and depends upon a significant degree of help from the subjects themselves.

Sanctions are important in maintaining a ruler's political power—especially in crises. But *the ability to impose sanctions* itself derives from the obedience and cooperation of at least some subjects; also, *whether those sanctions are effective* depends on the subjects' particular pattern of submission. Let us discuss each of these.

Without various types of cooperation and assistance, no ruler could impose sanctions, either on the people he wishes to rule in his own country, or internationally on foreign enemies. This ability depends to a considerable degree on whether his subjects are willing to become police and soldiers for him, and if so, upon the degree of efficiency with which they

carry out commands to impose sanctions.²⁷ Furthermore, the material weapons themselves are social products. Once one gets much beyond bows and arrows, the manufacturing process for weapons—guns, bombs, planes, tanks and so on—depends on social cooperation, often of many people and of diverse organizations and institutions. Even technology has not changed this. New developments in communications and weaponry may in the future reduce the extent of assistance needed at a given moment to inflict sanctions, and may change the types of sanctions. The relationship of dependency will not be reduced or abolished, however.

Finally, the effectiveness of even enthusiastic police and troops in carrying out their tasks is often highly influenced by the degree to which the general population gives them voluntary support or obstructs their efforts.²⁸ As W.A. Rudlin points out, it is not that the State rests on "force," but that the State possesses "force" as long as most of its subjects deem this desirable.²⁹ Therefore, the capacity to *impose* sanctions rests on cooperation. But the *effectiveness* or ineffectiveness of sanctions when available and used also depends on the response of the subjects against whom they are threatened or applied.

Thus, the compliance pattern of the subjects will largely determine the extent to which sanctions are "required" to bolster obedience and even their relative effectiveness when used. We are speaking here of the degree to which people obey without threats, and the degree to which they continue to disobey despite punishment. Speaking of the general pattern of obedience under "normal" conditions, Karl W. Deutsch has argued that the chances of detection and punishment, even when small, help to strengthen and reinforce the pattern of obedience. This general obedience is sufficiently widespread and strong to make enforcement practical and probable in the minority of cases of disobedience. Enforcement and obedience are, then, interdependent: the greater the voluntary obedience, the greater the chances of detection and punishment of deviations.³⁰ Compliance and enforcement thus reinforce each other: the stronger the compliance pattern, the more effective the enforcement (and conversely). Also the weaker the compliance pattern, the less effective the enforcement (and conversely), with a continual range of variations. This applies to all types of regimes, including totalitarian systems.³¹

The ruler's power, we may summarize from the above discussion, is therefore not a static "given" *quantum*. Instead, his power varies because the number, type and quality of the social forces he controls varies. "The internal stability of a regime can be measured by the ratio between the number and strength of the social forces that it controls or conciliates,

in a word, represents, and the number and strength of the social forces that it fails to represent and has against it."³²

Similarly, the variations in the ruler's power are in turn directly or indirectly associated with the willingness of the subjects to accept the ruler, to obey, to cooperate with him and to carry out his wishes.³³ So important is the cooperation of the subjects in determining the availability of the sources of power, and hence the extent and capability of any ruler's power, that Bertrand de Jouvenel has put the ruler's political power, the sources of his power and the obedience of the subjects on an almost mathematical basis of equality.³⁴

WHY DO MEN OBEY?

The most important single quality of any government, without which it would not exist, must be the obedience and submission of its subjects. Obedience is at the heart of political power. The relationships between the ruler and the subjects, and the ancient question of why some men obey other men, therefore become relevant to our analysis.

Many people often assume that the issuance of a command and its execution form a single, more or less automatic operation and therefore that the wielding of political power is an entirely one-way relationship. If this were true, any suggestion that a ruler's power might be controlled by reducing and withdrawing obedience and cooperation would be absurd, for the command and its implementation would be inseparable. However, such an assumption is not true: the relationship between command and obedience is always one of mutual influence and some degree of interaction—which is “mutually determined” action³⁵ involving a two-sided relationship between the ruler and the subjects.

Sanctions for disobedience are more severe in the relationship between ruler and subject than is usual in other relationships between persons who are superior in rank (superordinates) and those who are under the controls or orders of a superior (subordinates).³⁶ Nevertheless, certain basic similarities of interaction and dependence do exist between the ruler-subject relationship and all other superordinate-subordinate relationships. Professor Harold Lasswell, the German sociologist Georg Simmel and Chester I. Barnard, the American analyst of *The Functions of the Executive*, have all offered insights into the nature of this interaction and dependence. Professor Lasswell has described this mutual influence as “cue-giving” and “cue-taking.”³⁷ He cites the orchestra as an example, observing that

just as a conductor may impose penalties upon members who fail to follow his cues, so the orchestra if dissatisfied with the conductor can impose penalties and “by deliberate noncooperation or hostile agitation . . . may get him fired.”³⁸ Lasswell adds that without the expected conformity by the subordinates (whether in the form of “passive acquiescence or active consent”) the power relationship is not complete, despite the threat or infliction of sanctions.³⁹

Simmel has offered other examples of interaction, which occur even where least expected.⁴⁰ He cites the relationship between the speaker and his audience, the teacher and his class, and the journalist and his readers as instances in which the subordinates actually influence the superordinate in a major way. “Thus, a highly complex interaction . . . is hidden here beneath the semblance of pure superiority of the one element and a purely passive being-led of the other.”⁴¹ Even in the case of certain types of personal relationships in which the exclusive function of one person is to serve the other, he says, and even in the case of the relation between the hypnotist and the hypnotized, an element of reciprocity and mutual dependence is involved. As he puts it, “. . . appearance shows an absolute influence, on the one side, and an absolute being-influenced, on the other; but it conceals an interaction, an exchange of influences . . .”⁴² He concludes that “. . . even the most miserable slave . . . in some fashion at least, can still in this sense react to his master.”⁴³

Barnard has also pointed out that the same type of interaction takes place *between institutions* and between the various units *within a complex organization*.⁴⁴ Because the superordinate body is dependent on its subordinate members or suborganizations to carry out orders and tasks, he describes their operation as a “cooperative effort.”⁴⁵

The same type of interaction takes place in the State: commands and orders are not automatically obeyed. This is true in the relationship between ruler and subjects, between ruler and the regime's various departments and agencies, among the various departments, and, within each of them, between its head and its subordinate members.⁴⁶ The power relationship exists only when completed by the subordinates' obedience to the ruler's commands and compliance with his wishes. As we shall see, this does not always take place. Even where political power is backed by sanctions, some degree of interaction *always* exists between the rulers or superiors-in-rank and those to whom they give orders and commands.⁴⁷ The wielding of political power is *not*, therefore, a one-way process in which the ruler issues commands which are inevitably carried out. “Since political power is the control of other men,” Franz

Neumann wrote, "political power . . . is always a two-sided relationship."⁴⁸ Furthermore, the interaction between ruler and subject takes place within a political and social setting in which a variety of factors may influence its course and outcome.

The variables in this interaction are generally three: the ruler (or leader), the subject (or follower), and the situation.⁴⁹ All are subject to constant mutual influence, changes in one altering the reactions of the other two, and in turn requiring a new response from the original factor. The degree to which the ruler succeeds in wielding power and achieving his objectives thus depends upon the degree of obedience and cooperation emerging from this interaction. Both domestically and internationally a regime's power "is in proportion to its ability to make itself obeyed and win from that obedience the means of action. It all turns on that obedience. Who knows the reasons for that obedience knows the inner nature of Power."⁵⁰

Having established the fact that obedience is necessary if the command is to be carried out and also the fact that obedience is not inevitable, we come to the ancient question: why do the many obey the few?

How is it that a ruler is able to obtain and maintain political domination over the multitude of his subjects? Why do they in such large numbers submit to him and obey him,⁵¹ even when it is clearly not in their interest to do so? How is it that a ruler may even use his subjects for ends which are contrary to the subjects' own interests?⁵² All these questions are not new. But in asking them here as though they were new, we may rediscover old insights and explore afresh their implications. The answers will be important in determining what solutions are to be offered to the problem of how to control political power. As the sociologists Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills have concluded, ". . . from a psychological point of view the crux of the problem of power rests in understanding the origin, constitution, and maintainance of voluntary obedience."⁵³

Thomas Hobbes' answer in the seventeenth century to the question of obedience was simple. Subjects obey their rulers because of fear, he wrote, either fear of the ruler himself or of one another.⁵⁴ Were fear the only reason for obedience there would be only two possible means of control of the sovereign's power: either inducing in the ruler self-imposed limitations, or threatening or using superior fear-instilling power. Today these means are often seen to be inadequate. Their inadequacy may be rooted in an erroneous or incomplete understanding of the reasons for obedience. Hobbes' view, taken by itself, is not true. Other factors in addi-

tion to fear have played a significant role in the development of governments and the maintenance of obedience. It is necessary to look beyond Hobbes' conceptual framework to discover the reasons for obedience.

A. The reasons are various and multiple

Actually there is no single self-sufficient explanation for obedience to rulers. Nor can political obedience be explained solely in rational terms. The reasons are multiple, complex and interrelated; different combinations and proportions of reasons produce obedience in various situations. A number of specific answers and explanations have, however, been offered. We can learn much from them, provided we remember that no one answer can be totally adequate, and that each must be seen in the perspective of the others.

1. Habit One reason why men obey is that obedience has long been the practice of humanity, and it has become a habit. In the opinion of some, the habit of obedience is in fact "the essential reason" for continued obedience.⁵⁵ David Hume said that habit consolidates what other principles of human nature have imperfectly founded. Once accustomed to obedience, he wrote, men "never think of departing from that path in which they and their ancestors have constantly trod, and to which they are confined by so many urgent and visible motives."⁵⁶

No one claims, however, that habit is the sole cause of obedience. Convincing reasons felt over a long period are necessary to make obedience habitual. Such obedience, Austin suggested, is the consequence of a combination of various factors such as custom, prejudice, utility, and a perception of the expediency of political government.⁵⁷ Further, in times of political crisis, or when the demands of the ruler increase sharply, habit ceases to be a complete explanation of obedience.⁵⁸ Unless other adequate reasons for obedience also exist, it may then cease.

2. Fear of sanctions The fear of sanctions has been widely acknowledged as a source of obedience.⁵⁹ While sanctions may take various forms, such as social and economic pressures, we are here largely concerned with the sanctions provided in the law and practice of the State. These generally involve the threat or use of some form of physical violence against the disobedient subject, and induce obedience by ". . . power merely coercive, a power really operating on people simply through their fears . . ."⁶⁰

The intent behind such sanctions may be both to provide a punishment or reprisal for failure to meet an obligation (thus, sanctions applied against subjects are usually not primarily intended to achieve the objective of the

original command) and also to encourage the continued compliance of *other* subjects by inspiring in them, through exemplary cases, a fear of the sanctions for disobedience.⁶¹ Fear of violent internal sanctions against individuals and the existence of means for waging violent conflict against groups (both internally and externally) have often been regarded as important in the origin of the State and of political obedience.⁶² The role of fear of sanctions is especially important when other reasons for obedience have become weakened. Yet political power cannot be reduced simply to physical might, and fear of sanctions in support of laws and commands is not the sole reason for obedience.

3. Moral obligation A third reason for obedience is that subjects feel a moral obligation to obey. This is distinct from a legal obligation to do so, although certain types of moral obligation may be associated with a legal obligation. A sense among the subjects of a moral obligation to obey is a common quality of all forms of political organization.⁶³

A sense of moral obligation to obey is partly a product of the normal process by which the individual absorbs the customs, ways and beliefs of his society as he grows up,⁶⁴ and partly the result of deliberate indoctrination.⁶⁵ The line between these processes is not always clear. They produce in the subject an inner "constraining power"⁶⁶ which leads him to obedience and submission.⁶⁷ This sense of moral obligation may not originate with the ruler but, instead, come from general views about the welfare of the whole society or from religious principles. On the other hand, because of the limited effectiveness of fear, rulers may try to influence "the most efficacious of all" restraints, that of "a man's own conscience."⁶⁸ The ruler's "secret of success" then becomes the subject's mind, and propaganda becomes "the indispensable adjunct of the police."⁶⁹

The origins and effects of such feelings vary, but generally they may arise from four considerations:⁷⁰

a) The common good of society. Belief that constraint by government is for the common good is always an element in political obedience.⁷¹ Hume described this as the motive which first produced submission and obedience to governments and one which continued to do so.⁷² Obedience makes protection from antisocial persons possible,⁷³ and promotes the good of all. As T.H. Green put it, both morality and political subjection originate in general rational recognition of "a common well-being," embodied in rules to restrain those who would violate it.⁷⁴ This view includes both belief in the benefits of government in general and of a particular government as compared to any possible alternative.⁷⁵

Belief that political obedience is for the common good—held by both the general population and those able to impose sanctions for disobedience—thus "gives great security to any government."⁷⁶ Without this belief, says Green, no one would recognize any claim to the common obedience of the subjects.⁷⁷

The degree to which the law or the particular regime is identified with the common good will help to determine the degree of loyal obedience.⁷⁸ However, a considerable discrepancy may be tolerated, for belief in the advantages of government makes people averse to resistance and displeased when others resist.⁷⁹ Although dissatisfied, people may therefore continue to obey for fear that resistance might entail still greater evil and that government itself might collapse.⁸⁰

b) Suprahuman factors. A second source of moral obligation leading to political obedience lies in the identification of the lawgiver or ruler with suprahuman qualities, powers, or principles which make disobedience inconceivable. These qualities may originate in magic, supernatural beings, deities, or "true-believer" ideologies (both political and religious). But the effect on obedience is similar. The ruling system thus takes on the character of a religious or nonreligious "theocracy"—a development which significantly contributes to obedience,⁸¹ for disobedience then becomes heresy, impiety, a betrayal of race, nation, or class, or a defiance of the gods,⁸² of History, or of Truth. Various methods, such as rituals, may be used to keep alive deference and belief in the particular suprahuman qualities, powers, or principles identified with the lawgiver or ruler.

c) Legitimacy of the command. Commands are also obeyed because they are considered legitimate owing to their source⁸³ and their issuer.⁸⁴ If the command is given by someone in an accepted official position, if it is seen as being in accordance with tradition, established law and constitution, if the ruler has obtained his position through the established procedure, then the subject will usually feel a greater obligation to obey than he would if these conditions were not present.⁸⁵ More rarely, by contrast, in revolutionary situations legitimacy may derive not from tradition but from "the people," "the revolution," and activities during the struggle against the previous, now "illegitimate," ruler or system. There are also other sources of legitimacy⁸⁶ which contribute to obedience by increasing the ruler's authority.

d) Conformity of commands to accepted norms. The fourth source of feelings of moral obligation to obey rulers lies in the conformity of their commands to accept norms of conduct. People then obey because the behavior commanded by the ruler is what they believe to be right in any case, such as not stealing or not killing. The law is then obeyed because

of the "rationality of its contents."⁸⁷ As Green puts it, the law corresponds to the "general sense of what is equitable and necessary."⁸⁸

4. Self-interest Nonpolitical organizations and institutions—business, educational, scientific and the like—often obtain the desired cooperation of individuals by offering incentives, such as money, position and prestige. Similarly, incentives may also be important in political institutions, including the State, as they help to procure the obedience, cooperation and active assistance of subjects. Hume lists self-interest as a secondary, supporting, reason for obedience which operates in combination with other reasons.⁸⁹ People who dislike a ruler or system may nevertheless continue not only to obey passively, but even to serve actively in what they consider to be their own positive self-interest. There may also be a negative type of self-interest, involving the avoidance of molestation and inconvenience; this is related to sanctions and is discussed under that topic.

Positive self-interest is most important if the ruler is to obtain the various types of assistants and helpers he needs to run the government and to rule. Once the ruler is established, he is able to encourage the expectation of rewards.⁹⁰ Normally his ministers and military force, for example, "find an immediate and visible interest in supporting his authority."⁹¹ Such self-interest may also be especially important for persons who occupy secondary governmental positions in administration, enforcement and the like, as well as nongovernmental intermediary positions in the society.

Self-interest may be appealed to in terms of: *prestige* (the hope for titles, decorations and various honors); *relative power position* (maintenance and improvement of one's status in the political and social pyramid);⁹² or *direct or indirect financial gain* ("every man is supposed to have his price").⁹³ These rewards especially help the ruler to obtain the services of the minority, which he will use to rule and control the majority.⁹⁴

While direct economic rewards have generally been limited to relatively small numbers of persons, economic self-interest may now in certain societies be an increasingly important motive for obedience among a larger percentage of the population. With the multiplication of government jobs and controls over the economy, more people may find it to their interest to remain loyal, to obey, and to cooperate. Also, indirect economic rewards may encourage general submission; higher standards of living and increasing material benefits in highly industrialized countries may contribute significantly to continuing political obedience and positive assistance for the system and regime.

5. Psychological identification with the ruler Subjects may also obey and cooperate because they have a close emotional identification with the ruler or with the regime or system. This identification may be stronger and more usual in societies in which the common beliefs and sense of purpose have broken down; people often need something or someone to believe in and some source of purpose and direction in their lives. Deutsch refers to persons who look "upon the government in some manner as an extension of themselves or upon themselves as an extension of the government . . . the triumphs and successes of the government are felt as personal triumphs by its subjects; its defeats are experienced as personal dishonor or misfortune . . ."⁹⁵ This phenomenon is not limited to any particular political system.

6. Zones of indifference Although subjects do not obey all laws with equal thoroughness or enthusiasm, it does not follow that all those laws which do not arouse enthusiastic obedience will be poorly obeyed in the absence of threats of sanctions. This is because, in Robert M. MacIver's words, "there is a margin of indifference and a margin of tolerance."⁹⁶ Barnard also observes that one reason that it is possible to achieve enduring cooperation is the existence of " 'a zone of indifference' within which each individual will accept orders without consciously questioning their authority . . ."⁹⁷ How wide this zone is will vary, depending on a number of social and political conditions and the inducements offered for obedience.

7. Absence of self-confidence among subjects Many people do not have sufficient confidence in themselves, their judgment and their capacities to make them capable of disobedience and resistance. Having no strong will of their own, they accept that of their rulers, and sometimes prefer rulers who will direct their lives and relieve them of the task of making decisions. The subjects may be disillusioned, exhausted, apathetic, or possessed of inertia, or they may lack a belief system which makes it possible both to evaluate when one ought to obey and disobey, and also to give confidence in one's right and ability to make such a decision. Lack of self-confidence may also be influenced by a belief that the ruling group is more qualified to make decisions and to carry them out than are the subjects. This attitude may be based on perceived greater competence,⁹⁸ social customs and class distinctions,⁹⁹ or conscious indoctrination.¹⁰⁰

One consequence of the lack of self-confidence is a tendency to avoid responsibility, to seek to delegate it upward and to attribute greater authority to superiors in the hierarchy than is in fact merited.¹⁰¹ People

lacking self-confidence may seek a ruler, a leader, a despot, a tyrant who will relieve them of responsibility for guiding their present and their future.¹⁰² Wrote Rousseau: "Slaves lose everything in their chains, even the desire of escaping from them: they love their servitude, as the comrades of Ulysses loved their brutish condition."¹⁰³ Even where subjects wish to alter the established order, they may remain submissive because they lack confidence in their ability to act effectively in bringing about the desired changes. As long as people lack self-confidence they are unlikely to do anything other than obey, cooperate with, and submit to their rulers.

B. Obtaining the ruler's functionaries and agents

Every ruler uses the obedience and cooperation he receives from *part* of the society to rule the *whole*. He is assisted by a "veritable army of underlings,"¹⁰⁴ a complex graded organization of subordinates, functionaries and agents,¹⁰⁵ who help to subject the society as a whole to his domination.¹⁰⁶ This requires and produces a hierarchical system.¹⁰⁷ Because of the key role of this section of the population, brief special attention to their motives for obedience and cooperation is required. As with the general populace, these motives are various and multiple: habit, fear of sanctions, moral obligation, self-interest, identification with the ruler, indifference within very broad limits to particular policies, and insufficient self-confidence to refuse. While the preceding discussion of these motives also applies here, it seems that for this group a particular motive may be of either more or less importance than among the general population. Feelings of moral obligation to obey and to provide help may be especially important. Within the ruling group, which includes this organization of functionaries and agents, "some common sentiment," "something like voluntary consent" is needed.¹⁰⁸ As already noted, self-interest may play a disproportionately large role; Boétie observed that there may be "as many people to whom tyranny seems profitable, as those to whom liberty would be agreeable."¹⁰⁹ Today, many people have vested in the continuance of established regimes and therefore continue to serve them.

Fear of sanctions is probably less important among the functionaries and agents than among the general populace. (An exception might be soldiers who are drafted into the army against their wishes and face severe sanctions should they mutiny.) Generally, however, violent sanctions are not decisive in obtaining the special assistance of functionaries and agents; other motives predominate. This may be important in getting them

to refuse to assist groups which have illegally seized the State apparatus by a *coup d'état*, for example.

C. Obedience is not inevitable¹¹⁰

Obedience to a ruler's command, though usual, is not inevitable. It always varies in degree with the individual concerned and with the social and political situation. Obedience is never universally practiced by the whole population. Many people sometimes disobey the law. Some people do so frequently. The degree of general compliance varies widely. The most powerful ruler receives no more than the habitual obedience of the bulk of the subjects.¹¹¹ Publicized cases of mass disobedience, defiance and noncooperation are simply more extensive dramatic evidences of this general truth. They are demonstrations that the wielding of political power is indeed a case of interaction.

People are generally law-abiding, except when "unmoored by catastrophic events or by social convulsions."¹¹² At any given point in a given society there are limits within which a ruler must stay if his commands are to be obeyed. These limits are subject to change throughout the history of a society.¹¹³ To the degree that the law and the ruler's general policies agree with the needs of a society and the general sense of what is desirable and tolerable, obedience will be widespread. But, Rudlin observed, "Obedience can be enforced only while the mass of men are in some sort of agreement with the law. There is no lack of examples of opposition and successful opposition, to government decision."¹¹⁴

It follows that under certain conditions subjects may be willing to put up with inconvenience, suffering and disruption of their lives rather than continue to submit passively or to obey a ruler whose policies they can no longer tolerate. Having long been accustomed to receiving widespread obedience, rulers do not always anticipate these eventualities.¹¹⁵

THE ROLE OF CONSENT

In light of the above discussion, it is reasonable to view the political obedience on which a ruler's power is ultimately dependent as a consequence of a combination of a fear of sanctions and free consent—the latter arising either from a more or less nonrational acceptance of the standards and ways of one's society, or from a more or less rational consideration of the merits of the regime and the reasons for obeying it. This is compatible with discussions by several theorists who describe obedience as

arising from a mixture of "coercion" and "consent."¹¹⁶ Clearly sanctions *alone* could not produce the necessary degree, extent and constancy of obedience. Yet if *other* reasons for obedience are present, an increase in sanctions may increase compliance.¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, the fact remains that sanctions do not *always* produce an increase in obedience. This may be because in order to produce obedience, sanctions must also operate through the volition, or will, of the subject. This possibility merits further exploration. If true, it has important political implications.

Let us first admit that there is a meaningful sense in which obedience is *not* voluntary, in which the individual is a more or less helpless victim of vast social and political forces which impinge upon him—even determining his beliefs, his moral standards, his attitudes to social and political events, and consequently his obedience to the State. If these forces are insufficient to produce obedience, there is always the repressive power of the State, which he has learned to fear. This combination of pressures, controls and repression is, more often than not, seen as a conclusive reason for the view that obedience follows more or less automatically from the issuance of commands. As we have seen, however, the wielding of political power involves social interaction, and obedience is by no means as uniform or universal as this deterministic view of obedience would lead us to expect. The reason for this inconsistency may be simple: the view that political obedience is constant, that it is determined by these social and political forces (or, if all else fails, will at least be produced by sanctions) is fallacious.

A. Obedience is essentially voluntary

In reviewing the reasons for obedience we find that although they are highly influenced by various social forces, each reason must operate through the will or the opinion of the individual subject to be effective. If he is to obey, the subject must accept a combination of the current reasons for obeying as in fact being sufficient for obedience. Because sanctions do not automatically produce obedience, the subject's evaluation of the reasons for obedience will even include sanctions. The will or opinion of the individual is not constant and may change in response to new influences, events and forces. In varying degrees the individual's own will may then play an active role in the situation. There is thus an important sense in which the obedience of subjects is essentially the result of an act of volition.¹¹⁸

Even in the case of obedience by habit, the subject accepts the view that it is best to continue to obey without consciously trying to examine

why he should do so. Feelings of moral obligation, a psychological identification with the ruler, and acceptance of a "zone of indifference" all involve a basically voluntary acceptance of the ruler's wishes. The role of self-interest in procuring obedience may vary, depending upon the relative importance given (more or less consciously) to it by the subject, in the context of a variety of other attitudes. In certain situations the subject may even conclude that it is in his self-interest to *disobey* a regime—especially if he foresees its collapse. The degree of his lack of self-confidence also varies and may be influenced by changes in the attitudes of other subjects.

Even in the case of sanctions, there is a role for an act of will, for choice. The sanction must be *feared* and its consequences be seen as more undesirable than the consequences of obedience. This is not to deny that there is always "a margin of obedience which is won only by the use of force or the threat of force."¹¹⁹ Even Gandhi would admit that "consent is often forcibly procured by the despot."¹²⁰ To say there is a role for will or choice even in the case of sanctions is to say that one can choose to obey, thus avoiding the sanctions threatened for disobedience. Or one can choose to disobey and risk receiving the threatened sanctions.

Here a distinction must be made between obedience and coercion by direct physical violation. If, for example, a man who is ordered to go to prison refuses to do so and is physically dragged there (that is, if he is coerced by direct physical violation), he cannot be said to obey, argued Austin. But if he *walks* to prison under a command backed by *threat* of a sanction, then he in fact obeys and consents to the act, although he may not approve of the command.¹²¹ *Obedience thus exists only when one has complied with or submitted to the command.*

Physical compulsion affecting only the body therefore does not obtain *obedience*. Only certain types of objectives can be achieved by direct physical compulsion of disobedient subjects—such as moving them physically, preventing them from moving physically, or seizing their money or property. Even to achieve such limited objectives in the face of a larger number of disobedient subjects would require a vast number of enforcement agents able to force or constrain each of them physically. Most other objectives of commands, and certainly active cooperation, cannot be produced by even continuous direct physical violation of persons—whether the command is to dig a ditch, obey traffic signals, work in a factory, offer technical advice, or arrest political opponents. The overwhelming percentage of a ruler's commands and objectives can only be achieved by inducing the subject to be *willing* for some reason to carry them out. Punishment

of one who disobeys a command does not achieve the objective (for example, the ditch remains undug even if the men who refused to dig it have been shot).

The threat of physical compulsion or sanctions produces obedience and consent only when the threat affects the subject's mind and emotions—in other words, when the subject fears the sanctions and is unwilling to suffer them. This was Simmel's point too: he argued that despite penalties for disobedience, the choice to obey or to disobey is always possible.¹²² *It is not the sanctions themselves which produce obedience but the fear of them.*¹²³ In Robert Michels' words: "Even when authority rests on mere physical coercion it is accepted by those ruled, although the acceptance may be due to a fear of force."¹²⁴ Of course, it is almost axiomatic that most people in most situations are quite unwilling to suffer the penalties for disobedience. Even when their dislike of the status quo is high, there will be hesitation. Gandhi, for example, on the basis of his efforts to produce large-scale disobedience and voluntary acceptance of imposed sanctions, observed that feelings must be very intense to make possible the acceptance of such sacrifice.¹²⁵ However, disobedience sometimes occurs despite sanctions, as will be described later in more detail.

If, then, choice and volition are present even where obedience is largely produced by sanctions—where one could least expect an act of will—the obedience of subjects in general can be regarded as voluntary and as arising from consent. This is especially so because generally people obey for reasons other than the threat of sanctions. Clearly, permanent obedience cannot be produced only by threat of sanctions.¹²⁶ It is reasonable to conclude with Austin that obedient subjects *will* the obedience they render, that they obey because of some motive, that they consent to obey. Their obedience is therefore essentially voluntary.¹²⁷ This is one of the significant characteristics of government.

The conclusions of the discussion thus far may be put succinctly. A ruler's power is dependent upon the availability of its several sources. This availability is determined by the degree of obedience and cooperation given by the subjects. Such obedience and cooperation are, however, not inevitable, and despite inducements, pressures, and even sanctions, obedience remains essentially voluntary. Therefore, *all government is based upon consent.*¹²⁸

Support for this view comes from widely diverse political thinkers and actionists. For example, Austin wrote that the view "that every government continues through the people's consent" simply means that in every society "the people are determined by motives of some description or an-

other, to obey their government habitually . . ." ¹²⁹ William Godwin, an earlier and more libertarian thinker, argued that people can be held in subjection only insofar as ". . . they are willing to be subject. All government is founded in opinion."¹³⁰ Acceptance of this view came even from Adolf Hitler: "For, in the long run, government systems are not held together by the pressure of force, but rather by the belief in the quality and the truthfulness with which they represent and promote the interests of the people."¹³¹

To say that every government depends on consent of the people does not, of course, mean that the subjects of all rulers *prefer* the established order to any other which might be created. They *may* consent because they positively approve of it—but they may also consent because they are unwilling to pay the price for the refusal of consent.¹³² Refusal requires self-confidence and the motivation to resist and may involve considerable inconvenience¹³³ and social disruption,¹³⁴ to say nothing of suffering.

The degree of liberty or tyranny in any government is, it follows, in large degree a reflection of the relative determination of the subjects to be free and their willingness and ability to resist efforts to enslave them.

Three of the most important factors in determining to what degree a ruler's power will be controlled or uncontrolled therefore are: 1) the relative desire of the populace to control his power; 2) the relative strength of the subjects' independent organizations and institutions; and 3) the subjects' relative ability to withhold their consent and assistance.

Ultimately, therefore, freedom is not something which a ruler "gives" his subjects. Nor, in the long run, do the formal institutional structures and procedures of the government, as prescribed by the constitution, by themselves determine the degree of freedom or the limits of the ruler's power. A society may in fact be more free than those formal arrangements would indicate. Instead, the extent and intensity of the ruler's power will be set by the strength of the subjects and the condition of the whole society. Those limits may themselves, in turn, be expanded or contracted by the interplay between the actions of the ruler and those of the subjects.

The political conclusions to be drawn from these insights into the power of all rulers are simple but they are of fundamental significance in establishing control over dictators and finding a substitute for war. Errol E. Harris has formulated them succinctly. He argues that political power "can never be exercised without the acquiescence of the people—without the direct cooperation of the large numbers of people and the indirect coopera-

tion of the entire community."¹³⁵ Therefore, tyranny has "flourished only where the people through ignorance, or disorganization, or by actual connivance and complicity, aid and abet the tyrant and keep him in power by allowing themselves to be the instruments of his coercion."¹³⁶

. . . a nation gets the government which it deserves, and those to whom this dictum is distasteful are either the small minority of dissidents, too few to influence the popular will of which they are the victims, or else those whose discontent is inconsistent with their practice, and who cooperate with the tyranny they deplore in spite of themselves and often without realizing it.¹³⁷

Leo Tolstoy had such insights into the nature of all government in mind when he wrote about the English subjection of India:

A commercial company enslaved a nation comprising two hundred millions. Tell this to a man free from superstition and he will fail to grasp what these words mean. What does it mean that thirty thousand men . . . have subdued two hundred million . . . ? Do not the figures make it clear that it is not the English who have enslaved the Indians, but the Indians who have enslaved themselves?¹³⁸

It was not simply English military might which subjected India to English rule, argued Tolstoy; this subjection could not be understood except in the context of the condition of Indian society which led the Indians to cooperate with, submit to, and obey the new *Raj*.

Such obedience and cooperation are not offered automatically, for people do not give equal obedience and help to every person and group which lays claim to governing them. Nor does any particular ruler necessarily receive equal obedience and assistance throughout his reign.

B. Consent can be withdrawn

We have seen that obedience by the subject is the consequence of the mutual influence of various causes operating through his will. These causes of obedience are not, however, constant. The reasons for obedience are variable and may be strengthened or weakened. For example, the degree of a ruler's authority will vary. Other reasons for obedience may increase or decrease. Conditions and outlooks, the state of the subjects' knowledge, their attitudes and emotions—all may change. They may alter the subjects' willingness to submit or to resist. Even fear of sanctions is not constant. Such fear may grow because of increased severity or personal insecurity. Or it may decrease, because of reduced severity or increased willingness

to accept sanctions because of overriding goals. The subjects' willingness to submit to a particular policy or to a whole regime may also be altered because of new beliefs (or new insights into old ones) and because of changes in perceptions of the established system. As a result of all these possible variations, the necessary consent of the subjects is unstable. It is always characterized by minor variations; it may at times be characterized by major changes.

Obedience therefore varies. For example, decline in the ruler's authority may undermine the subjects' willingness to obey and also weaken their voluntary cooperation.¹³⁹ When one or more reasons for obedience lose strength, the ruler may seek to counteract that loss by efforts to increase other reasons for obedience, such as by making sanctions harsher and more frequent or by increasing rewards for loyal service.¹⁴⁰ If such efforts are not successful, the continued decline in grounds for obedience may lead to the disintegration of the particular regime.

The change in the subjects' wills may lead to their withdrawing from the ruler their service, cooperation, submission and obedience. This withdrawal may occur among both the ordinary subjects and the ruler's agents and administrators. There is abundant historical evidence that changes in the opinions of the subjects and agents have led to reduced obedience and cooperation with the established ruler and, in turn, to the weakening of the regime.

The attitudes and beliefs of the ruler's agents are especially important here. Destroy the opinion of the supporting intermediary class that it is in their interest to support the ruler, urged Godwin, "and the fabric which is built upon it falls to the ground."¹⁴¹ Likewise, he argued, any army, domestic or foreign, which is used to hold a people in subjection may be influenced by the opinions and sentiments of the people at large. The army may then decline to provide the ruler with assistance in suppressing the people, just as the general populace may withhold its assistance.¹⁴²

Gandhi, who experimented widely with the political potentialities of disobedience, emphasized the importance of a change of will as a prerequisite for a change in patterns of obedience and cooperation. There was, he argued, a need for: 1) a psychological change away from passive submission to self-respect and courage;¹⁴³ 2) recognition by the subject that his assistance makes the regime possible;¹⁴⁴ and 3) the building of a determination to withdraw cooperation and obedience.¹⁴⁵ Gandhi felt that these changes could be consciously influenced, and he therefore deliberately set out to bring them about. "My speeches," he said, "are in-

tended to create 'disaffection' as such, that people might consider it a shame to assist or cooperate with a government that had forfeited all title to respect or support."¹⁴⁶

Changes in the attitudes of workers in factories or of citizens in politics, for example, which result in withdrawal of obedience and cooperation can create extreme difficulties for the system. It can be disrupted or paralyzed. At times this can happen even when the ruler's own agents continue their loyal obedience. The sheer difficulties of maintaining the normal working of any political unit when its subjects are bent upon an attitude of defiance and acts of obstruction are sufficient to give any ruler cause for thought. Without the obedience, cooperation, assistance and submission of the subjects and agents, power-hungry men claiming to be rulers would be "rulers" without subjects, and therefore only "objects of derision."¹⁴⁷

If a ruler's power is to be controlled by withdrawing help and obedience, noncooperation and disobedience must be widespread and must be maintained in the face of repression aimed at forcing a resumption of submission. However, once there has been a major reduction of or an end to the subjects' fear, and once there is a willingness to suffer sanctions as the price of change, large-scale disobedience and noncooperation become possible. Such action then becomes politically significant,¹⁴⁸ and the ruler's will is thwarted in proportion to the number of disobedient subjects and the degree of his dependence upon them. The answer to the problem of uncontrolled power may therefore lie in learning how to carry out and maintain such withdrawal despite repression.

TOWARD A THEORY OF NONVIOLENT CONTROL OF POLITICAL POWER

Many people may readily admit that noncooperation and disobedience may create minor and temporary problems for rulers, but deny that such action can do more. If such were the limits of the impact of noncooperation and disobedience, then reliance would have to be placed elsewhere for control of the power of governments. Indeed, a number of political theorists have pointed to very different means of control over ruler's powers, and their theories have gained wide acceptance.

A. Traditional controls

Because a discussion of these more traditional means of control can, by comparison and contrast, help to point up important characteristics

of the nonviolent approach, they should be briefly surveyed here. Generally speaking, they fall into three categories: voluntary self-restraint by rulers themselves, institutional arrangements designed to limit the exercise of power, and the application of superior power of the same type, as in violent revolution or war.

1. Self-restraint Self-restraint has long been one of the important restraining or limiting influences on rulers: the ruler voluntarily accepts some limits on the scope of his power and on the means he would use to wield that power. Beyond such limits he would be unwilling to go, because of a belief that to do so would violate moral and other standards accepted by the ruler and by society. This self-restraint has operated both alone and in combination with other controls, especially certain institutional arrangements which are discussed below.

Among contemporary writers, Martin J. Hillenbrand has placed special emphasis on the importance of self-control in rulers, regarding it as one of the two fundamental ways of controlling "the power of force" (the other being "the superior power of force").¹⁴⁹ He calls this "the internal control of self-restraint in the use of power based on some criterion or theory of conduct."¹⁵⁰ Hillenbrand concludes that for the present and in the future "the essential solution" to the problem of the control of power "must lie in the inducement of restraint in the possessors of power so that they will use it only in accordance with certain criteria."¹⁵¹

2. Institutional arrangements The second traditional means to control the abuse of power has been the attempt to establish "a principle or a set of institutions by which governments might be restrained."¹⁵² This has involved setting up procedures for selecting the power-holder, determining government policy, and regulating government actions. The institutional and constitutional arrangements of liberal democracies have been the prime contributions toward this type of control. The legislature is elected by the subjects, and then either the executive is chosen by the legislature (as a prime minister and his cabinet) or the chief executive is elected directly by the subjects (as the American president). Governmental powers and procedures have been enumerated in the constitution, laws and traditions of such systems. In the American system differing tasks have been assigned to separate branches of the government, and the rights of the subjects have been enumerated. The judiciary has often been authorized to defend the rights of the subjects and to limit the actions of the government. These are only examples. Such systems are based on the assumption that in the last analysis the elected government is willing to abide by such restrictions on its power, and that powerful internal forces do not handicap seriously or disrupt the normal functioning of the system.

3. Applying superior means of violence Where all other means of asserting influence and control over a political ruler have failed, the traditional solution has been to threaten or to use superior violence against his forces. As we noted, Hillenbrand speaks of "the threat of, or the actual use of, superior power of force" as one of "two fundamental ways by which the power of force may be controlled."¹⁵³ Violence for this purpose has taken a variety of forms, including rioting, assassination, violent revolution, guerrilla warfare, *coup d'état*, civil war and international war.

The need for some further means of control beyond these three has often been admitted. Jouvenel, for example, has spoken of the difficulty of finding "some practical method" for controlling power,¹⁵⁴ and Jacques Maritain has posed "the problem of the means through which the people can supervise or control the State."¹⁵⁵

This is not an easy task, for an alternative technique of control over political power ought to contain the potential for dealing with extreme situations as well as minor ones. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, surveys briefly a small part of the evidence from existing theory and practice which indicates that withdrawal of cooperation, obedience and submission may threaten the ruler's position and power.

B. Theorists on withdrawal of support

Several political theorists have also argued that the withdrawal of obedience, cooperation and submission by subjects, if sustained, will produce a crisis for the ruler, threatening the very existence of the regime. These include Boétie, Machiavelli and Austin. The similarities of their views to the conclusion reached to this point in our analysis are striking.

Boétie—the least known of these theorists—argued that refusal of assistance to tyrants cuts off the sources of their power, and continued refusal causes tyrants to collapse without need for violence against them. "... if they are given nothing, if they are not obeyed, without fighting, without striking a blow, they remain naked and undone, and do nothing further, just as the root, having no soil or food, the branch withers and dies."¹⁵⁶ Boétie maintained that people could deliver themselves from a tyrant by casting off servility: "... just don't support him, and you will see him like a great colossus whose base has been stolen, of his own weight sink to the ground and shatter."¹⁵⁷ Boétie's views—reputedly written at the age of eighteen—exerted a great influence upon Thoreau and Tolstoy.¹⁵⁸ Through Tolstoy, those views also influenced Gandhi who saw in them a confirma-

tion of the theory of power he had already grasped, and the political potential which he had already begun to explore.

A few years before Boétie, Machiavelli also pointed to the dangers which disobedience (by both his agents and his ordinary subjects) presented to a prince, especially in times of transition from a civil to an absolute order of government. The prince must then depend on the uncertain goodwill of his agents (magistrates), who may refuse to assist him, or of his subjects, who may not be "of a mind to obey him amid these confusions."¹⁵⁹ Machiavelli argued that the prince "... who has the public as a whole for his enemy can never make himself secure; and the greater his cruelty, the weaker does his regime become."¹⁶⁰

Marat, writing in the *Ami du Peuple* on June 30, 1790, warned the "aristocracy of rich men" that, instead of taking revenge, the poor should simply leave the rich to themselves, for "... to take your place, we have only to stand with folded arms. Reduced, as you will then be, to working with your hands and tilling your own fields, you will become our equals..."¹⁶¹

Percy B. Shelley, poet and son-in-law of Godwin, was similarly convinced that by noncooperation numerically overwhelming subjects might control their rulers. His wife, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, has written: "The great truth that the many, if accordant and resolute, could control the few... made him long to teach his injured countrymen how to resist."¹⁶²

Jouvenel, one of today's major political philosophers, has emphasized the dependence of earlier rulers on their subjects. How could a feudal king have waged "war if the barons had not mustered their contingents? What use to condemn a notable if his peers were certain to refuse to cooperate in the execution of the sentence?"¹⁶³ Not only the nobility but also the common people possessed power over the ruler through noncooperation: "... how could a feudal king have mustered an army if the barons... had not received obedience in their domains? And how could the industrialists have paid their taxes if their workers had stopped work?"¹⁶⁴

It is almost axiomatic that in the face of such noncooperation and disobedience from anything less than the total population, the ruler will inflict severe sanctions through those agents remaining faithful to him. Repression of the subjects in such situations may force a resumption of submission. But repression will not necessarily ward off the danger to his position and power. As we have seen, disobedient subjects may still refuse to submit and may be willing to endure the repression and to continue their resistance in order to achieve some overriding objective. The subjects may

then win, for, as Tocqueville argued, "A government which should have no other means of exacting obedience than open war must be very near its ruin . . ." ¹⁶⁵

Austin was similarly convinced:

For if the bulk of the community were fully determined to destroy it [the government], and to brave and endure the evils through which they must pass to their object, the might of the government itself, with the might of the minority attached to it, would scarcely suffice to preserve it, or even to retard its subversion. And though it were aided by foreign governments, and therefore were more than a match for the disaffected and rebellious people, it hardly could reduce them to subjection, or constrain them to permanent obedience, in case they hated it mortally, and were prepared to resist it to the death. ¹⁶⁶

"It is easier to conquer than to rule," observed Rousseau. ¹⁶⁷

C. Clues to the political impact of noncooperation

There is considerable historical evidence that the theoretical insights of Boétie, Machiavelli, Austin, Jouvenel and others are valid and that, at least in certain circumstances, noncooperation can be effective in controlling governments and other bodies that wield political power. Let us explore a few examples which show in diverse situations the dependence of the titular ruler on his bureaucracy and then on the mass of the general populace.

1. Bureaucratic obstruction Three cases are offered to show the dependence of power-holders on their bureaucracy. The first of these involves the withholding of cooperation in a political situation with a high degree of support for the ruler (the American presidency). The second is an intermediary case, with civil servants acting in an atmosphere of reservation and hostility (Russia in 1921-22). In the third there is a high degree of outright resistance (the German bureaucracy against the Kapp Putsch).

The United States. Richard Neustadt has documented the actual limitations on the power of the American president, especially those imposed by his own aides, bureaucracy and Cabinet. After analyzing several important cases in the administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, Neustadt concludes: "The same conditions that promote his leadership in form preclude a guarantee of leadership in fact." ¹⁶⁸ The president has a "power problem":

This is the classic problem of the man on top of any political

POWER




CHART ONE

THIS IS A CONTINUAL PROCESS WHICH INCREASES OR DECREASES THE RULER'S POWER CAPACITY. THIS PROCESS ENDS ONLY WHEN THAT POWER IS DISINTEGRATED.

system: how to be on top in fact as well as name. It is a problem common to Prime Ministers and Premiers, and to dictators, however styled, and to kings who rule as well as reign. It is a problem also for the heads of private "governments," for corporate presidents, trade union leaders, churchmen.¹⁶⁹

True, the position of the president gives him important persuasive and bargaining advantages, but these do not guarantee that his wishes will be implemented; all sorts of limitations and counterpressures confront him.¹⁷⁰ These come even from his executive officials, including White House aides and Cabinet members. Neustadt quotes a former Roosevelt aide:

Half of a President's suggestions, which theoretically carry the weight of orders, can be safely forgotten by a Cabinet member. And if the President asks about a suggestion a second time, he can be told that it is being investigated. If he asks a third time, a wise Cabinet officer will give him at least part of what he suggests. But only occasionally, except about the most important matters, do Presidents ever get around to asking three times.

Neustadt adds that "this rule applies to staff as well as to the Cabinet, and certainly has been applied by staff in Truman's time and Eisenhower's."¹⁷¹

The limiting pressures on the effective power of the president extend, of course, far beyond the executive branch and include the attitudes and actions of private citizens, a variety of publics, and a vast network of institutions, political organizations, officials, personalities, and even foreign governments. Real government power "is influence of an effective sort on the behavior of men actually involved in making public policy and carrying it out"; the president's "power is the product of his vantage points in government, together with his reputation in the Washington community and his prestige outside."¹⁷² Even clear commands are not always carried out, and command is a form of persuasion not suitable for everyday use.¹⁷³ While in office President Truman once said: "I sit here all day trying to persuade people to do things they ought to have sense enough to do without my persuading them. . . . That's all the powers of the President amount to." This limitation, Neustadt writes, points to "the essence of the problem," for "'powers' are no guarantee of power . . ."¹⁷⁴

In the summer of 1952, before the heat of campaign, President Truman contemplated the problems of a general-become-president should Eisenhower win the election: "He'll sit here," (tapping his desk for emphasis), "and

he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' *And nothing will happen.* Poor Ike—it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating."¹⁷⁵

Even as late as 1958 President Eisenhower still experienced " 'shocked surprise' that orders did not carry themselves out" and that the assistance of others had to be deliberately cultivated in order to produce "effective power."¹⁷⁶ Of course, it is possible to cultivate the art of inducing others to provide necessary help. However, the necessity to do this helps to confirm the pluralistic-dependency theory of power, the need of a powerholder to receive his power from others.

The Soviet Union. In March 1922, at the Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Lenin presented the Political Report of its Central Committee. In very clear terms Lenin stated that "the political lesson" of 1921 had been that control of the seats of power does not necessarily mean control of the bureaucracy. Asking what constituted Communist strength and what the Party lacked, Lenin observed that "We have quite enough political power . . . The main economic power is in our hands." Nevertheless, something was missing. This, it was "clear," was lack of culture among the stratum of Communists who perform the functions of administration." In Moscow there were 4,700 responsible Communists and also the Russian government's "huge bureaucratic machine, that huge pile." But, Lenin said, "we must ask: Who is directing whom?" Were the Communists directing? No, said Lenin. "To tell the truth, they are not directing; they are being directed." Remarkably, Lenin compared this domestic power problem to the international power problem of occupation of a defeated country by a foreign conqueror—something they had learned in their history lessons as children, said Lenin. The nation that conquers appears to be the conqueror and the nation that is vanquished appears to be the conquered nation. However, what really happens then depends, said Lenin, on the relative cultural level of the two nations. Despite the military realities, if the vanquished nation is more "cultural" than the conquering nation "the former imposes its . . . culture upon the conqueror."

Lenin then asked: "Has something like this happened in the capital of the R.S.F.S.R? Have the 4,700 Communists (nearly a whole army division, and all of them the very best) become influenced by an alien culture?" The "culture" of the "vanquished," though "at a miserably low and insignificant level," was, nevertheless, higher than that of the "responsible Communist administrators, for the latter lack administration ability."

Communists who are put at the head of departments—and sometimes art-

ful saboteurs deliberately put them in these positions in order to use them as a shield—are often fooled. This is a very unpleasant admission . . . but . . . this is the pivot of the question. I think that this is the political lesson of the past year; and it is around this that the struggle will rage in 1922.

Will the responsible Communists of the R.S.F.S.R. and of the Russian Communist Party realize that they cannot administer; that they only imagine that they are directing, but actually, they are being directed? If they realize this they will learn, of course; for this business can be learnt. But one must study hard to learn it and this our people are not doing. They scatter orders right and left, but the result is quite different from what they want.¹⁷⁷

Germany. The monarchist-military Kapp *Putsch* of 1920 against the new German Weimar Republic was defeated. According to the eminent German historian Erich Eyck, victory for the republic against this attempted *coup d'état* was won principally by “the general strike of the workers and the refusal of the higher civil servants to collaborate with their rebel masters.”¹⁷⁸ Particular attention will be given here to the refusal of assistance by these civil servants and certain other key groups. A further description is offered in Chapter Two.

At the onset of the *Putsch*, the legal Ebert government had proclaimed that German citizens remained under obligation to be loyal to and obey it alone.¹⁷⁹ The resulting resistance of the civil servants took a variety of forms. The officers of the *Reichsbank* refused Kapp's request for ten million Marks because it lacked an authorized official signature—all the under-secretaries in the ministries had refused to sign. The bank's cashier rejected Kapp's own signature as worthless,¹⁸⁰ even though his troops occupied the capital and the legal government had fled.

Unable to obtain the cooperation of qualified men to form the promised cabinet of experts, the Kappists asked public patience with a government of inexperienced men.¹⁸¹ Some cabinet posts were never filled.¹⁸² Many officials already in government bureaus refused to assist the Kapp regime; those in the government grain bureau, for example, threatened to strike unless Kapp retired.¹⁸³

Even lesser civil servants were not very helpful to those who had seized the pinnacle of power; as a result, hopelessly incompetent men were appointed to lesser but nonetheless important posts, such as directorship of the press bureau;¹⁸⁴ this weakened the Kapp regime. Even the noncooperation of clerks and typists was felt. When Kapp's daughter, who was to draft the

new regime's manifesto to the nation, arrived at the Reich Chancellery on Saturday, March 13, she found no one to type for her—no one had turned up for work that day—and no typewriter; as a result, Kapp's manifesto was too late for the Sunday papers.¹⁸⁵ Many offices of the Defense Ministry were also vacant that day.¹⁸⁶ Toward the end even the Security Police turned against Kapp, demanding his resignation.¹⁸⁷

Combined with a powerful general strike, the impact of such noncooperation was considerable. A specialist in the history of the *coup d'état* and a historian of the Kapp *Putsch*, Lieutenant Colonel D.J. Goodspeed, writes: “No government can function long without a certain necessary minimum of popular support and cooperation.”¹⁸⁸

2. Popular noncooperation The need for popular cooperation and the danger to the regime when it is absent are suggested by two cases: the Indians under the British in 1930 and the Soviet peoples under the Germans, 1941-45. In both cases we shall cite the views of the occupation officials.

India. Jawaharlal Nehru's experience with noncooperation in the Indian struggle for independence led him to conclude: “Nothing is more irritating and, in the final analysis, harmful to a government than to have to deal with people who will not bend to its will, whatever the consequences.”¹⁸⁹ Gandhi wrote: “If we are strong, the British become powerless.”¹⁹⁰

The British government seems to have agreed with Nehru and Gandhi. British officials saw large-scale noncooperation and civil disobedience as a threat and recognized the great potential of nonviolent struggle for the control of political power. Addressing both Houses of the Indian Legislative Assembly on July 9, 1930, during the noncooperation and civil disobedience movement of 1930-31 for independence (the *Swaraj satyagraha*), the British Viceroy, Lord Irwin (who was later to become Lord Halifax), rejected the view that this was “a perfectly legitimate form of political agitation.”

In my judgment and that of my Government it is a deliberate attempt to coerce established authority by mass action, and for this reason, as also because of its natural and inevitable developments, it must be regarded as unconstitutional and dangerously subversive. Mass action, even if it is intended by its promoters to be nonviolent, is nothing but the application of force under another form, and, when it has as its avowed objective the making of Government impossible, a Government is bound either to resist or abdicate. The present Movement is exactly analogous to a general strike in an industrial country, which has for its

purpose the coercion of Government by mass pressure as opposed to argument, and which a British Government recently found it necessary to mobilize all its resources to resist.

But in India the noncooperators had gone further; the All-India Working Committee of the Indian National Congress had "insidiously" attempted to undermine the allegiance of the government's police and troops. As a result, the Viceroy continued, the government had "no option" but to proclaim that body illegal. India needed to be protected from "principles so fundamentally destructive . . ."

Therefore it is that I have felt bound to combat these doctrines and to arm Government with such powers as seem requisite to deal with the situation. I fully realize that in normal times such special powers would be indefensible. But the times are not normal, and, if the only alternative is acquiescence in the result of efforts openly directed against the constituted Government of the King-Emperor, I cannot for one moment doubt on which side my duty lies . . . So long as the Civil Disobedience Movement persists, we must fight it with all our strength.¹⁹¹

It is remarkable to find the British Viceroy in essential agreement with Nehru, Gandhi and Tolstoy on the nature of British power in India and on the effective means of destroying the foreign *Raj*.

The Soviet Union. Conditions and events during the German occupation of major sections of the Soviet Union during World War II differed vastly from those prevailing in India during the British occupation. However, German experiences also led certain officials of Nazi agencies and officers of the army to the view that the cooperation and obedience of the population of these territories were needed in order to maintain the occupation regime.

In accordance with their racial ideology and policies (especially that of replacing the existing population with Germans), for a long time the Nazis did not even seek cooperation from the Eastern *Untermenschen* (subhumans). This case therefore represents an absence of cooperation by the population of the occupied areas rather than a deliberate refusal of cooperation when sought. The situation is not always clear, for many factors influenced the course of the occupation. The role of the absence of cooperation in the occupied territories is itself sometimes difficult to isolate, because of the war and guerrilla activities in these territories. Nevertheless, despite ideology, Nazi policies and war, some German officials and officers very significantly concluded that the subjects' cooperation was needed.

In his study of the occupation Alexander Dallin is able to cite many in-

stances of Nazi officials and army officers who came to realize the need for such cooperation. For example, Kube, the *Reichskommissar* in Belorussia, slowly and reluctantly concluded that at least the passive support of the population was needed. In 1942 he became convinced, Dallin reports, "that German forces could not exercise effective control without enlisting the population."¹⁹² Dallin also quotes a statement by German military commanders in the Soviet Union in December 1942: "The seriousness of the situation clearly makes imperative the positive cooperation of the population. Russia can be beaten only by Russians."¹⁹³ Captain Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt expressed similar views in lectures before a General Staff training course: "Germany, Strik-Strikfeldt concluded, faced the choice of proceeding with or without the people: it could not succeed without them if only because such a course required a measure of force which it was incapable of marshalling." General Harteneck wrote in May 1943: "We can master the wide Russian expanse which we have conquered only with the Russians and Ukrainians who live in it, never against their will."¹⁹⁵

Reviewing the history of the German occupation of the Soviet Union, Dallin writes:

While the whip continued to be the rather universal attribute of German rule, there slowly matured an elementary realization that the active cooperation of the people was needed for maximum security and optimal performance. A pragmatic imperative, perceived primarily in the field, dictated a departure from the practice, if not the theory, of Nazi-style colonialism.¹⁹⁶

This departure is all the more significant because it was diametrically opposed to the Nazi ideological position, which called the East Europeans subhumans, and to the earlier plans for exterminating the original population of major areas in order to provide empty territory for colonization, *Lebensraum* for the German *Volk*.

D. Toward a technique of control of political power

In May 1943 Hitler told Alfred Rosenberg that in the occupied East, German policy needed to be so tough as to numb the population's political consciousness.¹⁹⁷ However, in July he also declared that:

. . . ruling the people in the conquered regions is, I might say, of course a psychological problem. One cannot rule by force alone. True, force is decisive, but it is equally important to have this psychological something which the animal trainer also needs to be master of his beast. They must be convinced that we are the victors.¹⁹⁸

What follows from Hitler's admission that "force" alone is inadequate in ruling people in conquered territories if the people refuse to accept the militarily successful invaders as their political masters? Hitler's emphasis on the psychological nature of occupation rule very significantly coincides with the views of the political thinkers which have already been presented: that in order to rule it is necessary to reach the subjects' minds. These theoretical insights into power indeed have practical implications. Noncooperation and defiance by subjects, at least under certain conditions, can create serious problems for rulers, thwart their intentions and policies, and even destroy their government.

If this is true, then *why* have people not long since abolished oppression, tyranny and exploitation? There appear to be several reasons. First, such victims of a ruler's power usually feel helpless in the face of his capacity for repression, punishment and control. These feelings of helplessness arise from several causes.

The subjects usually do not realize that they are the source of the ruler's power and that by joint action they could dissolve that power. Failure to realize the role they play may have its roots either in innocent ignorance or in deliberate deception by the ruler. If the subjects look at their ruler's power at a given moment, they are likely to see it as a hard, solid force which at any point may fall upon them in their helplessness; this short-range view leads them to the monolith theory of power. If they were to look at their ruler's power both backward and forward in time, however, and note its origins and growth, its variations and fragility, they would begin to see their role in the genesis, continuance and development of that power. This realization would reveal that they possess the capacity to destroy that power.

It is also often in the ruler's power-interest to keep the people deceived about the fragile nature of political power and their capacity to dissolve it. Hence, rulers may sometimes seek to keep this knowledge from them. Tolstoy argued that the people, on whose cooperation the oppressive regime ultimately depended, continued to serve it by becoming soldiers and police, because "from long continued deception they no longer see the connection between their bondage and their own share in the deeds of violence."¹⁹⁹ In his day Hume similarly anticipated that rulers would themselves see the dangers of this view of power to their own position:

Were you to preach, in most parts of the world, that political connections are founded together on voluntary consent or a mutual promise, the magistrate would soon imprison you, as seditious, for loosening the

ties of obedience, if your friends did not before shut you up as delirious, for advancing such absurdities.²⁰⁰

Hobbes saw something of the power of disobedience and, anticipating that it would destroy *all* government (not only a particular one), he turned away horrified, arguing firmly for the universal (or near universal) unquestioning submission of subjects to rulers.²⁰¹

Unjust or oppressive rulers have every reason to keep knowledge of this theory from their subjects, and there are signs that they deliberately do so. (It is much less obvious that governments which genuinely reflect the will of their subjects have good reason for such restriction.) Even small-scale strikes and trade unions were widely illegal until union organization became too strong to suppress. The frequent reactions of governments when confronted with general strikes and mass popular action are worth noting. Do they not react with disproportionately intense determination not to give in, to defeat such actions—even when these actions have majority support and are aimed at relatively minor objectives? Do not such governments often refuse to negotiate until the general strike has been called off? Even when concessions are made, are these not often attributed to causes other than the popular noncooperation? It would seem that at least part of the explanation for such reactions is that the governments often object less to granting the demands than they do to the popular withdrawal of cooperation and obedience, and that they fear the spread of an awareness of the power of noncooperation in controlling political power. This would also explain, among other things, why rulers who pride themselves on their liberalism and who acknowledge the right of individual dissent, even in conscientious objection to military service, may react so strongly when a number of individuals act collectively in noncooperation and disobedience.

We are assuming that, under at least certain circumstances, ethical justification for disobedience of commands of rulers, and even for the abolition of whole regimes, exists. This is an assumption which not everyone will grant, but it is not a question which any longer requires much debate. Always to deny such a right of disobedience or revolution is to say that once Hitler's Nazi regime came to power, it was the duty of all Germans to obey it completely and carry out all its plans efficiently, that no matter what it did, there was no right of resistance or revolution. Few today will accept so extreme an interpretation of one's duty to obey. If they do not accept it, they implicitly grant that disobedience and defiance may be morally justified, at least under certain conditions.

The right to disobey and resist has been argued, however, on other

grounds as well. Hume, for example, believed that constitutional government, with its separation and limitation of powers, depended on some form of resistance to keep it democratic, for "every part or member of the constitution must have a right of self-defence, and of maintaining its ancient bounds against the encroachments of every other authority." It is, he argued,

a gross absurdity to suppose in any government a right without a remedy, or allow that the supreme power is shared with the people, without allowing that it is lawful for them to defend their share against every invader. Those, therefore, who would seem to respect our free government, and yet deny the right of resistance, have renounced all pretensions to common sense, and do not merit a serious answer.²⁰²

The problem of finding remedies which are not in the long run worse than the evils they are intended to remove—a problem which concerned Hobbes—is still a difficult one. It is important to examine all proposed courses of action in that light, including the technique on which this book is focused. Examination of specific political potentialities of this technique lies outside the scope of this study, which is limited to exploration of the nature of nonviolent action; but an understanding of nonviolent action and its theory of power requires that this point be briefly answered. There is no reason to assume, as Hobbes did, that the withdrawal of obedience and cooperation to deal with a tyrant, for example, necessarily destroys all future capacity to maintain social order and democratic government. There are important reasons for believing that this is not true; these will become clearer as we consider in the concluding chapters the actual operation of the technique of action based upon this theory of power. There is even evidence that the alternative forms of behavior—violent counteraction or passive submission to oppression—may be more destructive of society than nonviolent action, especially under modern conditions.

Long before he became Chancellor, Hitler wrote that "one must not imagine that one could suddenly take out of a briefcase the drafts of a new State constitution" based on the leader-principle and impose them dictatorially on the State by command, "by a degree of power from above. One can try such a thing, but the result will certainly not be able to live, will in most cases be a stillborn child."²⁰³ What would happen if people realized this on a wide scale, knew that they could prevent the imposition on them of unwanted policies and regimes, and were skillfully able to refuse to assist, in open struggle? It has been suggested that such knowledge could lead to the abolition of tyranny and oppression. Gandhi, for

example, though referring specifically to economic issues, certainly had in mind wider implications when he wrote:

The rich cannot accumulate wealth without the cooperation of the poor in society. If this knowledge were to penetrate to and spread amongst the poor, they would become strong and would learn how to free themselves by means of nonviolence from the crushing inequalities which have brought them to the verge of starvation.²⁰⁴

Harris has observed that people do not realize that ". . . political power is their own power. . . . Consequently, they become its accomplices at the same time as they become its victims. . . . If sufficient people understood this and really knew what they were about and how to go about it, they could ensure that government would never be tyrannical."²⁰⁵ It is not without significance, perhaps, that the first issue of the first illegal resistance newspaper in Nazi-occupied Norway included this sentence near the conclusion of its first policy article: "We are convinced that a system which builds on hate, injustice and oppression never can last."²⁰⁶

The central political implications of our analysis point to control of political power by, in Green's words, "withdrawal by the sovereign people of power from its legislative or executive representatives."²⁰⁷ It is control of the ruler's power by withdrawal of consent. It is control, not by the infliction of superior violence from on top or outside, not by persuasion, nor by hopes of a change of heart in the ruler, but rather by the subjects' declining to supply the power-holder with the sources of his power, by cutting off his power at the roots. This is resistance by noncooperation and disobedience. If it can be applied practically and can succeed despite repression, this would seem to be the most efficient and certain means for controlling power.

If this theory of power is to be implemented, the question is *how*. Lack of knowledge of how to act has also been one reason why people have not, long since, abolished tyranny and oppression.

First, the citizens' rejection of the tyrannical government must be actively expressed in refusal to cooperate. This refusal may take many forms; few of these will be easy, each will require effort, many will be dangerous, and all will need courage and intelligence. And there must be group or mass action. As Gaetano Mosca pointed out, the ruling minority is unified and can act in concert, whereas the ruled majority is "unorganized"²⁰⁸—or, we may add, often lacks independent organization. The result is that the subjects are usually incapable of corporate opposition and can be dealt with one by one. Effective action based on this theory

of power requires *corporate* resistance and defiance—which may or may not be preceded by opportunity for advance specific preparations.

But generalized obstinacy and collective stubbornness are not effective enough. General opposition must be translated into a strategy of action, and people need to know how to wage the struggle which will almost inevitably follow their initial act of defiance. This includes how to persist despite repression. They will need to understand the technique based on this insight into power, including the methods of that technique, its dynamics of change, requirements for success and principles of strategy and tactics. The implementation must be skillful. We need, therefore, to examine in detail how the technique of nonviolent action—which is built on this insight into power—operates in struggle.

Therefore, we first turn to the exploration of the basic characteristics of the nonviolent technique and a survey of its history. This will lead us, in Part Two, into the multitude of specific nonviolent “weapons,” or methods, included in its armory. The chapters of the concluding Part will examine in detail the dynamics and mechanisms of nonviolent struggle, and the factors which in a particular conflict determine its failure or its success.

NOTES

1. Martin J. Hillenbrand, *Power and Morals* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 12.
2. Robert M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 87.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
4. A number of respected political and social theorists and prominent political activists have assumed this view of the nature of power, although there have been few systematic presentations of it. One reason for this lack appears to be that many of the theorists have presumed the view to be so obvious that detailed analysis was thought to be unnecessary. For a brief presentation of this view of power, see Errol E. Harris, “Political Power,” *Ethics*, vol. XLVIII, no. 1 (Oct. 1957), pp. 1-10. Dr. Harris’ article came to my attention sometime after the early drafts of this analysis were completed.

5. Auguste Comte pointed to the close relationship between the society and the political system and their mutual influence on each other, emphasizing the need to view political systems in the context of “the coexisting state of civilization.” (Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*. Freely trans. and condensed by Harriet Martineau, with an Introduction by Frederic Harrison, 2 vols. [London: George Bell & Sons, 1896], vol. II, pp. 220-223.) He lamented that “the existing political philosophy supposes the absence of any such interconnection among the aspects of society . . .” (*Ibid.*, p. 225.)

T. H. Green maintained that political theorists have often erred in focusing their attention solely on a coercive State and isolated individuals, ignoring other forms of community and the important role of society in influencing the nature of political power. (Thomas Hill Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*. [London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1948 (orig. 1882)], pp. 121 ff.) “The notion that force is the creator of government,” argued MacIver, “is one of those part-truths that beget total errors.” (MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 15.)

More recently Errol E. Harris has written: “Physical force itself is the instrument only, not the essence, of political power. Brawn, guns, and batons are but the tools employed. Power itself is not a physical phenomenon at all, it is always and only a social phenomenon . . .” (Harris, “Political Power,” p. 3.)

6. The term “ruler” or “rulers” is used here as a kind of shorthand to describe the individuals or groups which occupy the highest positions of decision and command in a given government. At times this “ruler” may be, or come close to being, a single person — as is usually assumed to have been true in the case of Hitler and Stalin. In other cases the “ruler” may be a small elite or an oligarchy. Most of the time, however, a very large number of persons, with complex interrelationships, may collectively occupy the position of “ruler.” In a case of pure direct democracy, the position of “ruler” as separated from the “ruled” would not exist. Intermediary forms and gradations also exist.
7. Etienne de La Boetie, “*Discours de la Servitude Volontaire*,” in *Oeuvres Completes d’Etienne de la Boetie* (Paris: J. Rouam & Cie., 1892), p. 12. See also *Boetie, Anti-Dictator: The “Discours sur la servitude volontaire”* of Etienne de La Boetie, trans. by Harry Kurz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), pp. 11-12. That translation differs slightly from the one in the text of this volume which was made by Madeline Chevalier Emerick.
8. Comte saw “every social power” as being “constituted by a corresponding assent . . . of various individual wills, resolved to concur in a common action, of which this power is the first organ, and then the regulator. Thus, authority is derived from concurrence, and not concurrence from authority . . . so that no great power can arise otherwise than from the strongly prevalent disposition of the society in which it exists . . .” The degree of disposition in the society toward a ruler, Comte believed, would determine the relative strength or weakness of the power-holder. (Comte, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, pp. 222-223.)
9. Two contemporary American writers argue similarly to Comte. Harold D. Lasswell writes: “Power is an interpersonal situation; those who hold power are empowered. They depend upon and continue only so long as there is a continuing stream of empowering responses . . . power is . . . a process that vanishes when the supporting responses cease. “The power relationship is . . . giving-and-taking. It is a cue-giving and cue-taking in a continuing spiral of interaction.” (Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1948], p. 10.)

MacIver says it this way: "... social power is in the last resort derivative, not inherent in the groups or individuals who direct, control or coerce other groups or individuals. The power a man has is the power he *disposes*; it is not intrinsically his own. He cannot command unless another obeys. He cannot control unless the social organization invests him with the apparatus of control." (MacIver, *The Web of Government*, pp. 107-108.)

10. Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1954, and London: Hollis and Carter, 1954), U.S. ed., p. 126; British ed., pp. 114-115.
11. John Austin, *Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law* (Fifth ed., rev. and ed. by Robert Campbell; 2 vols; London: John Murray, 1911 [1861], vol. I, p. 89.
12. Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws* (Trans. by Thomas Nugent; Introduction by Franz Neumann; New York: Hafner, 1949), vol. I, p. 313.
13. Arthur Livingstone emphasized the closeness of the relationship between possession of the sources of power and being a ruler: "A man rules or a group of men rules when the man or the group is able to control the social forces that, at the given moment in the given society, are essential to the possession and retention of power." Social forces are defined by Livingstone as "any human activity or perquisite that has a social significance - money, land, military prowess, religion, education, manual labor, science - anything." (Arthur Livingstone, Introduction to Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (Trans. by Hannah D. Kahn; ed. and rev. with an Introduction by Arthur Livingstone; New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. xix.
14. Rousseau speaks "of morality, of custom, above all of public opinion" as "the real constitution of the State" upon which "success in everything else depends." (Jean Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract," in *The Social Contract and Discourses* [New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1920, and London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1920], p. 48.)
15. While acknowledging the role of coercive force, David Hume points out that "nothing but their own consent, and their sense of the advantages resulting from peace and order" could be responsible for the subjection of multitudes to a ruler. (Frederick Watkins, ed., *Hume: Theory of Politics* [Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1951], p. 196.) It is, Hume says, "on opinion only that government is founded," including not only the most free and popular, but also the most despotic and military ones. (*Ibid.*, p. 148.)
William Godwin argues that it is precisely *because* government is based upon opinion and consent that rulers use various pressures to influence the subjects to accept their authority. (William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness* [Sec. ed.; London: G. G. and J. Robinson, 1796], vol. I, p. 98.)
16. Bertrand de Jouvenel, *On Power: Its Nature and The History of its Growth* (Trans. by J. F. Huntington; Boston: Beacon Paperback, 1962), p. 355. British edition: *Power: The Natural History of its Growth* (Revised; London: The Batchworth Press, 1952), p. 302.
17. Green, *Lectures . . .*, p. 103. Habitual obedience, he argued, arises from "the common will and reason of men," and only rarely needs backing by coercive force. (*Ibid.*; see also p. 98.) Coercive force, says Green, is not the most important thing about governments; it is not coercive power operating on the fears of the subjects "which determines their habitual obedience." (*Ibid.*, pp. 98 and 103.)

That would require far, far more police than there are; Jouvenel says as many police as subjects. (Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 376. Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 317.) Even where people have been conquered by military might, the dominance cannot last if it depends solely upon such means (MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 16; Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948], p. 149). Even the power of undemocratic regimes depends on acceptance of their authority. (Harris, "Political Power" p. 6.) Rousseau insisted: "The strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms his strength into right, and obedience into duty." (Rousseau, "The Social Contract," p. 8.)

Niccolo Machiavelli speaks repeatedly in *The Prince* of the need to keep subjects satisfied and loyal, to maintain or win their good will, and of the importance of avoiding their hatred. (Machiavelli, *The Prince* [New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Everyman's Library, 1948, and London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Everyman's Library, 1948], pp. 16, 74-77, 81-82, 129 and 146-147.) In his *Discourses* Machiavelli writes that the prince "who has the public as a whole for his enemy can never make himself secure; and the greater his cruelty, the weaker does his regime become. In such a case the best remedy he can adopt is to make the populace his friend." (Machiavelli, "The Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy," *The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950], vol. I, p. 254.

18. W. A. Rudlin, "Obedience, Political," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, (New York: Macmillan, 1935), vol. XI, p. 415.
19. Says Green: "If a despotic government comes into anything like habitual conflict with the unwritten law which represents the general will, its dissolution is beginning . . ." (Green, *Lectures . . .*, p. 313.)
Jouvenel points out that in the extremity of the total rejection of the ruler's claimed authority, he would simply not have the attributes of a ruler. The State "falls to pieces as soon as the authority of the sovereign loses its hold on a part of the subject mass, which bestows its allegiance elsewhere." (Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty: An Enquiry into the Political Good* [Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1959, and London: The Batchworth Press, 1952], p. 4.)
Without authority, says MacIver, organizations can "carry no function whatever." (MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 84.) "Even the most ruthless tyrant gets nowhere unless he can clothe himself with authority." (*Ibid.*, p. 83.) In a situation where a considerable portion of the subjects rejects the ruler's authority while another considerable portion continues to accept it, his political power will be seriously weakened, but not necessarily destroyed. Two States will then tend to form and will engage in some form of struggle which will lead to the destruction of one (as in a civil war), or to some kind of accommodation (ranging from reforms to separation into two independent States, e.g., in colonial conflicts).
20. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Trans., ed. and with an Introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills; New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Book, 1958 [orig. 1946], and London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trabner and Co., 1948), p. 81.
21. See Bernard, *The Functions of the Executive*, pp. 181-182.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
23. Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A. Shils point out that full control is rarely possible over a large subordinate staff, and hence the subordinates may assume a certain amount of independence and initiative in wielding power. This,

- combined with the ruler's dependence on them, "... tends to set up a bilateral power relation between the chief power-holder and his subordinates, giving the latter power over the chief power-holder in addition to any independent power they may exercise over the mass. Subordinate power-holders, to the extent that they exercise independent power in the sphere claimed by the chief power-holder, will limit the power of the latter, and to that extent lose their character of subordinates." (Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A. Shils, "Power and Status," in *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XLV, no. 2 [September 1939], p. 177.) A ruler, over a period of time, must therefore come to terms with his subjects and adjust to some degree to their needs and aspirations. (See Jouvanel, *On Power*, p. 110; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 101.)
24. Barnard insists: "... no absolute or external authority can compel the necessary effort beyond a minimum insufficient to maintain efficient or effective organization performance." (Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive*, p. 182.) He argues that this need for contributions is a common characteristic of all institutions including the State. Most attempted organizations fail because "they ... cannot secure sufficient contributions of personal efforts to be effective or cannot induce them on terms that are efficient." Such failure occurs, in the last analysis, because "the individuals in sufficient numbers ... withdraw or withhold the indispensable contributions." (*Ibid.*, pp. 164-165).
 25. Jouvanel, *Sovereignty*, p. 4.
 26. MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 16.
 27. As Harris has pointed out: "... there is no such thing as political enforcement which is not a socially exercised activity in which a considerable proportion of the members of the group on which it is imposed participate." (Harris, "Political Power," p. 6.) Both the manufacture and the use of the instruments applied in inflicting violent political sanctions depend on "that very social organization which the political power is needed to maintain." (*Ibid.*, p. 4; see also pp. 3-5).
 28. Karl W. Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 315.
 29. Rudlin, "Obedience, Political," p. 416.
 30. Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith," pp. 314-315.
 31. Deutsch writes: "At one end of this spectrum, we could imagine a situation where everybody obeys habitually all commands or decisions of the totalitarian regime, and no enforcement is necessary; at the other end ... we could imagine a situation where nobody obeys voluntarily any decision of the totalitarian system, and everybody has to be compelled to obey at pistol point, or under conditions of literally ever-present threat and ever-present supervision. "In the first of these cases, enforcement would be extremely cheap and, in fact, unnecessary; in the second, it would be prohibitively expensive, and in fact no government could be carried on on such a basis. Even the behavior of an occupying army in wartime in enemy territory falls far short of this standard; even there, many of its orders are obeyed more or less habitually by an unwilling population in situations where immediate supervision is not practicable. If the occupying army had to put a soldier behind every man, woman, and child of the local population, it would be extremely difficult for the army to keep sufficient numbers of its men detached from such occupation duties to continue with further military operations. Somewhere in the middle between these extremes of universal compliance and ubiquitous enforcement is the range of effective government. There a majority of individuals in a majority of situations obeys the decisions of the government more or less from habit without any need for immediate supervision." (*Ibid.*, pp. 313-314.)
 32. Livingstone, "Introduction," to Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, p. xix.
 33. As Jeremy Bentham put it: "The efficacy of power is, in part at least, in proportion to the promptitude of obedience..." (Jeremy Bentham, *A Fragment on Government* [Ed. with an Introduction by F. C. Montague; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1931 (orig. 1891)], p. 168.) The degree of political power is established by "neither more nor less ... than a habit of, and disposition to obedience..." (*Ibid.*, p. 223.) The need for obedience is not limited to free societies argued Montesquieu: In despotic states, the nature of government requires the most passive obedience..." (Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, vol. I, p. 2.) Weber said it concisely: "If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be." (Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," p. 78.)
 34. Jouvanel, *On Power*, p. 18; Br. ed.: *Power*, pp. 27-28.
 35. Kurt H. Wolff, editor and trans., *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), p. 183.
 36. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, Third Edition, revised, 2 vols. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959), vol. II, pp. 2060 and 2084.
 37. "Although cue-giving is highly concentrated in the conductor, commanding officer or foreman, the function is not wholly monopolized by any of them. The conductor, for instance, is continuously responsive to what comes to his attention from the orchestra; and neither the drill master nor the foreman is oblivious to the behavior of his men. And the members of the orchestra, the squad or the work-team are attentive to one another, adapting themselves to one another's performance." (Lasswell, *Power and Personality*, pp. 10-11.)
 38. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
 39. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
 40. Wolff, ed., *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, p. 183.
 41. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
 42. *Ibid.*
 43. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
 44. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive*, pp. 181-182.
 45. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
 46. These same principles apply despite the fact that on relatively minor issues the supporting units of the State will usually support "law and order" regardless of the merits of the case, and despite the fact that the pressure on individual subjects to conform will be strong. (*Ibid.*, p. 183.)
 47. E. V. Walter writes: "A power relation ... is a dynamic interaction in which at least some control may be exercised by all parties. It is clear, of course, that each does not control the others to the same degree, nor do they control the same thing." (E. V. Walter, "Power and Violence," *American Political Science Review*, vol. LVIII, no. 2, [June 1964], p. 352.)
 48. Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and The Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory* (Ed. and with a Preface by Herbert Marcuse; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press and Falcon's Wing Press, 1957), p. 3.
 49. Paul Pigors offers a fourth variable: the presence of absence of a common cause uniting the ruler and subject. This factor is here included in the situation. See

- Paul Pigors, *Leadership or Domination* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935, and London: George G. Harrap, 1935), p. 195. See also Mary Follett, *Creative Experience* (New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924), p. 61.
50. Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 17; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 27. Jouvenel uses the term "Power" with a capital "P" as approximately the same as "the State."
51. "Discipline on such a scale as this," wrote Jacques Necker, "must astound any man who is capable of reflection. This obedience on the part of a very large number to a very small one is a thing singular to observe and mysterious to think on." (Necker, *Du Pouvoir Executif dans les Grandes Etats* [1792], pp. 20-22; quoted in Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 19; Br. ed.: *Power*, pp. 28-29.) It was Hume's question too: "Nothing appears more surprising, to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few, and the implicit submission with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers." (Watkins, ed., *Hume*, p. 148.) Contemporary political thinkers are still asking the same question. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills have written: "Since power implies that an actor can carry out his will, power involves obedience. The general problem of politics accordingly is the explanation of varying distributions of power and obedience, and one basic problem of political psychology is why men in their obedience accept others as the powerful. Why do they obey?" (Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1953, and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954], p. 193.)
52. In the sixteenth century Boetie marvelled at the phenomenon of obedience to oppressors: "... what happens in every country, by all men, and in all eras, that one man abuses a hundred thousand and deprives them of their liberty, who would believe it, if only he heard of it, and did not see it? And if it only happened in strange and distant lands and that it was spoken of, who would not suppose that it was somewhat false and made up, not really true?" (Boetie, *Discours de la Servitude Volontaire*, p. 8; see also, Boetie, *Anti-Dictator*, p. 9.)
53. Gerth and Mills, *Character and Social Structure*, p. 194.
54. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Reprinted from the edition of 1651; New York: E. P. Dutton, 1950 and Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), U.S. ed., p. 167; Br. ed., p. 152.
55. Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 22; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 30. See also Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith," p. 314; MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 76; Green, *Lectures . . .*, pp. 101 and 126; Austin, *Lectures . . .*, pp. 292-294; and Necker, quoted in Jouvenel, *On Power*, pp. 21-22; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 30.
56. Watkins, ed., *Hume*, p. 155. See also p. 197.
57. Austin, *Lectures . . .*, p. 294.
58. Jouvenel, *On Power*, pp. 23-24; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 32.
59. See, e.g., Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State*, p. 8; MacIver, *The Web of Government*, pp. 76-77; Jouvenel, *Sovereignty*, p. 2; Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith," p. 314; Rudlin, "Obedience, Political," p. 417; Austin, *Lectures . . .*, p. 298; Watkins, ed., *Hume*, pp. 201-206; Godwin, *Enquiry . . .*, vol II, pp. 43-44; and Hobbes, *Leviathan*, U.S. ed., p. 167; Br. ed., p. 152.
60. Green, *Lectures . . .*, p. 98.
61. Machiavelli, although emphasizing the need for the goodwill of the populace if a prince were to maintain his power, believed that under certain conditions obedience could be produced by sufficient violence and threat of violence. (See, e.g., Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 67.) Leo Tolstoy, too, emphasized the role of fear of sanctions in obtaining obedience to the State, especially in cases where obedience was not in the interest of the subjects. (See, e.g., Leo Tolstoy, *The Kingdom of God Is Within You* [New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1899, and London: William Heinemann, 1894], U.S. ed., pp. 154-155, 263-264, 266; Br. ed., pp. 237, 413, 417.)
62. See e.g., Watkins, ed., *Hume*, pp. 154-155; Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, pp. 53-54; and Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1938; and London: Geo. Allen and Unwin, 1938), U.S. ed., p. 184; Br. ed.: p. 190.
63. Montesquieu, for example, found it under both monarchies and republics, (See, Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, vol. I, p. 34). Contemporary writers such as Jouvenel, have found it "varying in liveliness and effectiveness from one individual to another, among the members of any political society." (Jouvenel, *Sovereignty*, p. 87.)
64. See MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 77, and Green, *Lectures . . .*, pp. 123-124.
65. Feelings of moral obligation as a cause of obedience may be variously interpreted; ranging from Green's view that this is largely a recognition of the objective social benefits of government, to the anarchist view that this is always a means of deception used to hold the people in subjection. (See Godwin, *Enquiry . . .*, vol. I, p. 98, and Emma Goldman's pamphlet *The Individual, Society and the State* (Chicago: Free Society Forum, n.d.), p. 5.)
66. Green, *Lectures . . .*, pp. 123-124.
67. See Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive*, pp. 152-153.
68. Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 376; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 317.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
70. See Hume's two-fold classification of (1) "opinion of interest," including consideration (a) in this text; and (2) "opinion of right," including (b), (c), and (d). Watkins, ed., *Hume*, pp. 148-150.
71. Green, *Lectures . . .*, p. 125.
72. Watkins, ed., *Hume*, pp. 102 and 213.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
74. Green, *Lectures . . .*, pp. 124-125. Green acknowledged the existence of objections and certain qualifications to the theory concerning the general good and obedience, while insisting on its general validity. (See *ibid.*, pp. 126-128 and 131-135.) Similar observations are made by Jouvenel (*On Power*, pp. 25-26; Br. ed.: *Power*, pp. 32-33); Simmel (Wolff, ed., *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, p. 284); and Robert M. MacIver (*The Modern State* [Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1926; London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1964], p. 154).
75. Watkins, ed., *Hume*, pp. 148-149.
76. *Ibid.*
77. Green, *Lectures . . .*, pp. 103 and 109.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
79. Watkins, ed., *Hume*, p. 104.
80. See Austin, *Lectures . . .*, p. 293 and Rudlin, "Obedience, Political," p. 417.
81. Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 355 (see also pp. 41-42); Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 301 (see also p. 45).

82. One of the conditions described by Mosca in which resistance to rulers was seen as impossible was "When the leaders of the governing class are the exclusive interpreters of the will of God or the will of the people and exercise sovereignty in the name of those abstractions in societies that are deeply imbued with religious beliefs or with democratic fanaticism . . ." (Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, p. 134.)
83. MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 76.
84. Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 24; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 32.
85. Goldhamer and Shils, "Power and Status," p. 173; Jouvenel, *Sovereignty*, p. 5; Pigors, *Leadership or Domination*, p. 311; Godwin, *Enquiry . . .*, vol. I, p. 250. Several sources of authority described by Hume clearly refer to ways in which the legitimacy of the ruler may be established. In addition to the supposed role of original contract, he discusses five other sources: (a) time ("long possession in any one form of government or succession of princes"), (b) present possession, (c) right of conquest, (d) right of succession, and (e) "positive laws" enacted by the legislature to fix a form of government or succession of princes. These sources, Hume stated, may appear in combinations and in varying degrees. (See Watkins, ed., *Hume*, pp. 106-113 and 197-198.)
86. Max Weber has distinguished three "pure types" of "ruling power, profane and religious, political and apolitical," on the basis of the type of legitimacy claimed by the ruling power. These are: (a) charismatic authority "a rule over men, whether predominantly external or internal, to which the governed submit because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the specific person"), (b) traditionalist authority (domination resting upon "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed"), and (c) legal authority ("based upon an *impersonal* bond to the generally defined and functional 'duty of office,'" the official duty being fixed "by *rationaly established* norms, by enactments, decrees, and regulations, in such a manner that the legitimacy of the authority becomes the legality of the general rule, which is purposely thought out, enacted, and announced with formal correctness"). (Gerth and Mills, eds., *From Max Weber*, pp. 294-301.)
87. MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 76.
88. Green, *Lectures . . .*, p. 101.
89. Watkins, ed., *Hume*, p. 150.
90. *Ibid.*
91. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
92. MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 76.
93. Godwin, *Enquiry . . .*, vol. II, p. 45; see also pp. 42-45.
94. Tolstoy, *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, U.S. ed., p. 302, Br. ed., p. 474.
95. Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith," p. 315.
96. MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 76.
97. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive*, p. 167.
98. See Pigors, *Leadership or Domination*, p. 311, and Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, p. 53.
99. See Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Trans. by George Lawrence, and ed. by J. P. Mayer; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1969), p. 658.
100. Tolstoy, *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, U. S. ed., pp. 293-294; Br. ed., pp. 459-460. Arguing that English education increased Indian submission to the colonial system, Gandhi wrote: "Culturally, the system of education has torn us from our moorings, our training has made us hug the very chains that bind us." (Quoted, Gene Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1960), p. 54.)
101. See Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive*, p. 170.
102. See Sebastian de Grazia, *The Political Community: A Study of Anomie* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), especially p. 177; Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 11; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 22; Wolff, ed., *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, p. 193; Machiavelli, *The Discourses . . .*, vol. I, p. 496; Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, pp. 257 and 701-702; and especially Erich Fromm, *Escape From Freedom* (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1961; Br. ed.: *The Fear of Freedom*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961 [orig. 1942]).
103. Rousseau, "The Social Contract," p. 7.
104. Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 20; Br. ed. *Power*, p. 29. See also Pigors, *Leadership or Domination*, p. 197. MacIver, *The Modern State*, p. 47; Tolstoy, *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, U.S. ed., pp. 276 and 294; Br. ed., pp. 434 and 460; and Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1958 [orig. 1909]), pp. 56-57.
105. This has not always been a characteristic of all political systems. For centuries, says Jouvenel, Rome had no permanent officials or standing army within its walls and only a few lictors (Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 20; Br. ed.: *Power* p. 29). Montague also mentions the absence of State means of enforcement. (See his Introduction to Bentham, *A Fragment on Government*, p. 73.)
106. Jouvenel, *Sovereignty*, pp. 32-33.
107. See MacIver, *The Modern State*, p. 47.
108. Bertrand Russell, *Authority and the Individual: The Reith Lectures for 1948-1949* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949 and London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949), U.S. ed., p. 14; Br. ed., p. 30. See also MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 16, and Watkins, ed., *Hume*, p. 148.
109. Boetie, quoted in Leo Tolstoy, *The Law of Violence and the Law of Love* (Trans. by Mary Koutouzow Tolstoy; New York: Rudolph Field, 1948), p. 44; a slightly different wording appears in Boetie, *Anti-Dictator* (trans. Harry Kurz), p. 43.
110. Austin argued that "no conceivable motive will *certainly* determine to compliance, or no conceivable motive will render obedience inevitable." (Austin, *Lectures . . .*, vol. I, p. 90.)
111. Montague, "Introduction" to Bentham, *A Fragment on Government*, p. 74.
112. MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 76.
113. Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 18; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 27.
114. Rudlin, "Obedience, Political," p. 417.
115. Russell, *Power*, p. 177; Br. ed., p. 183.
116. See, e.g., Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, p. 139; Watkins, ed., *Hume*, pp. 155-156; Jouvenel, *Sovereignty*, p. 2; Russell, *Power*, pp. 117-118; Br. ed., p. 120.
117. See Austin, *Lectures . . .*, vol. I, p. 90; Jouvenel, *Sovereignty*, p. 33; and Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith," p. 314.
118. Austin insisted that "... every *forbearance* is *intended*; and is either the effect of an aversion from the consequences of the act forborne, or is the effect of a preference of that act. Consequently, every forbearance, like every act, is the

- consequence of a desire." (Austin, *Lectures . . .*, p. 453.)
119. Jouvenel, *Sovereignty*, p. 33.
 120. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Young India*, 30 June 1920; quoted in Nirmal Kumar Bose, *Selections from Gandhi* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1948), p. 116.
 121. Austin, *Lectures . . .*, pp. 295-297.
 122. Within a relationship of subordination, the exclusion of all spontaneity whatever is actually rarer than is suggested by such widely used popular expressions as 'coercion,' 'having no choice,' 'absolute necessity,' etc. Even in the most oppressive and cruel cases of subordination, there is still a considerable measure of personal freedom. We merely do not become aware of it, because its manifestation would entail sacrifices which we usually never think of taking upon ourselves. Actually, the 'absolute' coercion which even the most cruel tyrant imposes upon us is always distinctly relative. Its condition is our desire to escape from the threatened punishment or from other consequences of our disobedience. More precise analysis shows that the super-subordination relation destroys the subordinate's freedom only in the case of direct physical violation. In every other case, this relationship only demands a price for the realization of freedom — a price, to be sure, which we are not willing to pay. It can narrow down more and more the sphere of external conditions under which freedom is clearly realized, but except for physical force [i.e. direct physical violation], never to the point of the complete disappearance of freedom." (Wolff, ed., *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, p. 183.)
 123. Austin: "Our desire of avoiding the evil which we might chance incur by disobedience makes us will the act which the command enjoins, makes us forbear from the act which the command forbids." (Austin, *Lectures . . .*, p. 453.)
Hobbes is prominent among those who have recognized the role of fear of the ruler's punishment in securing consent. The case "where a Sovereign Power is acquired by Force" occurs, he said, "when a man singly, or together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his Power." (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, U.S. ed., p. 167; Br. ed., p. 152.)
 124. Robert Michels, "Authority," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: MacMillan, 1935), vol. II, p. 319.
 125. Gandhi, *Young India*, 18 August 1920; quoted in Gandhi, *Non-Violent Resistance* (U.S. ed.: New York: Schocken Books, 1957; Indian ed.: *Satyagraha*, Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan, 1951), p. 157.
 126. See MacIver, *The Web of Government*, p. 16; William Laud, quoted in Gerth and Mills, *Character and Social Structure*, p. 194; and Green, *Lectures . . .*, p. 126.
 127. Austin, *Lectures . . .*, vol. I, pp. 295-296.
 128. "Since, then, a government continues through the obedience of the people," argued Austin, "and since the obedience of the people is voluntary or free, every government continues through the consent of the people or the bulk of the political society." (*Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 296.)
 129. *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 295-297.
 130. Godwin, *Enquiry . . .*, vol. I, p. 145.
 131. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941), p. 388.
 132. Austin, *Lectures . . .*, vol. I, p. 297.
 133. *Ibid.*, pp. 296-297.
 134. The nature of this disruption may vary considerably with the precise means used.
 135. Harris, "Political Power," p. 6.
 136. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
 137. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.
 138. Leo Tolstoy, "A Letter to a Hindu," in *The Works of Tolstoy*, vol. 21, *Recollections and Essays*, (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1937), p. 427; Indian ed.: Kalidas Nag, *Tolstoy and Gandhi* (Patna, India: Pustak Bhandar, 1950), pp. 92-93.
 139. Jouvenel, *Sovereignty*, p. 33.
 140. *Ibid.*
 141. Godwin, *Enquiry . . .*, vol. I, pp. 145-146.
 142. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 254.
 143. "The moment the slave resolves that he will no longer be a slave, his fetters fall. He frees himself and shows the ways to others. Freedom and slavery are mental states. Therefore, the first thing is to say to yourself: 'I shall no longer accept the role of a slave. I shall not obey orders as such but shall disobey them when they are in conflict with my conscience.'" (Gandhi, *Harijan*, 24 February 1946; quoted in M. K. Gandhi, *Nonviolence in Peace and War*, vol. II [Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan, 1949], p. 10.)
 144. "It is not so much British guns that are responsible for our subjection as our voluntary cooperation." (Gandhi, *Young India*, 9 February 1921; quoted in Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 116.)
 145. "I believe, and everybody must grant, that no Government can exist for a single moment without the cooperation of the people, willing or forced, and if people suddenly withdraw their cooperation in every detail, the Government will come to a standstill." (Gandhi, *Young India*, 18 August 1920; quoted in Gandhi, *Nonviolent Resistance*, p. 157; Indian ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 157.)
 146. Quoted in Clarence Marsh Case, *Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Methods of Social Pressure* (New York: Century Co., 1923), pp. 391-392.
 147. Godwin, *Enquiry . . .*, vol. I, pp. 253-254.
 148. Gandhi, *Young India*, 16 June 1920; quoted in Gandhi, *Nonviolent Resistance*, pp. 114-115; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, pp. 114-115.
 149. Hillenbrand, *Power and Morals*, p. 5.
 150. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
 151. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
 152. David Spitz, *Democracy and the Challenge of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. viii.
 153. Hillenbrand, *Power and Morals*, p. 5.
 154. Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 42; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 45.
 155. Maritain, *Man and the State*, U. S. ed., p. 64; Br. ed., pp. 58-59.
 156. Boétie, "*Discours de la Servitude Volontaire*," pp. 8-11; see also Boetie, *Anti-Dictator*, pp. 9-10.
 157. Boétie, "*Discours de la Servitude Volontaire*," pp. 12-14; see also, Boetie, *Anti-Dictator*, pp. 12-13.
 158. The influence on Tolstoy, and through him on Gandhi is indisputable, as Tolstoy quotes from Boétie. The influence on Thoreau, however, I have not seen documented, although it is frequently stated to have been the case.

However, the close friendship between Emerson and Thoreau and the certainty of Emerson's familiarity with that essay makes it almost without doubt that Thoreau also knew it.

159. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 77.
160. Machiavelli, *The Discourses . . .*, p. 254.
161. Gaetano Salvemini, *The French Revolution 1788-1792* (trans. by I. M. Rawson; New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1954, and London: Jonathan Cape, 1963), p. 162.
162. Thomas Hutchinson, ed., *The Complete Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904), p. 364. See esp. Shelley's "The Mask of Anarchy" in *ibid.*
163. Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 180; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 154.
164. Jouvenel, *On Power*, p. 161; Br. ed.: *Power*, p. 138-139.
165. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, p. 139.
166. Austin, *Lectures . . .*, vol. I, p. 296.
167. Rousseau, "The Social Contract," p. 64.
168. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), p. 7 (italics in the original).
169. *Ibid.*, pp. vii-viii.
170. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
171. *Ibid.*, p. 41. The statement by A. Roosevelt Aide is from Johnathan Daniels, *Frontier on the Potomac* (New York: MacMillan, 1946), pp. 31-32.
172. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
173. *Ibid.*, pp. 26 and 32.
174. *Ibid.*, p. 9-10.
175. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
176. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
177. V. I. Lenin, "Political Report of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)" delivered March 27, 1922, at the Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), *V. I. Lenin; Selected Works in Three Volumes* (New York: International Publishers, 1967), vol. III, pp. 692-693, and in Nikolai Lenin (sic), *The Essentials of Lenin in Two Volumes* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1947), vol. II, pp. 788-789.
178. Erich Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. I. *From the Collapse of the Empire to Hindenburg's Election* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 151.
179. S. William Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy: A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933* (Hamden, Conn. and London: Archon Books, 1946), p. 180.
180. Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. I, pp. 151-152.
181. W. H. Crook, *The General Strike: A Study of Labor's Tragic Weapon in Theory and Practice* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1931), p. 512.
182. D. J. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators: A Study in the Coup d'Etat* (New York: Viking Press, 1962; Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada, 1962), p. 131.
183. Crook, *The General Strike*, p. 515.
184. Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, p. 179.
185. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators*, p. 130 and John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The*

Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954 and London: Macmillan, 1953), p. 77.

186. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators*, p. 131.
187. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*, p. 79.
188. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators*, p. 211.
189. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Toward Freedom* (Rev. ed.; New York: The John Day Co., 1942), p. 249.
190. Quoted in D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi* (New rev. ed.; Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1962), vol. VI, p. 88.
191. Government of India, *India in 1930-31: A Statement Prepared for Presentation to Parliament in accordance with the requirements of the 26th section of the Government of India Act (5 & 6 Geo. V, Chapter 61)* (Calcutta: Central Publication Branch, Government of India, 1932), pp. 80-81.
192. Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957, and London: Macmillan, 1957), p. 218.
193. *Ibid.*, p. 497.
194. *Ibid.*, p. 516.
195. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 550.
196. *Ibid.*, p. 663.
197. *Ibid.*, p. 580.
198. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 498.
199. Tolstoy, *The Law of Violence and the Law of Love*, p. 47.
200. Watkins, ed., *Hume*, p. 198.
201. Hobbes' recognition of the power of disobedience apparently frightened him and encouraged his authoritarian view of government. In a discussion of "the poison of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, *That every private man is Judge of Good and Evil actions*," Hobbes argues that this doctrine will lead men to decide to obey or disobey "the commands of the Commonwealth . . . as in their private judgements they shall think fit. Whereby the Commonwealth is distracted and *Weakened*." (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, U.S. ed., pp. 277-278; Br. ed., p. 249.) Hobbes clearly placed obedience at the heart of political power and believed that disobedience therefore would lead to the ruler's collapse: "For the prosperity of a People ruled by an Aristocratically, or Democratically assembly, cometh not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of the Subjects: nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the People,) and they shall not only not flourish, but in a short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme the Commonwealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it . . ." (*Ibid.*, U.S. ed., pp. 291-292; Br. ed., p. 261.)
202. Watkins, ed., *Hume*, p. 115.
203. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, pp. 872-873.
204. Gandhi, *Harijan*, 25 August 1940; quoted in Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 79.
205. Harfis, "Political Power," p. 10.

206. *Vi Vill Oss et Land*, October 1940. Quoted in Hans Luitn, *De Illegale Avisene: Den Frie, Hemmilige Pressen i Norge Under Okkupasjonen* (Oslo and Bergen: *Universitetsforlaget*, 1960), p. 18.
207. Green, *Lectures . . .*, p. 77.
208. Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, p. 53.