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Chapter 14

The Redistribution of Power

INTRODUCTION

The nonviolent technique of action inevitably has important effects on the nonviolent group itself and on the distribution of power among the contenders in the conflict and within the wider system. These consequences of the technique require consideration. As is the case with all other areas which this study has been exploring, very little research has been carried out on these subjects. This discussion must, therefore, be limited to those effects which are now fairly clear. Further investigation may correct possible errors in our present understanding, reveal other important effects, and explore the complexities of these consequences of nonviolent action.

EFFECTS ON THE NONVIOLENT GROUP

Reference has already repeatedly been made to the fact that the strength of the nonviolent actionists may grow as the struggle proceeds,

both in comparison to their earlier strength and to the capacity of their opponent. Although some of this strengthening of the nonviolent group may be temporary, other aspects of this increased internal strength are likely to last. There are also other important effects of the use of this technique. For example, to start with, the people end their submissiveness and learn a technique of action which shows them they are no longer powerless. They are also likely to experience a growth of internal group solidarity. Certain psychological changes will occur which spring from their new sense of power and their increased self-respect. Finally, members of the group which uses nonviolent action seem during and after the struggle to cooperate more on common tasks. We shall now explore these, and related, consequences in more detail.

A. Ending submissiveness

Participation in nonviolent action both requires and produces certain changes in the previous pattern of submissiveness within the grievance group. A change of the opponent's outlook and beliefs may or may not be an objective of the campaign, but some kind of "change of heart" must take place in the nonviolent group and in the wider grievance group. Without it there can be no nonviolent action. Without a change from passive acceptance of the opponent's will, from lack of confidence and helplessness and a sense of inferiority and fear, there can be no significant nonviolent action and no basic transformation of relationships.

Erik Erikson has pointed out the close association between hierarchical systems and the subordinate's view of himself:

Therapeutic efforts as well as attempts at social reform verify the sad truth that in any system based on suppression, exclusion, and exploitation, the suppressed, excluded, and exploited unconsciously believe in the evil image which they are made to represent by those who are dominant.¹

As long as members of the subordinate group regard themselves as inferiors, are submissive, and behave in a deferential and humiliating manner to members of the dominant group, repeating the customary habits of acknowledging inferiority (the lowered eyes, and "Yes, sir," for example), they confirm the dominant group's view of them as inferiors and as creatures or persons outside the "common moral order."² Submissive behavior by the subordinates helps to support the views which serve to "justify" the established system. Also, such a pattern of submission

makes possible the system's continuation, for that behavior helps the system to operate smoothly.

Gregg related this self-image to an inability of subordinates to act to change their condition. He argued that an inferiority complex created in childhood and regularly reinforced in later years is "the most potent of all methods of restraining independent creative action among individuals and masses of people. It makes them feel utterly helpless and in times of crisis it creates a fatal hesitation and lack of confidence."³ Use of nonviolent action requires at least a partial end to the former pattern of self-deprecation and submission. Gregg has argued that people using nonviolent action also cease to experience such social weaknesses as lack of self-respect, dislike of responsibility, the desire to be dominated, and political and economic ignorance.⁴

B. Learning a technique which reveals one's power

One of the most important problems faced by people who feel that they are oppressed, or that they must oppose dominant "evil" policies and systems, is: *how can they act?* Nonviolent action provides a multitude of ways in which people, whether majorities or minorities, can utilize whatever potential leverage they may possess to become active agents in controlling their own lives. People learn a "new" way of acting which immediately frees them from feelings of helplessness. As the movement develops and they become a formidable force, they become freed from the sense of impotence and they gain confidence in their own power. The specific ways this operates differ with the situation and the leverages utilized—labor, buying power, public sympathy, self-sacrifice, political behavior and the like. But to gain a sense of power, it is often necessary to learn how to use the leverage effectively. As they learned how to strike, industrial workers realized they could act together effectively, instead of being individually helpless. They learned to wield power by withdrawing their labor in order to gain certain objectives from their employers. During the rise of industrialism, workers did not always have this knowledge and ability. They were often unfamiliar with earlier cases of strikes. We frequently forget that this type of nonviolent action also had to be learned, experimented with, and tested in struggle.

As strikes became more widespread the participating workers gained confidence in their ability to improve their lot by their own efforts, and this example stimulated other workers to form unions and similarly to withdraw their labor in case their demands were not met. The workers

had to achieve group solidarity, learn how to act, and be willing to undergo temporary suffering during the struggle as the price of winning improvements in their condition and status. These are qualities common to most instances of nonviolent action.

This process among industrial workers took place in a variety of situations and countries. In Russia, for example, industrial workers began to learn the weapon of the strike about 1870.⁵ In the following three decades the process which we have described in general terms above occurred. "The modest ameliorations [produced by the strikes] were often in practice nullified by evasion and corruption, but," writes Schapiro, "they taught the workers the important lesson that they could improve their lot by striking."⁶ The strikes in the late 1890s not only gave the workers confidence that they could achieve immediate concessions but also made them aware that they possessed the power, given time, to make much more fundamental changes in the system. "By making concessions only when faced with organized force [in the form of strikes], it [the autocracy] nurtured the hope that the fortress could one day be stormed."⁷ Strikes became commonplace at the beginning of the 1905 revolution. Although usually spontaneous and unorganized, each strike "helped to impress the 'strike habit' more firmly on Russian workers" and strikes spread.⁸ The workers were soon convinced that this was an appropriate form of action for more fundamental changes. The process continued to develop, and in a few months the Great October Strike dramatically demonstrated the increased use of the weapons of noncooperation against the government. Both supporters of strikes and of the autocracy had to take notice of the change which had been introduced.⁹

The success of the noncooperation against the 1920 Kapp *Putsch* gave even the calmest and most responsible labor leaders an unexpected sense of great power (sometimes they forgot the roles in that struggle played by others: civil servants, the Berlin population, etc.). The labor leaders then sought to use this power in bargaining to achieve their own political demands. Despite only partial success in that effort "many workers and their leaders . . . nourished long memories of how effective their weapon had been."¹⁰

The Indian experiments under Gandhi produced a similar sense of power among nonviolent actionists as they learned a "new" way to act. Gandhi often described a nonviolent action campaign as a means by which the people would generate the strength to enable them to advance toward achieving their political goals.¹¹ It was through noncooperation, Gandhi said, that people come to realize "their true power."¹² Referring

to the experience of the Bardoli revenue-refusal campaign of 1928, he pointed to the importance of the participants learning the lessons "that so long as they remain united in nonviolence they have nothing to fear" and that they could wield "the unseen power of nonviolence."¹³ At the beginning of the 1930-31 struggle, Gandhi wrote: "The mission of the Satyagrahis ends when they have shown the way to the nation to become conscious of the power lying latent in it."¹⁴ Gandhi insisted that nonviolent action enables people to feel their own power, and added that "possession of such power is independence."¹⁵

The phenomenon is not new. It occurred also as a result of the American colonists' successful noncooperation campaign against the Townshend Acts (September 1767 to April 1770). Schlesinger writes: "The workingmen had emerged from the struggle against the Townshend duties conscious for the first time of their power in the community."¹⁶ The South African civil disobedience campaign by the Indian minority in 1908 (against registration certificates, similar to the present passes) gave the Indians "some consciousness of their strength."¹⁷ The mutiny of the 2nd Division of the Colonial Infantry (Tenth French Army) in May 1917 gave the defiant soldiers a similar awareness. So many mutinied that they were not generally punished, but were instead talked into returning to the trenches—with the important difference that they were not required to make the almost suicidal attack on German trenches.

And the soldiers sensed with an ominous thrill that they could defy their officers, could shrug off the faceless inevitability of discipline with near-impunity, could refuse to attack. In short, it was up to the troops themselves whether they would live or die. And, marveling at this simple but heretofore unsuspected truth, they marched forward to share it with the Army.¹⁸

Reluctant support for this view of the effect of nonviolent struggle came from Lenin who was firmly committed to violence for revolutionary aims. Writing of the impact of the mass strike on the exploited class during the 1905 revolution, Lenin observed that ". . . only the struggle discloses to it the magnitude of its own power . . ."¹⁹

The capacity of nonviolent action to give the people who use it increased power has been described by Seifert as a general characteristic of the technique. Nonviolent resistance movements, he writes, "have demonstrated that the powerless can wield power and that social means can be democratized." People who have been politically subjugated and economically dispossessed "have accomplished on country roads and city streets"

the power changes usually associated "only with paneled board rooms and marble legislative halls." A chief result of resistance campaigns, Seifert continues, has been to "give to disprivileged groups the conviction that there is something they can do about their plight. Nonviolent strategies have given a powerful voice to those otherwise inarticulate."²⁰

Individual nonviolent campaigns may be primarily intended to strengthen the subordinate group through the learning and use of nonviolent struggle, even though their avowed objectives are to win concessions from the opponent. The strengthening of the subordinates will be the most fundamental of these changes and have lasting consequences.

C. Increasing fearlessness

That the grievance group needs to cast off fear in order to use nonviolent action effectively has already been discussed. The other side of the story is that experience in the use of nonviolent action tends to increase the degree of fearlessness among the actionists. It may be that initially both fear and anger among nonviolent actionists must be consciously controlled.²¹ Discipline and training may assist in this, as they do in military conflict. The nonviolent actionists learn, through explanation, training, example and experience, that they can remain firm in face of the opponent's repression, that he is not omnipotent, even that his violence betrays his weakness.²² The actionists learn that if they act together and refuse to be terrorized, they are powerful. Imprisonment and other suffering can be withstood. In common with heroes of violent combat, they also risk death as a chance not too high to take on behalf of fundamental principles and goals. Casualties are interpreted as assertions of the dignity and importance of individuals²³ who refuse to bend in face of wrong and who struggle with others to achieve their objectives. Hence, casualties may simply prod the others to make still stronger efforts.

Beyond this conscious discipline there appears, however, to be a stage in which the nonviolent actionists do not have to control their fear because they cease to be fearful. Gandhi has pointed out that in actual cases people who had previously been "fear-stricken" of the government had "ceased to fear" its officials.²⁴ Interpreting the 1930-31 Indian campaign, Gregg wrote that its activities had been intended to end the fear of the government among the masses and "to stimulate courage, self-reliance, self-respect and political unity." He concluded that these aims had been largely achieved.²⁵ It might be possible to dismiss the testimony of both Gandhi and Gregg on the ground that, as believers in

an ethic of nonviolence, they were not objective observers. However, Nehru, who was never such a believer and only reluctantly came to accept the practicality of nonviolent struggle, pointed to the same effect. He wrote that "the dominant impulse" in British-ruled India was "fear, pervasive, oppressing, strangling fear." Sources of this fear were the army, the police, the widespread secret service, the official class, laws, prisons, the landlord's agents, moneylenders, unemployment and starvation. "It was against this all-pervading fear that Gandhi's quiet and determined voice was raised: Be not afraid." It was not quite so simple, Nehru admitted, but in substance this was accurate. Although "fear builds its phantoms . . . more fearsome than reality itself," the real dangers, when calmly faced and accepted, lose much of their terror. Nonviolent struggle resulted in the lifting to a large degree of that fear from the people's shoulders.²⁶

Noncooperation gave the masses "a tremendous feeling of release . . . , a throwing-off of a great burden, a new sense of freedom. The fear that had crushed them retired into the background, and they straightened their backs and raised their heads."²⁷

There is evidence that not only masses of people but even individual actionists lose fear in the midst of nonviolent struggle. After being personally beaten by a mounted policeman using a *lathi*, Nehru wrote that he forgot the physical pain in the "exhilaration that I was physically strong enough to face and bear *lathi* blows."²⁸ Other participants in nonviolent defiance, too, he reported, experienced a growth of inner "freedom and a pride in that freedom. The old feeling of oppression and frustration was completely gone."²⁹

Experience in the American nonviolent civil rights movement was similar. As a result of participation in the Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott, wrote King, "a once fear-ridden people had been transformed."³⁰ The 1960 sit-ins created, wrote Lomax, a new type of Negro: "They were no longer afraid; their boldness, at times, was nothing short of alarming."³¹ Student sit-inners and freedom riders frequently experienced a "strange calm" immediately before especially dangerous actions. Physical injury was feared more than death, and when lives were indeed in danger, the actionists tended to think: "One of us is going to die, I bet, but it's not going to be me; it's going to be him, the next guy." When these student nonviolent actionists did face the prospect of their own deaths, they felt it might arouse sympathy for their cause and they were sometimes inspired by heroes who had died in *violent* campaigns against oppression.³²

The development of fearlessness is seen both as having important consequences for the personal growth of the individual actionists, as they develop such qualities as self-sacrifice, heroism and sympathy,³³ and also as having far-reaching social and political implications. Absence of fear may not only threaten the particular hierarchical system being opposed. It will greatly enhance the ability of those people to remain free and to determine their own future.

D. Increased self-esteem

If hierarchical systems exist in part because the subordinates submit as a result of seeing themselves as inferiors, the problem of how to change and end the hierarchical system becomes twofold: first, to get the members of the subordinate group to see themselves as full human beings, not inferiors to anyone, and, second, to get them to behave in ways consistent with that enhanced view of themselves, i.e., to resist and defy the patterns of inferiority and subordination.

People who are not, and do not regard themselves as, inferior must not behave as though they were: they must act to refute those conceptions and to challenge the social practices based on those views.³⁴ Some change of self-perception among at least certain members of the subordinate group must precede action, and further changes or extensions of those changes among more members of the subordinate group are likely to occur as a result of participation in nonviolent struggle.

An improved self-image often must precede action against the stratified system, and indeed an enhanced view often requires such action. When people who have accepted domination come to see their previous submission as unworthy of their new estimate of themselves, they must bring their behavior in line with their enhanced self-image. They must cease cooperation with that system, noncooperate with and disobey its behavior patterns, and the established "rules" which symbolize and perpetuate the inferior status. Self-image and resistance are thus seen to be closely linked. Lahey points out that "there is a tendency for the initiators of campaigns of exploited groups to be persons closest to the exploiting group in status in terms of self-image."³⁵ This changed behavior by the subordinates may then be important in changing the views of them held by members of the dominant group, who are confronted by behavior which refutes their stereotyped and distorted picture of the subordinate group.

The focus here, however, is primarily on the changes in self-perception which participation in nonviolent struggle has on the nonviolent

actionists and other members of the subordinate group. Behavior which itself defies and refutes the former self-image of the subordinates becomes a major factor in spreading and deepening their new enhanced view of themselves. Even the very initiation of action and tackling the underlying conflict may improve the self-image of members of the subordinate group. To many of them it may come as a revelation that they are capable of standing up to the opponent, and that by acting together they become formidable challengers of whom notice must be taken. They then gain a new sense of importance.³⁶ By their action they throw off and refute the opponent's image of themselves as inferior and stand up to him as equals. They demonstrate courage and determination. Even injuries and deaths incurred in struggle are not viewed as cruelties inflicted on helpless victims but as the price of change paid by determined resisters struggling to alter their present condition and to create their own future. These people who have been subordinates are no longer a passive mass of malleable humanity, but men and women acting powerfully against conditions they oppose. They have learned to rely on themselves, and to shape their own lives.

Willingness to undergo punishment without retaliation does not destroy this new image. There is a crucial difference in the self-esteem of the person who suffers because he is punished for defying a law which he regards as violating his dignity, and he who suffers out of passive acquiescence to the same law which he regards in the same way, as Luthuli said: "Nationalist laws seek to degrade us. We do not consent. They degrade the men who frame them. They injure us—that is something different."³⁷ Because of the importance of this element, although Indian civil disobedience prisoners in 1930 had been instructed by Gandhi to obey most prison rules, they were not to submit to orders which were "contrary to self-respect," nor would they submit "out of fear." During that campaign the Indians outside of prison refused to cooperate with the British census because, they reasoned, as long as they remained a subject people such a census was in their eyes like a "stocktaking" of "slaves."³⁸

Standing up against the opponent and fighting back by *some* means, even if violent ones, may contribute to greater self-respect. For example, Negroes of Washington, D. C. who fought back violently when attacked during the 1919 riots gained increased self-respect.³⁹ However, there are indications that when the struggle is conducted by nonviolent means the group will gain additional self-respect not only because they are struggling instead of submitting but also because they are acting with means which

are seen to be ethically superior.⁴⁰ Nehru records, for example, that in the Indian nonviolent struggles the Indians saw their goal and their non-violent type of struggle as better than the goal and methods of their British rulers, and this gave the Indians "an agreeable sense of moral superiority over our opponents."⁴¹

An enhanced view of themselves and a new sense of their own importance has been noted among strikers and other nonviolent actionists.⁴² Hiller points out that increased self-esteem may result from success.⁴³ But success is not the only factor, for Hiller also indicates, as does Lakey,⁴⁴ that even when the nonviolent group is not successful, increased self-confidence and less inner tension tend to develop.⁴⁵

The capacity of nonviolent action to change the participants themselves was, writes James Farmer, one of the reasons why the early Congress of Racial Equality (C.O.R.E.) concentrated on nonviolent direct action projects instead of working for new laws and court decisions:

CORE . . . wanted to involve the people . . . personally in the struggle for their own freedom . . . [I]n the very act of working for the impersonal cause of racial freedom, a man experiences . . . a large measure of private freedom . . . which, if not the same thing as freedom, is its radical source.

Having described a courageous initial attempt at nonviolent defiance by Negroes of Plaquemine, Louisiana, Farmer pointed to a change within them:

Gradually, during . . . those two violent days, they made the decision to act instead of being acted upon . . . [They] refused to be victimized any longer by the troopers, [and] had been transformed into a community of men, capable, despite the severest limitations, of free and even heroic acts. Their subsequent activity at the polls and in initiating a school boycott suggests that this kind of freedom, though essentially personal, will inevitably lead to social action, and that freedom once won is not readily surrendered.⁴⁶

Nehru described the change wrought by Gandhi on the Indian millions as one "from a demoralized, timid and hopeless mass, bullied and crushed by every dominant interest, and incapable of resistance, into a people with self-respect and self-reliance, resisting tyranny, and capable of united action and sacrifice for a larger cause."⁴⁷ Describing a similar change among the fifty thousand Negroes of Montgomery, Alabama, during the year-long bus boycott, King wrote that they "acquired a

new estimate of their own human worth."⁴⁸ Seen in this context certain instances of Gandhi's moralizing have strong political implications. He insisted on dignity, discipline and restraint which would bring the Indians self-respect. Their self-respect would bring them the respect of others, and this would bring them freedom. "To command respect is the first step to *Swaraj* [self-rule]."⁴⁹

The growth of self-esteem, with its impact on the opponent, the subordinate group, and the ability and determination of that group to defy the behavior patterns of inferiority, may have highly significant long term consequences.

E. Bringing satisfaction, enthusiasm and hope

Despite the dangers and hardships encountered in the struggle, non-violent actionists may find the overall experience a satisfying one. The precise source of the satisfaction has varied, but it has occurred in diverse cases, including the pro-Jewish strikers of Amsterdam in February 1941:

To those who had participated, the strike provided a sense of relief, since it represented an active repudiation of the German regime. . . . In the strike the working population of Amsterdam had discovered its own identity in defiance of the occupying power.⁵⁰

Tens of thousands of British citizens found the 1926 General Strike to be "the most enjoyable time of their lives."⁵¹ A high society lady from Washington, D.C., who supported woman suffrage by doing picket duty, maintained that "no public service she had ever done gave her such an exalted feeling."⁵² In England, woman suffragist public demonstrations had a similar effect on the actionists; Mary Winsor wrote that "to make women feel at ease in the streets of the city helped to break the sex dominance that man had set up."⁵³ Nehru wrote: "In the midst of strife, and while we ourselves encouraged that strife, we had a sense of inner peace."⁵⁴

Of similar experiences in the United States, Farmer has observed that tens of thousands of young Negroes who participated in marches, sit-ins, or went to jail experienced "the joys of action and the liberating effect" of working to determine their own future. Consequently, "they began to regard themselves differently." ". . . men must achieve freedom for themselves. Do it for them and you extinguish the spark which makes freedom possible and glorious . . ." The many Negroes who participated in the nonviolent civil rights movement, Farmer continued,

achieved "a measure of spiritual emancipation" which no legal document could give them: "The segregation barriers . . . have ceased to be an extension of their minds . . . They do not feel inferior . . . We feel dignified . . ." People who had formerly felt little and insignificant changed as a result of taking part in nonviolent struggle, he reports, so that afterwards they "in their own eyes, stand ten feet tall." Farmer quotes a student in Atlanta: "I, myself, desegregated that lunch counter on Peachtree Street. Nobody else. I did it by sitting-in, by walking the picket line, by marching. I didn't have to wait for any big shots to do it for me. I did it myself." Farmer adds: "Never again will that youth and the many like him see themselves as unimportant."⁵⁵

Participants in nonviolent action may also experience increased enthusiasm, dedication and hope.⁵⁶ Luthuli concluded that the 1952 Defiance Campaign in South Africa "had succeeded in *creating* among a very large number of Africans the spirit of militant defiance. The Campaign itself came to an untimely end, but it left a new climate, and it embraced people far beyond our range of vision. Since then there have been a number of unexpected demonstrations, especially among women." Luthuli goes on to cite several instances in which Africans after that campaign was over applied nonviolent action and "the refusal to comply" because they had caught the "mood" of the campaign "and sometimes its technique."⁵⁷

The 1962 civil rights campaign among Mississippi Negroes (which consisted largely of the "freedom registration" and "freedom ballot") "energized Negroes who had never before dreamed of participating in their state's political process . . ."⁵⁸ The 1961 Freedom Riders "went back to their homes with a deep and abiding commitment to the movement of the sort that only direct participation can inspire." The gains that were won through nonviolent action also produced a "sense of possibility . . . in the ghetto."⁵⁹ Hope was restored, or perhaps born.

Lenin was no friend of nonviolent action, but in his "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution" he acknowledged the role which some methods of this technique played in radically altering the attitudes of the masses. Before January 9, 1905 the revolutionary party in Russia, he writes, "consisted of a small handful of people . . ." Within a few months "slumbering Russia became transformed into a Russia of a revolutionary proletariat and a revolutionary people." How had this transformation come about? What were its methods and ways? Lenin had no doubt, although the answer was contrary to his elitist conception of revolution. "The principal means by which this transformation was brought about

was the *mass strike*." The social content of that 1905 revolution, he wrote, was a "*bourgeois-democratic* revolution" but "in its methods of struggle it was a *proletarian* revolution." It was this type of action which had made the change: ". . . the specifically proletarian means of struggle—namely, the strike—was the principal instrument employed for rousing the masses . . ." This struggle had imbued the masses with "a new spirit." "Only the struggle educates the exploited class." Only struggle reveals to that class the extent of its own power, while it also "widens its horizon, enhances its abilities, clarifies its mind, forges its will . . ." Even reactionaries had to admit, concluded Lenin, that the year 1905 had "definitely buried patriarchal Russia."⁶⁰

F. Effects on aggression, masculinity, crime and violence

Participation in nonviolent action has at times reversed or demonstrated a reversal of the usual assumed relationships between nonviolent behavior and human aggressiveness, masculinity, crime and future violence.

The use of nonviolent struggle by multitudes of ordinary people should make it clear beyond dispute both that human beings are not by nature too aggressive to use such means, and that human aggressiveness can be expressed nonviolently. It is fairly obvious that aggressiveness and feelings of hostility may be expressed in economic boycotts which inflict financial losses on the opponent, and that demonstrators who sit down in the street may realize that by this nonviolent act they are being more difficult to deal with than if they had used violence. There are also indications that the show of friendliness toward opponents may be associated with contempt for them, and that even extreme gestures of humanity in nonviolent action may at times derive from feelings of aggressiveness. Solomon and Fishman point to this association in their studies of American student civil rights actionists: "The friendliness of demonstrators toward their foes . . . sometimes is displayed at moments when the students *feel* the most hostile and contemptuous." They cite an instance in which a member of the American Nazi Party, carrying and shouting extremely offensive racial expressions, taunted a civil rights picket line near Washington, D.C. One student demonstrator wanted for the first half hour to hit the Nazi, but for the sake of the movement he didn't. Then, the student started smiling at the Nazi every time he saw him. In a quarter of an hour, the Nazi started smiling back, but then felt ridiculous for not hating the student enough, got mad, and left. That student had found in other cases also that friendly behavior to hecklers made them "quite exasperated at themselves." He adopted

a Mississippi journalist's motto: "I always love my enemies because it makes them mad as hell."⁶¹

Nonviolent action has also been used by groups which have been famous for their very aggressive behavior and violence. Bondurant points to the case of the Pathans, in the North-West Frontier Province of British India. She quotes William Crooke's observation of their nature, published in 1896: "The true Pathan . . . is cruel, bloodthirsty and vindictive in the highest degree He leads a wild, free, active life in the rugged fastnesses of his mountains; and there is an air of masculine independence about him . . ." Bondurant quotes others who have said that war has traditionally been the "normal business of the land" among the Pathans, who had "no hesitation to kill when the provocation causes sufficient wrath." It should also be noted that the Pathans were Muslims, adherents of a religion widely regarded as approving of war for a good cause. Yet among these Pathans, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, "the Frontier Gandhi," organized a powerful movement of the Khudai Khidmatgar, or Servants of God, which was pledged to complete nonviolence and whose members became some of the bravest and most daring and reliable nonviolent resisters of India's struggle for independence. Bondurant writes: "The achievement of the Khudai Khidmatgar was nothing less than the reversal in attitude and habit of a people steeped in the tradition of factious violence The instrument for this achievement was a Pathan version of satyagraha."⁶² It seems clear from this extremely important case that there was no basic change in the "human nature" of the Pathans, but that the aggressiveness, bravery and daring of those people found new nonviolent expressions through the nonviolent technique.

Jerome D. Frank, Professor of Psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University, writes that nonviolent action struggles have also broken "the psychological link between masculinity and violence, thus circumventing one of the major psychological supports for war." He points to Kenneth Boulding's "First Law": "What exists, is possible." Frank continues: "Nonviolent action exists and has succeeded under some circumstances, and this alone destroys the contention that nonviolent methods of conflict are hopelessly at variance with human nature." The Indian campaigns under Gandhi and the American nonviolent civil rights struggles, in very different societies with quite unlike traditions,

. . . have reversed the relationship between masculinity and violence, and shown that this may be based more on cultural expectations than on the usually assumed biology of maleness. They suc-

ceeded in establishing group standards in which willingness to die rather than resort to violence was the highest expression of manly courage.

Frank cites as supporting evidence the findings of two studies of participants in the American sit-in movements and Freedom Rides, which ". . . have revealed that by refusing to resort to violence, the participants gain a heightened feeling of manliness and a sense of moral superiority over their opponents, who in effect, act out their own aggressive impulses for them."⁶³

Nonviolent action may also help reduce crime and other anti-social behavior among the general grievance group. At the end of the Montgomery, Alabama, Negro bus boycott, King observed a decline in heavy drinking, crime and divorce among the Negroes, and in the number of fights on Saturday nights.⁶⁴ Others reported the same trend from other cities. Hentoff wrote:

Significantly, again and again in recent years, when a large section of a Negro community has been caught up in a movement against discrimination, the crime rate in that community has gone down and remained down so long as mass action continues.⁶⁵

Mrs. Gloria Richardson, Chairman of the Cambridge, Maryland, Non-Violent Action Committee, said in 1963:

It's funny, but during the whole time we were demonstrating actively, there were almost no fights in this ward and almost no crime. . . . Now they've gone back to fighting each other again. They've been thrown back to carrying a chip on their shoulder.⁶⁶

Farmer cited both the above cases also, pointing in addition to Jackson, Mississippi, which before the 1961 Freedom Rides had "a shocking incidence of petty and violent crime of Negro against Negro. When the Freedom Buses came, the city united in support and the crime rate dropped precipitately." He added: "Whenever people are given hope and the technique to get the heel off their necks, crime will decline."⁶⁷ Solomon and Fishman also cited reports of sharp decline in crime and delinquency during public protest campaigns, noting generally: "The movement provides a release of pent-up resentment and anger in a socially and politically advantageous and morally superior manner. . . ." ⁶⁸ There has also been a psychiatric study on this result of nonviolent action.⁶⁹

Participation in nonviolent action, under some circumstances at least,

may contribute to an extension of the areas of life in which the person may feel able to act nonviolently, instead of violently, and to an increased sympathy for nonviolence as an overall moral principle. Lakey reports changes among participants in the sit-in movement in the Deep South: some began taking part while being rather hostile and aggressive persons, but later came gradually to "accept the Gandhian values of nonviolent action as a part of their everyday behavior."⁷⁰ This is in line with Gregg's view that "in actual life action often precedes and clarifies thought and even creates it."⁷¹ Similar developments in some individual participants of the British Committee of 100 civil disobedience demonstrations were reported.

Of course, such changes may not take place at all, or if they do, they may occur only among a small percentage of the actionists; this will depend on various factors. Given sufficient time and favorable experiences (not necessarily pleasant ones), such changes are likely, however, among *some* of the participants. A process of "emotional relearning" may take place in which, by testing out a new way of behaving, the actionist learns that his earlier fears about the consequences of nonviolent behavior may not in fact materialize.⁷² Janis and Katz have suggested that the prospect of taking part in a future act of violence in a conflict situation may produce at least a small degree of anticipatory guilt feelings, and hence emotional tension; they add that this inner tension may be reduced by a group decision to abstain from violence and to use "an effective form of nonviolent action instead." They argued that even when the group's approval of nonviolent behavior is only lip service, that approval may increase the individual's self-esteem concerning his own adherence to nonviolence. The combination of this reduced inner tension and this increase in self-esteem for his own nonviolence, may make the individual increasingly sympathetic to nonviolent behavior more generally.

If each act of abstention [from violence] is rewarded in this way, a new attitude will gradually tend to develop such that the person becomes increasingly more predisposed to decide or vote in favor of nonviolent means. Perhaps under these conditions, good moral "practice makes perfect."

Even where success is ambiguous, they argued, this type of process is likely to take place among those members of the group "who have a relatively low need for aggression," and people who, without thinking, formerly accepted violent methods may instead accept nonviolent methods for dealing with opponents.

Other factors and processes are of course involved in such a change. Just as the person may have inner hesitations about using violence, he may also be apprehensive about using nonviolent means only, Janis and Katz continued. Such a pressure against nonviolence may arise, for example, from the widely accepted view that violence is the only suitable response in severe conflicts, or from such a question as "Am I a sissy?" The person using nonviolent action may therefore have to justify to himself his participation in a campaign which rejects violence or withdraw from the struggle. Janis and Katz have argued that the process set in motion by this is likely to "contribute to two types of attitude change: 1) reduced hostility toward the rival group, and 2) more favorable evaluations of the desirability of using positive [i.e., nonviolent] means in general."⁷³ Gregg argued that nonviolent action is also less exhausting and requires less emotional energy than violence;⁷⁴ if so, this factor too may make the nonviolent actionist sympathetic to use of nonviolent methods in other areas of his life.

There may also be certain social-psychological effects of adherence to nonviolent methods on the group as a whole. Janis and Katz have suggested that reliance on nonviolent action may strengthen the group's commitment to its avowed goal, whereas reliance on violence may lead to the original goals being abandoned and to other "corrupting" effects.⁷⁵

On a more conscious and rational level, participation in nonviolent action may convince people that such behavior may be practical and effective in conflicts in which they have presumed only violence to "work." Moral imperatives to refrain from violence—contained in various philosophical and religious systems to which lip-service is widely paid—are often violated because people believe that nonviolent behavior is not practical in serious social, political and international conflicts.⁷⁶ If people become convinced by participation, observation and new knowledge that nonviolent action is practical, it may be used in more serious conflict situations, and the tension between a desire to adhere to a nonviolent ethic and a wish to be effective in real conflicts may be reduced or removed. This process will not, of course, operate unless concrete and practical nonviolent courses of action are worked out to deal with each conflict situation.

G. Increased group unity

The effectiveness of nonviolent action is increased when the actionists and the general grievance group possess a high degree of internal

unity. In addition, the use of nonviolent action in itself contributes significantly to the growth of such internal solidarity. This growth has often been seen in the labor movement. Conflict, said Hiller, "solidifies the group." "Under attack, strikers perceive the identity of their interests." Comradship is generated in the group during the conflict and a feeling of elation is produced by acting with the whole group. "Mutual stimulation increases the readiness to act."⁷⁷

There is evidence that the nonviolent actionists are likely to find it easier to achieve and maintain group unity than is the opponent group; and also easier than if they use violent means. Violence is likely to exclude certain persons from full participation, both because of age, sex, physical condition and the like, and because of beliefs, or simple distaste and revulsion against the use of violence in the conflict.

For example, there was much greater unity among the American colonists during the predominantly nonviolent campaigns against English laws and policies than there was later, after the struggle had shifted to a military confrontation. The Morgans point out that the colonies had never been able to unite for any purpose, even against the French and Indians in war, prior to the Stamp Act struggle. Not only did the Stamp Act Congress show this unity: the solidarity of merchants in several cities in supporting nonimportation agreements, despite temptations to profit by violating them, was also new. A proposal for an intercolonial union was making rapid progress when the Stamp Act was repealed. Joseph Warren in March 1766 wrote that Grenville's legislation had produced "... what the most zealous Colonist never could have expected. The Colonies until now were ever at variance and foolishly jealous of each other, they are now . . . united . . . nor will they soon forget the weight which this close union gives them."⁷⁸ Further noncooperation followed, and greater unity among the colonies. This unity grew, so that during the deliberations of the First Continental Congress in 1774 (which drafted the most ambitious noncooperation campaign yet), Patrick Henry of Virginia was able to declare: "The Distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders, are no more. I am not a Virginian, but an American."⁷⁹

The initial period of the 1905 Revolution in Russia, which was significantly more nonviolent than the concluding period, produced a "strong feeling of camaraderie and unity," wrote Harcave. It was possible to achieve a common front uniting everyone from revolutionaries to conservatives against the regime, under the limited but common con-

viction that it was impossible to continue without change.⁸⁰ It was under the program urged by Gandhi and the application of nonviolent action to achieve independence that the Indian National Congress was transformed from a very small group of intellectuals who met for discussions and consideration of resolutions once a year into a mass membership political party engaged in active struggle with the British Empire. During this same period, despite diverse linguistic, cultural and religious groups, very considerable if inadequate steps were taken in developing Indian unity. The 1952 South African Defiance Campaign also saw increased solidarity and a sense of power among the nonwhites. The various nonwhite Congresses were strengthened, and in particular the number of paid members of the African National Congress jumped from seven thousand at the beginning of the campaign to one hundred thousand at the end.⁸¹ The South African 1957 bus boycott by Alexandra township Africans also produced similar effects. African National Congress leader Walter Sisulu said later that "the bus boycott has raised the political consciousness of the people and has brought about a great solidarity and unity among them."⁸² Repeatedly, the use of nonviolent action against racial discrimination and segregation in the United States led to a significant increase in Negro unity. The June 1963 Boston Negro boycott of the public schools, in protest against *de facto* racial segregation, produced this result, as Noel Day, one of its leaders, pointed out: "The boycott was a success in terms of getting the Negro community organized for action. It was never as united before the boycott as it has been since."⁸³ Feelings of group unity are closely associated with increased cooperation, self-help and organization within the grievance group.

H. Increased internal cooperation

The withdrawal of cooperation from the opponent and his system by nonviolent actionists does not lead simply to chaos and disorganization. On the contrary, such noncooperation and defiance are balanced by increased cooperation within the grievance group in general and among the nonviolent actionists in particular. The effective conduct of a nonviolent action movement requires considerable organization, cooperation and self-help.

At the same time, increased cooperation within the grievance group is required in order to provide alternative ways of meeting those social needs formerly met by the institutions with which cooperation has been now refused. The reverse side of noncooperation is cooperation, and

that of defiance is mutual aid. These make it possible both to preserve social order and to meet social needs during and following a nonviolent action movement. Without such positive efforts, even though the nonviolent action were effective and successful—which is doubtful—the result would be social chaos and collapse which would lead the way toward quite different results than those intended by the nonviolent group, unless there were a prompt resumption of cooperation under the old system. The alternative arrangements for preserving social order and meeting human needs depend upon the willingness of the grievance group to give them their cooperation and to make them a success.

The close relationship between noncooperation and cooperation was repeatedly emphasized by Gandhi:

The movement of non-cooperation is one of automatic adjustment. If the Government schools are emptied, I would certainly expect national schools to come into being. If the lawyers as a whole suspended practice, they would devise arbitration courts . . . ⁸⁴

Bondurant makes the same point: “. . . the non-cooperation of satyagraha has the necessary concomitant of cooperation among the resisters themselves . . . for establishing a parallel social structure, [and] also in . . . conversion of the system against which the group is resisting.” ⁸⁵

This building up of cooperation to fulfill the social needs formerly met by the opponent's institutions is illustrated by the Montgomery bus boycott. With the decision of the Negroes to refuse to ride on the segregated buses, fifty thousand people were left without a public transportation system. This was one of the first problems to be tackled by the planning committee. Through a series of efforts, they established a highly efficient alternative transportation system. The importance of this rival institution was clearly recognized by the city officials who made repeated efforts to crush it. ⁸⁶

There is considerable variation in the degree to which this balancing of noncooperation with cooperation is consciously developed or just “happens” without advance consideration. There are even some cases in which a broad program of social change and development based on this developing cooperation has been thought out and deliberately promoted to take place both between and during nonviolent action struggles. A whole series of alternative national Hungarian cultural, educational, economic and political institutions were built up during Hungarian opposition to Austrian rule in the mid-nineteenth century, especially during

the passive resistance phase from about 1850 to 1867. It is clear that these alternative institutions were important in the continuation of Hungary as a nation and in its ability to resist domination from Vienna. ⁸⁷

In India, Gandhi also developed his “constructive program” ⁸⁸ on the need for parallel substitute institutions to replace those of the opponent. With this theory and program, new institutions and social patterns need not wait for the capture of State machinery: far better, they could be initiated immediately, Gandhi maintained. Social “evils” were to be attacked directly by nonviolent action when necessary. Along with such struggle, however, had to go the broader educational and institutional work, a balancing cooperation to meet social needs. To the extent that there is support for this constructive program and that it succeeds, the new efforts will gradually weaken and replace the former system. Also in Gandhi's view, as it showed results that constructive program would increase support for the resistance movement by showing that change was both desirable and possible. Gandhi constantly pressed for constructive work, both between and during direct action struggles. He believed it helped to train volunteers, to educate the masses, and was a necessary accompaniment to all nonviolent action struggles except in cases of a local specific common grievance. ⁸⁹

Both Gandhi and the Hungarians in the mid-nineteenth century apparently had an explicit theory about the need for alternative social institutions. However, even in the absence of such theories, nonviolent action struggles tend to be accompanied by increased cooperation within the grievance group expressed in organizational, institutional and often economic forms. Some type of compensating process seems to be involved: noncooperation with certain institutions tends to produce increased alternative cooperation with other institutions, even if these have to be created especially for the purpose.

Economic noncooperation campaigns by American colonists against England, for example, led to strong efforts to build up American self-sufficiency in both agriculture and manufactures. ⁹⁰ Strikes and political noncooperation in the Russian Empire in 1905 were balanced by a growth of organizational strength among the revolutionaries, especially among trade unions and the creation of *soviets* (councils) as institutions of direct popular government. ⁹¹ A logical consequence of this development of internal cooperation and of alternative institutions for meeting social needs and maintaining social order in a revolutionary situation is dual sovereignty and parallel government.

I. Contagion

When nonviolent action is used with at least moderate effectiveness, the technique will tend to spread. The same people may use it again under other circumstances, and the example set may be followed by other people in quite different circumstances. This effect of contagion is not unique to nonviolent action—political violence too seems to be contagious—but the spread of nonviolent action is important, especially because that technique enhances the power of the nonviolent actionists. Those consequences, as we shall see, are different from those of political violence.

The royal governors of American colonies claimed that it was the contagious example of Boston's initial defiance of the Stamp Act (not strictly nonviolently) which had set off resistance in their colonies, too, and produced the situation in which no one was willing and able to put the Act into operation on November 1, 1765, when it was to come into force. Reports which exaggerated the radical nature of resistance in Virginia led to resistance in other colonies more extreme than had actually occurred in Virginia.⁹²

Success in achieving repeal of the Stamp Act paved the way for the colonists to use comparable methods when facing new grievances, such as the Townshend taxes. The very influential "Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania" (authored anonymously by John Dickinson) reminded the American colonists of the previous effectiveness of their legislative petitions and nonimportation agreements, and urged that those means of protest be revived against the new Townshend Acts. Arthur Schlesinger wrote: "These articles were read everywhere and helped to prepare the public mind for the mercantile opposition of the next few years."⁹³

This additional colonial experience with noncooperation made possible in turn the development of a more comprehensive program of such resistance embodied in the Continental Association, adopted by the First Continental Congress. It was, wrote Schlesinger, in part "the standardization and nationalization of the systems of commercial opposition which had hitherto been employed on a local scale." There was, however, a significant difference, for initiative and control had been seized by the radicals, who were now using the weapons which the merchant class had earlier developed and used for their own purposes; the radicals "had now reversed the weapons on them in an effort to secure ends desired solely by the radicals."⁹⁴

There were repeated instances during the 1905 Revolution in which strikes and other forms of struggle spread by imitation. Small successes

from strikes earlier in the year led to expansion of trade union organizations and more use of strikes. Similarly, limited political successes have sometimes prodded resisters and revolutionaries to press on to larger objectives. The Tsar's October Manifesto which granted civil liberties and a limited *Duma*, wrested from the Tsar by the Great October Strike which had paralyzed the country and the government, convinced the revolutionaries that they had the power to press on. The majority considered, Harcave reported, that they had won "a preliminary victory" which should be followed "by a final assault on autocracy."⁹⁵

To my knowledge, studies have not been made specifically on the contagion effect of the nonviolent technique. However this contagion seems to operate even across national borders and around the world as descriptions of nonviolent struggles are relayed by radio, television and newspapers. Printed accounts in books or pamphlets may also serve a similar purpose at times. When nonviolent struggles are failures, contagion is not likely to occur; but when successes follow each other nonviolent action may spread and the use of the technique may multiply almost geometrically.

J. Conclusion

The bulk of the earlier analysis in this Part was focused on the dynamics of nonviolent struggle in terms of its effects on the opponent. That is obviously an extremely important aspect of the technique. However, as the discussion in this section has shown, the effects of this technique on its practitioners are far-reaching and in light of the analysis of power on which this technique rests, may in the long run be the most important. For if people are strong and know how to resist effectively, it becomes difficult or impossible for anyone to oppress them in the first place. Future analysis of the dynamics of nonviolent action may, therefore, give more attention to the changes the technique produces among the nonviolent actionists than to the immediate effects on the opponent. The strengthening of the grievance group is bound to alter power relationships in lasting ways.

DIFFUSED POWER AND THE NONVIOLENT TECHNIQUE

Tocqueville pointed out that a society needs strong social groups and institutions capable of independent action and able to wield power

in their own right; when necessary, these may act to control the power of the established government or any possible domestic or foreign usurper. If such groups (*loci*—or places—of power) are not present to a significant degree, it may prove extraordinarily difficult or impossible for that society to exercise control over its present ruler, to preserve its constitutional system, and to defend its independence.⁹⁶ People are better able to act together against the ruler or usurper when they can act through groups, organizations and other institutions than when each person is isolated from all others, and no group of them has collective control over any of the sources of the power of the State.

According to this view, lasting capacity for popular control of political power, especially in crises, requires the strengthening of such non-governmental groups and institutions in the normal functioning of the society in order that in crises they will be able to control the sources of political power, and therefore control rulers who do not wish to be controlled. In this establishment of effective control over the political power of rulers, questions of social organization and of political technique converge.

There may be a causal connection between the relative concentration or diffusion of power in the society and the technique of struggle, or final sanction, relied upon by that society to maintain the social system or to change it. Political violence and nonviolent action may produce quite different effects on the future concentration of power in the society. Therefore, the choice between the various political techniques will become that society's ultimate sanction and technique of struggle and may help to determine the future capacity of that society to exercise popular control over any ruler or would-be ruler.

This brief discussion necessarily deals in broad generalizations and tendencies, which may not give full appreciation to the complexities of a given case. It may be remembered not only that many other factors may be operating in a given situation, but that under particular conditions the tendencies discussed here might not be realized.

A. Violence and centralization of power

It has been widely recognized that violent revolutions and wars have been accompanied and followed by an increase both in the absolute power of the State and in the relative centralization of power in its hands. This recognition has by no means been limited to opponents of political violence and centralization. Following successful violent revolutions, the new ruler may in some cases behave in a more humanitarian

and self-restrained way than the former regime, but this is not always so, and there is nothing in the new structure which requires it. Furthermore, the increased power of the new government frequently puts the general populace in a more unfavorable position to exert control over it in the future than the populace was under the old regime. The weakening of other social groups and institutions and the concentration of increased power in the hands of the State—whoever might hold the position of ruler—thus generally has not brought to the subjects increased ability to control political power. This process, Jouvanel has argued, laid the foundation for the monolithic State.⁹⁷

The centralizing effect of conventional war has similarly been widely recognized. This has been especially obvious in the twentieth century, but the tendency was apparent earlier.⁹⁸ Technological changes and the breakdown of the distinction between civilians and the armed forces have accentuated this tendency. Effective mobilization of manpower and other resources into an efficient war machine, the necessity of centralized planning and direction, the disruptive effect of dissension, the need for effective control over the war effort, and the increase in the military might which is available to the government, all contribute to the strong tendency of modern war to concentrate more and more effective power in the hands of the ruler—whoever occupies that position. There seems to be a causal connection between the use of political violence and the increased centralization of power in the government. Political violence, therefore, even when used against a particular tyrant, may contribute to increased difficulties in controlling the power of future rulers of that society and in preventing or combatting future tyranny.

There are various factors in the dynamics of political violence which appear to influence this connection; all of these seem to be aggravated by modern developments in technology and political organization. For example, centralized control of the preparations for and the waging of violence is generally necessary if the violence is to be applied efficiently. In order to provide control over the preparations and waging of violence, centralized control of the weapons (and other material resources), the active combatants, and the groups and institutions on which these depend, is also required.

The combination of all these types of control means increased power before and during the struggle for those exercising that control. The controllers will also be able to use violence against the population to maintain that control. After a successful violent struggle, the group which controlled the conduct of the struggle, and which now controls

the State, is likely to retain at least most of the power which they accumulated during the conflict. Or, if a *coup d'etat* takes place, others will obtain control of that increased power. In addition, when violent revolutionaries take over the old State, now strengthened by the additional centralized power accumulated by them during the violent conflict, the overall effective power of the new ruler will be increased, compared to that of the old one.

Furthermore, the power of the State is likely also to be increased relatively as a result of the destruction or weakening during the struggle of the effective *loci* of power—the independent institutions and social groups. The combination of an increase in the power of the State and a weakening of the *loci* of power among the people will leave the subjects under the new regime relatively weakened *vis à vis* the ruler, compared with their condition before the change. In addition, the new regime which was born out of violence will require continued reliance on violence, and therefore centralization, to defend itself from internal and external enemies. In a society where subjects and ruler alike regard violence as the only kind of power and the only effective means of struggle, the subjects may feel helpless in face of a ruler which possesses such vast capacity to wield political violence. Technological developments in modern weaponry, communications, police methods, transportation, computers and the like all contribute to the further concentration of control of effective political violence and to a diminution of what can be called freedom or democracy. All these various factors and related ones may thus help to reduce the capacity of subjects to control political power in a society which has relied upon violence as its supreme sanction and technique of struggle.

B. Nonviolent action and decentralization of power

Nonviolent action appears to have quite different long term effects on the distribution of power in the society. Not only does this technique lack the centralizing effects of political violence, but nonviolent action appears by its very nature to contribute to the diffusion of effective power throughout the society. This diffusion, in turn, is likely to make it easier in the long run for the subjects to control their ruler's exercise of power in the future. This increased potential for popular control means more freedom and more democracy.

There are several reasons why widespread use of nonviolent action in place of political violence tends to diffuse power among the subjects.

These reasons have to do with the greater self-reliance of the people using the technique, as related to leadership, weapons, the more limited power of the post-struggle government, and the reservoir capacity for nonviolent struggle which has been built up against future dangers.

Leadership in nonviolent struggle, although important, is an unstable and often temporary phenomenon, while the dynamics of the technique promote and even require greater self-reliance among the participants. The chances of continuing domination by a leadership group are thereby drastically reduced. Although strong leadership may play an important role in initiating the movement and setting its strategy, as the struggle develops the populace takes up its dominant role in carrying out the noncooperation or defiance, and the original leadership is often imprisoned or otherwise removed by the opponent. A continuing central leadership group then ceases to be so necessary or even possible in many situations. The movement thus tends to become self-reliant, and in extreme situations effectively leaderless. Under severe repression, efficiency in nonviolent action requires that the participants be able to act without reliance on a central leadership group.

A nonviolent struggle movement cannot be centrally controlled by regulation of the supply and distribution of weapons to the combatants and populace, because in nonviolent action there are no material weapons. There are, it is true, a multitude of nonviolent "weapons"—the many specific methods examined in Chapters Three to Eight—but their availability cannot be centrally controlled. The nonviolent actionists depend not on weapons which can be restricted or confiscated or ammunition which may not be freely available, but on such qualities as their bravery, ability to maintain nonviolent discipline, skill in applying the technique and the like. These qualities and skills are likely to develop with use, so that during and at the end of a nonviolent struggle the populace is likely to be more self-reliant and powerful than in a violent struggle when the fighting forces are dependent on the supply of equipment and ammunition. This is important for the distribution of power in the post-struggle society, for people who have, or believe they have, no independent capacity for struggle are likely to be treated by elites as a passive populace to be controlled and acted upon, not as people capable of wielding effective power for their own objectives.

Irving L. Janis and Daniel Katz have suggested that the choice of violent action or nonviolent action may also have significant effects on the *type* of leadership likely to arise in the movement, to be perpetuated in it, and to carry over into the post-struggle society. Violence, they

suggest, tends to result in a more brutal, less democratic leadership than does nonviolent action, and also in the long run reduces adherence to the movement's original humanitarian goals as motivating principles for both leaders and participants. "That individuals and groups can be involved in anti-social practices in the interests of desirable social goals and still maintain these goals in relatively pure fashion is a doctrine for which there is little psychological support." They add that "... repeated behavior of an anti-social character, though originally in the interests of altruistic social goals, will probably lead to the abandonment of those goals as directing forces for the . . . leaders as well as the followers within any group or organization." Social approval for violence, they continue, is likely to increase the amount of violence in the society by weakening super-ego controls and by releasing latent violence. Where the violence becomes institutionalized, Janis and Katz conclude, even assuming the political "success" of the movement, it tends to lead to rigidity and to the filling of political and social positions involving violence with individuals whose basic personality patterns (deriving satisfaction from such work) are reinforced by rewards of status, salary and social approval.⁹⁹

Nonviolent leaders do not use violent sanctions to maintain their positions and hence are more subject to popular control than leaders of violent movements which may apply violent sanctions against internal opposition. During nonviolent campaigns, their leaders depend for their positions upon voluntarily accepted moral authority, acceptance of their political and strategic judgment, and popular support—not upon any capacity to threaten or use violence against the participants themselves. After the struggle, the leaders who do not accept official positions in the State will have no means of violence for use against the populace to maintain their leadership positions or to impose a nondemocratic regime. In such cases as national independence struggles or social revolutions in which some of the leaders after the conclusion of the conflict accept official positions in the State, that capacity of the State for violence against the populace, as we have seen, will be more limited than it would have been had the struggle been violent. After the nonviolent struggle, then, the State power remains unenlarged while the popular capacity for resistance has increased; greater chances for future popular control and a greater degree of diffused power therefore exist.

Whereas violent struggles tend to erode or destroy the independence of the society's *loci* of power, with nonviolent struggle those groups and institutions are likely to have been strengthened. That increased

capacity will in turn contribute to greater institutional vitality, capacity for opposing autocratic tendencies, and to the general diffusion of power in the post-struggle society.

It cannot be expected that a nonviolent campaign for specific objectives will be followed immediately by that society's full rejection of violence in all situations. However, effective use of nonviolent struggle may be a step in the direction of increased substitution of nonviolent for violent sanctions in that society. Increased confidence and understanding of the potential and requirements of the nonviolent technique will need to be accompanied by efforts to work out specific strategies to deal with specific issues, since lasting substitution hinges on the nonviolent alternative being, and being seen to be, effective for each specific conflict. That is, replacement of violence with nonviolent action is likely to be a continuing series of particular substitutions instead of a single sweeping adoption of nonviolent means, regardless of the reason it might be chosen. In addition, changes won by nonviolent means are unlikely to be seen to "require" violence to maintain them, in contrast to changes won by violence. When, to cite a third possibility, the changes have been "given" by the opponent without struggle by the grievance group, those changes may be taken away, either by the donor or some other group, as easily as they were received. However, changes won in struggle by nonviolent action are accompanied by the capacity developed in struggle to defend those changes nonviolently against future threats. Such changes achieved by nonviolent action are therefore likely to be relatively lasting, and not to require political violence to maintain them.¹⁰⁰

Members of grievance groups which have, respectively, used violent struggle and nonviolent struggle successfully, are likely—following the conflicts—to have different perceptions of their own power in the new situation. With confidence in violence as the real type of power, after a nominally successful violent struggle which has, for example, changed the elite which controls the State, the populace viewing the concentrated capacity for violence held by the new government is likely to see it in comparison as relatively helpless in any possible serious struggle against it. A quite different situation is, however, likely to follow a successful nonviolent struggle. Training in nonviolent "battle" contributes to increased future capacity to apply the technique in crises and to the ability of that populace to control whatever ruler may seek to impose his will on the people. Nirmal Kumar Bose has written that experience using nonviolent action puts people "on their own legs." In contrast to vio-

lence which, when all accept it as the "real" power, gives the upper hand to the group which uses it most effectively, nonviolent struggle distributes power among all. Given determination and bravery, every person can apply the nonviolent technique which brings power to each actionist. Consequently, Bose continued, in a nonviolent revolution power "spreads evenly among the masses . . ." ¹⁰¹ This is, of course, a tendency and not a nothing-or-all process. The degree to which power is diffused among the populace, and whether in the course of time this continues and grows or is diminished and largely lost, is dependent on the course of that nonviolent struggle and later events. However, experience in the effective use of nonviolent action "arms" the populace with knowledge of how to wield nonviolent weapons; this technique thereby tends toward the diffusion of power throughout the society and contributes decidedly toward the capacity of the populace to control the ruler should he on future occasions alienate the support of the majority of the subjects. All these indications are suggestive that nonviolent action and political violence may contribute to quite different types of societies.

Gregg argued in the 1930s that the adoption of nonviolent action in place of violence might break the constant circle of the violence of one group leading to violence by the other, and also break the frequent escalation in the extent and severity of violence. ¹⁰² If valid, the social consequences of breaking the spiral of violence are obviously important for reducing the amount and intensity of violence, especially political violence. Since violence may be particularly compatible with hierarchical and especially dictatorial systems, the ramifications of such breaks in the spiral of violence may be wide and profound.

CONCLUSION

This book has been an exploration of the nature of nonviolent struggle. We began with an examination of political power, which has been often assumed to derive from violence and to be ultimately controllable only by still greater violence. We discovered that political power derives instead from sources in the society which may be regulated or severed by the withholding or withdrawal of cooperation by the populace. The political power of governments may in fact be very fragile and even the power of dictators may be destroyed by withdrawal of the human assistance which has made their regime possible. At least that was the theory.

The technique of nonviolent action is rooted in that theory of power.

We surveyed its basic characteristics and sketched part of the history of its development. Then we turned to an examination in detail of the multitude of specific methods which fall within that technique, under the general classes of nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention. These methods make possible the application of diverse leverages against the opponent in the effort to achieve the objectives of the actionists: psychological, ideational, economic, social, political, physical and other leverages. Attention then shifted to the complex ways in which this technique may operate in conflict with a violent opponent. The groundwork which may precede the launching of nonviolent action was examined, and some of the basic requirements for the effective use of the technique. Then we focused on the initial impact which the launching of nonviolent action may have on the social situation and the opponent, to the probability of repression and the need for a determined, yet nonviolent, continuation of resistance. The opponent's repression, we saw, may rebound to weaken his power position through the process of political *jiu-jitsu*.

Instead of nonviolent action achieving change in one simple way, we discovered that there were three main processes, or mechanisms, by which change was produced, ranging from conversion of the opponent, so that he now agrees with the nonviolent group—probably the rarest type of change—to nonviolent coercion on the other extreme in which changes are forced, albeit nonviolently, on the opponent, with accommodation falling at midpoint and being the most usual mechanism. Nonviolent struggle also brings changes of various types to the nonviolent group itself, as we examined in this concluding chapter. These changes are especially associated with a new sense of self-respect, self-confidence, and a realization of the power people can wield in controlling their own lives through learning to use the nonviolent technique. These changes within the nonviolent group gain greater significance in light of the analysis of power in the first chapter which showed it to derive ultimately from the people who are ruled or otherwise subordinated. The changes in the nonviolent group, the relative strengthening of the non-State institutions of the society in which nonviolent action is used, and the development of a nonviolent struggle capacity by which the opponent's violence may be made impotent, combine to redistribute power in that society.

This book has thus been limited to an attempt to understand the nature of the technique of nonviolent action. Despite its widespread application on many issues against diverse opponents, nonviolent struggle

has remained an underdeveloped political technique, largely neglected not only by the officials of governments and leaders of the society's dominant institutions but also by social reformers, avowed revolutionaries, even pacifists, and very importantly also by academics. We are only becoming aware of the past history of this type of conflict and of the vast armory of nonviolent weapons it utilizes. The ways it operates in major struggle to produce change are still new to us and its long term possibilities and significance are still primarily matters of speculation rather than careful analysis based on adequate understanding. One thing is, however, abundantly clear: this is a significant technique of great past importance and of considerable future potential.

As the brief historical survey of the development of this technique showed, nonviolent struggle has in the past century undergone major innovations, development and expansion as compared at least to what we know of its previous history. Certain other characteristics of this same century stand in sharp contrast: the extension and growth of control by centralized States, the development and expansion of depersonalized industrial production, the emergence of total war with World War I and then with World War II the invention of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the development in the 1920s and 1930s of modern totalitarian systems, the deliberate extermination of whole population groups, and the mass killings of still more millions in pursuit of domestic political objectives or in the course of war. Even many of the rebels against the old order have adopted its belief in the omnipotence of political violence, now in the forms of guerrilla warfare, domestic repression, or even nuclear weapons. There have been other similar developments in political violence. Yet it was in this same century that nonviolent action became more significant and powerful than in any previous era.

Nonviolent struggle may now be entering a new phase of its development. One of the most important factors in this phase is the conscious effort to increase our knowledge and understanding of the nature of the technique, to improve its effectiveness, and to extend the areas in which it may be substituted for violence, even as a replacement for military defense. This new phase has begun, but only just, and it remains to be seen how and to what extent it will develop. Once again, it is remarkable that this development in nonviolent alternatives should begin at the same time that important trends in politics, technology, social control, social organization and violence are moving in the opposite direction: toward capacity for super destruction, toward vast State controls over institutions and people, toward computer and other technological aids to

regimentation, toward psychological and chemical control of people's behavior, toward an increased police capacity for political surveillance, toward centralized control of the economy by small elites, and even toward genetic control of future mankind. For those of us who still believe that human dignity, creativity, justice and freedom are important, the nonviolent technique of struggle may provide one of our last hopes for effective reversal of the current directions toward dehumanization, regimentation, manipulation, and the dominance of political structures of violence and tyranny.

Such a hope may or may not be achieved, for between our present condition and the current underdeveloped status of the nonviolent technique on the one hand, and a reversal of present trends, on the other, lies a great gap. All the requirements for filling that gap are not yet clear, but it is possible to indicate at least a few of them which are directly associated with nonviolent action.

One step is clearly research and analysis on the nature of this technique. The insights, theories and hypotheses of this study require continual testing, evaluation and modification in light of other cases of nonviolent action, future experience and further research. This book has been intended to stimulate further explorations of the politics of nonviolent action. These explorations include opening this field to a greater degree than hitherto to academic investigation. This is only the beginning.

A related step involves efforts to explore and develop various extensions in the practical application of this technique in place of violence in a variety of specific tasks for meeting pressing problems. These vary widely and may include its potential for securing rights for suppressed minorities, for obtaining, maintaining or extending civil liberties, for expanding social justice, for restructuring social, economic or political institutions, for disintegrating and replacing political dictatorships, for achieving social revolution with freedom, for preventing internal usurpations by *coup d'état* and other political violence, and even as a substitute for military defense in deterring and defeating foreign invasions and foreign-aided *coups*. These and various other areas for basic research and investigation of policy alternatives are outlined elsewhere as parts of a comprehensive program which needs to be launched.¹⁰³ Needless to say, this research, analysis and policy exploration must include attention to weaknesses, limitations and possible undesirable ramifications of the nonviolent technique, as well as its more positive potentialities.

Another step is public education using various media to share widely

the information we now have or soon gain about the nature of non-violent action, its requirements and know-how, as well as new proposals for its application to problems for which people now rely upon violence. One of these areas of possible future application would be "civilian defense"—the use of prepared nonviolent resistance to defeat domestic usurpations and foreign invasions. Others might focus on current or anticipated problems of a country or area, such as conflicts of color, poverty, freedoms, institutional restructuring, prevention and disintegration of tyranny and many others. Courses in nonviolent alternatives in schools and universities at all levels would be an important part of such public education and would help develop qualified future researchers on these phenomena.

Then too, there is the field of action. Many people would place this first. While in some ways it is primary, it is given a slightly lower priority here since nonviolent action which is ill-conceived, based on ignorance of the requirements of the technique or of the conditions and issues of the conflict, on poor strategy and tactics and similar inadequacies is likely to be counterproductive in advancing the adoption of nonviolent alternatives. On the other hand, until and unless people have themselves gained experience in the use of this technique for limited objectives, and have observed others applying it also effectively, they will be unlikely or may even be unable to use it in the more difficult and crucial conflicts.

Attention is also needed to the ways in which nonviolent action may be related to milder peaceful ways of action and to regular institutional procedures, either private or governmental ones, for nonviolent action is not a substitute for, but an aid to, other peaceful ways of dealing with problems and carrying out common tasks where they are responsive to popular control.

There are other important things to be done. Each person who is familiar with the needs of his neighborhood, people, country and world will be able to propose and tackle additional problems.

For all its many pages and hundreds of thousands of words, this book is not the last word on nonviolent action. It is hoped that instead it may turn out to be one of the first in this new stage of the development of nonviolent alternatives. If we are to gain new knowledge and increased understanding, and if deliberate efforts are to be made to apply nonviolent action in place of violence in the crucial conflicts of today and tomorrow, then the responsibility must fall on all of us who see these as tasks which need to be accomplished. This means the responsibility is ours. It falls on each of us, on me and on you.

NOTES

1. Erik Erikson, *Identity and the Life Cycle*, in *Psychological Issues* (New York: International Universities Press, 1959), vol. I, monograph 1, p. 31.
2. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms of Nonviolent Action" (thesis), p. 43; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 26.
3. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 85-86.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
5. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 445.
6. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 20.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
8. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 133.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
10. Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. I, p. 154.
11. See Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 356; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 356, and Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power*, pp. 72 and 100.
12. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 154; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 154.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 218.
14. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 71.
15. Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 205.
16. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, p. 280.
17. M. K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, p. 203.
18. Watt, *Dare Call it Treason*, p. 183.
19. Lenin, "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution," in *Lenin, Selected Works in Three Volumes*, vol. I, p. 792.
20. Seifert, *Conquest by Suffering*, p. 174.
21. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 55. Gregg also argues that fear, anger, and hatred are closely related emotionally, and that therefore the capacity to control or replace one of them is associated with the capacity similarly to deal with the others. See pp. 66-67.
22. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (thesis), p. 63; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 43.
23. See Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 29.
24. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 8; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 8.
25. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 64.
26. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York: John Day, 1946), p. 361.
27. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 69.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
29. Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, p. 129.

30. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, p. 119; Br. ed.: p. 140. See also Peck, *Freedom Ride*, pp. 51-54.
31. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt*, p. 137.
32. Frederic Solomon and Jacob R. Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities," *Psychiatry*, vol. XXVII (1964), p. 96.
33. See Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 19.
34. See Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, p. 199.
35. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms of Nonviolent Action," p. 45; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6, p. 28.
36. Hiller, *The Strike*, pp. 22 and 168-169.
37. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 10.
38. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 67-68 and 188.
39. Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in*, p. 37.
40. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 85.
41. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 70.
42. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (thesis), pp. 44-45; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), pp. 27-28.
43. Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 19.
44. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . .," p. 74; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6, pp. 51-52.
45. Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 88.
46. Farmer, *Freedom - When?* pp. 17-18.
47. Nehru, *India and the World*, p. 173.
48. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, p. 7; Br. ed.: p. 9.
49. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 44-45.
50. Warmbrunn, *The Dutch Under German Occupation, 1940-1945*, p. 111.
51. Symons, *The General Strike*, p. 53.
52. Inez Haynes Irwin, *The Story of the Woman's Party* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1921), p. 219. I am grateful to George Lakey for this and the next reference.
53. Mary Windsor, "The Title is Probably This Long," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (Season, 1914).
54. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 70.
55. Farmer, *Freedom - When?* pp. 67 and 80-81.
56. Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS p. 249.
57. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 136.
58. Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in*, p. 264.
59. Farmer, *Freedom - When?* pp. 72 and 76.
60. Lenin, "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution," in Lenin, *Selected Works in Three Volumes*, vol. I, pp. 789-792.
61. Solomon and Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities," *Psychiatry*, vol. XXVII (1964), p. 97.
62. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 131-145. Quotations are respectively from pp. 132 and 144.
63. Frank, *Sanity and Survival*, pp. 270-271. He cites C. M. Pierce and L. J. West,

- "Six Years of Sit-ins: Psychodynamic Causes and Effects," in *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, vol. XII (1966), pp. 29-34, and Solomon and Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities."
64. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, pp. 177-178.
65. Hentoff, *The New Equality*, p. 55.
66. *Ibid.*
67. Farmer, *Freedom - When?* pp. 35-36.
68. Solomon and Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities," p. 99.
69. F. Solomon, W. L. Walker, G. O'Connor, and J. R. Fishman, "Civil Rights Activity and Reduction in Crime Among Negroes," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, vol. XII (March 1965), pp. 227-236.
70. Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms . . ." (thesis), pp. 74-75; *Peace Research Reviews*, vol. II, no. 6, p. 52.
71. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 63.
72. See Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Hostility" p. 93.
73. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-95.
74. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 45, 47, and 60-61.
75. Janis and Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Hostility" pp. 88 and 90-93.
76. See Sharp, "The Need of a Functional Substitute for War" *International Relations* (London), vol. III, no. 3 (April 1967), pp. 187-207.
77. Hiller, *The Strike*, pp. 30, 90, 19 and 17.
78. Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis*, pp. 368-369.
79. Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. XII, *The Triumphant Empire: Britain Sails into the Storm, 1770-1776*, p. 244. On other general indications of this tendency, see Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 371ff. and *passim*.
80. Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 116-117.
81. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 215 and 146. See also Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, pp. 125 and 192.
82. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 275. See also Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 180.
83. Hentoff, *The New Equality*, p. 205. For mention of a similar effect in Chicago, see p. 206.
84. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 152; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 152.
85. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 186. See also Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 31.
86. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, pp. 46, 65, and 69-74, 120-122 and 152-154.
87. Griffith, *The Resurrection of Hungary*, p. 170.
88. On the theory and content of the constructive program, see M. K. Gandhi, *Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place* (pamphlet; Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1941 and later), and Sharp, "The Constructive Programme," *Mankind* (Hyderabad), vol. I, no. 12 (July 1957), pp. 1102-1112, and Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, pp. 190-208.
89. Gandhi, *Constructive Programme*, pp. 5 and 30 (1957 edition), and Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, pp. 191-193.
90. See Gipson, *The Coming of the Revolution, 1763-1775*, pp. 181 and 187, and Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 97, 106-107, 109-110, 112, 117, 121-123, 128, 130-131, 140, 143, 147, 151-152, 243, 369-370, 482, 492,

- 500-502, 517-518, 524, 528 and 610.
91. See Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 110-111, 134, 143-144, 154, 171, 176-177 and 215.
 92. Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis*, pp. 203 and 243.
 93. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 114.
 94. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 423-424 and 432.
 95. Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 77, 79-81, 179, 181, 183-184, 225 and 174. The quotation is from p. 200.
 96. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. I, pp. 9, 92-93, 333-334, and vol. II, pp. 93, 258, 271-272, and 296. See also Jouvanel, *Power*, pp. 244-246 and Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 134.
 97. Jouvanel, *Power*, pp. 18-22 and 244-246.
 98. Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), vol. I, pp. 232-242, 302 and esp. 311; Bronislaw Malinowski, "An Anthropological Analysis of War," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XLVI, no. 4, esp. p. 545; and Malinowski, *Freedom and Civilization* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1944), esp. pp. 265 and 305.
 99. Irving L. Janis and Daniel Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Hostility," in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. III, no. 1 (March 1959), pp. 90-91.
 100. See Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 125, and Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. I, pp. 87 and 235, and vol. II, p. 340. Gregg writes: "Reforms will come to stay only if the masses acquire and retain the ability to make a firm veto by mass nonviolent resistance. . . . Hence reformers would be wise to lay less stress upon advocacy of their special changes and concentrate on the teaching of nonviolent resistance. Once that tool is mastered, we can make all sorts of permanent reforms." Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 146.
 101. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 148.
 102. See Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 134.
 103. See Sharp, *Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1970), pp. 73-113.