

Sharp, Gene. 1973. The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part Three: The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher.

Chapter 13

Three Ways Success May Be Achieved

INTRODUCTION

Nonviolent struggle can only be successful when the necessary conditions exist or have been created. Despite the improvised character of most nonviolent action in the past, successes from which we can learn have occurred. Even failures can provide important insights. As understanding of the requirements for effectiveness grows, the proportion of successes is likely to increase. The question then increasingly becomes *how* success can be achieved.

The influences, causes and processes involved in producing success in nonviolent conflict are diverse, complicated and intermeshed. The determining combination of influences, pressures and forces will never be precisely the same, the possible combinations being infinite. It would be a distortion to impose on them an unnatural uniformity or an artificial simplicity.

It is, however, possible to distinguish three broad processes, or mechanisms, by which the complicated forces utilized and produced by nonvio-

lent action influence the opponent and his capacity for action and thereby perhaps bring success to the cause of the grievance group. These are *conversion*, *accommodation* and *nonviolent coercion*,¹ which we introduced briefly in Chapter Two. Other consequences of nonviolent struggle, affecting the actionists themselves and the long-term distribution of power in the society, will be discussed in the next chapter.

In *conversion* the opponent has been inwardly changed so that he wants to make the changes desired by the nonviolent actionists. In *accommodation*, the opponent does not agree with the changes (he has not been converted), and he could continue the struggle (he has not been nonviolently coerced), but nevertheless he has concluded that it is best to grant some or all of the demands. He may see the issues as not so important after all, the actionists as not as bad as he had thought, or he may expect to lose more by continuing the struggle than by conceding gracefully. In *nonviolent coercion* the opponent has not changed his mind on the issues and wants to *continue* the struggle, but is *unable* to do so; the sources of his power and means of control have been taken away from him without the use of violence. This may have been done by the nonviolent group or by opposition and noncooperation among his own group (as, mutiny of his troops), or some combination of these.

Advocates and practitioners of nonviolent action have differed in their attitudes to these mechanisms. All too often their attitudes have been oversimplified, focusing primarily on the extremes of complete conversion or full nonviolent coercion. Thus, exponents of a nonviolence derived from religious conviction who emphasize conversion frequently see nonviolent coercion as closer to violence than to their own beliefs. Exponents of nonviolent coercion (say, use of the general strike to achieve social revolution) often deny even the possibility of conversion, and see that approach as alien to their own efforts. There are also middle positions. The choice of a preferred mechanism will influence the conduct of the struggle, including the strategy, tactics and methods used, the public statements made, the "tone" of the movement, and the responses to the opponent's repression. A choice or preference by actionists of one of these mechanisms is possible and even necessary, whether on ethical or strategic grounds. In practice, however, matters are rarely clear and simple between pure conversion and strict coercion, as exponents of these extreme mechanisms would have us believe. Not only may the mechanisms be variously combined and play different roles in the various stages of the struggle; different persons and subgroups within the opponent group may be diversely affected or even unaffected by the nonviolent action. We shall return to

the ethical significance of these complexities later. First we must examine the three broad mechanisms of change themselves.

CONVERSION

"By conversion we mean that the opponent, as the result of the actions of the nonviolent person or group, comes around to a new point of view which embraces the ends of the nonviolent actor."² This change may be influenced by reason, argumentation and other intellectual efforts.³ It is doubtful, however, that conversion will be produced solely by intellectual effort. Conversion is more likely to involve the opponent's emotions, beliefs, attitudes and moral system.

A. Seeking conversion

While Gandhi did not in certain circumstances rule out actions which produced change by accommodation or even nonviolent coercion,⁴ he sought to achieve the change as far as possible by means which did not "humiliate" the opponent "but . . . uplift him."⁵ Gandhi's statements provide good illustrations of this objective of conversion. He wrote to the Viceroy in 1930: "For my ambition is no less than to convert the British people through nonviolence, and thus make them see the wrong they have done to India."⁶ On another occasion he wrote that a *satyagrahi* never seeks to influence the "wrong-doer" by inducing fear; instead the appeal must always be "to his heart. The Satyagrahi's object is to convert, not coerce, the wrong-doer."⁷ The aim of nonviolent action with this motivation is thus not simply to free the subordinate group, but also to free the opponent, who is thought to be imprisoned by his own system and policies.⁸

In line with this attitude, while maintaining their internal solidarity and pursuing the struggle, the nonviolent actionists will emphasize that they intend no personal hostility toward the members of the opponent group. Instead, the actionists may regard the conflict as a temporary, but necessary, disruption which will make possible deeper unity and cooperation between the two groups in the future.⁹ Gandhi said: "My non-cooperation is non-cooperation with evil, not with the evil-doer." He added that he wished by noncooperation to induce the opponent to cease inflicting the evil or harm so that cooperation would be possible on a different basis.¹⁰ "My non-cooperation is with methods and systems, never with men."¹¹ This aim of conversion has in certain situations had significant effects on the opponent group. Replacement of hostile personal attitudes by

positive attitudes will reduce the pressure on the opponent group to be defensively aggressive. "Thus the opponents may be influenced to engage in fewer acts of provocative hostility, and, in the long-run, some of their leaders and part of the membership may even become motivated to live up to the other group's view of them as potential allies."¹²

The extreme Gandhian emphasis on conversion is translated into action only rarely. However, efforts to convert sometimes occur in the absence of such a doctrine, and conversion sometimes occurs without conscious efforts. Also, conversion of *some* members of the opponent group (say, soldiers) may contribute to change by accommodation or nonviolent coercion.

Conversion efforts may sometimes take place side by side with the application of other nonviolent pressures, such as economic or political noncooperation. For example, even as Philadelphia merchants were in late 1765 cancelling orders already placed with British merchants and launching a campaign of economic noncooperation in an effort to obtain repeal of the Stamp Act, they sent a memorial to British merchants in which they urged those same merchants to help the Americans achieve repeal of the Act and the removal of certain commercial restrictions.¹³ Almost exactly three years later under comparable conditions a similar memorial was sent from Philadelphia, seeking support for repeal of the Townshend duties.¹⁴

The opponent group of course consists of many members and a variety of subgroups, and the nonviolent group will be unable to apply equal influences for conversion to all of these. Furthermore, the nonviolent group may deliberately choose to concentrate its efforts to achieve conversion on certain persons or subgroups in the opponent camp. When the most direct personal contact in the course of the struggle occurs between the nonviolent actionists and the opponent's agents of repression—his police and troops—the actionists may attempt to convert these agents, instead of the general public or the policy makers. For example, during the resistance to the Kapp *Putsch*, striking workers carried on an open discussion with troops serving the usurpers who, it soon turned out, could no longer completely rely on their own soldiers.¹⁵ Even in the East German Rising in 1953 demonstrators and strikers made significant, spontaneous and repeated appeals to police and troops, although there was no systematic effort to win them over.¹⁶

Variations will also occur in the type of influences utilized to induce conversion. One approach may be to change the social situation drastically, eliminating the opponent's power or profits, in order that he may see the ethical issues in his past policies in a new light. For example, when

an oppressor's economic gains are eliminated he may find it easier to see that exploitation is morally wrong. Gandhi sometimes spoke of this path to attitude change.

More often, however, nonviolent groups which have sought to convert have emphasized direct appeals to their opponent's better nature, as Gandhi put it.¹⁷ These appeals have not only been made with words, as in the Philadelphia examples, but have primarily utilized emotional pressures induced through the nonviolent actionists' own self-suffering, either at the opponent's hands (as in withstanding repression) or at their own hands (as in fasts). It is important to understand the rationale underlying this view.

B. The rationale of self-suffering

All nonviolent actionists who understand their technique accept the necessity of willingness to suffer and to persist in the face of repression. As has been discussed earlier, such willingness is the necessary price for maintaining resistance and possibly also a way to neutralize or immobilize the opponent's repression. Suffering in the context of the conversion mechanism is more than that, however. *Some* nonviolent actionists see an *additional* reason for acceptance of such nonretaliatory suffering: to them it is the main means by which the opponent may be converted to their views and aims. (Other nonviolent actionists, of course, reject that objective as undesirable, unnecessary or impossible, and instead stress change by accommodation or nonviolent coercion.)

Advocates of suffering to achieve conversion maintain that on some issues a strictly rational appeal to the opponent's mind will be inadequate, and insist that it is then necessary to appeal also to his emotions. Gandhi repeatedly argued along these lines:

I have found that mere appeal to reason does not answer where prejudices are age-long and based on supposed religious authority. Reason has to be strengthened by suffering and suffering opens the eyes of understanding.¹⁸

... if you want something really important to be done you must not merely satisfy reason, you must move the heart also. The appeal of reason is more to the head but the penetration of the heart comes from suffering. It opens up the inner understanding of man.¹⁹

He identified the appeal to the hearts of the opponent group as "evoking the best that is in them."²⁰ Bondurant explains it in these words: "Suffering operates in the satyagraha strategy as a tactic for cutting through

the rational defenses which the opponent may have built in opposing the initial efforts of rational persuasion . . ." In other words, suffering "acts as a shock treatment . . ." ²¹

It must be clear that just any kind of suffering is not likely to set in motion the processes which may lead to changes in the opponent's feelings, beliefs and attitudes. The suffering of nonviolent actionists has little or nothing to do with the suffering of those who passively accept their fate. For suffering to lead to conversion, Lakey points out, the opponent must experience feelings of identification with the nonviolent group. This identification in turn, he argues citing Freud, requires a new perception of a common quality between the two groups. Such perception depends not only on the actual suffering but on the way in which the nonviolent actionists behave prior to and during such suffering. Therefore, he continues, suffering by people who have demonstrated their bravery, openness and honesty, goodwill and nonviolent determination is far more likely to produce a significant sympathetic response in the opponent than is suffering by people who behave like cowards, and cringe, flee, lie and hate. ²²

The opponent's initial reactions to the suffering of nonviolent actionists may vary widely from situation to situation. Initial reactions are, however, often unstable and may be reversed. Self-suffering is likely to shatter normal indifference to the particular issue, producing instead (as it did in South Africa) extremes in reactions, "active emotions of hate or sympathy." ²³ In face of challenge, as noted earlier, the opponent group may first unite, ²⁴ but in face of the nonviolent actionists' suffering and other influences, that initial unity may be shattered as the actionists' demonstrated bravery and sincerity arouse sympathetic interest. ²⁵

The initial reaction of the general public may also be split, with the suffering evoking resentment among some, and pity among others. ²⁶ This pity may lead members of the public to see the suffering actionists as men of integrity, determination and goodwill, ²⁷ even while not agreeing with them. Suffering for a cause may also help move public opinion on the issues at stake, ²⁸ as was discussed in the previous chapter. That shift may in turn influence the attitudes of members of the opponent group to the issues at stake. It is in the nature of conversion of this type that a considerable number of influences will operate simultaneously and often unconsciously, over a period of time.

It is unlikely to be easy to endure the suffering which can induce conversion. The actionists may be helped to continue their struggle and to maintain the necessary discipline by awareness that their courageous suffering without counter-violence may help both to frustrate and immobilize the

opponent's repression and also to contribute to changes of attitudes and feelings. Hiller has pointed out correctly, however, that the sacrifice required of actionists must be "bearable," or depression will set in and their will will be broken. ²⁹ It is not solely the opponent who determines what is bearable, however. The sufferings which one group may find trivial may be intolerable to another. It is also true and very important that the sufferings which one group will find intolerable may be quite acceptable to another as the price of change. The will power, determination, beliefs and emotional response of the nonviolent actionists will help to determine, sometimes decisively, how much suffering is tolerable as the price of change.

Gregg also has pointed out that when nonviolent actionists understand the role of suffering in the dynamics of their type of struggle, and regard suffering as not simply a necessary risk, as in war, but also as an effective weapon for strengthening their cause, casualties will not lower their morale. ³⁰ Voluntarily accepted suffering for the sake of winning goals may instead enhance morale and unify the actionists and others in support of their objectives. ³¹ Summarizing the Gandhian view of suffering in this context, Kuper writes: "Hence, suffering being positively desired by the resisters becomes an armour against the tyrant rather than a weapon in his hands." ³²

In most types of nonviolent action suffering is not deliberately courted but neither is it avoided when it is a consequence of other appropriate stages of the campaign. ³³ There are, however, certain forms of Gandhian *satyagraha* which at times do seek suffering by provocative acts of physical nonviolent intervention or by fasts, for example. Even in these, however, Gandhi insisted that the suffering not to be sought for its own sake and argued that previous personal and social preparation were important in order to achieve maximum beneficial effects. Even in such cases of nonviolent provocation there is little sign that actions are undertaken for masochistic purposes. In their study of student civil rights workers in 1963 (especially of some who took dangerous actions and were severely attacked), Drs. Solomon and Fishman, both psychiatrists, reported: "Only very rarely have we heard of a personally masochistic demonstrator—emphasis in the movement is always on group values and goals." ³⁴

C. The barrier of social distance

The "social distance" between the contending groups—the degree to which there is or is not "fellow feeling," mutual understanding and sympathy—is important in the operation of self-suffering as a tool for convert-

ing members of the opponent group. At one extreme, if members of the nonviolent group are not even regarded as fellow human beings, the chances of achieving conversion by nonviolent suffering are likely to be nil. This barrier needs to be examined.

The closeness or distance between the contending groups will help to determine the effect of the suffering of the nonviolent group on members of the opponent group. If the opponent group sees the grievance group as members of "a common moral order," this perception is likely to encourage better treatment and a more sympathetic response to their challenge. Conversely, if the subordinates are regarded as outside such a common moral order, or as traitors to it, or as inferiors or nonhumans, the opponent group is more likely to be both cruel and indifferent to their sufferings.

Citing Simmel's analysis, Kuper points out that the possibility of conversion through suffering in nonviolent action will be influenced by the structure of the social system.³⁵ Kuper argues that whether the members of *both* the dominant and subordinate groups in the system are recognized as full human beings, or are regarded simply as members of some category, will be important. Not only will the perception by the dominant group of the subordinates as a class of inferior creatures block sympathy and empathy for their suffering, but also, if the members of the opponent group see *themselves* not as individuals but as members of some overriding collectivity, they will be less responsive to the sufferings of nonviolent actionists. Seeing themselves simply as parts of a very important whole (party, race, etc.) members of the opponent group will be likely to surrender their own sense of responsibility, standards of behavior, and right of moral judgment to the group, and to hide behind the policy or decision of their government, party or other collectivity. Suffering then becomes institutionalized, and may take relatively impersonal forms. Brutalized elements of the population become the agents for inflicting severe repression or brutalities on the nonviolent group, and the average citizen may be protected from emotional involvement by an insulating barrier of institutional procedures. Arguments that the members of the grievance group are inherently inferior may be consciously used to keep the average citizen indifferent to their suffering.

The greater the social distance, the fewer the "reality checks" on each group's picture of the other,³⁶ and the more likely that the conflict can proceed with relative indifference to the human suffering involved. Censorship and other controls over the media of communication may increase the difficulties of using suffering to overcome the social distance be-

tween the two groups.³⁷ Conversely, the more sympathetic feelings the two groups have for each other, the more difficult it will be for the opponent to use violence against the nonviolent group.

Illustrations of how subordinate groups can be treated inhumanly because they are regarded as nonhuman or outside the common moral order can be found in the behavior toward the Negro by the Ku Klux Klan member, toward the Jew by the Nazi, and toward the "enemy" in many wars. Even within the institution of slavery, the degree of cruelty varied, with the same social distance, being generally less when the master knew the slave personally, and greatest when slave traders or overseers regarded the slave simply as a commodity or as a subhuman species.³⁸ When people were "debtor slaves," i.e., were bound into slavery in their own country because of debts, they were usually treated more considerately than were foreign slaves.³⁹

Within the context of nonviolent action, a similar difference has occurred in repression and attitudes toward actionists who were members of the opponent's own people and toward actionists who were foreigners. For example, Harvey Seifert reports that during the New England Puritans' persecution of Quakers from 1656 to 1675 officials distinguished foreign Quakers from colonists who had become Quakers, penalties for colonist-Quakers being consistently more lenient than for Quakers who came from outside.⁴⁰

The role of social distance as an insulator against influence by suffering helps to explain why governments sometimes use police and troops who have as little as possible in common with the people they are to repress. For example, the Soviet government used non-Russian speaking troops from Far Eastern sections of the U.S.S.R., who could therefore not talk with Russian-speaking Hungarians, to repress the Hungarian 1956 revolution, after there had been considerable unrest and defections among the Russian and Ukrainian troops previously utilized.

Where a large social distance exists, the opponent may be insulated against empathy for the suffering nonviolent actionists by various interpretations of the suffering. Such misperceptions may be especially frequent in societies in which people already suffer a great deal *involuntarily* in the course of normal living.⁴¹ When the actionists deliberately court suffering for a cause, the opponent may, initially at least, regard their act of defiance which leads to suffering and the actionists' taking the initiative themselves in inviting suffering, as a kind of impudence and status-usurpation.⁴² By defying the opponent's expectations the challenge by self-suffering may therefore initially produce, not sympathy or pity, but hostile-

ity.⁴³ Alternatively, the nonviolent suffering may initially be interpreted as cowardice, the result of a "mental condition," or ridiculous. When the opponent group believes its dominance to be for the benefit of the subordinates, it may interpret the nonviolent suffering as an attempt to exploit its good nature by trying to arouse sympathy for a "bad" cause, or as the result of the subordinates being misled by subversive or foreign influences.⁴⁴ For example, the South African 1952 civil disobedience campaign was described by government supporters to be the result of Mau Mau influence, Russian Communism and Indian imperialism.⁴⁵

After a time, certain misperceptions of the self-suffering of nonviolent actionists may be recognized by members of the opponent group as inaccurate. Other misperceptions may, however, not be so quickly corrected. Which each of these will be, and why, will vary with the particular case. When the social distance between the groups is considerable, all of the misperceptions of the grievance group and the actionists are likely to aggravate the difficulty of converting members of the opponent group by sacrificial suffering. That effort may still have some effect on some members of the opponent group, especially over a long period of time.⁴⁶ But for short-term or less costly changes it may at times be necessary to bring the other mechanisms of change into operation also.

Recognizing the importance of social distance, nonviolent actionists have taken a number of steps to overcome and remove it. When members of the grievance group have seen certain of their traits to be undesirable in themselves and also objectionable to others—such as lack of cleanliness, rudeness, etc.—they may make deliberate efforts at self-improvement, as Gandhi often urged. Participation in the struggle by persons with high prestige and status may also help to penetrate the barrier of social distance.⁴⁷ When the barrier involves language and lack of acquaintance with the people and issues at stake, the nonviolent action involving self-suffering may be used as a means of communication. Gregg pointed to this possibility: "Nonviolent resistance . . . uses facial expressions, bodily gestures and the tone of voice, just as in all personal communication . . . conduct . . . itself may be a rapid, accurate, and efficient means of communication."⁴⁸ Even Gregg, who strongly favored conversion, recognized that this process may take place slowly or incompletely.

The opponent's fear of the challenge to the status quo, or his perception of the nonviolent group as a dangerous one with secret intentions and plans, work against the conversion. The nonviolent group which seeks a change in attitudes will need to relieve or counteract such fears. Nonviolent behavior is important here, but other means may also be helpful. For

example, when the opponent is afraid of large numbers, a specific demonstration may be restricted to high quality action by a few actionists in order to minimize, or remove, that impediment to the influence of self-suffering.⁴⁹ Miller has succinctly pleaded for this approach:

It is our task in any encounter with the opponent to strip away his fears and apprehensions and to deprive him of any rationalizations he may be using to distort the facts. It is distinctly to our advantage if we can summon sufficient empathy to see matters from his point of view so that we can help him to see the situation as it actually is.⁵⁰

In some cases, the self-suffering of the nonviolent actionists may itself finally break down the social distance between the groups, as a result of repeated actions which finally explode the old stereotypes of the group and gradually arouse respect from the opponent group. Some of the initial negative reactions to the suffering may gradually be modified and reversed. The fact that the suffering is *voluntarily* accepted,⁵¹ and that the actionists repeatedly demonstrate great bravery and heroism, may finally become decisive.

Just as an absence of respect for nonviolent actionists is a serious impediment to conversion by the self-suffering of the actionists, so a growth of respect can be an important step toward changed perceptions of the grievance group and the issues at stake. Respect does not automatically come with nonviolent behavior. Very courageous nonviolent actionists often gain respect from others, but in achieving that change it seems that while their nonviolence is important, their courage is primary. Indeed, their nonviolence may be perceived as a higher type of bravery. Their courage is more akin to the courage of brave violent fighters than to the behavior of people who use no violence but behave cowardly. Opponents are most unlikely to respect people who submit helplessly, or cringe or plead in fear of punishment. Respect for men with courage, and contempt for people who cringe, are especially likely responses from certain personality types which are most likely to be brutal in dealing with dissenters and resisters.

Bravery is so important in the context of nonviolent action that it has much in common with extreme courage demonstrated by violent resisters. The capacity of great bravery expressed in violence to arouse admiration from the most unlikely people is illustrated by the responses of two high Nazis to the Jews of the Warsaw ghetto rebellion of 1943. Even Adolph Eichmann, working hard at the extermination program, declared in total violation of Nazi racial theories that some of those Jews were "im-

portant biological material." That is, they had by their bravery demonstrated sufficient biological superiority to be important for "breeding" future generations, rather than being so biologically inferior and contaminating as to require extermination, as the Nazi ideology maintained. The Nazi police chief, S.S. Major-General Krueger, of the *General Government* (in the remnant of Poland), praised the endurance of the defiant Jews also.⁵²

In a different situation, Hitler too seemed moved by the courage of a rebel, in this case a defiant Nazi, Hans Frank, *Reichskommissar* for Justice for Germany and Governor-General of occupied Poland. Frank had split with the S.S. and after a personal friend, who was a Nazi official in Poland, had been executed without trial, Frank went on a stormy speaking tour of German universities in July 1942, advocating a return to constitutional rule. This was an act of defiance for which Frank might well have been executed, but although he was removed as *Reichskommissar* for Justice, Frank was kept as Governor-General and even won his fight with the S.S. Reitlinger writes that "Hitler had an uncanny respect" for a man who could remain defiant in the face of death.⁵³

These instances are very different from ideal nonviolent action; the Warsaw Jews were clearly violent and Frank was scarcely a model nonviolent actionist. But these instances do show that bravery and defiance can sometimes win respect even from the most unlikely persons. Some people have argued that by expressing heroism and courage nonviolently, nonviolent actionists may be braver than even courageous practitioners of violence, and thereby gain respect from the opponent through demonstrated courage, sincerity, nonretaliation and self-sacrifice.

Such bravery is likely to violate the opponent's stereotype of the nonviolent group. Some members of the opponent group may, Seifert suggests, feel more threatened by such an unexpected response, and hence react with more intense aggression, but others who are more open may begin to change to bring their perceptions closer to reality. The impact of such a dramatic demonstration and suffering, "combined with a comparative absence of personal threat, make this outcome more likely," Seifert writes. "Although perceptions always remain somewhat distorted, under these circumstances it is harder to maintain the bias of old stereotypes in full force . . . Under the conditions created by nonviolent resistance, man's capacity for unreality is more likely to be limited."⁵⁴

Farmer reports that newspaper and television accounts of the 1960 sit-ins in the United States presented images which reversed the common stereotypes of Negroes—stereotypes which extended beyond cowardice and

passivity. The students taking part in the sit-ins were well-dressed, well-mannered, studious and quiet, while the crowds of white boys outside were disorderly and trying to start trouble.⁵⁵ Solomon and Fishman made similar observations: the movement was destroying both the *Southern* stereotype of the "contented Negro," and the *national* stereotype of the "violent Negro."⁵⁶

When nonviolent actionists seek conversion through self-suffering, Miller argues, it is necessary to make "a maximum effort to establish rapport and to present the opponent with an image that commands respect and can lay a basis for empathy."⁵⁷ If a change of image and a growth of respect take place it may become possible for the opponent to "identify" with the suffering nonviolent actionist despite the former extreme social distance between the two groups. Such a breakdown of social distance has occurred both outside and within the context of nonviolent action.⁵⁸ The social distance between the orthodox Brahman Hindus and the untouchables in South India in the 1920s was about as great as can be imagined. Yet the 1924-25 Vykom temple-road *satyagraha* campaign ended sixteen months after it began with the Brahmans changing their attitude. This campaign, which was described in Chapter Two, persisted despite beatings, prison sentences, tropical sun and floods. The actionists sought not simply the right of the untouchables to use a road which passed the temple, but that the Brahmans should willingly agree to that change. In the end, the Brahmans said: "We cannot any longer resist the prayers that have been made to us, and we are willing to receive the untouchables."⁵⁹ This illustrates that under certain circumstances conversion is possible despite extreme social distance. For these cases, and the many more in which the barriers to conversion are not so high, it is important to examine *how* this conversion takes place.

D. Conversion through self-suffering

Because there has been so little research on conversion in nonviolent action it is impossible here to offer a full and accurate analysis of how conversion is achieved, when it is, or to give full consideration to all the important variations within this mechanism. It is, however, possible to summarize present insights into the process which raise hypotheses for further research and add to our understanding of the dynamics of the technique.

Conversion is, of course, not a single precise phenomenon. It includes various types of changes varying in their rational and emotional compo-

nents, operating on different people, and differing with the length of time the change has been in operation.

Conversion includes various changes in the opponent's attitudes, beliefs, feelings and world views. There may be changes in opinions and reactions toward the grievance group, for example, or toward themselves, or toward the issues at stake in the conflict, toward the repression, their own social system, or, finally, toward their own belief system or that of the actionists. The conversion may be primarily focused on one of these or involve all of them to a significant degree, or a combination of several of them.

Conversion results from differing influences and also varies in the degree of rationality and nonrationality involved; it seems to range on a continuum from a relatively rational change of attitude on the specific issue at stake to a change almost exclusively in the person's emotions and deepest convictions. The latter type may involve a revulsion against past policies and behavior, contrition and repentance, and a change in an entire outlook on life, including the adoption of new beliefs. This type is apparently much the rarest type of conversion, although it is the type most often discussed in the writings of actionists who believe in principled nonviolence and who seek conversion. Most cases of conversion fall at various points between these extremes.

Nor will all members of the opponent group be equally converted simultaneously. Some may not change at all. Although members of the general public of the opponent group may change their views and feelings toward the conflict or the grievance group and even ordinary soldiers may do so, the persons occupying the top political positions may not be moved in the slightest. Nonviolent actionists, far more than their violent counterparts, view their opponent as a heterogeneous group. Although headed sometimes by strong leaders who may be hard to influence, the actionists see the opponent group as consisting of diverse subgroups and people who may be far less committed to the objectionable policies than are the leaders. These sub-parts of the opponent group may be much more susceptible to influence in favor of the nonviolent group, and their conversions may prove to be highly important.

Furthermore, conversion of any type takes place over a time span and the process goes through various stages. This means that if the process is interrupted or halted at a certain point, although the opinions and feelings of the person will differ from what they were previously, they will also differ from those which would have developed had the conversion process been completed.

Although believers in principled nonviolence derived from religious sources most often are the exponents of conversion, this mechanism occurs in the absence of such beliefs and even when conversion is not deliberately sought. For example, most of the attitudes thought to be needed to achieve conversion were apparently absent in the Irish peasants' boycott of the now famous Captain Boycott, mentioned briefly earlier. Although economically ruined by the peasants' action in 1879, he returned in 1883 from New York to Ireland, but this time as a *supporter* of the Irish cause.⁶⁰ This does not show that the peasants' boycott alone had changed his opinions, but that his personal experience was bound to have played a role in his thinking about conditions in Ireland.

Theory and opinions from Gandhi and others on how conversion operates may best be understood if an example of change by conversion is described first: the Quakers' struggle in Puritan Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1656-75.⁶¹ When the Quakers attempted to proselitize in Puritan Massachusetts they became involved in a nonviolent action campaign for religious liberty. The Puritans regarded Quakerism as a "sink of blasphemies" and Quakers themselves as "ravening wolves." They were accused of defiance of the ministry and the courts, naked dancing, and a plot to burn Boston and kill the inhabitants. Perhaps most important, a grant of religious toleration would have ended the Puritan theocracy and political ideal. The Puritans believed they had a religious duty to persecute those who spread religious "error."

Two women Quakers were the first to arrive; they were sent back to England on the next boat. Two days later eight more Quakers arrived; despite harsh penalties the numbers constantly increased as they waged "a direct frontal attack." They met in private homes, tried to speak after sermons in churches, spoke during their own trials and from their jail cell windows, issued pamphlets and tracts, returned to the colony in defiance of the law, held illegal meetings, refused to pay fines, and when imprisoned refused to work at the cost of food being denied them. Despite expulsions, whippings through towns and executions, the Quakers repeatedly returned. One already banished on pain of death walked calmly into the court where another was on trial for his life.

Initially the general public and the theocratic leaders were united in favor of the persecution. Gradually, however, a split developed as the public began to see the Quakers in a new light. Sympathizers began to pay the jailers' fees and at night passed food to the Quakers through jail windows. The bearing of the Quakers as they were whipped and executed convinced people that they had "the support of the Lord" and were "the

Lord's people." The Governor expressed his determination to continue executions so long as the Quakers persisted.

Public unease increased. After a time that same governor even threatened to punish a jailer who had nearly killed an imprisoned Quaker by beating. The law on banishment under pain of death was modified to allow trial by jury. Later, opposition to enforcement of the law grew and after a woman Quaker was executed discontent increased. Finally, even the General Court (the legislature) began to weaken. The death penalty was virtually abolished. Although the laws became milder, it was difficult to obtain constables to enforce them. By 1675 in Boston the Quakers were holding regular Meetings undisturbed. The Quakers were now included in the category of human beings and a "common moral order," and religious liberty was then not far behind.

In a very different case, despite his rejection of nonviolence as a moral principle and his emphasis on economic and political forces, Nehru's experience forced him to conclude that something like conversion did at times take place in nonviolent struggle:

That it has considerable effect on the opponent is undoubted. It exposes his moral defences, it unnerves him, it appeals to the best in him, it leaves the door open for conciliation. There can be no doubt that the approach of love and self-suffering has powerful psychic reactions on the adversary as well as on the onlookers.⁶²

All writers on conversion by nonviolent action seem to see self-suffering by the actionists as the dominant factor which initiates conversion, but there are differences on whether the suffering directly initiates conversion or whether it does so indirectly. Sometimes such suffering is seen to operate *directly* on the consciences of members of the opponent group, and at other times the suffering is seen first to influence wider public opinion which then causes members of the opponent group to experience inner emotional conflict and to question their previous opinions and beliefs.

Gandhi sometimes spoke of this *indirect* type of conversion. In the case of the Vekom *satyagraha*, already described, he said: "The method of reaching the heart is to awaken public opinion."⁶³ The opponent's violence, then, first puts him in a bad light in the eyes of observers, and their disapproval contributes to the beginnings of inner uncertainty in the opponent himself. As Gregg put it:

With the audience as a sort of mirror . . . the attacker with his violence perhaps begins to feel a little excessive and undignified—even a little ineffective—and by contrast with the victim, less generous and in

fact brutal. He realizes that the onlookers see that he has misjudged the nature of his adversary, and realizes that he has lost prestige. He somewhat loses his self-respect . . .⁶⁴

The sufferings of the nonviolent actionists may also be a *direct* stimulus to inner change in the opponent, especially when the social distance between the groups is not great or can be overcome with time. Voluntary suffering for a belief or ideal, argues Gregg, is likely to induce in others feelings of "kinship with the sufferer"⁶⁵ and sympathy for him. If the severity of their suffering disturbs the opponent, awareness that granting the demands of the nonviolent actionists can quickly end the suffering may stimulate change. When the opponent starts to wonder if the demands of the nonviolent group are justified, he is on the way toward conversion.

The existence of a complex of strong emotions, which may swing between opposites, was regarded by Case as another factor facilitating conversion; this is said to make possible sudden rushes of sympathetic emotions such as admiration, remorse, compassion and shame. The changed views may focus on the violence of the repression or on the issues at stake.⁶⁶

Among the possible effects of the self-suffering of nonviolent actionists on the members of the opponent group are three: the sincerity of the actionists may become clear; their courage and determination may bring reluctant respect; and the old image of the group may be replaced by a new, more favorable, one.

Willingness to endure sacrifices—such as poverty, injury, imprisonment and even death—in furtherance of their beliefs or cause is likely to demonstrate the sincerity of the nonviolent actionists. Sacrifices incurred in *violent* conflict also demonstrate sincerity, as already discussed, but, it is argued, sympathy for the actionists is more likely when they are not also inflicting suffering on the opponent.⁶⁷ "To be willing to suffer and die for a cause is an incontestable proof of sincere belief, and perhaps in most cases the only incontestable proof."⁶⁸ Willingness of leaders of social movements to make visible personal sacrifices for their cause has also been called a test of their sincerity.⁶⁹

If the opponent recognizes the sincerity of the nonviolent group, this may be a very important step toward respect for them and toward a reconsideration of the issues. Gandhi saw respect of the opponent for the nonviolent actionists as an achievement which heralded approaching success. He argued that at the approach of this stage, the nonviolent actionists must conduct themselves with special care.

Every good movement passes through five stages, indifference, ridicule, abuse, repression, and respect. . . . Every movement that survives repression, mild or severe, invariably commands respect which is another name for success. This repression, if we are true, may be treated as a sure sign of the approaching victory. But, if we are true, we shall neither be cowed down nor angrily retaliate and be violent. *Violence is suicide* . . . power dies hard, and . . . it is but natural for the Government to make a final effort for life even . . . through repression. Complete self-restraint at the present critical moment is the speediest way to success.⁷⁰

The self-suffering of the nonviolent actionists may also contribute to changes in the opponent group's perception of themselves. At times, instead of seeing themselves as the brave heroes courageously defending their loved ones, principles and society against vicious attacks, the events may break through their psychological defences and force them to recognize that it is *they* who have harshly attacked courageous men standing firmly for their cause without either threats or retaliation. On one occasion King expressed his confidence in the power of such self-suffering to bring inner disturbance to the perpetrators of such cruelties.⁷¹

In certain circumstances repression of the nonviolent group may lower the self-esteem of members of the opponent group. This change may affect their will to continue the repression and the struggle generally, especially if the opponent's objectives are difficult to justify.

Intermediary stages of the conversion mechanism may lead to reduced violent repression. While continued and increasingly severe violence is more likely against a violent action group—violence thrives on violence—violent repression tends to be reduced when confronted with nonviolent resistance. Another source of reduced repression is the growth of respect for the nonviolent actionists which may, according to Gregg, lead the opponent unconsciously to imitate them by reducing his own violence.⁷² The absence of violence from the actionists may also lead individual members of the opponent group to reject a violent response; for example, during a lunch counter sit-in in Tallahassee, Florida, in February 1960, when tough-looking characters entered the store and looked as if they might attack the sit-inners, the waitress asked them to leave, and when some made derogatory remarks, she told them, "You can see they aren't here to start anything."⁷³

In some instances the opponent's anger at the nonviolent group may prove to be physically and emotionally exhausting. Such exhaustion, com-

bined with new inner uncertainties, may lead him to make mistakes in calculation and judgment, or may reduce his ability to make crucial decisions.⁷⁴

When the influences which may bring about conversion are first set into operation the opponent is unlikely to be conscious of them. Gandhi described this conversion process as three-fourths invisible, its effect being in inverse ratio to its visibility. This led, he argued, to more effective and lasting change in the long run.⁷⁵ These inner influences may grow until the opponent realizes that he has doubts and has begun to question the rightness of his attitudes and behavior. When he becomes aware of these inner conflicts, the conversion process has already reached an advanced state. "If you want to conquer another man," wrote Gregg, "do it . . . by creating inside his own personality a strong new impulse that is incompatible with his previous tendency."⁷⁶ This inner conflict may be increased because the opponent finds that his usual outlook on life, his ways of behaving and responding to subordinates, opponents and crises—in which he has always had confidence—have failed to produce the expected results. In a very real sense this places him in a new world which requires that he reconsider many things.⁷⁷

The willingness of nonviolent actionists to suffer rather than to submit may therefore lead the opponent to look once again at his dogma and policies, as Case suggests.⁷⁸ Initially, he may have intended to revel in their correctness, but now he may see them differently. Attitudes and feelings may then change, including some which seemed rigid. Some changes will appear as apparently sudden reversals of outlook.⁷⁹

Such results will, of course, not take place easily, or even at all. There will be strong counterpressures, psychological, economic, political or other, to continue the old policy and activities, and the opponent may decide to do so no matter what the cost. He may also become brutalized and callous to the sufferings of others, and his mind may become closed to rational arguments.⁸⁰

In order to avoid such brutalization, advocates of conversion in nonviolent action have often counseled restraint, and recommended that the opponent not be pushed too far at a single point. They have urged that he not be required to choose too often between being repeatedly brutal and acquiescing to demands. Whole campaigns, and even individual demonstrations, may therefore be planned to be implemented in phases which are intended to reduce hatred, to avoid extreme fury, and to provide time for one phase to work before the next begins. Such a phased campaign gives the opponent opportunity for reflection and thought, and is an effort

to show him that not he personally but his policy is under attack. The choice of methods, the numbers participating at a given time and point, the tactics employed, attitudes conveyed, and even small personal gestures, may all be important in this attempt. These refinements may facilitate the operation of the conversion mechanism despite unfavorable circumstances by showing the opponent the sincerity of the actionists and by removing his misconceptions about them and their objectives.

As the opponent's first point of reference is himself,⁸¹ he must keep a favorable self-image. His justification for the policy at issue and his dismissal of the grievance group as nonhuman or as outside the common moral order may have helped him to do this. If as a result of the nonviolent group's self-suffering, he begins to doubt his policy and also begins to see the members of the grievance group as fellow human beings, it will be difficult to keep that favorable self-image. In order to do so he must then change the policy and cease certain behavior.

The conflict may thus be resolved by a change of the opponent's will, aims and feelings. "He ceases to want in the same way the things he wanted before; he ceases to maintain his former attitude toward the resisters; he undergoes a sort of inner conversion."⁸² The inner conflicts and uncertainty—which are certainly not easy to bear—may lead the opponent to become receptive to suggestions from the nonviolent group as to an honorable way out of the particular conflict,⁸³ as well as to new ideas which may lead to more fundamental conversion.⁸⁴ In such circumstances the opponent may be considerably more subject to influence and suggestion than the nonviolent group.⁸⁵ Gregg also argues that the emotional and moral perturbation taking place in the opponent during the struggle may bring to the surface "moral memories" which he had long since forgotten and which had ceased to influence his behavior; these, he suggests may also influence the opponent to make a more humane response to the conflict.⁸⁶ The conversion process may finally lead the opponent to come to see the situation "in a broader, more fundamental and far-sighted way . . ." ⁸⁷ Gregg describes this change confidently in these words:

Nonviolent resistance demoralizes the opponent only to re-establish in him a new morale that is finer because it is based on sounder values. Nonviolent resistance does not break the opponent's will but alters it; does not destroy his confidence, enthusiasm and hope but transfers them to a finer purpose.⁸⁸

Gandhi's views on this mechanism may be illuminating. Although he

fully recognized the importance of power in social and political conflicts and in certain circumstances justified action which would produce nonviolent coercion, Gandhi had full confidence in the power of voluntary suffering to convert the opponent. "Given a just cause, capacity for endless suffering and avoidance of violence, victory is certain." Another path was concentration over a long period on the reform of the nonviolent group itself; this would produce various influences and finally result in the opponent being "completely transformed."⁸⁹

The results of voluntary suffering might not appear at once,⁹⁰ and especially difficult cases might require extreme suffering. This did not, however, alter his view: even "the hardest heart" must melt before "the heat of nonviolence," and there was no limit on the capacity of nonviolence to generate heat.⁹¹ Gandhi credited the brave suffering of the Boer women of South Africa in concentration camps set up by Lord Kitchener with changing the English attitude toward the Boers and making changes possible in British government policy for that country.⁹² Gandhi applied this same principle in India, incorporated in nonviolent action. He wrote in 1930: "If the people join me as I expect they will, the sufferings they will undergo, unless the British nation sooner retraces its steps will be enough to melt the stoniest heart."⁹³

When results from voluntary suffering were not immediately forthcoming, Gandhi, perhaps using circular logic, explained that there had been not enough suffering, or not enough time, or the suffering had not been pure enough. Granted the quality of the suffering, however, Gandhi saw an almost mathematical relationship between the suffering and the results. "Success is the certain result of suffering of the extremest character, voluntarily undergone."⁹⁴ "Progress is to be measured by the amount of suffering undergone by the sufferer, the purer the suffering, the greater is the progress."⁹⁵ At times he even defined the technique of *satyagraha* as "a method of securing rights by personal suffering . . ."⁹⁶

It is not necessary to share Gandhi's extreme view of the power of voluntary suffering to achieve conversion to recognize that under some circumstances this mechanism may be effective. However, an oversimplified view of conversion, whether held by exponents of that mechanism, or by sceptics, is bound to lead to misunderstanding and the unwarranted dismissal of conversion as a genuine mechanism of change in certain circumstances. It is important to recognize, as Ebert points out, that "if it occurs at all, it does so by way of intermediate stages."⁹⁷ Furthermore, there are distinguishable factors which may influence the operation of the conversion mechanism, and it is to these that our attention now turns.

E. Some factors influencing conversion

The factors influencing the operation of the conversion mechanism in nonviolent action may be roughly divided into external factors and internal factors—external factors being those inherent in the conflict situation and outside the direct control of the nonviolent group, and internal factors being those under the direct control of the nonviolent group and involving either its internal condition or the activities and gestures it may make in efforts to convert the opponent.

1. External factors

These factors will include the following:

(a) The degree of conflict of interest. If the issue at stake in the conflict is highly important to the opponent, the nonviolent actionists can reasonably expect that it will be more difficult to convert him to their point of view than if the issue at stake is of relatively little importance to the opponent. Janis and Katz describe this as "the degree of conflict of interest relative to the community of interest between the competing groups."⁹⁸ The gravity of the issues at stake, and the likely consequences if the demands of the nonviolent group are granted, may significantly influence the resistance of members of the opponent group to efforts to convert them.

(b) Social distance. In accordance with the earlier discussion, whether or not the subordinates are regarded by the opponent as members of a common moral order will be an important factor influencing the possibility of conversion.

(c) The personality structure of the opponents. Certain types of personalities may be particularly susceptible to conversion by nonviolent self-suffering, while others may be extremely resistant to such influences. (This does not imply that sadists, for example, would simply revel in the opportunity to inflict cruelties against nonviolent actionists, for other factors in the situation, especially the absence of masochistic fear, cringing, etc., among them, may make the relationship unsatisfactory for sadists.) Research, which takes into consideration both existing knowledge of personality structure and change, and also the nature of this technique of struggle, could contribute significantly to understanding the personality factor.

(d) Beliefs and norms—shared or diverse. If the opponent and the nonviolent actionists share common beliefs and norms of behavior, they will provide "a higher tribunal, standing above the parties" to which the nonviolent group can appeal with the expectation of understanding and perhaps sympathy.⁹⁹ Where such common ideals and standards are absent, however, and especially where the opponent group is committed to belief

in the right or duty of domination, there will be "formidable barriers" to the conversion of the opponent.¹⁰⁰

(e) The role of third parties. Whether or not the opponent group cares about praise or condemnation from third parties, and whether and how those groups respond to repression of the nonviolent actionists, will frequently be an important factor influencing conversion.

These five factors may at times be supplemented by others. Even when these five factors are unfavorable to conversion, a nonviolent group might be able to achieve conversion anyhow. However, the combination of a high degree of conflict of interest, great social distance, unfavorable personality types in the opponent group, absence of shared beliefs and moral standards, and unsympathetic third parties would make conversion exceedingly difficult.

2. Internal factors

According to Gandhian thinking, there are at least eight factors influencing conversion which are under the control of the nonviolent group.¹⁰¹

(a) Refraining from violence and hostility. If the nonviolent group wants to convert the opponent, it generally emphasizes the importance of abstention from physical violence and also from expressions of hostility and antagonism toward the opponent. Deliberate rejection of violence in favor of nonviolent means is regarded as having an important psychological impact on the opponent which may influence his conversion,¹⁰² removing or reducing his fear of the grievance group, and hence increasing his ability to consider its arguments and to respond sympathetically to its plight. Gandhi believed that when the Englishmen came to feel that their lives were protected, not by their weapons but by the Indians' refusal to harm them, "that moment will see a transformation in the English nature in its relation to India . . ." ¹⁰³ When an opponent feels a campaign to be a personal attack on himself—psychological if not physical—he is more likely to resist changes in his outlook and policies, and to be more imperious to appeals from the actionists and third parties, than when the actionists are able to convince him they bear no personal hostility and are concerned only with policies.¹⁰⁴

(b) Attempting to gain the opponent's trust. Trust of the nonviolent actionists may significantly increase the chances of conversion. This trust may be consciously cultivated, in at least four ways. 1) Truthfulness, in the sense of accuracy of one's word. Statements to the opponent and to the public should be as correct as possible. In describing the grievance, for example, the facts should not be exaggerated or falsified. All statements to the opponent should be accurate with no attempt at deception. 2)

Openness concerning intentions. Truthfulness is carried to the point of telling the opponent one's plans for action and broader intentions.¹⁰⁵ In addition to the factors discussed in Chapter Nine openness also has beneficial psychological influences on the opponent. 3) Chivalry. If the opponent experiences some unrelated difficulty, such as a natural disaster, the non-violent action may be postponed, or he may even be offered assistance. This "don't hit a man when he's down" behavior may help gain his trust and promote conversion.¹⁰⁶ 4) Personal appearance and habits. Offensive appearance and behavior may, as Sir Herbert Read, the anarchist, observed, "create a barrier of suspicion and reserve which makes the communication of any truth impossible."¹⁰⁷ To gain trust, the actionists may try to make their appearance and behavior inoffensive without compromise on the issues at stake. If the opponent does gain more trust in the actionists, his own insecurity may be reduced, and hence his desire for dominance.¹⁰⁸

(c) Refraining from humiliating the opponent. Humiliation is an unlikely step toward sympathy, voluntary change and conversion. Therefore, if the nonviolent group aims at conversion, it must refrain "from any action that will have the effect of humiliating the rival group."¹⁰⁹

This implies various "do's" and "don'ts" for the nonviolent actionist. For example, *don't* rely on numbers to convert the opponent. Numbers as such may inspire fear, and hence work against conversion. Even an outward "victory," produced by massive numbers may produce only obstinacy or bitterness. *Do* rely on the power of a few determined, nonviolent, self-sacrificing volunteers, or even a single one. Gandhi believed one actionist might "induce a heart change even in the opponent who, freed from fear, will the more readily appreciate his simple faith and respect it."¹¹⁰ Seeking conversion, actionists also sometimes may refrain from pressing home a "victory" within their reach while persisting in action, as at Vykom, until the opponent is ready to agree to the objective.

(d) Making visible sacrifices for one's own cause.¹¹¹ If the suffering is to have the greatest impact on the opponent, it should, argued Gandhi, be offered by people directly involved in the grievances. This is more likely to be perceived as sincerity, and therefore influence conversion, than if they are unwilling to do so, or if some other people are taking the risks. Even major sacrifices by other people who are, or are regarded as, "outsiders," may have comparatively little effect. Their participation may even arouse hostility as "outside intervention" and "trouble-making." The opponent may even see the whole campaign as originating with outsiders, not with the people directly affected by the grievance.¹¹²

Generally, in Gandhi's view, outside aid should be limited entirely to expressions of sympathy. When the aim is conversion of the opponent, sympathetic nonviolent action should be offered only in special circumstances. During the Vykom *satyagraha*, a Christian became leader of the nonviolent actionists at one point. Gandhi then urged that participants should be limited to Hindus (including untouchables).

The silent loving suffering of one single pure Hindu as such will be enough to melt the hearts of millions of Hindus; but the sufferings of thousands of non-Hindus on behalf of the "untouchables" will leave the Hindus unmoved. Their blind eyes will not be opened by outside interference, however well-intentioned and generous it may be; for it will not bring home to them the sense of guilt. On the contrary, they would probably hug the sin all the more for such interference. All reform to be sincere and lasting must come from within.¹¹³

Self-sufficient nonviolent action by members of the grievance group was also necessary, Gandhi argued, to show the opponent his dependence on that group and that "without the cooperation, direct or indirect, of the wronged the wrong-doer cannot do the wrong intended by him."¹¹⁴

There are also some indications from the experience of nonviolent action movements in the Deep South that outsiders may arouse more antagonism than local people in initiating projects.

(e) Carrying on constructive work. Constructive program work and other efforts at self-improvement within the subordinate group may help to achieve conversion. Janis and Katz describe such work as "maintaining a consistent and persistent set of positive activities which are explicit (though partial) realizations of the group's objectives."¹¹⁵ Such work may demonstrate sincerity and social concern. "Participation (*as individuals*) in wider community activities which are widely regarded as necessary in the common welfare" is listed by Robin Williams as one means by which a vulnerable minority group can reduce the majority's hostility towards it.¹¹⁶

It is relatively difficult to dismiss humanitarian and constructive work and to distort the motives behind it; when people who engage in such work are also practicing nonviolent action, the opponent may take their statements and behavior more seriously.

(f) Maintaining personal contact with the opponent. Nonviolent actionists seeking to convert the opponent repeatedly emphasize the importance of maintaining personal contact with him. Such contact may at times also be maintained by personal letters, or by discussions and con-

ferences. Such contact may help keep personal relations friendly despite the conflict and achieve maximum accurate understanding of the other's views, motivations, aims and intentions.¹¹⁷ Personal contact may at times contribute to conversion by both emotional and rational processes.

(g) Demonstrating trust of the opponent. The nonviolent group seeking to convert the opponent will, in Gandhian thinking, adopt "a consistent attitude of trust toward the rival group and [take] overt actions which demonstrate that one is, in fact, willing to act upon this attitude."¹¹⁸ When the nonviolent group has high expectations of the opponent's intentions and future behavior, those expectations, it is believed, may encourage him to live up to them. Such high expectations of the opponent may also place the nonviolent group in a favorable light with third parties. The actionists do not, however, play down their indictment of the opponent's policies, or temporize about the justification for nonviolent action.¹¹⁹ However, negotiations and other means of settling the conflict short of direct action will be fully explored, and the nonviolent group will deliberately appeal to the best in the opponent to facilitate a response in similar terms. All suggestions by him for negotiations will be seriously explored, even when they may be intended as diversions from the direct action campaign.¹²⁰ It is, of course, not necessary to suspend direct action for negotiations to take place, and if, after an agreement has been reached, the opponent does not fulfill his pledges, nonviolent action can always be resumed.

(h) Developing empathy, good will and patience toward the opponent. Conversion will be helped if the actionists can achieve an inner understanding of the opponent, ". . . a high degree of empathy with respect to the motives, affects, expectations, and attitudes of the members of the rival group."¹²¹ With such empathy, the nonviolent actionists may be more able to anticipate the opponent's moves and reactions, and will also have a more sympathetic understanding of his outlook, feelings and problems—while disagreeing with him on policy.

The actionists can then refrain from action which would needlessly antagonize the opponent and, positively, in small ways—a glance, tone of voice, letter—or in large ways communicate the nonviolent actionists' lack of personal hostility and even their personal friendship in the midst of battle. This may aid the opponent's conversion. Demonstrated respect for the individual members of the opponent group, and understanding of their outlook and problems may in turn make them more sympathetic and less hostile to the nonviolent challengers.

The expression of personal goodwill for the opponents may express

itself in such ways as continuation of personal friendships in the midst of the struggle or efforts not to inconvenience the opponent. Bondurant reports instances in India "of proper satyagrahis refusing to take action in the mid-day sun because of the hardship this would work on European opponents who were less accustomed to extreme heat, and again, of satyagrahis postponing an action to spare the Englishman for his Easter Sunday services and celebration."¹²² When the police raided the *satyagrahis* camp at Dharasana in 1930, following two days of bloody repression which had turned the camp into a hospital, one of the *satyagrahis* wrote: "Some twenty policemen surrounded us. We were going on with our own work. As it was hot we gave our police brethren a drink of cold fresh water. On the mornings of the 21st and 22nd, we had given them our blood as patiently and quietly."¹²³ Nonviolent actionists intent upon converting the opponent must be willing to demonstrate considerable patience with him. This patience with him as an individual is combined with impatience with his policies.

F. Conversion may not be achieved

There are a variety of reasons why the self-suffering of nonviolent actionists may not convert the opponent. Sometimes only partial success may be achieved, while in other cases the struggle may end without outward indications that any degree of conversion has been achieved. Such factors as the conflict of interest, the social distance, absence of shared beliefs and norms, and the personality structure of members of the opponent group may have established a broad and deep chasm between the groups, so unfavorable to conversion that the suffering of the nonviolent group is insufficient to achieve conversion. Even Gregg—who stresses conversion—admits that "in the case of a very proud and obstinate opponent, there may have to be a complete outward defeat before the change of heart really takes place . . ."¹²⁴ Others acknowledge that certain groups may be especially difficult, or impossible, to convert. Miller singles out unofficial and anonymous attackers drawn from "the worst elements among the opponent's masses" who may bomb, shoot, beat and kill nonviolent actionists (he recommends appeals to "the more responsible elements in their community to quarantine them.")¹²⁵ Members of a terroristic secret police, such as the Gestapo, must also be expected to be nearly immune to conversion attempts, while ordinary conscript soldiers may be vulnerable. While it is easy on the one hand to dismiss the possibilities of conversion with excessive enthusiasm, it would also be naïve not to recognize that in some cases conversion will never take place.

Frequently all three mechanisms of change operate in the same situation. In many campaigns success cannot be attributed solely to conversion or nonviolent coercion, or even to the middle mechanism, accommodation. Instead, change may be produced by some combination of these mechanisms.

Sometimes, for example, although conversion is attempted, the conflict may produce other forces of change which contribute to accommodation or nonviolent coercion so rapidly that the aims of the actionists will be achieved before the conversion process has had time to work. In those cases in which the passive acquiescence of the grievance group has in the past been largely responsible for the grievance, their noncooperation and defiance may in itself be sufficient to abolish the objectionable policy or practice. The halt to their submissiveness may result from a "change of heart" within the members of the *grievance group*, rather than the different type of "change of heart" in the *opponent group*, which is more often discussed in the literature. The withdrawal of support by the grievance group may have a rapid impact on the operation of the system. "The unifying power of nonviolent resistance may often take effect more rapidly than does the breaking down of the morale of the opponents."¹²⁶

Some advocates of conversion as the only ethical or moral mechanism in nonviolent struggle have a very simplistic view of the nature of change in nonviolent action, of possible courses of action, and of the ethical problems posed by the differing mechanisms. Some of these are revealed by the power of noncooperation even when conversion is sought. Extreme exponents of conversion reject all change which is not willingly agreed to by the opponent leadership. But where the victims of an objectionable policy have ended it by noncooperation and such moralists still insist on conversion, they must also advocate a resumption of cooperation and continuance of the "evil" to which they object until the leaders of the opposition group are converted. Should the grievance group, with its new sense of self-respect, courage and determination, then be counseled to continue to submit while the opponent's domination or objectionable social practices continue?

Related ethical problems concerning conversion are raised when some members of the opponent group are converted while others, such as the top officials or leaders, have not been changed. The effort to achieve conversion is not likely to win over *all* members of the opponent group simultaneously. The opponent's troops, administrators and general population may be converted before the top leaders. Soldiers, for example, carrying out repression against the nonviolent actionists may, despite their discipline and habits of obedience, come to question the use of such re-

pression against nonviolent people. Such questions, combined perhaps with fraternization with the nonviolent group, may lead them to think for themselves, and then to lower their morale and finally to question orders, disobey and perhaps even mutiny.¹²⁷ A similar process may take place among the opponents' administrators, home civilian populations, and even officers. When such members of the opponent group begin to protest at the opponent's policies and finally refuse to obey orders, should they resume their roles as tools for maintaining the objectionable policies until their top officials have been converted?

Nonviolent actionists may, of course, not even attempt to convert the opponent. Or they may be willing to try to do so, while being ready after a certain point to use full nonviolent coercion. Nonviolent action can achieve social and political objectives by means other than conversion.

Difficulties in producing conversion have led many exponents and practitioners of nonviolent action, among them James Farmer, to reject the attempt to achieve it, and to concentrate on change by accommodation or nonviolent coercion: "In the arena of political and social events, what men feel and believe matters much less than what, under various kinds of external pressures, they can be made to *do*."¹²⁸ Attention now turns to the mechanisms of change by *accommodation* and *nonviolent coercion*.

ACCOMMODATION

Accommodation as a mechanism of nonviolent action falls in an intermediary position between conversion and nonviolent coercion. In accommodation the opponent is neither converted nor nonviolently coerced; yet there are elements of both involved in his decision to grant concessions to the nonviolent actionists. This may be, as has been suggested, the most common mechanism of the three in successful nonviolent campaigns.¹²⁹ In the mechanism of accommodation the opponent resolves to grant the demands of the nonviolent actionists without having changed his mind fundamentally about the issues involved.¹³⁰ Some other factor has come to be considered more important than the issue at stake in the conflict, and the opponent is therefore willing to yield on the issue rather than to risk or to experience some other condition or result regarded as still more unsatisfactory. The main reason for this new willingness to yield is the changed social situation produced by the nonviolent action. Accommodation has this in common with nonviolent coercion. In both mechanisms, action is "directed toward . . . a change in those aspects of the situation

which are regarded as productive of existing attitudes and behavior.”¹³¹ This means that the actionists

. . . operate on the situation within which people must act, or upon their perception of the situation, without attempting directly to alter their attitudes, sentiments or values. The pressure for a given type of behavior then comes either from (a) revealing information which affects the way in which individuals visualize the situation, or from (b) actual or potential alteration of the situation itself.¹³²

In nonviolent coercion the changes are made when the opponent no longer has an effective choice between conceding or refusing to accept the demands. In accommodation, however, although the change is made in response to the altered situation, it is made while the opponent still has an effective choice before him, and before significant nonviolent coercion takes place. The degree to which the opponent accepts this change as a result of influences which would potentially have led to his conversion, or as the result of influences which might have produced nonviolent coercion, will vary. Both may be present in the same case. Sometimes other factors not capable of leading to either extreme may contribute to achieving accommodation.

A. Violent repression seen as inappropriate

The opponent may become convinced that despite his view of the rights and wrongs of the issues at stake in the conflict, continued repression of the nonviolent group by various types of violence is inappropriate. The suffering of the nonviolent actionists may have moved him to the point where, although not converted, he sees them as fellow human beings against whom the continued infliction of violence is no longer tolerable. Or he may feel that his violence is losing him “face” among third parties whose opinions may be important to him, and that if he continues the repression, he will lose still more. As Seifert explained it,

Humanitarians in government or in the general population may oppose the cause of the resisters, but also want to protect an image of themselves as decent, tolerant persons. In order to protect the second . . . they may yield on the first. For them the costs of terrorization and brutality have become greater than the costs of . . . whatever the resisters were contending for. Or opponents may . . . no longer consider the central issue to be as important as they once did . . . They would still like to have their own way on [it] . . . but . . . continuing the struggle is not worth the trouble.¹³³

The change of opinion among Montgomery, Alabama, whites is an example of this type of accommodation. While still favoring segregation at the end of the bus boycott, many of them could no longer countenance extreme violence, such as bombings and shootings, to support it.¹³⁴ A similar reaction was noted by correspondent Negley Farson in India in 1930. His dispatch published on June 23 said:

“Where is this going to end? What can we do with people like this?” These are some of the questions which at clubs, home, offices and on the streets Europeans in Bombay are now asking each other, many of them appalled by the brutal methods police employ against Mahatma Gandhi’s nonviolent campaign.¹³⁵

Four days later it was reported that the very Englishmen who had six weeks earlier been the “damn-well-got-to-rule” type had now come to say, “Well, if the Indians are so determined to have dominion status as all this, let them have it and get on with it.”¹³⁶ A similar development occurred in the American woman suffrage movement. Seifert reports that many people

. . . who objected to militant tactics or to woman suffrage, . . . objected even more to cruel handling of them The suffragists quoted an unnamed congressman as saying, “While I have always been opposed to suffrage I have been so aroused over the treatment of the women at Occoquan [a prison] that I have decided to vote for the Federal Amendment” When a choice had to be made between supporting the cause of the militants and cruelly suppressing them, many people preferred the former.¹³⁷

The opponent may thus find that, although he is perfectly capable of continuing the repression and although he still has not agreed with the demands of the nonviolent actionists, “the campaigner is not really so bad after all and that, all things considered it ‘costs too much’ to suppress the campaigner.”¹³⁸ He may thereby end the still unresolved inner conflict produced by the behavior of the nonviolent actionists.¹³⁹

B. Getting rid of a nuisance

Sometimes opponents may grant the actionists’ demands, or make major concessions, simply because they regard the group, or certain consequences of the conflict, as a nuisance which they wish to end. Lakey has argued that “when the campaigner succeeds in projecting an image of himself as a ‘nuisance’ and not as a ‘threat,’ he is close to a resolution

of the conflict.”¹⁴⁰ Seifert writes that some Americans may favor accommodation in face of nonviolent action because, for example, they are more devoted to orderly community life than to the issues, because they want quiet and an end to continued demonstrations; even segregationist parents may prefer open integrated schools to closed segregated ones. With these priorities, such persons “therefore detach their support from repressive policies.”¹⁴¹

Sometimes when repression against nonviolent actionists is proving unsuccessful and frustrating, the government may itself conclude that the group is more of a nuisance than a threat, and that therefore partial or full concessions are in order.

The toleration of Christians in the Roman Empire seems to have resulted from this type of accommodation. The edict of toleration, issued by the Roman Emperor Galerius in April 311 A.D. frankly admitted that the attempt to get the Christians to return to the State religion, which had been reinforced by bloody repression, had not been successful. In granting toleration, the Emperor appears not to have been motivated by a sudden conversion to the principle of religious liberty, much less being coerced into making concessions. Rather, it appears, he wished to end the constant source of irritation posed by the Christians who would not bend to the Emperor. The reconsideration of the status of the Christians was made, the edict stated, in the context of various other arrangements “which we are making for the permanent advantage of the state.” The edict spoke of the “willfulness” and “folly” of the Christians who “were making themselves laws for their own observance . . . and in diverse places were assembling various multitudes.” Although in face of the repression many had given in and others had been “exposed to jeopardy,” “very great numbers” had refused to yield. The edict stated that therefore, following the pattern of clemency and pardon granted to others in the past, “Christians may exist again, and may establish their meeting houses, yet so that they do nothing contrary to good order.”¹⁴² There is other evidence that this edict was not, as the Christians then claimed, an act of repentance, but an act of State policy influenced by the lack of success of the policy of repression.¹⁴³

C. Adjusting to opposition in his own group

As discussed repeatedly above, one likely consequence of nonviolent action is to create or deepen internal dissension and opposition over policies and repression within the opponent’s group. These internal disagreements may become so serious that the leaders of the opponent group find

it to their domestic political advantage to grant some or all of the demands of the nonviolent actionists. This is especially likely if such opposition is expected to grow, and it therefore seems best to cut the ground from under it. In some extreme cases failure to do so could result in the power-holders’ being removed from their official positions. In such cases, Seifert points out, the officials “would prefer to continue the suppression, but they cannot do so and remain in office.” Given that choice “they unwillingly give up the repression.”¹⁴⁴ This does not imply that such internal opposition within the opponent’s own group will always be successful, nor that a change in government will never be involved.

Although such opposition was a very important factor in achieving repeal of laws against which the American colonists were using economic and political noncooperation, Lord Chatham’s plan of conciliation (which would have made the colonies autonomous, but subordinate, states within the Empire) failed to win approval of Parliament in early 1775, a crucial period before a major shift in the colonies to violent struggle.¹⁴⁵ As has already been shown, however, opposition in the opponent’s own camp was highly important in achieving the withdrawal of French forces from the Ruhr, following electoral defeat for the French government produced in part by dissension over the occupation and repression. (German willingness to call off the noncooperation was obviously also important.) There are wide variations in the extent of internal opposition which is required to produce change and the forms in which it may be expressed.

D. Minimizing economic losses

The opponent may find it to his interest to accommodate to the demands of the nonviolent actionists, without either conversion or nonviolent coercion, if his economic position is important to him and the struggle is affecting his wallet more than would concessions. This is an extremely common motive in settlements of strikes and economic boycotts, when the objectives are improved wages and working conditions. (Various illustrations of this factor in accommodation may be found in Chapters Five and Six.)

Economic motives for settlement may also be important, however, in other cases where they are less obvious, and even when economic demands are not present or are secondary. Thus in American civil rights campaigns both economic boycotts of white-owned stores and peaceful demonstrations which discourage shoppers from buying in the area where they were held have sometimes helped Southern white businessmen to favor concessions to the Negro demands.¹⁴⁶ For example, during a sit-in campaign in Atlanta between November 25 and mid-December 1960,

Christmas buying was down sixteen percent, almost ten million dollars below normal.

Repeal of the Stamp Act, achieved partly because of support from British merchants, was certainly influenced by the effects of the American colonists' cutting off trade and refusing to pay commercial debts to those merchants. A Bristol merchant reported in August 1765, for example: "The present Situation of the Colonies alarms every Person who has any Connection with them The Avenues of Trade are all shut up We have no Remittances, and we are at our Wit's End for Want of Money to fulfill our Engagement with our Tradesmen."¹⁴⁷ The merchants' petitions for modification or repeal of the relevant acts emphasized this economic motivation,¹⁴⁸ and the repeal statute itself stated that continuation of the Stamp Act would be accompanied by ". . . many Inconveniences, and may be productive of Consequences greatly detrimental to the Commercial Interests of these Kingdoms . . ."¹⁴⁹

Economic motives for a settlement proved effective in achieving a victory for African bus boycotters in South Africa in 1957. Africans reported for work as usual during the boycott, but walking ten miles or more each way between their homes in Alexandra township and their jobs in the city of Johannesburg inevitably reduced their productivity. Despite the obstinacy of the Nationalist government, businessmen and industrialists became worried, and their intervention finally led to a settlement which gave victory to the Africans, as Luthuli reports:

A stage was reached when an honorable conclusion became a possibility, as a result of a set of proposals made by the Chamber of Commerce—the fatigue of workers was not doing production any good. To put it briefly, the Chamber of Commerce appeared willing to do what the adamant Government refused to do, which was to subsidise the [bus] company indirectly rather than place a new burden on poor folk.¹⁵⁰

E. Bowing gracefully to the inevitable

In other instances of accommodation, the opponent may concede because he sees inevitable defeat. He may, therefore, wish to bow to change gracefully, avoiding the humiliation of defeat and perhaps salvaging more from the situation than might be possible at a later stage. The degree of choice the opponent has in such a situation may vary. In some cases, the social and political situation may have so changed that while the opponent cannot be said to be nonviolently coerced it would nevertheless be most difficult for him to pursue an earlier intended course of action. This

happened, for example, to the recommendations of the British government's Simon Commission concerning the future political development of India. The Commission had begun its work early in 1928, and, in face of widespread boycott and refusal of assistance by the Indians, concluded its work over a year later. By the time its report was published in June 1930, however, the three-month-old national civil disobedience movement had so changed the Indian political situation that it was impossible for the British even to attempt to follow the Commission's recommendations. "The report . . . was dead before it was born."¹⁵¹

In other cases, the opponent may decide to accommodate himself to the nonviolent actionists while he still has some freedom of action. If he expects the nonviolent movement to grow significantly in strength, he may be inclined to accede to the demands voluntarily. Strength may include numbers but, as discussed earlier, encompasses much more.

In some situations, the opponent may accede relatively easily to the demands of the nonviolent actionists if he anticipates that otherwise he will face a really powerful movement capable of causing considerable difficulties and perhaps of winning despite repression. The motivation for accommodation in this case may not be simply to bow to the inevitable, but to prevent the activists and the rest of the population from realizing by experience the power of which they are capable when united in nonviolent noncooperation and intervention.

This motivation is illustrated in Faulkner's novel, *A Fable*, which describes troops of both sides in World War I defying their generals, mutinying and bringing the war to a sudden halt. The threat implied in the troops' action was deeper than the mere stopping of the war, however. The more severe threat was the possibility that troops and people generally would learn that they were *able* to stop wars if they wanted to do so. The group commander in the novel saw this clearly:

We can permit even our own rank and file to let us down on occasion; that's one of the prerequisites of their doom and fate as rank and file forever. They may even stop the wars, as they have done before and will again; ours merely to guard them from the knowledge that it was actually they who accomplished that act. Let the whole vast moil and seethe of man confederate in stopping wars if they wish, so long as we can prevent them learning that they have done so.¹⁵²

After a struggle has reached an advanced stage, the opponent's fear of the awareness of people's knowledge of their own power may make him determined *not* to make concessions. For example, in January 1775

Lord Chatham's plan of conciliation with the American colonies was opposed in the House of Lords by the Earl of Suffolk for essentially this reason: victories for the colonists would give them confidence to demand independence. Suffolk condemned the First Continental Congress, which had adopted a noncooperation program:

. . . the whole of their deliberations and proceedings breathed the spirit of unconstitutional independency and open rebellion . . . Now, therefore, was the time to assert the authority of Great Britain, for . . . every concession on our side would produce a new demand on theirs; and in the end, bring about that state of traitorous independency, at which it was too plain they were now aiming.¹⁵³

Fear that the people would learn their power also appears to have been one of the major obstacles to reaching a settlement of the Bardoli peasants' revenue-refusal campaign in 1928, waged against the government of Bombay Presidency. In this instance nearly the entire population of 87,000 had stood together and effectively blocked the government's will. More extreme repression might have caused the local campaign to spread to all India. There seemed little the government could do except to concede defeat. But that was difficult. Therefore, though the settlement finally agreed upon meant in practice that the government would grant the peasants' demands, it did not openly state that the demands were granted. The government was much concerned with "saving face" and with finding a formula which would grant the demands of the *satyagrahis* without directly admitting the government's defeat. This was done by establishing an Enquiry Committee whose eventual recommendations meant that there was virtually no increase in the revenue in Bardoli.¹⁵⁴ It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it was not simply an empty gesture to support the prestige of the government, but a desire not to admit defeat in face of determined nonviolent action—an example which in the India of unrest and turmoil of 1928 might have had the most dangerous consequences for the British *Raj*.

The factors influencing accommodation may be summarized as the degree of conflict of interest, all factors influencing the conversion mechanism, actual and potential support for the nonviolent actionists and their cause in the opponent's group and among third parties, the degree of effectiveness of the opponent's repression and other countermeasures, economic losses produced by the conflict, the estimated present and future strength of the nonviolent actionists, and the estimated chances of victory and defeat and their consequences.

But not even accommodation may be achieved, for there are clearly some types of opponents who may be unwilling to grant any demands of the nonviolent group. Even if they know that they may be finally defeated, such opponents may prefer to remain firm to the end. For these cases, too, the question arises as to whether nonviolent action can win except by a change of will in the opponent? Is there such a thing as *nonviolent coercion*?

NONVIOLENT COERCION

In some cases of nonviolent action, the opponent is neither converted nor does he decide to accommodate to the actionists' demands. Instead he may be determined to win full victory against them. Under some circumstances he may do so, or he may at least achieve temporary success in crushing the actionists. Failure of both conversion and accommodation does not, however, always mean victory for the opponent. The demands of the nonviolent group may also be achieved *against* the will of the opponent, that is, he may be *nonviolently coerced*. This type of nonviolent change has often been neglected in favor of the other two mechanisms.

As James Farmer has pointed out, when change by conversion and accommodation is believed to be unrealistic, neglect of the mechanism of nonviolent coercion has left the field clear for advocates of violence:

Perhaps we at CORE have failed to show how effective and virile nonviolence can be . . . We must show that nonviolence is something more than turning the other cheek, that it can be aggressive within the limits a civilized order will permit. Where we cannot influence the heart of the evil-doer, we can force an end to the evil practice.¹⁵⁵

Roughly speaking, nonviolent coercion may take place in any of three ways: 1) the defiance may become too widespread and massive to be controlled by the opponent's repression; 2) the noncooperation and defiance may make it impossible for the social, economic and political system to operate unless the actionists' demands are achieved; 3) even the opponent's ability to apply repression may be undermined and may at times dissolve. In any of these cases, or any combination of them, despite his resolution not to give in, the opponent may discover that it is impossible for him to defend or impose his objectionable policies or system. In such an instance, the change will have been achieved by nonviolent coercion.

A. The concept of nonviolent coercion

The concept of coercion is not limited to the effects of threat or use of physical violence. Neither the *Oxford Dictionary* nor the *Webster Dictionary* suggests that its definition is restricted to the impact of that pressure or force which comes from physical violence. On the contrary, it is often made clear that coercion can be effected by nonphysical pressures including moral force.¹⁵⁶ Instead of violence, the key factors in coercion are: 1) whether the opponent's will is blocked despite his continued efforts to impose it, and 2) whether the opponent is *able* to act in an effort to implement his will. These two aspects are emphasized by Paullin and Lakey. "Coercion is the use of either physical or intangible force to compel action contrary to the will or reasoned judgement of the individual or group subjected to such force."¹⁵⁷ "Coercion . . . is taking away from the opponent either his ability to maintain the status quo or his ability to effect social change."¹⁵⁸ The concept of "coercion" is thus a very broad one, which clearly includes the imposition of certain conditions by means of nonviolent action without the opponent's agreement.

There is, however, a vast difference between nonviolent coercion and what might be called violent coercion. As Bondurant points out: "The difference between violent coercion in which deliberate injury is inflicted upon the opponent and nonviolent coercion in which injury indirectly results is a difference of such great degree that it is almost a difference of kind."¹⁵⁹ Involved in the former is the deliberate intention of *inflicting* physical injury or death; in the latter, the coercion largely arises from noncooperation, a refusal of the nonviolent group to submit despite repression, and at times removal of the opponent's ability to inflict violence: "nonviolent coercion forces the opponent to accept the [nonviolent actionists'] demands even though he disagrees with them, has an unfavorable image of [the nonviolent group], and would continue resisting if he could."¹⁶⁰ In such cases the nonviolent actionists have so grown in numbers and strength, or the opponent's sources of repressive sanctions have been so weakened, or both, that the opponent is unable to continue to impose his will on the subordinates.¹⁶¹ The opponent can no longer wield power contrary to the wishes of the nonviolent group.

Nonviolent coercion is not simply a creation of theoretical speculation. Nor is it even a forecast of future potentialities of the technique based on extensions of previous experience. Despite the improvised nature of most past cases of nonviolent action, nonviolent coercion has sometimes occurred. In other cases it has nearly taken place. Noncooperation has sometimes been so effective that temporary paralysis of the opponent's power has been achieved, but total collapse of his regime did nevertheless not

result. The regime may have regained ground because of the actionists' failure to capitalize strategically on the situation, the introduction of resistance violence or other disruptive influences, or some other factor. For example, as described earlier, effective British power in several of the American colonies was for a time paralyzed and it even collapsed in the face of noncooperation.

A similar situation existed at certain points in the Russian 1905 Revolution. *The Times* in London reported at the end of October: "The nation is still in passive revolt, and the Government is incapable of enforcing even the semblance of authority."¹⁶² The Great October Strike, described above, was so effective and inclusive that the government was for a while unable to govern.

For five days Nicholas II and his advisors found themselves virtually isolated at Peterhof, facing a country that appeared to be gripped by some strange paralysis. It was this situation that in the final instance induced the Tsar to issue the constitutional manifesto of 17 October—a turning-point in the 1905 revolution and a landmark in Russian history.¹⁶³

The 1920 Kapp *Putsch* against the new Weimar Republic is a much clearer case of this mechanism. The general strike and political noncooperation made it impossible for the usurpers to govern, despite their successful occupation of Berlin. They were unable to win the assistance of those persons and groups whose help was essential. Without that assistance and the submission of the people, the Kappists remained an impotent group, pretending to govern a country whose loyalty and support were reserved for the legal government. The *Putsch* therefore simply collapsed.

Despite a limited amount of violence, the February 1917 Russian Revolution, to which reference has repeatedly been made above, provides another example of success through nonviolent coercion. There were massive strikes—on February 28 nearly a quarter of a million were on strike in Petrograd alone. There were massive peaceful street demonstrations in which the people talked with the soldiers trying to win them over, and even the Bolshevik leaders tried to prevent violence, which they saw would only provide an excuse for extreme repression. Revulsion at obeying orders to fire on such crowds contributed to unrest and to the mutiny of the Tsar's troops. When reinforcements were sent to replace ineffective or disobedient troops, they dissolved into the crowds. Soon organized government forces ceased to exist. The Commander of the Petrograd Military District, General S.S. Khabalov, was unable even to rely on the troops which had not disappeared. When he realized his powerlessness, he "probably did

not even know to whom he could have surrendered." Meeting on the 27th, the Council of Ministers experienced "a sense of impotence and lassitude." Rodzyanko, Chairman of the Duma Committee, declared "the old regime has turned out to be impotent," while others asserted that it had fallen. On the night of March 2, Nicholas II quietly signed an act of abdication for himself and his son. The Tsarist government had been "dissolved and swept away."¹⁶⁴

Economic shutdowns and other noncooperation produced two other cases of nonviolent coercion, the nonviolent paralysis in 1944 of the dictatorships of Martinez in El Salvador and of Ubico in Guatemala, described in Chapter Two. These cases involved far less violence than the February 1917 revolution, and their coercive character is unmistakable.

B. Withdrawing the sources of political power

The theoretical analysis of the sources of political power and their withdrawal by noncooperation, which was developed on Chapter One, now merges with our analysis of the dynamics of nonviolent struggle. In this section we shall recall the sources of political power which have already been discussed and examine how each of these may be restricted or severed by nonviolent action. Some of the examples which illustrate the restriction or severance of the particular source of power are from cases of nonviolent coercion, while others simply show the potential of nonviolent struggle to affect the particular power source. The discussion in this section will show the practical relevance of the earlier power analysis and will also help to explain how nonviolent coercion is possible. It is precisely the remarkable convergence of the necessary sources of political power with the ways in which nonviolent action strikes at the opponent's strength and position which gives this technique the potential for high effectiveness and greater political power than violence.

As the analysis in Chapter One showed, political power emerges from the interaction of all, or several, of the following sources of power, each of which derives from the cooperation, support and obedience of the subjects: *authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources and sanctions*. As was noted, changes in the degree to which these sources are available to the ruler will determine the degree of the ruler's political power. Our earlier catalogue of the methods of nonviolent action and our analysis of the dynamics of this technique show that these sources are potentially highly vulnerable to a widespread, yet qualitative, application of nonviolent action.

It is the capacity of the nonviolent technique to cut off these sources of power which gives it the power of coercion. The precise ways in which these sources of power are restricted or severed, and the extent to which they are cut, will vary. This technique can both restrict and sever the availability of those sources of power to the opponent, and also reveal the loss of those sources by other means. This technique becomes coercive when the people applying it withhold or withdraw to a decisive degree the necessary sources of the opponent's power. Nonviolent action makes possible "coercion through nonparticipation."¹⁶⁵ This potential is of the greatest political significance and requires detailed attention, even at the risk of repeating points made earlier, to show how each of these sources of power may be cut off.

1. Authority Nonviolent action affects the opponent's authority in three ways: 1) it may show how much authority the opponent has *already* lost, and a demonstrated major loss of authority will by itself weaken his power; 2) nonviolent action may help to undermine his authority *still further*; and 3) people who have repudiated his authority may transfer their loyalty to a rival claimant in the form of a parallel government, which may in turn weaken his authority yet more as well as create or aggravate other serious problems. Any of these consequences for the opponent's power may be serious.

Bloody Sunday—which produced a loss of authority—was followed by a warning to the Tsar from Minister of Finance Vladimir Kokovstev that something had to be done at once to regain public confidence, and also by the expressed fear of Count Witte, chairman of the Committee of Ministers, that the "aureole of the ruler would be destroyed" if Nicholas II did not publicly dissociate himself from the day's events.¹⁶⁶ Their warnings proved correct. Katkov points also to the Russian liberals' campaign over some years of denouncing and discrediting the autocracy, that is destroying its authority, as paving the way for the success of the February 1917 "popular rising and the mutiny of the Petrograd garrison [which] resulted in the bloodless collapse of the monarchy . . ."¹⁶⁷

In his account of the East German Rising, Brant observes:

To the people of the Soviet Zone it [the declaration of the state of emergency by the Red Army, not the East German regime] was confirmation of what they already knew: after seven years in command the Red republicans were still dependent on power lent them by their protectors. But lasting domination depends less upon power than upon authority; power demands constant submission, and submission can

quickly turn to *mutiny*. Authority requires and is granted respect, which in time of trouble and unrest is confirmed in willing obedience.¹⁶⁸

If, in an extreme case, loss of authority in a system or regime may lead to recognition of the authority of a rival, nascent regime, and therefore the transfer of loyalty and obedience from the old to the new government. (At times loyalty may also be transferred, not to a rival regime, but to a more abstract authority, as a religious or moral system, or to a principle or ideology.)

A parallel government will emerge only in unusual instances of non-violent action in clearly revolutionary situations. To be successful, the new government must possess widespread and deep support, and the old regime must have lost its authority among the vast majority of the populace. However, when a parallel government develops in a serious way, the opponent's *remaining* authority and power will also be severely threatened.

Such a parallel government obviously faces a number of difficult problems, and whether it succeeds or not will depend on how they are answered. Little analytical work has been done to date on the factors leading to success or failure of this particular method, or on the ways in which, when successful, the replacement may take place.

2. Human resources Nonviolent action may also cut off the human resources necessary to the opponent's political power. Usually, in "normal times," rulers assume that they will receive general obedience and cooperation among the subjects who will obey and do all the things that need to be done to maintain them as rulers and to enable the system to operate. The widespread practice of nonviolent action, however, may shatter that assumption. The sheer numerical multiplication of non-cooperating, disobedient and defiant members of the subordinate group and general population is likely not only to create severe enforcement problems but also to influence the ruler's power position. Nonviolent action is likely to lead not only to an increase in the refusal of consent among the subordinates directly affected by the grievance, but also to a related withdrawal of consent among the opponent's usual supporters (assuming there is a distinction between the two.)

This withdrawal of human resources will be most effective in 1) conflicts within the opponent's country in which the noncooperation of his own home population denies him the only available source of the human assistance he requires, and 2) in conflicts, as in a foreign occupation, in which the opponent is denied the assistance of *both* population groups,

that is his usual supporters (the home population) and the grievance group (the people of the occupied country). However, even when two population groups are involved, and only *one* of these (as in an occupied country) withholds its human assistance, the noncooperation may nevertheless prove effective given the presence of certain other favorable conditions.

The increased withholding of human resources both in absolute and proportionate terms may lead to a disastrous situation for the opponent. These human resources, along with other sources of power, are likely to be reduced simultaneously with an increase in the demands upon that power which have been produced by the growth of noncooperation and defiance. The opponent then may lose control of the situation and the regime may become powerless. When this happens in politics nonviolent action has produced in the political arena results comparable to an effective strike in the industrial arena. Nonparticipation may paralyze the opponent's political system. This potentiality was clearly foreseen by Gandhi:

I believe, and everybody must grant, that no Government can exist for a single moment without the cooperation of the people, willing or forced, and if people suddenly withdraw their cooperation in every detail, the Government will come to a stand-still.¹⁶⁹

For major periods during the Russian 1905 Revolution the situation was completely out of the control of the government and the police were powerless to intervene, so massive was the popular defiance.¹⁷⁰

In face of massive nonviolent defiance in Peshawar in April 1930 and the Garwali mutiny, already cited, the British temporarily gave up the attempt to control the city and withdrew their troops, abandoning the city for nearly ten days until reinforcements were available.¹⁷¹

The Devlin Commission's report to the British Government in 1959 revealed that the real reason for the 1958 Emergency in Nyasaland (now called Malawi) was fear that widespread African noncooperation and disobedience would lead to collapse of the government—not the "murder plot" which was so widely publicized at the time. By early March the situation reached the point where "the Government had either to act or to abdicate."¹⁷² The Commission declared: "The decision to suppress Congress, we think, owed more to the belief that its continued activities were making government impossible than to the feeling that it was, or might be, a terrorist organization."¹⁷³

3. Skills and knowledge People do different jobs, have different skills and knowledge, and a particular regime or system needs some of these more than others. A withdrawal, therefore, by key personnel, tech-

nicians, officers, administrators, etc., of their assistance to the opponent (or their *reduced* assistance) may have an impact on the opponent's power quite disproportionate to the numbers actually noncooperating.

Refusal of assistance by key subjects may make it difficult for the opponent to develop and carry out policies appropriate to the situation he faces. This may lead to the acceptance of policies which prove to be political mistakes or to an inability to implement chosen policies, or difficulties in doing so.

For example, during the Inquisition imposed by Spain's Charles V on the Netherlands which Spain then ruled, the opposition of officials and magistrates, as well as of regular citizens, seems to have been decisive in blocking its implementation. In 1550 there was an attempt to impose the most severe measure yet, the "edict of blood," which imposed the death sentence for all trespasses. It proved, however, impossible to carry out the edict on a large scale. Pieter Geyl reports that both officials and magistrates opposed it and declined to give their cooperation. "In the opinion of those who designed the system, religious persecution in the Netherlands never worked anything but defectively."¹⁷⁴

Gandhi maintained that if the Indians who held official posts under the British *Raj* were to resign them, the result would probably be the end of foreign rule without the need for the noncooperation of the masses. The alternative for Britain, he said, would be a pure despotic military dictatorship which, he argued, Britain did not dare contemplate.¹⁷⁵ Pleas were often made during the Indian struggle for officials to resign.¹⁷⁶ The key contribution made to the defeat of the Kapp *Putsch* by the noncooperation of civil servants and the refusal of experts to join the new cabinet has already been described above. The German government in 1923 recognized the special role of civil servants in the official passive resistance struggle against the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, as it forbade all State, provincial and local authorities and civil servants from obeying the occupation officials' orders.¹⁷⁷

Doubtless in some political and social situations the chances of the administrators and officials—the bureaucracy—shifting their loyalty are greater than in other situations, but if it happens, it may prove decisive. The opponent's political power may be weakened also by internal conflicts within his own regime, both at upper and lower levels. These conflicts may be independent of the nonviolent action, or may be accentuated by it, or perhaps even created by it—as on such questions as whether to make concessions and what repression should be applied. While the regime may give the impression to the outside world that it is firmly united, the

actual situation may be quite different, with or without a major nonviolent action movement.

The theoretically omnipotent Russian Tsar, for example, in 1904 could neither impose his will on his advisors nor stop their intrigues and disputes.¹⁷⁸ The split inside the Soviet Communist Party and the regime in 1924-27 is another example.¹⁷⁹ Various splits also occurred within the Nazi regime over policy and administration of the occupied areas of the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁰ Khrushchev's admission of disputes within the Russian leadership on how to react to the Hungarian Revolution is confirmation that such conflicts may exist in response to a major challenge outside the regime. The mere existence of such internal conflicts under various conditions may accentuate the impact of nonviolent action.

The analysis of the dynamics of nonviolent action suggests that for a variety of reasons such internal conflicts may be *more* probable in face of major nonviolent action, although documentary proof is at present not available. Where they occur, such internal conflicts in the opponent's regime will affect detrimentally the degree to which the regime's full potential of skills, knowledge, insight, energy, etc., is available for dealing with the challenge.

4. Intangible factors Such factors as habits of obedience, political beliefs and the like may be significantly threatened by widespread nonviolent action. Such a movement involves the destruction of the habit of *unquestioning* obedience and the development of conscious choice to obey or disobey. This development would tend to make the opponent's political power more dependent upon the active and deliberate support of the subjects.

Nonviolent action may also be associated with changes in outlook and political beliefs. Nonviolent action in some situations (not necessarily the majority) *reflects* the spread among the subjects of views which challenge officially blessed doctrines. In most situations, however, the actionists are likely to be concerned instead with either particular grievances or a single broad political principle or objective, or with both. Even such cases may contribute to *further* erosion of unquestioning belief in an official doctrine. In such a struggle, events may refute official dogmas. For example, effective nonviolent challenge to the dictatorship may refute the view that violence is omnipotent. Or, the doctrine that the dictatorship reflects the will of the "people," or is a "workers' State," may be questioned when the general population, or the workers, demonstrate in the streets against it, go on strike, or noncooperate politically. Or, a belief that the dictatorship is benevolent and humanitarian may be shattered by

repression against nonviolent people whose demand seems reasonable. The degree to which members of the population as a whole, and particularly members of the dominant group (the government, the Party, etc.) will be able and willing to re-examine the official political ideology will vary. At times firm adherence to the official ideology may ensure that repression is swift and harsh, although this may be a temporary phase. In other conflicts the actionists may be seen as trying to implement the "real" principles underlying official doctrines, while the existing regime is viewed as violating and distorting them to support despicable policies.

This discussion is only illustrative of ways nonviolent action may alter the intangible factors which help to secure the subjects' obedience and to preserve the ruler's power.

5. Material resources Nonviolent action also may regulate the degree to which material resources are available to the opponent. These resources include control of the economic system, transportation, means of communication, financial resources, raw materials, and the like. The capacity of nonviolent action to impose economic penalties on the opponent should already be clear, for of the 198 methods of this technique described in earlier chapters 61 are directly economic, boycotts, strikes or intervention. In addition certain other methods may also have indirect economic effects, as from political disruption or by increasing costs of enforcement, or by losing goodwill for the opponent, or public confidence, so that third parties withhold loans, investments, trade and the like. A view popular among economic determinists—that nonviolent action is inevitably ineffective and irrelevant because financial and material factors determine the course of politics—is therefore based upon a fundamental gap in their understanding of this technique.

The Townshend duties, against which the American colonists complained so harshly, had been imposed to reduce the burdens on the British taxpayer by raising revenue in North America. The colonists' campaign of noncooperation not only blocked achievement of that objective, but also imposed additional economic losses on the Mother Country. A correspondent (probably Benjamin Franklin) pointed out in the London *Public Advertiser* on January 17, 1769, that only a maximum revenue of £3,500 had been produced in the colonies, while the British business loss due to the American nonimportation and nonconsumption campaign was estimated at £7,250,000. He also pointed to the possibility of war if the policy were continued, which would take the British at least ten years to win, cost at least £100,000,000, and leave a loss of life and a legacy of hatred. In Britain by that time, says Gipson, ". . . most men in public life were

persuaded that to attempt to collect such duties in face of colonial opposition was economically unsound and politically unwise."¹⁸¹

It would be possible to offer innumerable examples from the two centuries since 1769 in which nonviolent action has inflicted such material losses on opponents that their economic, and consequently their power position, were both placed in jeopardy. Many examples described in Chapters Five and Six are of this type, especially of generalized strikes, general strikes and economic shutdowns.

However, only one more example of how nonviolent action affects the economic resources of the opponent will be offered: the nonviolent Indian struggles against British rule. These economic losses are in the main attributed to three sources: direct revenue refusal, increased expenditure for administration and enforcement, and deliberate economic boycotts.

During the Indian 1930-31 struggle, as a result of tax refusal and boycott of goods providing government revenue, and with increased expenditure to deal with the civil disobedience movement, the British regime faced deficits in the provincial governments. At various times the government of the Punjab faced a deficit of Rs. 10,000,000, the Bombay government faced a deficit of Rs. 10,250,000, the Central provinces Rs. 5,000,000, Madras Rs. 8,700,000, Bengal Rs. 9,482,000 and Bihar Rs. 4,200,000.¹⁸² Gandhi's *Young India* commented: "When we check the nourishment from passing from the victim to the parasite the latter naturally weakens and dies while the former revives."¹⁸³ It is clear that revenue refusal was an important aspect of that movement.¹⁸⁴

Year	Total Exports of the United Kingdom to British India in Millions of Pounds
1924	90.6
1925	86.0
1926	81.8
1927	85.0
1928	83.9
1929	78.2
1930 (boycott year)	52.9 ¹⁸⁵

People who argue that Gandhi's nonviolence had nothing to do with the British leaving India, that the real reasons were instead economic, erroneously assume that there was no contact between the two. There was,

however, a close relationship, which included an immediate reduction of trade and profits.

A survey of exports to India over several years is instructive.

For certain specific items the decrease in imports from Great Britain between 1929 and 1930 ranged from eighteen percent to forty-five percent.¹⁸⁶ The Secretary of State for India told the House of Commons at the end of 1930 that the general depression in world trade accounted for a drop of twenty-five percent in exports to India, while he credited a drop of a further eighteen percent to the Congress' boycott.¹⁸⁷ Even eighteen percent is a significant figure, but the boycott may have been even more effective. Imports of British cotton cloth to India dropped far more that year than imports of cotton cloth from all foreign countries combined.¹⁸⁸ Between October 1930 and April 1931, when the boycott was at its height, there was a decline of eighty-four percent in imports of British cloth. Lancashire millowners and workers petitioned the Secretary of State for India to "do something about India."¹⁸⁹

These cases are simply illustrative, and quite mild at that. Large-scale strikes and economic shutdowns affect much more severely the economic resources available to the opponent and the degree of political power he can wield, as the Great October Strike of 1905 or the 1944 economic shutdowns in El Salvador and Guatemala illustrate. International consumers' boycotts and embargoes may also influence the outcome of the struggle.

6. Sanctions Even the opponent's ability to apply sanctions may on occasion be influenced by nonviolent action. We saw in Chapter One that fear of the ruler's sanctions is one of the reasons for obedience. We also noted that the threat or use of sanctions does not necessarily produce obedience, and that they can be neutralized by massive defiance.

In addition, sanctions as a source of the ruler's power may be reduced or removed by nonviolent action by those who help to provide the sanctions. Usually, this means that police and troops carry out orders for repression inefficiently, or disobey them completely. Sometimes the actions of others may also cut off the supply of weapons and ammunition, as when foreign suppliers halt shipments, or when strikes occur in domestic arms factories and transport. These means of control may be very important in certain situations.

The opponent's ability to apply sanctions may also be influenced by the degree to which his agents of repression—police and troops—are willing to carry out orders. In some situations there may be too few such agents because they have not volunteered or because conscripts have re-

fused duty. In other situations, the existing police or troops decline to carry out orders efficiently, or refuse them completely—i.e. mutiny. Mutinies have occurred in wartime, in face of violent revolution, and in cases of mixed violent and nonviolent struggle.

As we have already discussed, there is good reason to believe that mutiny is much more likely in face of nonviolent resistance. The troops or police then do not face injury or death from the "rebels" and they must decide whether to obey orders to inflict severe repression against *non-violent* people. Laxity in obedience and finally open mutiny will only occur in special circumstances, however. Police and troops will vary in their sensitivity or callousness to the sufferings they inflict on the nonviolent group. The potential for reduced reliability of the agents of repression nevertheless exists; this may be described as a tendency in nonviolent conflicts. Gandhi was quite convinced that soldiers who wound and kill nonviolent actionists undergo a traumatic experience which in time will bring them to contrition: ". . . an army that dares to pass over the corpses of innocent men and women would not be able to repeat that experiment."¹⁹⁰

Efforts to convert the opponent group may produce both laxity in obeying orders for repression and open mutiny among police and troops, which may lead to nonviolent coercion of the opponent leadership. In other cases, mutiny may occur without conscious efforts at conversion. In any case, disobedience by the agents of repression will reduce the opponent's power, in some cases decisively. Widespread mutinies of Russian troops during the revolutions of 1905 and February 1917 have already been described above.¹⁹¹ In the latter case they played a major role in achieving the disintegration of the tsarist regime.

The Nazis recognized well that if they lost control of the Army their power would be drastically weakened; Goebbels reveals that in early February 1938 the Nazis feared most of all not a *coup d'etat* but the collective resignation of all high-ranking officers¹⁹²—a form of noncooperation.

During the predominantly nonviolent East German Rising of June 1953 police sometimes withdrew completely or willingly gave up their arms. Among the East German armed forces there were some cases of mutiny and laying down of arms. There were even evidences of sympathy from Russian soldiers and of reluctance to fire on the civilians. The overwhelming number of Russians who obeyed orders apparently suffered reduced morale.¹⁹³ It is reported that some one thousand Soviet officers and other ranks refused to fire at demonstrators, and that fifty-two Party members and soldiers were shot for disobeying orders.¹⁹⁴

Large-scale deliberate inefficiency among troops and police is likely to reduce the regime's power. When officials realize that obedience is uncertain, especially if small mutinies have already occurred, they may hesitate before ordering severe repressive actions which might provoke mutiny. That hesitation also limits sanctions as a source of power. A major mutiny is bound to alter power relationships radically, and the opponent is unlikely then to be able to withstand the demands of the nonviolent actionists. In fact, his regime may then disintegrate.

C. Some factors influencing nonviolent coercion

There is no single pattern for producing nonviolent coercion. The factors which produce it occur in different combinations and proportions; there appear to be at least eight such factors. The role and combination of these will not be the same when the nonviolent coercion has been largely produced by mutiny, for example, as when the coercion has been achieved by economic and political paralysis. The contribution of each factor will depend upon the degree to which it regulates one or more of the opponent's necessary sources of power.

Generally speaking, nonviolent coercion is more likely where the *numbers* of nonviolent actionists are very large, both in absolute numerical terms and in proportion to the general population. It is then possible for the defiance to be too massive for the opponent to control; paralysis by noncooperation is more likely. There, too, may be a greater chance of interfering with the sources of power which depend upon manpower, skilled or unskilled.

The *degree of the opponent's dependence* on the nonviolent actionists for the sources of his power is also important. The greater the dependence, the greater the chances of nonviolent coercion. It therefore becomes important to consider exactly *who* is refusing assistance to the opponent. "The extent of nonparticipation required to produce measurable political effects varies with the strategic position of the strikers," argued Hiller.¹⁹⁵ Under certain circumstances the opponent may be relatively indifferent to large numbers of noncooperating subjects and in other circumstances he may be nonviolently coerced by the action of a relatively few.

The *ability* of the nonviolent group *to apply the technique* of nonviolent action will be very important. The role of fighting skill here is comparable to its importance in any other type of combat. Skill here includes the capacity to choose strategy, tactics and methods, the times and places for action, etc., and ability to act in accordance with the dynamics and requirements of this nonviolent technique. Ability to apply nonviolent

action skillfully will help to overcome the weaknesses of the nonviolent group, to capitalize on the opponent's weaknesses, and to struggle against the opponent's countermeasures.

Whether or not nonviolent coercion is achieved will also depend on *how long* the defiance and noncooperation can be maintained. A massive act of noncooperation which collapses after a few hours cannot nonviolently coerce anyone. Willingness and ability to maintain nonviolent action for a sufficient duration despite repression are necessary to reduce or sever sources of the opponent's power.

The sympathy and support of *third parties* for the nonviolent group may be important in producing nonviolent coercion if the opponent depends on them for such things as economic resources, transportation facilities, military supplies and the like. Such supplies may then be cut off and his power position thereby undermined.

The *means of control and repression* which the opponent can use, and for how long, in an attempt to force a resumption of cooperation and obedience are also important. Even more important is the actionists' response to them.

The final factor contributing to nonviolent coercion is *opposition within the opponent group* either to the policies at issue or to the repression, or to both. The number of dissidents, the intensity of their disagreement, the types of action they use, and their positions in the social, economic and political structure will all be important here. On occasion splits in the ruling group itself may occur. Should this happen, or should a general strike or major mutiny of troops or police take place in opposition to repression of the nonviolent actionists, it would be a major factor in producing nonviolent coercion.

A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION?

Contrary to a popular view, skillfully applied nonviolent action may offer greater chances of success than would political violence in the same situation. However, the simple choice of nonviolent action as the technique of struggle does not and cannot guarantee victory, especially on a short-term basis. Changes will take place when significant nonviolent struggle occurs, but there is no certainty that these changes will always be for the better, from the perspective of the actionists. Nor are the results of such conflicts always full defeat or full success, but *as in all conflicts* they are frequently mixtures of the two in differing proportions. The results of many cases of nonviolent struggle might be spread

along a continuum with complete defeat and complete success at opposite poles, and a draw falling at the midpoint. This allows for various intermediary types of results, such as partial failures and partial successes, which is where most of the cases would fall. The terms "success" and "failure" will both require examination since, as we shall note, they are usually far less precise and lucid than they first appear. The risk of defeat and its possible consequences will be considered first.

A. The risk and nature of defeat

Defeat in immediate political terms is always possible in nonviolent action, just as it is in war or in other types of political violence. "Defeat" here indicates failure to achieve the objectives of the struggle. During the analysis in this Part, stress has repeatedly been laid on the need to develop various qualities and to fulfill a number of conditions if the actionists are to wield maximum power. If these requirements have not been met in sufficient degree, there is no reason to expect success. If the grievance group does not as yet possess sufficient internal strength, determination and ability to act to make this technique effective against their opponent, then the simple verbal acceptance of nonviolent action will not save them. There is no substitute for genuine strength in nonviolent action and if the subordinates do not possess sufficient to cope with the opponent, they cannot be expected to win until they develop that strength.

Comparative studies are urgently needed of cases of "failure" and "success" to see whether common features are present within each group and if so what they are. It might then be possible to seek ways to counter weaknesses and to overcome especially difficult external circumstances.

The possibility of defeat is not a characteristic limited to this technique, however. Comparative evaluations of nonviolent and violent means must take into consideration that political violence is often defeated also. By conventional standards, does not one side lose in each international war, civil war and violent revolution? Such defeats have usually been explained as resulting from certain weaknesses or inadequacies, such as lack of fighting spirit, insufficient or poor weapons, mistakes in strategy and tactics, or numerical inferiority. Comparable weaknesses may also lead to defeat in nonviolent action. The common practice of explaining defeats of political violence in terms of such *specific* shortcomings while blaming defeats of nonviolent action on the presumption of its *universal* impotence is both irrational and uninformed.

The precise consequences of defeat will vary from case to case de-

pending on the particular conditions in each situation. In some cases there may be physical suffering and mental anguish. At times defeat will bring economic losses and worsened conditions, as for the defeated British miners in 1927. Defeat may also be followed by new legal restrictions and prohibitions designed to place the government in a more advantageous position to prevent or control future nonviolent action. The defeat of the British General Strike of 1926 was followed by the harsh Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act of 1927,¹⁹⁶ and the Defiance Campaign of 1952 in South Africa was followed by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, No. 8 of 1953 and the Public Safety Act, No. 3 of 1953.¹⁹⁷

Where defeat leads to demoralization and loss of confidence in the effectiveness of nonviolent action, the chances of a later resort to this technique may be drastically reduced. This was the case, writes Symons, after the British 1926 General Strike: "One thing Governments, Conservative, Labour or National, could feel happily sure: the trade unionists would never again attempt to engage in a General Strike."¹⁹⁸ Previous successes or failures in the use of nonviolent action are likely to influence whether or not the technique is used again, and, if so, may also help to determine the outcome of those later campaigns.

It does not follow, however, that defeats are necessarily always total and permanent. There are two relevant perspectives here: first, it is sometimes better to have fought and lost than not to have fought at all, and second, even in the midst of defeat there may occur less obvious changes which contribute to a later success for the nonviolent group.

Nehru expressed the former view well, when it was becoming obvious that the current civil disobedience campaign (of 1932-34) was not going to win. He wrote in prison in 1933:

Outside, the struggle went on, and brave men and women continued to defy peacefully a powerful and entrenched government, though they knew that it was not for them to achieve in the present or the near future. And repression . . . demonstrated the basis of British rule in India. There was no camouflage about it now . . . It was better that we should be governed thus, we thought, than . . . sell our souls and submit to spiritual prostitution. . . . [T]he cause went on despite setbacks; there could be no failure if ideals remained undimmed and spirits undaunted. Real failure was a desertion of principle . . . and an ignoble submission to wrong. Self-made wounds always took longer to heal than those caused by an adversary.

There was often a weariness at our weakness . . . and yet . . . it was good to feel oneself to be a member of a gallant band.¹⁹⁹

Obviously defeat alone does not determine whether the actionists become demoralized and nonviolent action is abandoned permanently. Defeat can also be seen as a lost battle, leaving for the future the winning of the war. Other factors make the difference in perspective. One of these may be an awareness that the side effects of even defeated nonviolent action can be important. Sometimes in conventional war the cost of success is so great that the victor has won only a Pyrrhic victory, which contributes to the relative strengthening and final victory of the defeated side. A comparable situation sometimes also occurs in nonviolent action. The actionists appear to be defeated, but the opponent's power is in the process weakened, or the subordinates' determination and ability to resist are significantly strengthened.

L. de Jong has observed that the mass strikes in the occupied Netherlands against Nazi rule in February 1941, 1943 and again in September 1944 were met with "great ferocity." Although there were no changes for the better in German policy, the strikes were "a tremendous stimulant to solidarity" of the Dutch people and offered ". . . convincing proof of the will to resist animating the majority of the people . . ."²⁰⁰

Although not immediately successful, if the nonviolent actionists increase their spirit of resistance, expand their organizational strength, improve their skill in applying this technique, and gain sympathy and friends which may be useful in the future, then even defeat may become a prelude to success.

B. A draw or an interim settlement?

During difficult stages of the struggle various steps can be taken to maintain a high level of participation and high morale among actionists. These steps may include phasing the strategy and tactics, varying the specific methods used, shifting the degrees of involvement and of risk for various groups, and attempting to win certain smaller interim goals or partial successes. If spirits are sagging, or fear of repression is increasing, some form of fearless, dramatic and dangerous action may be undertaken by a few reliable people in an effort to restore morale and confidence and to rally continued participation.

If such steps are not taken, or are not successful, however, the actionists may have to face the reality that, despite their achievements, they do not as yet have sufficient strength to win. In any contest of

strength there are likely to be periods of increased and reduced direct involvement, high and low morale, growing strength and loss of vitality. In reference to military war Clausewitz pointed to the need always to allow for a line of retreat in case of necessity.²⁰¹ He also spoke of the need to provide rest for certain population and reserve groups while others take up the most exhausting action and thus keep up constant pressure on the opponent.²⁰² In nonviolent struggle, the "troops" may also become afflicted with "war-weariness" and reach a limit to their capacity for tension and suffering. This was the situation by late January 1931 in India after ten months of the civil disobedience campaign, reports Gopal. "Repression," Gandhi had earlier argued, "does good only to those who are prepared for it."²⁰³ Not all nonviolent actionists have an equal capacity for suffering, and the capacity of the same person may vary at different stages within a particular movement. "Suffering has its well-defined limits. Suffering can be both wise and unwise, and, when the limit is reached, to prolong it would be not unwise but the height of folly."²⁰⁴ This must be considered by leaders who plan and launch a campaign and who can influence the time and circumstances of its termination.

If the participants are not capable of further voluntary suffering without demoralization then tactical or even strategic changes may be necessary. "A wise general does not wait till he is actually routed; he withdraws in time in an orderly manner from a position which he knows he would not be able to hold," wrote Gandhi.²⁰⁵ It may be wise to halt the current phase of the movement while one is still strong enough to achieve a negotiated settlement, or an unwritten one, with certain gains.

In other situations, when the actionists would have to give up or compromise on *essentials*, there may be no formal or informal truce. Instead, the nonviolent group may simply make a major change in strategy and take steps to provide rest for the combatants while attempting to make the situation more propitious for major action at a future date. There is no standard rule for determining when to call a formal halt to the campaign under honorable conditions with partial gains, and when to continue the defiance by the many in spirit and by only a few in action. Careful assessment of the particular circumstances is required.²⁰⁶ If a temporary halt is to be called, it should be done at the most favorable moment. One factor in the choice of that moment will be the opponent's readiness to negotiate and to offer significant concessions.

The opponent, too, may have good reasons for wishing to end the struggle. The course of the struggle may have placed him in an insecure

position from which he may wish to extricate himself. While the non-violent actionists had been unable to win, the opponent may have been unable to crush the movement and may have found the losses due to the conflict unacceptable. The opponent may therefore seek, by means other than repression, a resumption of cooperation and obedience. He may be willing to make certain concessions, either explicit ones or in substance.

This may well involve formal negotiations with the nonviolent actionists. For example, Lord Irwin, the British Viceroy, at the end of the 1930-31 struggle made determined efforts to settle the conflict and to obtain the resumption of cooperation by the Congress with the British regime. It is clear that these efforts were in large degree politically motivated by the need for an end to the noncooperation.²⁰⁷ Where such efforts take place they may be encouraged by the actions of less extreme groups which did not participate in the nonviolent action movement, but urged the opponent to grant concessions and offer a settlement as did the Indian Liberals in 1930-31.²⁰⁸

Following the negotiated settlement at the end of the 1930-31 struggle, Gandhi said in his Press statement:

It would be folly to go on suffering when the opponent makes it easy for you to enter into a discussion with him upon your longings. If a real opening is made, it is one's duty to take advantage of it, and in my humble opinion, the settlement has made a real opening. Such a settlement has necessarily to be provisional, as this is. The peace arrived at is conditional upon many other things happening. The largest part of the written word is taken up with what may be called, "terms of truce."²⁰⁹

It should be stressed again that the nonviolent actionists may compromise on secondary, nonessential, matters, but will not on essentials or give up fundamental principles or demands. They may, however, state in a document that disagreements on such points continue, although direct action on them is being suspended for the time being. The policies of compromise and of this type of interim settlement are quite different.²¹⁰ Compromise requires willingness on each side to give up part of their aims and objectives, on essential as well as unessential issues. Nonviolent actionists see such compromise at times as morally and politically unacceptable. For example, how does one "split the difference" on such issues as freedom of religion or speech, equal treatment of minorities, international aggression, the existence of a dictatorship, and the

like? Compromise on basic issues is thus rejected both as a substitute for nonviolent struggle and as a means of settling a nonviolent campaign. Nonviolent actionists are willing to negotiate, but not on essentials—even when they cannot be won.

Even the occurrence of negotiations may mark a recognition of changes which the nonviolent action has produced in the relationships between the opponent and the nonviolent group. If a government, or other powerful opponent, agrees to negotiate it is usually because the opponent recognizes that the other side is able to wield effective power. This capacity to wield power will also influence the course and outcome of the negotiations. For example, Gandhi argued that the struggle must continue unabated during the 1931 negotiations, since any slackening at that stage would lead to a prolongation of the struggle.²¹¹

In certain political circumstances, such negotiations may themselves be a major concession by the opponent and a recognition of the new status of the subordinates. In 1931, for example, "the Congress was negotiating with the Government on what was virtually an equal footing."²¹² Gandhi came to the Viceroy as the representative of India to negotiate with the representative of the British Empire. Sir Winston Churchill condemned the "nauseating and humiliating spectacle of this one-time Inner Temple lawyer, now seditious fakir, striding half-naked up the steps of the Viceroy's palace, there to negotiate and to parley on equal terms with the representative of the King-Emperor."²¹³ While the British in that year had not been converted, nor yet forced to give full independence, they found it necessary to negotiate and thus give a kind of *de facto* recognition to India as a separate political unit. The terms of the truce and the specific concessions—either direct concessions or ones granted in substance without officially conceding the demands of the nonviolent actionists²¹⁴—important though they were, were secondary to this more fundamental recognition in the change of the relationship between Britain and India. The settlement itself "was framed in the form of a treaty to end a state of war." Gandhi saw its most important feature to be the recognition of the Indian National Congress as the intermediary between the people and the government. Members of the government in London privately expressed disapproval of the acceptance of "the unique and semi-sovereign position of the Congress."²¹⁵

Formal negotiations and agreements are not the only ways to produce a truce or interim settlement. Such negotiations or agreements do not create the changes in the relationships but reflect and result from them.

Such formal bargaining at the conference table may, of course, not occur at all. The opponent may refuse to negotiate or make significant concessions, or other political circumstances may be difficult. In such cases a tacit truce may develop and informal understandings may become the equivalent of a settlement. For example, the opponent may call a halt to arrests for certain types of nonviolent action, especially if he has not been able effectively to halt them anyhow and if the wider public has clearly expressed its belief that on these issues justice lies with the actionists. The nonviolent group, in turn, might refrain from launching new types of action, or might halt its most ambitious methods, such as nonviolent raids or civil disobedience of regulatory laws. Gains already achieved toward the long run wider objectives might then be tacitly accepted—such as advances in free speech, freedom of the press, desegregation and the like—without the opponent abandoning his intent to block full realization of wider objectives and without the nonviolent group disavowing its intent to implement the full goals.

For the nonviolent group, the period following such a truce or interim settlement will be difficult. They will need as a minimum to maintain their existing position and marginal gains; at best they need to utilize this as a period for regrouping and gaining new strength. If they can do that, then later under more favorable conditions the nonviolent actionists will be stronger and can press more effectively to their full goal.

Pressures to renew the attack along exactly the same line will have to be resisted.²¹⁶ So also must be pressures to jump to the offensive too soon and without good reason to believe that one's relative strength has in the interim been significantly increased. Clausewitz' insights on war are applicable here:

The first movements [after a lost battle] should be as small as possible, and it is a maxim in general not to suffer ourselves to be dictated to by the enemy. This maxim cannot be followed without bloody fighting with the enemy at our heels, but the gain is worth the sacrifice; without it we get into an accelerated pace which soon turns into a headlong rush, and costs merely in stragglers more men than rear-guard combats, and besides that extinguishes the last remnants of the spirit of resistance.²¹⁷

In nonviolent action where morale and psychological influences are so important, very careful consideration must be given to trying to understand and solve these problems. Periods of retreat, and even times

of defeat, must be turned into opportunities for the recovery of strength, confidence and determination, and for preparations for more favorable action. As Nehru pointed out, one should not count on a chance "irrepressible upheaval of the masses," although it might occur, but instead anticipate "a long struggle with ups and downs and many a stalemate in between, and a progressive strengthening of the masses in discipline and united action and ideology."²¹⁸

To some degree, increased understanding of the nature of the technique combined with advanced training, wise strategy and careful preparations will make major successes by campaigns of shorter duration more likely. These campaigns may involve larger numbers of participants, applying more extensive, disciplined and persistent noncooperation and defiance.²¹⁹ Even if increased knowledge of this technique brings shorter and more successful conflicts, there will still be cases in which the nonviolent actionists must regroup and strengthen themselves and the wider grievance group. If a given campaign is not successful, the actionists' attitude in such a case generally is that the people are externally defeated for the time being, but internally still determined and defiant. They may be, for example, a "subjected but unconquered people,"²²⁰ who in time will translate their inner spirit of independence and opposition into an overthrow of the external subjugation.

Strategy and tactics during the period of regrouping and regaining strength will be of particular importance. One should never remain completely passive, for the population must not sink again into submissiveness. In such periods nonviolent action may be continued by individuals or reliable small groups especially committed and prepared to act. Sometimes large numbers or even masses of people may be involved in limited actions of a symbolic nature which, although clearly showing the feelings and views of the participants and hence perhaps improving morale, involve a minimum of risk to the participants. Demonstrations, protest or resistance may be used briefly or occasionally. Various methods of nonviolent protest, or even protest strikes, may be used on such occasions. National days, religious holidays, anniversaries of events related to the struggle and the like, may provide occasions for these limited acts of mass participation. For example, although the South African Defiance Campaign was really over, on June 26, 1953, the first anniversary of its launching, Albert Luthuli in a message to Africans and their allies appealed to them to light bonfires or candles or lanterns outside their homes, "as a symbol of the spark of freedom which we are determined to keep alive in our hearts, and as a sign to freedom-lovers that we are keeping the vigil on

that night.”²¹ Such limited acts of protest or resistance must be continued until the time for more severe struggle comes.

Organizational work and training in nonviolent action will also be highly important during such a period. Where appropriate local issues require remedies, and the necessary support, determination and resistance capacity are present, local campaigns may be highly important for correcting the particular grievance. They may also help to maintain the spirit of resistance, improve morale by producing victories, and train people by participation and example for wider future campaigns. Ebert calls these “continuity or revival struggles” or “local continuity actions.”²² The nonviolent group may also use the period for trying to undermine both the opponent’s belief in the rightness of his policies and his confidence that he can win; they may also try to improve his attitudes toward the grievance group and the nonviolent actionists in particular. If such efforts are successful to a significant degree, then when struggle is resumed, the opponent group may lack both the will power to refuse the demands and also the determination to impose severe repression.

In a different type of situation, when the nonviolent group wins its full objectives as the result of a series of struggles each of which achieves part of the full aim, the points actually won by each particular conflict are likely to correspond to more basic changes in attitudes, power positions and other relationships between the contending groups. If so, those limited successes are likely to be genuine and lasting, ones which cannot be easily taken from them by anyone, as they could if they had been given as an edict or a gift without struggle.

C. Success

Most of this chapter has been devoted to evaluations of the ways in which nonviolent action may make the changes which produce success by the three mechanisms of change. It is possible that the most successful cases of nonviolent action involve optimal combinations of the three mechanisms. A considerable number of the illustrative cases of nonviolent action which have been offered in the book as a whole were successful. It has also been shown that a few cases of nonviolent struggle—as in the Ruhr—which are commonly regarded as complete failures instead achieved a considerable degree of success. The time has come to offer some final observations on the nature of success with this technique, and the ways in which it may occur.

In internal political conflicts and in international wars the terms “success” and “failure” or “victory” and “defeat” are widely used in very diverse senses, some quite clear, others imprecise or misleading. In violent struggles attention is frequently paid only to that side which succeeds in crushing the combat forces of the other and to that side which surrenders. Is that a sufficient criterion for success? What is the situation when, despite military victory, the political objectives or war aims of the winning side are not achieved? Or are won only in part? What if the military struggle ends in a stalemate, but one side gets most or all of its political objectives? Many other similar questions could be asked. Examinations of violent struggles in which it is presumably clear who won and lost, to determine whether goals of each side were achieved or not, are revealing.

It is important to see the problem of defining “success” in nonviolent action in this wider context. Precise thought and careful criteria are needed in order to determine intelligently whether given cases of nonviolent action have, or have not, succeeded, and to what degree.

As is often the case with violent struggles, it is not always possible to conclude categorically that a particular nonviolent action movement has been a clear “success” or “failure.” Elements of both success and failure may be present in the same situation. The particular struggle must often be seen in the wider context of a series of campaigns and of its contribution to the later struggles and relationships. Even though all the goals may not have been won at a particular stage, it is possible that the struggle may have paved the way for their later achievement. Much more work on the nature and conditions of success in nonviolent struggle is needed. Understanding of this technique could be considerably advanced by a comparative study of cases of nonviolent action in terms of the results which were produced. Such a study might take into consideration such factors as these: 1) were the goals of the nonviolent group achieved? fully? in part? as the result of nonviolent action? as the result of other means or factors? immediately, or some time after the struggle? 2) which mechanisms of change operated? 3) were the nonviolent group and the grievance group strengthened or weakened internally as a result of the campaign? 4) was the basis laid for later or wider achievement of their objectives, or both? 5) were there changes in attitudes and perceptions toward the issues and toward the various groups? 6) were there additional subtle and indirect effects, and if so of what types? 7) were there lasting effects on the social structure or social system generally, and if so of what kind? 8) what was the cost of the achievements, and

how do they compare with the cost of other efforts to achieve similar results? Doubtless other relevant questions might also be added.

That type of study cannot, however, be attempted here. For our purposes "success" in nonviolent action will be measured by whether the avowed goals of the nonviolent group were achieved as a consequence of the struggle, either at its end or shortly thereafter. Where all (or almost all) of their goals or demands are achieved, then the movement is described as *a full success*. Where only some of those goals are achieved, the movement is described as *a partial success*. Both of these may be achieved by any one, or any combination, of the three mechanisms of change discussed above, conversion, accommodation and nonviolent coercion.

If the nonviolent actionists have persisted on their chosen course despite repression, and have achieved a significant number of the factors upon which change hinges, then they are in sight of a victorious conclusion of the struggle. This is a crucial period, and a dangerous one. The opponent, sensing his imminent defeat, may make special exertions and take unexpected measures to defeat the actionists. Members of the nonviolent group, sensing victory, may become victims of overconfidence, carelessness and reduced determination. Gandhi clearly warned that ". . . the danger is the greatest when victory seems the nearest. No victory worth the name has ever been won without a final effort, more serious than all the preceding ones."²²³

Where full success is achieved, or a partial success in which most of the goals are won, there is no single formula with which the campaign is ended. Indeed, some cases are successful even before direct action is launched, at the stage of negotiations. James Farmer reports significant cases of desegregation and of opening employment to Negroes during negotiations because the opponent was familiar with other cases of successful nonviolent action for similar objectives by the Congress of Racial Equality (C.O.R.E.) These "victory before struggle" cases included, for example, the desegregation of all sixty-nine Howard Johnson restaurants in Florida, the ending of employment discrimination at various Sears Roebuck stores, and at the First National Bank in Boston.²²⁴

Attention here, however, is on the more common cases in which success follows only after struggle. As might be expected, with a technique as broad and diverse as nonviolent action and with the multitude of possible variables, there is no uniform pattern for the successful conclusion. At times conflict situations, especially international ones, may be so complex that it is difficult to disentangle the relative roles of non-

violent action and other factors in producing the change, as for example the conclusion of the Hungarian struggle against Austrian rule. In other cases the proportionate role of the nonviolent action will be clearer.

The mechanism with which change has been effected—conversion, accommodation or nonviolent coercion—will influence the manner of conclusion. Negotiation with a formal settlement is possible in all three mechanisms.²²⁵ Some negotiations will be real bargaining sessions, but others will simply formalize the changes already agreed or recognized as inevitable. Those nonviolent groups which seek conversion of the opponent, or at least accommodation, may be only satisfied by a settlement which involves real agreement with the opponent.²²⁶

In certain instances of conversion or accommodation, there may be no formal negotiations or settlement. The opponent may simply grant the full, or essential, demand. Where a full success is achieved by nonviolent coercion, negotiations may produce a formal surrender to the actionists' demands. In other cases, the nonviolent group may even refuse to negotiate with the opponent, on the ground that he deserves no recognition at all; this was the case in 1920 when the legitimate Ebert government in Germany refused negotiations with Lüttwitz, who headed the putschists after Kapp fled to Sweden.²²⁷

In some cases of nonviolent coercion there may be no agreement or negotiation at the end of the struggle because of the impact of a major mutiny of the opponent's troops and police, an economic shutdown, massive popular noncooperation and an effective parallel government. The opponent's power may have disintegrated and collapsed, and the people's loyalty shifted to the new regime or system.

D. Toward a genuine solution

Advocates of the use of nonviolent action in place of techniques of violence have sometimes argued that the results achieved by nonviolent action are likely to be more permanent and satisfactory than those achieved by violence. Gregg, for example, wrote that victory achieved by violence is likely to result in hatred and desire for revenge, which may in turn lead to a new war to achieve revenge or restitution. The results of a successful nonviolent struggle, Gregg maintains, are quite different; it is likely there will be "no aftermath of resentment, bitterness, or revenge, no necessity for further threats of force."²²⁸ The solution has been reached on a deeper level, with better feelings on both sides and fewer ill effects. The readjustment of relationships, he says, is more likely to be permanent.²²⁹ Gandhi was of the opinion that even

the sufferings of nonviolent actionists inflicted by repression did not lead to bitterness which would cause lasting tension and hostility.²³⁰ King also pointed to increased respect in the opponent group for the nonviolent actionists after their demands had been won, and a lack of bitterness toward them; he attributed the lack of bitterness to "our insistence on nonviolence" and the resulting absence of casualties among the opponent group.²³¹ Others, too, have maintained that changes won by nonviolent action are much more lasting both than those won by violence and also than those which have been bestowed without struggle.

Such claims merit investigation. Comparative studies of the results of cases of successful violent action and successful nonviolent action have yet to be undertaken. They could, however, help significantly an intelligent evaluation of the relative merits of the contrasting techniques. The analysis in the preceding chapters, however, suggests that successful nonviolent action may well produce a number of long-term beneficial results.

For example, the likelihood of bitterness, hatred and desire for revenge may be indeed reduced, especially where the conversion and accommodation mechanisms have operated to any considerable degree. The incidence of political violence may be reduced in the future also. The defeated opponent may be less likely to use violence in new attempts to impose policies on people who do not want them, because he has learned that violence is not omnipotent. The grievance group, having won nonviolently, may be less inclined to use violent means in future conflicts if feasible nonviolent strategies can be developed. Under some conditions the nonviolent struggle may have had lasting repercussions on the opponent group, such as stimulating new ways to achieve their objectives, bringing new outlooks and goals, or modifying the system itself. To the degree that the nonviolent action has been able to remove the grievances which provoked the nonviolent action, these will not provide issues for future conflicts.

Where changes have been achieved in accommodation or nonviolent coercion because of power changes, a lasting alteration in the power relationships of the contending groups is likely. This, too, may contribute to more equitable and less contentious relationships in the future. Many of the most important changes are within the grievance group itself. It is to those changes, and the changes in power relationships, to which we now turn in the concluding chapter.

NOTES

1. This roughly follows Lakey's similar discussion of three mechanisms, except that I have offered a substitute title for the second and modified its description slightly. See Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms of Nonviolent Action" p. 23; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 14. Earlier writers have usually not included this intermediary mechanism, jumping directly from conversion by suffering to nonviolent coercion. See, for example, Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 77-78, and Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 11.
2. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." p. 20; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 12.
3. See Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, pp. 397-398.
4. Gandhi did not like the term "nonviolent coercion" but sometimes spoke of "compelling change" and of "compulsion."
5. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. I, p. 44.
6. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power*, p. 65.
7. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance* p. 87; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 87. See also Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, 1926-31, pp. 4-5.
8. See Kumarappa's statement in Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 190-191.
9. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 85.
10. Quoted in Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 162.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Hostility," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. III, no. 1 (March 1959), p. 95.
13. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, p. 79.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
15. Ehrlich, "*Den Ikke-voldelige Modstand, der Kvalte Kapp-Kupet*," p. 201.
16. See Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" pp. 180, 188, and 191-193.
17. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. I, p. 412.
18. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 194; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 194.
19. Gandhi quoted in Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 162. See also Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 146.
20. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 202; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 202.
21. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 227-229. See also Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, pp. 69-70.
22. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." pp. 30-33; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), pp. 19-20.
23. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 22.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

25. Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 159.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 169-171.
27. Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, p. 400.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 399-400.
29. Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 91.
30. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 78.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
32. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 79.
33. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 18.
34. Frederick Solomon and Jacob R. Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Non-violence in Student Civil Rights Activities," *Psychiatry*, vol. XXVII (May 1964), p. 99.
35. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 87-91.
36. See Wolff, ed., *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, pp. 224-249.
37. See Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Hostility," p. 88.
38. See Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 131.
39. E. Franklin Frazier, *Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 49-50.
40. Bernard J. Stern, "Slavery, Primitive," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934), vol. 14, p. 73.
41. Harvey Seifert, "The Use by American Quakers of Nonviolent Resistance as a Method of Social Change," MS p. 41.
42. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 84-85.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
44. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . .," pp. 83-84; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), pp. 54-55.
45. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 85 and 89.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
47. Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 170.
48. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 85, and Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, pp. 62-63; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, pp. 62-63.
49. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 54-55.
50. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 294; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 294.
51. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 146.
52. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 85.
53. Reitlinger, *The Final Solution*, p. 277.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39 and 157-158.
55. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 68.
56. Farmer, *Freedom - When?*, pp. 67-68.
57. Solomon and Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities," *Psychiatry*, vol. XXVII (May 1964), p. 97. See also Miller, *Nonviolence* pp. 312-313.
58. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 173.
59. McCleery has cited such a case in a Southern prison, where a Negro had defied officials: "In North Carolina, a Negro who had remained defiant through a reported 26 days in 'the hole' (solitary confinement) and repeated beatings was held in high respect by the predominantly Southern, white, members of his

- group." Richard H. McCleery, "Authoritarianism and the Belief System of Incurables," in Donald R. Cressey, ed., *The Prison: Studies in Institutional Organization and Change* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 283. I am grateful to George Lakey for this reference.
60. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 46-52.
61. Lindberg, "Eksempler fra Irland," in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*, pp. 161-162.
62. Seifert, "The Use by American Quakers of Nonviolent Resistance as a Method of Social Change," pp. 22-54.
63. Jawaharlal Nehru: *An Autobiography*, p. 545.
64. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 191; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 191.
65. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 45.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 53. See also p. 78.
67. See Case, *Nonviolent Coercion*, p. 398. Gandhi describes how his wife's resistance and suffering in response to his efforts to dominate her "ultimately made me ashamed of myself, and cured me of my stupidity in thinking that I was born to rule over her, and in the end she became my teacher in non-violence. And what I did in South Africa was but an extension of the rule of satyagraha which she unwillingly practised in her own person." Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. I, p. 174.
68. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 78.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 47. See also p. 133.
70. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 227, Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Hostility," p. 91, and Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 147, and Bertrand Russell, *Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism* (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1918), p. 14.
71. Quoted in Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 204.
72. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, p. 177; Br. ed.: p. 207.
73. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 54.
74. Peck, *Freedom Ride*, p. 75.
75. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 45-46.
76. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. I, pp. 128-130.
77. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 53.
78. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.
79. Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, p. 400.
80. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 55-56.
81. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (thesis), p. 33; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 21.
82. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." p. 87; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6, p. 57.
83. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 83.
84. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
87. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
90. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. II, p. 64.

90. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 178.
91. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 180.
92. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, pp. 16-17.
93. Quoted in Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 65.
94. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 117.
95. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 113; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 113. See also pp. 188-189.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
97. Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS p. 297.
98. Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Conflict," p. 88.
99. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 90. Kuper cites Wolff, ed., *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, pp. 195-197.
100. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 91.
101. The outline of these eight factors is based upon Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Conflict," p. 86, who based their listing upon Arne Naess' analysis of Gandhi's norms of action. See Naess, "A Systematization of Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. I (1957), pp. 140-155.
102. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. II, p. 91.
103. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 154; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 154.
104. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (thesis), p. 37; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 24.
105. Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Conflict" p. 86.
106. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 119-120.
107. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 168.
108. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 133.
109. Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Conflict," p. 86.
110. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 295; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 295.
111. Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Conflict," p. 86.
112. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, pp. 21-22.
113. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 181; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 181.
114. Quoted in Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 127.
115. Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Conflict" p. 86.
116. Williams, *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*, p. 77.
117. Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Conflict," p. 86.
118. *Ibid.*
119. See Gandhi's letter to Lord Irwin, in Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 61-66.
120. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 78 and 55.
121. Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Conflict," p. 86.
122. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 120 n.
123. See Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 145.
124. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 83.
125. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 164.
126. Gregg, *The Power of Non-violence*, p. 85.
127. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-76.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

129. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (thesis), p. 21; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 12.
130. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . .," p. 22; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6, p. 13. Lakey described this mechanism as "persuasion," interpreted as persuasion to discontinue resistance to the efforts of the nonviolent actionists, rather than persuasion over the demands and issues at stake. In my slightly different interpretation of this mechanism, emphasizing the importance of adjustment to a changed social situation, the term "accommodation" may be more descriptive. See Farmer, *Freedom - When?* p. 41.
131. Williams, *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*, p. 14.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
133. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, pp. 73-74.
134. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, pp. 8 and 140-144; Br. ed.: pp. 10 and 164-168.
135. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 165.
136. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
137. Seifert, "The Use by American Quakers of Nonviolent Resistance as a Method of Social Change," MS p. 94.
138. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (thesis), p. 23; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 14. For Gandhi's similar view, see Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 121; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 121.
139. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . .," p. 36; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6, p. 23.
140. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . .," pp. 22-23; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6, p. 13.
141. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 74.
142. "The Toleration Edict of Galerius, 30 April 311," in J. Stevenson, ed., *A New Eusebius: Documents Illustrative of the History of the Church to A.D. 337* (London: S.P.C.K., 1957), p. 296.
143. See Hans Lietzmann, *From Constantine to Julian* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1960), p. 72. I am grateful to J. D. Kemp for this and the above reference.
144. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 73.
145. Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. XII, *The Triumphant Empire, Britain Sails into the Storm, 1770-1776*, pp. 277-307.
146. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 74.
147. Gipson, *The Coming of the Revolution, 1763-1775*, p. 106.
148. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
150. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 177.
151. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, 1926-1931*, p. 91.
152. William Faulkner, *A Fable* (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 54.
153. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XII, p. 279.
154. See Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 53-64, esp. pp. 60-61 and 64, and Mahadev Desai, *The Story of Bardoli*, esp. pp. 256-263.
155. Farmer, *Freedom - When?* p. 101.
156. In addition to those dictionaries, see Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, p. 403, and Horace M. Kallen, "Coercion," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. III, pp. 617-619.
157. Theodor Paullin, *Introduction to Non-violence*, p. 6. Philadelphia: Pacifist

Research Bureau, 1944. Paullin defines "force" as "physical or intangible power or influence to effect change in the material or immaterial world." Elliott's definition of "force" is similar: "... force need not be limited to physical coercion. Any form of willed compulsion, whether it uses economic means or even moral pressure may become political force if it is used to accomplish political ends." W. Y. Elliott, "Political Force," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1935), Vol. VI, p. 338.

158. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . . (thesis), p. 18; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 10.
159. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 9.
160. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . .," p. 23; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6, p. 13.
161. Some believers of nonviolence as a moral principle reject such "nonviolent coercion." Gandhi and some of his interpreters have often argued in these terms, although they have admitted that satyagraha contained a justifiable "compelling element." On Gandhi and "nonviolent coercion," see Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, pp. 223-224; Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, pp. 133-134, 254, and 261-266; Shridharani, *War Without Violence*, pp. 291-292, Br. ed.: pp. 249-250; Diwakar, *Satyagraha*, pp. 44 and 61; Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 9-11 and 173; and Johan Galtung and Arne Næss, *Gandhis Politiske Etikk* (Oslo: Tanum, 1955), pp. 223 and 258-259.
On the other hand, it has been argued, by Bondurant, Case and others, that it is precisely the combination of coercion and nonviolence which is so important, and which makes the ideals politically relevant, their achievement possible, and also makes the application of nonviolent means acceptable to people who would otherwise use violence. Case writes: "Perhaps it is only through a working partnership of seemingly incongruous forms of behavior as nonviolence and coercion that the problems of social collision can be permanently solved." (Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, p. 413. See also pp. 3, and 403-404.)
162. Crook, *The General Strike*, p. 165.
163. Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia*, p. 222. See also Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 191-197.
164. Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. 249, 263-264, 269-276, 278-281, 284, 288, 296, 340-344 and 364.
165. This is Hiller's phrase. See Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 125.
166. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 121.
167. Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. 423.
168. Brant, *The East German Rising*, p. 155.
169. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 157; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 157. Sometimes specific tactics and methods of nonviolent action are used to make the optimal use of numbers in order to bring about the collapse of the government, as by massive nonviolent raids on government salt depots in India in 1930. "Such a widening of the salt campaign, by substituting collective action for individual breaches of the law, directly challenged the Government's ability to maintain the public peace." Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, p. 70.
170. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 66, and Charques, *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*, pp. 119, 125 and 132. See also, Katkov, *Russia 1917*, p. 262.
171. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin*, p. 69.

172. Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, p. 74.
173. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
174. Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands (1555-1609)*, pp. 55-56.
175. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 121; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 121. See also Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 199.
176. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, p. 80.
177. Sternstein, "The *Ruhrkampf* of 1923," p. 114. See also pp. 111, 115, 117, 123, and 132-133.
178. Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, p. 214.
179. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, pp. 286-308.
180. Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945, passim*.
181. Gipson, *The Coming of the Revolution, 1763-1775*, p. 193.
182. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 190, 179, 200, 210, 189, and 204, respectively.
183. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
184. *Ibid.*, pp. 106, 126-128, 134, 160, 175, 182-183, 190, 192-193, 196, 205, and 211, and Gopal *The Viceroyalty . . .*, pp. 79-80 and 86-87.
185. Shridharani, *War Without Violence*, p. 24; Br. ed.: p. 43.
186. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, p. 97, based on telegrams of the Viceroy to the Secretary of State.
187. Cited by Kumarappa in "*Young India*", and quoted in Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 186.
188. Shridharani, *War Without Violence*, p. 25; Br. ed.: p. 44; Shridharani reports that these figures are based upon the *Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom* 74th number, and *Trade and Navigation, The United Kingdom*.
189. Shridharani, *War Without Violence*, p. 25, Br. ed.: p. 44.
190. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 361; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 361.
191. See also Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. 262, 274, 276-282, and 340-341.
192. Görlitz, *The German General Staff*, p. 319. See also p. 341.
193. Stefan Brant, *The East German Rising*, pp. 86, 106, 149-153. On the behavior of the East German police and troops, and the Russian troops during the rising, see also Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" pp. 187-190.
194. *Das Parlament* (Bonn), 15 June 1955. Cited in Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS p. 254.
195. Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 233.
196. Symons, *The General Strike*, pp. 224-227.
197. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, pp. 62-63.
198. Symons, *The General Strike*, p. 228.
199. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 360.
200. L. de Jong, "Anti-Nazi Resistance in the Netherlands," in *European Resistance Movements, 1939-1945*, p. 142.
201. Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, pp. 249-250.
202. *Ibid.*, pp. 231-234.
203. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, p. 100.
204. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 220.
205. Bose, *Selections From Gandhi*, p. 154. See also p. 153.
206. Opposite views were, for example, offered by Nehru in differing conditions.

- Nehru, *An Autobiography*, pp. 405-406, and Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS pp. 427-430 and 437-439.
207. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, pp. 97-100 and Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 203.
 208. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 124, 202 and 207, and Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, pp. 92-94.
 209. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 220-221.
 210. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 196-197.
 211. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 207.
 212. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, p. 101.
 213. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 206.
 214. See *ibid.*, pp. 213-219, or Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, pp. 140-144.
 215. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty . . .*, pp. 112-113.
 216. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, p. 348.
 217. Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, pp. 306-307.
 218. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 339.
 219. See Ebert's discussion of a nonviolent *Blitzkrieg* strategy for use in national defense through prepared nonviolent resistance (civilian defense), in his chapters "Preparations for Civilian Defense" p. 155 and "Initiating Popular Resistance to Totalitarian Invasion," in Mahadevan, Roberts and Sharp, eds., *Civilian Defence: An Introduction*, pp. 159-161.
 220. O'Hegarty, *A History of Ireland Under the Union*, p. 487. This discussion draws upon Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS pp. 431-438.
 221. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 145.
 222. Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance" MS p. 435.
 223. Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 203.
 224. Farmer, *Freedom - When?*, pp. 38-39.
 225. For some general observations on the role of negotiations in civil rights struggles, see Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, pp. 24-25.
 226. See Gandhi's view, Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 187.
 227. Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, pp. 181-182.
 228. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 98.
 229. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62, 98, 100-101 and 120. Aldous Huxley argued that the results of nonviolent action were preferable to those of violence because "... the means employed inevitably determine the nature of the result achieved..." Aldous Huxley, *Ends and Means: An Enquiry into the Nature of Ideals and into the Methods Employed for Their Realization* (New York: Harper Bros., 1937 and London: Chatto and Windhus, 1948), p. 55.
 230. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 31; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 31.
 231. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, p. 148; Br. ed.: p. 174.