

Sharp, Gene. 1973. The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part Three: The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher.

Chapter 12

Political Jiu-Jitsu

INTRODUCTION

Political *jiu-jitsu*¹ is one of the special processes by which nonviolent action deals with violent repression. By combining nonviolent discipline with solidarity and persistence in struggle, the nonviolent actionists cause the violence of the opponent's repression to be exposed in the worst possible light. This, in turn, may lead to shifts in opinion and then to shifts in power relationships favorable to the nonviolent group. These shifts result from withdrawal of support for the opponent and the grant of support to the nonviolent actionists.

Cruelties and brutalities committed against the clearly nonviolent are likely to disturb many people and to fill some with outrage. Even milder violent repression appears less justified against nonviolent people than when employed against violent resisters. This reaction to repression is especially likely when the opponent's policies themselves are hard to justify. Thus, wider public opinion may turn against the opponent, members of his own group may dissent, and more or less passive members of the general griev-

ance group may shift to firm opposition. The effects of this process do not stop there, however. In addition to shifts of opinion *against* the opponent, positive sympathy in *favor* of the nonviolent actionists and their cause is also likely to develop. Most important, all these shifts in opinion may lead to action. The opponent may find more and more groups, even among his normal supporters, resisting his policies and activities; at the same time, increased active support for the nonviolent actionists and their cause may develop.

Thus, precisely because the actionists have rejected violence while persisting in resistance and defiance, the opponent's violence has certain effects on several social groups which tend to shift loyalties, social forces and power relationships against him and in favor of the nonviolent actionists. *Their nonviolence helps the opponent's repression to throw him off balance politically.*² *The nonviolent group is also able to gain far more support and power than if it had met violence with violence.*

Political *jiu-jitsu* does not operate in all nonviolent struggles. Most of the many specific methods of action listed in earlier chapters are independent of this particular process. If opponents become more sophisticated in dealing with nonviolent action, so that they drastically reduce, or even eliminate, violent repression and thereby political *jiu-jitsu*, the nonviolent actionists will still be able to win. They will still be able to utilize the many psychological, social, economic and political forces and pressures which the multitude of specific methods brings into play.

Political *jiu-jitsu* operates among three broad groups: 1) uncommitted third parties, whether on the local scene or the world level, 2) the opponent's usual supporters, and 3) the general grievance group. Now we shall explore the ways in which the views and actions of each of these three groups tend to shift away from the opponent and in favor of the nonviolent actionists. We shall begin with third parties whose potential influence is normally the smallest, then consider the opponent's usual supporters who are obviously very important, and conclude with the grievance group, whose role may be crucial.

WINNING OVER UNCOMMITTED THIRD PARTIES

Repression against nonviolent people may attract wide attention to the struggle and strong sympathy for the suffering nonviolent group among persons not involved in the struggle in any way. As the American sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross put it,

The spectacle of men suffering for a principle and *not hitting back* is a moving one. It obliges the power holders to condescend to explain, to justify themselves. The weak get a change of venue from the will of the stronger to the court of public opinion, perhaps world opinion.³

A. International indignation

Indeed, some of the main cases used in this study support this conclusion. For example, Bloody Sunday (1905) in St. Petersburg produced, reports Harcave, "immediate and bitter international revulsion" expressed in anti-tsarist demonstrations in England, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Sweden, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, United States, Argentina and Uruguay.⁴ Two days after the massacre, Kokovtsev, the Minister of Finance, reported to the Tsar that not only had the killings impaired morale at home, but that Russian financial credit abroad had been affected.⁵ In other words, repression of nonviolent actionists had drawn even foreign "third parties" into the struggle against the regime (even if the creditors' motives were selfish).

Similar results have taken place in such contrasting cases as Germany and India. In 1923 government-sponsored nonviolent resistance in the Ruhr against the Franco-Belgian occupation produced wide sympathy for Germany, brought new discredit to the Treaty of Versailles, and alienated British opinion from the invaders at a time when France needed British support for the international security it wanted.⁶ And in the thirties, British repression against nonviolent Indian volunteers helped move world opinion significantly toward the Indians.⁷

International indignation was also aroused by repression against nonviolent actionists in both South Africa and South Vietnam. Sometimes the actionists, aware of this process, have deliberately sought to arouse this international support, as they did in South Africa.⁸ For example, the 1952 Defiance Campaign attracted world attention to *Apartheid* in South Africa and the plight of nonwhites there. Press reports hostile to the regime became common. Several Asian governments and African political groups expressed sympathy for the resisters. After India raised the matter in the United Nations General Assembly, a U.N. commission investigated the effects of *Apartheid* legislation.⁹ This widespread disapproval of its policies, Kuper writes, posed two problems for the South African government: how to win over world opinion, and how to explain world condemnation to its own European population.¹⁰ The government was more successful in the latter than in the former, but continued major efforts to win international acceptance indicate its importance to that regime.

Eight years later, in 1960, during another nonviolent campaign in that country, the killing of demonstrators at Sharpeville (where Africans had only thrown stones, and that without inflicting serious injuries) produced widespread condemnation and economic sanctions against the South African government. The extreme disproportion between the repression and the demonstrators' behavior shocked world opinion. The shootings had made clear, said Luthuli, "the implacable, wanton brutality of their regime."¹¹ Throughout far away Norway, for example, flags were flown at half-mast in mourning. The Legums report that the European population in South Africa was in 1960 "staggered by the unanimity of the world's reaction to Sharpeville." By December 1963, hostility at the United Nations had increased to the point that "South Africa stood alone in the face of the world's unanimous condemnation of its policies." The South African Europeans again "reacted with dazed incomprehension or truculent self-justification."¹²

Another quite different case, the 1963 Buddhist struggle against the South Vietnamese regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem, also illustrates that, by being nonviolent, the repressed group is likely to gain significant sympathy from third parties. By 1963 President Diem had for nine years had the support of the United States. Hedrick Smith reported in his article on Diem's overthrow in *The New York Times* series on *The Pentagon Papers* revelations that "until the eruption of Buddhist demonstrations against the Diem regime in May 1963, much of the American public was oblivious to the 'political decay' in Vietnam described in the Pentagon account . . ."¹³

But on May 8 government troops fired into a crowd of Buddhists in Hué who were displaying religious flags in defiance of a government decree. Armored vehicles crushed some of the demonstrators. Nine were killed and fourteen injured.¹⁴ The Buddhist campaign followed, using nonviolent struggle and also suicide by fire, in which monks burned themselves with gasoline. During those weeks the United States government pressed the Diem regime to meet Buddhist demands. On June 12 the deputy U.S. Ambassador, William Truehart, warned Diem that unless the Buddhist crisis was solved the United States would be forced to dissociate itself from him. Finally, on August 15 Diem declared his policy always to have been conciliation with the Buddhists.

Only six days later, however, the South Vietnamese Special Forces, financed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency and commanded by Diem's very powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, conducted cruel and destructive midnight raids on Buddhist pagodas: 1,400 people, mostly monks, were arrested, many were beaten, and thirty Buddhists were killed.¹⁵ On

August 29, United States Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge cabled Secretary of State Rusk, in part: ". . . there is no possibility . . . that Diem or any member of the family can govern the country in a way to gain the support of the people who count, i.e., the educated class in and out of government service, civil and military—not to mention the American people. In the last few months (and especially days) they have in fact positively alienated these people to an incalculable degree."¹⁶

In addition to internal reactions, the pagoda raids brought deep world resentment against the Diem regime, including criticism from the Vatican,¹⁷ plus open United States government criticism and hints that a change of government might not be unacceptable to Washington.¹⁸ The United States government applied pressure to get the arrested Buddhists freed and their grievances corrected. The author of the Pentagon's account of this period wrote of the consequences of the pagoda raids as follows: "In their brutality and their blunt repudiation of Diem's solemn word to [retiring Ambassador] Nolting, they were a direct, impudent slap in the face for the U.S. For better or worse, the August 21 pagoda raids decided the issue for us."¹⁹ Four days after the raids, on August 24, the initial State Department approval of a possible change in government was sent to Ambassador Lodge, signed by Acting Secretary George W. Ball.²⁰ Between late August and early October decisions were taken to cut various types of economic aid to the regime.²¹ From August 24 on, with slight shifts from time to time, United States officials encouraged and, from behind the scenes, assisted an already initiated generals' *coup*. This took place on November 1, after the Buddhist campaign had undermined the moral authority of and support for the regime; Diem and his family were deposed and Diem himself was killed.²²

South Vietnamese police were obviously aware during the Buddhist campaign that unfavorable news stories and especially photographs were dangerous to the regime. Although a complete news blackout to the outside world was not politically possible, the police took sporadic action against foreign reporters. On July 7 nine Western reporters and cameramen covering a Buddhist demonstration in Saigon were attacked by police.²³ Just before the crucial raids on Buddhist pagodas, many normal channels of communication with the outside world were cut off.²⁴ Also, on October 5 three American reporters were beaten by plainclothes police after resisting attempts to seize their cameras which had been used to photograph a political suicide by fire.²⁵

Nonviolent action by the Buddhists has been credited with extreme importance, both in bringing this sympathy to the Buddhists and in arous-

ing support within South Vietnam for a change in government. Denis Warner has written: "The physical weakness of the Buddhists was their moral strength. If they had had guns, the Ngo Dinh could have crushed them and neither Vietnam nor the rest of the world would have cared; defenceless they proved beyond defeat."²⁶

B. Factors determining the impact of third party opinion

The third parties whose opinions may shift may be local people, or from the wider region or nation, or as the above indicated, from the world as a whole. In any case, although these shifts of opinion are desirable and usually advantageous to the nonviolent group, they alone serve a limited role at best. There should be no naïve assumption that "public opinion" alone will triumph. Disapproval by third parties and condemnation by world opinion may be very important to some opponents. Both may, in certain cases at least, contribute to uncertainty about the type of counteraction and repression being used, and even about overall policies and objectives.²⁷ Hostile opinion may cause the opponent to try to justify his policies and measures, or to deprecate those of the nonviolent group. But world opinion on the side of the nonviolent group will *by itself* rarely produce a change in the opponent's policies. Frequently a determined opponent can ignore hostile opinion until and unless it is accompanied by, or leads to, shifts in power relationships, or threatens to do so.

Three groups of factors will determine whether or not the opponent is affected by changes in the opinion of third parties: 1) factors related to the nature of the opponent and of the conflict situation; 2) factors related to action based on the changed opinions; and 3) factors related to the effects of opinion changes on the nonviolent actionists themselves. We shall now consider these.

First, opponents are not alike. Some of them are far more sensitive to public opinion than others. A loss of prestige and the imposition of world censure may be an intolerable price for some opponents to pay, while others will be quite willing to do so if they see no other way to their objectives. There is probably a general correlation between the degree of democracy or autocracy in the opponent's regime or system on the one hand and the degree of responsiveness or unresponsiveness to wider opinion on the other. But this is clearly not an inviolate rule, and reverse combinations sometimes occur. At times even the Nazi regime seemed highly sensitive to public opinion. The nature of the regime, its ideology, its attitude to opposition in general, the role of repression, the social system and related factors may all be important in this context. In addition, some

issues may be regarded by the opponent as sufficiently important to be worth the cost of alienated opinion.

Furthermore, not all third parties will be of equal importance to the opponent. Esteem and condemnation are clearly of greater significance in some cases than in others. If the opponent is in fact dependent on certain third parties, he is much more likely to be sensitive to shifts in their opinion than he would be otherwise.

Second, changes in third-party opinions are much more likely to be effective if the opinions are transformed into actions affecting the opponent's relative power position, either opposing the opponent's regime and its policies or supporting the nonviolent group and its policies. Both *who* takes the actions and *what* actions are taken are important. All action is not equal.

The proportion of successes among past cases of international nonviolent action, especially by third parties, is extremely small.²⁸ There are reasons for this. In the past most third-party and international nonviolent supporting actions have been either largely symbolic in character, or, when more substantial (economic sanctions), have not been applied on the systematic and sustained basis required for effectiveness.

International action by third parties has also sometimes been regarded as a *substitute* for effective struggle by the grievance group itself—as in the case of South Africa—when in fact there is a limit to what third-party nonviolent actions alone can do. The capacity of such actions is—and perhaps should be—limited. Reliance on others is not a source of salvation for people who feel themselves oppressed but who are at the moment unable or unwilling to take effective action themselves. It is in the nature of the nonviolent technique that the main brunt of the struggle must be borne not by third parties but by the grievance group immediately affected by the opponent's policies. For third-party opinion and actions to be most effective within the context of political *jiu-jitsu*, they must, regardless of their strength, play the auxiliary role of backing up the main struggle being conducted by the nonviolent actionists from the grievance group itself. Any other view may be dangerous, for overconfidence in the potential of aid from others may distract resistance efforts from their own most important tasks. In fact, third-party support is more likely to be forthcoming when nonviolent struggle by the grievance group is being waged effectively.

Foreign financial support for nonviolent actionists is one form which third-party assistance has taken. Gandhi argued, however, that nonviolent actionists should be financially (and in other ways) self-reliant, and that in some situations foreign funds could be misperceived or misrepresented and

hence be counterproductive. Instead, complete financial self-reliance, even when more limited, could be a better policy, he felt. That view does not, of course, exclude other types of third-party supporting action, such as protests, public declarations and demonstrations, diplomatic representations and sanctions, and economic sanctions.

The final way in which shifts in third-party opinion clearly aid the nonviolent actionists is by boosting their morale and encouraging them to persist until they win. Conversely, strong third-party opinion supporting the nonviolent actionists and opposing the opponent's policies and repression may help to undermine the morale of the opponent group as a whole or perhaps primarily that of certain sections of that group.

C. The future of third party support

One reason for the limited use and effectiveness of third party and international supporting actions lies in their primitive state. Conscious attempts to maximize effectiveness of this aspect of the nonviolent technique have been extremely limited, especially when it comes to supporting action for a domestic nonviolent resistance movement.

Perhaps in the future other forms of third party action may be designed to help the grievance group and the nonviolent actionists to increase their nonviolent combat strength. These forms might, for example, include supply of literature and handbooks about nonviolent struggle, of printing facilities or services, radio broadcasting facilities and equipment, and bases and centers for study and training in this type of struggle. Additional possible forms may provide for communication among resisters, especially when under severe repression, and with the outside world. Third parties could also relay messages between the actionists and the opponent when regular communications were severed, and could at times bring them into direct touch.

Over the past fifteen years or so pacifists have discussed the possibility of third party action in the form of international nonviolent intervention on a politically significant scale. This proposal has usually taken the form of illegal nonviolent crossings of national borders in solidarity with an internal resistance group, especially in relation to (the former) Northern Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa, but such an invasion has not occurred. Such forms of international nonviolent action may be applied in the future, but they are likely to have very limited effectiveness.

The conscious development of third party and international support for a domestic nonviolent resistance movement raises, of course, a series of difficult problems which lie outside the scope of this study. Some of these

are questions of political wisdom, others are practical questions of application and effectiveness. Such support may in the future have far-reaching implications and potentialities, but it can, and should be, primarily in assistance of an internal resistance movement.

AROUSING DISSENT AND OPPOSITION IN THE OPPONENT'S OWN CAMP

Violent repression of nonviolent actionists is far more likely to result in uneasiness and criticism within the opponent's camp than is violent repression of violent actionists. This is so for two general reasons. First, severe repression against nonviolent people is more likely to be seen as unreasonable, distasteful, inhuman or dangerous for the society. Such repression may also be seen by members of the opponent group as too high a price to pay for continued denial of the demands of the nonviolent group. Second, when the actionists are nonviolent instead of violent it is much easier for members of the opponent group to express their possible misgivings, to advise caution, or to recommend changes in the counteractions or in the policy which is at issue. Even without a change of opinion about the issues at stake, a perception within the opponent group that severe repression or brutalities are inappropriate against nonviolent people may detach support from the opponent and arouse active dissent. Seifert suggests that the most likely group to be alienated by violent countermeasures is the vast body of persons who are normally indifferent or apathetic about major issues. When repression becomes "nasty or annoying, they withdraw their support."²⁹ The violence of repression does not, of course, operate completely in isolation. The issues at stake—what are they, and how important?—and the wider public and international reactions to the conflict may also be significant in this process.

A. Questioning both repression and the cause

Opposition in Britain to British policies in India and to repressive measures against the Gandhian nonviolent struggles is often cited as a reason why nonviolent action could work in that special situation. However, criticisms in Britain, and even within its Parliament, of British policy in India were only in part a result of the nature of British society and institutions, though these were obviously important. These criticisms were also a consequence of the Indians' choice of nonviolent means, which made it easier for people at home to view British rule in India in an unfavorable light.

The Indians were well aware of this aspect of political *jiu-jitsu* and consequently sought to maintain their nonviolent discipline in order to create maximum dissent from British policy in Britain itself. V.J. Patel once made this perception explicit to the American journalist Negley Farson, who had questioned him concerning the program of action for the 1930 campaign. Patel, who had just resigned as Speaker of the Indian Legislative Assembly to show support of the noncooperation movement, said:

I am going to make you beat me so outrageously that after a while you will begin to feel ashamed of yourself, and while you are doing it, I am going to put up such an outcry that the whole street will know about it. Even your own family will be horrified at you. And after you have stood this scandal long enough, you will come to me and say, "Look here, this sort of business cannot go on any longer. Now, why cannot we two get together and settle something?"³⁰

In contrast, the violence of the Mau Mau movement during the Emergency in British-ruled Kenya was far less conducive to criticism and dissent within Britain, either concerning the anti-Mau Mau repression or British colonial policies in Kenya.

In this asymmetrical conflict situation—violent repression versus nonviolent struggle—some members of the opponent group may begin to question not only the *means* of repression, but their cause itself. This is a new stage, for they may then become willing to consider the claims of the nonviolent group. Conversion, or partial steps in that direction, then become possible. In certain conflicts such positive support within the opponent group may contribute to still stronger internal dissent and opposition. Not only is the repression seen as inappropriate or cruel, but even the cause for which it is used is rejected as unjust. Thus both the negative rejection of extreme repression and brutalities, and the positive espousal of some or all of the nonviolent actionists' cause, may lead to withdrawal of support for the opponent's policies and measures. The positive espousal of the actionists' cause may also lead to concrete assistance for it even within the opponent's own camp where he normally counts on solidarity in times of crisis. Seifert points out that nonviolent action is especially conducive to playing upon existing diversities within the opponent group, including age, sex, class, political allegiance, economic interest, ideology, personality type and many others. In fact, he writes:

In the swing toward more sympathetic regard for the resisters and their rights, it is possible to speak of a spectrum of potential support . . . This continuum ranges from those individuals and groups most

predisposed to alter their position, through various intermediary groupings, to those most rigid and tenacious in their condemnation of the resisters.³¹

This aspect of political *jiu-jitsu* may, in summary, contribute to several types of dissent and supporting reactions among members of the opponent group. These include: 1) feelings that the repression and possible brutalities are excessive and that concessions are preferable to their continuation; 2) an altered view of the nature of the opponent's regime and leadership, possibly resulting in a new or greatly intensified conviction that important changes in its policies, personnel, or even the system itself are required; 3) active sympathy for the nonviolent group and their cause; 4) various resulting types of unease, dissidence and even defection and disobedience among members of the opponent group, including officials and agents of repression; and 5) various types of positive assistance for the cause of the grievance group and aid to the nonviolent actionists. One, two, or more of these may occur in the same situation, and at times members of the opponent group may begin with the first of these reactions and then move on to more extreme ones. Illustrations of these aspects of political *jiu-jitsu* are diverse. First we shall focus on certain cases of attitude change, and then cite some cases where attitude change was followed by action.

B. Repression produces defections: three cases

Occasionally an opponent has recognized in advance that, if used, severe repression would cost him support in his own group and even arouse active opposition. Because of this recognition, he had limited his repression. The British government, in late 1765 for example, faced a very difficult problem in dealing with the American colonists' defiance of the Stamp Act and their use of the weapons of economic boycott, civil disobedience, and refusal to pay debts, for these methods stimulated important opposition to the Stamp Act and support for the colonists in England itself. Giving in to the colonists could set a dangerous precedent, but on the other hand, ". . . were it to attempt to enforce the Stamp Act by the sword . . . it risked uprisings in support of the colonials in many of the leading trading towns of England."³²

More often, however, the realization that repression of nonviolent resisters could arouse significant opposition among the opponent's usual supporters has come only after the event. This was true in Russia in January 1905. Superficially, Bloody Sunday was a full victory for the tsarist regime:

it had been demonstrated that protest processions would not be allowed, petitions to the Tsar would not be received, and that tsarist troops could control the streets, ruthlessly routing dissident crowds. But the real result was very different and Bloody Sunday in fact inflicted a defeat on the regime from which it was never to recover.

Not only were the poor who had long believed in the Tsar and his concern for their welfare alienated from him—a point discussed later in this chapter—but the brutality of the repression aroused strong protest among several groups whose support the system required. Liberals who still did not favor revolution obtained 459 signatures for a letter to “Officers of the Russian Army,” which declared Russia’s need for bread, enlightenment, liberty and a constitution, and asked the officers: should their place be with the Tsar or “. . . with all of honourable and selfless Russia? As men of honour, you will not use arms against the unarmed, you will not take money from the people for its blood, which you have already spilled.” The letter asked them to turn their arms against “the enemies of the people.”³³ Not only did factory workers go on strike; there developed “what may be called a strike among the educated class, . . . generally peaceful but openly defiant.” Lawyers refused to appear in the courts and formally protested against the “pitiless hand of the government.” Medical, legal, pedagogical and agricultural societies denounced the regime, calling for a constituent assembly. Because of their participation in the repression of Bloody Sunday, guards officers were refused admittance to the Merchants Club. The Manufacturers Association voted to give financial help to the victims’ families, to demand political reforms, and to take no action against workers on strike. A declaration that the events had created the need for a change in government was issued by sixteen members of the august Academy of Sciences, and signed first by 326 distinguished professors and lecturers and then by 1,200 of the country’s most noted scholars.³⁴

It is not widely recognized that French military action and brutal measures of repression against the nonviolent resistance in the Ruhr alienated Frenchmen at home and played a role in the 1924 electoral defeat of the government which had launched the invasion and been responsible for the repression. In the 1924 elections a coalition of the Left was victorious, and consequently in May Poincaré resigned. Halperin writes that this political upset was partly due to “a nation-wide revulsion against the methods he [Poincaré] had employed in dealing with the whole complex of Franco-German relations . . .” Many Frenchmen, Halperin reports, had begun to realize that both the occupation and “the policy of coercion”

against the resistance had been mistakes. Not only had “France . . . failed to attain her objective” but “the invasion cost her more than she was able to get out of it.”³⁵ Not only did Frenchmen at home change their attitudes toward the occupation and repression; so did many French occupation soldiers and civilian occupation aides. The German historian of this struggle, Friedrich Grimm, reports:

The occupation had repercussions which no one had expected. Thousands of Frenchmen who went to the Ruhr as soldiers and civilians became “*advocats des boches*,” intercessors on behalf of the Germans. For the first time they saw the Germans as they really are . . . There were even many high-ranking officers who had soon to be replaced as unsuitable because of their friendly attitude towards the Germans . . .³⁶

C. Four more cases of defections

Even the Nazis had on occasion to consider whether or not they might lose more support by acting against a defiant opponent than by giving in. After the failure of a number of written protests by Catholic and Protestant church leaders against the “top secret” program of systematic extermination of the incurably ill, Bishop Galen, speaking in the St. Lamberti Church in Münster on August 3, 1941, described in detail how the ill were being killed and their families deceived; Galen stamped the actions as criminal, and demanded that the killers be charged with murder. Copies of the Bishop’s sermon were circulated throughout the country and among troops at the front. He became so popular that the government—at the height of its military victories—decided in its own interest not to punish him. Martin Bormann (Head of the Nazi Party Chancery) thought Bishop Galen should be executed, but propaganda chief Goebbels feared that if that happened, the population of Münster and perhaps of all Westphalia would be lost to the war effort. Even though Hitler was furious, he feared to make Bishop Galen a martyr; indeed a short while later a *Führerbefehl* was issued stopping the systematic extermination of the incurably ill. By then about seventy thousand had been gassed; only scattered killings occurred later.³⁷

Brutalities against nonviolent Africans have aroused sympathies among the dominant Europeans—even in South Africa. Such sympathies developed, for example, during the successful 1957 bus boycott conducted by Africans living in Alexandra location near Johannesburg. Despite official threats, many European automobile drivers gave rides to the walking African boycotters. On the route the Africans had been systematically intimidated and

persecuted by the police.³⁸ Also, after Sharpeville, unprovoked attacks—including whippings—by police against Africans in the Capetown area during an African strike, led to so many European bystanders phoning to report the attacks to Capetown newspapers that the switchboards were jammed; the President of the Cape Chamber of Industries, C.F. Regnier, personally pleaded with the Chief of Police, Col. I.P.S. Terblanche, to stop the assaults.³⁹

In the United States also, nonviolent persistence against repression and brutalities in civil rights struggles led to considerable white support and participation in the actions and in other ways; later, when nonviolent means were less prominent and violence increased, this white support was drastically reduced.⁴⁰ When official repression and unofficial brutalities against disciplined and courageous nonviolent actionists became especially severe, Southern white communities and even the prosegregationist leadership sometimes split, and significant sections among them counseled moderation, concessions to the Negroes, and a halt to brutalities. Sometimes these defections began to operate behind the scenes before they became public.⁴¹ There are several examples, including some from Montgomery, Atlanta and Birmingham.

After a federal court ordered an end to racial segregation on the buses of Montgomery, Alabama, at the end of the 1956-57 bus boycott, white extremists bombed two homes and four churches. Martin Luther King, Jr., reported that the next morning there were three major defections from the hard-line segregationists' camp. The editor of the *Montgomery Advertiser*, Gus Hall, in a strong editorial entitled "Is it safe to live in Montgomery?" argued that although he supported segregation, the bombings had shifted the issue, and he could not stomach these excesses. Several white clergymen issued a statement, repeated throughout the day by the distinguished Presbyterian minister Reverend Merle Patterson, denouncing the bombings as un-Christian and uncivilized. The businessmen's organization, the Men of Montgomery, also publically opposed the bombings. King wrote: "For the first time since the protest began, these influential whites were on public record on the side of law and order."⁴² A few more bombings were attempted, but they were quickly halted. The bombings had lost important support for the extreme segregationists and, reports King, "it was clear that the vast majority of Montgomery's whites preferred peace and law to the excesses performed in the name of segregation."⁴³

Later, in 1961, when anti-segregationist "freedom riders" were brutally beaten by white extremists in Atlanta, Georgia, with the police refusing

to intervene, many Southern whites were again repelled. The *Atlanta Constitution* editorially criticized the police for not preventing the brutalities against the "freedom riders":

If the police, representing the people, refuse to intervene when a man—any man—is being beaten to the pavement of an American city, then it is not a noble land at all. It is a jungle. But this is a noble land. And it is time for the decent people in it to muzzle the jackals.⁴⁴

In May 1963 when police brutalities were committed against demonstrating Negro women and children during the civil rights struggle in Birmingham, Alabama, one of the effects was a withdrawal of the white business community from its firm support for segregation. Also, in contrast to earlier situations, most Birmingham whites no longer actively supported or participated in the repressive actions; instead "the majority were maintaining a strictly hands-off policy."⁴⁵ After returning from a tour of the Far East, the President of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, Sidney Smyer, said that his city had lost much prestige as a result of the violence there against freedom riders.⁴⁶

A similar defection from the opponent's camp occurred in South Vietnam in 1963 in the campaign in which Buddhists charged they were discriminated against by the government, which favored the Roman Catholic minority. Although South Vietnamese Catholics might have been expected to support the Diem regime against the 1963 Buddhist campaign, many Catholics felt they could not support the repressive measures being used. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Saigon, Nguyen Van Binh, circulated a pastoral letter in August appealing for religious tolerance, stating that some "confuse the political authority that governs Vietnam with the spiritual power that rules the Church in Vietnam."⁴⁷ Brutal repression during that struggle led to major defections from the Diem regime, both at the lower levels, and high in the regime; for example, the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador to the United States both resigned.⁴⁸ Actual defections of officials as a result of the operation of this aspect of political *jiu-jitsu* have also occurred in other cases.

D. The troops mutiny

Defections sometimes extend to police and troops who are charged with inflicting repression, as happened in the Vietnamese struggle. After the repression of Buddhist demonstrators in early June 1963, the *New York Herald Tribune* reported "growing unrest among army units in central Vietnam, whose ranks are mostly filled by Buddhists."⁴⁹ In August un-

rest was widely reported even among the wives of secret policemen, with the result that there was often plenty of warning of coming repression.⁵⁰ Army unrest extended even to the generals, producing, as we noted, a military *coup* when the government's moral authority had been undermined by the Buddhist campaign, a *coup* backed, but not instigated, by the United States.

Unease and disaffection among the opponent's agents of repression may be expressed by deliberate inefficiency in carrying out their duties. This inefficiency is especially likely if they are unwilling or unable to risk the penalties for open disobedience. In other cases, the police or troops may actually mutiny and defy orders to inflict repression. Both these types of behavior are discussed in Chapter Seven. Out of revulsion against severe repression against nonviolent actionists, regular troops, police and officers may deliberately but covertly restrict their assistance in it, or they may openly defy orders to carry out repression. Both types of behavior may, if sufficiently widespread or if they occur in crisis situations, severely reduce the repressive power of the regime.

The main example which will be offered here of the impact of troop mutiny in face of nonviolent action on the outcome of the struggle is from the February 1917 Russian revolution. This case is sufficiently important to merit detailed attention, especially since many people assume in ignorance that violence was necessary to destroy the tsarist regime.

Even Trotsky, who was no exponent of nonviolence, acknowledged after 1905 that victory or defeat in that revolution had hinged on whether the troops could be made sympathetic to the revolutionaries. He added that the greatest power did not lie in weapons, though they were useful:

Not the capacity of the masses to kill others but their great readiness to die themselves . . . assures in the last instance the success of a popular uprising . . . the soul of the soldier . . . must experience . . . a profound commotion . . . Even barricades . . . are of significance in reality above all as a moral force . . .⁵¹

The failure of the 1905 Revolution can be largely traced to the failure to win the soldiers over to massive disobedience on a large scale.

In contrast, large scale mutinies occurred in February 1917 and these were highly significant in the disintegration of the Tsar's power. One of the reasons for these mutinies was the "profound commotion" produced within and among the soldiers by the predominantly nonviolent behavior of the revolutionary people. It is true that for a time there was considerable restraint in the use of violence on *both* sides, and also that violence

was used in Petrograd by *both* sides on a scattered basis. However, up to February 25 the government forces had orders not to use firearms on the demonstrating crowds except in self-defense. This made it possible for the demonstrators to talk with the troops. "The soldiers soon caught the mood of the crowd. To them they seemed to be peaceful demonstrators, against whom it would be an outrage to use arms."⁵²

Even the Bolsheviks at this point tried to prevent violence by the revolutionaries—though Leninist doctrine stressed the importance of violence. The Bolsheviks in Petrograd now behaved very differently than they had in 1905. In February 1917 they saw prevention of violence against the troops as necessary to induce them to mutiny, after which, the Bolsheviks believed, the former soldiers would make effective military means available for the revolution; the Bolsheviks sought nonviolence only for tactical purposes. This does not, however, destroy the significance of these events. Katkov writes:

. . . even the Bolshevik leaders seem to have done everything in their power to prevent shooting in the streets. [Alexandr] Shlyapnikov [one of three members of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party] is most definite on this point. When workers urged him to arm the demonstrators with revolvers, he refused. Not, he says, that it would have been difficult to get hold of arms. But that was not the point:

"I feared [says Shlyapnikov] that a rash use of arms thus supplied could only harm the cause. An excited comrade who used a revolver against a soldier would only provoke some military unit and provide an excuse for the authorities to incite the troops against the workers. I therefore firmly refused to give arms to anybody who asked for them, and insisted again and again that the soldiers must be brought into the uprising, for in this way arms would be provided for all workers. This was a more difficult decision to carry out than getting a couple of dozen revolvers, but it was a consistent programme of action."⁵³

The Tsar had telegraphed an order on February 25 to Khabalov, commander of the Petrograd Military District, to "put an end as from tomorrow to all disturbances in the streets of the capital." Accordingly, the troops fired into demonstrating crowds in Znamensky and Kazansky Squares on the next day. There were many dead and wounded. Katkov reports the impact of the events on the soldiers who had obeyed orders:

What cannot be too strongly emphasized is the effect of the shooting on the troops themselves . . . When at last they were ordered to open

fire on the same predominantly unarmed crowds they had previously fraternized with, they were appalled, and there is no reason to doubt General Martynov's estimate of the situation: "The overwhelming majority of the soldiers were disgusted with the role assigned to them in quelling the riots and fired only under compulsion." This applied in particular to the training unit of the Volynsky Regiment, consisting of two companies with two machine-guns, which had to disperse the demonstrations of Znamensky Square . . . leaving forty dead and as many wounded lying on the pavement.⁵⁴

The result of this and other shootings was that "order had been restored." That was not, however, the end of the story.

The next day there was a brief mutiny of some members of the Pavlovsky Guards Regiment, two of whose companies had taken part in the shootings. Some went into the streets and called for an end to the bloodshed.⁵⁵ Much more significant, however, was the effect of the shootings on the soldiers of the Volynsky Regiment, who had fired on demonstrators in Znamensky Square.

After the officers had left the barracks, the men gathered to discuss the day's events. They could not understand why they had had to shoot . . . Nothing indicates that it was revolutionary conviction that led to the troops' momentous decision to refuse to fire on the demonstrating crowds. They were, far more probably, prompted by a natural revulsion against what they had been doing under the command of a most unpopular officer. Yet they must have known the risks they incurred in adopting a mutinous attitude.⁵⁶

On Monday, the 27th, the day after the shootings, these same troops informed their officer of their refusal to go out into the streets. After he left them he was shot by an unknown assassin. The disobedient troops left their barracks, went into the streets, proclaimed their support for the people's rising, and tried to persuade other regiments to follow their example. Other units did indeed also mutiny, and troop reinforcements had a way of "dissolving" on the way to their destinations, merging with the anonymous crowd. It was not long before the Tsar's regime no longer had an effective military force at its command in the capital.⁵⁷ This evidence suggests that had the demonstrators at Znamensky Square fired on the soldiers of the Volynsky Regiment, and had other demonstrators also done so elsewhere, the Tsar's troops would have been more likely to remain loyal, and without their mutiny the Tsar's regime would probably not have disintegrated. The Tsar's capacity for violent repression was de-

stroyed when the troops mutinied after shooting peaceful demonstrators. Exponents of nonviolent action see this process as important in revolutionary situations.

In a very different case, it is significant that the Garhwali mutiny in India in late 1930 occurred immediately after severe repression in Peshawar, where at least 30 and perhaps as many as 125 demonstrators had been killed.⁵⁸ "The 2/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles were ordered to Peshawar, but two platoons refused to proceed, on the ground that their duty was to fight enemies from abroad and not to shoot 'unarmed brethren,'" writes Gopal.⁵⁹ The severe repression against peaceful demonstrators thus produced a situation of great potential gravity for the regime, although insufficient to destroy it.

Some cases of disaffection or open mutiny also occurred during the 1953 East German Rising. For example, as stronger action was taken against the rising, the Russians sent Polish tanks across the border at Goerlitz to disperse demonstrators. Thousands of the demonstrators greeted the tanks. An eyewitness to the encounter, Don Doane, an Associated Press correspondent, wrote:

The senior Polish officer stepped out of his tank, faced the Germans—and saluted. "I don't fire on German workers," he said. The Germans returned his salute.

When the Russians saw the Poles were not going to resist the Germans, they ordered the Polish troops back across the border and sent in Russian tanks.⁶⁰

East German police and troops and even Russian troops sometimes proved unreliable when ordered to put down the predominantly nonviolent rising. Cases of disobedience of orders occurred both among East German police and Russian officers. The Russians frequently brought in fresh troops who had not previously been in East Germany and would presumably have less inhibitions against carrying out repressive measures against the population.⁶¹

E. Splits in the opponent regime

Not only may troops defect; splits over the conflict may develop between officials of the regime itself. This should be expected, for internal conflicts sometimes occur in a regime engaged in conflict, even when it is against a *violent* enemy. For example, significant conflicts over policy for the occupied sections of the Soviet Union occurred within the Nazi system—a regime in which most people would not expect to find internal dis-

putes.⁶² However, internal conflicts in the opponent group are much more likely when the other party to the conflict is *nonviolent*. This is because the actionists pose no *violent* threat (which usually unifies the opponent's camp), and also because counteracting a nonviolent campaign is especially difficult, conducive to different opinions on what to do, and later to recriminations over the failure of those counteractions. Some of the conflicts within the opponent group may thus be created by the problems of dealing with a nonviolent struggle group, while others may be rooted in earlier problems or rivalries within the regime which have been aggravated by the conflict.

Studies focusing on the relationships between splits within the opponent regime and the use of nonviolent struggle in actual historical cases remain to be undertaken. A comparative study might be undertaken of the opponent's internal conflicts on policy and repression in several cases, for example, the British in dealing with the Indian campaigns, the French in dealing with the Ruhr resistance, and the Norwegian fascists and German Nazis in dealing with the Norwegian resistance. Internal conflicts may be most expected when the campaign lasts some weeks or months, which gives time for conflicts arising over how to deal with the challenge to develop, or for control measures to fail and invite recriminations, or for old rivalries to take on new forms in the context of the struggle. However, the fact that splits among officials occurred almost immediately in the unexpected and very brief civilian insurrection of the East German Rising of June 16-17, 1953, suggests that splits within the opponent's regime may be extremely important in some cases of nonviolent struggle.

In the East German case some of the confusion and splits among officials and Party leaders focused on the problem of the appropriate counteraction, and both East German leaders and the Russians themselves thought that severe repression might cost them more than it would help in crushing the rebellion. The Socialist Unity Party's Central Committee later admitted that some Party organizations, organs, officials and members had given in "to panic and confusion," and that in "many cases" Party members had lost nerve and capitulated or even themselves taken part in meetings and demonstrations against the regime. Also, at the time, the Minister for State Security, Wilhelm Zaisser, and the Editor-in-Chief of the official paper *Neues Deutschland*, Rudolf Herrnstadt, formed a faction in the Politburo and the Central Committee with the intent of overthrowing Ulbricht.⁶³ Their reasons may not have been directly related to the rising itself, but the timing may be significant. From the beginning some Party officials favored violent repression, but others counseled against

it. On June 16 the Russians first prohibited repressive police action against workers marching down the Stalinallee, believing it would be "provocative." Despite pressure from the chief of the East Berlin police, the Berlin district secretary of the Party refused to urge the Russians to permit strong repression, as he did not want to be regarded as a "worker slaughterer."⁶⁴ The nature of the East German and Russian regimes, and the rapidity with which internal conflicts appeared, suggest that investigation of the possible relationships between nonviolent struggle and splits in the opponent's camp may be highly important.

F. Provocation and appeals

Nonviolent actionists aware that brutal repression may produce unease, dissent and opposition within the opponent group have on occasion provoked the opponent to violence deliberately. For example, after British woman suffragists were maltreated by bystanders and police and then arrested, some suffragists concluded that their cause had gained more than it had lost by the events, and therefore they in the future deliberately provoked violent police reprisals in order to split the opponents of woman suffrage over the repression, embarrass the leaders of the political parties and get them to act on the demand for suffrage.⁶⁵ This type of provocation, however, has limited utility and contains its own dangers. Conversely, fearing the political *jiu-jitsu* effect of severe repression and not wanting opposition "at home," the opponent may try to prevent the facts from being discovered at all and to block the dissemination of existing information. This interpretation was placed on British attempts in 1930-31 to block investigations into severe repression against Indian nonviolent actionists, as by arresting two unofficial committees before their enquiries into police excesses in Rampur, Gujarat, could begin.⁶⁶ Censorship may also be applied on a wide scale.

Nonviolent actionists may also encourage splits in the opponent group by quite different means, by direct appeals and efforts to persuade members of that group of the justice of the cause of the grievance group and to solicit their support for it. These efforts may take a variety of forms, including personal conversations, small and large meetings, distribution of literature, and many other means. Luthuli in South Africa, for example, took advantage of a number of opportunities to address all-white meetings and racially mixed gatherings in order to explain the conditions under which Africans were living and to plead their cause.⁶⁷ In 1920 the legal German government used leaflets called "The Collapse of the Military

Dictatorship" to spread President Ebert's stirring appeal to defeat the Kapp *Putsch*. Strikers handed the leaflets to troops, and a government plane dropped them over the capital, including over the soldiers barracks.⁶⁸

As the examples in this section show, nonviolent action may accentuate and arouse internal dissent and opposition within the opponent's own group both without deliberate efforts by the nonviolent group to do so, and when the actionists consciously seek to produce such splits—and deliberate efforts are likely to help. The capacity of the nonviolent technique to create and aggravate internal problems for the opponent group puts nonviolent action in a special class among techniques of struggle. Violent techniques, in contrast, usually seem to presume that the opponent group is a fixed entity to be fought and defeated, not a group which could be split and within which major active support could be won. In this respect guerrilla warfare is closer to nonviolent action than other violent techniques, though still at a considerable distance. In conventional warfare, although splits in the opponent group are welcomed when they occur, the usual assumption is that they will not and that the group as a whole must be defeated; in addition, conventional warfare generally contributes to increased unity within the opponent group which rallies together against the dangers of enemy attack.

INCREASING SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION FROM THE GRIEVANCE GROUP

There is a third way in which political *jiu-jitsu* causes the opponent's severe repression and brutalities to recoil against his power position. The repression may increase the resistance from the grievance group itself, instead of intimidating them into acquiescence. This process will be first illustrated with an example from the Russian revolutionary movement, and then the general process will be discussed with further examples.

A. The victory in Palace Square

Nineteenth century Russian revolutionaries had long been vexed with a severe problem: how to destroy the naïve faith in the Tsar held by the mass of the peasants and workers, how to make them see that the Tsar was not a benevolent well-intentioned father but the head of an oppressive social and political system, how to make them see the system in all its naked violence. Bakunin, for example, had written: "Above all we

must destroy within the hearts of the people the remains of that unfortunate faith in the Tsar which for centuries has condemned them to terrible serfdom."⁶⁹ Violence by revolutionaries had failed to do this. In 1866, when Karakozov attempted to assassinate Tsar Alexander II, the result was a rallying of sympathy and support from the poor for the Tsar, while the revolutionaries lost both drastically. Venturi reports that "... all sources are agreed that the peasants stood by the Emperor, often violently." "... the attempt on the Tsar's life did show how strong was the alliance between the monarchy and the mass of working classes and peasants."⁷⁰ As long as the workers and peasants believed in the benevolence of the Tsar and consequently supported him, popular mass revolution in Russia would remain a utopian dream of isolated sectarians.

The killing and wounding of hundreds of peaceful marchers who were under instructions to remain nonviolent, which made January 9, 1905 famous as Bloody Sunday, destroyed that alliance of the poor with the Tsar. The sharp contrast between the brutal political violence of the regime and the nonviolence of the marching petitioners shattered the naïve belief of the peasants and workers in the benevolence of the Tsar. Only when that belief was shattered did a popular revolution by the masses of people become possible. The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Lord Hardinge of Penhurst, wrote that because of Bloody Sunday "... a gulf was created between the Emperor and his people and the story was spread that when his subjects came to present their grievances to the 'Little Father' they were mowed down by his troops."⁷¹ Several historians have also pointed to this change and its significance. Schapiro: "... from this day on, ... faith in the Emperor's love and care for his people was shattered."⁷² Charques: "... it did perhaps more than anything else during the whole reign to undermine the allegiance of the common people to the throne ..."⁷³ Harcave: "After January 9, the liberation movement could count on far greater support and more favorable conditions for expansion and action than ever before." "The socialists ... had been given just what they had sought for years: an aroused working class."⁷⁴ Keep: "It dissipated what remained of peasant ways of thinking and opened their minds to revolutionary propaganda."⁷⁵ "Another event like Bloody Sunday might be sufficient to topple the government ..."⁷⁶

On January 17, six days after the shootings, Minister of Agriculture Alexis Ermolov in his regular report to the Tsar called the shootings a disaster for the government, warned that the army might disobey orders to shoot and that even if it remained loyal it might be inadequate to defeat a rising in the countryside. Ermolov reminded the Tsar that he depended

on the people's support, which needed to be regained and maintained.⁷⁷

In addition to turning the middle class, intellectuals, businessmen and nobility against the regime—as discussed earlier—Bloody Sunday began one of the great popular mass revolutions in history. The workers resorted to strike action—in the remainder of January alone more workers were on strike than the whole decade from 1894 to 1904.⁷⁸ For the first time in Russia's history the peasants began to act as an organized political force in opposition to the government.⁷⁹ The easy "victory" of the Tsar's troops in Palace Square reverberated throughout the Empire, shattered illusions, and recoiled in anger, determination and revolution. The "victory" in clearing the square had created the most important precondition for a mass revolutionary movement.

B. Strength needed to withstand repression

Of course severe repression does not always produce mass revolution or even increased resistance. As has been emphasized throughout this Part of the book, this technique has requirements which must be fulfilled if it is to be successful. The most important of these are the requirements associated with the nonviolent group itself. One of these is that people must not be intimidated by repression. Whether severe repression results in decreased or increased resistance depends to a considerable degree on how much suffering the actionists and the general grievance group are willing and able to endure as the price of change. If their conviction in the rightness of their cause is not strong, if their courage falters, or if the suffering is greater than their capacity to bear it, then whether or not more persons become alienated from the opponent, the numbers of actionists will not increase by additions from the general grievance group, and may even diminish. Under such conditions, growing severity of repression may lower morale in the grievance group and among the nonviolent actionists and reduce resistance. The weak may be weeded out.⁸⁰ This is one of the important reasons why numbers alone are not decisive in nonviolent action, and why there is no substitute in this technique for genuine strength. Submission to violence spells defeat.

But violent repression need not spell submission. Contrary to popular opinion, as we have already seen in Chapter Ten, how much suffering people can withstand is *not* determined only by the relative severity of the repression. The strength, resilience and will of the nonviolent group are also very important. In fact, severities and brutalities under certain conditions *increase* resistance and weaken the opponent. Machiavelli argued that when

a ruler is opposed by the public as a whole and attempts to make himself secure by brutality, "the greater his cruelty, the weaker does his regime become."⁸¹

C. Repression may legitimize resistance

When violence is committed against people who are, and are seen to be, nonviolent, it is difficult for the opponent to claim "self-defense" for his use of extreme repression, or to argue that the severe repression was for the good of the society as a whole. Instead, the opponent is likely to appear to many people as a villain, and many will believe that the worst accusations against the opponent are being confirmed, and that they are witnessing "deepening injustice."⁸²

When such extreme repression occurs, the chances of the nonviolent group agreeing to a compromise settlement far short of their avowed aims may be sharply reduced. Severe Puritan repression against Quakers in Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example, "made the Quakers all the more certain that the Puritans were anti-Christ."⁸³ British measures against Indians practicing civil disobedience made many Indians believe the worst possible interpretations of British motives and of the nature of the *Raj*.

When severe repression is directed against nonviolent actionists who persist in the struggle with obvious courage and at great cost, the actionists' persistence makes it difficult for the opponent to claim he has acted to "defend" or "liberate" the people concerned. Instead, it will be seen that the opponent could not win obedience and support on the basis of the merits of the regime and its policies and has therefore in desperation sought to induce submission by severe measures. He is seen as *unable* to rule without extreme repression. Concerning repression in India, J.C. Kumaraappa made this point when he wrote in 1930 that "the Government . . . is . . . demonstrating beyond a doubt its total incapacity to govern by civilized methods."⁸⁴ People whose lives have been affected by the grievances, who have nevertheless seen the opponent as benevolent and well-intentioned, may now shift. For them the opponent's positive image may be destroyed and they may become convinced that he deserves not obedience and cooperation but defiance and resistance.

One result of this increased alienation is that the *existing* group of nonviolent actionists may become more—not less—determined to continue their intended course and even to expand their efforts to bring about change. To be imprisoned for disobedience, for example, is interpreted not as a shame but as an honor. This shift took place both in India among

nationalist resisters,⁸⁵ and in the United States among woman suffragists and civil rights workers.⁸⁶ "The result is both legitimization and intensification of revolt."⁸⁷ The effects of alienation from the opponent extend still further, however.

D. The numbers of resisters may grow

If determination and willingness to pay the price of resistance become great enough among members of the general grievance group, this increase in alienation from the opponent may mean that more members of that group become active participants in the struggle. The numbers of nonviolent actionists defying the opponent may then increase. This is in line with Gregg's view that in nonviolent action the suffering and even death of the volunteers in face of the opponent's repression are likely to produce new volunteers to take the place of the fallen.⁸⁸

The opponent's problems in dealing with this development will be multiplied because this nonviolent technique can, far more than violence, involve as active participants *all* sections of the population—not only able-bodied young men, but women, the young, and the old.⁸⁹ In India in 1930 for example, at Mahuva in Kathiawad, Gujarat, four thousand women and children went on a fast in sympathy with the picketers of shops selling foreign cloth. The dealers in foreign cloth then stopped sales.⁹⁰ Also in that campaign, thousands of women took an active part in picketing, parades and in civil disobedience against the Salt Act and other types of noncooperation. This participation of women, usual in Indian society, was difficult for the police to deal with.⁹¹ During the Korean struggle in 1919–22 against Japanese rule, not only women but school children took part in the nonviolent protest campaign. It was reported that police attacked them with drawn swords, beat them, and as a punishment publicly stripped girls taking part in the protest. As a result Koreans were still further alienated from the regime.⁹²

Increased resistance has sometimes resulted also when brutal repression has been applied against violent resistance or against mixed violent and nonviolent resistance. There are cases in which the violence of the repression was highly disproportionate to the lesser violence of the resistance. The Nazis encountered this general phenomenon on a number of occasions. In occupied areas of the Soviet Union, they were ruthless in repression, seized people for slave labor in Germany, exterminated many prisoners of war, and did many other such things. The result was not, however, passive submission to Nazi rule, but flaming resentment and re-

sistance. Dr. Otto Bräutigam, deputy leader of the Political Department of Rosenberg's Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, in a confidential report to his superiors, wrote that German policy and practice in the occupied Soviet Union had "brought about the enormous resistance of the Eastern peoples."⁹³ Shooting of innocent hostages was widely used in Nazi-occupied Europe to terrorize the population into submission and to halt various acts of opposition, usually sabotage or acts of violence. The results were often the opposite of those intended, however. The policy of shooting hostages led to protests to Keitel from both the Commander of the *Wehrmacht* (German Army) in the Netherlands and from the military Governor of Belgium, General Falkenhausen. The latter wrote to Field Marshall Keitel in September 1942, as follows:

The result is undoubtedly very unsatisfactory. The effect is not so much deterrent as destructive of the feeling of the population for right and security; the gulf between the people influenced by Communism and the remainder of the population is being bridged; all circles are becoming filled with a feeling of hatred towards the occupying forces, and effective inciting material is given to enemy propaganda. Thereby military danger and general political reaction of an entirely unwanted nature . . .⁹⁴

In Denmark, the Nazis were unable to destroy a single Danish resistance organization of any importance throughout the occupation, although they were able to arrest, deport and execute members of those organizations. The Danish occupation historian de J. Hæstrup writes: "It seems that suppression only gave birth to more vigorous resistance. The view might be different in other countries where conditions were more cruel, but the Danish conclusion must be that suppression is a two-edged sword."⁹⁵

Although, as the above cases indicate, a *jiu-jitsu* effect increasing, not reducing, resistance *may* operate in cases of mixed violent and nonviolent resistance, or of repression highly disproportionate to the resistance violence, the *jiu-jitsu* effect is both more frequent and more intensive in cases of exclusively nonviolent action. This is so contrary to the popular assumption that power accrues to the violent, that several cases will now be described or cited in which repression against nonviolent action produced not passive submission but increased alienation and resistance.

In addition to the events of 1905, described earlier in this section, there are many other Russian examples of repression leading to increased alienation of the population and to intensified resistance. Thus, for exam-

ple, the tsarist regime used the army to intervene in 269 industrial disputes between 1895 and 1899. Keep writes:

. . . some officers seem to have taken it for granted that bloodshed was an unfortunate but necessary means of intimidating "rebellious elements" into submission. Naturally, where shooting took place, this served to embitter the atmosphere still further. Often it provoked action by workers in other enterprises, which it was the main aim of the military to prevent.⁹⁶

When police used whips to quell student disturbances at St. Petersburg University in 1899, the result was a student strike all over Russia.⁹⁷

The old statement that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church is thus not at all a sectarian religious saying for the comfort of the believers. It is a profound statement about a likely consequence of brutal repression against nonviolent people who stand firm in their convictions—a statement with wide political implications far beyond the treatment of unwanted religious groups. In his tirade against the German philosopher Eugen Dühring, Frederick Engels, no less, argued that Dühring's anti-religious extremism would in fact help religion to survive: ". . . he incites his gendarmes of the future against religion, and thereby helps it to martyrdom and a prolonged lease on life."⁹⁸ In the 1920s the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, having ignored Engels' warning, found it difficult to ignore the demonstrated validity of his opinion. "The party," writes Schapiro, "could persecute priests and preach atheism, but the communists were soon to discover that religion thrives on persecution."⁹⁹

The sixteenth century Inquisition begun by Charles V in the Netherlands, if not increasing public defiance, at least added to the numbers of heretics. Pieter Geyl writes:

. . . after the first deaths by fire—the victims were two Antwerp Augustinian monks, burnt at Brussels in 1523—the number of the martyrs kept steadily growing . . . And yet this horror . . . achieved no more than that the opinions which it was intended to kill were driven underground. Men who could have given a lead kept quiet or left the country, but the spectacle of the martyrs' sufferings and courage made many thousands of simple souls take the new heresy into their hearts. In the parlour and the market place, in the workshop and in the meetings of the Rhetoricians, passionate discussions went on about the problems of faith. Souls that were inaccessible to the learning of the humanists now thirsted after the new doctrine.¹⁰⁰

In the American colonies, too, the English soon found that their attempts to force the colonials to obey and to halt political and economic noncooperation by military means or by threats of new punishment usually only heightened the spirit of defiance. The unplanned Boston Massacre heightened the spirit of opposition and increased the practice of resistance not only in Massachusetts Bay but throughout the American colonies—even though the British troops had been provoked. In Boston the deaths of those shot by the troops were deliberately used to arouse more general opposition to the British rule.¹⁰¹ The commanding officers finally acceded to the demand of the Boston town authorities, supported unanimously by the Council of Massachusetts Bay, that British troops be withdrawn from the city; they were transferred to Castle William in the harbor,¹⁰² a result which the colonials could not easily have achieved by military means. Other colonies also reacted very strongly to the news¹⁰³ and the Massacre gave considerable impetus to the economic boycott movement.¹⁰⁴

Although relatively mild by contemporary standards of State repression, the coercive acts enacted by Parliament in the spring of 1774 evoked widespread opposition and a significant increase in resistance, which they had been intended to quell. The new acts were designed to alter the Massachusetts constitution and destroy the independence of the town meetings in order to halt unrest and to punish the refusal of compensation to the East India Company for the losses inflicted at the Boston Tea Party. While these acts led to a tendency for merchants to side with the government more than they had earlier, the general effect of the coercive acts was to win converts to the radical position, to make the issues at stake in the conflict clearly political, and to increase hostility to the English government. Dr. Benjamin Franklin was one of many who, though antagonized by the earlier destruction of tea in Boston harbor, found the new acts even more offensive.¹⁰⁵ The closing of the port of Boston and transfer of the provincial capital from the city also aroused widespread indignation, opposition and resistance (not all nonviolent), instead of achieving the intended reimbursement for property losses and passive submission.¹⁰⁶ These acts against Boston were cited as a reason for the Continental Association program of noncooperation.¹⁰⁷ "The Coercive Acts made open rebellion inevitable."¹⁰⁸ Gipson also writes concerning the situation in September 1774: "Only the removal of the pressures brought to bear upon Massachusetts Bay to compel its obedience to the will of the government of Great Britain could now stem the revolutionary tide."¹⁰⁹

During the nonviolent resistance to the Kapp *Putsch* there were several similar instances. When pro-Kapp *Freikorps* troops on March 14, 1920, occupied the offices of two newspapers supporting the legal Government, *Freiheit* and *Vorwärts*, the result was not the submission of all associated with newspaper publishing, but a strike of all the printers in Berlin.¹¹⁰ One morning the Kapp group arrested all the ministers of the Prussian Government—which controlled a major section of Germany. Immediately, the railroad workers threatened to strike unless Minister Oesser—in charge of railroads—were released; he refused to leave unless the other ministers were also released, and they were all let go.¹¹¹ It is true that the *Putsch* was ill planned and inefficiently carried out. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute its collapse to faint-heartedness of Dr. Kapp in face of resistance, for he finally ordered that all strikers be shot (only to find that his own troops would not carry out the order).¹¹²

While French repression was sometimes effective during the *Ruhrkampf*, at other times it was not. In one case, for example, after an occupation ultimatum of twenty-four hours had expired, French troops evicted thousands of families of striking railworkers from their homes and left them in the streets. The German workers, however, did not return to their jobs. In fact German Transportation Minister Gröner instructed not only the workers, but also all higher functionaries and civil servants of the railroads in the occupied territory to refuse all cooperation with the French. Furthermore, Gröner promised them financial compensation for possible losses.¹¹³

Indians struggling nonviolently against British rule often found that severe repression, and especially brutalities (even when provoked), helped the independence movement by increasing the number of Indians opposed to the *Raj* and willing to resist it. The shootings at Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar, in 1919 were unprovoked. They permanently alienated many Indians from British colonial rule. On an official goodwill visit for Britain sometime after the Amritsar shooting, the Duke of Connaught observed: "Since I landed I have felt around me bitterness and estrangement between those who have been my friends. The shadow of Amritsar has lengthened over the face of India."¹¹⁴ Those shootings, which came to be called a massacre, helped to complete Gandhi's own disaffection from the British Empire for which he had once had warm and sympathetic feelings. Disillusioned with the manner in which Prime Minister David Lloyd George handled the killings and the question of reparations, Gandhi wrote in December 1920 that his "faith in the good intentions of the Government and the nation which is supporting it" had been "com-

pletely shattered."¹¹⁵ In the coming years India and Britain were to experience the full effects of his alienation.

Severe unprovoked repression occurred during the 1930-31 campaign, but sometimes the Indians used nonviolent means that were deliberately provocative. A young Indian in Bombay attempted to stop a truck delivering foreign cloth by lying in front of it and was killed when the truck ran over him. Then the population throughout Bombay Presidency became indignant and the boycott of foreign cloth became highly successful.¹¹⁶ After reporting a number of police brutalities against the non-violent actionists, H. N. Brailsford commented:

The importance of such affairs . . . was psychological. They helped to discredit the Government during the critical time when the masses were hesitating whether they should unreservedly support Congress. The privations . . . suffered by the main body . . . of the political prisoners in jail had the same effect.¹¹⁷

Specific provocative tactics were sometimes chosen to arouse extreme repression and discredit the regime. In Gandhi's view, nonviolent provocation was intended: 1) to reveal clearly the inherent violence upon which the British Empire rested; 2) to exert moral pressure on the British to change their attitudes; 3) to make clear to the world the nature of the empire in India and the determination of Indians to be free; and 4) very important, to expose the nature of the British system to the Indians themselves, thereby alienating them from it and increasing their resolution to destroy it.

The nonviolent raids on the salt works at Dharasana that year, described briefly in Chapter Eight, were deliberately planned by Gandhi with the knowledge that they would provoke extreme repression. He expected such repression to put the British *Raj* in a very bad light, strengthening the Indian position while weakening the British. Concerning this instance, J. C. Kumarappa has written:

Dharasana raid was decided upon not to get salt, which was only the means. Our expectation was that the Government would open fire on unarmed crowds Our primary object was to show to the world at large the fangs and claws of the Government in all its ugliness and ferocity. In this we have succeeded beyond measure.¹¹⁸

Madeline Slade wrote: "India has now realized the true nature of the British *Raj*, and with that . . . the *Raj* is doomed."¹¹⁹

At the end of the 1930-31 struggle Britain still remained established in India, but from an Indian perspective Britain had not won. A psy-

chological change had taken place which was comparable to that in Russia on Bloody Sunday 1905. Rabindranath Tagore described the change in these words:

Those who live in England, far away from the East, have now got to realize that Europe has completely lost her former moral prestige in Asia, she is no longer regarded as the champion throughout the world of fair dealing and the exponent of high principle, but as the upholder of Western race supremacy and the exploiter of those outside her own borders.

For Europe, this is, in actual fact, a great moral defeat that has happened. Even though Asia is still physically weak and unable to protect herself from aggression where her vital interests are menaced, nevertheless, she can now afford to look down on Europe where before she looked up.¹²⁰

The effort by Soviet officials in East Germany to avoid provoking further resistance by overreaction to the initial demonstrations and strikes of the 1953 rising has already been noted.¹²¹ While later intervention of the Soviet military forces defeated the demonstrators and strikers, on at least two occasions during those June days severe repression led to increased resistance. In the case of demonstrations in smaller towns near the zonal border on June 18, "it was largely the news of the brutal suppression of the strikes in the big industrial centers which drove the people into open resistance."¹²² Similarly, when the news of the execution in Jena of a young motor mechanic reached Erfurt, "the employees of three large factories joined the strike."¹²³

The Diem regime's repression of Buddhist resisters in 1963 greatly alienated other South Vietnamese from the regime and increased resistance instead of quelling it; conversely a reduction in repression seemed to reduce resistance. *The New York Times* on August 5 reported: "Some observers feel that the Buddhist movement has slowed down in the last two weeks because the Government had been shrewder and less repressive in handling the Buddhists."¹²⁴ One result of the severe pagoda raids the night of August 20-21 was a wave of revulsion against the government throughout the country.¹²⁵ Surveying the campaign and the effects of severe repression against nonviolently defiant Buddhists, David Halberstam concluded:

Often the Government broke up their demonstrations with violence and bloodshed, and as Bull Connor and his police dogs in Birmingham were to etch indelibly the civil rights movement in the minds

of millions of Americans, so the Buddhists used the Government's repeated clumsiness to commit their people further to their cause and to strengthen the movement. "There is blood on the orange robes," a spokesman would say at a demonstration, and the emotional response was always astonishing.¹²⁶

As Halberstam suggests, this general phenomenon has also occurred repeatedly in the United States in nonviolent struggles against racial discrimination and segregation. Both arrests and unofficial extremist violence failed to intimidate Negroes in Montgomery, Alabama, or to cause them to halt their famous bus boycott. Instead, the opposite results were achieved, as Dr. King reported: "Every attempt to end the protest by intimidation, by encouraging Negroes to inform, by force and violence, further cemented the Negro community . . ." ¹²⁷ When mass arrests came, the results were anything but those desired by the white officials: "Instead of stopping the movement, the opposition's tactics had only served to give it greater momentum, and to draw us closer together."¹²⁸

Various types of official and unofficial counteractions against the student sit-ins in 1960 were followed not by acquiescence but increased demonstrations. On successive days in late March, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, seven and nine student sit-inners, respectively, were arrested. The results: 3,500 students marched through the center of town to the State Capital.¹²⁹ On April 19 in Nashville, Tennessee, the home of a well-known Negro attorney defending the sit-inners was bombed. The result: a few hours later 2,500 un intimidated demonstrators marched on City Hall.¹³⁰ The 1961 Freedom Rides began with thirteen people, with the organizers hoping there would still be that many at the end. Then one bus was burned in Anniston, Alabama, and the actionists on the other bus were cruelly beaten. The result: ". . . we were deluged with letters and telegrams from people all over the country, volunteering their bodies for the Freedom Rides," James Farmer reported. Hundreds of people inexperienced in nonviolent action arrived, and it became possible to begin filling the jails of Mississippi with opponents of segregation.¹³¹

Birmingham, Alabama, in the spring of 1963, also experienced this phenomenon of severe repression increasing resistance, especially when school children were arrested and police dogs were used against them. One of the effects was, writes Waskow, that, "it swiftly involved many more Negroes in active, vigorous support of the movement for integration—since that movement now meant not only an abstract demand for social change, but the concrete and immediate protection of their children."¹³² In addition, the Birmingham struggle provoked new Negro

demonstrations and demands throughout the South and also in Northern ghettos.¹³³

After James Meredith was shot and wounded by a fanatical white supremacist in June 1966, the march through Mississippi—which he had only just begun with a tiny handful of supporters—became the biggest since the march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama. *Newsweek* wrote that the three shotgun blasts “reverberated across the nation,” echoing other cases of brutalities against Negroes and several civil rights martyrs, and once again leading to government action. “It was the same dark counterpoint of nonviolent protest and violent response that produced the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965.” President Johnson called the shooting an “awful act of violence,” and Congress began to move more quickly on civil rights legislation. Emanuel Celler, aged chairman of the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, commented: “There are times when the civil-rights movement has no greater friend than its enemy. It is the enemy of civil rights who again and again produces the evidence . . . that we cannot afford to stand still.”¹³⁴

To avoid misunderstanding, let it be emphasized again that whether repression crushes or increases resistance to the opponent depends on a variety of conditions other than the repression itself. To a large degree these may be within the control of the nonviolent actionists and the general grievance group for which they are acting. Severe repression and brutalities against nonviolent people have led to increased resistance by more people in too many cases in diverse circumstances for this result to be dismissed as an isolated and atypical occurrence. Instead, it is an important part of the general process by which nonviolent action combats repression and brutalities, using them to weaken the power position of the opponent and to strengthen that of the nonviolent actionists through the workings of political *jiu-jitsu*.

LESS SEVERE REPRESSION AND COUNTER-NONVIOLENCE?

Some opponents, or some members of the opponent group, sometimes realize that severe violence against nonviolent actionists is counterproductive. When the repression or brutalities have already been committed, this realization may lead to private recriminations and disagreements among officials within the opponent group. Where the realization precedes the repression, there may be experiments in less severe counteractions or even counter-nonviolence.

Where the realization by some members of the opponent group that severe action is counterproductive follows the event, a reversal of steps already taken may not follow. In fact, there may be a great show of determination and haughty rejection of protests about the repression at the same time that the leadership of the opponent group realizes that the severity of the repression was a mistake. An example of this is official Nazi reaction to the mass arrests of Norwegian students at the University of Oslo November 30, 1943 under the orders of *Reichskommissar* Josef Terboven. The arrests followed a long conflict with the students, faculty and administration of the University on one side, and the Germans and their supporters in the Norwegian fascist party *Nasjonal Samling* on the other.¹³⁵ The immediate cause was a fire set November 28, in the *Aulaen*, a large hall in the main University building, located near the Palace. The Nazis charged that students had set the fire as part of their protest, and the Norwegians charged it was a Nazi provocation.¹³⁶ Action against students was decided upon. Warnings to students to escape were possible because of information leaked from German officers to the underground Homefront Leadership, and other warnings from high *Nasjonal Samling* sources. Nevertheless, between 1,100 and 1,200 male students were arrested, of whom about 700 were deported to Germany.¹³⁷ The University was closed.

Propaganda chief Goebbels, Interior Minister Himmler and Hitler himself all concluded that Terboven's action was excessive and more detrimental to Germany's position than milder action would have been. Goebbels wrote in his diary on December 5 and 6, 1943:

The Fuehrer was somewhat put out—and rightly so—that this question was handled with a sledge hammer. The Fuehrer is also skeptical about the success to be expected. Undoubtedly it would have been possible to achieve an essentially greater effect with less effort, for there are only a couple of dozen rebels among Oslo students who could have been arrested without the public noticing it. Most decidedly it was a big mistake to arrest all students of Oslo. Terboven is especially to be blamed for not having informed the Fuehrer before acting. The whole affair would have run an entirely different course had he done so.

. . . the whole Oslo affair stinks. The Fuehrer, too, is quite unhappy about the way it was handled. He received two representatives of Terboven and gave them an energetic scolding. Terboven has once more behaved like a bull in a china shop. Himmler is furious about the effects of Terboven's action. He was going to enlist about 40,000

to 60,000 volunteers in Norway during the coming months. Prospects for this seemed to be excellent. By Terboven's stupid action a good part of the plan has fallen in the water.¹³⁸

There was no public apology or reversal of Terboven's action, however. Despite considerable turmoil in both Sweden and Finland about the arrests, Hitler ordered Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to reject the Swedish Government's official protest "in the sharpest language." Accordingly Ribbentrop gave the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin "a very juicy and cutting reply." "Naturally we can't beat a retreat on this Oslo student question now," wrote Goebbels. "But it would have been better to think matters over before rather than after."¹³⁹

In other cases there have been advance attempts to reduce the extent or intensity of the repression. In the United States in 1937 when confronted with unusual strike action in which workers occupied factories and unemployed coal miners simply appropriated coal, both industrialists and government officials sometimes found it best not to take severe repressive action.

. . . General Motors evidently feels it would lose public support by evicting the strikers from the plants by force. Even though the sit-downers . . . are manifestly trespassers on others' property, the public is averse to violence and apt to blame the side which begins it, whatever the legal rights may be. For that reason, coal operators and public officials in Pennsylvania are shrugging their shoulders while unemployed miners dig and sell anthracite which does not belong to them.¹⁴⁰

In South Africa also there were several instances in 1952 in which, despite advance notice from the volunteers, the police refused to arrest actionists committing civil disobedience, sometimes even when they paraded past the police in defiance of curfew regulations. In other isolated cases, the police cordoned off areas where civil disobedience might be committed in order to thwart the defiance of the laws without making arrests. In another case, at Mafeking, volunteers were convicted but not imprisoned.¹⁴¹ Police in Britain sometimes refused to arrest large numbers of supporters of the Committee of 100 who were committing civil disobedience during their anti-nuclear campaigns.

Sometimes, in the midst of a struggle, the opponent has made a generous and challenging gesture or appeal intended to put the leadership of the nonviolent group in a situation in which they almost had to respond in a conciliatory way. In January 1931—in the midst of the nonviolent

Indian rebellion—the British Viceroy of India, Lord Irwin, in a speech to the Central Legislature, paid high tribute to Gandhi's spiritual force and invited his cooperation in constitutional revision and in the restoration of friendship between the British and Indian peoples. Later, he unconditionally released Gandhi and his chief colleagues and again made the Congress Working Committee a legal body. This clearly put the pressure for the next move on the Congress.¹⁴²

In some instances another type of gesture has been offered. One cold winter day President Wilson invited the woman suffragists who were picketing him into the East Room of the White House to warm up. (They refused the invitation.)¹⁴³ In August 1966 United States Air Force police abandoned their guns in dealing with an attempted nonviolent invasion of a base by two hundred demonstrators, mostly children. The group was protesting a decision of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives to block for five years use of the base for low and middle-income housing. The demonstrators were stopped at the entrance but, after a conference with the head of the group, Air Force officers invited them in for a free tour of the base in Air Force buses. The Associated Press dispatch called the counteraction "one of the coolest bits of public relations in military history."¹⁴⁴

There is another type of response to nonviolent action which, though relatively undeveloped, may in future decades become as significant as violent repression, or more so. The British (both in India and in the American colonies) and the American segregationists have been pioneers in this response. It involves confronting nonviolent action with counter-nonviolent action. For example, on one day during the nonviolent raids on the Dharasana salt depot in 1930, the police stopped the nonviolent volunteers on the road before they could reach the salt mounds and, when the Gandhian raiders sat down in protest, the police did the same. For some hours the two groups sat facing each other, until the patience of the police expired and they again resorted to violent methods to remove the sit-downers.¹⁴⁵ Later in Bombay, police also sat down in front of thirty thousand people sitting in the street after their procession had been halted. After hours and much rain, during which the volunteers passed their food, water and blankets to the police, the police gave in and the procession ended in a triumphant march.¹⁴⁶

After several bitter experiences of the effectiveness of the American colonists' nonviolent economic noncooperation, the British attempted to apply similar economic measures against the Americans, albeit *after* the colonists had largely shifted to reliance on violence following the skirmishes

at Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775. The measure was Lord North's Prohibitory Bill, introduced on November 20, 1775, and given the royal assent on December 22. It provided for the prohibition of all trade and intercourse with the colonies: it also provided for the appointment of commissioners with authority to exempt from that prohibition any person, group or colony which they determined to be at peace with His Majesty. Other important concessions to the colonists were also promised by Lord North. The trade ban, however, was not to be enforced nonviolently but by seizures by the navy of vessels and cargoes, and allowance for impressment of crews of seized ships. This Act was regarded by many as "a declaration of perpetual war" against the colonies.¹⁴⁷

In the United States civil rights struggles, there has been a very large number of examples of forms of nonviolent action used by segregationists. Sometimes these have taken rather simple forms, such as closing down businesses or making gestures of conciliation. For example, the bus terminal facilities in Montgomery, Alabama, were closed in May 1961, just before the arrival of Freedom Riders intent on violating segregation practices there.¹⁴⁸ In Orangeburg, South Carolina, the management of a lunch-counter where students were holding a sit-in responded, first by a temporary closure, then by removing seats, and finally by closing completely for two weeks.¹⁴⁹ The Maryland State Guard in Cambridge, Maryland, in May 1964, asked demonstrators to sing a few songs, led the group in prayer, and then politely asked them to disperse.¹⁵⁰ Imitation by segregationists of the same forms of nonviolent action being used by the integrationists has also occurred. For example, the Ku Klux Klan members in Atlanta, in late 1960, imitated student picketers by appearing dressed in full K.K.K. regalia to hold a counter-demonstration wherever they learned the students were demonstrating. They also threatened to call a white boycott against any store that desegregated its eating facilities in response to the student pressures.¹⁵¹ During the Freedom Rides to integrate busses, a group of American Nazis sent a "hate bus" from Washington, D.C. to New Orleans, where they were jailed for "unreasonably" alarming the public; in protest the Nazis went on a fast.¹⁵² Economic pressures have been widely used against opponents of segregation in the South.

Such cases of counter-nonviolence may be the first feeble attempts to move toward a new type of conflict situation in which *both* sides to a conflict will rely on nonviolent action as their ultimate sanction. If that were to occur widely, it would have the deepest social and political implications and ramifications. Many people, of course, will object to their opponents' doing anything to defend or advance viewpoints or practices which

they reject as undemocratic or unjust. However, agreement on issues within a reasonable period of time is often impossible. In this situation the conflicting groups still hold contradictory views which each believes must not be compromised. Is it then preferable that the group whose views one detests continues to use murder and terror or instead adopts economic boycotts and other nonviolent methods? Although powerful, those nonviolent methods do not involve killing but allow a continuation of the conflict by nonviolent means—which may bring into play various human influences leading to its ultimate resolution. This special type of conflict situation requires thoughtful analysis.¹⁵³ One important question is: what factors would be most important in the dynamics of this technique and in determining success in that special conflict situation?¹⁵⁴ This speculative exploration lies outside the scope of the present study, however. For the more limited purposes of this book, these developments show on the one hand a variation in the usual pattern of nonviolent action being met with violent repression. They also indicate that the opponent sometimes perceives that even from his perspective a nonviolent response is preferable. This perception may be based on a recognition that repression, especially when brutal, does not always strengthen the side which uses it; it sometimes strengthens the apparently defenseless nonviolent actionists.

By choosing to fight with a technique which makes possible political *jiu-jitsu*, the nonviolent actionists unleash forces which though often less immediately visible and tangible may nevertheless be more difficult for the opponent to combat than violence.

ALTERING POWER RELATIONSHIPS

The power of each contender in a conflict in which nonviolent action is used by one side, or by both, is continually variable, as was pointed out at the beginning of Chapter Nine. Far more than in violent conflict, the nonviolent actionists are able to exert considerable control not only over their own group's power, but directly and indirectly over the power of the opponent group. This the nonviolent actionists do by the effects which their behavior has on the social sources of each group's power. As discussed in this chapter, the availability of these sources of power is regulated, among other ways, by the operation of political *jiu-jitsu*, which affects the roles of third parties, the opponent group itself and the grievance group. Each of these groups of people exercises influence and control over the distribution of power by making available their cooperation

with one side or the other, or by restricting or withholding cooperation from one or the other.

Shifts in power relationships as a consequence of political *jiu-jitsu* will not always be immediately apparent; sometimes they may be obvious and dramatic only after they are completed, as when the army has mutinied. Nor are these shifts all-or-nothing changes. The steps may be partial ones, and may be expressed in a variety of ways. For example, persons and groups who once supported the opponent fully may simply become uncertain, take up neutral positions, and refrain from offering major help to either side. On the other hand, persons who were formerly indifferent or neutral may through this process move toward the nonviolent group, either offering it minor or major assistance or simply withdrawing cooperation with the opponent. There is a considerable variety of other ways in which changes in feelings, attitudes and opinions stimulated by the opponent's repression may shift the social sources of power; some of these shifts may be decisive.

Political *jiu-jitsu* is one of the important factors which break up and reverse the initial polarization, discussed in Chapter Ten, when at the very beginning of the campaign the opponent is likely to gain support. As the changes which have been described in this chapter occur, that initial polarization is revealed as highly unstable. As attitudes shift, and as actions are brought into line with the new attitudes, the relative power positions of the protagonists also shift. What Seifert called (as we already noted) the "progressive detachment of groups arranged in a spectrum of potential support" may develop.¹⁵⁵

The power shifts produced by political *jiu-jitsu* do not operate in isolation. They are concurrent with the other ideational, psychological, social, economic and political influences and pressures induced by the operation of the methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention—the methods described in detail in Chapters Three to Eight. A period in which the balance of forces may seem to be in the opponent's favor, or one in which the contending forces seem approximately equal, may therefore be followed by the build-up and extension of the forces supporting the nonviolent struggle, while those supporting the opponent's violent regime disintegrate.

The Kapp *Putsch* provides an example. After initial success (seizure of the capital and flight of the legal government), followed by uncertainty (as noncooperation was launched), support for the *Putsch* bit by bit collapsed as key groups (previously either pro-Kapp or discreetly undecided) shifted loyalty to the legal government. Three *Reichswehr* commanders,

previously uncertain, announced support for the legal government. Britain announced it would never recognize the usurping regime. The Nationalist Party, which had given the rebels limited support, urged Kapp to withdraw. The powerful National Association of German Industries, after initial reservation about the general strike, formally denounced the Kapp regime. The hitherto neutral Security Police demanded Kapp's resignation. Kapp resigned and flew to Sweden, leaving General von Lüttwitz as his heir. But even Lüttwitz's troops and regimental officers did not help: the Potsdam garrison mutinied against the usurpers, and most of his officers favored calling off the *Putsch*. "The General was somewhat bewildered at the way in which the whole structure of the conspiracy had suddenly crumbled around him."¹⁵⁶

Mass nonviolent struggle may become so overwhelming that it is impossible to crush. It may also undermine the very power of the opponent, so that even if he wants to continue fighting the movement, he is no longer effectively able to do so. Massive defiance of the people can make a government powerless. Whether this potential will be fully realized will depend on the circumstances. Influential will be the degree to which, by its nonviolent discipline, persistence, and choice of strategy and tactics, the nonviolent group promotes the operation of political *jiu-jitsu*.

This is one of the ways in which change may be achieved by nonviolent action, although, as we noted, nonviolent struggle can be successful even if the political *jiu-jitsu* is reduced or eliminated by an opponent's restraint in counter measures. We shall next consider in more detail the effects of the application of nonviolent action, and the nature and requirements of the three mechanisms by which change may be achieved with its effective use—conversion, accommodation and nonviolent coercion.

NOTES

1. In his 1935 study, *The Power of Nonviolence* (pp. 44-45), Richard Gregg described nonviolent action as "moral *jiu-jitsu*." He referred to the moral or psychological effects of nonviolent persistence on the people carrying out the repression themselves. For the purposes of this study of the social and political dynamics of the technique, "social *jiu-jitsu*" or "political *jiu-jitsu*" is a much more important process. It incorporates "moral *jiu-jitsu*" when it occurs as part of a much broader process. A violent opponent facing a determined and disciplined nonviolent struggle movement can never really come to grips with its kind of power, and the more he tries to do so by means of his violence and brutalities, the more he loses his political balance.
2. The use of repressive violence against persistent nonviolent actionists rebounds against the opponent's very sources of strength. "The might of the tyrant recoils upon himself when it meets with no response, even as an arm violently waved in the air suffers dislocation," Gandhi said. (Gandhi, *Nonviolent Resistance*, p. 57; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 57.) But the process is more complex than that. Nehru came closer in his description:
Naked coercion . . . is an expensive affair for the rulers. Even for them it is a painful and nerve-shaking ordeal, and they know well that ultimately it weakens their foundations. It exposes continually the real character of their rule, both to the people coerced and the world at large. They infinitely prefer to put on the velvet glove to hide the iron fist. Nothing is more irritating and, in the final analysis, harmful to a Government than to have to deal with people who will not bend to its will, whatever the consequences. (Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 393.)
3. Ross, "Introduction," in *Case, Non-violent Coercion*, p. iv. See also Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power*, p. 186. Gregg, (*The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 86) and Hiller, (*The Strike*, p. 169) have also pointed to the tendency for the opponent's repression against nonviolent actionists to arouse public opinion and enlist it in sympathy for the nonviolent group.
4. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 116.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
6. Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, p. 288.
7. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 123 and 151.
8. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 132. The nonwhite campaigners had even organized special "U.N.O. batches" of volunteers to commit civil disobedience just before the U.N. General Assembly discussed apartheid.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
11. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 222. For his comment on world attention on the Treason Trial, see p. 181.
12. Colin and Margaret Legum, *South Africa: Crisis for the West* (New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 75.
13. *The Pentagon Papers* as published by *The New York Times* (New York, Toronto, London: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 163.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 166: also *The New York Times* 24 August 1963, and *Daily Telegraph* (London), 24 August 1963, cited in Adam Roberts, "The Buddhist Revolt," MS p. 25.
16. *The Pentagon Papers*, p. 197.
17. *Observer* (London), 8 September 1963, cited in Roberts, "The Buddhist Revolt," MS p. 27.
18. *New York Times*, 26 and 27 August, cited in *ibid.*, MS p. 26.
19. *The Pentagon Papers*, p. 166.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 194 and 168.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 172-178.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-232.
23. *The Times* (London), 8 July, 1963 and *The New York Times*, 6 October, 1963, cited by Roberts, "The Buddhist Revolt," MS p. 16.
24. *New York Times*, 23 August 1963, cited in *Ibid.*, MS p. 24.
25. *New York Times*, 5 and 6 October, 1963, cited in *Ibid.*, MS p. 36.
26. Roberts, "The Buddhists, the War, and the Vietcong," p. 215. Denis Warner's quotation is from his book *The Last Confucian* (London and Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 221.
27. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 45-46.
28. See Peter Wallensteen, "Characteristics of Economic Sanctions," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1968, no. 3, p. 251.
29. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 58.
30. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 124. When charged with causing feelings of contempt toward the government, J.C. Kumarappa claimed in court that it was not he but "the accredited agents of this Government that bring it into disrepute." *Ibid.*, p. 209.
31. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 56.
32. Gipson, *The Coming of the Revolution*, p. 108. Gipson cites Walpole's *Memoirs* as authority for that statement. During the period of the Continental Association program of colonial resistance, adopted by the First Continental Congress, in 1774-1775, wide public support for the colonists' grievances continued in England. See Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. XII, *The Triumphant Empire, Britain Sails into the Storm, 1770-1776*, pp. 259-290.
33. Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 94-95.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 100-110.
35. Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, p. 288.
36. Quoted in Sternstein, "The *Ruhrkampf* of 1923," p. 129.
37. Lewy, *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany*, pp. 265-267.
38. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 176.
39. Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 280-281.
40. This white help was so widespread that the following are only scattered examples: there was significant white participation in the 1961 freedom rides (*ibid.*, pp. 313-317); the United Auto Workers and National Maritime Union provided bail money for jailed Birmingham Negroes in 1963 (*ibid.*, p. 337);

especially in 1963 there was significant endorsement of nonviolent action against segregation and discrimination from major religious denominational bodies and active participation in various demonstrations of major church leaders and a multitude of clergymen – who were sometimes arrested and imprisoned (*ibid.*, pp. 208-211 and 309).

41. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, pp. 23-24.
42. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, pp. 166-167.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
44. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 58; quoted from *The Freedom Ride*, p. 6, a "special report" issued by the Southern Regional Council, May, 1961.
45. King, *Why We Can't Wait*, pp. 100-101.
46. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 315.
47. *New York Herald Tribune*, 21 August 1963, quoted in Roberts, "The Buddhist Revolt," MS p. 23.
48. Roberts, "Buddhism and Politics in South Vietnam," pp. 246-247.
49. *New York Herald Tribune*, 5 June 1963, quoted by Roberts, "The Buddhist Revolt," MS p. 10.
50. *New York Times*, 26 August 1963, cited in *ibid.*
51. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution*, pp. 333-334.
52. Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. 263.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 263-264.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 269.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 272-284.
58. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, pp. 68-69.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
60. Associated Press dispatch, datelined Berlin, 22 June 1953, quoted in Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 352.
61. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" pp. 189 and 192, and Brant, *The East German Rising*, pp. 149-152.
62. See Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945*.
63. See Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" p. 183. He cites Martin Jänicke, *Der dritte Weg: Die Antistalinistische Opposition gegen Ulbricht seit 1953* (Cologne: Neuer Deutsche Verlag, 1964), p. 38.
64. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" p. 186.
65. Eleanor Flexner, *Century of Struggle* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 250-251.
66. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 180.
67. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, pp. 211-214.
68. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*, p. 79, and Goodspeed, *The Conspirators*, p. 134.
69. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 433.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 348.
71. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, *Old Diplomacy*, p. 114.
72. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 65.
73. Charques, *The Twilight of Imperial Russia* p. 113.

74. Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 98 and 114. See also p. 110.
75. Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia*, p. 154. See also p. 158.
76. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 114.
77. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 171-172.
80. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 42.
81. Machiavelli, *The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli*, vol. I, p. 254.
82. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 43.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
84. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 186.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
86. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 45.
87. *Ibid.*
88. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 133.
89. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. I, p. 130.
90. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 196.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
92. Brockway, *Non-co-operation in Other Lands*, pp. 62-65. Brockway's account is mostly based on F. A. Mackenzie's *Korea's Fight for Freedom*.
93. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, p. 941. See also Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945, passim*, and Crankshaw, *The Gestapo*, pp. 230-231.
94. Crankshaw, *The Gestapo*, p. 214.
95. de J. Haestrup, "Exposé," in *European Resistance Movements 1939-1945*, p. 160.
96. Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia*, p. 40. See also Schapiro, *The Communist Party . . .*, p. 28.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 70. For other examples of the general phenomenon, see also pp. 72, 98 and 216, and Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. 420.
98. Frederick Engles, *Anti-Dühring* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), p. 440.
99. Schapiro, *The Communist Party . . .*, p. 347.
100. Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands 1555-1609*, p. 56. Later under Philip in 1565 there was another lesson that repression may produce the opposite to the intended results. See *ibid.*, pp. 78-79.
101. Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. XI, *The Triumphant Empire: The Rumbling of the Coming Storm 1766-1770*, pp. 282-283.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 278; and Gipson, *The Coming of the Revolution 1763-1775*, pp. 201-202.
103. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XI, p. 305.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 190, and Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, pp. 155, 181-186 and 194.
105. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 305-311.
106. *Ibid.*, pp. 353, 360, 363, 366, 367, 373, 397, 425 and 430-431. It also produced, it is claimed, the first explicit call for an American union; from the town meeting of Providence, Rhode Island, a week after the news of the Boston

- Port Act reached America. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XII, p. 157.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 608.
 108. Gipson, *The Coming of the Revolution*, p. 227.
 109. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .* vol. XII, p. 160. There were, of course, other instances when punishments, or threats, produced increased defiance. For example, in 1774 Brigadier Ruggles, a magistrate at Hardwicke, Massachusetts Bay threatened to jail any man who signed a Covenant not to purchase or use British goods, a hundred men defiantly signed it. (Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 323.) In the summer of 1774, Salem held a town meeting in defiance of the Governor's orders. (Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol XII, p. 157.)
 110. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators*, p. 132.
 111. Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. I, p. 151.
 112. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*, p. 79.
 113. Ehrlich, "Ruhrkampen," in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*, p. 186.
 114. Quoted in Case, *Non-Violent Coercion*, p. 381.
 115. *Ibid.*, pp. 381-382.
 116. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 167.
 117. *Ibid.*, p. 193. See also pp. 165-166.
 118. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
 119. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
 120. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
 121. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" pp. 186 and 190.
 122. Brant, *The East German Rising*, p. 92.
 123. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
 124. Quoted in Roberts, "The Buddhist Revolt," MS p. 20.
 125. Roberts, "Buddhism and Politics in South Vietnam," p. 246.
 126. David Halberstam, *The Making of a Quagmire* (New York: Random House and London: The Bodley Head, 1965), p. 215.
 127. Quoted in Peck, *Freedom Ride*, p. 57.
 128. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, p. 143.
 129. Major Johns, "Baton Rouge: Higher Education - Southern Style," p. 89, in Peck, *Freedom Ride*.
 130. Paul Laprad, "Nashville: A Community Struggle," in Peck, *Freedom Ride*, p. 87.
 131. Farmer, *Freedom - When?*, pp. 69-70.
 132. Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in*, p. 234.
 133. *Newsweek*, 27 May 1963, cited in Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS p. 397.
 134. *Newsweek*, 20 June 1966, pp. 27-31.
 135. On the over-all struggle, see Sverre Steen, "*Universitetet i Ildlinjen*," in Steen, gen. ed., *Norges Krig*, vol. III, pp. 127-194.
 136. See *ibid.*, pp. 182-184.
 137. *Ibid.*, pp. 186 and 190.
 138. Lochner, ed., *The Goebbels Diaries*, pp. 542-544.
 139. *Ibid.*
 140. "Editorial Research Reports," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* 20 January 1937; quoted in Bernard, *Social Control in its Sociological Aspects*, p. 389.
 141. See Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 82, and 125-126, and Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 118.
 142. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, pp. 98-100.
 143. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 38.
 144. *Baltimore Sun*, 2 August 1966.
 145. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 136-137.
 146. *Ibid.*, pp. 166-167.
 147. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XII, pp. 346-349.
 148. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt*, p. 155.
 149. Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 308-309.
 150. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 87.
 151. C. Eric Lincoln, "The Strategy of a Sit-in," in Sibley, ed., *The Quiet Battle*, pp. 295 and 298.
 152. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt*, pp. 151-155.
 153. For an interesting discussion on this, see Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in*, pp. 276-303.
 154. Gregg suggests that in such conflicts with both sides using nonviolent action, success would go to the side with the greatest understanding of nonviolent action, the best discipline, and preparations, the most self-purification and love, the best understanding of society, the greater inner unity and strength, and the more respect from the other side and from the public. Gregg, however, emphasizes the mechanism of conversion and gives very little consideration to the wider social, economic and political pressures, often coercive, which may be involved in nonviolent action. Hence, further analysis is required. See Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 99-100.
 155. Harvey J.D. Siefert, "The Use by American Quakers of Nonviolent Resistance as a Method of Social Change," MS p. 145.
 156. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*, p. 80. For the specific cited changes in loyalty, see pp. 79-81.