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Chapter 11

Solidarity and Discipline to Fight Repression

INTRODUCTION

Faced with repression and suffering, the nonviolent actionists will need to stand together, to maintain their internal solidarity and morale, and to continue the struggle. As the opponent attributes violence to them and tries to provoke them to commit violence—with which he could deal more effectively—the nonviolent actionists will need to persist in reliance on their chosen technique of struggle and to maintain nonviolent discipline. As the conflict deepens, the nonviolent actionists will need to continue to pursue the struggle in order to bring into operation the changes that will alter relationships and achieve their objectives.

THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY

The need for solidarity has been recognized in many campaigns, both in the initial stages and in the later more difficult phases. During the ini-

tial stages, when the effort is to rally as much support as possible, the nonviolent group is likely to identify with the grievance group as a whole and its needs. This will continue, Lakey points out, as long as the group of participants is growing; "little if any emphasis is placed on a boundary between the nonviolent actor and the public."¹ In some cases the whole population group is more or less involved, although not always equally so. In other cases, the nonviolent actionists may be a minority and a highly visible group, in comparison to the general population or even the group whose grievances are being championed.

Sometimes people will hesitate to commit themselves to nonviolent action unless they are convinced that there will be sufficiently solid support to make it effective. In the spring of 1768 New England merchants were, for example, cautious about a nonimportation campaign; they wanted assurances that merchants in the colonies down the coast would also take part. New York merchants made their adoption of the plan later that year dependent on continued support from Boston and the adoption of similar measures in Philadelphia.²

Nonviolent actionists will aim for the full participation which was shown at the beginning of the British General Strike of 1926:

The workers' reaction to the strike call was immediate and overwhelming. There can be no doubt that its completeness surprised the Government, as well as the TUC. From district after district reports came into the TUC headquarters at Eccleston Square, sending the same message in various words: the men were all out, the strike was solid. This is a very rare thing . . . this one, almost unprepared and imperfectly coordinated, might have been expected to show signs of collapse from the start. Instead, the response was in effect complete.³

On June 16, 1953, similar solidarity was shown by East Berlin workers. Workers from *Volkseigener Betrieb Industriebau's* Block 40 section were indignant at the approximately ten percent increase in their work norms, which had been announced by the ministerial council. At first it was decided to send delegates to Ulbricht and Grotewohl to protest the change, but, Ebert reports:

At an improvised meeting a foreman said that it was time to act. All the workers should go, not just the delegates. One of the workers has described this decisive movement in the history of the uprising: "A colleague came forward. 'Take your choice. If you are with us, step over to the right: if not step over to the left.' The whole gang moved to the right." The uprising began in that instant. The workers re-

solved to protest openly. After that there was no turning back. The fact that they had all taken the same step gave them strength and confidence.⁴

It should not be assumed, however, that such initial unanimity will always be possible, nor that it is always required (however desirable it may be). If near unanimity of participation is not likely, or does not materialize, this fact will have to be considered in the selection, or modification, of the strategy, tactics and specific methods for the campaign. Where the active participants in the nonviolent struggle are only a section of the general population, deliberate efforts may be needed to strengthen their morale. This strengthening may involve developing the nonviolent actionists as a *self-conscious* group distinguished from the rest of the population. Lakey writes that this drawing of boundaries may happen "as soon as campaigners cease to be recruited at a high rate."⁵ When maximum possible support has at that stage been rallied, the nonviolent group is likely without conscious influence to develop its internal solidarity as it faces the coming struggle. Deliberate efforts may also be made to develop and maintain group solidarity.

The maintenance of morale in nonviolent struggles is extremely important. There appear to be roughly four ways of doing this (and here we follow Hiller's analysis of morale-building in strikes⁶ with some modifications and additions). These are: 1) maintaining rapport, feelings of group participation and group solidarity; 2) generating incentives to carry on the struggle; 3) lessening incentives to give it up; and 4) possessing or using restraints on participants wishing to abandon the struggle.

A. Maintaining rapport

The ability of the participants to face repression will be very significantly increased if they constantly feel that they are part of a much larger movement which gives them, personally, support and strength to carry on. Even when the individual is physically separated from the group, the awareness that others are continuing in solidarity with him will help him to resist temptations to submit. Regular contacts and demonstrations of "togetherness" are therefore important ways of maintaining group morale.⁷ This explains the role of regular mass meetings during strikes.⁸ During the Montgomery bus boycott, regular mass prayer meetings were held, first twice a week and later once a week.⁹

Other specific actions seemingly intended as resistance against the opponent or as an effort to reach the public may in reality help to maintain internal group solidarity and morale. For example, parades and

marches may be used. As Hiller points out in the case of strikes: "Marching before spectators is a declaration 'to the world' that one's lot has been cast with the group in its rivalry with others. Self-display before a public causes one to feel identified with those similarly placed and associated." Picketing has an effect, not only on the public, strikebreakers, etc., but on the strikers themselves. Hiller describes this effect as being "more influential upon the strikers than upon the scab and the employer. The very antagonism which these efforts provide helps to maintain the conflict, boost morale, and lessen desertions."¹⁰

During the Indian 1930-31 campaign, for example, there were a significant number of parades, picketing, the hoisting or carrying of the Indian national flag, the burning of foreign cloth and mass meetings. The *hartal* was not only a form of protest but also a means of keeping up morale. Singing was frequently used by large crowds in crisis situations.¹¹ At the beginning of the campaign, Gandhi, writing in *Young India*, stated that during the movement *satyagrahis* should find themselves:

1. In prison or in an analogous state, or
2. Engaged in civil disobedience, or
3. Under orders at the spinning wheel, or at some constructive work advancing *Swaraj* [self-rule].¹²

Thus in the crises, work on the constructive program (intended to remove social evils, educate the people, and build new, self-reliant, institutions) also helped to keep people involved and active in the overall movement, whether or not engaged in civil disobedience. In 1952 mass meetings were used in South Africa both to build up a spirit of resistance and solidarity and to spread the objectives and plans of the civil disobedience movement. The campaign was preceded by a day of prayer in many African locations throughout the country.¹³

In some situations temporary camps for volunteers may be set up, as in India in 1930. These are particularly necessary in combat situations, as during the nonviolent raid at Dharasana,¹⁴ and serve not only to meet elementary physical needs but also to maintain group spirit.

Sometimes the wearing of certain symbols of unity will help people to identify with the movement and show their support for it. For example, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn tells how this worked in an American labor strike:

The strike was in danger of waning for lack of action. We got every striker to put on a little red ribbon . . . and when they got out of their homes and saw the great body that they were they had renewed energy which carried them along for many weeks in the strike.¹⁵

Norwegians during the Nazi occupation wore paper clips in their lapels, a sign of "keep together," and students and pupils took to wearing necklaces and bracelets of paper clips. Red caps were worn as a sign of resistance. Pupils wore tiny potatoes on match sticks in their lapels. Every day they became larger, indicating that the anti-Nazi forces were growing. The smallest Norwegian coin, showing "H VII" for King Haakon VII, was brightly polished and worn. Flowers were widely worn on the King's seventieth birthday. Such symbolic actions not only irritated the Nazis—several hundred Norwegians were arrested for them—but also served to boost feelings of solidarity among the Norwegians.¹⁶

Explaining why a strikers' picnic was held on Sunday (when the strikers could have had a rest and break), Flynn pointed out that the reasons went "deep into the psychology of a strike." She then elaborated on the importance of conscious efforts to maintain solidarity if the strikers were to win. "You have got to keep the people busy all the time, to keep them active, working," she explained. This was the reason why the Industrial Workers of the World had "these great mass meetings, women's meetings, children's meetings . . . [.] mass picketing and mass funerals. And out of all this . . . we are able to create that feeling . . . 'One for all and all for one' . . . we are able to bring them to the point where they will go to jail and refuse fines, and go, hundreds of them, together . . ."¹⁷

B. Generating incentives

A second way of maintaining morale is to promote determination to carry on the struggle. The participants must believe that they have very good reasons for continuing, that their action is justified, that the objectives when won will be worthwhile, and that the means of action to achieve them have been wisely chosen. "The biggest job in getting any movement off the ground," wrote Martin Luther King, Jr., "is to keep together the people who form it. This task requires more than a common aim: it demands a philosophy that wins and holds the people's allegiance; and it depends upon open channels of communication between the people and their leaders."¹⁸

The leaders in Montgomery put much effort into explaining nonviolent action and "Christian love" in the mass meetings. Morale is likely to increase if the nature of the technique, the plan of action and tactics, the significance of the repression and the response to it are understood. Sometimes the opponent's repression will by its brutality make waverers more firm on their resolve. If the goals and means of struggle are, or can be, related to deep religious or philosophical convictions *already held*

by the participants and the wider population, their resolve and morale are likely to be stronger.

C. Reducing grounds for capitulation

At certain stages in nonviolent campaigns, the participants may become discouraged or fatigued, and specific attention must then be given to counteract these conditions. Wise nonviolent leaders will have anticipated this development and may have tried to reduce its severity by advance measures. It is highly important that at least the original participants continue support and that none desert. The failure to maintain lasting internal solidarity among the inhabitants of the Ruhr led to serious weakening of the movement. "The united front against occupiers, which had been firm and strong at the outset, now began to disintegrate," writes Sternstein about the months of August and September, 1923.¹⁹

Where fatigue or monotony occur, special entertainment may be marginally useful. There was a considerable effort in this direction during the 1926 British General Strike. The General Council of the Trades Union Congress suggested the organization of sports and entertainment, and local Strike Committees organized concerts, football matches and other sports. In many cases strikers played football matches against teams of local policemen. All over Britain, local Strike Committees organized "Sport and Entertainment" sections. The Cardiff, Wales, Strike Committee advised the local men: "Keep smiling. Refuse to be provoked. Get into your garden. Look after the wife and kiddies. If you have not got a garden, get into the country, the parks and the playgrounds."²⁰

Where, because of participation in the struggle, the nonviolent actionists and their families suffer from lack of food, housing, money and the like, or if they may do so in the future, there may be a major effort to supply these needs. This assistance would relieve the nonviolent combatants and their families of immediate worries, and enable them to carry on longer than otherwise possible. Such efforts to equalize the burdens and provide mutual help have been made in various recent campaigns, but the practice is an old one, having been used by American colonists. South Carolinians, for example, devised a scheme for equalizing the burdens which would come with the plan for economic resistance contained in the Continental Association; the possible adverse effects on rice planters were regarded as especially important.²¹ When the British closure of the port of Boston brought economic hardship to the city's merchants and unemployment for workingmen, other cities and towns, and indeed other colo-

nies at some distance, provided various forms of mutual help, ranging from free use of storerooms and wharves for Boston merchants in nearby Marblehead to financial assistance for Boston's needy.²² Modern forms of such assistance have included legal representation, bail funds, financial assistance to families, and (where the campaign was in support of the government) advance guarantees of compensation for financial losses arising from the struggle. For example, the German Minister of Traffic, Gröner, in 1920 promised all staff members, officials and workers in the State railroads that in accordance with the policy of refusing all cooperation with French efforts to run the railroads in the Ruhr, the government would reimburse them for all injury and loss. This compensation policy was also extended to industrialists of the territory for their losses during the struggle, and 715,000,000 marks were later paid in compensation.²³ In other cases, where the resistance organization was a private one with little or no financial reserve, volunteers have sometimes been asked to sign a statement acknowledging that there will be no claim for, or pledge of, financial remuneration for any losses or difficulties arising from the struggle.

The sufferings incurred in the course of nonviolent struggle are sometimes interpreted by nonviolent leaders in ways which make them seem more bearable. Where this effort is successful, further grounds for capitulation will be reduced. Various speakers emphasized such interpretations during the 1952 South African Defiance Campaign:

I know you will be called upon to make many sacrifices and you may have to undergo many sufferings. But what are these sufferings compared with the sufferings of other people in this country to-day Our people suffer every day, and it is all wasted. What we say is, suffer, but for a cause, and let us rather die for a good cause.

If they put you in gaol, I ask you: is your condition better outside?

They can bring their machine-guns, as they did on the first of May, and shoot us down—innocent men—without provocation. And what will happen to you if you die? I ask you. My friend, let me tell you that when you die they must take that chain off you and you will be free in your death.

. . . their power is great. But are we going to be frightened of that power? . . . The power of man is greater than the power of machine-guns . . . And if justice and truth is on our side, no machine, no police, no power can stop us from marching onwards.²⁴

D. Restraints or sanctions

The last, most extreme, and least used, means of maintaining solidarity is the threat or use of nonviolent restraints or sanctions. Such restraints or sanctions may be applied to those who have refused to join the movement, or to members of the nonviolent group who have weakened and withdrawn from the campaign. These nonviolent sanctions differ radically from the sanctions for indiscipline applied in violent conflicts, which are imprisonment or execution.

The nonviolent alternative sanctions may under suitable circumstances be powerful and effective. Sometimes verbal persuasion is sufficient to restore adherence to the movement. When this is not adequate, other methods are available, including vigils, public prayers, picketing, fines, publication of names, suspension of membership, social boycott, economic boycott, fasting and nonviolent interjection.²⁵

If such pressures are to be used, considerable care will be needed in their application. Intimidation and threats of physical harm must not be used, or the movement is likely to slide into a struggle with violence applied against one's own people. Rejection of threats is certainly a minimum limitation on sanctions for maintaining solidarity. Frequently nonviolent leaders insist that the attitude toward the persons whose behavior requires these pressures must be a benevolent one. Gandhi insisted, for example, that such means must be applied without vindictiveness or hostility. This is contrary to attitudes frequently accompanying Western labor conflicts when nonstrikers are ostracized or "sent to Coventry." Social boycotts, it should be remembered, do not require bitterness and hatred. In any case, supplies of food and all other necessities must be maintained; if necessary these must be provided to those who are being socially boycotted.

The activists among American colonists during their noncooperation campaigns against British laws, regulations and government probably still furnish the outstanding example of these types of restraints and sanctions. (This is not to deny that threats of physical violence were also on occasion used against recalcitrants.) For example, in 1769 residents of Massachusetts Bay Colony used various nonviolent methods against those not complying with the nonimportation campaign, including distribution of thousands of handbills urging people to shun the shops of merchants not abiding by the agreement, refusal to do business with any vessel which loaded forbidden goods at any British port, and publication in newspapers of the names of violators.²⁶

This is, however, simply one illustration of many which might be of-

ferred. Various committees were set up throughout the colonies to enforce the provisions of the ongoing campaign, and these achieved considerable effectiveness.²⁷ In Connecticut the Continental Association was enforced by open, fair trials of persons accused of violations of its provisions.²⁸ In order to prevent a skyrocketing of prices as a consequence of short supplies during nonimportation, colonials controlled prices by instituting investigations (at times demanding examinations of accounts), publishing names of violators, and imposing economic boycotts on those who sought to profit from the crisis.²⁹ The most important nonviolent sanctions were the "naming" of people—i.e., publishing their names in newspapers—imposition of social boycott, and in the case of merchants and traders, the application of secondary economic boycotts against them. In practice it was often difficult to separate the operation of the methods of "naming," social boycott and economic boycott.³⁰ One ultraradical wrote in late 1774:

The [Continental] Congress, like other Legislative bodies, have annexed penalties to their laws. They do not consist of the gallows, the rack, and the stake . . . but INFAMY, a species of infamy . . . more dreadful to a freeman than the gallows, the rack, or the stake. It is this, he shall be declared in the publick papers to be *an enemy to his country* . . .³¹

In certain situations certain austerities adopted for resistance, including the ban against gambling, were also enforced by such means. The enforcement measures took a variety of additional forms depending on the situation, including dismissal from their jobs of ship captains or masters who had taken on prohibited goods and the refusal of lawyers to provide services for violators of the noncooperation plan.³²

Enforcement of the nonimportation and other measures by such means was frequently effective. Banned goods were sometimes returned to England without being unloaded, while at other times such imports were unloaded but placed in storage for the duration of the campaign, or sold at auction for the benefit of the resistance movement.³³ Occasionally shopkeepers were "sentenced" to burn boycotted tea in their possession.³⁴

The Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts Bay, Thomas Hutchinson, writing of the period when he acted as Governor before General Gage replaced Governor Bernard, confirmed the effectiveness of the various means of enforcement:

The design, at this time, was to enforce the compliance with the former subscription, and to compel all other persons to abstain from

importation. The first step for this purpose was the publication in the newspapers, of the names of such persons as were most notorious for persisting in importing goods contrary to the agreement of the merchants, "that there might be the concurrence of every person upon the continent in rendering their base and dangerous designs abortive." Many persons, at first, appeared determined not to submit to so arbitrary a proceeding, but the subscription was general, with few exceptions only.³⁵

Hutchinson also offered several examples of pressures which involved a shift toward physical intimidation to enforce the noncooperation provisions.³⁶ Without doubt there was at times both a strong tendency for suppression of contrary opinions and violation of freedom of speech, and a development of quasi-military groups,³⁷ but such developments do not necessarily follow from the nonviolent enforcement of resistance policy: indeed, they need to be prevented.

In an unusual extension of this type of enforcement, colonies which were firmly supporting nonimportation applied secondary economic boycotts not only against towns where the expression of opposition was weak,³⁸ but even against whole colonies which had been lax in launching or maintaining noncooperation, especially Rhode Island, South Carolina and Georgia.³⁹

During the Irish rent refusal campaign, Charles S. Parnell, Member of Parliament and President of the Land League, called for social boycott against Irishmen who did not maintain solidarity with their resisting compatriots. Parnell declared at Ennis on September 19, 1880:

Now what are you to do to a tenant who bids for a farm from which another tenant has been evicted? I think I heard somebody say shoot him. I wish to point out to you a very much better way—a more Christian and charitable way, which will give the lost man an opportunity of repenting. When a man takes a farm from which another has been evicted, you must shun him on the roadside when you meet him—you must shun him in the streets of the town—you must shun him in the shop—you must shun him on the fair-green and in the market place, and even in the place of worship, by leaving him alone, by putting him into a moral Coventry, by isolating him from the rest of his country, as if he were the leper of old—you must show him your detestation of the crime he has committed . . .⁴⁰

Examples of the use of nonviolent interjection, for example, to press nonstrikers to stay away from work have also been offered in Chapter

Eight in the description of that method.⁴¹ On occasion fasts have been used to maintain solidarity. For example, during the Ahmedabad textile workers' strike led by Gandhi in 1918, after four weeks the strikers became dispirited and some began to return to work. Gandhi regarded their weakening as a breaking of their pledge not to do so. Accordingly, he reminded the workers of their pledge and undertook a fast, saying, "unless the strikers rally and continue the strike till a settlement is reached, or till they leave the mills altogether, I will not touch any food." This restored morale and solidarity.⁴²

In late 1930, when tax refusal was added to the methods of resistance used by the Indians and the government consequently seized properties of tax resisters, fasts were applied against fellow Indians who sought to profit from the struggle. In Siddapur *taluka* (subdistrict), in Kanara, Karnatak province, thirty-seven women fasted at the doors of persons who had bought the seized properties of tax resisters, and at Mavinagundi such a fast lasted thirty-one days.⁴³

It is possible, of course, that in face of repression, despite such means of promoting solidarity, both determination and fearlessness may weaken and the movement may collapse. If, however, the nonviolent actionists remain determined and fearless, are willing to undergo the suffering and maintain their solidarity and high morale, it is highly likely that the movement will continue. This will present severe problems for the opponent. It will mean, among other things, that his effort to crush the movement by his strongest means of action—repression—will have failed. To achieve this, however, the actionists must maintain nonviolent discipline, for there are strong chances that the opponent will falsely attribute violence to them and seek to provoke them into committing it. That is to his advantage.

INHIBITING REPRESSION

The difficulties which the opponent faces in attempting to defeat a nonviolent action movement arise from 1) the fact that the opponent strongly tends to be more limited in the means of repression which he may use against nonviolent action than against violent action, and 2) the nature of his means of repression, which are generally most effective in dealing with *violent* action.

Extremely severe and brutal repression against a group pledged to nonviolence and to harm no one is much more difficult to justify to everyone concerned than is such repression against a group engaged in injuring and killing people. Awareness of this in advance, or as a result of ex-

perience, will in many cases cause the opponent to make his counteraction less severe than against violent actionists. He learns that disproportionate repression may react against him, not only in terms of opinion but also in weakening his own relative power position. This reaction includes increased support for the nonviolent group, less support for, and greater open opposition to, the opponent's policies, repression and regime generally.

Lahey puts it this way:

... the strategy of the nonviolent actor is to limit the means of repression which can be included in the definition of the situation of the opponent. The nonviolent actor does this by persuading his opponent that some means are inappropriate for use against him. Even if the opponent has traditionally exploited or been violent against the campaigner, the latter seeks to protect an image of himself which will remove the justification for the opponent's violence.⁴⁴

It is true that the British were far more brutal in putting down the Indian nonviolent movement than most people today realize.⁴⁵ However, it is also true that they were by no means as ruthless as they *could* have been, and as they in fact *were* in putting down the 1857 uprising in India and the Mau Mau movement in Kenya, or in the bombings of German cities in World War II. At least a major part of the reason for the comparative British restraint in dealing with the Indian nonviolent movement was that the Indians' continuing nonviolence limited the British in the means of repression which are effectively open to them. Focusing on labor strikes, Hiller points to the influence of the presence or absence of a public on the kinds of repression which may be used against strikers.⁴⁶

Explaining the British Government's refusal to arrest Gandhi during his Salt March to the sea to commit civil disobedience in 1930, Gandhi said:

... the only interpretation I can put upon this noninterference is that the British Government, powerful though it is, is sensitive to world opinion which will not tolerate repression of extreme political agitation which civil disobedience undoubtedly is, so long as disobedience remains civil, and, therefore, necessarily nonviolent.⁴⁷

The degree to which a regime will feel able to defy world—or internal—opinion will of course vary, depending on several factors. These include the kind of regime it is, whether it thinks the events can be kept unknown, the degree to which it is threatened by the events, and whether

opinion against the regime will be translated into assistance for the nonviolent group and into actions against the opponent.

Censorship kept the news of the 1919 massacre of Jalianwala Bagh in Amritsar, India, from reaching the United States for eight months—but it did eventually leak out.⁴⁸ In dealing with the defiant nonviolently resisting Norwegian teachers Quisling could obviously have been more ruthless than he was and could have shot some or all of them. However, he was not really free to do so because he knew that if he took harsher measures against the teachers than sending them to concentration camps he might irrevocably increase public hostility to his regime and make forever impossible his hope of gaining the consent and cooperation he needed for establishing the Corporative State in Norway.⁴⁹

The British in India clearly faced some very difficult decisions concerning what means of repression should be used and when they should be applied. Nehru described this situation in late 1921: "The nerves of many a British official began to give way. The strain was great. There was this ever-growing opposition and spirit of defiance which overshadowed official India like a vast monsoon cloud, and yet because of its peaceful methods it offered no handle, no grip, no opportunity for forcible repression."⁵⁰ Gopal, who had access to government correspondence and reports, describes some of the problems during the 1930-31 struggle and the differences of opinion within the government about measures of repression.⁵¹ These are simply indicative of the general problem which an opponent faces when confronting nonviolent action. The decisions are difficult for him if he is to consider the effects of his action on his own position, strength and future; the responses offered to this problem may vary considerably.

In other cases, too, there is suggestive evidence that the maintenance of nonviolent discipline in face of repression tends significantly to restrict the repression and to cause especially difficult problems for the opponent. For example, in South Africa, in an effort to crush a strike by Africans which began on March 22, 1960 (the day after the shooting at Sharpeville), police invaded the Nyanga location near Capetown on April 4; for four days they unleashed a reign of terror including extensive whippings of men, use of batons and some shootings and killings. (This was after extensive unprovoked police brutality against Africans elsewhere, which had produced important white protests against the police.) Norman Phillips of the *Toronto Star* reports the inhibiting effects of nonretaliation even in this situation: "For sheer sadism, the closest comparison to what happened at Nyanga was when the Gestapo sealed off the Warsaw ghetto and

began to annihilate it. Had Nyanga fought back, it, too, would have been wiped out; but the Africans employed nonaggressive tactics that puzzled the police."⁵² The French commander confronted with nonviolent resistance in the Ruhr acknowledged that it was not very easy to crush the movement; he told the German author Friedrich Grimm: "You have no idea of the difficulties I had, nor of the opportunities you had of exploiting them."⁵³

Sir Basil Liddell Hart offered further evidence of the special problems of repression against nonviolent actionists from German occupation experience in World War II:

When interrogating the German generals after the Second World War, I took the opportunity of getting their evidence about the effect of the different kinds of resistance which they had met in the occupied countries.

Their evidence tended to show that the violent forms of resistance had not been very effective and troublesome to them, except in wide spaces or mountainous areas such as Russia and the Balkans, where topography favoured guerrilla action. In the flat and thickly populated countries of western Europe, it rarely became a serious handicap unless and until the Allied armies were able, and close enough, to exert a simultaneous pressure.

Their evidence also showed the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance as practised in Denmark, Holland and Norway—and, to some extent, in France and Belgium. Even clearer, was their inability to cope with it. They were experts in violence, and had been trained to deal with opponents who used that method. But other forms of resistance baffled them—and all the more in proportion as the methods were subtle and concealed. It was a relief to them when resistance became violent and when nonviolent forms were mixed with guerrilla action, thus making it easier to combine drastic repressive action against both at the same time.⁵⁴

THE OPPONENT PREFERS VIOLENCE

Because of the special difficulties of repressing a nonviolent resistance movement, the opponent may seek to ease them by attributing violence to the nonviolent actionists. The British policy in 1930-31 was to publicize widely all the violence that occurred and, it often seemed, to issue deliberately false reports. The official report for the year, *India in 1930-31*, stated that between April 6 and July 7, 1930, there was a consid-

erable number of "riots and serious disturbances" and "disorders" throughout the country. Fifty-three such happenings were listed—with no attempt to distinguish between violent riots and nonviolent "disorders."⁵⁵ During the 1952 Defiance Campaign in South Africa, as we have seen, there was considerable attempt to identify the civil disobedience movement with the Mau Mau movement in Kenya.⁵⁶ The opponent may also plant incriminating evidence "proving" violent intentions and unsavory political associations within the nonviolent group. For example, according to Denis Warner in the *Daily Telegraph* (London) the South Vietnamese Diem regime planted weapons, explosives and "Communist propaganda" in the Xa Loi pagoda in Hué, in 1963.⁵⁷ This was to help "justify" severe repression, harsh raids, and large-scale arrests.

Frequently fearing nonviolent resistance more than violent resistance, officials have on occasion preferred that the actionists resort to violence. On the other hand, an opponent who genuinely holds humanitarian and moral views may be partially grateful that the actionists use nonviolent means.⁵⁸ However, if the opponent is more interested in maintaining policies which are difficult to justify, in preserving his dominance, and in crushing opposition than he is in upholding an ethical outlook, he may try to provoke violence. In the history of the labor movement, for example, there are frequent instances in which employers have found that resort to violence by the strikers was counterproductive for them but an advantage for the employers.⁵⁹ In the United States, Oppenheimer and Lakey report as follows: "Again and again in the civil rights struggle police have been itching to shoot into demonstrations but have not fired because they could not find the excuse of 'self-defense' or 'rioting.'"⁶⁰

Toward the end of Gandhi's struggle in South Africa, one of the secretaries to General Smuts said to Gandhi: "I often wish you took to violence like the English strikers, and then we would know at once how to dispose of you."⁶¹ Gopal reports that whereas the British found Gandhi's nonviolent action "bewildering," "nothing would have suited the British better than to have been confronted with a series of weak, armed rebellions . . ." ⁶² Benjamin Tucker argued: "There is not a tyrant in the civilized world today who would not rather do anything in his power to precipitate a bloody revolution rather than see himself confronted by any large fraction of his subjects determined not to obey."⁶³

Even minor breaks in discipline and very limited violence may be the occasion for quite disproportionate response by the agents of repression; this happened both at Sharpeville in 1960 when stones were thrown at the police and in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963, when initial taunting of the police produced high pressure water hosing against Negro dem-

onstrators, a step which led to the Negroes' hurling stone paving-blocks at police in a struggle which lasted an hour-and-a-half.⁶⁴ Even a little violence will give the opponent the excuse for which he may well have waited to use his overwhelming violence and repression. Severe repression may, of course, occur even when nonviolent discipline is maintained; but in that case, the repression is more likely to rebound against the opponent's power, as is discussed in Chapter Twelve.

Where both sides rely on violence, despite their disagreements, "in reality they conduct their fight on the basis of a strong fundamental agreement that violence is a sound mode of procedure."⁶⁵ The use of nonviolent means against a violent opponent, however, creates a condition of disequilibrium within the dynamics of the conflict which operates to the benefit of the nonviolent group.

It is clear that Hitler and the Nazi regime generally regarded some type of "provocation" as necessary, or at least highly desirable, when they were about to launch some major international or domestic power grab which might otherwise have met with considerable opposition. If the provocation desired by the Nazis did not happen on its own, then it was "necessary" to fake a provocation. Detailed study of archives and documents might show whether or not the Nazis consciously applied this as a general practice to resistance movements of various types; this extensive research has not been possible. However, the available evidence shows that even in the Nazis' opinion provocation greatly facilitated international aggression, internal usurpation and brutalities against and murder of hated people. This Nazi desire for provocations adds plausibility to the view that violence used by or on behalf of nonviolent actionists is likely to be counterproductive and help the opponent to inflict overwhelming repression and brutalities. Since the Nazi regime would be expected to be most indifferent to a need for such "justification," these cases are especially significant. Several such instances will therefore be surveyed here. In all these the Nazis wanted violence from their opponents. If it did not happen anyhow, the Nazis either falsely attributed violence to the opposition or provoked them to commit it. Then the Nazis utilized such violence for their own political advantage.

In 1933 Hitler clearly saw provocation to be necessary if he were to use his precarious position as Chancellor representing a minority party in a coalition cabinet operating under a democratic constitution, to abolish the Weimar Republic and to establish a one-party Nazi system. Communist violence was seen as necessary for the "legal" destruction of the Communist Party, and the Nazis would accordingly wait.⁶⁶ The burning of the *Reichstag*, the parliament building, provided the occasion. Al-

though one might expect such a dramatic act of presumed opposition to the Nazis to weaken them, it in fact strengthened them. Arriving at the burning building, Hitler declared: "This is a sign from God. No one can now prevent us from crushing the Communists with a mailed fist."⁶⁷ As far as the role which the fire played in the Nazi rise to power is concerned, it makes little or no difference whether one believes the fire was (as the Nazis said) started by the Communists as part of a plot, or was (as anti-Nazis said) started by the Nazis themselves for the purpose of blaming the Communists,⁶⁸ or was (as Fritz Tobias says) started only by Marius van der Lubbe.⁶⁹ The fact remains that the fire provided the necessary provocation which enabled the Nazis by several actions to rout the Communists, abolish constitutionally guaranteed liberties, arrest members of the *Reichstag*, and achieve passage of the disastrous Enabling Act—which suspended the constitution and made it possible for Hitler's National Socialist German Workers Party to become undisputed ruler of Germany.

In international adventures, Hitler always sought to shift the blame to someone else and to show that his peace-loving regime had only acted in the interest of order and self-defence after the most extreme provocation and, if possible, attack by his victims. On July 1, 1940, Hitler told the Italian ambassador, Dino Alfieri, "it was always a good tactic to make the enemy responsible in the eyes of public opinion in Germany and abroad for the future course of events. This strengthened one's own morale and weakened that of the enemy."⁷⁰ Accordingly, considerable preparations preceded the German occupation of Austria so that the act might appear, not as military aggression, but as an altruistic act intended to save Austria from violence and civil war; these preparations may even have included plans for the murder of the German Ambassador Franz von Papen.⁷¹ The advance planning for the 1939 invasion and take-over of Czechoslovakia included extensive manipulation of the victim's internal situation designed to make it possible for Hitler to pose as the savior of the cruelly persecuted and terrorized German minority. By threats Hitler even gained the submission of the Czechoslovak government in order to maintain the appearance of "legality" for the actual occupation.⁷² In the later case of Poland, the Nazis were not content with justification of the invasion on the basis of persecution of the German minority, but on August 31, 1939, even staged a fake border incident in an attempt to show that the Poles had attacked first and seized a German radio station near the border; as "proof" that Polish troops had made the attack, a dozen or so condemned German criminals in Polish uniforms were left

dead, with appropriate wounds, at the scene.⁷³ The next day at dawn the German armies invaded Poland.

Acts of violence against Germans provided favorable opportunities for the Nazis to carry out the brutalities they wanted to commit. The murder of the young Ernst vom Rath, anti-Nazi third secretary at the German Embassy in Paris, in November 1938 by seventeen-year-old Herschel Gryszpan, son of one of the Jews who had been deported across the Silesian border, was met with "the week of broken glass." Well-organized "spontaneous" reprisals took place against Jews throughout Germany in what became the "first ruthless and undisguised suppression of Jews in Germany on a wholesale scale," and various anti-Jewish laws and economic measures were also then introduced.⁷⁴ The assassination of Reinhardt Heydrich on May 29, 1942, near the village of Lidice, Czechoslovakia, by agents from England was followed by the execution of 1,690 persons. These included 199 from Lidice (the village itself was razed to the ground), 152 Jewish hostages in Berlin, and 1,339 other persons in Prague and Bruenn.⁷⁵ Attacks on German soldiers and acts of sabotage in several occupied countries were met with brutal retaliation.⁷⁶ Hitler even regarded some provocation necessary for the planned extermination of Polish intellectuals, nobility, clergy and Jews. The original excuse, a faked rising in the Galician Ukraine, was set aside as the Nazis waited for a more favorable moment. The extermination was then "justified" by the claim that it was necessary to end agitation dangerous to the security of the troops.⁷⁷ It was clear that Hitler was quite conscious in his utilization of violent opposition as the occasion for disproportionately brutal retaliation; he said, for example, that partisan warfare launched in occupied areas of the Soviet Union "enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us."⁷⁸

These various cases show two simple points: 1) that even Hitler and his cohorts were strongly convinced that their own ruthlessness and aggression would be much more easily committed and have greater success if it could be portrayed as retaliation for the violence of others, and 2) that the common assumption that violence by the grievance group can only strengthen their position and not weaken it is, in many situations, not true. This does not prove, of course, but it does make more plausible, the view that violence committed by or in support of nonviolent actionists operates to the advantage of the opponent, and is indeed precisely what he may want in order to consolidate his position and to apply ruthless repression.⁷⁹

The opponent may therefore attempt to provoke the nonviolent actionists and grievance group to violence. This may be attempted in several

ways. One of the common means is to make the repression so severe that the actionists break the nonviolent discipline spontaneously, or a group of them begins to advocate violent retaliation openly and to gain a following. This is how Gandhi interpreted the government's declaration of martial law and other harsh repressions in Bardoli in 1928 when the whole area was refusing to pay the land revenue: "It is evident that by the latest form of 'frightfulness' the Government is seeking to goad people into some act of violence, be it ever so slight, to justify their enactment of the last act in the tragedy."⁸⁰ This had already happened in 1919 during the *satyagraha* campaign against the Rowlatt Act when people in Ahmedabad, Viramgam, and other parts of the Gujarat heard of Gandhi's arrest. Gandhi later testified: "They became furious, shops were closed, crowds gathered and murder, arson, pillage, wirecutting and attempts at derailment followed."⁸¹ Describing a scene in Bihar in 1930, Rajendra Prasad, later President of India, reported: "The police are, it seems, now determined upon provoking violence so that they get an excuse for using their guns."⁸² Writing to the Viceroy after the beginning of the 1930-31 campaign, Gandhi once again commented on this tendency: "If you say, as you have said, that the civil disobedience must end in violence, history will pronounce the verdict that the British Government, not bearing because not understanding nonviolence, goaded human nature to violence which it could understand and deal with."⁸³

Similar claims were made by African speakers early in the 1952 Defiance Campaign in South Africa:

And the police who are supposed to uphold order but who only start riots, shot down a hundred at Bellhoek, May 1st, 1951! I don't need to remind you that in many African townships the police started the riots. If the Africans will not fight, the police make them fight.⁸⁴

They [the volunteers] must behave well as the police will provoke them. Tomorrow the police will say, "*Ek het 'n kaffer geskiet, hy het met 'n klip gegooi.*" ("I've shot a kaffir. He threw a stone at me.") But that policeman has never been injured. But what will they say now? "*Hoe gaan ons werk, kerels, die mense baklei nie.*" ("What shall we do, chaps? These people don't fight.") You must give them that headache.⁸⁵

Police in Birmingham, Alabama, on May 3, 1963, appeared to be deliberately provoking Negroes to violence, using first torrents of water from fire hoses, then dogs, then "a state police investigator deliberately swerved his car into the crowd." At that point the Negroes threw bricks and bot-

ties at the police. After a settlement had been reached, white extremists unsuccessfully tried to get white leaders to provoke the Negroes to new violence as a pretext for repudiation of the agreement.⁸⁶

The opponent may also employ spies and agents in an effort to defeat the nonviolent movement, including *agents provocateurs*. If the nonviolent action campaign is being operated without secrecy—as is common in nontotalitarian countries—spies and agents will not be much good for gathering secret information, for there will be none. They may, however, be useful in stirring up “jealousies and resentments among the campaigners and spreading morale-disturbing rumors.”⁸⁷ The opponent may by such means make serious attempts to demoralize the movement internally, to divide it on policies or personal matters, or to bog down its policy-making meetings with endless bickerings or to prevent effective operation of the group’s normal decision-making process.

Agents provocateurs may also be used in a deliberate attempt to provoke the group to violence. At an earlier stage of the labor movement, employers used *agents provocateurs* widely to combat the development of trade unions and to defeat particular strikes. One method is to place agents inside the nonviolent group. These agents then agitate for a switch to violence, or, defying group decision and discipline, commit violence themselves. The hope is to incriminate the whole group or to provoke wider violence. Sometimes they may operate outside the nonviolent group as such, and seek in difficult situations to provoke large nonviolent demonstrations into violence, or to commit acts of violence which, though actually separate from the plans of the nonviolent group, can be identified in the public’s mind with their resistance.

This danger was emphasized by Gregg:

Who in this actual world of hard realities does or ever would for an instant fear this so-called weapon of nonviolent resistance?

The answer is known to every student of history, every detective, secret service man or C.I.D. officer, every really “hard-boiled” ruthless executive of an American industrial corporation which has had a strike of employees, every American trade union leader, every leader of a subject people striving for political freedom. The answer is that every “blood and iron” type of governor fears nonviolent resistance so much that he secretly hires *agents provocateurs* who go among the nonviolent resisters pretending to be of them, and invite them to deeds of violence or actually throw bombs or do deeds of violence themselves. This was the method of the tsarist government of old Russia. Rulers in power immediately make great outcry, stir up public indig-

nation against the “miscreants,” call out the police or soldiery, and “repress the uprising” with considerable brutality, meanwhile assuring the world that these are stern but necessary steps taken only in the interests of public safety, law and order. Those striving for freedom or more privileges are indeed often violent in the first instance. But if they are not violent, their opponents or the underlings of their opponents frequently stir up violence in order to take advantage of the public reaction against it. That they feel they need to adopt such tactics shows how much they fear nonviolent resistance.⁸⁸

Kuper also points to the dangers of agents:

In certain circumstances, the rulers may incite the resisters to violence, by use of *agents provocateurs* and of extreme provocation, for two reasons. First, force is more readily mobilized against violence . . . Second, the severe repressive measures, which the ruler may wish to use and is organized to use, require some justification. The violence of the resisters is the best justification for violent counteraction; this explains the tendency of the ruling groups in South Africa to identify the passive resistance campaign with Mau Mau.⁸⁹

Nehru claimed after the violence at Chauri-Chaura in 1922 that “numerous *agents provocateurs*, stool pigeons, and the like . . . [have] crept into our movement and indulged in violence themselves or induced others to do so.”⁹⁰ In 1936, in his presidential address at the forty-ninth session of the Indian National Congress at Lucknow, Nehru again reported the existence of “. . . a wide network of spies, and [a] . . . tribe of informers and *agents provocateurs* and the like.”⁹¹ An examination of the relevant archives would be useful in checking these charges and possibly shedding more light on the subject. In England itself, during the 1926 General Strike, the British Army had agents all over the country who mixed with strikers; whether they would have been used to provoke violence is not clear, but certainly they were instructed to gather information and report current attitudes of strikers—a much milder role.⁹²

In combatting the Finnish nonviolent noncooperation movement for independence from tsarist Russia, the Russian Governor-General of Finland, General Nikolai I. Bobrikov, arranged for *agents provocateurs* (hired by the Ochrana, the Russian secret police) to commit violence themselves against Russians, or to provoke the Finns to adopt violence. The aim was to help justify savage repression.⁹³ Despite the pleas of innocence of the last head of the police under the Tsar, A.T. Vassilyev,⁹⁴ there is impressive evidence that the Ochrana did use *agents provocateurs* against

the Russian revolutionary groups,⁹⁵ in addition to very effectively infiltrating its agents into these groups in order to gain information.⁹⁶

These means of counteracting a movement of nonviolent action will not necessarily be successful, however. Provocation is, indeed, highly dangerous for the opponent. If it should be publicly revealed (as is always possible) that he had deliberately attempted to provoke violence, this could disastrously affect his normal support and relative power position. Even if his agents do not publicly reveal their activities, there are other ways in which they may be unmasked (see Chapter Eight, on "disclosing identities of secret agents"), and in which their provocations may be blocked or nullified. The nonviolent group will need to give careful attention to this problem, and additional research and analysis on it are needed. The opponent's provocation to violence emphasizes still further the importance of strict adherence to nonviolent discipline. To resort to violence, declared Gandhi, is to "cooperate with the Government in the most active manner."⁹⁷ "Restraint under the gravest provocation," he insisted, "is the truest mark of soldiership." Just as even a novice in "the art of war knows that he must avoid the ambushes of his adversary," so nonviolent actionists must see every provocation as "a dangerous ambush into which we must resolutely refuse to walk."⁹⁸

If the actionists can maintain such discipline under very difficult circumstances, they will not only help expose *agents provocateurs* and reveal the opponent, not only as an upholder of order, but as one who prefers resisters who injure and kill to disciplined nonviolent resisters; they may also help to prevent the most ruthless repression and to bring the actionists success. This is because nonviolent struggle, like other techniques for conducting conflicts, has requirements which must be fulfilled if it is to "work." One such requirement is that the nonviolent actionists and their supporters maintain nonviolent behavior.

THE NEED FOR NONVIOLENT BEHAVIOR

The requirement that volunteers maintain their nonviolent behavior is rooted in the dynamics of the technique of nonviolent action and is not an alien emphasis introduced by moralists or pacifists.⁹⁹ Without nonviolence, the opponent's repression will not rebound to undermine his power through political *jiu-jitsu* (discussed in Chapter Twelve), and the mechanisms of this technique (discussed in Chapter Thirteen) will not operate. This is not a new perception. In 1861 Francis Deák warned fellow Hungarians not to be betrayed into acts of violence nor to abandon legal-

ity (i.e., the old Hungarian constitution) as the basis of their struggle against Austrian rule: "This is the safe ground on which, unarmed ourselves, we can hold our own against armed force."¹⁰⁰ As Gandhi put it, "victory is impossible until we are able to keep our temper under the gravest provocation. Calmness under fire is a soldier's indispensable quality."¹⁰¹ "Nonviolence is the most vital and integral part of noncooperation. We may fail in everything else and still continue our battle if we remain nonviolent."¹⁰² Nonviolent conduct is "a strategic imperative."¹⁰³

Nonviolent means are often perceived to be more legitimate (or sometimes less illegitimate) than violent means in the same situation, especially if the nonviolent ones seem effective. This reaction may be partly intuitive, partly emotional and partly rational. It is especially likely among third parties, usual passive supporters of the opponent, and members of the grievance group not yet participating in the struggle. These are precisely the groups whose shifts of position and loyalty may, as we shall see in later chapters, help to determine the outcome of the conflict.

Nonviolent behavior is likely to contribute to achieving a variety of positive accomplishments. Four of these are: 1) winning sympathy and support, 2) reducing casualties, 3) inducing mutiny of the opponent's troops and similar disaffection, and 4) attracting maximum participation in the nonviolent struggle. We shall consider each of these briefly here; and some of them will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

The sympathy and support which a nonviolent political stance tends to bring to the actionists has often been anticipated by groups using nonviolent means, even at times ones which did not exclude possible later use of violence. This was the case, for example, in the Suffolk Resolves passed by delegates in Suffolk County, Massachusetts Bay, in 1774. These Resolves were later approved by the First Continental Congress. While the Suffolk delegates clearly provided for military preparations in case hostilities broke out, they preferred peaceful forms of struggle which would bring respect and sympathy to the colonials.

... we would heartily recommend to all persons of this community not to engage in any routs, riots, or licentious attacks upon the properties of any person whatsoever, as being subversive of all order and government: but, by a steady, manly, uniform, and persevering opposition, to convince our enemies that in a contest so important—in a cause so solemn, our conduct shall be such as to merit the approbation of the wise, and the admiration of the brave and free of every age and of every country.¹⁰⁴

The tendency already discussed for the opponent's repression to be relatively limited against nonviolent actionists obviously only operates so long as they remain nonviolent. Even then, the limitations on repression are not complete, and brutalities may occur. The murder of three young civil rights workers in Mississippi in 1964 is evidence of the fact that brutalities must be expected, but does not refute this tendency on nonviolent behavior to limit the repression; in fact, Robert Moses, head of the Mississippi 1964 Summer Project, has stated: "One reason we've survived is that we haven't had guns and everyone knew it."¹⁰⁵

A nonviolent stance in face of repression may help undermine the morale and loyalty of the opponent's police, troops and other important aides so much that they may mutiny or express their disaffection in other strong ways. One important example of such mutiny and disaffection occurred in Petrograd in the February 1917 Revolution and was largely responsible for the final disintegration of the Tsar's regime. This instance will be described in more detail in the following chapter on political *jiu-jitsu*. There seems little doubt that serious disaffection and mutiny are much more likely in face of heroic nonviolent resistance than in face of violence when the safety and lives of the police, troops and the like are threatened. When mutiny occurs on a large scale, it demonstrates that nonviolent behavior may deal with the opponent's violent repression in a fundamental and effective way.

There is one final reason why adherence to nonviolence strengthens the movement: the use of nonviolent action will allow the maximum degree of active participation in the struggle by the highest proportion of the population.¹⁰⁶ Nonviolent action can be actively applied by men and women, old and young, city dwellers and rural people, factory workers, intellectuals and farmers, educated and uneducated, able-bodied and the physically weak. Virtually no one in the population need be excluded. This makes possible a much higher number of active combatants than in any other technique. The realization of this potential hinges, of course, on people's will to act and on their skill and persistence in doing so, but the technique makes possible the participation of the highest numbers of all possible forms of struggle. This will not only increase the strength of the grievance group, but this large and diverse popular participation is also likely to cause especially severe problems for the opponent. There will be many more people against whom he must act. It will often be more difficult to separate "combatants" from "noncombatants." Application of his usual control measures and repression against the old, women, the young, handicapped people, etc.—the very groups usually excluded from

active combat—is especially likely to provoke reactions which weaken his power position and strengthen that of the nonviolent group. (How this happens is discussed in the next chapter.) Maintenance of nonviolent behavior is therefore extremely important in this technique for practical reasons.

HOW VIOLENCE WEAKENS THE MOVEMENT

Political violence "works" in quite different ways from nonviolent action. The introduction of violence into a nonviolent campaign by the nonviolent actionists or the grievance group, or on their behalf, is highly dangerous because the process which in nonviolent action produce strength, and could lead to success, will thereby be reversed. This reversal is likely to lead to reduced strength for the nonviolent actionists, to increased effectiveness of the opponent's measures to retain or regain control, and to the defeat of the nonviolent group. "Two opposite forces can never work concurrently so as to help each other," stated Gandhi.¹⁰⁷ In his study of the strike, Hiller pointed out that violence "reverses the character of the response" to the resistance.¹⁰⁸ It is no accident that, as we have noted, opponents confronted with nonviolent action often attribute violence to the nonviolent group when it is not present, and that, when it occurs, they concentrate on it, and exaggerate its seriousness. One example, out of the many possible, is the reaction to the predominantly nonviolent East German Rising. On June 23, 1953, the official Communist paper *Neues Deutschland* sought to justify violent suppression by recounting alleged violent actions by demonstrators and strikers during the Rising: "On 17 June . . . Fascist hordes roamed the streets, murdering, pillaging, destroying and screaming."¹⁰⁹ Similarly, a few days after the event, the government described speakers who had actually advised disciplined behavior at a city strike meeting of twenty thousand in the Goerlitz town square as "fascist provocateurs, criminals and bandits," and charged that they had incited the crowd to sabotage and violence.¹¹⁰

The use of violence by the nonviolent actionists, or on their behalf, has a strong tendency to shift attention to that violence and away from the issues at stake in the conflict and from the nature of the opponent's system, and also away from the (usually much greater), violence of his repressive measures. The tendency for the basic issues to be lost sight of in such cases has been pointed out by Mulford Sibley in the case of labor strikes: "If strikers resort to violence, whether initially or in response to provocation, they simply provide an excuse for the government to use

force against them; and once force has been employed, the original issues leading to the strike become confused or are often forgotten.”¹¹¹

The events which followed the bombing of policemen at a strike meeting in Haymarket Square, Chicago, on May 4, 1886, illustrate both that resistance violence may shift attention from the issues in the struggle and also become the “justification” for overwhelming repression. The bombing occurred during a large and reasonably effective strike movement in various cities for the eight-hour day. In Chicago the labor organizations which believed in violence headed the strike movement, and proviolence anarchists were very influential. The peaceful open-air strike meeting at Haymarket Square had been called after police had fired into a group of two hundred striking workers who had taunted and attacked nonstrikers at a Chicago plant. At least four workers were killed and many wounded. The bomb which was thrown by an unknown person into a group of policemen killed seven and wounded sixty-six; the police had been about to disperse the small remnants of the large meeting. Although the real identity and motives of the bomber could not be established, the blame was placed on anarchists and labor radicals.

The Haymarket bomb had many results, but the eight-hour day and stronger workers’ organizations were not among them. Nor was an advance for anarchism. The dead and wounded workers felled by police firings immediately after the bomb exploded were only the beginning of the workers’ casualties. “Stimulation of public hysteria became the main activity of the police,” writes Yellen.¹¹² All strike leaders and twenty-five printers of a labor newspaper were arrested. Newspapers throughout the country demanded “instantaneous execution of all subversive persons . . .” There were many police raids; homes, offices and meeting halls were broken into and searched; evidence was often fabricated. Eight strike leaders were found guilty of the bombing and four were sentenced to hang, even though they had been tried primarily on their anarchist convictions rather than on evidence. The State’s Attorney admitted they were “no more guilty than the thousands who followed them,” and John Altgeld, later Illinois governor, denounced the trial as grossly unfair. There were more savage police attacks on strikers’ gatherings; the workingmen’s ranks were split; the “Black International” dwindled to a few intellectuals and anarchism never regained a hold on the American labor movement. For many years all radical theory and practice fell into disfavor with American labor organizations. The issue of the eight-hour day was lost, the strike movement for it collapsed, and even in most cases where the eight-hour day had been already granted, employers took it away.¹¹³

Some people advocate the use of violence for restricted and special

use in a campaign in which overwhelming reliance is to remain on non-violent methods. There is evidence, however, that when significant violence is introduced into a nonviolent action campaign, the result will be its collapse, or the abandonment of nonviolent methods, or at least considerably reduced nonviolent action and its subordination to violence as the dominant technique.

Violence by or on behalf of the nonviolent actionists may lead to the collapse of the nonviolent movement. After the peasants of Bardoli district in India had in 1928 successfully refused to pay land revenue increases, Gandhi said that if they had “committed one single act of violence, they would have lost their cause”;¹¹⁴ “. . . we capitulate miserably if we fail in adhering to nonviolence.”¹¹⁵ This is likely to lead to “disaster.”¹¹⁶

The outbreak of violence in South Africa in 1952 played a very important role in the collapse of the Defiance Campaign. At the peak of the civil disobedience movement, after it had been in motion for about six months, a series of African riots broke out between October 18 and November 9. Six whites were killed and thirty-three Africans. The white dead included a nun who had been a missionary doctor to the Africans; her body was spoliated.¹¹⁷ This contributed to the sensationalism and to feelings that repression was “justified.” The precise causes of the riots are not clear. The resistance leaders demanded an enquiry, which the government refused. There was no evidence that the resistance movement was responsible, and there were suggestions that *agents provocateurs* may have been involved.¹¹⁸ In any case, the effects of the riots “were to damp down the spirit of resistance.”¹¹⁹ It is possible, Kuper acknowledges, that the campaign was ready to decline anyhow, but even then the riots played an important role:

In October the movement was still in full vigor. The number of resisters was the highest sent into action—2,354 . . . Probably as many as 1,000 defied the laws in the latter half of October. In November and December, however, the number of resisters fell to 280. Nor did the introduction of white resisters check the decline.¹²⁰

For “all practical purposes,” says Kuper, “the resistance campaign was at an end.”¹²¹ Other factors in this may include the impending general elections and the arrest of leaders, but,

Clearly the riots played a decisive role. Quite apart from their effect on the resisters, the riots provided the opportunity for the Government to take over the initiative and to assume far-reaching powers with some measure of justification.¹²²

This violence also assisted the Europeans' attempt to identify the civil disobedience movement, not with Gandhi, but with Mau Mau in Kenya.¹²³

The transition between nonviolent struggle and violent struggle in the case of the American colonists illustrates that, on occasion at least, a gradual increase in readiness to use violence and the introduction of unplanned violence (Lexington and Concord) may alter the situation so drastically that even a carefully-planned, comprehensive and phased nonviolent campaign with wide popular backing may be abandoned for violence. This is especially likely when there is little deep appreciation of the practical advantages of nonviolent struggle, and when, despite using nonviolent means, people still regard violence as the most effective means of combat. Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., pointed out the vastly disproportionate effect of unplanned minor skirmishes in Massachusetts Bay on the carefully worked-out and phased program of hitherto effective economic noncooperation, the "Continental Association" adopted by the First Continental Congress. After February 1, 1775, ". . . British mercantile houses and manufactories became idle so far as American business was concerned. They were threatened with dull times and industrial depression at a time when their capital was more largely than usual tied up in American ventures." At this point limited firings took place between American irregulars and British troops. After four-and-a-half months of the noncooperation movement these events "changed the whole face of public affairs and rapidly converted the Association from a mode of peaceful pressure into a war measure." The military action at Lexington and Concord, and that which followed, convinced the radicals that ". . . the Association as a method of redress had suddenly become antiquated and that it must be altered, if not altogether abandoned, to meet the greatly changed conditions. This realization was at once acted upon by local committees and by Congress; and by the middle of 1775 the Continental Association was rapidly losing its original character." The political machinery of the Association turned increasingly to military preparations, so that by September 10, 1775, when the nonexportation phase of the noncooperation was to begin, the character of that measure was changed. "Thus, the bold experiment, inaugurated by the First Congress . . . was brought to a premature close by the call to arms."¹²⁴

The introduction of violence is also likely to counter sharply, and to reverse, both the process of political *jiu-jitsu* and the operation of the very special mechanisms of change and dynamics of the technique of nonviolent action, discussed in later chapters. This tendency develops even when the violence is on the relatively small scale of rioting, injury, accidental loss of life in violent sabotage, or individual assassinations. For example,

the whole conversion mechanism, which aims at a change of opinions, feelings and outlook, will be blocked. Violence will enable the opponent who had been unsettled by courageous nonviolence to resume his previous certainty and views, saying "I told you so . . ." ¹²⁵ Also, the opponent's violence will no longer rebound against him by alienating his usual supporters, or by bringing sympathy and support from third parties. As resistance violence leads to a contraction of support for the nonviolent group in the grievance group, the opponent group and among third parties, the chances of change by nonviolent coercion are also almost entirely eliminated. With factors leading to both nonviolent coercion and conversion virtually eliminated, change by accommodation, which falls between them, also becomes most unlikely. Later we shall see in detail how these mechanisms are disrupted by resistance violence.

Success in nonviolent struggle depends to an extremely high degree upon the persistence of the nonviolent actionists in fighting with *their own methods*, and upon their refusing all temptation, whether caused by emotional hostility to the opponent's brutalities, by temptations of temporary gains, or by *agents provocateurs*, to fight with the opponent's "weapons system." If the nonviolent group switches to violence, it has, in effect, consented to fight on the opponent's own terms and with weapons where most of the advantages lie with him. This hands the initiative to the enemy, when the initiative should be retained by the nonviolent group, as we have already discussed. Luthuli points to this shift of initiative as a consequence of the riots, already described, which happened at the peak of the 1952 Defiance Campaign. Before they occurred, he wrote:

The Defiance Campaign was far too orderly and successful for the Government's liking, and it was growing The challenge of non-violence was more than they could meet. It robbed them of the initiative. On the other hand, violence by Africans would restore this initiative to them—they would then be able to bring out the guns and the other techniques of intimidation and present themselves as restorers of order.

It cannot be denied that this is exactly what happened, and at the moment most convenient for the Government. The infiltration of *agents provocateurs* in both Port Elizabeth and Kimberly is well attested. They kept well clear of the volunteers and the Congress. They did their work among irresponsible youngsters . . .

It was all the Government needed. The riots and the Defiance Campaign were immediately identified with each other in the white South African imagination. The initiative was with the Government.

It is well known that the Government used its recovered initiative harshly and to the full . . . The activities of rioters provided the pretext for crushing nonviolent demonstrators.¹²⁶

Violence by the actionists will also tend strongly to alienate existing support for the struggle by other members of the grievance group. Thus violence may weaken the unity and reduce the combat strength of the general grievance group. There are many examples of this from the history of the Russian revolutionary movement.¹²⁷ Katkov points out these effects on one revolutionary party:

The Socialist Revolutionary Party did not give up its terrorist activities until the double agent, Azef, who directed them, was unmasked in 1908. Terrorism, however, had sapped the organizational capacity of the party and alienated it from the masses, who never understood the purpose of political terror.¹²⁸

Alienation of support by acts of violence also happened during the various struggles of the American colonists; initially it was mob disorders and intimidations which alienated people—especially merchants—who otherwise supported the objectives of the struggle.¹²⁹ The destruction of property belonging to someone else—as the dumping of tea into Boston harbor—also alienated other Americans who were not merchants:

. . . the Boston Tea Party was best calculated to enkindle the public mind; but, to the surprise of the radicals, there was no bursting forth of the flame that had swept over the country at the time of [the non-violent campaigns against] the Stamp Act and again during the Townshend Acts, save in Massachusetts where the fuse had been carefully laid . . . The merchant class was generally shocked into remorseful silence . . . and many other people, more liberally inclined, were of their cast of mind.¹³⁰

Even Benjamin Franklin called the tea destruction “an act of violent injustice on our part.”¹³¹ When military resistance broke out, even some radicals deserted the colonists’ cause.¹³² There had been a great degree of unity in implementing the earlier noncooperation campaigns. When violent resistance became dominant, Gipson points out, many Americans chose to be Loyalists and to fight for the King and the association with England—giving the contest “all the characteristics of a civil war in many parts of the country.” Furthermore, he continues,

. . . there were vastly greater numbers of colonials hostile to the revolutionary movement. They stood aghast at the acts of terrorism per-

formed by bands of rioters and vandals . . . To people of such conservative tendencies the patriotic cry of liberty was a mockery, when hand in hand with it went acts of violence designed to deprive them of all liberty because they disagreed on the great issue of the day.¹³³

The earlier opposition of moderates to the Continental Association plan of resistance by economic noncooperation¹³⁴ had thus been multiplied and intensified by the switch to violence.

There is supporting evidence also from the contemporary Afro-American struggle in the United States that violence alienates support.¹³⁵ James Farmer, then National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality, predicted this process in 1965, before the large-scale urban riots; his warning has been largely fulfilled.

Widespread violence by the freedom fighters would sever from the struggle all but a few of our allies. It would also provoke and, to many, justify such repressive measures as would injure the movement. None would profit from such developments except the defenders of segregation and perhaps the more bellicose of the black nationalist groups.¹³⁶

There is wide evidence in support of Farmer’s view that violence by the grievance group tends to unleash disproportionately severe repression. Such repression would otherwise probably not have happened even though the opponent might well have liked to use it, and if it had happened in face of nonviolent resistance it would probably not have been effective. There are repeated examples of this. The firings at Lexington and Concord led to British occupation of Boston by troops, who turned it into an armed camp.¹³⁷

Irish reforms, an end to English coercion, and the possibility of Home Rule were all destroyed by the assassinations in Phoenix Park, Dublin, on May 6, 1882, of two government officials. These occurred just when the coercion policy had been ended, the Irish leaders Parnell, Dillon and Davitt had been released from prison, and the strongest men in the government, including Gladstone, were coming around to Irish Home Rule. The assassinations were carried out by “The Invincible Society,” a group of about twenty youthful Irish patriots. “The result was almost fatal to the national movement,” writes O’Hegarty.¹³⁸ A new far more severe Coercion Act, which suspended the ordinary processes of law and civil liberties, was enacted. Conservative opinion hardened, and any step toward Home Rule became out of the question. “This year and next, Ireland was under the iron heel.”¹³⁹ Morley, biographer of Gladstone, writes: “The

reaction produced by the murders in the Park made perseverance in a milder policy impossible in face of English opinion, and parliament eagerly passed the Coercion Act of 1882.”¹⁴⁰ “The Invincible Society” succeeded in aiding English imperialism with great effectiveness. “No worse blow could have been struck at Mr. Parnell’s policy.”¹⁴¹

Even the youthful Stalin warned workers against individual assaults on employers or managers—“economic terror”—which were becoming widespread, because they would recoil on organized labor.¹⁴²

Casualties also tended to be much higher among violent resisters than among nonviolent resisters. During the 1905 revolution, for example, much greater numbers of dead occurred in instances of large-scale violence than in overwhelmingly nonviolent demonstrations and general strikes. Thus relatively brief violent rebellions in Lodz left three hundred dead; in Odesa, about two thousand dead; and in Moscow, one thousand dead. Nonviolent strikers and demonstrators were also killed, but not in such proportions, even though their challenge to the government’s power was often far greater.¹⁴³

The government-sponsored nonviolent noncooperation struggle against Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr was detrimentally affected by the introduction into the struggle of acts of political violence, including destructive sabotage, attacks on French sentries and blowing up of bridges. The distinguished German historian, Erich Eyck, points to their counterproductive effects:

Although such acts satisfied the bitter mood of many Germans, politically they were absurd, indeed suicidal. Only the politically immature could persuade themselves that these incidents would force France and Belgium to retreat. Their only consequence could be still worse sufferings for the unfortunate people of the occupied zones: arrests, expulsions, and executions . . . [Carl] Severing, [the Prussian Minister of the Interior], and the whole Prussian government were only doing their clear duty when they tried to stop as best they could this playing with fire.¹⁴⁴

Similar evidence of the tendency for violent action to provoke strong repression may be found in reactions to the United States 1919 race riots,¹⁴⁵ and from the urban ghetto riots of the late 1960s.

Solomon and Fishman have also pointed to the tendency for violence to remove the limitations on the opponent’s repression, while maintenance of nonviolence tends to restrict repression. In fact they describe this nonviolent technique as “. . . a means of directly asserting aggression while

still trying to minimize provocation. When a group or individual wants to struggle against strong opposition which is capable of inflicting disastrous retaliation, the nonviolent mode of ‘defiance’ seems to provide a way of resolving the dilemma.”¹⁴⁶ Violence by the subordinates, however, removes the limitations on repression imposed by the dynamics of nonviolent action.

Violence by, or in support of, the nonviolent actionists is also likely to bring an abrupt reversal of sympathy for them among the members of the opponent group, and especially end any internal opposition to the objectionable policies or repression. It was, for example, much easier for Englishmen to oppose colonialism and repression in India during the Gandhian struggles than in Kenya during the Mau Mau campaign. Members of the opponent group who have supported the policies and regime out of idealistic motives are especially likely to be alienated by violence; however, had nonviolent discipline been maintained, those people might have proved to be the least reliable of the opponent’s supporters. Since nonviolent action operates to aggravate existing dissent in the opponent group, and to create within it support for the nonviolent group, such violence would be especially unfortunate. Increased solidarity in the opponent group behind the policies and repression will sharply reduce the chances of victory for the nonviolent actionists.

American colonial economic noncooperation had by early 1775 aroused British merchants, traders and investors with American connections into a considerable campaign against the Government and for repeal of the coercive acts of 1774. (Total export trade from England to the participating North American colonies dropped by nearly ninety-seven percent from 1774 to 1775.) The merchants carried on systematic activities to convince the King’s ministers and Parliament to yield; these included many petitions and were similar to actions which had on earlier occasions brought changes in government policies for America. The ministry did not yield in response, but before the merchants’ indignation against government coercive measures against the colonists could find new expressions, the merchants became reconciled to the situation and their opposition faded. One important factor in this was the improvement in mid-1775 in British business conditions as a result of increased European orders and improved payments of debts by American merchants. However, there was another equally important reason for the collapse of the support for the Americans by British merchants. Schlesinger writes: “undoubtedly the affair at Lexington and Concord in April sharpened the understanding of many of them as to the nature of the issues at stake.”¹⁴⁷

Resistance violence is especially likely to restore loyalty and obedience among any of the opponent's troops or police becoming disaffected by the nonviolent action. Soldiers under fire are likely to remain obedient, not mutiny. It is well known that ordinary soldiers will fight more persistently and effectively if they and their friends are being shot, wounded or killed. Resistance violence will tend to remove the influences producing sympathy for nonviolent actionists and shatter possible inner doubts about the issues of the conflict and the soldier's own duty. In nonviolent struggles in which success and failure hinge on whether the opponent's troops can be induced to mutiny, violence against them may spell defeat.

There is suggestive evidence of this counterproductive role of violence from the Moscow general strike and armed rising of December 1905. In the weeks prior to the Moscow strike there was considerable and widely scattered unrest in the armed forces, involving "... an unmistakable change in attitude toward authority. The results were mutinous and disorderly conduct that ranged from minor infractions to quite ominous outbreaks."¹⁴⁸ There had been several mutinies of both sailors and soldiers. These, added to lesser instances of insubordination, "made the navy practically worthless as a trustworthy fighting force..."¹⁴⁹ Disaffection in the army was widespread, even in the interior of the Empire. Although outright disobedience by soldiers was not so marked in those areas, "... there were good reasons for concern about the instrument upon which the regime would have to place its ultimate dependence, its armed forces."¹⁵⁰ Although the Menshevik and Bolshevik wings of the Social Democratic Party in Moscow were both agreed that "the Tsarist government was deliberately provoking the working class . . .," both supported the plan for an armed rising; although the Bolsheviks favored an immediate armed rising, they agreed to the Menshevik proposal for "a general political strike which should transform itself into an armed uprising."¹⁵¹ This was in response to the November 27 call from the St. Petersburg Soviet for a general armed rising, issued immediately before it was crushed.¹⁵²

There was no reason to assume at the time that there was a serious chance of victory for an armed rising in Moscow. The militia of the Social Democratic Party in the city numbered only about one thousand, inadequately organized and armed and with less than twenty handmade bombs and grenades. The head of the militia himself opposed an armed rising, and others expressed doubts that the soldiers would support insurrection.¹⁵³ Very important, it has been reported that the tsarist government was deliberately provoking violence in order to be able to crush the revolution.¹⁵⁴ Once the decision had been made, workers, party revolu-

tionaries and even Bolsheviks were all uneasy about the plan. They lacked enthusiasm and even believed in "the inevitability of defeat."¹⁵⁵ "Although damaging to the Government's prestige," Keep writes, a violent rising had "no chance of bringing about its overthrow . . ."¹⁵⁶

Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks had taken the lead in pushing for an armed rising in Moscow. On the basis of available evidence, the Leninist Social Democrats did not seem to have compared the likely effect of an armed rising to alternative courses of action, on the chances of inducing a major mutiny of the Tsar's troops. The "Right Bolsheviks," however, apparently did. The Bolsheviks under Lenin were instead primarily concerned with gaining control of the situation for their own purposes and directing it as they chose to gain Bolshevik political objectives, regardless of the wishes of others or of effects on the revolution.¹⁵⁷ It is also clear the call of the Moscow Bolsheviks for an armed rising was not an "irresponsible" independent act of the local group, for on November 27 there had been a meeting of the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Party in St. Petersburg, attended by Lenin, at which preparations for an armed rising were discussed.¹⁵⁸

It is difficult to document the Bolsheviks' motives for an armed rising launched when the loyalty of the troops still hung in the balance, and when the chances of mutiny were high while those of military victory were very small. Prawdin writes that "the real purpose of the Bolsheviks was to bring it home to the workers that they could not do without military organization and arms."¹⁵⁹ This interpretation is consistent with Lenin's comments on the need for violence, which he had written before the Moscow rising,¹⁶⁰ and with his comments on the rising written afterwards.¹⁶¹

The general strike phase of the Moscow insurrection began on December 7—four days after the mutiny of a regiment stationed in the city. The Social Democratic Party seems to have been either indifferent to the mutiny or incompetent in responding to it. The party offered no practical advice to the disobedient troops in their barracks—not even to become lost in civilian clothes among the general population. All they did was to advise restraint. The mutiny was then suppressed and several units were withdrawn from Moscow.¹⁶² Then the general strike began, and during this phase, Harcave reports, "Two-thirds of the government troops . . . were judged unreliable; one whole regiment had actually undertaken to join the strikers before the fighting began, and had been prevented only by the interposing of loyal troops."¹⁶³ There were a number of instances of troops refusing to fire on demonstrators.¹⁶⁴

The violent insurrection then developed. This included partisan warfare tactics, street barricades and sniper fire against the soldiers patrolling the city. In contrast to the earlier disaffection, disobedience and mutiny, the troops now obeyed orders.¹⁶⁵ The violent insurrection was defeated. "The Moscow rising was a failure," writes Seton-Watson, "and it was clear that the revolution was over. The army's loyalty was by now ensured."¹⁶⁶ Other historians also point to the end of the Moscow rising as the beginning of the end for the revolution; Lenin's conclusion on that single point was identical.¹⁶⁷ Further research is needed, but provisionally the evidence suggests that: 1) the failure of the Moscow rising had a significant influence on the revolution as a whole, contributing to its defeat, 2) the Moscow rising was a failure because the troops, despite widespread unrest, did not mutiny, 3) the chance of large-scale mutinies of soldiers in Moscow would have been greater if revolutionary activities had been restricted to nonviolent ones not threatening the lives of the troops, and 4) had nonviolent discipline been more widespread and a nonviolent Moscow rising replaced the violent one, the tsarist system might have been destroyed in December 1905-January 1906. The popular view that violence in a resistance or revolutionary movement by definition adds to the power and chances of success of that movement can no longer be accepted.

SABOTAGE AND NONVIOLENT ACTION

Hostile conservative critics of nonviolent action sometimes argue that nonviolent struggle should be rejected because it is closely associated with sabotage or leads to sabotage. In contrast, others interested primarily in maximum effectiveness in struggle and who think themselves to be more realistic argue that sabotage should be used along with nonviolent action. Both views reveal an inadequate understanding of the nonviolent technique.

Sabotage, as used here, refers to acts of demolition and related destruction directed against machinery, transport, buildings, bridges, installations and the like. Because these are acts against *property*, they are not included in the definition of "violence" in this book. Such acts would, however, become "violence" if they bring injury or death to *persons*, or threaten to do so. Certain other types of action fall somewhere between sabotage and nonviolent action, such as removal of key parts from machinery and vehicles, removal or release in nondangerous ways of fuel for machinery and vehicles, removal of records and files for various government departments and offices (as police) and even their destruction by means

which could not possibly cause physical injury to any persons. Such methods require separate consideration, and this discussion does not apply to them. Those methods are more likely to be compatible with nonviolent action, but are not always so in all situations. They, too, can be detrimental to effective nonviolent action under certain conditions.

Sabotage has on occasion followed nonviolent action, especially when the latter was not immediately effective, as in South Africa. Sabotage has also occurred during nonviolent resistance when there has been no decision to use only certain means of resistance, as in Norway during the Nazi occupation. Even there, however, much if not most of the sabotage was organized from England for Allied military purposes, not by resistance groups in Norway. Also, sabotage has on occasion been used during a consciously nonviolent struggle by persons and groups ignoring or defying the instructions of the leadership to eschew acts of demolition, as was the case in the *Ruhrkampf*. But sabotage has never, to my knowledge, been deliberately applied by a disciplined movement which has consciously chosen to fight by nonviolent action. Gandhi constantly emphasized that sabotage was contrary to this technique.¹⁶⁸ In terms of the principles, strategy and mechanisms of operation, sabotage is more closely related to violent than to nonviolent action. This is true even though the aim of the sabotage may be only the destruction of material objects without taking lives—such as an empty bridge as distinct from a bridge being crossed by enemy troops.

There are strong reasons why the introduction of sabotage will seriously weaken a nonviolent action movement. These are rooted in the differing dynamics and mechanisms of these two techniques. There are at least nine such reasons:

First, sabotage always runs the risk of unintentional physical injury or death to opponents or to innocent bystanders, as in attempts to destroy bridges, factories, etc. Nonviolent action, on the other hand, requires that its supporters refuse to use physical violence and instead protect the lives of opponents and others. Even limited injuries or deaths will rebound against the nonviolent movement.

Second, effective sabotage in difficult situations requires a willingness to use physical violence against persons who discover the plans and are willing and able either to reveal or to prevent them. These may be informers, guards, soldiers, or ordinary people. Nonviolent action, conversely, requires for success the strict maintenance of nonviolence.

Third, sabotage requires secrecy in the planning and carrying out of missions. As already discussed, secrecy introduces a whole series of disrupt-

tive influences. These include ultimate dependence on violence (instead of nonviolence), fear of discovery (in place of fearless open action), and wild suspicions among the opponents about the resisters' intent and plans which may increase brutalities and intransigence (in place of the usually openly announced intentions).

Fourth, sabotage requires only a few persons to carry it out and hence reduces the number of effective resisters, while nonviolent action makes possible a large degree of participation among the whole population.

Fifth, confidence in the adequacy of nonviolent action is a great aid to its successful application. The use of sabotage, however, demonstrates a lack of such confidence which is detrimental to effective use of nonviolent action.

Sixth, nonviolent action is based upon a challenge *in human terms* by human beings to other human beings. Sabotage relies on physical destruction of property, a very different approach likely to detract from the operation of the other, potentially more powerful, influences.¹⁶⁹

Seventh, sabotage and nonviolent action are rooted in quite different premises about how to undermine the opponent. Nonviolent action produces withdrawal of consent by the subjects, while sabotage acts against the opponent by destroying property.

Eighth, where physical injury or death occurs to persons because of sabotage, whether accidental or deliberate, there is likely to be a relative loss of sympathy and support for the nonviolent group and/or an increase of sympathy and support for the opponent—the opposite of what is likely and necessary in nonviolent action.

Finally, therefore, sabotage is likely to result in highly disproportionate repression against the saboteurs or the general population, or both.¹⁷⁰ Contrary to the effects of repression against persistent nonviolent actionists, repression provoked by sabotage is not likely to weaken the opponent's relative power position.

That sabotage does not combine well with nonviolent action is amply illustrated by the 1923 Ruhr struggle. There is further evidence to support the view of Eyck quoted above that sabotage had detrimental effects. Not only were electricity and telegraph wires cut but also various objectives, such as railway lines, canal locks and barges, railway trestles and military trains carrying occupation troops were bombed. Ten Belgian soldiers were killed and forty wounded by the attack on the Rhine bridge near Duisburg. Other acts of violence included terrorist attacks against occupation soldiers, and suspected spies and traitors within the sabotage groups were sometimes murdered.¹⁷¹ One reason for these developments was the Ger-

mans' lack of a plan for nonviolent resistance and their relative lack of effective leadership and organization.¹⁷² Although sabotage and similar acts did harass the occupation officials, there is little indication that the acts were effective in limiting or reducing the occupiers' control or ability to achieve their objectives. However, sabotage had other effects, including extremely severe repression from the occupying forces who sometimes beat and killed people, including innocent bystanders. Also, the unity of the population of the occupied area—which had been achieved under the nonviolent resistance campaign—was destroyed. Repression included a widespread ban on road traffic which, according to Wentzcke, “heralded the end of passive resistance.” Internationally, the moral isolation of France and the high degree of world sympathy which had been produced by the nonviolent resistance were not only erased, but to a significant degree reversed.¹⁷³

For these reasons, the idea that sabotage is compatible with nonviolent action must be rejected, as either a false accusation of uninformed critics, or as a highly dangerous action proposal likely to disrupt the processes which could bring strength and victory.

OTHER WAYS TO SLIP INTO VIOLENCE

One reason why the most perceptive exponents and practitioners of nonviolent action have emphasized so strongly the firm and meticulous maintenance of nonviolent behavior is that without strict and conscious attention, the movement could easily slip into progressively greater reliance on violence without a prior conscious decision to do so. This may happen at a variety of points, a number of which are illustrated by instances in the American colonists' struggles. Their struggles probably provide the richest example of this type of development—from systematic and repeated noncooperation to a long war of independence.

Even while the colonists' struggle prior to April 1775 was overwhelmingly nonviolent, there were quite a few points at which actions were taken which were either themselves violent or which potentially set the stage for violence. Until Lexington and Concord, however, these did not expand sufficiently to alter the predominantly nonviolent character of the resistance. They are nevertheless instructive. During the opposition to the Stamp Act there was considerable use of personal and mob threats, physical intimidation, and destruction of personal and public property designed, for example, to induce newly appointed Stamp Distributors to resign their posts.¹⁷⁴ During the same period, there was a general tendency among-

undisciplined elements of the population to act in disregard of the recommended plans of those who had launched the campaign and had selected the means of action which were to be used.¹⁷⁵ Economic boycotts and nonuse of taxed imports lead to smuggling, and "smuggling proved to be the first channel through which violence was injected into the struggle."¹⁷⁶ Sometimes relatively insignificant behavior burst into violence, because "the high tension which public affairs had reached ripened the public mind for violence."¹⁷⁷ Some radicals, such as Thomas Mason, urged that a policy of disobedience to Parliament's laws be defended if necessary by "resort to armed resistance and secession . . ."¹⁷⁸ Sometimes delaying a decision or postponing action provided the necessary opportunity for advocates of violence to win the day.¹⁷⁹ The destruction of property rapidly escalated in seriousness, as from the dumping of tea in Boston harbor to the later burning of a tea-bearing vessel at Annapolis, Maryland.¹⁸⁰

The exchanges of fire between British troops and colonial irregulars at Lexington and Concord were, as it happened, the actions which resulted in abandonment of a comprehensive plan of economic noncooperation before it had been fully applied and in its replacement by military means. The campaign of economic noncooperation embodied in the Continental Association had been signed by the members of the First Continental Congress on October 20, 1774. It was broadly divided into two phases, the nonimportation of British goods to begin from December 1, 1774, and the nonexportation of American goods to Britain to begin from September 10, 1775.¹⁸¹ This remained the colonists' resistance strategy, even though tensions were sometimes high and though various groups were on their own initiative preparing for military conflict. In Massachusetts Bay the Provincial Congress took steps in February 1775 to prepare the militia and the "Minute Men" and to raise taxes to pay for weapons.¹⁸² This was independent action taken outside the context of the Continental Association campaign of resistance adopted for all the colonies. Further preparations for military conflict were shortly taken by the Committee of Safety. When seven hundred British troops under orders to destroy the colonists' military supplies hidden at Concord met seventy-five Minute Men on the Lexington village green on April 19, there was an exchange of fire. This was probably initiated by an American who was not among the Minute Men; the latter fled, leaving dead and wounded on the green. Most of the Concord supplies were removed before the British arrived there, and the Minute Men with large reinforcements forced British troops to retreat under fire toward Boston. The Redcoats were continually fired upon by Americans hidden behind stones and trees, and only the arrival

of British reinforcements made possible a fighting withdrawal to Charlestown, across the river from Boston.¹⁸³

For the purposes of this study, the significance of these events is the effect that they had on the entire course of the American struggle. The large-scale preparations for military conflict in Massachusetts Bay were undertaken on the initiative of Massachusetts radicals only, and outside of the resistance measures outlined in the Continental Association. These had not even mentioned military resistance, neither to commend it, threaten it, nor to discourage it, except by implication in the statement that nonimportation, nonconsumption and nonexportation measures "faithfully adhered to, will prove the most speedy, effectual and peaceable measures . . ."¹⁸⁴

Once military preparations against the British had begun in Massachusetts Bay it was to be expected that, short of immediate evacuation, the British would have to take counteraction. The British action was intended to be a very limited one, to destroy supplies of American arms hidden at Concord, the exact location of which they knew from an informer. However, once each side had taken these steps the chances of avoiding an exchange of fire were few. (If the Concord supplies had all been moved, as most of them were, and hidden elsewhere and the Americans had themselves remained out of sight the British troops would have had to return to Boston without having accomplished their mission but also without military hostilities.) The consequence of general military preparations in *one* colony and the unplanned shift to military struggle on April 19 extended to all the colonies and altered the whole approach to the conduct of the conflict.

It is arguable that the American colonists could have won full independence more quickly, with more support within the colonies and from Englishmen, had they continued to rely upon the nonviolent methods of struggle they had so successfully used to that date. *De facto* British control in the colonies was already extraordinarily weak, owing to the Americans' political noncooperation, economic sanctions and development of alternative political institutions to which they gave loyalty. Governor Dunmore of Virginia wrote to Lord Dartmouth on December 24, 1774, that the Continental Association was being enforced there "with greatest rigour," that the "Laws of Congress" (the Continental Congress) received from Virginians "marks of reverence they never bestowed on their legal Government, or the Laws preceding from it." He added:

I have discovered no instance where the interposition of Government, in the feeble state to which it is reduced, could serve any other pur-

pose than to suffer the disgrace of a disappointment, and thereby afford matter of great exultation to its enemies and increase their influence over the minds of the people.¹⁸⁵

In South Carolina the British Government was so weak compared to the Continental Association that "ministerial opposition is here obliged to be silent," as the General Committee wrote at the time.¹⁸⁶ The Governor of Massachusetts Bay in early 1774 was already of the opinion that "All legislative, as well as executive power was gone . . ." ¹⁸⁷ Governor Gage made a similar report from there in September 1774, and by the end of October he had virtually no power except that of his troops.¹⁸⁸ By October 1774, the legal government in Maryland had virtually abdicated.¹⁸⁹ There are also other indications.¹⁹⁰

By mid-April the nonimportation and nonconsumption phase of the Continental Association resistance plan had only been in operation about four-and-a-half months, and the more extreme nonexportation phase was not due to come into operation for almost another five months. The introduction of the unplanned but obviously significant violence of the Massachusetts Bay Minute Men in the colonists' struggle created a situation in which imitation of their action seemed natural, and a large-scale extension of military preparations and action seemed to be required—"seemed" is used since there was apparently no careful evaluation of the relative advantages of a major shift to military struggle as compared with an attempt to isolate the Lexington-Concord events and to continue to rely upon the established strategy of political and economic noncooperation along with a further development of parallel governmental institutions. One immediate result was confusion, as Robert R. Livingston put it during the Second Continental Congress, which opened on May 10, 1775: "We are between hawk and buzzard; we puzzle ourselves between the commercial and warlike opposition."¹⁹¹ The uncertainty did not last long, however. Schlesinger summarized the change which took place:

The tocsin of war, sounded on the historic April day at Lexington and Concord, wrought a radical change in the nature of the opposition directed by the Americans against the British measures. This did not mean that a struggle for independence had begun, but it did mean that armed rebellion had superseded commercial coercion as the dependence of the radicals in their struggle for larger liberties. Thereafter the Continental Association lost its distinctive character as a method of peaceful coercion; it became subordinated to the military necessities of the times.

The transformation which the Association was undergoing revealed itself in five ways: in the widespread adoption of defense associations; in the determination of the Georgian moderates to adopt the Continental Association as a deterrent to the more violent methods advocated by the radicals there; in the spontaneous action of the extra-legal bodies in the several provinces in taking on disciplinary and military functions; in the adoption, by provinces exposed to the perils of war, of non-exportation regulations prior to the time fixed in the Association; and in the important alterations made in the text of the original Association by the Second Continental Congress.¹⁹²

This Second Congress regarded the Lexington events as a declaration of war, began to act like a government, and took direction of the rebellion. In June, 1775, already, George Washington was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the army of the United Colonies, and regulations were announced for the army and navy. On July 6 a declaration was issued which in effect said that the British use of military force required the colonists to change their means of struggle and to reply with military means also.¹⁹³

THE NECESSITY OF DISCIPLINE

If the nonviolent struggle movement is to persist in face of repression, to remain nonviolent, and to carry through the campaign, discipline among the nonviolent actionists is required. Basically, this discipline consists of adherence to certain minimum standards of behavior. The degree and type of discipline required will vary depending on the situation and the nature of the nonviolent group and of the opponent. The absence of discipline will mean that effective use of this technique will become very difficult or impossible. This emphasis on discipline is not, as some might think, associated only with Gandhian nonviolence. The need for it was emphasized by the Danish exponent of nonviolent action, Nils Lindberg, before World War II on the basis of other considerations,¹⁹⁴ and very un-Gandhian East Germans called for discipline in the course of resistance during the rising of June 1953.¹⁹⁵ Although Gandhi antedates these instances, their emphasis on discipline is derived from other sources.

Discipline may be encouraged by leaders through instructions, appeals, pledges, as well as by discipline leaflets, marshals and other means, as discussed below, and, as we have already seen, various nonviolent sanctions may be applied in support of group decisions and discipline. How-

ever, in nonviolent action discipline cannot be imposed or forced upon the participants by the leaders; various means of encouraging discipline will be effective only to the degree that they influence or strengthen the will or conscience of the actionists. Despite important measures to promote and maintain discipline, including nonviolent sanctions, by the nature of the technique discipline in nonviolent action must be essentially the self-discipline of the participants.

Discipline in nonviolent action is, therefore, self-discipline and inner discipline. This is true whether the discipline has been promoted by the active leaders of the movement, or has been continued after all distinguishable leaders have been imprisoned, or has been developed intuitively in a spontaneous movement. But there are a variety of ways used to promote nonviolent discipline and there is room for comparative evaluation and choice among these alternative ways. But there must be some type of discipline. Those who out of ignorance or emotional reaction to discipline would ignore or abolish it in nonviolent action place the entire struggle in a perilous position. If their views predominate, effective nonviolent action becomes impossible. It is not necessary to agree with everything Gandhi said on the subject to appreciate his general assessment:

Freedom of four hundred million people through purely non-violent effort is not to be gained without learning the virtue of iron discipline —not imposed from without, but sprung naturally from within. Without the requisite discipline, non-violence can only be a veneer.¹⁹⁶

Continued participation in the struggle and refusal to submit to fear are the most crucial aims of discipline. After this, adherence to nonviolent behavior is the most important single aspect of discipline in this technique. Discipline serves other functions also, including increasing the actionists' ability to withstand severe repression. "A group of people who are acting under discipline are less likely to crack under pressure," argues Bradford Lytle. Just as discipline helps military troops to continue to confront the enemy despite danger, discipline helps nonviolent actionists: "disciplined demonstrators can better resist charge by the police or attack by counter-demonstrators." Discipline, Lytle writes, will help nonviolent demonstrators to remain calm and firm, and to react effectively in unexpected situations.¹⁹⁷

Where discipline is weak or absent, there is danger that a nonviolent demonstration may, in a tense situation, lead to a major riot which would most likely both shift attention from the original grievance and also alienate support. Four days of riots in Negro areas of New York City in July

1964 were triggered in this way. On the evening of July 18, a rally was held by several city chapters of the Congress of Racial Equality (C.O.R.E.) to demand a civilian review board to examine cases of alleged police brutality and the removal of the police commissioner. The rally was held two days after an off-duty policeman had shot to death a youth who had attacked him in Harlem. About a hundred people were led by C.O.R.E. organizers to a Harlem police precinct station where they presented their demands. They then sat down in the street, announcing they would stay until at least some of the demands were met. When police tried to push some of the crowd back, several scuffles took place, but the organizers generally maintained control. They were, however, arrested, dragged into the police station, and, some reported, beaten. Its nonviolent leadership removed, the crowd began throwing bricks and bottles at the police, who charged into the crowd. Later a flaming bottle of gasoline was thrown at a police car, police fired at rioters, looting took place, and such activities continued during the night. In Harlem and the Negro ghetto of Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn similar violence took place, largely between Negro youths and white police, for the next four nights.¹⁹⁸ Had the experienced C.O.R.E. organizers not been arrested, or had the remaining sit-downers maintained discipline, the rioting would probably not have happened, and attention would have remained focused not on Negro rioting, but on charges of police brutality and demands for a civilian control board.

In addition to maintaining nonviolent behavior in organized planned demonstrations, discipline includes adherence to the plans and instructions for the action. If prospective nonviolent actionists do not have confidence in the judgment of those responsible for planning the nonviolent action, then they ought not to take part. If they do have confidence, then the plans and instructions ought to be carried out precisely.

Where advance planning is possible, it should be in the hands of those persons most qualified for the job on the basis of their knowledge of the technique, understanding of the situation and experience. Other important qualities include ability to express themselves and to get along well with others. Persons who accept the planners' recommendations, and therefore wish to participate in the action or campaign, should then have the humility to follow the recommended strategy and course of action. Almost always action should be limited to the forms prescribed for the particular conflict. Not everyone is equally capable of intelligent planning for group or mass nonviolent action, any more than everyone is equally capable of doing anything else. While knowledge of the dynamics, methods

and strategy of this technique remains restricted, there are likely to be fewer capable planners. But when such knowledge increases and spreads, more and more persons will become capable of participating in formulation of wise plans for nonviolent struggle. It is either arrogance or deliberate disruption intended to help the opponent which causes a person to join a nonviolent group and then ignore the prepared plans for the struggle, insisting on doing whatever he or she pleases. To the degree possible, leaders should take participants into their confidence and explain to them the reasons for the choice of the given strategy and plans for action, along with discussion of anticipated difficulties and recommended ways of dealing with them.¹⁹⁹

Well formulated plans take into consideration the best means for achieving maximum impact, given the numbers, strengths and qualities of the nonviolent actionists, the nature of the opponent, the issues, the conflict situation, and the requirements of this technique. If then some participants take other unplanned types of action, while claiming to be part of the planned action, the effectiveness of the whole operation may in serious instances be jeopardized unless the rest of the nonviolent group is able to isolate or to counterbalance the innovations. Undisciplined activities are likely to give the effect of disunity and dissension. As a result other participants may be placed in a situation for which they are not prepared, represented as supporting actions with which they do not agree, or confronted with unanticipated repression by police or troops responding to the unexpected.

Of course, in a given instance, the unplanned innovations may seem to do little harm, or even be beneficial. However, they intrinsically involve dangers. For example, unplanned types of action, or demonstrating at other places than those selected can greatly facilitate the outbreak of counterproductive violence among the grievance group and the application of effective repression by the opponent. Sometimes indiscipline and internal chaos may be promoted by well intentioned but confused people. At other times, they may be emotionally disturbed. On still other occasions, they may be undercover agents for the police or a hostile political organization. Small or large groups of bystanders—whether friendly or hostile—may also present special discipline problems requiring different types of control measures.²⁰⁰

Political groups with strong viewpoints, clear policy, internal discipline and ambitions far beyond the immediate demands of the struggle may also seek to “use” the conflict situation to their own advantage, even though promotion of their political advantage may require weakening of the nonviolent struggle and harming its cause, verbal pronouncements notwith-

standing. Sometimes such political groups will promote indiscipline themselves and at other times they may try to capitalize on disruption and confusion introduced by others. Groups which have a strong doctrinal belief in the necessity of political violence, such as the Communists, are especially risky potential collaborators. Even when they do not seek to enter the nonviolent opposition movement their behavior may be disruptive. At the beginning of the general strike against the Kapp *Putsch* in Germany in 1920, the Communists refused to support it and thereby refused to act against the attempted military-monarchist seizure of power because they did not wish to help a capitalist republic. Later they supported the strike, but after the collapse of the *coup* the Communists tried to capitalize on the internal crisis by organizing violent rebellion in the Ruhr and by attempting their own *coup* in Sachsen.²⁰¹ Communists and their supporters in South Africa who used and supported nonviolent action at certain stages were prominent among those who later denounced nonviolent methods as having “failed” without offering comparative strategic analyses of the problems, advantages and disadvantages of various types of both nonviolent and violent struggle in the situation. The South African Communists’ abandonment of nonviolent means could have been, and indeed was, predicted.²⁰²

Discipline is especially important when there is special danger that violence may break out and when participants lack experience and deep understanding of nonviolent technique. In addition to the multitude of statements by Gandhi on the importance of the volunteers’ carrying out instructions, and obeying the rules and resolutions of their own group,²⁰³ various Western groups have also stressed discipline. Peace action groups have often been especially articulate on this point. The 1962 discipline of New York City peace groups, for example, included this pledge:

We will adhere to the planned program of action for each demonstration, unless a change of plan is communicated to us by the demonstration’s sponsors or by their representatives. We will not initiate any unannounced action, unless it has been explicitly approved by the sponsors.

We recognize that conducting an orderly demonstration depends upon mutual cooperation and respect between participants and those who have organized and are responsible for the demonstration. (If requests are made for action which you feel are unwise, you will have an opportunity to discuss your complaint fully with the responsible persons after the demonstration, if it is not possible at the time.) If a request is made which you cannot accept, please quietly disassociate yourself from the demonstration.²⁰⁴

The nonviolent group's standards for behavior of participants may cover not only the direct action stage, but also the period of imprisonment following arrests.²⁰⁵

Exponents of discipline in nonviolent action have argued that a disciplined movement (as compared to an undisciplined one) is more likely to win the respect of third parties and of the opponent,²⁰⁶ achieve a greater recognition of the seriousness of purpose involved, be more inspiring and produce a greater impact.²⁰⁷ Such discipline, Gregg argued, also contributes to inner growth and inner strengthening of individual participants.²⁰⁸ It will also help to maintain social order even in the midst of major struggle and sharp political conflict. Though not easy, nonviolent discipline is quite within the capacities of the vast majority of people; Gregg argued that discipline in nonviolent action, once understood, is not necessarily more difficult than the quite different type of discipline which is often achieved among soldiers in war situations.²⁰⁹

PROMOTING NONVIOLENT DISCIPLINE

In some cases participants may intuitively, or by common accord, adhere to nonviolent discipline without formal efforts to promote it. Strong support for the objectives and general acceptance of nonviolent action as the means to achieve them may be sufficient to ensure the necessary degree of nonviolent discipline in the particular situation. This may be especially true if the participants are experienced in the use of nonviolent technique, if opposition is not strong, if the factors likely to produce violence are minimal, and if the actionists have a strong religious or moral preference for nonviolent means.

However, since the dangers to the movement of indisciplined action and of an outbreak of violence are so serious, one should not passively stand by and hope for the best even when such favorable conditions are present. A movement *may* come through safely, but every effort needs to be made to avoid those threats to success. Furthermore in the larger number of cases without those favorable conditions, stronger efforts still are needed to maintain nonviolent discipline. Some persons with anti-authoritarian personalities or *some* philosophical anarchists react very negatively to any type of discipline. To allow emotional reactions or inadequately considered philosophical generalizations to block efforts to promote nonviolent discipline is most unwise and irrational. There is nothing "wrong" with nonviolent discipline; it is necessary because it "helps prevent actions or reactions which bring disunity or disorder or which work against the

objectives of the action [and] provides a way by which a group of people can do corporately what they wish to do," as Charles C. Walker has pointed out.²¹⁰

Nonviolent discipline also frequently includes willingness to carry out humble and undramatic tasks, as well as the more visible and daring ones from which a greater personal sense of importance, recognition, or honor may result. Nonviolent actionists also need to be willing to try to improve their abilities and skills so as to be able to act with greater effectiveness. Dignified, calm behavior may frequently be a part of nonviolent discipline.²¹¹ All this does not in any way imply submissiveness or cringing before the opponent and his police or troops; behavior will be polite but firm. Nonviolent actionists will treat the opponent and his agents as human beings, but the actionists will not be bullied.²¹²

It follows from the need for nonviolent discipline that those persons or groups unwilling or unable to abide by it must be asked not to take part. They will help most by remaining outside the movement or withdrawing from it until they feel able to act in accordance with the required standards of behavior.²¹³ The maintenance of high standards for participants may initially reduce the numbers of nonviolent actionists. However, in the long run both larger numbers of participants and success in the struggle depend on maintaining the quality of the movement, as has already been pointed out. Reducing nonviolent discipline in order to bring in larger numbers will have serious detrimental effects on the movement. Gandhi argued, for example, that the lowering of the standards for volunteers late in the 1930-31 struggle seriously weakened the movement and led to *goondaism* (rioting or violent disorder) in some places.²¹⁴

Persons not familiar with the past practice of nonviolent action are often highly skeptical that nonviolent discipline can be achieved on a group or mass basis. The assumption that only individuals are capable of disciplined nonviolent action is a denial of the facts. It is widely acknowledged that with group encouragement and support many individuals commit acts of violence which they never would commit, acting alone. Group encouragement and support help achieve a similar, but reverse, change in behavior in the case of nonviolent action. Individuals who are not pacifists, and who if attacked individually would reply with counter-violence, have with group encouragement, support and pressures successfully maintained nonviolent discipline even when physically attacked. This happens when the nonpacifist participant is able to see that nonviolent discipline and nonretaliatory persistence are necessary to advance the group's goals which he shares.²¹⁵ There are cases of such group discipline even when

advance instructions and training in nonviolent conflict behavior were minimal or absent.²¹⁶

Nonviolent action almost always occurs in a situation of conflict and tension: it generally heightens such conditions rather than reduces them. Given that fact, it requires some skill to prevent violence and to maintain discipline. But it is possible to do this because not all conflict is violent and because tension and aggression can be released in disciplined nonviolent ways. Sometimes—but not always—in situations where the atmosphere strongly favors violence, or where violence has already broken out, nonviolent leaders have judged it best not to start a nonviolent campaign at that point, or to call off a current campaign, until a more propitious moment. For example, Gandhi suspended the campaign against the Rowlatt Bills in 1919 because of the outbreak of violence.²¹⁷ In the summer of 1939 Gandhi rejected suggestions that he organize mass nonviolent struggle, arguing:

. . . the atmosphere is surcharged with violence . . . nonviolent mass movement is an impossibility unless the atmosphere is radically changed . . . If any mass movement is undertaken at the present moment in the name of nonviolence, it will resolve itself into violence largely unorganized and organized in some cases. It will bring discredit on the Congress, spell disaster for the Congress struggle for independence and bring ruin to many a home.²¹⁸

Ruling out mass nonviolent struggle did not, however, necessarily rule out all nonviolent action, as Gandhi had pointed out two weeks earlier: “. . . some active form of Satyagraha, not necessarily civil disobedience, must be available in order to end an impossible situation . . . There must be either effective nonviolent action or violence and anarchy within a measurable distance of time.”²¹⁹

Other methods may be used in advance to prevent the creation of an explosive situation. In 1769 during the nonimportation campaign to achieve repeal of the Townshend duties, the decision of Philadelphia merchants to refuse to allow any English goods not ordered before February 6, 1769 to be landed from the ships had this effect. As the goods were returned to England directly, there was no occasion for acts of violence against anyone for possession, use or attempt to sell the prohibited goods, nor for attempts to destroy the goods. It is uncertain whether this calming result was the intended consequence of banning the landing of boycotted goods, but it happened. Schlesinger concluded that in Philadelphia in 1769-70 “. . . the enforcement of nonimportation was free from all exhibitions of

mob violence, largely because goods violative of the agreement were immediately re-shipped to Great Britain.”²²⁰ This prevention of provocative situations may contribute to nonviolent discipline.

Whenever two hostile crowds have gathered and may meet, the situation is ripe for violence. For example, in New York City on July 7, 1770, during that same campaign, crowds for and against the nonimportation policy encountered each other in Wall Street, “where stiff blows were exchanged with cane and club and the nonimporters finally dispersed.”²²¹ Where opposing groups are likely to gather, or have already done so, nonviolent strategists seeking to maintain peaceful discipline will need to take counter measures. If the hostile group attacks, the nonviolent actionist will need strong self-discipline in order to prevent both a rout and violence. If the leaders wish to avoid a physical encounter, possible lines of action include movement of the nonviolent group away from the violent demonstrators, dispersal, or a switch to some other type of individual or small group nonviolent action. If the possible physical attack by the mob is to be confronted directly, the nonviolent leadership will need to be sure that the actionists will be capable of maintaining both discipline and nonviolence if the conflict is not to degenerate into flight or riot. Sometimes various novel acts may be applied at such a point, including singing religious or patriotic hymns, kneeling in prayer, and sitting down.

In many situations where conflict and tension are widespread the launching of militant nonviolent action may be regarded as a necessary step to prevent the outbreak of violence. Such action is aimed at providing alternative effective means for conducting the conflict and simultaneously releasing feelings of aggression and hostility which have accumulated within the grievance group. Militant nonviolent action may often be risky, but it may be the only alternative to passive submission on the one hand and allowing the forces of violence to gain the upper hand on the other. A decision to launch militant nonviolent action to prevent violence may be made when there is high tension but as yet no open conflict (either violent or nonviolent), or in a tense situation once the nonviolent struggle has begun.

It has been recognized for a long time that certain nonviolent activities may defuse potential violence. For example, in 1765, after Newport, Rhode Island, had already experienced one riot, another threatened as the tense local situation combined with the approach of November 1, when the hated Stamp Act was to go into effect. The result might have been a politically counterproductive explosion. Then, on that date, “. . . in order to forestall any possible riot, the Sons of Liberty attempted to divert

popular feeling into an orderly demonstration, by staging a 'grand Funeral of Freedom', as described in detail in Chapter Three. Many decades later, on a vastly larger scale, Gandhi sought to provide nonviolent means of struggle which would simultaneously be effective for achieving political ends and also would prevent political violence. While there were growing terrorist groups, Gandhi showed the effectiveness of nonviolent struggle and got the Indian National Congress—the nationalist party—to adopt it for achieving independence. Jawaharlal Nehru, who had been an advocate of violent revolution and who never became a believer in nonviolent doctrine, was among those who accepted the nonviolent technique for practical reasons.²²² Later, while the struggle continued, he wrote:

Terrorists have flourished in India, off and on, for nearly thirty years . . . terrorism, in spite of occasional recrudescence, has no longer any real appeal for the youth of India. Fifteen years' stress on nonviolence has changed the whole background in India and made the masses much more indifferent to, and even hostile to, the idea of terrorism as a method of political action. Even the classes from which the terrorists are usually drawn, the lower middle classes and intelligentsia, have been powerfully affected by the Congress propaganda against methods of violence. Their active and impatient elements, who think in terms of revolutionary action, also realize fully now that revolution does not come through terrorism, and that terrorism is an outworn and profitless method that comes in the way of real revolutionary action.²²³

James Farmer has strongly supported this analysis: ". . . rather than leading to riots, demonstrations tend to prevent them by providing an alternative outlet for frustration." Farmer then supported his view with evidence from New York City and Chicago. In the summer of 1963, in New York, for example, he maintained, "anger and frustration were just as high as they were to be in the riotous summer of 1964." However, in 1963 there were "hundreds of mass demonstrations" against discrimination in the building trades. Many unemployed youths who would otherwise have prowled the streets aimlessly, joined in the demonstrations. They picketed, climbed cranes, and blocked the bulldozers. Furthermore, these youths remained nonviolent. "They did not have to resort to throwing bottles and bricks, and they didn't." In the summer of 1964, however, there were few demonstrations, and there were riots.

Farmer denied a simple cause-and-effect relationship between organized nonviolent protest and avoidance of riots, ". . . but certainly there

is some relationship. We have seen it countless times, in the South as well as the North." During the riots of 1964 Farmer walked the streets of Harlem and reported: "I saw more clearly than I have ever before how young men who feel that nothing is being done about grievances so deep they can barely articulate them, will finally spring to violence." He added: "I firmly believe that if Harlemites had been better trained in legitimate mass demonstrations (demonstrating *is* doing something)—and if the police had not acted so unwisely—the Harlem riots [of July 1964] could have been averted." As a general conclusion, Farmer continued: "One way to avert riots is to satisfy people that they can do something—not promise that things will be done, but satisfy them that *they can do something* without turning to self-defeating violence. One thing they can do is demonstrate." (Italics added). This was exactly what happened in the summer of 1965, and the riots which had been predicted did not occur.

Just as labor movement violence has been replaced by legitimizing strikes and other mass labor demonstrations, so racial violence can be replaced by ". . . legitimizing the techniques of mass action developed by the civil rights groups. It seems to me obvious that without demonstrations we will learn what violence and chaos really are. To inhibit mass demonstrations is madness." Of course, Farmer continued, where the only possible result of a demonstration is immediate mob violence it should not be held, but that certainly does not mean abandonment of "all but the most polite demonstrations of protest." Instead, he concluded, ". . . if demonstrations are in danger of courting violence, the remedy is not to stop demonstrating but to perfect our ability to control the more undisciplined participants and to spread our teaching." Farmer also points to the desirability of countering ill-advised demonstrations by the development and use of tactically sounder ones, rather than leaving people with the choice of doing nothing or participating in an unwise action.²²⁴

This discussion is not to imply that *any* form of nonviolent action can channel aggression and group hostilities away from violence. That obviously is not true, and careful consideration needs to be given to the selection of the precise ways most suitable for the particular situation. The remainder of this section is a survey of the types of efforts to maintain nonviolent discipline that have been used in the past. High morale is important in achieving and preserving nonviolent discipline. Walker emphasizes that high morale requires that participants believe they are members of a group which cares about them as individuals, which gives them the opportunity for creativity, active participation, overcoming obstacles and working together loyally with others who share their outlook and pur-

poses.²²⁵ Mass meetings may be held periodically—daily, weekly, or at some other interval—for the purpose of building morale, as well as increasing understanding of the nonviolent technique and disseminating information; mass meetings have been used in support of nonviolent action in the South, as during student sit-ins, and during the Montgomery bus boycott.²²⁶

The hope of achieving victory will often help maintain nonviolent discipline, especially among the less reliable elements, and may also help hold together the existing coalition of diverse groups behind the struggle. This was the case during the early stages of the 1905 revolution in Russia: “. . . as long as the possibility of peaceful political change remained in sight . . . the weakly united front of liberals and socialists continued.”²²⁷ When this united front dissolved and workers turned toward the more pro-violent socialists it was “. . . not so much because of the socialists’ ideology as because of their vigorous tactics—which now seemed to many the only means of influencing events and achieving new victories.”²²⁸

Morale will often be increased, also, by feelings among the actionists that some significant source of strength not available to their opponent is supporting them. In some cases these feelings may arise in part from a sense of the power of the technique of action they are using, or the justice of their cause, or the inevitability of their victory. In some cases, such feeling may be rooted in a belief that they have powerful friends whose influence and capacity may finally help to defeat their opponent. Norwegian participants in nonviolent struggle against Quisling’s regime and the Nazi occupation frequently point to the importance to their morale of their belief that the Allies were waging a powerful military struggle against the Nazis; civil rights workers using nonviolent action in the Deep South gained inner strength not only from the rightness of their cause and the moral superiority of their methods, but also from “. . . an intimate sense of identification with public opinion and with the movement of the Federal Government—however slow. He [the civil rights worker] is isolated only from the immediate antagonistic community.”²²⁹ During the 1920 Kapp Putsch, Dr. Kapp and part of the army had to confront a determined population inspired by awareness that they were defending the Republic at the request of the constitutional government. As a result, “an inspired purposefulness reigned in the camp of Dr. Kapp’s enemies.”²³⁰

Where the nonviolent actionists are a distinct minority and also do not have access to these sources of feelings of strength, they will need to take compensating measures to support high morale. Such measures should not be simply gimmicks and should be able to survive crises. In any case,

it would be dangerous and overly optimistic simply to count on high morale to achieve and maintain nonviolent discipline. There are other ways to promote this.

One of these is that active participants in the struggle, sympathizers and the general population understand well *why* the campaign needs to be kept strictly nonviolent. Such understanding has not always been achieved to a significant degree; instead, a few inadequate generalizations about nonviolence being “better” or “more moral” have often been regarded as sufficient. Fuller and politically more adequate explanation of the need for nonviolent discipline might be more effective both in avoiding scattered violence during the campaign and a later major switch to violence. The groups most likely to advocate or initiate violence are precisely those likely to be least influenced by vague generalizations and moral exhortations to be nonviolent.

As understanding of the reasons for the importance of nonviolent behavior for the operation of the technique spreads, it will be more and more difficult to provoke violence. Also, the chances are increased that if the opponent attempts to do precisely that, his efforts will be publicly exposed. Under this new discipline, violence against the opponent becomes “as traitorous to the cause as desertion is in the army.”

Once that understanding, attitude and discipline are attained among the group of nonviolent resisters, any *agent provocateur* who comes whispering among them or preaching violence, retaliation or revenge will be immediately known for what he is and repudiated. And the group will soon prove its tactics so clearly to the public that the latter will not be deceived by the act of an *agent provocateur* bomb thrower or inflammatory speaker.²³¹

The need for outward discipline is thus likely to be reduced as the volunteers gain confidence in the adequacy of nonviolent action to further their cause.²³²

Good organization, wise leadership, carefully laid and intelligently formulated plans and effective means of communication within the movement will contribute significantly to the achievement and maintenance of nonviolent discipline. Conversely, the absence of these will greatly facilitate both indiscipline and violence. “Karl Ehrlich” (pseud. for Karl Raloff) attributed the development of terrorism during the *Ruhrkampf* to the absence of German plans for nonviolent resistance, and the relative absence of leadership and organization for the struggle.²³³

Organization, leadership, plans and communication involve attention

to a considerable variety of particular problems and tasks. Strategy, tactics and methods always need to be carefully chosen, but when the atmosphere is especially conducive to violence special care in their choice and formulation will be needed. In some cases methods which rely on the high-quality action of a few people may be more appropriate than those that rely on large numbers of less disciplined participants.²³⁴ For particularly difficult tasks the person or group to carry them out needs to be carefully selected on the basis of reliability and other qualifications, especially when the task is dangerous, or extremely important, as in starting the struggle,²³⁵ or in shifting its direction at a critical point.

The degree to which regular participants in the action should be selected from among the volunteers, or that selection is possible, will differ from one conflict to another. So, too, will the degree and type of advance training of general participants differ. Detailed discussion of methods for training of both general participants and specialist personnel lies outside the scope of this study. Study groups, workshops, seminars and socio-drama have been used widely in the United States by civil rights groups.²³⁶ Such methods, however, obviously only scratch the surface of the possibilities. Consideration of the purposes, levels and means of training large numbers of people or the whole population is essential.

Organizers, leaders and sometimes ordinary participants have used speeches, messages and on-the-spot pleas in efforts to prevent violence and maintain discipline. Initial calls for action and statements by leaders and spokesmen for the grievance group before or at the beginning of the struggle, often emphasize the nonviolent and disciplined nature of the coming action, with the intent of influencing the course of the movement and the behavior of possible participants. Such statements were made, for example, in South Vietnam at the start of the 1963 Buddhist anti-Diem struggle. The conflict began after shootings into crowds of Buddhists in Hué as they objected to restrictions on their religious freedom. The next day (May 9) a Buddhist leader, Thich Tan Chau, wrote a letter addressed to all monks, nuns, and other Buddhists in Vietnam asking support to “. . . protect our just religion in an orderly, peaceful, nonviolent manner.” The following day the manifesto of demands to be the basis of the coming struggle, presented in Hué, declared that Buddhists “will use nonviolent methods of struggle.”²³⁷ Verbal pleas for nonviolent disciplined behavior, as many persons may expect, were often made by Gandhi,²³⁸ by King,²³⁹ and by leaders of the 1952 Defiance Campaign in South Africa.²⁴⁰ Such calls have also been made in situations where they might be less expected. It is not so widely known that the manifesto issued by the Pan Africanist

Congress of South Africa before its 1960 campaign against the Pass Laws called for “absolute nonviolence.” After several hours of intimidation of the orderly and disciplined seven thousand demonstrators at Sharpeville on March 21, some Africans broke discipline and began throwing stones at the police. (It was only at that point the police without warning began firing into the crowd with the deadly results that are so well known.) The Pan Africanists continued to seek nonviolent discipline, however, Philip Kgosana was notably successful in achieving this with very large demonstrations; on March 30 he led a disciplined peaceful thirty thousand Africans marching thirty abreast through Capetown. (He was later arrested as he led a deputation, when police broke their promise that the deputation would be received by officials.²⁴¹

There were numerous verbal attempts to maintain nonviolent discipline during the 1953 East German Rising. It was repeatedly emphasized that this was a struggle against the East German Communist regime and that all possible steps should be taken not to provoke the Russians. For example, a speaker at a mass meeting of sixty thousand in Halle “. . . asked the crowd to observe strict discipline warning against panic buying, looting and violence—the Red Army, he told them earnestly, must be given no excuse to intervene.”²⁴² It was a similar story in Goerlitz: “At no time had the demonstrators become involved with the occupation troops. Speaker after speaker had warned against provoking the Red Army into taking action and no one had contradicted them.”²⁴³ The leader of the insurgents at East Germany’s largest chemical plant (the *Leunawerke* near Leipzig), Friedrich Schorn declared: “Everything is at stake. But violence isn’t the answer . . . Let’s keep order.” When factory guards turned over their weapons, Schorn ordered them locked in a storeroom, instead of being used in the rising. When the plant’s workers marched to Merseburg for a mass meeting, Schorn again urged the crowd to remain calm, even as Soviet troops advanced on the square where the meeting was being held. When some demonstrators began shouting and spitting at the Russians, signs of possible serious violence in that situation, Schorn after consultations with others urged the strikers to return to their respective factories but not to begin work. “They formed columns and marched off in perfect discipline.”²⁴⁴

Sometimes more active intervention has been used to halt acts of violence or acts which might lead to serious violence even though they might in themselves not be very serious. For example, on one occasion after an initial clash between police and strikers outside the House of Ministries, in East Berlin, June 17, 1953, a few of the demonstrators tried to prevent

others from throwing stones at the police.²⁴⁵ Night patrols have also been used. In Newport, Rhode Island, on November 1, 1765, for example, as the Stamp Act went into force "the Sons of Liberty endeavored to maintain popular feeling against the Stamp Act without touching off another riot"; after the substitute nonviolent demonstration (in the form of a mock funeral described above) they also took other measures. "In the evening a number of persons patrolled the streets to prevent the gathering of a mob, and the night passed quietly."²⁴⁶

Effective organization and communication in the nonviolent group will contribute significantly to achieving and maintaining nonviolent discipline. Certain measures for organization and communication which appear to be directed solely to relations with the opponent or the press, for example, the selection of a spokesman to issue statements, answer questions and speak for the demonstrators during the confrontation²⁴⁷ also are likely to promote group discipline.

Highly important in promoting nonviolent discipline will be "... clear lines of command and communication, and ... a clear understanding by the participants of what they are to do in a variety of circumstances."²⁴⁸ One of the most effective means of promoting nonviolent discipline in large scale nonviolent action demonstrations has been detailed instruction and discipline leaflets. Sometimes the detailed instructions for the particular action are combined with the general instructions about how to behave in crises, and sometimes they have been separate leaflets. Clear, simple explanations of the plans, of the nonviolent discipline, and of the reasons for them, combined with recommendations on how the actionist is expected to behave in various specific situations, may help remove much of the uncertainty and potential to violence. Where violence nevertheless breaks out, these detailed instructions may help prevent the nonviolent actionists from being blamed for the violence. Such instruction and discipline leaflets sometimes include brief explanations of why a particular course of action is recommended or rejected.

"Marshals" for demonstrations have also been used to help keep a given action nonviolent and disciplined. These marshals are usually especially experienced, able to remain calm and confident, and well versed in an understanding of the technique. The marshals receive special briefings on the plans and problems expected. They may be assigned to particular small groups of actionists, so that reliable persons who are able to set an example, offer advice and instructions, and relay detailed plans and lines for action to those near them are spread throughout a large demonstration. In the South African struggles in the early 1900s violence would

sometimes have broken out but for the "most vigilant supervision," reports Gandhi.²⁴⁹ In Britain the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Committee of 100 all made extensive use of marshals to keep the demonstrations orderly and peaceful. On the Aldermaston marches, such marshals even assisted in directing traffic, relieving the police of some of their normal duties. These marshals played an extremely important role in promoting nonviolent discipline among large numbers of people who may have been new to both demonstrations and nonviolent action. As an extremely effective means to maintain nonviolent discipline, the use of marshals is likely to be adopted and refined increasingly by practitioners of nonviolent action. Marshals have also been used widely in the United States, especially for massive anti-Vietnam-War demonstrations in Washington, D.C. Agitation against marshals—they have been called "peace pigs"—may have various motives, some for destroying the movement, as may other pressures against nonviolent discipline discussed above. In the absence of extraordinary self-discipline and experience, however, efforts to undermine the moral authority and effectiveness of marshals can only benefit the opponent by increasing the chances of violence.

Organizers of nonviolent action have sometimes sought to promote nonviolent discipline by asking volunteers to promise, or to sign a pledge in advance, to adhere to a certain code of behavior. "Success depends entirely upon disciplined and concerted non-cooperation and the latter is dependent upon strict obedience to instructions, calmness and absolute freedom from violence," declared a statement issued in India by the Noncooperation Committee for public information and guidance in 1920.²⁵⁰ There have been two types of these written standards—campaign pledges and demonstration pledges. In India far more than elsewhere, volunteers have been asked to pledge themselves to participate in a long-term struggle and to abide by certain standards of behavior while taking part. "Long-term" implies the duration of the campaign, from a few to many months. Formal pledges asked of persons volunteering to take part in a whole campaign have included a clause on nonviolent behavior and on obedience to orders.²⁵¹ The Indians have not, however, been the only ones to seek pledges for a whole campaign.

An attempt was made in New York during the boycott of tea in 1773 to obtain signatures to a pledge of nonviolent behavior during the struggle, as Schlesinger reports that "the more conservative merchants" saw a clear drift toward mob control. Four days after a mass meeting of two thousand endorsed a secondary boycott of persons helping introduce boycotted dutied

teas, a few persons, including Isaac Low and Jacob Walton, sought signatures to a pledge not to resort to violence in opposing the introduction of the tea. Schlesinger reports that the project quickly made some headway, ". . . but was abandoned on the next day because of the excitement aroused by the receipt of news of the Boston Tea Party. From that moment, as Governor Tryon informed Dartmouth, all hope of a temperate opposition was gone."²⁵²

Codes of discipline for participants in particular demonstrations have been used both in Britain by the Direct Action Committee against Nuclear War and the Committee of 100,²⁵³ and in the United States by peace groups.²⁵⁴ Some of the basic points in various American peace and civil rights discipline codes have been listed by both Walker²⁵⁵ and Miller.²⁵⁶ For several years the Congress of Racial Equality used a general code of nonviolent discipline, and local groups have sometimes prepared their own codes, as that adopted by college students in Nashville, Tennessee, for use in lunch counter sit-ins.²⁵⁷

Often the intent to keep a resistance movement nonviolent has been partially frustrated by the arrest of the very resistance leaders capable of preventing violence. O'Hegarty reports this happened in Ireland following the arrests of Parnell, Dillon and other local and national leaders of the Land League in October 1881:

Deprived of their leaders, deprived of their Organization, the people resisted as individuals, and resisted as families, and as communities. With no central direction or policy, violence and outrage and intimidation, the unarmed or poorly armed people's only defence against tyranny, soon held full sway.²⁵⁸

This is one reason why it is insufficient for nonviolent actionists to rely only on the established leaders. In any case, most such movements require a constant influx of new blood into the leadership group. Some times the recognized leadership may be arrested before it has been able to formulate plans. In other cases, at an advanced stage of a campaign all the leaders are likely to be imprisoned or otherwise removed. Whether leaders are arrested early or late, it is vital that the other persons be capable of stepping into leadership positions, and finally that the nonviolent actionists become capable of acting courageously and effectively in the absence of a recognizable leadership group.²⁵⁹ This was emphasized by Gandhi. He spoke of the stage in a campaign ". . . where no one has to look expectantly at another, where there are no leaders and no followers, or where all are leaders and all are followers . . ."²⁶⁰ He also said: "Dis-

cipline has a place in nonviolent strategy, but much more is required. In a satyagraha army everybody is a soldier and a servant. But at a pinch every satyagrahi soldier has also to be his own general and leader."²⁶¹

While capable of free action the leaders will need to take steps to help people maintain the necessary nonviolent discipline when they must act without leaders. These steps will include both general instructions and specific training in the nature of nonviolent action, in the need for nonviolent discipline and in ways of maintaining it. Also important is the careful formulation of the initial stages of the campaign so that the early pattern can set the mood and serve as an example for the later stages.

In other situations, the opposite trend may develop: instead of all leadership being removed, the nonviolent forces may become so strong that characteristics of a parallel government emerge,²⁶² which help maintain nonviolent discipline. For example, during the Continental Association plan for economic nonviolent resistance, Connecticut colonial patriots in 1775 enforced compliance with the resistance provisions by open trials of persons accused of violating the resistance plans. The problem of enforcement was more difficult in that colony because it possessed no commercial metropolis but only several small river and coast towns. The movement started, Schlesinger reports, at a meeting of the committees of inspection of Hartford County on January 25, 1775. It was agreed that proceedings against a person accused of violating the noncooperation program should be conducted in an "open, candid and deliberate manner." Furthermore, formal summonses would be served upon him, containing the nature of the charge, and an invitation to defend himself before the committee six days or more later. Witnesses and other evidence were to be "openly, fairly and fully heard"; and conviction should be made only "upon the fullest, clearest and most convincing proof." New Haven, Fairfield and Litchfield counties adopted the same mode of procedure. Nor were these mere pious platitudes. Schlesinger reports that "trials of offenders by the committees of inspection bore every evidence of being fair and impartial hearings, although mistakes were occasionally made."²⁶³

REFUSAL TO HATE

It should be clear at this point that nonviolent action does not require its practitioners to "love" their opponent, nor to try to convert him. Clearly this technique has been applied by people who hated their opponent and desired to coerce him. Such emotions and attitudes can coexist with the use of nonviolent means.

However, it is also true that effectiveness with the nonviolent technique may be increased when the actionists are able to refrain from hatred and hostility. This is true for all three mechanisms of change, which are discussed in detail in Chapter Thirteen. Appeals to "love" the enemy may at times be emotionally or religiously motivated appeals of persons who are politically naïve. But it is often similarly naïve to dismiss pleas to regard members of the opponent group as fellow human beings and to treat them with respect, personal friendliness and even "love." If actionists are incapable of making this distinction between persons and the issues, and are able only to abstain from physical violence, they should be credited with that achievement rather than have their behavior and attitudes discredited because they were less than perfect. However, if in addition they can refrain from hostility, ill will and hatred, and perhaps even demonstrate personal goodwill for members of the opponent group, they may have much greater chances of success.

An absence of hostility and the presence of goodwill will facilitate the operation of the conversion mechanism. Repression against people who are not only nonviolent but also personally friendly while persisting in their firm action will often appear less justifiable than repression of hostile persons. Repression may still be applied, but the impact of the resulting suffering on the opponent group and on third parties is also likely to be greater. Where the conversion mechanism is not fully achieved, the non-hostile attitudes of the actionists may facilitate change by accommodation. An absence of personal ill will while fighting for the issue may increase the degree to which the opponent's repression rebounds to weaken his own political position.²⁶⁴

Even when nonviolent coercion is sought there are good reasons for deliberate efforts to minimize ill will, hostility and hatred by the nonviolent actionists toward the opponent group and to promote positive personal relationships. Such efforts may, for example, help undermine the loyalty of the opponent's police and troops, possibly leading to reduced efficiency in the carrying out of orders for repression, or even to open refusal to obey.

Gandhi is prominent among those who have argued that there is no room for hatred, malice or ill will in nonviolent action, and that they should be replaced by the gentleness, civility, compassion and love for the opponent.²⁶⁵ This attitude has also been expressed in Western cases of nonviolent action as illustrated in discipline leaflets for demonstrations by American and British peace groups. A 1962 discipline leaflet adopted by New York City peace organizations include these sentences:

Our attitude toward persons who may oppose us will be one of understanding and of respect for the right of others to hold and express whatever views they wish.

We will not be violent in our attitude, make hostile remarks, shout or call names. If singing or chanting is indicated, it will be in a manner consistent with the nonviolent spirit of the demonstration.²⁶⁶

The discipline leaflet issued in Britain by the Committee for Direct Action Against Nuclear War (the predecessor of the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear war) contained this request:

Do not use any language or take any action which is likely to provoke violence by others. A dignified bearing and courteous determination will greatly contribute to victory for this cause.

If you are jeered or called names, do not shout back or jeer those who differ from our views. Silence and a friendly smile are the best reply to hostility, as you continue [to act] as before the interruption.²⁶⁷

The nonviolent action movement against racial segregation in the Deep South placed very great importance on "love" for the white segregationists. "The nonviolent resister not only refuses to shoot his opponent but he also refuses to hate him," wrote Martin Luther King, Jr. "At the center of nonviolence stands the principle of love."²⁶⁸ This extreme emphasis turned some people away from nonviolent means. When understood as a *requirement* for nonviolent action (rather than a helpful refinement), the demand for "love" for people who have done cruel things may turn people who are justifiably bitter and unable to love their opponents toward violence as the technique most consistent with bitterness and hatred. This confusion of secondary refinements with primary requirements and alienation of many potential users of the nonviolent technique has sometimes been aggravated by attempts of pacifists and believers in the principles of nonviolence to proselytize within nonviolent action movements, and to blur the distinctions between their beliefs and the nonviolent technique. Such efforts may in the long run impede rather than promote the substitution of nonviolent for violent means. Nevertheless, for the sake of effectiveness and beneficial long-term consequences, it is desirable for nonviolent actionists to minimize hostility and hatred and to maximize their goodwill for members of the opponent group while firmly continuing the struggle.

THE INEFFICACY OF REPRESSION

As we have already indicated, repression against a movement of non-violent action does not always produce the desired results. If the nonviolent actionists remain fearless, keep their nonviolent discipline, are willing to accept the sufferings inflicted for their defiance, and are determined to persist, then the opponent's attempt to force them to submit to his will is likely to be thwarted. He may be able to imprison them, to injure them, or even to execute them, but as long as they hold out, his will remains unfulfilled. Even if only a single person remains defiant, to that degree the opponent is defeated. The political potentialities of this thwarting of the opponent's will begin to assume much clearer forms when large numbers maintain this persistence, along with the other necessary qualities of nonviolent action. Where significant sections of the population continue defiance, the results will extend far beyond individual example and martyrdom, perhaps even to the point where the opponent's will is effectively blocked. That is, he is politically unable to carry out his plans even with the aid of repression.

He may arrest the leaders, but the movement may simply carry on without a recognizable leadership. He may make new acts illegal, only to find that he has opened new opportunities for defiance. He may attempt to repress defiance at certain points, only to find that the nonviolent actionists have gained enough strength to broaden their attack on other fronts so as to challenge his very ability to rule. He may find that mass repression fails to force a resumption of cooperation and obedience, but instead is constantly met by refusal to submit or flee, producing repeated demonstrations of impotence. Yet, not only may his repression prove inadequate to control his defiant subjects; his very agencies of repression may in extreme cases be immobilized by the massive defiance.

A. Arresting leaders is inadequate

It is natural for the opponent to believe that arresting the leadership will cause the movement to collapse. This was the view of Thomas Hutchinson, Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts Bay Colony, when he attempted to counteract the campaign of nonimportation of British goods and other noncooperation; in 1769 and 1770 he urged passage by Parliament of an act to punish organizers and participants in such a movement. He denounced "the confederacy of merchants"—who were providing leadership—as unlawful and wrote that Parliament's laws would always be nullified in America ". . . if combinations to prevent the operation of them

and to sacrifice all who conform to them are tolerated, or if towns are allowed to meet and vote that measures for defeating such acts are legal." 269 Operating on such a view, opponents confronted with nonviolent action have often seen their best immediate course of counteraction to be the arrest of the leaders and making the organization of this form of struggle illegal. In certain circumstances, this type of repression may be effective. This is most likely to happen when the movement does not genuinely have the strength it appeared to have, when the people are not fearless and when they do not understand how to conduct nonviolent action.

But when the movement does have strength, when the people are fearless, when they understand how to carry on, then the arrest of the leaders may prove a very inadequate means of crushing the movement. Repression is most likely to be made impotent when there has been a widespread and intensive program of public education in the use of nonviolent action or when the actionists have had considerable experience with the technique. Sometimes the example of a few and the intuition of others may suffice to continue resistance, but this is rare and dangerous; sound preparation is safer. Advance training and a widely distributed manual on how to use nonviolent action may help in compensating for the loss of the leadership. These aids may help the actionists to continue to struggle even though reserve layers of leadership have also been removed.

Provision of successive layers of leadership to replace those arrested, or otherwise removed by the opponent, seems to have been given the greatest attention during the Gandhian struggles in India. Not only was a secondary leadership prepared to take the place of the first-line leadership when it was arrested but a whole chain of successive layers of leadership was selected in advance, sometimes up to the thirtieth successive group, to take over direction of the movement as the previous groups were arrested. Sometimes there was, instead, a clear procedure for selecting later leaders, especially by having an existing leader appoint his successor. But, in a mass defiance campaign against an opponent intent upon repressing it ruthlessly, such measures are only stop gap measures. It is likely that sooner or later the continued operation of centralized leadership will become impossible.

In a struggle using political violence—violent revolution, civil war, or international war, for example—the leadership is in most situations kept back, out of danger. Indeed, the movement may depend upon the safety of the top leadership. In nonviolent action, by contrast, the leaders are usually the first victims of the opponent's repression. Having laid down

the basic strategy, tactics and methods by which the struggle is to proceed, having helped to forge the organization to carry out those plans, and having emphasized the importance of fearlessness, persistence and maintenance of the nonviolent discipline, the leaders must *act* accordingly. They must by their own fearlessness, suffering and bearing set an example for the many who shall follow them. It is partly because the leadership will be so quickly removed from the scene that so much emphasis must be laid on the quality of the movement at the very beginning. Said Gandhi, "... clean examples have a curious method of multiplying themselves."²⁷⁰ He emphasized the consequences of the importance of the quality of the participants in a nonviolent movement: "... mass instruction on any other terms is an impossibility."²⁷¹ The leaders, wrote Bose, "... are out of the picture at the first shot, only to leave their example to work as leaven in raising the masses."²⁷²

"There should be no demoralization when the leaders are gone, and there should be no surrender in the face of fire."²⁷³ Rather than causing a slackening, the imprisonment or death of these and other participants in the struggle ought to cause an intensification of the fight:²⁷⁴ "... surely the memory of imprisonment should act as a spur to greater and more disciplined action. We must be able to stand on our own legs without support even as we breathe naturally and without artificial aid."²⁷⁵ This leads to a situation in which "self-reliance is the order of the day."²⁷⁶

These prescriptions by Gandhi for a successful major nonviolent action movement against severe repression were to a considerable degree filled during the 1930-31 independence campaign. Almost immediately after the launching of this struggle, the government began arresting and imprisoning prominent members of the nationalist party, the Indian National Congress. When Jawaharlal Nehru was sentenced to six months' simple imprisonment, there was a universal, spontaneous and complete *hartal*. He left a message for the people: "Keep smiling, fight on and get through the job."²⁷⁷ When Gandhi was arrested and imprisoned without trial, there were *hartals* and demonstrations throughout the country and the remaining Congress leadership resolved to intensify the struggle by extending the areas of noncooperation and civil disobedience.²⁷⁸ Gradually the various Congress organizations were declared illegal. They continued, nevertheless, to function for a considerable time with varying membership. After the Congress Working Committee had been effectively halted in its activities, "... civil disobedience lacked steering; but it had by now secured sufficient momentum to continue on its own."²⁷⁹

This broad self-reliance and continued resistance were deliberately promoted. In an article in *Young India* Jairamdas Daulatram wrote:

The Government wishes to disorganize us. Each town, each village may have, therefore, to become its own battlefield. The strategy of the battle must then come to be determined by local circumstances and change with them day to day. The sooner the workers prepare for this state of things, the earlier shall we reach our goal. They should need little guidance from outside.²⁸⁰

This decentralization of the battle-planning must, he added, be accompanied by continued firm adherence to discipline and to nonviolence, and continued obedience to leaders as long as they remain at liberty. After nearly all the Congress organizations had been declared illegal, Vallabhbhai Patel declared that thereafter every home must be a Congress office and every individual a Congress organization.²⁸¹

At Mathura when the leaders were all arrested before the plans for civil disobedience could be put into effect, the response was a spontaneous city-wide *hartal*, and a huge procession paraded through the city; eight thousand carried out civil disobedience in the form of making illegal salt.²⁸² In Bihar, with nearly all the leaders in prison, many more salt centers were opened illegally.²⁸³ Referring to conditions throughout the country as a whole, Gopal commented: "The policy of arresting only the leaders was obviously ineffective in countering a movement which drew its strength from local organizations."²⁸⁴

This growth of decentralization and self-reliance developed to such a point that without fear of contradiction Gandhi was able to point to the difficulties of carrying on negotiations with the British when only members of the Working Committee had been released from prison. He maintained that evidently the authorities did not understand that the people as a whole had become so much affected by the movement that, no matter how prominent the leaders, they could not dictate a course of action if the masses were not in accord.²⁸⁵ Such a development, if it should take place to a significant degree over a large area, would be most difficult to combat.

It would be an error to conclude that continued popular resistance despite arrests of leaders is only possible in India, or only with Gandhi as the inspiring leader even when in jail. There is scattered evidence from other conflicts that this continued resistance may occur in a considerable variety of situations. Officials have sometimes anticipated that increased resistance would result from the arrest of leaders and have accordingly

acted with caution. For example, although the tsarist Minister of the Interior, Peter Svyatopolk-Mirsky, in January 1905 issued orders for the arrest of Father Gapon and nineteen of his lieutenants before the planned march to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, the Prefect of the capital, General Ivan Fullon, did not carry out the arrests, fearing that his police force could not handle the greater, potentially violent, tumult which he expected as the result of such arrests.²⁸⁶ At Vorkuta in 1953, as noted earlier, the original strike committee was arrested even before the strike began, but the plans went ahead. In Montgomery, Alabama, during the 1957 bus boycott, there were mass arrests of the leadership. Rather than striking fear into the Negroes, the result was increased determination and fearlessness.²⁸⁷

Diffused leadership may also be required as a result of the very effectiveness of the nonviolent struggle. This is illustrated by the Russian 1905 Revolution. Only one newspaper was still being printed (a reactionary one in Kiev); telegraph communications were either cut or under government control; there was generally no public transportation operating; the postal system was almost paralyzed. All this meant that no strike leadership could be effective beyond the local area; consequently, resistance leadership was diffused, with leaders in each city acting in virtual isolation.²⁸⁸

B. Repression measures may become new points of resistance

Where the nonviolent actionists are strong, and other favorable conditions are present, various measures of repression may be utilized as new points at which to practice civil disobedience and political noncooperation. This is quite distinct from increasing the group's *demands*, which is regarded as generally unwise once the movement has begun. The extension of resistance to repression measures themselves also differs from expansion of other points of resistance and defiance.

It may have been planned, for example, that if the movement showed sufficient strength new methods of action would be used, or the same ones would be applied at new points. In other cases unexpected vigor and resilience of the actionists and grievance group may make such an expansion of points of resistance possible and desirable. It must be emphasized that any extension of the points of resistance should only be launched if the movement has demonstrated unmistakably sufficient support, tenacity and discipline to warrant the extension; it would be a grave strategic error to overextend the fronts beyond the ability of the nonviolent group to hold them and to keep the initiative.

If the movement shows such nonviolent power and is even able effectively to extend the struggle against certain measures of repression themselves, the opponent will find the situation particularly frustrating. The more his countermeasures infringe on widely accepted standards of conduct and political practice, the more suitable they may be for selection as new points for nonviolent challenge. For example, in trying to combat the nonviolent movement, the opponent may restrict freedom of the press, or freedom of speech or assembly. Such counteractions and repression provide the nonviolent group with additional points at which to resist and defy the regime on issues which will have the sympathy and support of many people still outside the movement.

The 1930-31 struggle in India probably provides the best examples of the extension of resistance, both to more ambitious forms as part of a planned strategy, and also to the opponent's repressive measures themselves. For instance, Gandhi decided to escalate the massive individual violations of the Salt Laws (in which individuals or groups committed civil disobedience by boiling down sea water or digging salt) to large-scale nonviolent raids on government salt depots.²⁸⁹ Following Gandhi's arrest, the Working Committee of the Congress expanded the scope of the campaign considerably, intensifying the salt raids and the boycott of foreign cloth, encouraging no-tax campaigns, expanding breaches of the Salt Act by manufacture, civil disobedience of the Forest Laws, initiating a boycott of British goods, banking and insurance, and urging the newspapers to noncooperate with new government restrictions on them.²⁹⁰

Among the government measures to deal with the civil disobedience movement was the Press Ordinance. This required all journals and newspapers to deposit a security with the government. If the publication then printed information or views ruled by the government to be subversive, the deposit was forfeited and publication was to cease. The Congress Working Committee urged the newspapers to regard this as a new point of refusal of cooperation with the government and to cease publication as a printed journal. Gandhi's own press closed, but *Young India* continued to be issued in duplicated form. Walls, sidewalks and paved roads served as blackboards for Congress notices. Handwritten and typed newspapers were copied and recopied and widely circulated. Various papers and news sheets appeared, all to be declared illegal. (However, most newspapers, but not all, complied with the government ordinance, thus not completing the extension of the defiance which was made possible by the measures.)²⁹¹ When public distribution of certain literature was made illegal, *satyagrahis* sometimes held public readings of the banned mate-

rial, in a further act of civil disobedience.²⁹² Other extensions of resistance took place also. For example, at one point political prisoners in several jails in the Central Province were on hunger strike,²⁹³ and elsewhere peasants unable to bear further repression went on a protest-migration (*hijrat*) to areas outside British control.²⁹⁴ It is significant that during that campaign the United Provinces Government opposed the proposal that the central government should declare all Congress organizations illegal. The former felt that "such action was not justified by local conditions and might well revive an agitation which was more or less at a standstill [in the province]." ²⁹⁵ Gopal reports also that while the imposition of collective fines on villages and districts, and the introduction of whipping, had in limited localities helped to control the nonviolent movement, "elsewhere ordinances only seemed to serve the purpose of providing fresh opportunities for defiance; and when the ordinances lapsed the tendency to lawlessness was keener than before." ²⁹⁶

If the nonviolent actionists' response to repression is an effective expansion of the points at which noncooperation and defiance are committed, and a significant increase in the numbers of active participants in the struggle, the opponent is faced with a strong movement whose opposition may become total. He is then in serious trouble. Very likely, he will in desperation intensify repression. Not only may this not work, but it may backfire to undermine his power position still further. Having failed to deal with the power of noncooperation and defiance, he may unwittingly have brought yet another force into operation against him: that of political *jiu-jitsu*.

NOTES

1. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms of Nonviolent Action" (Thesis) p. 68; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 47.
2. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, pp. 113-115.
3. Symons, *The General Strike*, p. 62.
4. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" p. 177.
5. Lakey, *loc. cit.*
6. Hiller, *The Strike*, pp. 83-84.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.
9. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, U.S. ed., p. 67; Br. ed., p. 79.
10. Hiller, *The Strike*, pp. 87 and 123.
11. See Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power*, pp. 41-210 *passim*.
12. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 59.
13. See Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 10-19 and 112-122.
14. See Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 133 and 144-148.
15. Quoted in Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 94.
16. See Sharp, *Tyranny Could Not Quell Them*.
17. Quoted in Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 94.
18. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, U.S. ed., p. 66; Br. ed., p. 78.
19. Sternstein, "The *Ruhrkampf* of 1923", p. 127. See also Ehrlich, "*Ruhrkampen*," p. 191.
20. Symons, *The General Strike*, pp. 141-142.
21. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 465-469.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 314, 480, 485, 489, 514-515, 520 and 611.
23. Ehrlich, "*Ruhrkampen*" in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*, pp. 186 and 192.
24. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 112-113, 116, 119 and 121.
25. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." p. 73.
26. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 156-164.
27. See Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 186-187, 189, 192-193, 205-206, 208, 387, 427-428, 437-438, 441-443, 447 n.2, 498, 504-505, 611-612, and Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. XII, *The Triumphant Empire: Britain Sails into the Storm, 1770-1776*, pp. 217-254.
28. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 487-488.
29. See *ibid.*, pp. 516-517, 586-587, and 610-611.
30. See *ibid.*, pp. 82, 111-112, 122, 124, 139, 141-143, 146, 148-151, 153-154, 158, 162-164, 173-175, 177, 181-182, 184, 188-189, 195, 198, 203, 205-206,

- 208-209, 211, 215-219, 227-228, 367-370, 388, 454 n.1, 477-478, 481, 483, 486, 491, 493, 495, 507-508, 515, and 610-611; Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. XI, *The Triumphant Empire: The Rumbling of the Coming Storm, 1766-1770*, pp. 183, 188, and 265n., and vol. XII, pp. 69, 196, 208, 252, and 254.
31. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 432-433.
 32. *Ibid.*, pp. 519, 524-525, 610 and 504-505.
 33. In addition to above references, see *ibid.*, pp. 479ff, 489, 498-499, 520-521, 526, 551, and 611.
 34. *Ibid.*, pp. 484 and 507.
 35. Thomas Hutchinson, *The History of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts-Bay*, vol. III, p. 185. See also, pp. 191 and 193. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936. Some additional material on resistance is contained in Catherine Barton Mayo, ed., *Additions to Thomas Hutchinson's "History of Massachusetts Bay"* (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society, 1949). I am grateful to Ron McCarthy for locating this.
 36. See *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 185-187 and 191-194.
 37. See Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 81-82, 478, 542, 552-559, and 564.
 38. *Ibid.*, pp. 363, 367 and 372.
 39. *Ibid.*, pp. 189, 225, 267, 269, 360-362, 472, 483ff, 529, 531f, and 612.
 40. O'Hegarty, *A History of Ireland Under the Union, 1880-1922*, p. 491. During this struggle violence became applied to a significant degree against Irishmen who did not support the campaign, or who weakened in their resolve. For some cases of this, see Forster, *The Truth About the Land League, Its Leaders and Its Teachings*, esp. pp. 70-71, and 84-85.
 41. See above Chapter Eight, method 171, nonviolent interjection.
 42. See Shridharani, *War Without Violence*, U.S. ed., pp. 86-87; Br. ed., pp. 90-93; Divakar, *Satyagraha*, pp. 112-114; Gandhi, *An Autobiography*, pp. 427-428 and 430-432; and Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth*, pp. 351-362.
 43. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 183.
 44. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (Thesis), p. 34; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 22.
 45. See Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 89-211.
 46. Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 149.
 47. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 85.
 48. See Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 79.
 49. Sharp, *Tyranny Could Not Quell Them*, p. 16.
 50. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 70.
 51. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, pp. 55, 58-59, 64-66, 69-70.
 52. Norman Phillips, *The Tragedy of Apartheid* (New York: David McKay, 1960), p. 172.
 53. Sternstein, "The *Ruhrkampf* of 1923", p. 132.
 54. Liddell Hart, "Lessons from Resistance Movements—Guerilla and Nonviolent", p. 205. See also Sir Basil Liddell Hart, *Defence of the West: Some Riddles of War and Peace* (London: Cassell, 1950), pp. 53-57 (Chapter VII "Were we Wise to Foster 'Resistance Movements'?").
 55. Government of India, *India in 1930-31, a Statement prepared for Presentation to Parliament etc.* (Calcutta: Government of India, 1932), pp. 69-72.

56. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 87 and 156.
57. *Daily Telegraph*, 4 September 1963; cited in Roberts, "The Buddhist Revolt," MS p. 25.
58. See, e.g., Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 98.
59. See, e.g., Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 164.
60. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 116.
61. Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 141.
62. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, p. 5.
63. Quoted by de Ligt, *The Conquest of Violence*, p. 118.
64. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 336.
65. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 44.
66. See Delarue, *The Gestapo*, pp. 6 and 40 (including a quotation to that effect from Goebbels).
67. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
68. See, e.g., Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, pp. 191-196, Delarue, *The Gestapo*, pp. 7-10 and 34-46, and Bullock, *Hitler*, pp. 262-274.
69. Fritz Tobias, *The Reichstag Fire*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1964.
70. Quoted in Shirer, *The Rise and Fall . . .*, p. 756.
71. See *ibid.*, pp. 336, 339, 342, and 345n., and Bullock, *Hitler*, pp. 427-428 and 433.
72. See Shirer, *The Rise and Fall . . .*, pp. 304, 357, 361-363, 377, 383, 387-388, 406, 427, and 443-444, and Bullock, *Hitler*, 443-466 and 482-485.
73. Delarue, *The Gestapo*, pp. 173-176, Crankshaw, *Gestapo*, pp. 101-102 and 109-111, Shirer, *The Rise and Fall . . .*, pp. 464, 472, 518-520, 546-547, 554 inc. n., 563, 577, 579 n., 582, 593-595, 602, 604 and 615, and Bullock, *Hitler*, pp. 376 and 546-547.
74. See Reitlinger, *The Final Solution*, pp. 10-15, Shirer, *The Rise and Fall . . .*, pp. 430-435, Crankshaw, *Gestapo*, p. 160, Delarue, *The Gestapo*, p. 268 inc. n., Neumann, *Behemoth*, pp. 118-120.
75. Reitlinger, *The Final Solution*, p. 100.
76. See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 309, 330-331, 348, and 361.
77. See Delarue, *The Gestapo*, pp. 177 and 191-192, and Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*, p. 461.
78. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall . . .*, p. 941.
79. Another important example of the effect of revolutionary violence in making the regime stronger, more dictatorial and in uprooting opposition is the attempted assassination of Tsar Alexander II of Imperial Russia in 1866. That year Karakozov, an emotionally unstable member of a revolutionary group decided against the opinion of his fellow revolutionaries to assassinate Alexander II. This followed a period of liberalization and certain reforms approved by the Tsar. Karakozov's attempt to shoot the Tsar failed and he was seized. "The shooting made an enormous impression [writes Venturi]. It put an end to the few remaining traces of collaboration between the Emperor and the liberal intelligentsia in the direction of reforms—a collaboration that had made possible the freeing of the serfs and the subsequent changes in local administration and justice. A wave of indignation and fear destroyed any liberal dreams that still survived after the repression of 1862. And the period of what is traditionally called the 'White Terror' now began. Even men like Nekrasov, who had inherited the spirit of the Tsar's earliest years on the throne, bowed down and tried to save what could still be saved. They added their voice to the chorus

of protests against 'nihilism' and joined with the intelligentsia in a mass condemnation of the desperate and violent younger generation. Muravev, who in 1863 had crushed the Polish rebellion in blood, was put in effective charge of internal affairs. He organized a system of repression which aimed to root out the forces of revolution by striking the intellectual tendencies which had given them birth.

"The reaction went deep, and even spread to the people. Exact information is difficult to come by, but all sources are agreed that the peasants stood by the Emperor, often violently."

The workmen in the factories similarly rallied to the Tsar, he reports.

"... the attempt on the Tsar's life did show how strong was the alliance between the monarchy and the mass of working classes and peasants. It was a bond which could not be cunningly exploited to incite violence against the nobles, as the revolutionaries had hoped. They must have realized now what an abyss still divided them from the people."

After Karakozov's arrest it was not long before the police were able to trace other members of the revolutionary group.

"The entire Moscow group was at once caught. The arrested were taken to St. Petersburg.

"The atmosphere of reaction and terror in which the enquiries were made inevitably had profound effects on the results. The extent of the arrests, which involved several hundred people, eventually provided the police with a large number of facts."

"The repression which followed Karakozov's attempt to kill the Tsar had one immediate and tangible effect. Between 1866 and 1868 there was not a single group in Russia able to carry out clandestine activities or make known its ideas by giving a more general significance to its internal debates." Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, pp. 345-350.

80. Gandhi, *Non-Violent Resistance*, p. 212; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 212.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
82. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields* . . . , p. 103.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
84. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 239.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
86. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 333 and 338.
87. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (Thesis), p. 95; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 63.
88. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 87-88. The use of *agents provocateurs* against nonviolent campaigns is also briefly mentioned in Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 116 and Walker, *Organizing for Non-violent Direct Action*, p. 26.
89. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 87.
90. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 81.
91. Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, p. 394.
92. Symons, *The General Strike*, pp. 112-113.
93. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 247.
94. Vassilyev, *The Ochrana*, pp. 63-78.
95. See, e.g., Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. xxvi, 288 and 419.
96. See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 28, 30-31, 33, 170, 288, 420.
97. Gandhi, quoted in Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 204.

98. *Ibid.*

99. It is sometimes assumed that this emphasis on keeping the struggle nonviolent is a recent innovation stemming from pacifist or Gandhian influences; this is not true. The degree to which the mass use of nonviolent means has been self-conscious has, of course, varied considerably. The nonviolent character of certain mass struggles has often been intuitive or spontaneous in nature and therefore with limited or no explicit efforts to keep it nonviolent. However, in several cases where the ethical view of nonviolence was minimal or absent there have been efforts to maintain nonviolent behavior. In the American colonists' struggles, for example, the noncooperation measures were often seen as a peaceful substitute for war, even though explicit attempts to prevent violence were comparatively limited. (See Gipson, *The British Empire* . . . , vol. XII, pp. 153 and 252-253.) But such efforts to keep the struggle peaceful were made in Virginia, New York and Massachusetts Bay. In this last colony, Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson wrote in late 1773 of "the greater part" of the merchants; that "though in general they declare against mobs and violence, yet they as generally wish the teas may not be imported." (Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants* . . . , p. 283 n.2. See also pp. 93, 96, 129, 189-190, 283, 293, and 605, and Gipson, *The British Empire* . . . , vol. XII, pp. 201-202, and 246.)

The Finnish constitutionalists' struggle launched in 1901 against new Russian measures was based on the view, writes Jutikkala, that "the unarmed nation must carry on the struggle with all the means available, without, however, resorting to violence." (Jutikkala, *A History of Finland*, p. 233.) In the predominantly nonviolent Russian 1905 Revolution there were frequent explicit attempts to keep strikes and demonstrations nonviolent. Although significant spontaneous violence did occur, much of the violence can be traced to deliberate initiatives of students and Marxists—especially Bolsheviks; the political wisdom of those initiatives can be challenged most seriously. (See Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 73, 90, 92-93, 100, 105-106, 116-117, 144, 171, 187 and 219; Schwarz, *The Russian Revolution of 1905*, pp. xi, 65, 68, 132-134, and 138-143; Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia*, pp. 157, 159, 172-174, 187, 220, 222, 225-226, 228, 236, 258, 260, 263, 266, 270, and 289-290, and Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, *Old Diplomacy*, p. 114.

When the French and Belgians invaded the Ruhr, the proclamation to the entire German people from the President and government urged avoidance of counterproductive action: "... take no action which would harm our just cause. Anyone who . . . commits any rash and unconsidered action which in the end would only serve the enemy's ends would be deeply guilty. The public good depends on each and every person exercising the utmost self-control." (Sternstein, "The *Ruhrkampf* of 1923" p. 112.) In the predominantly nonviolent East German rising of 1953 there were spontaneous attempts to keep it nonviolent. (See Brant, *The East German Rising*, pp. 71, 73, 76, 84, 94, 99, 102-103, 115, 124, 126, and 190-191.) Ebert writes: "... in general the more reasonable elements among the workers managed to prevent acts of violence. The demonstrators locked up or destroyed any weapons they found." (Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" pp. 190-191.) These few examples illustrate that nonviolent discipline is not an alien emphasis introduced by moralists, but that other practitioners have perceived it to be a necessary aspect of the technique itself.

100. Griffith, *The Resurrection of Hungary*, p. 32. See also pp. 17 and 57.
101. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 56; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 56. See also p. 187.

102. Gandhi, in Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 203.
103. The phrase is Miller's. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 155.
104. "Suffolk Resolves" Nr.18, *American Archives*, Fourth Series (Washington, D.C.: M. St. Clarke and Peter Force, 1937), vol. I, p. 778.
105. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 121.
106. Lindberg, "Konklusjonen: Teorien om Ikke-vold", p. 209, in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*. Lenin also acknowledged this tendency in 1905 although he favored violence. See Lenin, "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising" in Lenin, *Selected Works in Three Volumes*, vol. I, p. 577.
107. *Young India* (weekly), 27 March 1930.
108. Hiller, *The Strike*, pp. 171-172.
109. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" p. 191.
110. Brant, *The East German Rising*, p. 124.
111. Sibley, *The Quiet Battle*, p. 117.
112. Samuel Yellen, *American Labor Struggles* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936), p. 58.
113. This account is summarized from Yellen, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-71.
114. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 218; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 218.
115. Gandhi, quoted in Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 203.
116. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 288; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 288.
117. See Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 133-140.
118. See *ibid.*, pp. 140-143.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 143. On these riots and their effects, see also Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, pp. 127-128 and 130.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
122. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
123. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
124. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 475-476. For some specific examples of the abandonment or repeal of provisions of the Continental Association, see also pp. 566-568, 572, 583-585 and 589.
125. See Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 133.
126. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, pp. 127-128.
127. See Yarmolinsky, *Road to Revolution*, pp. 9, 141-142, 161, 177-178, 227, 291; Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, p. 72; Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 80 and Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, pp. xxvi, 469 and 527. On the effects of arson, see Yarmolinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-114, and on the effects of robberies, see Schapiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 and 104.
128. Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. xxvi.
129. See Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 92-93.
130. *Ibid.*, pp. 298-299. See also pp. 300 and 308-309.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 542.
133. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XII, p. 369.
134. See Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 435-439.
135. See, e.g., Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-In*, p. 261 for an early observation of this.

136. Farmer, *Freedom - When?*, p. 79.
137. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 531.
138. O'Hegarty, *A History of Ireland Under the Union, 1880-1922*, p. 515.
139. *Ibid.*, p. 522.
140. John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone* (New York & London: Macmillan & Co., 1903), vol. III, p. 70.
141. *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 68.
142. Deutscher, *Stalin*, p. 102.
143. See Harcave, *First Blood*, esp. pp. 155-157, 177 and 238.
144. Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. I, p. 237. See also Sternstein, "The *Ruhrkampf* of 1923" pp. 120 and 125. He reports especially the taking of hostages, and the deaths of 141 Germans from beatings, arbitrary executions, and firings from guards and patrols.
145. Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in*, pp. 199-202.
146. Solomon and Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities," *Psychiatry*, vol. XXVII (May, 1964), p. 95.
147. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 539. See also pp. 536-540. There remained, however, other important British support for the Americans even after Lexington and Concord. See Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XII, pp. 340-351.
148. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 220.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
150. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
151. Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia*, p. 249.
152. *Ibid.*, pp. 239-242.
153. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
154. Henry W. Nevins, who was at the time in Moscow as a special correspondent for the *Daily Chronicle* (London) reported the disaffection and untrustworthiness—prior to the rising—of the soldiers stationed in Moscow. Nevins also wrote that on December 6 (19) — the day before the general strike began— " . . . the Government was only longing for disturbances as an excuse for military assassination." He reported that on Dec. 8 (21): "They [the revolutionists] were ill-armed, had only eighty rifles as yet; a good many revolvers certainly, but not enough arms. Besides, if the Government wanted a rising, they obviously ought not to rise. It is a bad strategist who lets the enemy dictate the time for battle."
 "But the Government had determined that neither delay nor opportunity should be given. Their one thought was the urgent need of money, the power that commands force is the Government, and the power that commands money can command force; that was their just and simple argument. Their one hope was to stir up an ill-prepared rebellion, to crush it down, and stand triumphant before the nations of Europe, confidently inviting new loans in the name of law and order, so as to pay the interest on the old and 'maintain the value of the rouble.' For this object it was essential that people should be killed in large numbers . . . unless the slaughter came quickly the officials could not count upon their pay. The only alternative was national bankruptcy. . . . At all costs the people must be goaded into violence, or the Government's strategy would have failed." Nevins, Henry W., *The Dawn in Russia or Scenes in the Russian Revolution* (London and New York: Harper & Bros., 1906), pp. 123 and 136-138.

155. Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia*, pp. 250-251.
 156. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
 157. *Ibid.*, pp. 245-246.
 158. Louis Fischer, *The Life of Lenin* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965 and London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 57.
 159. Prawdin, *The Unmentionable Nechaev*, p. 148. Also on the Bolsheviks' view of the Moscow defeat as "beneficial," see Adam B. Ulam, *The Bolsheviks: The Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia* (New York: Macmillan, and London: Collier-Macmillan, 1965), p. 236. And Nevinson, *The Dawn in Russia*, pp. 198-199.

160. In July 1905 Lenin wrote: "The revolutionary army is required for the military struggle and the military leadership of the masses of the people against the remnants of the military forces of the autocracy. The revolutionary army is needed because great historical questions can be solved only by *violence*, and the *organisation of violence* in the modern struggle is a military organisation." Lenin, "The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government," in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. III, *The Revolution of 1905-07* (Moscow and Leningrad: Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1934 [?]), p. 313. See also p. 315.

In August he wrote: "... we must clearly and resolutely point out the necessity for an uprising in the present state of affairs; we must directly call for insurrection (without, of course, fixing the date beforehand), and call for the immediate organisation of a revolutionary army. Only a very bold and wide organisation of such an army can serve as a prologue to the insurrection. Only insurrection can guarantee the victory of the revolution..." Lenin, "The Boycott of the Buligin Duma and the Insurrection" p. 327 in *op. cit.*, vol. III.

161. "The broad masses, however, were still too naive, their mood was too passive, too good-natured, too Christian. . . . they lacked . . . a clear understanding that only the most vigorous continuation of the armed struggle, only a victory over all the military and civil authorities, only the overthrow of the government and the seizure of power throughout the country could guarantee the success of the revolution." Lenin, "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution" (January 1917), in Lenin, *Selected Works in Three Volumes*, vol. I, p. 795. (Note: the Moscow 1934(?) edition refers to the seizure of power "over the whole state" instead of "throughout the country." See Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. III, p. 10.)

"... we should have explained to the masses that it was impossible to confine things to a peaceful strike and that a fearless and relentless armed fight was necessary. And now we must at last openly and publicly admit that political strikes are inadequate; we must carry on the widest agitation among the masses in favour of an armed uprising and make no attempt to obscure this question... We would be deceiving both ourselves and the people if we concealed from the masses the necessity of a desperate, bloody war of extermination, as the immediate task of the coming revolutionary action.

"... Another lesson [of the December 1905 events] concerns the character of the uprising, the methods by which it is conducted, and the conditions which lead to the troops coming over to the side of the people. An extremely biased view on this latter point prevails in the Right wing of our Party. It is alleged that there is no possibility of fighting modern troops; the troops must become revolutionary. Of course, unless the revolution assumes a mass character and affects the troops, there can be no question of serious struggle. That we must work among the troops goes without saying. But we must not imagine that they will come over to our side at one stroke, as a result of persuasion of their own convictions. . . . But we shall prove to be miserable pedants if we

forget that at a time of uprising there must also be a physical struggle for the troops."

"And the guerrilla warfare and mass terror that has been taking place throughout Russia practically without a break since December [1905], will undoubtedly help the masses to learn the correct tactics of an uprising." Lenin, "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising," in Lenin, *Selected Works in Three Volumes*, vol. I, pp. 579-582.

162. Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia*, pp. 246-247.
 163. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 235. On the four phases of the rising, see Keep, *The Rise . . .*, pp. 251-257.
 164. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 235.
 165. Keep, *The Rise . . .*, pp. 253-254.
 166. Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, pp. 224-225.
 167. Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 238 and 243. Nevinson wrote: "The failure at Moscow fell like a blight upon all Russia, and all hope withered." (Nevinson, *The Dawn in Russia*, p. 198.) Lenin later wrote: "In October 1905, Russia was at the peak of the revolutionary upsurge . . . the period of decline set in after the defeat of December 1905 . . ." "The turning point in the struggle began with the defeat of the December uprising. Step by step the counter-revolution passed to the offensive as the mass struggle weakened." Lenin, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution," from *Proletary*, Nr. 17, 20 October 1907, in *Collected Works*, vol. 13, June 1907-April 1908 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), pp. 114 and 116.
 168. "Sabotage, and all it means, including the destruction of property, is in itself violence," wrote Gandhi. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 145.
 169. See Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 378; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 378.
 170. See *Ibid.*, p. 379.
 171. See Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, p. 250, Karl Ehrlich, "*Ruhrkampen*," in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*, p. 187, and Sternstein, "*The Ruhrkampf of 1923*" pp. 123-126.
 172. Ehrlich, "*Ruhrkampen*" p. 187.
 173. On these negative influences of sabotage, see Sternstein, "*The Ruhrkampf of 1923*" pp. 124-126. The quotation from Wentzcke is on p. 125 from Paul Wentzcke *Ruhrkampf* (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1930), vol. I, pp. 424-425.
 174. See, e.g., Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 71.
 175. *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92 and 105.
 176. *Ibid.*, p. 97. See also p. 103.
 177. *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.
 178. *Ibid.*, p. 368.
 179. *Ibid.*, p. 390.
 180. *Ibid.*, pp. 391-392.
 181. For the text of the Association, see *ibid.*, pp. 607-613.
 182. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XII, p. 316.
 183. *Ibid.*, pp. 321-323.
 184. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 608.
 185. *Ibid.*, p. 519.
 186. *Ibid.*, p. 529.
 187. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XII, p. 145.

188. *Ibid.*, pp. 163-164.
189. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
190. See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 320-349.
191. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 563.
192. *Ibid.*, p. 541. See also p. 542. On various alterations in the earlier economic sanctions, see pp. 562, 566-568, 572-573, and 576.
193. *Ibid.*, p. 563.
194. See Lindberg, "Konklusionen: Teorien om Ikke-vold," pp. 207-208 in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*.
195. See Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" p. 182.
196. Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 200.
197. Bradford Lyttle, "The Importance of Discipline in Demonstrations for Peace" (duplicated, 2pp. New York: Committee for Non-Violent Action, 1962).
198. Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in*, pp. 255-257.
199. Lyttle, "The Importance of Discipline in Demonstrations for Peace."
200. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 120.
201. Ehrlich, "Rene Sociale Klassekamp. Den Ikke-voldelige Modstand. Der. Kvalte Kapp-Kuppet," pp. 200 n. and 202, in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*.
202. See Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 93 and Sharp, "A South African Contribution to the Study of Nonviolent Action: A Review" p. 400, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. V, no. 4 (December, 1961).
203. For examples of Gandhi's views, see Bose, *Selections From Gandhi*, p. 189; Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 151; and Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, pp. 57, 98, 100, 194-195, 302, 355 and 362-363; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, same pp.
204. "Discipline for Public Witness Demonstrations" (leaflet).
205. For Gandhi's views on self-discipline in prison, see Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, pp. 60-65; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, pp. 60-65.
206. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 80-81.
207. Lyttle, "The Importance of Discipline in Demonstrations for Peace".
208. See Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 71.
209. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
210. Charles C. Walker, *Organizing for Nonviolent Direct Action* (pamphlet) (Cheney, Pennsylvania: The Author, 1961), p. 16.
211. See *ibid.*, pp. 20 and 22.
212. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 108.
213. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 333; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 333. The Committee of 100 during the period of its greatest strength repeatedly made the same request for its civil disobedience demonstrations.
214. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 287; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 287.
215. See Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 118.
216. Luthuli paid strong tribute to the discipline of the inexperienced and largely untrained volunteers for the 1952 Defiance Campaign in South Africa, although this did not apply to the whole nonwhite population. See Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, pp. 118 and 125.
217. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 25; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 25.
218. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
219. *Ibid.*, p. 297.

220. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 193-194. On other cases of reshipment of goods without information on its effect on mob violence, see also pp. 200-201, 217 and 426.
221. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
222. See his statement in Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 49.
223. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 175.
224. Farmer, *Freedom - When?* pp. 27, 28, and 32-34. On the effect of nonviolent action reducing the chances of violence, see also Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in*, pp. 262 and 285.
225. Walker, *Organizing for Nonviolent Direct Action*, p. 28.
226. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 307 and King, *Stride Towards Freedom*, pp. 58-62 and 78-81.
227. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 149.
228. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
229. Solomon and Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities," p. 98.
230. Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, p. 179.
231. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 88.
232. See Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 151; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 151.
233. Ehrlich, "Ruhrkampen," p. 187.
234. See Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, pp. 143-144 and Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, pp. 139-141 and 151; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, pp. 139-141 and 151.
235. See Walker, *Organizing for Nonviolent Direct Action*, p. 20.
236. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 84 and Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 306-308, and Walker, *Organizing for Nonviolent Direct Action*, pp. 9-11.
237. Quoted in Roberts, "Buddhism and Politics in South Vietnam" pp. 243-244.
238. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 81.
239. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, U.S. ed., p. 51; Br. ed., p. 60. For an example of on-the-spot pleas for nonviolence from hostile crowds in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963, see Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 334-336.
240. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 119.
241. Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 278-280.
242. Brant, *The East German Rising*, pp. 102-103. See also p. 99.
243. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
244. Joseph Wechsberg, "A Reporter in Germany," pp. 38, 49 and 50 in *The New Yorker*, 29 August 1953, quoted in Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 352-353.
245. Brant, *The East German Rising*, p. 71.
246. Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis*, p. 248.
247. Peck, *Freedom Ride*, p. 76 and Walker, *Organizing for Nonviolent Direct Action*, p. 20.
248. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 87.
249. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 35; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 35.
250. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119. This view was repeatedly emphasized by Gandhi in very strong terms; see also, pp. 98 and 302.
251. See, for example, Gandhi, *Nonviolence in Peace and War*, vol. I, p. 154; Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy . . .*, pp. 211-213; Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 67-69 and 80-81; Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, pp. 205-206; Ind. ed.:

- Satyagraha, pp. 205-206; and Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 77 and 133-134.
252. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 293. In late June 1774 the town meeting of Portsmouth deliberately took various other measures—not involving pledges or codes of discipline—to prevent the outbreak of violence when dutied teas was landed, and at the town's insistence and expense re-exported so that it was not sold or used in Portsmouth. See *ibid.*, p. 303.
 253. The Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War issued a general but detailed discipline leaflet — “Demonstrators —” (1958?) intended both for organized demonstrations and for distribution during spontaneous demonstrations. That Committee also issued detailed briefings for participants on the particular plans and behavioral requirements for a given demonstration, as well as legal aspects and a guide for statements in court for those arrested. For example, for one action the following were issued: “Briefing for Non-Violent Obstruction at North Pickenham Rocket Base on Saturday December 6th” (25 November 1958), “Briefing on legal aspects of demonstration on December 6th” (4 December 1958), and “Explanatory statement to be made in Court” (n.d.). Discipline leaflets were also issued both for the National Committee of 100 and affiliated groups, as the Oxford Committee of 100. The Oxford leaflet differed from the D.A.C.A.N.W. leaflet not only in its brevity, but its recommendation that if violence broke out people should not physically place themselves between the fighters, but “immediately withdraw, leave an empty space, and sit down. Isolate the violence.”
 254. Twelve New York City peace organizations in 1962 issued a “Discipline for Public Witness Demonstrations” and a very detailed binding discipline code was issued by the Committee for Nonviolent Action for its long peace walk focusing on U.S. relations with Cuba: “Group Discipline — Principles of Conduct — or what have you for the Quebec-Washington-Guantanamo walk for peace — sponsored by CNVA.”
 255. Walker, *Organizing for Nonviolent Direct Action*, p. 16.
 256. Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 155-156.
 257. Sibley, *The Quite Battle*, pp. 299-300.
 258. O’Hegarty, *A History of Ireland Under the Union 1880-1922*, p. 514.
 259. This is discussed more fully in the last section of this chapter.
 260. Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 203.
 261. *Ibid.*,
 262. See above pp. 479-491.
 263. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 488-489.
 264. Thus Gandhi argued that the purer the suffering, the quicker would be the result. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 188; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 188.
 265. See, e.g., *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 93, 107, 162, 169, 179, 182, 193, 201-202, 207, 284-285, and 357.
 266. “Discipline for Public Witness Demonstrations” (leaflet). New York: various peace organizations, 1962.
 267. “Demonstrators — ” (leaflet). London: Committee for Direct Action Against Nuclear War, 1958 (?).
 268. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, U.S. ed., p. 83; Br. ed.: pp. 97-98.
 269. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 172.
 270. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 139; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 139.

271. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 129.
272. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
273. Quoted in Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 202.
274. *Ibid.*, pp. 202-203.
275. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
276. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
277. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 91.
278. See *ibid.*, pp. 118-127 and Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, p. 71.
279. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, p. 79.
280. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 172. See also p. 177.
281. *Ibid.*, pp. 171-172.
282. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
283. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
284. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, pp. 77-78.
285. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 202-203. On this possibility, see also Symons, *The General Strike*, pp. 210-211.
286. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 84.
287. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, U.S. ed., pp. 115-122; Br. ed.; pp. 136-144.
288. Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 186-187.
289. See Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, p. 70, and Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 114ff.
290. See Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, p. 71, and Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 125-127 and 174-176.
291. See Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, p. 77, and Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 113-114, 132 and 183. For Gandhi's views on hand-copied newspapers in 1921, see Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 200-201.
292. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 132 and 161.
293. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
294. *Ibid.*, pp. 198-200.
295. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, p. 78.
296. *Ibid.*, p. 87.