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## Chapter 10

# Challenge Brings Repression

## INTRODUCTION

The time comes when passivity, acquiescence and patience give way to open nonviolent struggle. This time for action may have been determined by various factors discussed in the previous chapter: tactical and strategic considerations, the opponent's actions, the absence of solutions through milder measures, and the state of mind of the grievance group.

This time for action is also the time for self-reliance and internal strengthening of the struggle group. During an Irish rent strike campaign in 1879 and 1880 Charles Stewart Parnell repeatedly called on the peasants to "rely on yourselves," not on any one else, to right their grievances:

It is no use relying on the Government . . . You must only rely upon your own determination . . . help yourselves by standing together . . . strengthen those amongst yourselves who are weak . . .

band yourselves together, organize yourselves . . . and you must win . . .

When you have made this question ripe for settlement, then and not till then will it be settled.<sup>1</sup>

Self-reliance and organization (or, occasionally, spontaneous united action) contribute to change by increasing the strength of the groups near the bottom of hierarchically organized social, economic and political systems. The dominant groups in such systems are usually well organized and capable of united action for their objectives. Subordinates in such systems are frequently not so. They may be large in numbers, and the dominant groups may be in fact dependent upon them. Yet the subordinates may often be incapable of effective joint action because they lack confidence in themselves, because they remain a mass of separated individuals and disunited groups,<sup>2</sup> and because they do not know how to act. Nonviolent action may change this situation. The grievance group may take joint action by a technique which mobilizes power among the subordinates and enables them to exert control over their present and future lives. Of course, to win, the actionists must do more; they must persist despite repression and must bring into operation the forces which can bring success.

## A HALT TO SUBMISSION

Nonviolent action means that submission and passivity are cast off. Nonviolence, said Gandhi, "means the pitting of one's whole soul against the will of the tyrant."<sup>3</sup> Nehru's view was similar.<sup>4</sup> This determination to struggle will be expressed in the use of the psychological, social, economic and political forces at the disposal of the actionists. These forces operate in concrete ways utilizing the methods of action which have been described in detail in Chapters Three to Eight. This period is the time of the matching of forces. If advance planning has preceded action, now will be the time to disseminate precise instructions on what action should take place, when, and which persons and groups are to act. If advance pledges to act have been made, this is the time to put them into practice.

The initial forms of action in a nonviolent struggle may differ widely. Methods of nonviolent protest—marches, parades, display of flags and the like—often begin a campaign, or in other cases some type of psychological nonviolent intervention—such as fasts—may be used. Other struggles begin directly with noncooperation—civil disobedience or a large-scale

strike, for example. Initial dramatic actions symbolic of the issues at stake, conducted in a disciplined manner, may strike the imaginations of all concerned, shatter inertia, awaken awareness, increase the morale of the grievance group, and set the tone for the struggle which has begun.<sup>5</sup>

Particular conflicts will differ widely in the pace with which the strategy is unrolled and the full strength of the movement is mobilized and applied. Sometimes a slow and deliberate development is most effective, while at other times it may be stunningly rapid. Since nonviolent campaigns differ widely, there are no universal steps or stages for them all. Therefore, in this and the next chapters the focus will be on the general processes, forces and mechanisms of change operating in this type of conflict. Their specific implementation will differ from case to case.

With the launching of nonviolent action, basic, often latent, conflicts between the respective groups are brought to the surface and activated. Through ensuing "creative conflict and tension"<sup>6</sup> it becomes possible to produce change to resolve the underlying conflict.

Unlike many religious pacifists, most exponents of nonviolent action would agree with Frederick Douglass:

Those who profess to favor freedom and yet deprecate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. The struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a physical one; or it may be both moral and physical. But it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without demand. It never did and it never will.<sup>7</sup>

Indeed, nonviolent actionists insist that in sharp conflicts, only effective nonviolent struggle can lead to a satisfactory solution which avoids both passive submission and political violence.

In some cases members of the grievance group may become enthusiastic at the prospect of nonviolent hostilities. As tension increases, morale rises and large numbers of formerly passive people become determined to take part in the coming struggle. "Such enthusiasm in the face of future suffering may be due to the fact that a community which has been oppressed and humbled, looks forward to the opportunity of proving their full and equal worth in combat," writes Ebert.<sup>8</sup>

The changes which nonviolent struggle brings to the struggle group will be explored more fully in Chapter Fourteen, but a brief mention of them is required here. Some will be psychological—a shattering of attitudes of conformity, hopelessness, inertia, impotence and passivity. Others will be more directly political—learning how to act together to achieve objec-

tives, the long-term results of which will obviously be most significant where success is achieved. Participation in nonviolent action may give people increased self-respect, confidence and an awareness of their own power. Thus, writes Hiller, "Recognition of laborers as formidable opponents undoubtedly helps to improve the status of every workingman. The strike, although it brings no material gain, is felt to bring a triumph if it brings this sense of importance."<sup>9</sup> The experience in India was similar. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that Gandhi's example and leadership changed the millions in India from a demoralized mass of people without hope or capacity for resistance, into people with self-respect and capacity for self-reliant struggle against oppression.<sup>10</sup>

The withdrawal of consent, cooperation and submission will challenge the system. How seriously, will vary with the quality and forms of action, the numbers of the actionists, and their persistence in face of repression. The social and political milieu is also important. This includes: how much nonconformity the system can tolerate, how much support for, or hostility to, the regime there is, what the chances are of the resistance spreading, and how much the opponent's sources of power are threatened by the action. The final outcome of the challenge will be determined by some kind of balance between the seriousness of the challenge and the degree to which the social and political milieu favors each side. The opponent's own efforts are clearly important, but, *in themselves*, they are not decisive. Take repression, for example. To be effective, repression must produce submission. But at times it does not. Repression may even be counterproductive, and forces started by the nonviolent actionists and outside of the opponent's control may even reduce or destroy his *ability* to act. An end to the submission of the grievance group initiates changes which may bring fundamental alterations in the relations of the contending groups.

### INITIAL POLARIZATION FOLLOWED BY SHIFTING POWER

The launching of nonviolent action will almost always sharpen the conflict, cause the conflicting groups to become more sharply delineated, and stimulate previously uncommitted people to take sides. This polarization seems to be a quality of all forms of open conflict.<sup>11</sup> At the beginning of nonviolent struggle, Lakey observes, "those initially inclined toward the opponent tend to move closer to his position and support it, while those initially inclined toward the campaigner may move in the cam-

paigned direction."<sup>12</sup> The point at which this occurs varies. Oppenheimer and Lakey point out that the previous period of indifference is likely to be replaced by one of "active antagonism, the time when tide often runs highest against the movement."<sup>13</sup>

This polarization of support for the opponent is well illustrated by reactions in the 1952 Defiance Campaign in South Africa. Before the campaign, the Europeans were usually indifferent to the many prosecutions of Africans and other nonwhites for breaking the Pass Laws and certain other regulatory laws. However, when the *Apartheid* laws and regulations were deliberately and publicly disobeyed by the nonwhites who used jail-going as a protest, the Europeans' indifference was shattered, and they reacted "with active emotions of hate or sympathy." A related political shift occurred also; the opposition United Party, committed to white domination in a milder form than the ruling Nationalist Party, "moved toward the assimilation of its non-European policy with that of the Government, and United Party supporters moved into the ranks of the Nationalist Party."<sup>14</sup> In this case the struggle ended without a major reversal of this trend although, as discussed in Chapter Twelve, under certain circumstances which include continuation of the struggle, this polarization in favor of the opponent is likely to be a passing phenomenon. In the South African case it was not, since the campaign collapsed just as disunity of the opponent group had started to appear.

During this initial polarization, which may be short or long, it is especially important for the nonviolent actionists to be most careful in their behavior. "Actions which confirm the prejudices of the opponent will be seized upon and magnified; those which counter the prejudices will have more impact than ordinarily." At this stage, the grievance group will be worse off than before the campaign started since repression has been added to the initial grievances. If the struggle halts at this stage the grievance group will remain worse off than before. But a continuation of the struggle in a disciplined manner is likely to lead to a new stage, characterized by the disunity of the opponent.<sup>15</sup> In this new stage the opponent is likely to lose even support he had before the struggle while support for the nonviolent actionists may grow.

Seifert supports this view of the instability of the initial polarization, drawing largely upon the cases of minority nonviolent action for social reform. Because the first public reaction to the nonviolent challenge may well be negative, the actionists should attempt to keep to a minimum defection of this pre-campaign support for the desired changes. But, Seifert argues, there seems to be nothing the actionists can do to prevent a tem-

porary strengthening of the opponent group. In addition, the supporters of change may become divided between nonviolent militants and more conventional moderates. After this initial stage, Seifert continues, the first shifts in favor of correcting the grievances "are likely to come at an agonizingly slow rate." A "tipping point" will come, however, after which the shifts in opinion, support and power will proceed at a rapid rate, and, for many, even become "the thing to do."

In the long run, therefore, successful nonviolent campaigns produce a strengthened solidarity among the nonviolent militants, a growth of wider support for correction of the grievance and a fragmentation and disintegration of support for the opponent. Seifert acknowledges, of course, that the factors making for this shift may not always be present; at times other factors, such as economic interests, may dictate a very rapid adjustment by the opponent to the new situation produced by the nonviolent challenge.<sup>16</sup>

This instability of the initial polarization, the tendency of a section of intermediary opinion to shift toward the nonviolent group, of the opponent's camp to split, and of support for the actionists' objectives to grow, are not inevitable. They appear to develop only so long as the group remains nonviolent. For reasons discussed in Chapter Eleven, if violence is used by or on behalf of the actionists the tendency toward both a relative and an absolute increase of their strength and support seems to reverse.

As intermediary opinion shifts toward the nonviolent actionists the new support may be expressed not by nonviolent action but by more conventional attacks on the grievances. This has occurred in several cases. Nonviolent sit-ins in the U.S. South, for example, are reported to have stimulated other less militant antisegregation action, such as voter registration, integration of schools and integration of all-white professional organizations.<sup>17</sup> There is other scattered evidence of this tendency. For example, the 1930-31 civil disobedience campaign in India prodded the Liberals (who had opposed it) to take stronger action by constitutional means, and to act as intermediaries in negotiations between the Indian National Congress and the British *Raj*.<sup>18</sup> The Defiance Campaign of 1952 in South Africa contributed significantly to the formation of the Liberal Party and the Congress of Democrats—both antiapartheid political groups. In that same campaign, the African National Congress experienced a jump from seven thousand to one hundred thousand in paid-up members. The objectives of the campaign also received support from various church groups not previously involved.<sup>19</sup>

Support for the nonviolent actionists and increased participation in the campaign itself are also likely to grow as the initial polarization is reversed. When these various changes take place, the extreme polarization

which first occurred between the nonviolent group and the opponent is revealed as unstable. There tends to develop what Harvey Seifert has called the "progressive detachment of groups arranged in a spectrum of potential support."<sup>20</sup> The course of the struggle may be viewed as the attempt of the nonviolent actionists continually to increase their strength (numerical and otherwise), not only among their usual supporters and third parties but even in the camp of the opponent, and by various processes to reduce the strength of the opponent group.

During the campaign the respective strengths of the two contending groups are therefore subject to constant change, both absolutely and relatively. Such change takes place to a much greater degree and more quickly than it does in struggles in which both sides use violence.

*The nonviolent actionists' behavior may therefore influence the strength or weakness of both their own group and also of the opponent. In addition the conduct of the nonviolent group will influence whether third parties turn to the support of either of the groups. The extreme and constant variability of the strength of both contending groups is highly important to the nonviolent actionists in choosing and applying strategy, tactics and methods. This highly dynamic and changeable situation means that particular acts within a nonviolent strategy may have extremely wide and significant repercussions on the power of each side, even more so than comparable acts in war. Each particular action, even a limited one, therefore needs to be selected and evaluated in terms of its wider influences on the overall struggle.*

If possible, the specific acts should not only demonstrate the present strength of the actionists, but also help to increase their absolute power and to diminish that of the opponent. This may happen even when the immediate political objective has *not* been achieved. Naturally, short-term successes which also contribute to a favorable alteration of relative strengths are to be preferred if possible, but short-term successes at the *cost* of an unfavorable alteration of relative strengths are most questionable. It is possible to *appear* to lose all the battles except the last and yet clearly to win that last one because of the changes in relative strengths that have occurred during the previous battles.

Improvements in the relative strength of the nonviolent actionists after the initial polarization will be highly important in determining the course of events in the intermediate and later stages of the campaign. An increase in genuine strength of the nonviolent group at each stage will make it easier for the group to meet unforeseen circumstances, will maximize its relative strength in the next stage of the struggle, and will increase the possibility of full success.

## THE OPPONENT'S INITIAL PROBLEM

The opponent's initial problem arises from the fact that the nonviolent action disrupts the status quo and requires of him some type of response. The type and extent of the disruption will differ. The opponent's tolerance will vary. And his reactions, both psychologically and in countermeasures, may range widely and may change as the struggle continues.

In mild cases, initiation of nonviolent action may disturb the existing situation only slightly. In extreme cases, however, it may shatter the status quo. The opponent will no longer be able to count on the submission of the members of the grievance group. He will no longer be able to assume they will do nothing fundamental to alter their plight; they are actively protesting, noncooperating and perhaps intervening to block implementation of his policies or to produce changes of their own. The opponent will have to respond to the new challenge. Generally he will try to end the opposition. To do so, the opponent will need to take a series of decisions about his own countermeasures. He will need to make similar decisions when the challenge is instead made by violent means, but, as later discussion will show, nonviolent means may be especially conducive to creating difficulties in making those decisions. Nonviolent action also tends to produce and aggravate conflicts within the opponent's camp about appropriate countermeasures.<sup>21</sup>

It is to the advantage of the nonviolent actionists to prevent and correct misperceptions of their intentions and activities. At the initial stage such misperceptions may cause the opponent group to make first responses which may be harmful to all concerned. If the misperceptions continue into later stages, they are likely to disturb—though not destroy—the normal operation of the mechanisms of change of nonviolent action, especially the processes associated with the conversion mechanism. Problems of accurate perception of nonviolent intentions existed even before Gandhi's campaigns. Nehru, who knew the English well, has written: "The average Englishman did not believe the *bona fides* of nonviolence; he thought that all this was camouflage, a cloak to cover some vast secret design which would burst out in a violent upheaval one day."<sup>22</sup> Past cases of violence during and following a nonviolent struggle therefore produce detrimental influences which the nonviolent group will need to counter, both at the initiation of the campaign and throughout its course. Frequently it will also be necessary to counter a general disbelief in the possibility of effective but strictly nonviolent struggle.

Sometimes—but not always—when confronted with nonviolent action the opponent and his officials become confused, especially when they have been taken by surprise by the events or when they are unfamiliar with this type of behavior. This confusion is not, of course, necessarily beneficial to the actionists and their cause. French army officers were, for example, confused and uncertain about what to do when faced with mass mutiny in 1917.<sup>23</sup> East German officials, police and Party leaders, especially on the local level, were confused and uncertain when confronted with strikes and demonstrations in June 1953.<sup>24</sup> Heinz Brandt—then secretary for agitation and propaganda in the Berlin organization of the Socialist Unity Party—has described the Party propagandists as "completely bewildered" as they witnessed the first "genuine working class movement" of their lives which, contrary to all they had been taught, was acting against the "workers' party."<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, a similar response came from higher officials: "Party and state officials were taken by surprise and increasingly paralyzed. A monstrous event was occurring before their very eyes: workers were rising against the 'worker-peasant' state. The world collapsed round their ears."<sup>26</sup> Workers rebelling against the Communist State often sang "The Internationale."<sup>27</sup> These events suggest that confusion may be especially likely when the nonviolent action takes the forms which shatter the perception of the world contained in official doctrines and ideology.

Confusion in the ranks of the opponent may have other sources as well. It may arise from excessive optimism and false confidence that others see his actions and policies as entirely good. When attempting to overthrow the Weimar Republic, Dr. Kapp "staked all on a great popular welcome, and when confronted with blank hostility, he showed himself bewildered, weak and helpless."<sup>28</sup> Nehru records British confusion and uncertainty as they faced the 1921 noncooperation movement:

As our morale grew, that of the Government went down. They did not understand what was happening: it seemed that the old world they knew in India was toppling down. There was a new aggressive spirit abroad and self-reliance and fearlessness, and the great prop of British rule in India—prestige—was visibly wilting. Repression in a small way only strengthened the movement, and the Government hesitated for long before it would take action against the big leaders. It did not know what the consequences might be. Was the Indian Army reliable? Would the police carry out orders? As Lord Reading, the Viceroy, said in December 1921, they were "puzzled and perplexed."<sup>29</sup>

Sometimes in the past, one source of the opponent's confusion has been surprise at the explicitly nonviolent character of the action movement. Such surprise may or may not have helped the nonviolent group. However, with increasing use of the nonviolent technique, the surprise element has declined; it will finally disappear. Governments are also rapidly accumulating experience in dealing with this type of challenge.<sup>30</sup> Although these developments may reduce the brutality of repression, they will not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of the technique. The struggle potential of nonviolent action is not dependent upon surprise or novelty.

At times, instead, the opponent may be ignorant of its nature and workings. Ignorance of the power of nonviolent struggle may cause the opponent to be overconfident and hence to react extremely mildly to the nonviolent challenge. This reaction may also derive from misperceptions of the intentions of the grievance group, or in overconfidence rooted in belief in the regime's omnipotence, or in long absence of effective challenge. Tsarist officials clearly miscalculated the gravity of the spreading illegal strike movement in St. Petersburg in the first few days of January 1905, a short while before the march on the Winter Palace on Bloody Sunday.<sup>31</sup> Even in later months, despite events and warnings from advisers, tsarist officials again underestimated the seriousness of the trouble spots throughout the Empire. In both instances they did so because of overconfidence in the regime's ability to deal with trouble should it erupt.<sup>32</sup>

In other situations, the opponent may clearly recognize the danger to his system or policies which the nonviolent action poses. Any given nonviolent action will not, however, be equally threatening to all regimes. There are variations in tolerance, i.e., in the degree to which the opponent can safely ignore the challenge or take only mild action against it. Several factors will be involved: the issues at stake, the numbers involved, the methods of nonviolent action used, and the expected future course of the movement. The degree to which the opponent can tolerate dissent may also be influenced by the degree to which the society is democratic or nondemocratic. Gandhi argued for example: "A civil resister never uses arms and hence he is harmless to a State that is at all willing to listen to the voice of public opinion. He is dangerous for an autocratic State, for he brings about its fall by engaging public opinion upon the matter for which he resists the State."<sup>33</sup> Many systems will not, and some cannot, tolerate defiance without taking repressive counteractions.

This is not to say that all hostile responses to nonviolent challenges arise solely from an intellectual recognition of the objective dangers which

they pose to the opponent's policies or system. Frequently, an opponent may react to nonviolent challenge emotionally, seeing it largely as an affront, an indignity, as offensive behavior, and as a repudiation of his authority and position. He may regard these aspects of the challenge as more important than the actual issues at stake. The opponent may then try to obtain either verbal acknowledgement of his authority and position, or a cancellation of the nonviolent campaign, or both, before he will consent to negotiations or reconsider the disputed policies. Even written protests and petitions, and correspondence concerning grievances between responsible bodies—which are far short of actual disobedience—may provoke this indignant reaction. Such mild acts by American colonists and their legislatures, for example, aroused highly emotional reactions in Britain, from the King and from members of both Houses of Parliament; until the colonials had acknowledged the supremacy of British laws and their responsibility to help support the government of the Empire, there was no disposition to consider objectively their grievances or petitions.<sup>34</sup>

Sometimes this reaction of indignation may accompany recognition that the nonviolent challenge is genuinely serious. The British government's reaction to the 1926 general strike, for example, was partially emotional, the strike being seen as an affront, as offensive, and as a repudiation of authority; but it was also rational, the strike being seen as a serious threat which had to be defeated in order to halt such challenges once and for all. In the days before the strike, the government broke off negotiations and demanded "an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the instructions for a General Strike."<sup>35</sup> As the time for action came, even government supporters who had earlier favored conciliation hardened their position, and concluded that, once begun, the struggle had to be fought to an end.<sup>36</sup> At almost the last minute, Labour M.P. Arthur Henderson (who opposed the strike) attempted a final appeal for a settlement to Sir Winston Churchill (leader of Cabinet "hard-liners"). When Henderson arrived, however, Churchill asked: "Have you come to say that the strike notices are withdrawn? . . . No? Then there is no reason to continue this discussion."<sup>37</sup>

In many instances, the opponent may be less concerned with challenges to his dignity or authority and more with the immediate issues at stake. He may recognize that his interest will be better served by concentrating primarily or exclusively on the issues in dispute. This does not necessarily mean that he will take the nonviolent challenge without concern, especially if withdrawal of the subordinates' usual cooperation and support brings realization to a somewhat startled opponent that his power is in

fact based upon the support which is now denied. For example, Watt reports that during the 1917 mutiny, French Army "officers suddenly found that they were not in control of their men . . ." <sup>38</sup> The Russian 1905 Revolution, concludes Katkov, brought to the tsarist government a "newly-discovered need for popular support . . ." <sup>39</sup> In his report to the Tsar on January 17, 1905, just over a week after Bloody Sunday, the Minister of Agriculture, Alexis Ermolov, reminded him that the strength of the throne was dependent on the support of the people. <sup>40</sup> Despite these insights the Russian government persisted in underestimating the power of various strike waves until they produced undeniable economic paralysis.

As already noted, the strong reactions to the British general strike of 1926 were in part rooted in a perception of the power of nonviolent economic struggle, which Conservatives saw as a challenge to the existence of the British constitutional system. An editorial written for the *Daily Mail* reflected this view. The general strike was not "an industrial dispute," it declared, but "a revolutionary movement" which, by inflicting suffering upon the general community, was intended "to put forcible constraint upon the Government." The general strike, the draft editorial continued, could "only succeed by destroying the Government and subverting the rights and liberties of the people." Therefore no civilized government could tolerate it, and "it must be dealt with by every resource at the disposal of the community." <sup>41</sup> With such a perception, the British government prepared to meet the crisis by withdrawing warships from the Atlantic fleet for use at home, dispersing soldiers and naval contingents to various parts of the country, and canceling all army and navy leaves. <sup>42</sup>

The Nazis also saw mass noncooperation in the form of the general strike as a dangerous weapon if used against them. For example on March 1, 1933, after the burning of the *Reichstag* (the German parliament building) on February 27, the Nazis issued a decree which provided punishments both for "provocation to armed conflict against the State" and for "provocation to a general strike." Delarue in his study, *The Gestapo*, writes, "What the Nazis feared the most was a general strike, which could be the sole effective weapon of the divided Left." <sup>43</sup>

Recognition of the power of nonviolent action will sometimes lead the opponent to make concessions in the hope of ending the challenge. The opponent may grant major demands claimed by the nonviolent actionists if they appear just to others and if he expects that otherwise the movement will grow and become increasingly difficult to control. He may see serious concessions to be in the long run the easiest way out. Or, he may hesitate to take such action because of fear that other groups with less

justified claims might resort to similar means. While conceding demands, the opponent may seek to save face, as by suddenly discovering that a long-standing commission or board had just submitted its recommendations which included changes demanded by the nonviolent group: "If only they had been patient and trusted us . . ."

At other times, the opponent will make major concessions only after a considerable period of struggle, that is, after he has recognized the real power of the movement. For example, the tsarist regime in 1905, especially during the Great October Strike, had "to become acquainted with the new force and form of the opposition and to meet unexpected problems." In the first days of the October strike, "the government seemed paralyzed; and in many ways it was." Very reluctantly, not knowing what else to do, the Tsar issued the imperial October Manifesto, in which he renounced his role as unrivaled autocrat, granted civil liberties and extension of the vote in principle to all, established that *Duma* (parliamentary) consent was required for all laws, and guaranteed effective popular supervision of appointed officials. <sup>44</sup> These concessions were, however, too mild to halt the revolution, for many people now aimed at bigger objectives.

Instead of major concessions, the opponent may offer comparatively minor ones. For example, after it was announced that the 1930-31 campaign in India would begin with civil disobedience of the Salt Act, the government referred the salt tax question to the Tariff Board; the aim was to lower the price of taxed salt to that of untaxed salt if the salt tax were abolished. Gandhi, however, affirmed that he would not be satisfied with this concession, and besides there were yet other forts to be stormed. <sup>45</sup> In a very different conflict, in early August 1953 during the peak of the strike in the Vorkuta prison camps, the State Prosecutor arrived with a retinue of generals from Moscow offering minor concessions: two letters could be mailed a month instead of a year, one family visit a year, removal of identification numbers from clothes, and removal of iron bars from windows. These were rejected in an open letter from the prisoners. Their reply was ignored and General Deravyanko traveled from camp to camp within the Vorkuta group promising better food, higher pay, shorter shifts, with "some effect on weaker and less politically active elements." <sup>46</sup> Often in ordinary labor strikes the employer offers certain limited improvements as a counter to trade union demands. The East German regime responded to the developing strikes and the Rising on June 16, 1953—which had been to a significant degree sparked by an increase in the amount of work required in the factories—by minor concessions. Very quickly government loud-speaker vans announced that the Politburo would

"reconsider" the increased work norms, and later the same day the Politburo did in fact rescind them.<sup>47</sup>

Relatively minor concession, however, frequently will not satisfy a determined movement. The Diem regime in South Vietnam on several occasions responded unsuccessfully to the Buddhist campaign of 1963 with minor concessions and gestures of conciliation. These included removal of certain local government officials, apologies for the actions of some subordinate officials, renewal of talks with the Buddhists, release of some Buddhist prisoners, removal of barbed wire around pagodas.<sup>48</sup> Minor concessions are related to what has become called "tokenism" in the Afro-American freedom movement, i.e., minor changes intended simply to end protest and pressure, as Martin Luther King, Jr., described it.<sup>49</sup>

But concessions, large or small, may not weaken the resistance, but strengthen it. The concessions may give confidence to the actionists, as occurred in the East German Rising. Striking and demonstrating workers were elated by their first gains, and cancellation of the increased work norms brought confusion to Party members who had been defending them.<sup>50</sup>

Many opponents have difficulties in granting major concessions, or in acceding to all the actionists' objectives as long as they still have a choice. These difficulties may be rooted in beliefs, prestige, or in power considerations. Occasionally an opponent—however autocratic—may genuinely believe that concessions, compromise, or surrender are out of the question if he is to be "true" to his mission or duty. Such a belief was very important in the qualms of conscience which Tsar Nicholas II experienced before deciding to abdicate in March 1917.<sup>51</sup> The opponent's sincere belief that he is right and that his policies and repression are correct and necessary may be highly important factors in particular conflicts. Under certain conditions, international prestige may also discourage certain opponents from making major concessions.<sup>52</sup> In other cases concessions may be difficult because of the opponent's desire to appease some of his supporters who strongly oppose the nonviolent group.

Even more serious can be the opponent's fear that once he surrenders on some specific issues, he may have to surrender everything. This was a frequent reaction to the predominantly nonviolent economic and political resistance campaign of the American colonists prior to April 1775. For example, in England there was a strong feeling against the impending repeal of the disrupted Townshend duties on the grounds that, says Gipson, "the government could not give way without bringing about a disruption of the Empire."<sup>53</sup> In 1774 when repeal of the remaining

tax on tea was being debated, Solicitor General Widderburn told Edmund Burke: ". . . if you give up this tax, it is not here you must stop, you will be required to give up much more, nay, to give up all."<sup>54</sup>

Rather than repression, the opponent may use psychological influences to induce the nonviolent actionists to be submissive again and to withdraw from the struggle. Usually the opponent may try to convince them that not only can the movement not succeed, but that it has already begun to lose strength. These tactics are commonly used in strikes, in the form of inspired reports that more and more of the strikers are returning to their jobs. In one major American steel strike, for example: "Full page advertisements begged the men to go back to work, while flaming headlines told us 'men go back to mills,' 'steel strike waning!' and 'mills operating stronger'; 'more men back at work'; and so forth."<sup>55</sup> At one point a false report of a settlement was issued in an attempt to bring the Montgomery bus boycott to an end.<sup>56</sup> In the Bardoli revenue refusal campaign in 1928 there were repeated attempts to induce key people to pay the land revenue which was being withheld in the hope that this would weaken the will of others.<sup>57</sup>

False rumors may also be spread about the movement, its intentions, and its leadership.<sup>58</sup> Attempts may be made to split off groups supporting the movement or to turn leaders against each other.<sup>59</sup> Or a more direct counterattack may be mounted, with the opponent making a major effort to justify existing policies and to show that there is no justification for the demands of the nonviolent group. This effort is intended to reduce the support that the nonviolent group can mobilize and retain.

It is common for nonviolent resistance to be met with repression when the opponent is unwilling or unable to grant the actionists' demands. Repression is an acknowledgement of the seriousness of the challenge. Sometimes the severity of repression will be in proportion to the seriousness of the nonviolent challenge, but this is by no means a standard pattern. In cases of civil disobedience, for example, in certain political situations, the fact that a law chosen for open disobedience is unimportant will not necessarily reduce the intensity of the opponent's reaction.<sup>60</sup> Gandhi acknowledged that when people practiced civil disobedience ". . . it was impossible for the Government to leave them free."<sup>61</sup> True, the opponent's need to bring an end to defiance may in certain situations be largely symbolic. But in other situations of widespread nonviolent action which is likely to become increasingly effective, the pressures on the opponent to halt it by some means or other will be overwhelming. Such strong pressures will especially occur where the system cannot stand major dissent.

For example, Luthuli pointed out that one reason for the South African Government's attempt to break the 1957 bus boycott by Africans living in Alexandra township, near Johannesburg, was that it needed "to break all demonstrations of African unity . . ." <sup>62</sup> (The boycott nevertheless succeeded.) "The first problem of an autocratic ruler is . . . how to maintain firm control of his subjects . . ." Hsiao writes. <sup>63</sup> In any conflict situation, involving an autocratic regime or not, if the nonviolent opposition is widespread or especially daring, the opponent really cannot ignore it without appearing to be helpless in the face of defiance and thereby running the risk of its spread. He must then take some kind of counteraction. Sometimes he will respond with police action even to public declarations of opposition and of intent to carry out resistance at some future time. <sup>64</sup> Sometimes the opponent's need to act against the nonviolent challenge will to a significant degree be rooted in his reactions of fear and uncertainty in face of challenges to his dominance, authority, status and wealth. <sup>65</sup> Economic noncooperation (especially by tax refusal and rejection of the government's paper money) may so threaten the financial stability of the regime that it constitutes "a challenge that could not be ignored"—which was the case in Russia in December 1905. <sup>66</sup> Repeated American colonial campaigns of economic and political noncooperation finally confronted the British Parliament with ". . . the alternative of adopting coercive measures, or of forever relinquishing our claim of sovereignty or dominion over the colonies,"—as Lord Mansfield declared in February 1775, two months before the violence at Lexington and Concord. <sup>67</sup> The morning after the general protest strike against Nazi maltreatment of Jews began in Amsterdam on February 25, 1941, the German occupation officials realized that it constituted a major challenge. Originally planned for only one day, the strike had been extended, had spread to towns outside Amsterdam, and large crowds were continuing to demonstrate within the city. "These constituted a serious threat to the occupying power, which could not tolerate a display of popular strength in defiance of its orders." Consequently Nazi officials ". . . felt that ruthless and quick action was needed, including the establishment of a state of seige during which harsher punishments would be meted out by summary courts." <sup>68</sup>

As these examples illustrate, an opponent who is unwilling to grant the demands of the nonviolent actionists, and who knows no other type of response to such a challenge, is likely to resort to sanctions. These sanctions will vary. In a strike, they may simply involve cutting off wages, or a lock-out. In other situations, however, when the opponent is the State,

or has its support, the sanctions are likely to involve the use of the police, the prison system and the armed forces. This response is repression.

Whether the opponent uses repression or some other means, as long as the actionists persist in struggle while maintaining nonviolent discipline, the opponent will experience difficulties in dealing with that struggle. These difficulties are associated with the dynamics and mechanisms of the technique and their tendency to maximize the influence and power of the nonviolent group while undermining those of the opponent.

## REPRESSION

Nonviolent actionists who know what they are doing will not be surprised at the repression inflicted by the opponent. "If we choose to adopt revolutionary direct action methods, however nonviolent they might be, we must expect every resistance," wrote Nehru. <sup>69</sup> The Buddhists struggling against the Diem regime in South Vietnam also expected repression. <sup>70</sup> Repression is especially likely when the nonviolent action takes forms and expressions which present a serious challenge to the opponent. As most political systems use some type of violent sanctions against dissidents, through police, prisons and the military forces, these are likely also to be used against the nonviolent challengers. In acute social and political conflicts the actionists must often pay a price in the struggle to achieve their objectives. Freedom is not free.

Once the opponent has decided to use repression, the questions are: what means of repression will he use, will they help him to achieve his objectives, and what will be the response of the nonviolent group and others to the repression. We turn first to the means of repression. Some of the sanctions which the opponent may use will be official while some may be unofficially encouraged. Sometimes there will be threats; other times the sanctions will be simply carried out. Some sanctions involve open police or military action (i.e., repression), others more indirect means of control and manipulation, and some even nonviolent sanctions. Many of the means of repression are also used in quite different conflict situations.

The sanctions the nonviolent actionist can expect will take many forms and involve different degrees of pressure. They may be discussed under eight general headings:

### A. Control of communication and information

These methods will include: censorship of all means of public information and communication; suppression of particular newspapers, books, leaflets, radio and television broadcasts, etc.; dissemination of false news reports; severance of private communication between members and sections of the nonviolent group, as by intercepting mail and telegrams; and tapping telephone conversations and the like.

### B. Psychological pressures

Although many other methods also have psychological influence, certain methods are intended to be primarily psychological. These include verbal abuse as name-calling, swearing, slander and rumors; ostracism; efforts to obtain defections and changes in plans by bribing key people, directly or indirectly, as with job offers; vague threats of various types of severe action if certain things are, or are not, done; threats of specific brutal actions; making "examples" of a few by severe punishment; retaliation against families and friends of resisters or other innocent people; and finally, severe mental pressures.

### C. Confiscation

These methods include confiscation of property, funds, literature, records, correspondence, offices and equipment.

### D. Economic sanctions

These range widely, from those imposed by courts and officials to popular economic boycotts. They include direct or indirect efforts to deprive nonviolent actionists of their livelihood, especially by dismissal from jobs and blacklisting; restrictions on trade, commerce, materials, supplies and the like; cutting off utilities, as water, gas and fuel; cutting off food supplies; consumer and other economic boycotts; individual fines and collective fines.

### E. Bans and prohibitions

These are government orders which prohibit certain types of acts and activities. They include orders declaring organizations illegal; the banning of public meetings or assemblies; interfering with travel of nonviolent actionists; curfews; and court injunctions against certain behavior associated with the struggle.

### F. Arrests and imprisonment

These are the sanctions which are commonly used to punish disobedience of the State's laws and regulations. They include: arrests for serious and minor charges related to the nonviolent action; arrests and legal harrasing on unrelated or imagined charges, as traffic violations; arrests of negotiators, delegations and leaders; and prison sentences of varying lengths.

### G. Exceptional restrictions

These methods involve unusual or more severe forms of detention and restrictions on normal public liberties. They include: new laws or regulations to deal with the defiance; suspension of *habeas corpus* and other rights; declaration of martial law and states of emergency; mobilization of special forces, as "special constables" or "deputy sheriffs," and use of army reserves, territorial army, national or state guards, or other military units normally assigned to other duties; forced labor, as in prison camps and road gangs; prosecutions on charges more serious than for the simple act of resistance, as for conspiracy, and incitement; conscription of nonviolent actionists into armed forces, where they will be subject to court martial for indiscipline; mass expulsion of the resisting population; exile or other removal of leaders; detention without trial; and concentration camps.

### H. Direct physical violence

These methods include official beatings and whippings; rough physical treatment, including manhandling, pushing, unofficial beatings including encouragement or permission for third parties (as hoodlums) to attack the nonviolent group physically; use of dogs, horses and vehicles against demonstrators; use of water from fire hoses, such instruments as electric cattle prodders and the like; bombings and other destruction of homes, offices and other buildings; individual assassinations; torture; shooting, discriminate or indiscriminate, of demonstrators or general population; executions, open or secret, individual, group, or mass; and bombings by airplanes.

Almost all of these have already been used in some cases of nonviolent action, and any of them—and others—could be used in extreme cases in the future. The amount and type of repression used by the opponent will vary with his perception of the conflict situation, the issues involved,

his understanding of the nature of nonviolent action, and the anticipated results of the repression both in restoring "order" and in alienating needed cooperation, support, etc., of others. In small local cases of nonviolent action, the number of means of repression may be few, while in large movements a considerable number may be involved. In some situations the opponent may operate on the basis of an overall strategy against the nonviolent movement, while in other cases specific means of repression may be selected or improvised to deal with particular nonviolent acts only.

Seifert has pointed out that the severity of repression frequently tends to increase significantly as the campaign continues and as earlier forms of repression prove ineffective. For example, when the first Quakers came to Massachusetts Bay Colony in defiance of Puritan legal prohibitions, they were immediately imprisoned and deported. Later they were whipped in addition. Then ear-cropping was instituted, and finally the Quakers were banished under threat of execution. Between 1659 and 1661 four Quakers were hanged, including a woman. Over two and a half centuries later, when woman suffragists first picketed the White House while Woodrow Wilson was President, they were not interfered with officially for nearly six months, but after several stages of escalation of repression, prison sentences of six and seven months were given out.<sup>71</sup>

The introduction of special laws, edicts and ordinances to deal with various forms of nonviolent action is nothing new. Confronted with the noncooperation of the bakers of the city of Ephesus in the second century A.D., the Roman Proconsul of Asia issued an edict: "I therefore order the Bakers' Union not to hold meetings as a faction nor to be leaders in recklessness, but strictly to obey the regulations made for the general welfare and to supply the city unfailingly with the labor essential for bread-making." He threatened violators with arrest and a "fitting penalty."<sup>72</sup> Very strong Roman laws against strikes were issued about the middle of the fifth century, A.D.<sup>73</sup>

In modern times, strikes for the purpose of achieving wage increases and improved conditions were illegal for decades in many countries, and in many cases antistrike laws were only repealed after considerable struggle. Laws against economic boycotts are still on the books of many American states.

There is also a record of laws against various types of nonviolent action used to achieve political objectives. In a direct attempt to deal with economic resistance by the American colonists, Lord North sponsored bills which became law in March and April 1775, which provided that until the nonimportation campaign ended and peaceful conditions of business

were restored, certain of the provinces would not be permitted to trade with any part of the world except the British Isles and the British West Indies, and after a short time with minor exceptions, those provinces would be prohibited from sending out fishing fleets also. One type of disruption of trade was to be matched by another type, to be backed by the means at the disposal of the British government.<sup>74</sup> One measure which Austria used to counter Hungarian economic nonviolent resistance around 1860 was to issue an ordinance declaring "exclusive trading" illegal.<sup>75</sup>

When the French and Belgian occupiers of the Ruhr were confronted with German government-sponsored nonviolent resistance, they issued innumerable regulations. "Soon there was nothing which was not forbidden or punishable under some regulation issued by General Degoutte or one of his subordinates," writes Grimm, who enumerates a multitude of aspects of life to which they applied. He concludes: ". . . finally [there was] a law for the suppression of passive resistance, which put an end to free speech and threatened with five years' imprisonment anyone evincing doubts about the justice and validity of the orders and directions issued by the occupation authorities. General Degoutte's decrees reached the remarkable number of 174."<sup>76</sup>

Two special laws were enacted in response to the South African 1952 civil disobedience movement. One of these, the Public Safety Act, No. 3 of 1953, provided the machinery for the introduction of wide emergency powers, the reorganization of the police and a change in their functions. This Act specified the conditions under which police violence might be used, and enabled the police to act before, rather than after, the event.<sup>77</sup> The other, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, No. 8, of 1953, is probably one of the first legislative acts created especially to deal with civil disobedience (as distinct from other forms of nonviolent action). This Act provides:

Whenever any person is convicted of an offence which is proved to have been committed by way of protest or in support of any campaign for the repeal or modification of any law or the variation or limitation of the application or administration of any law, the court convicting him may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law contained, sentence him to (a) a fine not exceeding three hundred pounds; or (b) imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years; or (c) a whipping not exceeding ten strokes; or (d) both such fine and such imprisonment; or (e) both such fine and such whipping; or (f) both such imprisonment and such a whipping.<sup>78</sup>

Kuper reports that even more drastic penalties are imposed by the Act on persons convicted of promoting or assisting offenses by way of protest against any law.<sup>79</sup> In actual practice it was not necessary to use the new powers bestowed on the government by the new laws. The mere assumption of these powers had an effect.

Another Act already on the books, the Suppression of Communism Act, could also be used against nonviolent action since charges of promoting "Communism" amazingly included "unlawful acts or omissions, actual or threatened, aimed at bringing about any [sic!] political, industrial, social or economic change." There were, of course, other South African laws against nonviolent action, such as the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act, which made strikes by Africans illegal.<sup>80</sup> One of the new laws decreed shortly after the end of World War II and the beginning of the occupation of the Eastern Zone of Germany by Soviet troops was one against "incitement to War, Murder and Non-cooperation."<sup>81</sup> The point is simply that special laws against various forms of nonviolent action are nothing new, but have occurred under diverse historical and political conditions.

Various other countermeasures may be used by the opponent along with repression. These differ widely, depending on the situation and forms of nonviolent action being fought. Countermeasures taken by the British government during the 1926 General Strike included a government newspaper, advance stockpiling of food, coal and fuel and the organization of alternative supplies and transportation. An unofficial Organization for the Maintenance of Supplies, said to include about one hundred thousand ready volunteers, was set up well in advance and its control was handed over to the government just before the outbreak of the strike.<sup>82</sup> The French during the Ruhr struggle also used various counter means to control the resistance as well as strictly violent repression. For example, they disbanded the police force of Essen and banished its members.<sup>83</sup> In other cases the opponent regime has responded by changes in its own structures and command system. This was illustrated during the February Revolution of 1917 by the Tsar's appointment of General Ivanov as Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd garrison with full powers even over government ministers.<sup>84</sup> Very different countermeasures were used in South Vietnam in 1963 when the Diem regime in combatting Buddhist resistance attempted to show "popular support" for the government; rival pro-government Buddhist organizations were set up and "elections" were held which produced 99.8 percent of the votes for prominent government personalities.<sup>85</sup>

Some people (including certain pacifists) have seen the opponent's

violent repression as created by the nonviolent group through its radical action; hence these people have often preferred milder means short of direct action. This reaction is, however, based upon both an inadequate understanding of the operation of the nonviolent technique and upon a very superficial view of political violence and the social system in which it is prominent. The absence of open violence by the ruler does not mean that violence is absent. Nor, if violence is the opponent's reaction to nonviolent action, does it mean that the nonviolent group created the violence. Rather, there is an intimate relationship between the kind of social system and the degree of violence the power holders in that system are prepared to use if it is challenged.

Political violence is not expressed only in beating, shooting or imprisoning people, but also in the readiness, threat and preparations to inflict such violence if the situation "requires" it. Political violence is also present in hierarchical political systems where status, wealth, effective decision-making and control are concentrated in an elite willing and able to use political violence to implement its will and to maintain dominance. In such a system, as long as the subordinates submit passively, there will be no need to implement the reserve capacity for violent repression and thus to show clearly the system's character and ultimate sanction. Nevertheless, the continuing domination by the elite through threats of violent sanctions for insubordination is from this perspective a case of constant political violence. Opponents of such systems describe them as "oppression," "exploitation," or "tyranny." In less extreme systems such as Western democracies, violence also remains the accepted sanction for dealing with law-breakers, insurrections, subversion, or external aggression.<sup>86</sup> The degree to which any particular political and social system depends for its existence upon covert or overt violence varies considerably. Where the degree of this dependence is small, where the citizens effectively influence and determine the government's policies, where there is confidence in ultimate sanctions other than violence for dealing with crises, there one can expect proportionately less violence in response to internal nonviolent action. Probably the chances of nonviolent action within the system will also be less. The converse would also follow.

When a system largely characterized by political violence is actively, albeit nonviolently, challenged, one can expect that the basic nature of that system will be more clearly revealed in the crisis than during less difficult times. The violence upon which the system depends is thus brought to the surface and revealed in unmistakable terms for all to see: it then becomes more possible to remove it.

In support of this view, Kuper argues that the 1952 response of hostility and violence from the South African whites to the civil disobedience had its roots in the nature of the oppressive system, which was revealed by nonviolent action: "The explanation of this violence lies in the nature of the domination itself." The original "naked force of conquest" had been translated into the sanctity of law. When the subordinate group challenged *any* law, even a trivial one, this was seen as "rebellion," and increased "force" was applied to suppress the rebellion. Kuper points out that civil disobedience brought the violence behind the law and the domination into actual operation. "Satyagraha strips this sanctity from the laws, and compels the application of sanctions, thus converting domination again to naked force." The nonviolent challenge had not created, but only revealed the violence. "Force is implicit in white domination: the resistance campaign made it explicit."<sup>87</sup> Kuper's observations on this point are consistent with Gandhi's conclusions. In Gandhi's view this process of making the violence inherent in the system explicit could be an important step in the destruction or radical alteration of the system. It could alienate support for the regime among its usual supporters and agents, promote greater solidarity and resistance within the subordinate group, arouse the opinion of third parties against the oppressor, and demonstrate that not even violent repression can compel the resisters to submit.

April Carter, an English direct actionist and political scientist, also supports this interpretation of violent repression against nonviolent actionists. She writes that civil disobedience is sometimes intended ". . . to force the opponent into overt use of the means of violence at his command," which reveals to the people and to the world at large the degree "to which the regime is oppressive and prepared to use violence to maintain itself." In that light, ". . . the true character of the South African Government was revealed at Sharpeville, the true character of segregation in the Deep South when the Freedom Riders were mobbed." The social violence inherent in *Apartheid* and segregation was made clear by those events, an important step toward changing the status quo.<sup>88</sup>

If one is not familiar with the workings of nonviolent action, the enumeration of the many possible means of repression and realization of the severe character of many of these, may prove rather staggering. It may then be difficult to see how one could hope for effectiveness from this technique. For example, during the Algerian War, Algerian nationalist leaders were asked why they had chosen to rely on political terrorism and guerrilla tactics instead of on massive nonviolent noncooperation. They replied that they had indeed tried strikes and boycotts which had been car-

ried our relatively effectively. The French had not, however, responded nonviolently but with the use of military might and Algerian people had been injured. Therefore, they said, the Algerians, too, had turned to political violence. But, we may ask, if the nonviolent action had been so ineffective and harmless to the established system, why was the repression so harsh? Why should the French authorities (or anyone else) bother to repress actions which are supposedly so impotent?

The fact is, of course, that while it is true that the severity of the repression may be out of proportion to the seriousness of a threat, the repeated application of repression which has occurred against nonviolent action in Algeria, South Africa, Nazi Germany, India, the Soviet Union, East Germany, the Deep South, England, occupied Norway and many other places, is very strong evidence that nonviolent action does frequently pose a serious threat to the established order. This repression is a confirmation of and a tribute to the power of nonviolent action. Refusal to submit to this repression while maintaining nonviolent discipline is crucial if the desired shift in policies and power relationships is to be achieved.

The opponent's repression may succeed in defeating the nonviolent actionists and in restoring passive submission, as has happened in various cases. Whether this happens will in large degree be determined by the nonviolent actionists' response; if they become frightened and weaken in their resolve, then, just as in military combat, the front lines will fall back and the whole front will be threatened.

However, repression will not necessarily cause a collapse of nonviolent action. As was pointed out in Chapter One, if sanctions are to be effective, they must operate on the minds of the subjects, and produce fear and willingness to obey. However, these necessary intervening processes may not occur because of the nonviolent actionists' lack of fear, or because of their deliberate control of fear, or because of their commitment to some overriding loyalty or objective; when fear does not control the mind the repression may not succeed. Exponents of nonviolent action have stressed the limits of repression in obtaining submission and obedience. In 1917, Gandhi for example said that tyrannical rulers could not effectively use violent force against a nonviolent actionist who continued to refuse his consent and submission: ". . . without his concurrence they cannot make him do their will."<sup>89</sup> Since the ruler's sanctions are not effective in restoring submission and obedience unless the will of the nonviolent actionist is changed, the repression is not necessarily effective. It remains possible for the nonviolent actionists to achieve their objectives. "Nothing is more irritating and, in the final analysis, harmful to a government,"

wrote Nehru, "than to have to deal with people who will not bend to its will whatever the consequences."<sup>90</sup>

The opponent faces an additional problem in making repression effective: the means of repression are more appropriate to deal with violent opposition than with nonviolent action. Since, however, nonviolent action operates quite differently from violent action, repression used against the nonviolent group may fail to produce the desired results, and may even weaken the opponent, as we shall see. In contrast, when a movement of violent terrorism, or a military revolt is met with violent repression the two conflicting groups are applying essentially the same means of struggle. Violent repression then has a certain logic and a greater chance of effectiveness and is more likely to be justified in the eyes of the general population and third parties. This is not true when one side instead struggles nonviolently. This is not to say that violent resistance poses no threat to a regime, or that violent rebellion is always easily squashed, but it is to say that nonviolent struggle can be more difficult to deal with and that violent repression against it is less likely to be effective than against violent resistance.

One of the ways in which nonviolent action functions is to exhaust the opponents' means of repression and demonstrate their impotence. In this, the actionists' attitude of fearlessness is crucial. Without fear of sanctions, the sanctions lose their power to produce submission. The actionists may therefore—instead of fearing the repression—openly defy laws, seek imprisonment and may even ask the opponent to do his worst. The result may be to make repression impotent.

The peculiar problems of repression against a nonviolent movement were felt by the British in India during the 1930-31 struggle:

... during the year there were violent disturbances and acts of terrorism in many parts of the country, but these the forces of law and order in India as elsewhere, were trained to counter. What perplexed them was the mobilization of inertia, the large crowds silently awaiting punishment, the well organized processions refusing to yield in face of attack.<sup>91</sup>

When people deliberately court arrest by practicing civil disobedience, imprisonment ceases to be a deterrent to their defiance. Indeed, imprisoned nonviolent resisters are sometimes more of a difficulty for the opponent than if they had been left safely in their homes. Other specific means of repression and other specific methods of action by the nonviolent group present their own difficulties for the opponent. Continued defiance by

nonviolent noncooperation and intervention by hundreds, thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even millions of people despite the opponent's repression can create a political nightmare for an autocratic ruler. Not only is his repression then ineffective; it may even multiply the problems created by the nonviolent challenge.

## PERSISTENCE

Faced with repression, nonviolent actionists have only one acceptable response: to overcome they must persist in their action and refuse to submit or retreat. As Gandhi put it, "In the code of the satyagrahi, there is no such thing as surrender to brute force."<sup>92</sup> Without willingness to face repression as the price of struggle, the nonviolent action movement cannot hope to succeed. Kuper argues, for example, that unwillingness to accept the vastly increased sanctions for violation of the laws in question was an important reason for the collapse of the 1952 Defiance Campaign.<sup>93</sup>

The opponent applying the repression is likely to be a believer in the effectiveness of political violence and to assume that repression, if severe enough, will produce submission. Therefore, as we have noted, once repression has begun, the opponent is likely to increase it when it is not immediately effective.<sup>94</sup> An unconsidered reaction by persons seeking to minimize suffering might then be to halt the nonviolent challenge and submit, or to seek a "compromise," or in effect a sell-out. This is a very shortsighted reaction, however. Such behavior confirms the opponent in his belief in the efficacy of repression, and encourages him to become increasingly brutal by showing him that sufficient cruelty will bring the nonviolent action to an end. Hence, stopping the movement in order to reduce repression while the actionists are still capable of continuing the struggle is likely in the long run to contribute to an increase in the extent and severity of repression against nonviolent action. Furthermore, a collapse of the movement at this stage will make it impossible to bring into operation the mechanisms of change upon which nonviolent action depends for success. It is necessary and possible at this point to break the usual repression-fear-submission pattern, that is, of repression producing fear, fear bringing submission, and submission causing a continuation of the objectionable policies or the intolerable regime.

Fearlessness, or deliberate control of fear, discussed in Chapter Nine is especially important at this stage of the struggle. Standing firm at this point will make it possible to refute stereotypes of the subordinate group. One of these may be that they are cowards: for example, "... that 'Negroes, like animals, will be scared away by a show of force.'"<sup>95</sup> Firm-

ness will make it possible for mass noncooperation to produce its coercive effects. Under certain circumstances persistence may also contribute to sympathy and respect for the defiant nonviolent actionists.<sup>96</sup>

Submission to violence is contrary to the nature of the nonviolent technique. Nonviolently resisting volunteers must be able to stand against apparently overwhelming physical force. Throughout history there have been many instances of an individual or a small number of men standing firmly for their convictions, struggling to achieve a wider social end, or fighting to defend their people or principles against "impossible" odds. Defiance without retaliation may enable the nonviolent actionists to remove the policy or regime to which they object and to make the repression impotent. "Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will,"<sup>97</sup> wrote Gandhi. "No power on earth can make a person do a thing against his will. Satyagraha is a direct result of the recognition of this great law . . ."<sup>98</sup>

There are various examples of nonviolent actionists standing firm in face of repression. At Vorkuta, for example, when the Russian authorities on July 20, 1953, arrested the Pit No. 1 Strike Committee (recognized as the central leadership) even before the prisoners could initiate their strike, the prisoners' response was to elect a new committee. The strike was thus merely postponed for twelve hours. Later, when the Strike Committee went to meet officials for negotiations but never returned, the strikers nevertheless continued.<sup>99</sup> When, during the Montgomery boycott, white officials resorted to mass arrests and private persons resorted to bombings, the result was a demonstration of increased determination and fearlessness by the Afro-Americans.<sup>100</sup> "The members of the opposition . . .," wrote Martin Luther King, "thought they were dealing with a group who could be cajoled or forced to do whatever the white man wanted them to do. They were not aware that they were dealing with Negroes who had been freed from fear. And so every move they made proved to be a mistake."<sup>101</sup> When the Ku Klux Klan rode through the Negro section, hoping to repeat its usual tactic of striking terror into the Negroes who would then lock their doors and darken their houses, they met with a surprise. The Negroes kept the lights on, the doors open, remained casual, as though watching a circus parade, some even waved to the cars. Nonplussed, the Klan disappeared into the night.<sup>102</sup>

The Quakers who kept coming with their religious message to Puritan Massachusetts Bay Colony were undeterred by deportations, whippings, imprisonments and even death penalties, as Seifert reports:

In spite of increasing severity, the same persons came back again and again "to look the bloody laws in the face." Although about sixty

years of age, Elizabeth Hooton came to Boston at least six times, being expelled each time, and was four times whipped through several towns out of the jurisdiction. Even the death penalty proved to be no deterrent. While William Leddra was being tried for his life, Wenlock Christison, who had already been banished upon pain of death, walked calmly into the courtroom. Then while Christison was on trial, Edward Wharton, who had also been ordered to leave the colony or forfeit his life, wrote from his home in Salem that he was still there. Such a succession of applications for execution identified a people who were not to be turned aside by any terrors their persecutors might devise.<sup>103</sup>

There are many other examples of defiance in face of repression. In November 1905 the Central Bureau of the Union of Railroad Workers in tsarist Russia defiantly called for anti-government strikes in retaliation for the court-martial sentencing to death of a railroad engineer named Sokolov and others for their participation in a recent strike at Kushka Station on the Central Asian Railroad.<sup>104</sup> Reitlinger gives a large measure of credit for the saving of over 75 per cent of the Jews in France from the Nazi extermination plan to the refusal of Frenchmen to submit and comply in face of Gestapo terror and other intimidation: "the final solution . . . failed in France because of the sense of decency in the common man, who, having suffered the utmost depths of self-humiliation, learnt to conquer fear."<sup>105</sup> Although Russian tanks had been roaming the streets of Halle, East Germany, and the People's Police had been firing warning shots into the air, an estimated sixty thousand to eighty thousand people attended a mass antigovernment meeting in the market place on June 17, 1953.<sup>106</sup>

Examples of this refusal to submit to repression, and this assertion of fearlessness, could be multiplied. It is especially important that the leaders of the nonviolent struggle be, and be seen to be, courageous and unbowed in face of repression and threats of future punishments. Albert Lutuli's compliance with various restrictions imposed by the South African government, which removed him from active political work without placing him in prison, is therefore an example which ought *not* to be followed, and is a response to repression which may encourage submission by others and help to discredit nonviolent struggle as a militant and effective technique.<sup>107</sup>

Courageous persistence must, of course, continue to be expressed through disciplined nonviolent behavior if the movement is not to be seriously weakened. This leaves room for, and indeed often requires, flexible and imaginative responses suitable to the particular situation. In various

cases the nonviolent actionists may make certain tactical moves to avoid unnecessary provocation of more severe repression. Miller writes, for example:

We must be careful not to corner our opponent . . . Firmness should never become dogmatic rigidity. Although nonviolence places a premium upon the capacity of the nonviolent cadre to endure suffering, each team of cadres should have sufficient tactical flexibility to be able to choose whether to extricate the individual members from a catastrophic situation or, if this alternative is foreclosed, to endure martyrdom with a composure that may cause their attackers to repent afterward.<sup>108</sup>

Sometimes nonviolent actionists may alter their behavior at the moment when repression is likely to begin or has just begun. For example, in 1959, when ordered to disperse by police who prepared to make a baton charge, African women demonstrators at Ixopo, South Africa, went down on their knees and began to pray. In that instance at least the baton charge was not made and the "police hung around helplessly."<sup>109</sup>

Sometimes certain methods of action will by their nature be more difficult to deal with by repression and less likely to put resisters to the test of withstanding severe brutalities. Some strike leaders from the East German Rising concluded that strikers who had stayed at home or had conducted a stay-in strike at their jobs were more difficult for the regime to cope with than demonstrators in the streets who could usually be easily dispersed by tanks. Ebert calls this "the avoidance of mass confrontations, which is not the same thing as renouncing resistance."<sup>110</sup> Nonviolent actionists or others may appeal to the opponent's troops and police urging them to restrict their repression in some way. Such appeals were planned in Berlin in June 1953, but both a prepared broadcast in Russian to members of the Soviet occupation forces by the acting mayor of West Berlin, Ernst Reuter, and appeals by Russian émigrés at the border with East Berlin to Russian soldiers not to use violence against demonstrating workers, were blocked by Western officials in Berlin.<sup>111</sup> Flexibility and alternative responses to repression while continuing the struggle may at times depend upon the recognition that in a given conflict situation victory will not come quickly and the campaign may be protracted.<sup>112</sup>

Any possible variations in tactics in response to repression must not, however, alter the basic nonviolent counteraction to repression: persistence, determination, nonviolent discipline and an end to fearful cringing before the opponent's threats and punishments. With this response, change is possible, for "the grip of fear" is broken,<sup>113</sup> and "an immediate and relentless and peaceful struggle" is under way. Those words are from the

call for resistance issued by Maxim Gorky and nine others shortly before their arrest the day after Bloody Sunday, 1905.<sup>114</sup>

## THE NECESSITY OF SUFFERING

Facing repression with persistence and courage means that the nonviolent actionists must be prepared to endure the opponent's sanctions without flinching. The nonviolent actionists must be prepared to suffer in order to advance their cause. Some people may interpret this suffering in a metaphysical or spiritual sense, but this view is not necessary for the technique; it is sufficient if the volunteers see something of the contribution which withstanding repression makes to achieving their objectives. Nonviolent action has long been regarded as a "two-edged sword"—a phrase used in 1770 by Governor Wright of Georgia to describe the colonists' nonimportation program.<sup>115</sup> While the analogy is accurate, it is not complete, for it may imply that direct actionists are likely to suffer only when they use the nonviolent technique, instead of violence, or when they do nothing. This is of course not true.

Political violence, too, especially in the forms of civil wars, terrorist movements, guerrilla war, violent revolution and international wars, involves the risk of suffering and usually high casualties. Accounts of certain nonviolent campaigns are sometimes gory with detailed descriptions of beatings and other brutal treatment of nonretaliating actionists, while histories of wars often cite casualties only in impersonal statistics. Such bloody events in nonviolent struggles are, of course, usually comparatively mild in both seriousness and extent compared with comparable scenes in major cases of political violence, accounts of which rarely describe in detail the human suffering which accompany them. Descriptions of brutalities incurred in nonviolent struggles are simply honest accounts of unpleasant events which for fairness should be balanced with equally detailed reports of suffering in violent conflicts. It is inappropriate for supporters of those violent means to object (as they sometimes do) to nonviolent action on the ground that somebody might get hurt. When only some form of direct action is judged to be an acceptable response to the situation, then suffering is an inherent consequence of that decision. The intelligent response is not to ask simply what means will most effectively release frustration and hatred. The likely consequences of violent action or of nonviolent action are also important.<sup>116</sup>

The fact that suffering is likely or inevitable with both violent and nonviolent action does not mean that there are no important differences.

Other questions remain, such as will there be more or less suffering with one technique or the other, and will the sacrifices incurred by use of each type of action really advance the long term objectives of the grievance group. There have been no careful comparative studies of casualties in violent and nonviolent struggles, but there are reasons for suggesting that both total casualties and suffering on both sides, and also those of only the nonviolent actionists and grievance group, are significantly less than when both sides use violence.

When both belligerents use violent methods, a pattern frequently occurs in which the violence of each side is met with counterviolence in a continuing cycle. Even without significant escalation in the severity and extent of its application, this process produces a continuing accumulation of violence, and of casualties and suffering until one side accedes. When, however, one side is fighting with a different, nonviolent, weapons system, the constant circle of violence is broken. Suffering will still occur, and at times it will be severe, but the substitution of nonviolent persistence for violent retaliation tends to reduce the severity of repression and to contribute in the long run to a reduction in political violence.

This break in the political violence cycle, produced by the willingness of the nonviolent group to accept nonretaliatory suffering as the price of achieving its goals, seems in that immediate struggle to reduce the casualties on both sides. Gregg, for example, argued in these terms:

In the Indian struggle for independence, though I know of no accurate statistics, hundreds of thousands of Indians went to jail, probably not more than five hundred received permanent physical injuries, and probably not over eight thousand were killed immediately or died later from wounds. No British, I believe, were killed or wounded. Considering the importance and size of the conflict and the many years it lasted, these numbers are much smaller than they would have been if the Indians had used violence toward the British.<sup>117</sup>

There were, however, a few Indian policemen in British service killed in the conflict. But the total casualties were still very small, as compared with the 1857 Indian violent struggle against the British—the idea that Indians are somehow by nature nonviolent is just not true—or compared with the number of Algerian dead in the Algerian revolution against the French, estimated variously, but by some as high as nearly a million out of a population only ten times that size.

It also appears that the introduction of violence into a nonviolent struggle will increase the casualties. Bondurant writes: “A comparison of campaigns of civil disobedience which remained nonviolent with others in

which satyagraha deteriorated into violence, indicates significantly greater incidence of injury and death in the latter cases.”<sup>118</sup> In the series of strikes in Soviet prison camps, especially in 1953 and 1954, there appears to be a significant correlation between the degree of brutality used in repression and the casualties inflicted on the prisoners on the one hand, and the degree to which the prisoners remained nonviolent or resorted to serious violence against the prison camp officials, police and troops.<sup>119</sup> Nazi repression and retaliation for the two day strike in Amsterdam and nearby towns in protest against persecution of Jews were severe: several people were wounded in the streets; seven were killed on the second day; Himmler authorized brutalities and the arrest and deportation of one thousand strikers; over one hundred Communists and others suspected of instigating the strike were arrested; fines were imposed on Amsterdam and other municipalities; the mayors of Amsterdam and nearby Haarlem and Zaandam were dismissed and other Dutch officials were also accused of not making sufficient efforts to suppress the strike.<sup>120</sup> There seems no question however that a comparable two day violent Dutch uprising in the same area and by the same number of people would in light of Nazi actions elsewhere against violent resistance (Warsaw, for instance) have produced many times that number of dead, wounded and imprisoned.

In addition to human suffering, a variety of economic losses have also occurred during nonviolent resistance campaigns, as, for example, in the American colonists' struggles, and in the *Ruhrkampf*. Writing about the effects of the nonimportation movement in Boston in 1770, Samuel Adams said: “The Merchants in general have punctually abode by their Agreement, to their very great private loss.”<sup>121</sup> Later, when the British closed the port of Boston in retaliation for the city's various and continued acts of defiance and noncooperation, it was not only the merchants who suffered economically. Hundreds of workmen were thrown out of jobs, and it proved necessary to find ways to feed the poor without giving in to the British.<sup>122</sup> However, the most severe example of economic suffering and dislocation accompanying nonviolent resistance is probably the *Ruhrkampf*. Much of the economic disruption of the German economy as a whole can be blamed, however, on the German government's decision to finance the resistance by unsupported paper money.<sup>123</sup> Within the Ruhr, shortages of milk in the cities endangered the health of children and of ill adults so severely that the death rate for children increased, and only evacuation of about a half million children to unoccupied Germany reduced their danger. Furthermore, in the occupied Ruhr district and the Rhineland, the number of unemployed reached two million out of a total population of about nine million.<sup>124</sup> An immense inflation took place

throughout Germany with disastrous economic results.<sup>125</sup> But even in such a case, one does not have to be very imaginative to see that a military war for repossession of the territory (had Germany been then capable of it) could well have been still more disastrous economically, not only for the Ruhr which would have become a battleground but for all Germany because of the required financial expenditure, the likely destruction of the Ruhr's productive capacity, and the extreme loss of lives.

Not all suffering is the same, nor does it have the same effects. The suffering involved in nonviolent action has more in common with the suffering of certain violent resisters than with the suffering of helpless terrorized and submissive people. Accordingly, the results of suffering of courageous resisters are likely to differ radically from that of the submissive. Gandhi himself pointed to some instances of violence as being almost comparable to those of courageous nonviolence. These cases of violence involved great courage in defying overwhelming forces with very little or no hope of victory, and with the certainty of major suffering. A woman defending herself from rape, a single man (even with a sword) defending himself against a horde of fully armed bandits and killers, or the Poles who "... knew that they would be crushed to atoms, and yet they resisted the German hordes." All three cases, he said, had in common "... the refusal to bend before overwhelming might in the full knowledge that it means certain death."<sup>126</sup> Suffering endured in such courageous violence had more in common with suffering in nonviolent action than the latter had with that of the terrified, passive victim of brutalities. However, this is not, of course, to say that the social and political results would be the same with equally courageous violent and nonviolent resistance.

In common with participants in violent revolution and war, the nonviolent actionists must be willing in extreme crises to risk their lives.<sup>127</sup> Gandhi repeatedly emphasized that rather than submitting to the violence of the opponent, the nonviolent actionist must be willing to make severe sacrifices including, if need be, his own life.<sup>128</sup> Those planning nonviolent action will need to consider the degree of suffering the volunteers are willing to endure, as this may determine which methods of action can be used and how firmly the volunteers will be able to defy the opponent's repression. If the degree of expected tolerable suffering is low, then the volunteers may require further preparation, or they will have to limit themselves to milder forms unlikely to require serious sacrifice.<sup>129</sup>

People may remain nonviolent, not for moral or ideological reasons, but because they realize this behavior is necessary for the practical operation of the technique. "Without suffering," wrote Gandhi, "it is not possible to attain freedom."<sup>130</sup> It was from this perspective that Motilal

Nehru, father of the late Prime Minister, declared on the eve of his own imprisonment in 1930:

We have not yet paid one hundredth part of the price of freedom and must go forward with unflinching step defying the enemy and all the cruel refinements of torture that he is capable of inventing. Do not worry for those who have been taken. See to it that every man, woman and child left behind gives a good account of himself or herself to the nation.<sup>131</sup>

This persistence through repression and willingness to suffer will have a number of effects. Two are: 1) the numerical or quantitative (sometimes almost mechanical) effect of many defiant subjects refusing to obey despite repression on the opponent's ability to control the situation and to maintain his policies, and 2) the psychological or qualitative (or moral) effect of the sacrifices on the opponent, his supporters, third parties and others. Both of these are complicated processes; frequently their operation depends on intervening processes, and in overcoming problems in accurate perception. We shall return to these effects and processes in the final chapters.

In many conflicts the repression and other counter action will be relatively mild or moderate. The intensity and extent of suffering among the actionists and the grievance group will therefore be within the range which can be withstood without extreme difficulty. However, in some cases there will be brutalities.

## FACING BRUTALITIES

Brutalities may arise from three main general sources.

First, the regime may be one in which brutality is commonplace. Terror may be used against all opponents, real or imaginary, in an effort to make the regime omnipotent. Such regimes are usually described as tyrannical or, in extreme forms, totalitarian.

Second, a nontyrannical regime may, when effectively and fundamentally challenged, react with brutal repression. This may follow from a decision that only drastic action can crush the resisters (especially if milder measures have failed) or from exasperation at the actionists' defiant behavior or refusal to submit in face of less severe repression.

Finally, without orders from the regime, local officers, or individuals, in the army, police, or even the general public, may on their own initiative perpetrate brutalities on the nonviolent actionists. These brutalities may result from sadistic personalities, from frustration produced by the

defiance, or from inner conflicts aroused by the situation and the qualities of the nonviolent actionists.

The first two sources may be described as official brutality and the third as unofficial brutality.

#### A. Official and unofficial brutalities

There must be no illusions. In some cases nonviolent people have not only been beaten and cruelly treated but killed, not only accidentally or as isolated punishment, but in deliberate massacres. Refraining from violence is not a guarantee of safety, although contrary to popular opinion it is arguable that nonviolent behavior has better "survival value" than violence. There are disturbing cases of major killings. The 1919 British massacre of at least 379 Indians (and wounding of 1,137) meeting peaceably in Jalianwala Bagh, Amritsar, is one such case.<sup>132</sup>

There have been some massacres of pacifists, although not always when engaged in nonviolent action. In the context of Ohio frontier wars and raids in 1782, two hundred white frontiersmen with full deliberation slaughtered a group of pacifist native American Indians, converts to the Moravian Church which held to nonresistant pacifism. These were wrongly believed to have killed a woman and her five children in a raid on a settler's farm. Twenty-nine men, twenty-seven women and thirty-four children (including at least twelve babies) were slaughtered two by two; almost all were then scalped by the whites.<sup>133</sup> Luthuli reports that in South Africa in 1924 "a hundred Hottentots were butchered for refusing to pay an incomprehensible tax on dogs."<sup>134</sup> It should be pointed out that the massacre of the Moravian Indians took place in the context of warfare, and involved mistaken identity. The victims were not engaged in nonviolent action as defined in this study although they were nonviolent. The case is included here simply to acknowledge that such events have occurred against peaceful people.

But the Indians in Amritsar were holding a peaceful protest meeting and the Hottentots were refusing to pay a tax—both methods of nonviolent action. The shootings on Bloody Sunday are another example. Massacres of nonviolent actionists can take place. Such killings also occur, probably much more frequently, when people resist violently, and even people who passively submit to their oppressors may die as victims of their policies and brutalities. There is no guarantee of safety as long as the underlying conditions contributing to brutality continue. If there is no immediate way to guarantee protection from brutalities, it is at least wise to be aware that they may occur against nonviolent actionists and to determine how to respond to them in accordance with the technique's requirements for effectiveness.

The more tyrannical the regime and system generally, the more probable will be extreme brutalities against the nonviolent actionists. Among all regimes and systems which to any considerable degree depend on violence, the common response when they are challenged, even though by nonviolent means, will be violence against the dissenters. As Bose put it, "the violence of the rulers, which was formerly implicit or camouflaged, now becomes explicit."<sup>135</sup> The degree of severity of repression and of brutalities will vary considerably. Frequently, the response may be quite out of proportion to the seriousness of the challenge. As Hiller pointed out: ". . . the stronger party (especially when it is irresponsible) tends to respond violently to a mild act of resistance or of assertion by the weaker, and especially by a despised party."<sup>136</sup>

Early in the conflict the opponent may have interpreted the actionists' nonviolence as cowardice or stupidity, only to discover it was neither. Continued nonviolent defiance may have proven to be difficult to crush and it may have come to threaten the opponent's continued dominance and control. When the opponent's will is thwarted, violent retaliation is a very likely response.<sup>137</sup> Brutalities may then be deliberate, as we have seen. Seifert has pointed to this type of motivation for brutalities: "This buildup in brutality may be the result of normal and rather rational goal-directed behavior." To the opponent, the established social order, institutions and policies may be good, and he may see the defeat of the resisters as the only way to protect them. "Since, so far as he knows, the only way to accomplish this defeat is to increase severity, he . . . becomes more repressive. This seems to him to be the best possible expedient among the choices available . . ." He is, "given his presuppositions . . . acting in a rational, defensible manner."<sup>138</sup> "Insofar as nonviolence is interpreted as a sign of weakness, it 'makes sense' to increase hostile pressure in the expectation that this will cause collapse of the resisters' cause."<sup>139</sup>

The degree of brutality inflicted as official policy will vary. It may be influenced by the degree to which the opponent understands what is happening, including his comprehension of the dynamics of nonviolent action, and the process of political *jiu-jitsu*, which will be discussed in Chapter Twelve. Confusion, uncertainty and fear will increase the likelihood of official brutalities.

Unauthorized and unofficial brutalities may also be committed on nonviolent actionists. Sometimes highly disproportionate repression may be quite accidental, especially when police or troops are threatened or attacked by undisciplined persons or groups, as was apparently the origin of the famous Boston Massacre of 1770.<sup>140</sup> Brutalities may be committed deliberately, although unofficially, for a variety of motives. A pater-

nalistic ruler who has been rejected by his subjects may commit brutalities.

Within a paternalistic, imperialist framework he may have expressed considerable kindness to a subject race so long as its members stayed "in their place." He may even have thought he was requiring participation in God's own true religion, an essential to the eternal salvation of the resister.<sup>141</sup>

Such an opponent, shocked at having his supposed "good" acts denounced as "evil" by the subordinates, and his egoism revealed and rejected, may resort to extreme acts. "When anyone strips away our cherished self-images and exposes what we really are, he invites punishment."<sup>142</sup> This is closely associated with the wider phenomenon of status-usurpation by the nonviolent actionists.

The agents of repression, and the dominant group in general, may see the nonviolent actionists of the subordinate group as behaving in ways they have no "right" to behave. That is, they are no longer acting like subordinates, but have behaved like equals, no longer cowed and submissive, but erect and insistent. One Deep South store manager faced with a sit-in declared, "Who do these niggers think they are?"<sup>143</sup> Speaking of self-suffering produced by nonwhite civil disobedience in South Africa, Kuper argues that one reason it may alienate sympathy of the whites is that "there is a quality of impudence about it, of status-usurpation, when looked at from the point of view of the dominant group."<sup>144</sup> This, too, may be conducive to brutalities.

The individual policemen or soldiers and the lower rank officers may be in a very difficult position, which may press them toward extreme actions. Not only are they used to having people obey them in such situations, but they are themselves required to obey and carry out orders from their superiors. If they fail to do so, they may be subjected to reprimands, sanctions and withholding of promotions. They may have been given orders to prevent certain actions by the nonviolent group, or to disperse and halt the action if it has already begun. With the nonviolent group remaining fearless, refusing to obey their orders and standing firm, the police, or troops, may find their ability to cope with the situation by the usual permitted means of action blocked. Fearing the consequences of a failure to carry out their orders, the men and lower officers may in desperation or frustration resort to extraordinary means in an effort to complete the tasks commanded by their superiors.

When, despite normal sanctions and repression, the actionists remain

fearless, continue their defiance while remaining nonviolent and refusing to be provoked into retaliation, the opponent's police, troops and the like are likely to become frustrated and irritated. Such behavior, in which people neither fear nor obey them, drastically reduces the ability of such agents to control the situation and to carry out their duties. In addition, as we have noted, they are likely to feel insecure when due deference is not given to their position. Irritation and inadequacy may lead to brutality. Seifert also describes this factor:

When measures taken against resisters have proved ineffectual, and when an opponent faces a personal loss of status or threat to his personality, he may lay on all the harder. Feeling powerless and being unable to tolerate such a feeling of impotence, he resorts to force to give himself the illusion of strength.<sup>145</sup>

This seems to have happened in India in 1930-31.<sup>146</sup>

In his autobiography, Nehru describes an earlier occasion in 1928 when he and other nonviolent demonstrators were beaten seriously by both foot police and a large number of cavalry or mounted police. Some Indians were permanently injured but, though badly beaten and wounded, Nehru recovered fully. He wrote:

But the memory that endures with me far more than that of the beating itself, is that of many of the faces of those policemen, and especially of the officers, who were attacking us. Most of the real beating and battering was done by European sergeants, the Indian rank and file were milder in their methods. And those faces, full of hate and blood-lust, almost mad, with no trace of sympathy or touch of humanity!<sup>147</sup>

On occasion it will be private individuals who commit brutalities. Such attacks sometimes occurred during lunch counter sit-ins in the United States South in 1960. One such instance was against high school anti-segregation sit-inners in Portsmouth, Virginia. The student sit-inners had not expected such violence and lacked both specific instructions and training to meet it. Hence, they finally reacted with violent retaliation. It started on February 15, 1960, when a group of young white hoodlums arrived on the scene to provoke violence and attack the sit-inners and other Negro youths. A participant, Edward Rodman, writes:

Outside [of the store] the [white] boy stood in the middle of the street, daring any Negro to cross a certain line. He then pulled a car

chain and claw hammer from his pocket and started swinging the chain in the air.

He stepped up his taunting with the encouragement of others. When we did not respond, he became so infuriated that he struck a Negro boy in the face with the chain. The boy kept walking. Then in utter frustration the white boy picked up a street sign and threw it on a Negro girl.<sup>148</sup>

In other cases, brutalities may at times take place as a consequence of an inner moral or psychological conflict within the individual committing them, a conflict produced at least in part by the behavior of the nonviolent actionists.<sup>149</sup> Disturbed, consciously or unconsciously, by the challenge of the nonviolent group, their claims and behavior, and by the acts against them he is expected to perform, the individual agent may seek to dismiss this inner conflict or to assert his loyalty to the opponent by extra vigor in repression. Sometimes it is the situation which Seifert describes: ". . . he knows that the resisters are right, but he cannot bear the knowledge. Therefore he represses it and strikes those who irritate his conscience."<sup>150</sup> On other occasions, he may still think the opponent right, but may find himself inflicting punishment which he knows is reprehensible, especially against nonviolent persons:

But he has too much emotional capital invested in his policy to admit he has been wrong . . . When the opponent doubts the defensibility of terror, he may intensify it as a way of convincing himself that he was right all along. He may beat the more to try to avoid a feeling of guilt for those already beaten.<sup>151</sup>

In addition, some of the extreme aggression against the nonviolent group may be the result of their providing, apparently, a safe group on which to vent aggressions against other, known or unknown, persons or conditions.<sup>152</sup> Unless and until the nonviolent behavior of the actionists is perceived as bravery and strength, some persons may see it as weakness and therefore express irrational hostility because of their own inadequacies, as Seifert points out:

Some persons are basically cowardly, but put on an outer show of bravado. When they see action which they interpret as weakness or cowardice, they strike out at it as though despising it wholeheartedly. Not being able to strike at the weakness in themselves, they hit the harder at the resister. For such persons the sight of suffering endured

may become provocative. Nonviolent resistance brings out the bully in those inclined to be bullies.<sup>153</sup>

A contrasting situation exists when the demonstrators do not firmly adhere to their nonviolent discipline, or when the police, troops, etc., on the spot do not understand that the group is going to remain nonviolent and is not attacking them violently. The police and others may then be inspired by fear in what they believe to be a highly insecure and threatening situation, especially if the group is large. This fear may lead them to inflict brutalities on the nonviolent group and to be generally hostile.<sup>154</sup> Such acts of violence may occur even in defiance of general orders from superior officers. Lord Hardinge, the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, claimed, for example, that (contrary to a widely held belief) on Bloody Sunday 1905 it was Prince Vassiltchikoff, commander of the Guards Division, who was on the spot (not the Grand Duke Vladimir), who gave the order to fire on the peaceful demonstrators. Hardinge added that Prince Vassiltchikoff also disobeyed an order from the Grand Duke to stop firing, "saying he could not be responsible for the safety of his troops or of the town unless they used their arms."<sup>155</sup> Lord Hardinge's testimonial may or may not be true, but this is the type of situation in which police and troops immediately in charge of maintaining order or of inflicting repression may fear the worst and act accordingly.

There will be a strong tendency to brutalities when the agencies of repression include a considerable number of persons with strong sadistic tendencies. Katz and Janis have pointed "toward a fit between unusual institutional roles and basic personality patterns." "When an institution permits violence as part of its function, people will be attracted to this role who derive satisfactions from the nature of the work. Thus there is a self-selection process for brutal roles." Even when the person is not especially brutal on entering such institutions, there will be a strong tendency for him to change or leave; in either case those people with strong sadistic or hostile drives will tend to continue and dominate the organization.<sup>156</sup> While this tendency is not universal it may be sufficiently common to help to explain brutalities committed by police, and other official bodies when they do occur. Seifert has also discussed the tendency for individuals to be harsher in their behavior when they are acting as members of a group, with its backing and on the basis of institutional decisions, than they would be as single individuals. Private inhibitions are thus reduced, and "the barrier of institutional decision can insulate a person from emotional involvement."<sup>157</sup>

In some situations, there will also be a considerable possibility that brutalities may be perpetrated on nonviolent actionists by members of the general population and by special civilian groups and organizations, as well as mobs. This has happened frequently in the Deep South.<sup>158</sup> Such private brutalities may be entirely independent of the police, or with their conveniently remaining elsewhere during the attacks, or watching the attacks as passive bystanders. At other times, nonofficial brutalities may be perpetrated despite active attempts by the police to prevent them.

### B. Remaining firm

Therefore, the informed actionist is not, in crisis situations, surprised by the occurrence of brutalities against the nonviolent group. As already noted, they may even be expected. Their occurrence in situations where many people would least expect them—as in India under British rule<sup>159</sup> or in the United States—should leave little doubt that they may certainly be expected in a system comparable to Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia. The response of the nonviolent actionists—if the movement is to continue and not be crushed—must be essentially the same as to normal repression. Either to halt the action or to resort to violence would have serious consequences and would certainly rebound to the opponent's favor. To be effective, the actionists must persist through the brutalities and suffering and maintain their fearlessness, nonviolence and firmness.

This will doubtless mean considerable suffering until it becomes clear that the brutalities are not effective in cowering the actionists, that instead they may be weakening the opponent's position, or until there is a change of policy or attitude toward the nonviolent group and their demands. This process, it must be clear, will often take some time and it may be necessary to have repeated demonstrations to the opponent and his agents that brutalities will not crush the movement.<sup>160</sup> The price the nonviolent actionists may thus have to pay may be at times severe, but it is, in terms of the dynamics of nonviolent action, a price which sometimes must be paid if fundamental changes are to be made. This has military parallels, although there are significant differences.

The leadership in a nonviolent struggle will not, on the basis of any criteria, be wise to demand that the actionists undergo suffering, or court brutalities, beyond their abilities to bear them. Certainly a new course of action which is liable to intensify repression and brutalities must be considered most carefully, and if an unwise course of action has been started it should not be continued out of dogmaticism or stubbornness.

Wise leadership will take great care to avoid unnecessary brutalization of the opponent. It is also desirable to seek to remove motives or influences which might produce brutalities when this can be done without weakening the movement, or giving in to cruelties intended to induce submission. However, there should be no retreat when maintenance of a firm stand, or even still more daring action, is required.

There are occasions when, in Gandhi's view, the nonviolent actionists ought to intensify resistance in face of severe repression and be willing to court additional suffering. This would demonstrate, he maintained, first that the repressive might of the opponent was incapable of crushing the resistance. This would also set in motion a number of forces which would lead to a relative weakening of the opponent, to a strengthening of the nonviolent group and to increased support for the latter from third parties. This is involved in the political *jiu-jitsu* process which is examined in Chapter Twelve. Such provocative nonviolent action may also sometimes be deemed necessary for the internal strengthening of the nonviolent group. A demonstration by a smaller group of some daring form of fearless dramatic action which, if known in advance, may bring upon them "the most intense form of repression possible,"<sup>161</sup> may contribute to improving morale and combating a growth of fear of repression.

The reasons for daring to take provocative nonviolent action and for risking cruel retaliation from the opponent are primarily concerned with the effects of such action on the nonviolent group, on the opponent, or sometimes on third parties, or a combination of these. In any case, the nonviolent group may deliberately seek to reveal to all the extreme brutality of which the opponent and his agents are capable. This type of provocative nonviolent action, it should be made clear, is especially Gandhian. Explicit advocacy of such a course, and theoretical justification for it, do not occur widely in other traditions of nonviolent action, although there are examples in actual practice.

Early in the Indian 1930-31 campaign scattered acts of brutality occurred against the nonviolent volunteers. Gandhi then decided that if this was going to happen anyhow, it would be best to challenge the regime in such a way that such brutality could be revealed publicly in unmistakable terms in order to alienate further support from the government. Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy:

... I feel that it would be cowardly on my part not to invite you to disclose to the full the leonine paws of authority, so that the people who are suffering tortures and destruction of their property may not

feel that I, who had perhaps been the chief party inspiring them to action that has brought to right light the Government in its true colours, had left any stone unturned to work out the Satyagraha programme as fully as it was possible under given circumstances.<sup>162</sup>

He therefore planned a nonviolent raid to seize the government salt depot at Dharasana, an act which because of its daring and challenge would inevitably bring either Government acquiescence or—far more likely—severe repression and brutalities.

This example should make it clear, if there be still any doubt, that it is an error to equate being nonviolent with keeping the opponent “good-natured.” The nonviolent strategist regards both the provocation of extreme repression in rare cases and the more usual willingness to withstand repression against more conventional nonviolent action, as interim stages, temporary phases, of a larger and more complicated process of change, a process which is necessary to alter an intolerable situation.

No opponent is likely to appreciate a serious challenge to his power or policies, even if the challenge is peaceful. The nonviolent actionist recognizes that the desired change may only come as the consequence of a difficult and temporarily disruptive struggle. Gandhi wrote:

Our aim is not merely to arouse the best in [our opponent] but to do so whilst we are prosecuting our cause. If we cease to pursue our course, we do not evoke the best in him but we pander to the evil in him. The best must not be confounded with good temper. When we are dealing with any evil, we may have to ruffle the evil-doer. We have to run the risk, if we are to bring the best out of him. I have likened nonviolence to a septic and violence to antiseptic treatment. Both are intended to ward off the evil, and therefore cause a kind of disturbance which is often inevitable. The first never harms the evil-doer.<sup>163</sup>

April Carter has drawn an analogy between the tensions and conflict involved in a civil disobedience struggle, and those the patient goes through under psychoanalysis, it being necessary in both cases to bring the conflict into the open and to experience it in order to remove it and allow a more healthy condition to be achieved.<sup>164</sup>

As the Gandhian nonviolent actionist understands the process, as long as the opponent is not simply becoming brutalized, and as long as the actionists are able to withstand the repression, there need be no alarm when the opponent temporarily becomes angry and inflicts repression, even brutalities. The situation must, however, be handled wisely and if the

above qualifying conditions no longer exist a change in tactics and methods may be urgently required. Barring that, the nonviolent actionists persist while remaining brave and nonviolent. If this can be achieved, there are good grounds for believing that the brutalities will be a temporary phase, though not necessarily a brief one. Seifert points out that while it is not always the case, “. . . it is entirely possible for the worst persecution to come shortly before capitulation by their opponents.”<sup>165</sup>

The precise factors which may lead to a reduction or cessation of brutalities will vary widely with the particular situation. These factors will be closely associated with 1) the operation of one or more of the mechanisms of change discussed in later chapters, and especially 2) the ways in which repression may rebound against the opponent's position as will be discussed in Chapter Twelve. For example, members of the opponent group may learn that the nonviolent actionists are in fact both brave and strong. With nonviolent discipline, the opponent group may realize it need not fear a violent attack on itself, and hence its hostility may be reduced.<sup>166</sup> Gandhi argued that when the opponent's violence was met with nonviolence, the result would be finally be a weakening of the opponent's desire or ability to continue his violence; in this way nonviolence would “blunt the edge of the tyrant's sword.”<sup>167</sup> An important factor in this process would be the opponent's realization that, rather than strengthening his position, his own repression and brutalities were reacting against him and weakening him, while increasing the relative strength of the nonviolent group.

The change will, however, come only if the nonviolent actionists and the wider grievance group are able to maintain and increase their solidarity. It is to this task and the means for doing so that the discussion now turns.

## NOTES

1. From Parnell's speeches at Tipperary, on 21 September 1879, and at Ennis, on 19 September 1880, quoted in O'Hegarty, *A History of Ireland Under the Union, 1880-1922*, pp. 490-491.
2. For examples of this, see Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, pp. 490, 573 and 651, and Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. XII, *The Triumphant Empire, Britain Sails into the Storm, 1770-1776*, p. 239.
3. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 134; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 134.
4. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 551.
5. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 64.
6. Farmer, *Freedom - When?*, p. 73. See also Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 74.
7. Quoted by Farmer, *loc cit.*
8. Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS p. 168.
9. Hiller, *The Strike*, pp. 22 and 88.
10. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India and the World: Essays by Jawaharlal Nehru* (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1936), p. 173. See also Diwakar, *Satyagraha*, p. 28.
11. Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 30.
12. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms of Nonviolent Action" (thesis), p. 110; also in *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 73.
13. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 23.
14. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 22 and 180. See also pp. 154-159 and 178-180.
15. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 23. See also Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 311, and Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 181.
16. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, pp. 61-62. See also p. 46.
17. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms of Nonviolent Action" (thesis), p. 110, and *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), pp. 73-74, cites: Paul Ernest Wehr, "The Sit-Down Protests: A Study of a Passive Resistance Movement in North Carolina" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina, 1960), and Martin Oppenheimer, "The Sit-In Movement: A Study in Contemporary Negro Protest" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1962), pp. 111 and 134.
18. See Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power*, p. 124. On their role in negotiations, see pp. 170, 178, 202-203, and 205-207.
19. See Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 209, 146, and 146-149.
20. Harvey J. D. Seifert, "The Use by American Quakers of Nonviolent Resistance as a Method of Social Change" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1940), p. 145.
21. On conflicts within the East German regime and in Moscow about the handling of the Rising, or as a consequence of it, see Ebert "Nonviolent Resistance

- Against Communist Regimes?" pp. 186-187 and Brant, *The East German Rising*, pp. 167-175.
22. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 70.
23. Watt, *Dare Call it Treason*, p. 182.
24. See Brant, *The East German Rising*, pp. 155-157 and Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" pp. 184-188.
25. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" p. 184.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*, p. 78.
29. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 70.
30. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 87. On Gandhi's views of the ways in which the government is unprepared for nonviolent action, essentially because it does not expect it, see Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, p. 214.
31. Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 76-77.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
33. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 174; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 174.
34. Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. XI, *The Triumphant Empire: The Rumbling of the Coming Storm, 1766-1770*, pp. 151-152, and vol. XII, pp. 309-311.
35. Symons, *The General Strike*, pp. 47-48.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
38. Watt, *Dare Call It Treason*, p. 186.
39. Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. xxv.
40. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 125.
41. Symons, *The General Strike*, p. 49.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.
43. Delarue, *The Gestapo*, p. 8.
44. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 189. On other instances of recognition by officials of the need to prevent spread of strikes, see also pp. 97, 174, and 196.
45. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 81.
46. Gerland, "The Great Labor Camp Strike at Vorkuta," *Militant*, 7 March 1955.
47. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" pp. 179 and 185. After the rising more significant concessions were made. See Brant, *The East German Rising*, pp. 163-164, and 166.
48. *Newsweek*, 17 June 1963, and *New York Times*, 19 July and 9 October 1963, cited in Roberts, "The Buddhist Revolt", MS pp. 13, 17 and 37.
49. King, *Why We Can't Wait*, pp. 30-32.
50. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" p. 185. On elation and determination to continue the struggle in Russia after the "October Manifesto" see Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 199-203.
51. Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. 322-323 and 332.
52. Jutikkala, *A History of Finland*, p. 229.
53. Gipson, *The Coming of the Revolution, 1763-1775*, p. 193.
54. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XII, p. 130. For similar statements, see

- also pp. 295 and 310-311, and Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, pp. 537-538.
55. William Z. Foster, *The Great Steel Strike and Its Lessons* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1920), p. 116. I am grateful to George Lakey for this reference. See also Symons, *The General Strike*, pp. 158, 182-186 and 196.
  56. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, U.S. ed., pp. 100-102; Br. ed., pp. 118-120.
  57. See Mahadev Desai, *The Story of Bardoli*, pp. 71-72, 88-89, 90, 94-95.
  58. See King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, U.S. ed., 98-99; Br. ed., p. 116.
  59. *Ibid.*
  60. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 86.
  61. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 208; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 208.
  62. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 175.
  63. Hsiao, *Rural China*, p. 3.
  64. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 159. This refers to reaction to the issuing of the Freedom Charter in 1955.
  65. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 49.
  66. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 232.
  67. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XII, p. 287. On a similar warning by General Gage in 1767, see *ibid.*, vol. XI, p. 57.
  68. Warmbrunn, *The Dutch Under German Occupation 1940-1945*, p. 110.
  69. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, pp. 328-329.
  70. Malcolm W. Browne (of Associated Press), *Japan Times*, 31 August 1963, quoted by Roberts, "The Buddhist Revolt," MS p. 45.
  71. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, pp. 39-40.
  72. Buckler, "Labour Disputes in the Province of Asia Minor," p. 31. On other repression against strikes and tax refusal, see Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, vol. I, p. 449.
  73. Ramsay MacMullan, "A Note on Roman Strikes," *Classical Journal*, vol. LVIII (1962-1963), pp. 269-271.
  74. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 538-539.
  75. Griffith, *The Resurrection of Hungary*, p. 34.
  76. Friedrich Grimm, *Vom Ruhrkrieg zur Rheinlandräumung* (Hamburg: *Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt*, 1930), p. 105. Quoted in translation by Sternstein, "The *Ruhrkampf* of 1923," pp. 121-122.
  77. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 63.
  78. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
  79. *Ibid.*
  80. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 149.
  81. Brant, *The East German Rising*, p. 20.
  82. See Symons, *The General Strike*, pp. 20-22, 26-27, 94 and 154-155.
  83. Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, p. 250.
  84. Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. 307-308.
  85. *New York Times*, 30 September 1963, quoted in Roberts, "The Buddhist Revolt," MS pp. 15 and 34.
  86. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 218.
  87. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 86, 79 and 206.
  88. April Carter, *Direct Action* (pamphlet; London: *Peace News*, 1962), p. 22.

89. Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 142.
90. Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, p. 249.
91. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, p. 64.
92. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 81; Ind., ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 81.
93. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 86.
94. See Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 39.
95. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 23.
96. Fredric Solomon and Jacob R. Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities," *Psychiatry*, vol. XVII, no. 2 (May 1964), p. 96.
97. Gandhi, *All Men Are Brothers* (Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan, 1960), p. 138.
98. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 347; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 347.
99. Brigitte Gerland, "The Great Labor Camp Strike at Vorkuta," *Militant* (New York), 7 March 1955, p. 3.
100. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, pp. 106-122; Br. ed.: pp. 126-144.
101. *Ibid.*, U.S. ed.: p. 122; Br. ed.: p. 144.
102. *Ibid.*, U.S. ed.: p. 132-133; Br. ed.: p. 156. On other examples from the Afro-American movement, see Farmer, *Freedom—When?*, p. 10, and Solomon and Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities," pp. 95-97.
103. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 41.
104. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 231.
105. Reitlinger, *The Final Solution*, p. 328.
106. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" p. 182.
107. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, pp. 11, 78, 145-147, 150-153, 155-157, 161, 170, 209, 214-217, 226, and 229, and Appendix C, and also Sharp, "Problems of Violent and Nonviolent Struggle," *Peace News*, 28 June 1963.
108. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 162.
109. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 196.
110. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" p. 193.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
112. Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS pp. 438-439.
113. Brant, *The East German Rising*, p. 164.
114. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 116.
115. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, p. 186. On economic hardships on the colonists of that campaign in 1770, see p. 273.
116. Niels Lindberg as early as 1937 attempted, and appealed for, a comparative evaluation on practical grounds of the advantages, disadvantages and consequences of nonviolent action, military resistance, terrorist resistance and guerilla war. See Lindberg, "Konklusionen: Theorien om Ikke-vold," in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*, pp. 203-213.
117. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 100.
118. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 229.
119. See *Monthly Information Bulletin* of the International Commission Against Concentration Camp Practices (August-November 1955), pp. 19-35, and 66-68.
120. Warmbrunn, *The Dutch . . .*, p. 110.
121. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 183.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 315.
123. Ehrlich, "Ruhrkampen," p. 189.
124. *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.
125. Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, pp. 252-254.
126. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. I, p. 338. See also, pp. 43, 226, 278, 323, and 337-339. For other discussions of suffering in nonviolent action, see *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 63, 145, 166 and 288; Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 134, and 172; Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 53, 78, 84, and 129-130; Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 183; Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, pp. 397-401; Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy . . .*, pp. 139-141; Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 78-93, and Wolff, editor, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, pp. 224-249, esp. p. 226.
127. See Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 29 and 198 and Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. II, p. 21.
128. See Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. II, pp. 36, 59 and 63, and Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 189.
129. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance* p. 67; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 67.
130. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
131. *Young India* (weekly), 10 July 1930 nr. 28.
132. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 76.
133. Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 224-229.
134. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 92.
135. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 161.
136. Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 151.
137. See Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (thesis), p. 84; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), pp. 54-55.
138. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 47.
139. *Ibid.*, p. 50. See also p. 49.
140. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 180 and Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XI, pp. 276-280.
141. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 47.
142. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
143. Quoted by Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (thesis), p. 83; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), pp. 54-55.
144. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 89.
145. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 48.
146. See Gopal, *Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, p. 65.
147. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 180.
148. Edward Rodman, "Portsmouth: A Lesson in Nonviolence," pp. 80-81, in Peck, *Freedom Ride*.
149. See Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 85.
150. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 48.
151. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
152. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.
152. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.
153. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

154. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (Thesis) p. 85; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), pp. 55-56.
155. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, *Old Diplomacy: The Reminiscences of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst* (London: James Murray, 1947), p. 114.
156. Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Hostility," p. 99.
157. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 51.
158. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 164.
159. See Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .* pp. 101-102; 104-105; 108-111; 115; 139-141; 142-144; 148-149; 162-166.
160. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 59, 83, 118, 120 and 126.
161. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 153.
162. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 117.
163. Quoted in Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 168.
164. April Carter, *Direct Action* (pamphlet), p. 23.
165. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 63.
166. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 48, and Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Hostility," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol III, no. 1 (March 1959), p. 95.
167. Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy . . .*, p. 141.