

Sharp, Gene. 1973. The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part One: Power & Struggle. Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers.

Chapter 2

Nonviolent Action: an Active Technique of Struggle

INTRODUCTION

In political terms nonviolent action is based on a very simple postulate: people do not always do what they are told to do, and sometimes they do things which have been forbidden to them. Subjects may disobey laws they reject. Workers may halt work, which may paralyze the economy. The bureaucracy may refuse to carry out instructions. Soldiers and police may become lax in inflicting repression; they may even mutiny. When all these events happen simultaneously, the man who has been "ruler" becomes just another man. This dissolution of power can happen in a wide variety of social and political conflicts. The factory manager's power dissolves when the workers no longer cooperate. Political power disintegrates when the people withdraw their obedience and support. Yet the ruler's military equipment may remain intact, his soldiers uninjured, the cities unscathed, the factories and transport systems in full operational capacity, and the government buildings undamaged. But everything

is changed. The human assistance which created and supported the regime's political power has been withdrawn. Therefore, its power has disintegrated.¹

When people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in their disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic human assistance and cooperation which any government or hierarchical system requires. If they do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, that government or hierarchical system will no longer have power. This is the basic political assumption of nonviolent action.

CHARACTERISTICS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION

Nonviolent action is a generic term covering dozens of specific methods of protest, noncooperation and intervention, in all of which the actionists conduct the conflict by doing—or refusing to do—certain things without using physical violence. As a technique, therefore, nonviolent action is not passive. It is *not* inaction. It is *action* that is nonviolent.

The issue at stake will vary. Frequently it may be a political one—between political groups, for or against a government, or, on rare occasions, between governments (as in imposition of embargoes or resistance to occupation). It may also be economic or social or religious. The scale and level of the conflict will also vary. It may be limited to a neighborhood, a city, or a particular section of the society; it may at other times range over a large area of a country or convulse a whole nation. Less often, more than one country and government may be involved. Whatever the issue, however, and whatever the scale of the conflict, nonviolent action is a technique by which people who reject passivity and submission, and who see struggle as essential, can wage their conflict without violence. Nonviolent action is not an attempt to avoid or ignore conflict. It is *one* response to the problem of how to *act* effectively in politics, especially how to wield power effectively.

A. A special type of action.

It is widely assumed that all social and political behavior must be clearly either violent or nonviolent. This simple dualism leads only to serious distortions of reality, however, one of the main ones being that some people call “nonviolent” anything they regard as good, and “violent” anything they dislike. A second gross distortion occurs when people totally erroneously equate cringing passivity with nonviolent action because in neither case is there the use of physical violence.

Careful consideration of actual response to social and political conflict requires that all responses to conflict situations be initially divided into those of *action* and those of *inaction*, and not divided according to their violence or lack of violence. In such a division nonviolent action assumes its correct place as *one* type of *active* response. *Inaction*, which may include passivity, submission, cowardice and the like, will not detain us, for it has nothing to do with the nonviolent technique which is the subject of this book. By definition, nonviolent action cannot occur except by the replacement of passivity and submissiveness with activity, challenge and struggle.

Obviously, however, important distinctions must be made *within* the category of *action*. Here, too, a dichotomy into *violent* or *nonviolent* is too simple. Therefore, let us set up a rough typology of six major classes of the forms of action in conflicts, one of them nonviolent action, the technique with which we are concerned. This (rather crude) classification includes: 1) simple verbal persuasion and related behavior, such as conciliation; 2) peaceful institutional procedures backed by threat or use of sanctions; 3) physical violence against persons; 4) physical violence against persons plus material destruction; 5) material destruction only; and 6) the technique of nonviolent action. Obviously, each of these classes may itself be subclassified. People may shift back and forth between types of action, or back and forth between action and inaction. However, it is crucial to understand that the basic dichotomy of social and political behavior is between action and inaction, rather than between nonviolence and violence.

It is also important to see why and how nonviolent action as a technique differs from milder peaceful responses to conflicts, such as conciliation, verbal appeals to the opponent, compromise and negotiation. These responses may or may not be used with nonviolent action or with any of the other five kinds of action, but they should not be identified with the nonviolent technique as such. Conciliation and appeals are likely to consist of rational or emotional verbal efforts to bring about an opponent's agreement to something, while nonviolent action is not verbal—it consists of social, economic and political activity of special types. For example, asking an employer for a wage increase is an act of attempted simple verbal persuasion, but refusal to work until the wage increase is granted is a case of nonviolent action. Nor should nonviolent action be confused with compromise, which involves settling for part of one's objectives. Compromise is not a form of conflict or struggle, as is nonviolent action. As with violence, nonviolent action may or may not lead to a compromise settlement, depending on the issues,

SIX CLASSES OF ACTION IN CONFLICTS




CHART TWO

power relationships, and the actionists' own decision. Similarly, negotiation is not a form of nonviolent action. Negotiation is an attempt at verbal persuasion, perhaps utilizing established institutional procedures, but always involving an implied or explicit threat of some type of sanction if an acceptable agreement is not reached. Negotiation could, therefore, precede a strike or a civil disobedience campaign, as it can a war. But such negotiation is an approach which must be distinguished from a strike, civil disobedience, or other form of nonviolent action.

Nonviolent action is so different from these milder peaceful responses to conflicts that several writers have pointed to the general similarities of nonviolent action to military war.² Nonviolent action is a means of combat, as is war. It involves the matching of forces and the waging of "battles," requires wise strategy and tactics, and demands of its "soldiers" courage, discipline, and sacrifice. This view of nonviolent action as a technique of active combat is diametrically opposed to the popular assumption that, at its strongest, nonviolent action relies on rational persuasion of the opponent, and that more commonly it consists simply of passive submission. Nonviolent action is just what it says: *action* which is nonviolent, not *inaction*. This technique consists, not simply of words, but of active protest, noncooperation and intervention. Overwhelmingly, it is group or mass action. Certain forms of nonviolent action may be regarded as efforts to persuade by action; others, given sufficient participants, may contain elements of coercion.

Another characteristic of nonviolent action which needs emphasis is that it is usually extraconstitutional; that is to say, it does not rely upon established institutional procedures of the State, whether parliamentary or nonparliamentary. However, it is possible to incorporate the technique into a constitutional system of government at various points, and it is also possible to use it in support of an established government under attack. Nonviolent action must not be confused with anarchism. That "no-State" philosophy has traditionally given inadequate thought to the practical problem of how to achieve such a society and to the need for realistic means of social struggle which differ in substance from those employed by the State.

B. Motives, methods and leverages

The motives for using nonviolent action instead of some type of violent action differ widely. In some cases violence may have been rejected because of considerations of expediency, in others for religious, ethical, or moral reasons. Or there may be a mixture of motivations of various types.

Nonviolent action is thus not synonymous with "pacifism." Nor is it identical with religious or philosophical systems emphasizing nonviolence as a matter of moral principle. Adherents to some of these belief systems may see nonviolent action as compatible with their convictions and even as a fulfillment of them in conflicts. Adherents to certain other creeds which also emphasize nonviolence may, however, find this technique too "worldly" or "coercive" for them. Conversely, nonviolent action has often been practiced, and in a vast majority of the cases led, by nonpacifists who saw it only as an effective means of action. The popular idea that only pacifists can effectively practice nonviolent action—a view sometimes pressed with considerable conceit by pacifists themselves—is simply not true.

Furthermore, in many cases motivations for using nonviolent action have been mixed, practical considerations being combined with a *relative* moral preference for nonviolence (although violence was not rejected in principle). This type of mixed motivation is likely to become more frequent if nonviolent action is increasingly seen to have important practical advantages over violence.

It is frequently assumed that nonviolent actionists seek primarily to convert their opponent to a positive acceptance of their point of view. Actually, there is no standard pattern of priority for either changes in attitudes and beliefs, or policy and structural changes. Sometimes the nonviolent group may seek to change the opponent's attitudes and beliefs as a preliminary to changing his policies or institutions. Or the nonviolent action may be an expression of the determination of the members of the group not to allow the opponent to change their own attitudes or beliefs. Or the actions may be aimed primarily at changing policies or institutions or at thwarting the opponent's attempts to alter them, whether or not his attitudes and beliefs have first been changed (these cases appear to be in the majority). In still other cases, the nonviolent group may seek to change attitudes and policies simultaneously.

Nonviolent action may involve: 1) *acts of omission*—that is, people practicing it may refuse to perform acts which they usually perform, are expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regulation to perform; 2) *acts of commission*—that is, the people may perform acts which they do not usually perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation to perform; or 3) a *combination* of acts of omission and acts of commission.³

There are in the technique three broad classes of methods. 1) Where the nonviolent group uses largely symbolic actions intended to help persuade the opponent or someone else, or to express the group's disap-

proval and dissent, the behavior may be called *nonviolent protest and persuasion*. In this class are such demonstrations as marches, parades and vigils. These particular methods may be used either in an attempt to change opinions or to express disagreement, or both. 2) Where the nonviolent group acts largely by withdrawal or the withholding of social, economic, or political cooperation, its behavior may be described as *non-cooperation*. This class contains three subclasses which include *social* noncooperation, *economic* noncooperation (economic boycotts and strikes), and *political* noncooperation. 3) Where the nonviolent group acts largely by direct intervention its action may be referred to as *non-violent intervention*. The nonviolent group in this class clearly takes the initiative by such means as sit-ins, nonviolent obstruction, nonviolent invasion and parallel government. The technique may be applied by individuals, by small or large groups, and by masses of people.

Just as there is diversity among the many specific methods which constitute this technique, so also wide variation exists in the intensities of pressures and the types of leverage exerted by this technique. When successful, nonviolent action produces change in one of three broad ways, which we call *mechanisms of change*. In *conversion* the opponent reacts to the actions of the nonviolent actionists by finally coming around to a new point of view in which he positively accepts their aims. In *accommodation* the opponent chooses to grant demands and to adjust to the new situation which has been produced without changing his viewpoint. Where *nonviolent coercion* operates, change is achieved against the opponent's will and without his agreement, the sources of his power having been so undercut by nonviolent means that he no longer has control. These three mechanisms are discussed in detail in Chapter Thirteen.

To a degree which has never been adequately appreciated, the nonviolent technique operates by producing power changes. Both the relative power and the absolute power of each of the contending groups are subject to constant and rapid alterations. This power variability can be more extreme and occur more rapidly than in situations where both sides are using violence. As may be expected, the actionists seek continually to increase their own strength and that of their supporters. They will usually seek and gain assistance and active participation also from among the wider group affected by the grievances. In addition, the nature of nonviolent struggle makes it possible for the actionists also to win considerable support even in the camp of the opponent and among third parties. This potential is much greater than with violence. The ability to gain these types of support gives the nonviolent group a capacity to influence—and at times to regulate—their opponent's power, by reducing

or severing the power of the opponent at its sources. Usually the results of these complex changes in the relative power positions of the contenders will determine the struggle's final outcome.

Nonviolent discipline must be viewed in the context of the mechanisms of change of this technique and the ways in which these power shifts are produced. The maintenance of nonviolent discipline in face of repression is not an act of moralistic naïveté. Instead, it contributes to the operation of all three mechanisms and is a prerequisite for advantageous power changes. As a consequence, nonviolent discipline can only be compromised at the severe risk of contributing to defeat. Other factors are, of course, highly important too, and it should not be assumed that maintenance of nonviolence will alone inevitably produce victory.

C. Correcting misconceptions

It is widely assumed that nonviolent action must always take a very long time to produce victory, longer than violent struggle would take. This may be true at times, but not necessarily so, and at times the situation even seems reversed. Violent struggle may take many months or years to defeat the opponent, assuming that it eventually does so. In a variety of cases nonviolent struggle has won objectives in a very short time indeed. The 1766 repeal of the Stamp Act, which the American colonists resisted, came in a very few months. The 1920 Kapp *Putsch* in Germany was defeated in days. In 1942 Norwegian teachers within months defeated the Quisling regime's first effort at establishing a fascist Corporative State. In 1944 the dictators of El Salvador and Guatemala were ousted in a matter of days. Economic boycotts in American cities have often very quickly induced significantly increased hiring of Afro-Americans. The time taken to achieve victory depends on diverse factors—primarily on the strength of the nonviolent actionists.

By examining and correcting misconceptions about nonviolent action we are often able to bring out more sharply positive characteristics. 1) As has been pointed out above, this technique has nothing to do with passivity, submissiveness and cowardice; just as in violent action, these must first be rejected and overcome. 2) Nonviolent action is not to be equated with verbal or purely psychological persuasion, although it may use action to induce psychological pressures for attitude change; nonviolent action, instead of words, is a sanction and a technique of struggle involving the use of social, economic and political power, and the matching of forces in conflict. 3) Nonviolent action does not depend on the assumption that man is inherently "good"; the potentialities of man for both "good" and "evil" are recognized, including the extremes of

cruelty and inhumanity. 4) People using nonviolent action do not have to be pacifists or saints; nonviolent action has been predominantly and successfully practiced by "ordinary" people. 5) Success with nonviolent action does not require (though it may be helped by) shared standards and principles, a high degree of community of interest, or a high degree of psychological closeness between the contending groups; this is because when efforts to produce voluntary change fail, coercive nonviolent measures may be employed. 6) Nonviolent action is at least as much of a Western phenomenon as an Eastern one; indeed, it is probably more Western, if one takes into account the widespread use of strikes and boycotts in the labor movement and the noncooperation struggles of subordinated nationalities. 7) In nonviolent action there is no assumption that the opponent will refrain from using violence against nonviolent actionists; the technique is designed to operate against violence when necessary. 8) There is nothing in nonviolent action to prevent it from being used for both "good" and "bad" causes, although the social consequences of its use for a "bad" cause may differ considerably from the consequences of violence used for the same cause. 9) Nonviolent action is not limited to domestic conflicts within a democratic system; it has been widely used against dictatorial regimes, foreign occupations, and even against totalitarian systems.

D. A neglected type of struggle

Nonviolent action has not always brought full, or even partial, victory. People using nonviolent action have been defeated. It is no magic ritual. This is also true of violent action, however, including military struggle. No type of struggle guarantees short-term victory every time it is used. Failure in specific cases of nonviolent action, however, may be caused by weaknesses in a group employing the technique or in the strategy and tactics used—as may be the case in military action. If the group using nonviolent action does not as yet possess sufficient internal strength, determination, ability to act, and related qualities to make nonviolent action effective, then repetition of phrases and words like "non-violence" will not save it. There is no substitute for genuine strength and skill in nonviolent action; if the actionists do not possess them sufficiently to cope with the opponent, they are unlikely to win. Considering the widespread ignorance of the nature and requirements of nonviolent action and the absence of major efforts to learn how to apply it most effectively, it is surprising that it has won any victories at all. Comparative studies are urgently needed of cases of "failure" and "success," and of possible ways to improve effectiveness.

It is clear, however, that the failures of nonviolent action do not adequately explain its widespread nonrecognition as a viable technique of struggle. This nonrecognition has taken several forms. One is a lack of attention to the history of nonviolent action. This technique has been widely used. It has a long history. At the moment of its use, its power and effectiveness have frequently been widely acknowledged; but once the particular case is over these characteristics are often forgot. Even the memory of them recedes. It is difficult to find good factual accounts of past nonviolent struggles.

The roots of this nonrecognition are hard to pinpoint, to separate one from the other and to trace to specific neglect. Suggested explanations can only be tentative at this stage of investigation. On a popular level it is easy to romanticize the more dramatic and heroic acts of violence for good causes, and the memory of such bravery has its influence on how the present is viewed, and therefore the past. Although nonviolent action may be equally heroic and dramatic, rarely do its deeds and heroes become romanticized as examples for future generations. There are also other, perhaps more fundamental, possible reasons for this nonrecognition. Some of the neglect of nonviolent struggle by historians may be rooted in their personal preconceptions and their acceptance of their society's assumption that violence is the only really significant and effective form of combat. In addition, where historians have been closely allied to established oppressive systems and ruling elites and have allowed that alliance to influence their writing, their neglect of these forms of struggle may be traced to consideration of the best interests of the ruling minority. The detailed recounting of forms of struggle usable by people who lack military weapons might be thought of as actual instruction in an antielitist technique which the people could use against their rulers. Furthermore, by recording effective continuing non-cooperation, for example, the historian might cast aspersions on the established ruler and administration by implying that they were either inefficient or unpopular.

Anthropologists have revealed great cultural diversity among human societies, which include quite opposite attitudes and behaviors toward violence and nonviolence. Were it not for this diversity it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that human nature is more violent than nonviolent. Many people accept this conclusion. Such a view influences not only what is done, but also how we interpret what happens. The conclusion that human beings are basically violent is, however, a distortion of reality, for in its assumptions Western civilization is biased toward

violence. Indeed, when people in our society are confronted with situations in which violence obviously suffers from grave disadvantages and where significant evidence shows that nonviolent alternatives exist, a large number of people will still say that they *believe* violence to be necessary—a resort to conviction rather than evidence. This built-in bias toward violence may also contribute to the nonrecognition of the viability of nonviolent action.

There is one more possible explanation of the nonrecognition of nonviolent action as a significant political technique, a much simpler one. Why has not any new way of viewing the world been accepted earlier? Why, although apples had fallen from trees for centuries, did it remain for Newton to formulate the law of gravity? How is it that slavery could be accepted for many centuries as a right and necessary social institution? So one might ask similar questions about diverse approaches to understanding reality and viewing society. The explanation of the neglect and nonrecognition of nonviolent action—its practice, nature and potential—may be very similar to answers to these different questions.

In addition, until very recently no overall conceptual system existed to reveal relationships between diverse and apparently dissimilar historical events which are now grouped as cases of nonviolent action. We can now see, not simply a multitude of separate and unrelated events and forms of action, but one common technique of action. The resistance of Roman plebeians, the defiance of American colonials, the boycotting by Irish peasants, the strikes by workers of St. Petersburg, the fasts of Algerian nationalists, the civil disobedience by Gandhians, the refusal of Afro-Americans to ride buses in Montgomery, Alabama, and the arguments of students in Prague with Russian tank crews—all are different aspects of essentially the same type of behavior: nonviolent action. For the many forms of military struggle an overall conceptual tool has long existed, and this itself may have contributed to the detailed attention which wars have received. Attention to war has included historical and strategic studies which could help in future wars. But, until very recently, nonviolent action has had no comparable self-conscious tradition. Such a tradition would probably have brought attention to many of these neglected struggles and might well have provided knowledge to be used in new cases of nonviolent action.

There has been, then, little or no awareness of the history of nonviolent action, not only among the general public but also among future leaders of nonviolent struggles. Contrary to earlier assumptions, before undertaking his own campaigns Gandhi had a general knowledge of sev-

eral important nonviolent struggles, especially in Russia, China and India; but even so he lacked the detailed knowledge that could have been gained from such conflicts.⁴

Another form of nonrecognition of nonviolent action is the general practice of unfairly comparing it with violence by using different standards of assessment for the two techniques. Sometimes when violence has had no chance of succeeding (even despite preparations), nonviolent action has been used, despite highly unfavorable conditions—including the usual lack of preparations, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Then when it failed, nonviolent action has later been criticized or condemned *as a whole* because its accomplishments were limited, slow to appear, or even absent. When violence fails, or when its achievements are limited or take time, *specific* inadequacies or factors are frequently blamed—not the technique itself. This rarely happens when nonviolent action is used, however. Rarely are the violent and nonviolent techniques carefully and fairly compared in terms of time, casualties, successes and failures (using specific criteria), adequacy of preparations, type of strategy, and the like. In cases where nonviolent action has produced partial or full successes, the tendency is to forget, minimize, or dismiss these as irrelevant. Full successes are sometimes written off, without careful analysis, as having been unique and without significance for future politics. This was the case with the downfall of the tsarist regime in Russia in 1917 and the collapse of the dictators of El Salvador and Guatemala in 1944. Who remembers these as victories won by nonviolent struggle? Where past struggles *are* remembered, their victories are forgotten or denied or minimized (as with the American colonists' struggles and the United States civil rights campaigns); or they are explained as having been unrelated to the nonviolent struggle or only partially so (as with the Gandhian struggles in India). Partial successes are often regarded as total failures—for example, the Ruhr struggle against the French and Belgian occupation in the period after World War I. In other cases, the nonviolent struggles may not be deliberately belittled, but greater attention may be paid to the less successful or less important violent struggles which preceded the nonviolent action (as in nineteenth-century Hungary) or which occurred alongside it (as in Nazi-occupied Norway).

Articulate opposition to the technique has often been based on misunderstanding and lack of information. Supposed "friends of nonviolent means"—such as some pacifists—have often by their own distortions and lack of knowledge discouraged others from taking this technique seriously. Generally, however, past nonviolent action has been ignored in contemplating how to face the conflicts of the future.

ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE PAST

Despite its widespread practice, nonviolent action has therefore remained an underdeveloped political technique. Very little deliberate effort has been given to increasing knowledge of its nature and how it works. Practically no research and planning have been carried out to promote its development and refinement. This is in sharp contrast to military war, guerrilla struggle, and the procedures of representative democracy. To date what we have in nonviolent action is essentially a raw, unrefined, intuitive technique—a type of struggle which still awaits efforts to increase its effectiveness and expand its political potential.

Nevertheless, in the past hundred years nonviolent action has risen to unprecedented political significance throughout the world. People using it have amassed major achievements. Higher wages and improved working conditions have been won. Old traditions and practices have been abolished. Government policies have been changed, laws repealed, new legislation enacted, and governmental reforms instituted. Invaders have been frustrated and armies defeated. An empire has been paralyzed, a seizure of power thwarted, and dictators overthrown. Sometimes, too, this technique has been used—as by Deep South segregationists—to block or delay changes and policies regarded by others as desirable and progressive.

A. Some early historical examples

Much of the long history of nonviolent action has been lost for lack of interest in recording and recounting these struggles. Even existing historical accounts and other surviving information have not been brought together. The result is that a comprehensive history of the practice and development of the technique does not yet exist. Therefore, in this section we can only outline the history of nonviolent action in broad terms and illustrate it with more detailed sketches of a few especially interesting or significant cases. These were not necessarily influential in later struggles, for much of the use of this technique has been independent of earlier practice.

Nonviolent action clearly began early: examples go back at least to ancient Rome. In 494 B.C., for example, the plebeians of Rome, rather than murder the consuls in an attempt to correct grievances, withdrew from the city to a hill, later called "the Sacred Mount." There they remained for some days, refusing to make their usual contribution to the life of the city. An agreement was then reached pledging significant

improvements in their life and status.⁵ Theodor Mommsen offers an account of a similar Roman action in 258 B.C. The army had returned from battle to find proposals for reform blocked in the Senate. Instead of using military action, the army marched to the fertile district of Crustumaria, occupied "the Sacred Mount," and threatened to establish a new plebeian city. The Senate gave way.⁶

Although occasionally there are in the literature other references to instances of nonviolent action in the ancient Mediterranean world, they are not detailed; a few will be cited later as examples of specific methods of this technique. No systematic attempt has been made to locate and assemble early cases of nonviolent action, not only from Rome, but from a variety of civilizations and countries. Nonviolent action certainly occurred between Roman times and the late eighteenth century, when the case material becomes rich—for example, the Netherlands' resistance to Spanish rule from 1565 to 1576 is one very prominent such struggle—but we lack a coherent account of instances of nonviolent action during these centuries. This still remains to be written. Careful search from this perspective even in existing historical studies might reveal a great deal.

B. The pre-Gandhian expansion of nonviolent struggle

We can, however, see that a very significant pre-Gandhian expansion of the technique took place from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. During this period the technique received impetus from four groups. The first consisted of nationalists (and others who were ruled from distant capitals) who found nonviolent action useful in resisting a foreign enemy or alien laws. The struggles of the American colonists before 1775 furnish highly important cases of such nonviolent resistance. In this period Daniel Dulany of Maryland, for example, advocated economic resistance in order to force Parliament to repeal offensive laws. In his proposals he urged the colonists to accept principles of action which are basic to this technique: "Instead of moping, and puling, and whining to excite Compassion; in such a Situation we ought with Spirit, and Vigour, and Alacrity, to bid Defiance to Tyranny, by exposing its Impotence, by making it as contemptible, as it would be detestable."⁷

Nationalist examples include the Hungarian resistance against Austria between 1850 and 1867 and the Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods in the early twentieth century. Both the American and the Hungarian struggles were extremely significant and effective, yet the degree to which the Americans won their demands and British power was immo-

bilized by noncooperation is today not often fully recognized.⁸ The nonviolent Hungarian resistance led by Deák is largely forgotten and is even lacking, it is said, a good historian; while the earlier, very unsuccessful, violent resistance under Kossuth is remembered and idealized.

The second source of impetus in the development of the nonviolent technique in this period came from trade unionists and other social radicals who sought a means of struggle—largely strikes, general strikes and boycotts—against what they regarded as an unjust social system, and for the improvement of the condition of working men. An examination of the histories of the labor movement and of trade union struggles, and an awareness of the current use of such methods, quickly reveal the vast extent to which strikes and economic boycotts have been and are still used. Indeed, it was action based on awareness that withdrawal of labor was a powerful instrument of struggle which not only made possible improved wages and working conditions, but frequently also contributed to an extension of the right to vote, to the political power of working people, and to reform legislation. The significance of this frequently escapes us today, when people are often more conscious of the inconveniences to themselves which strikes may involve. However real these may often be, it has been fortunate both for the labor movement and for society as a whole that predominantly strikes and boycotts have been used to right economic grievances, instead of physical attacks on factory managers and owners, arson, riots, bombings and assassinations. Today these may seem unlikely tools for such ends, but this is a reflection of the degree to which violent means of struggle have in this area been replaced with nonviolent ones in order to induce the desired concessions in negotiations. Today it is also largely forgotten that nonviolent struggle in the form of general strike, for example, had its exponents among advocates of major political and economic change.

A third source of impetus in the development of the nonviolent technique on the level of ideas and personal example came from individuals such as Leo Tolstoy⁹ in Russia and Henry David Thoreau¹⁰ in the United States, both of whom wanted to show how a better society might be peacefully created.

Thoreau, for example, sketched in the political potentialities of disobedience of "immoral" laws. "Let your life be a counter-friction to stop the machine," he wrote. Speaking of disobedience and willingness to go to prison as a means of struggle against slavery in the United States, he continued: "A minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight." He also envisaged that such disobedience

would be practiced by the ruler's agents: "When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned his office, then the revolution is accomplished."¹¹

Tolstoy's argument in his "A Letter to a Hindu"—that it was the submissiveness and cooperation of the Indians which made British rule of India possible—is known to have made a great impression on Gandhi. In terms of political impact, however, the use of nonviolent action against foreign rulers and by the labor movement was far more important than such men as Thoreau and Tolstoy.

A fourth group which contributed more or less unconsciously to the pre-Gandhian development of nonviolent struggle were opponents of despotism which originated, not abroad, but in their own country. Their contribution may be seen most clearly in the defeated Russian Revolution of 1905. This case deserves detailed and careful research and analysis, and its lessons may be much more profound than the ones usually offered: that the "situation was not ripe," or that a full-scale violent revolution was needed.

C. Early twentieth-century cases

A sense of reality and political substance can perhaps best be infused into the generalizations about the nature of nonviolent action and this sketchy historical survey by illustrating it with brief accounts of a few of the cases which have occurred in the twentieth century, beginning with the Russian Revolution of 1905.

1. Russian Empire—1905-06¹² The Russian Empire, which had been long ruled by tsars who believed in their divine duty to govern, had been shaken by internal unrest and by humiliating defeats in the Russo-Japanese War. The years immediately before 1905 had already seen expressions of dissatisfaction among the peasants, workers, students and the intelligentsia. There had been more demands for representative government. Strikes by industrial workers had occurred.

In January 1905 thousands joined a peaceful march to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to present a mild petition to the Tsar. The guards fired into the crowd; over a hundred persons were killed and over three hundred wounded. The day became known as "Bloody Sunday." A predominantly nonviolent revolution followed spontaneously. There was violence, especially among the peasants, but the year-long struggle was largely expressed in a multitude of forms of nonviolent action, especially strikes. The major strikes, which repeatedly paralyzed St. Petersburg and Moscow and the railway and communications sys-

tems, were only the most obvious forms of resistance. (Many of these are described in later chapters.) Whole provinces and nationalities broke away from tsarist control and set up independent governments.

By October the country was paralyzed. The Tsar finally issued the October Manifesto, granting an elected legislature, with admittedly incomplete but nevertheless significant powers—something he had vowed never to do. The revolution, however, continued. Newspapers and magazines ignored censorship regulations. Trade unions made rapid growth. Councils (called *soviets*) became popular organs of parallel government and were much more representative than the established regime. There had already been limited mutinies among soldiers and sailors; the loyalty of troops wavered, and upon their obedience or large-scale mutiny depended in part the continued life or complete collapse of the regime. About two-thirds of the government troops were unreliable at this point, reports one historian.

During a widespread strike movement the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks succeeded in getting the Moscow *Soviet* to endorse a plan to transform the city's general strike, in early December 1905, into an armed rising. In face of this rebel violence, with their own lives in danger, the soldiers in Moscow largely obeyed orders. The violent rising was crushed. The regime made this victory for the tsar the beginning of a counteroffensive against the revolution. The strikers had also faced other problems, but major historians cite the defeat of the Moscow rising as the beginning of the end of the 1905 revolution.

Certain forms of struggle persisted into 1906. The downfall of the tsarist autocracy was, however, postponed until the predominantly nonviolent revolution of February 1917—which as in 1905 took the political parties espousing revolution by surprise.

Gandhi's struggles began in South Africa in 1906 against white supremacist oppression of Indians and continued in India after his return home in 1915 until his assassination in 1948. This historical contribution will be discussed shortly. It is important to note, however, that non-Gandhian contributions to the development of the technique of nonviolent action and its political potentialities continued even after Gandhi's struggles had begun.

2. Berlin—1920¹³ The rightist Kapp *coup d'état* (or *Putsch*) against the young Weimar Republic of Germany was defeated by nonviolent action. This action was launched in support of the legitimate government after that government had fled Berlin. These events—which took place without advance preparation or training—merit attention, even though the

coup itself was rather amateurish and the improvised resistance something less than a perfect model. The case also illustrates the point that nonviolent action may be used to defend and preserve a regime or political system as well as to oppose it.

From the start the new Weimar Republic faced immense difficulties associated with the loss of the war: economic dislocation, military unrest, and attempts at revolution. In these circumstances, a right-wing promonarchist *coup d'état* was planned by Dr. Wolfgang Kapp and Lieutenant-General Freiherr Walter von Lüttwitz with the backing of General Erich von Ludendorff and various other army officers. On March 10, 1920, General Lüttwitz presented President Friedrich Ebert with a virtual ultimatum. This was rejected by the government, and it became apparent that a *Putsch* would be attempted. Minister of Defense Gustav Noske warned Lüttwitz that if orders were disobeyed and troops were used in an attempt to overthrow the Republic, the government would call a general strike. A meeting of generals showed that they were unwilling to use military force to defeat a rightist *Putsch*. They would not defend the Republic.

The same day—March 12—the Kappists, despite their limited preparations, began their march on Berlin. Police officers sided with the conspirators. There was grave doubt that government soldiers would fire on the advancing troops from the Baltic Brigades. The Ebert government abandoned Berlin without a fight, going first to Dresden and then to Stuttgart. Berlin was occupied on Saturday, March 13. The Kappists declared a new government. However, the *Länder* (states) were directed by the Ebert government to refuse all cooperation with the Kapp regime and to maintain contact only with the legal government.

When *Freikorps* (independent para-military units) troops occupied the offices of two progovernment newspapers on Sunday afternoon all Berlin printers went on strike. Other workers in Berlin by scores of thousands also spontaneously went on strike. Later that Sunday a call for a general strike against the *coup* was issued under the names of the members of the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.) and the S.P.D. members of the Ebert Cabinet: "There is but one means to prevent the return of Wilhelm II: the paralysis of all economic life. Not a hand must stir, not a worker give aid to the military dictatorship. General Strike all along the line."¹⁴ The general strike was supported by workers of all political and religious groups. (The Communists, however, had at first refused to support it.) No "essential services" were exempted. As described in Chapter One, the bureaucracy itself noncooperated. The

Kappist regime lacked money, and ordinary civil servants struck or otherwise refused to head ministries under Kapp, who was unable to obtain cooperation from the bureaucracy. Workers tried to influence the Kappist troops.

On the fifteenth of March the Ebert government rejected proposals for a compromise. The limited power of the occupiers of the Berlin government offices became more obvious. Some *Reichswehr* (German army) commanders resumed loyalty to the government. Leaflets entitled "The Collapse of the Military Dictatorship" were showered on Berlin from an airplane. The strike continued to spread despite severe threats and actual deaths by shooting. On the morning of the seventeenth the Berlin Security Police demanded Kapp's resignation.

Later that day, Kapp did resign and fled to Sweden, leaving General Lüttwitz as Commander-in-Chief. Bloody clashes took place in many towns. That evening most of the conspirators left Berlin in civilian clothes and Lüttwitz resigned from his new post. The next day the Baltic Brigades—now under orders of the Ebert government—marched out of Berlin but did not hesitate to shoot and kill some civilians who had jeered at them. The *coup* was defeated and the Weimar Republic preserved. The Ebert government faced continuing unrest, however, as bloody conflicts between government troops and an armed "Red" army in the Rhineland took many lives.

An authority on the *coup d'état*, Lieutenant Colonel D.J. Goodspeed, has pointed to one of the central lessons to be learned from the Kapp *Putsch*: after having seized the machinery of government, the conspirators must "obtain the required minimum of consent for their own administration."

The Kapp *putsch* is the episode where this question of popular support is seen at its clearest . . . to all intents and purposes the *coup* seemed to have succeeded. Yet it was broken, very largely because the people would not obey the new government.¹⁵

The distinguished German historian Erich Eyck has also concluded that "the strike . . . brought the *coup* of Kapp and company to an end after only four days. Since the regular tools of the state had been found wanting, only immediate intervention by the populace could have saved it so soon."¹⁶

3. The Ruhrkampf—1923¹⁷ The resistance to the Kapp *Putsch* was followed quickly by another very significant nonviolent struggle in support of legitimate government. This was the German resistance, in 1923,

to the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. During this remarkable struggle, trade unionists, industrialists, German civil servants, officials and many other people refused to obey or cooperate with the occupation regime. French repression was very severe.

Besides noncooperation, the situation was also complicated at certain stages by various types of sabotage. And there were economic problems for all of Germany. The country's economic situation was endangered by the severance of the industrial and coal-mining belt from the rest of Germany, as well as by the financing of the resistance by unsupported paper money.

The *Ruhrkampf* has been widely regarded as a failure. However, France found her ability to control the Ruhr and extract its resources and products frustrated, expenses in the attempt exceeding the economic gains. The French government fell, in part at least because of French domestic revulsion over the severe repression practiced by its occupation troops and officials. French troops evacuated the Ruhr after the German government agreed to call off the passive resistance campaign. The success-failure ratio seems to have been mixed for each side.

D. Gandhi's contribution

It was Gandhi who made the most significant personal contribution in the history of the nonviolent technique, with his political experiments in the use of noncooperation, disobedience and defiance to control rulers, alter government policies, and undermine political systems. With these experiments the character of the technique was broadened and its practice refined. Among the modifications Gandhi introduced were greater attention to strategy and tactics, a more judicious use of the armory of nonviolent methods, and a conscious association between mass political action and the norm of nonviolence. For participants, however, this association was not absolutist in character, and clearly most took part because this technique was seen to offer effective action. As a result of Gandhi's work the technique became more active and dynamic. With his political colleagues and fellow Indians, Gandhi in a variety of conflicts in South Africa and India demonstrated that nonviolent struggle could be politically effective on a large scale.

Gandhi used his nonviolent approach to deal with India's internal problems as well as to combat the British occupation of his country, and he encouraged others to do likewise. One of the well-known local uses of his *satyagraha* took place at Vykom in South India in 1924 and 1925; it was conducted by some of Gandhi's supporters to gain rights

for the untouchables. In this case there was a considerable attempt to change the attitudes and feelings of the orthodox Hindus. Gandhi's frequent exhortations on the need to convert, not coerce, the opponent were well implemented in this case. Emphasis on conversion is not usual in nonviolent action, however, nor is this case typical of the Gandhian struggles. However, it is significant precisely because of the attempt to convert the opponent group despite the extreme "social distance" between the Brahmans and the untouchables.

1. **Vykom—1924-25**¹⁸ In Vykom, Travancore, one of the states ruled by an Indian maharajah instead of the British, untouchables had for centuries been forbidden to use a particular road leading directly to their quarter because it passed an orthodox Brahman temple. In 1924, after consultations with Gandhi, certain high-caste Hindu reformers initiated action. Together with untouchable friends, this group walked down the road and stopped in front of the temple. Orthodox Hindus attacked them severely, and some demonstrators were arrested, receiving prison sentences of up to a year. Volunteers then poured in from all parts of India. Instead of further arrests, the Maharajah's government ordered the police to keep the reformers from entering the road. A cordon was therefore placed across it. The reformers stood in an attitude of prayer before it, pleading with police to allow them to pass. Both groups organized day and night shifts. The reformers pledged themselves to nonviolence and refused to withdraw until the Brahmans recognized the right of the untouchables to use the highway. As the months passed, the numbers of the reformers and their spirits sometimes rose and sometimes fell. When the rainy season came and the road was flooded, they stood by their posts, shortening each shift to three hours between replacements. The water reached their shoulders. Police manning the cordon had to take to boats.

When the government finally removed the barrier, the reformers declined to walk forward until the orthodox Hindus changed their attitude. After sixteen months the Brahmans said: "We cannot any longer resist the prayers that have been made to us, and we are ready to receive the untouchables." The case had widespread reverberations throughout India, it is reported, assisting in the removal of similar restrictions elsewhere and strengthening significantly the cause of caste reform.

2. **Gandhi's theory of power** Gandhi is better known, however, for his struggles against British domination. In these struggles he operated on the basis of a view of power and avowedly based his newly developed approach to conflict—*satyagraha*—upon a theory of power: "In politics,

its use is based upon the immutable maxim that government of the people is possible only so long as they consent either consciously or unconsciously to be governed."¹⁹ This constituted the basic principle of his grand strategy.

In Gandhi's view, if the maintenance of an unjust or nondemocratic regime depends on the cooperation, submission and obedience of the populace, then the means for changing or abolishing it lies in the non-cooperation, defiance and disobedience of that populace. These, he was convinced, could be undertaken without the use of physical violence, and even without hostility toward the members of the opponent group. In *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule*, an early pamphlet written in 1909, Gandhi expressed his theory of control of political power in a passage addressed to the British rulers:

You have great military resources. Your naval power is matchless. If we wanted to fight with you on your own ground, we should be unable to do so, but if the above submissions be not acceptable to you, we cease to play the part of the ruled. You may, if you like, cut us to pieces. You may shatter us at the cannon's mouth. If you act contrary to our will, we shall not help you; and without our help, we know that you cannot move one step forward.²⁰

A resolution drafted by Gandhi, approved by the All-India Working Committee of the Indian National Congress (the nationalist party), and passed by public meetings on the Congress-declared Independence Day, January 26, 1930, contained this statement on noncooperation and the withdrawal of voluntary submission to the British *Raj*:

We hold it to be a crime against man and God to submit any longer to a rule that has caused this fourfold disaster to our country. We recognize, however, that the most effective way of gaining our freedom is not through violence. We will therefore prepare ourselves by withdrawing, so far as we can, all voluntary association from the British Government, and will prepare for civil disobedience, including nonpayment of taxes. We are convinced that if we can but withdraw our voluntary help and stop payment of taxes without doing violence, even under provocation, the end of this inhuman rule is assured.²¹

Later that same year, Gandhi, at the request of the Indian National Congress, launched a movement of noncooperation and disobedience for the attainment of *swaraj*, i.e., "self-rule." This campaign was based

upon the above theory, the seditious nature of which Gandhi had nearly ten years earlier openly avowed.

. . . sedition has become the creed of the Congress. Every noncooperator is pledged to preach disaffection towards the Government established by law. Noncooperation, though a religious and strictly moral movement, deliberately aims at the overthrow of the Government, and is therefore legally seditious in terms of the Indian Penal Code.²²

This withdrawal of support, Gandhi said, should be in proportion to "their ability to preserve order in the social structure" without the assistance of the ruler.²³ The way to control political power therefore became, in his view, "to noncooperate with the system by withdrawing all the voluntary assistance possible and refusing all its so-called benefits."²⁴ On this basis he had formulated *satyagraha*.

While he sought to convert the British, Gandhi had no illusions that there could be an easy solution without struggle and the exercise of power. Just before the beginning of the 1930-31 civil disobedience campaign he wrote to the Viceroy:

It is not a matter of carrying conviction by argument. The matter resolves itself into one of matching forces. Conviction or no conviction, Great Britain would defend her Indian commerce and interests by all the forces at her command. India must consequently evolve force enough to free herself from that embrace of death.²⁵

It was by no means inevitable that the Indian struggle would be non-violent, and there are strong indications that in the absence of Gandhi's alternative grand strategy the terrorists would probably have carried the day. (This seems so despite the fact that nonviolent resistance played a significant role in the analyses and actions of Indian nationalists *before* Gandhi.)

Ranganath R. Diwakar, a participant in the independence struggle and author of several books on Gandhi's *satyagraha*, has written:

In fact, if Gandhiji had not been there to guide and lead India, awakened and conscious as she was, she would certainly have adopted the usual methods of armed revolt against her alien oppressors. . . . it would have been inevitable. . . . A choice had to be made and at the psychological moment Gandhiji presented this unique weapon of *satyagraha*.²⁶

Even after Gandhi's program of action had been accepted by the Indian National Congress and mass nonviolent campaigns had been launched, the terrorists continued to act, and there was wide support for advocates of violent revolution, especially for Subhas Chandra Bose, who was even elected president of the Congress in 1939. In 1928 Jawaharlal Nehru was still in favor of a violent war of independence. Contrary to many sentimental comments by both Indians and Westerners, this was the political context within which Gandhi's grand strategy was adopted and within which Gandhi formulated a series of nonviolent campaigns. One of these, the 1930-31 independence campaign, which began with the famous Salt March, remains a classic example of a nationwide nonviolent struggle.

3. India—1930-31²⁷ For the 1930 campaign Gandhi formulated a program of political demands and a concrete plan for nonviolent rebellion, including civil disobedience. Pleas to the Viceroy produced no concessions.

Focusing initially on the Salt Act (which imposed a heavy tax and a government monopoly), Gandhi set out with disciples on a twenty-six day march to the sea to commit civil disobedience by making salt. This was the signal for mass nonviolent revolt throughout the country. As the movement progressed, there were mass meetings, huge parades, seditious speeches, a boycott of foreign cloth, and picketing of liquor shops and opium dens. Students left government schools. The national flag was hoisted. There were social boycotts of government employees, short strikes (*hartals*), and resignations by government employees and Members of the Legislative Assembly and Councils. Government departments were boycotted, as were foreign insurance firms and the postal and telegraph services. Many refused to pay taxes. Some renounced titles. There were nonviolent raids and seizures of government-held salt, and so on.

The government arrested Gandhi early in the campaign. About one hundred thousand Indians (including seventeen thousand women) were imprisoned or held in detention camps. There were beatings, injuries, censorship, shootings, confiscation, intimidation, fines, banning of meetings and organizations, and other measures. Some persons were shot dead. During the year the normal functioning of government was severely affected, and great suffering was experienced by the resisters. A truce was finally agreed on, under terms settled by direct negotiations between Gandhi and the Viceroy.

Although concessions were made to the nationalists, the actual terms favored the government more than the nationalists. In Gandhi's view it

was more important, however, that the strength thus generated in the Indians meant that independence could not long be denied, and that by having to participate in direct negotiations with the nonviolent rebels, the government had recognized India as an equal with whose representatives she had to negotiate. This was as upsetting to Winston Churchill as it was reassuring to Gandhi.

Jawaharlal Nehru, who was later to become Prime Minister of independent India, was no believer in an ethic of nonviolence or Gandhi's philosophy or religious explanations. However, like many other prominent and unknown Indians, he became a supporter of Gandhi's nonviolent "grand strategy" for obtaining a British evacuation from India, and he spent years in prison in that struggle. Nehru wrote in his autobiography:

We had accepted that method, the Congress had made that method its own, because of a belief in its effectiveness. Gandhiji had placed it before the country not only as the right method but as the most effective one for our purpose

In spite of its negative name it was a dynamic method, the very opposite of a meek submission to a tyrant's will. It was not a coward's refuge from action, but a brave man's defiance of evil and national subjection.²⁸

E. Struggles against Nazis

Independent of the continuing Gandhian campaigns, significant nonviolent struggles under exceedingly difficult circumstances also emerged in Nazi-occupied Europe. Almost without exception these operated in the context of world war and always against a ruthless enemy. Sometimes the nonviolent forms of resistance were closely related to parallel violent resistance; occasionally they took place more independently. Often the nonviolent elements in the resistance struggles were highly important, sometimes even overshadowing the violent elements in the resistance.

Nonviolent resistance in small or large instances took place in a number of countries but was especially important in the Netherlands,²⁹ Norway³⁰ and, probably to a lesser degree, in Denmark.³¹ In no case does there appear to have been much if anything in the way of special knowledge of the technique, and certainly no advance preparations or training. The cases generally emerged as spontaneous or improvised efforts to "do something" in a difficult situation. Exceptions were certain strikes in the Netherlands which the London-based government-in-exile requested in order to help Allied landings on the continent.

1. Norway—1942³² The Norwegian teachers' resistance is but one of these resistance campaigns. During the Nazi occupation, the Norwegian fascist "Minister-President," Vidkun Quisling, set out to establish the Corporative State on Mussolini's model, selecting teachers as the first "corporation." For this he created a new teachers' organization with compulsory membership and appointed as its Leader the head of the *Hird*, the Norwegian S. A. (storm troopers). A compulsory fascist youth movement was also set up.

The underground called on the teachers to resist. Between eight thousand and ten thousand of the country's twelve thousand teachers wrote letters to Quisling's Church and Education Department. All signed their names and addresses to the wording prescribed by the underground for the letter. Each teacher said he (or she) could neither assist in promoting fascist education of the children nor accept membership in the new teachers' organization.

The government threatened them with dismissal and then closed all schools for a month. Teachers held classes in private homes. Despite censorship, news of the resistance spread. Tens of thousands of letters of protest from parents poured into the government office.

After the teachers defied the threats, about one thousand male teachers were arrested and sent to concentration camps. Children gathered and sang at railroad stations as teachers were shipped through in cattle cars. In the camps, the Gestapo imposed an atmosphere of terror intended to induce capitulation. On starvation rations, the teachers were put through "torture gymnastics" in deep snow. When only a few gave in, "treatment" continued.

The schools reopened, but the teachers still at liberty told their pupils they repudiated membership in the new organization and spoke of a duty to conscience. Rumors were spread that if these teachers did not give in, some or all of those arrested would be killed. After difficult inner wrestling, the teachers who had not been arrested almost without exception stood firm.

Then, on cattle car trains and overcrowded steamers, the arrested teachers were shipped to a camp near Kirkenes, in the Far North. Although Quisling's Church and Education Department stated that all was settled and that the activities of the new organization would cease, the teachers were kept at Kirkenes in miserable conditions, doing dangerous work.

However, their suffering strengthened morale on the home front and posed problems for the Quisling regime. As Quisling once raged at the

teachers in a school near Oslo: "You teachers have destroyed everything for me!" Fearful of alienating Norwegians still further, Quisling finally ordered the teachers' release. Eight months after the arrests, the last teachers returned home to triumphal receptions.

Quisling's new organization for teachers never came into being, and the schools were never used for fascist propaganda. After Quisling encountered further difficulties in imposing the Corporative State, Hitler ordered him to abandon the plan entirely.

2. Berlin—1943 It is widely believed that once the "Final Solution," the annihilation of Europe's Jews, was under way, no nonviolent action to save German Jews occurred and that none could have been effective. This belief is challenged by an act of nonviolent defiance by the non-Jewish wives of arrested Berlin Jews. This limited act of resistance occurred in the midst of the war, in the capital of the Third Reich, toward the end of the inhuman effort to make Germany free of Jews—all highly unfavorable conditions for successful opposition. The defiance not only took place, but was completely successful, even in 1943. The following account is by Heinz Ullstein, one of the men who had been arrested; his wife was one of the women who acted:

The Gestapo were preparing for large-scale action. Columns of covered trucks were drawn up at the gates of factories and stood in front of private houses. All day long they rolled through the streets, escorted by armed SS men. . . . heavy vehicles under whose covers could be discerned the outlines of closely packed humanity . . . On this day, every Jew living in Germany was arrested and for the time being lodged in mass camps. It was the beginning of the end.

People lowered their eyes, some with indifference, others perhaps with a fleeting sense of horror and shame. The day wore on, there was a war to be won, provinces were conquered, "History was made," we were on intimate terms with the millennium. And the public eye missed the flickering of a tiny torch which might have kindled the fire of general resistance to despotism. From the vast collecting centers to which the Jews of Berlin had been taken, the Gestapo sorted out those with "Aryan kin" and concentrated them in a separate prison in the Rosenstrasse. No one knew what was to happen to them.

At this point the wives stepped in. Already by the early hours of the next day they had discovered the whereabouts of their husbands and as by common consent, as if they had been summoned, a crowd

of them appeared at the gate of the improvised detention center. In vain the security police tried to turn away the demonstrators, some 6,000 of them, and to disperse them. Again and again they massed together, advanced, called for their husbands, who despite strict instructions to the contrary showed themselves at the windows, and demanded their release.

For a few hours the routine of a working day interrupted the demonstration, but in the afternoon the square was again crammed with people, and the demanding, accusing cries of the women rose above the noise of the traffic like passionate avowals of a love strengthened by the bitterness of life.

Gestapo headquarters was situated in the Burgstrasse, not far from the square where the demonstration was taking place. A few salvos from a machine gun could have wiped the women off the square, but the SS did not fire, not this time. Scared by an incident which had no equal in the history of the Third Reich, headquarters consented to negotiate. They spoke soothingly, gave assurances, and finally released the prisoners.³³

F. Latin American civilian insurrections

Latin America is more famous for its political violence than for non-violent action. This may be an unbalanced view. There have apparently been a large number of instances in Latin America of general strikes and several cases of nonviolent civilian insurrections. For example, within a few weeks in 1944 two Central American dictators, in El Salvador and Guatemala, fell before massive civil resistance. These cases are especially important because of the rapidity with which the nonviolent action destroyed these entrenched military dictatorships. Attention here is focused on the Guatemalan case.

1. Guatemala—1944³⁴ With the help of the secret police General Jorge Ubico had ruled Guatemala since 1931. Ubico was extolled in some U.S. magazines as a “road-and-school dictator”; the men who had faced his political police knew better. *Time* magazine called him an admirer of Hitler’s 1934 blood purge, and quoted Ubico: “I am like Hitler, I execute first and give trial afterwards . . .”³⁵

During World War II many U.S. troops were in Guatemala, which had joined the Allies. The Americans there promoted ideas of democracy for which, they said, the war was being fought. These appealed especially to Guatemalan students and young professional men. Other changes were undermining Ubico’s position. Seizure of German-owned coffee *fincas*

(plantations) in 1942 removed some of his supporters. Domestic issues were causing unrest, both among workers and within the business community. The dictator of nearby El Salvador, Martinez, had fallen a few weeks previously in the face of widespread nonviolent resistance. That proved to be a dangerous and contagious example. Action began in Guatemala, mildly—at first.

In late May 1944 forty-five lawyers asked the removal of the judge who tried most political opponents of the regime brought before a civil court. Ubico asked for specific charges against the judge. Surprisingly, one newspaper was allowed to publish them.

On the day prior to the annual parade of teachers and schoolchildren in tribute to the dictator, two hundred teachers petitioned Ubico for a wage increase. Those who drafted the petition were arrested and charged with conspiracy against the social institutions of the supreme government. The teachers replied with a boycott of the parade; they were fired.

On June 20 a manifesto announced the formation of the Social Democrat Party and called for opposition parties, social justice, lifting of the terror, and hemispheric solidarity. Students petitioned for university autonomy, rehiring of two discharged teachers and release of two imprisoned law students. Unless the demands were granted within twenty-four hours, they threatened a student strike.

Ubico declared a state of emergency. He called the opposition “nazi-fascist.” Fearful, many student leaders sought asylum in the Mexican Embassy. However, young lawyers and professional men refused to submit to intimidation, and supported the students. On June 23 the schoolteachers went on strike.

Ubico had once said that if three hundred respected Guatemalans were to ask him to resign he would do so. On June 24 two men delivered the *Memorial de los 311* to Ubico’s office. The three hundred and eleven prominent signers had risked their lives. The document explained the reasons for unrest, asked effective constitutional guarantees, and suspension of martial law. The same day, students marched past the U.S. Embassy and emphasized reliance on nonviolent means. Officials seemed surprised at the form of this demonstration. A peaceful meeting that evening demanded Ubico’s resignation. Later that night, however, police beat and arrested hundreds at a neighborhood religious and social celebration. Some blamed “drunken bandits, previously coached by the police”; others pointed to clashes between persons shouting anti-Ubico slogans and the dictator’s strong-arm men.

The next day the foreign minister summoned to the National Palace

the two men who had delivered the *Memorial de los 311*—Carbonell and Serrano. The ex-head of the secret police joined the meeting. Simultaneously, a demonstration took place before the National Palace; against it the government massed platoons of soldiers, cavalry, tanks, armored cars, machine guns, and police armed with guns and tear-gas bombs. Carbonell and Serrano were asked to “calm the people.” Although all meetings had been banned, the men were permitted to meet with other “leaders” of the movement to seek a solution to the crisis.

That afternoon women dressed in deep mourning prayed for an end to the night’s brutalities at the Church of San Francisco in the center of Guatemala City. Afterward they formed an impressive silent procession; the cavalry charged and fired into the crowd. An unknown number were wounded and one, María Chincilla Recinos, a teacher, was killed. She became the first martyr. “. . . the mask had been torn from the Napoleonic pose, revealing Ubico and his regime standing rudely on a basis of inhumanity and terror.”³⁶

Guatemala City responded with a silent paralysis. The opposition broke off talks with the government. Workers struck. Businessmen shut stores and offices. It was an economic shutdown. Everything closed. The streets were deserted.

After attempts at a new parley failed, at Ubico’s request the diplomatic corps arranged a meeting that afternoon between the opposition and the government. The delegates told Ubico to his face that during his rule “Guatemala has known nothing but oppression.” Ubico insisted: “As long as I am president, I will never permit a free press, nor free association, because the people of Guatemala are not ready for a democracy and need a strong hand.”³⁷ The possibility of Ubico’s resigning and the question of a succession were discussed. The delegates were to sample public opinion.

The opposition later reported to Ubico by letter the unanimous desire of the people that he resign. They again demanded the lifting of martial law, freedom of press and association, and an end to attacks on the people. Petitions and messages from important people poured into the palace; they also asked Ubico to resign. The silent economic shutdown of Guatemala City continued. The dictator’s power was dissolving.

On July 1 Ubico withdrew in favor of a triumvirate of generals. Immediate and unaccustomed political ferment followed. Labor and political organizations mushroomed, and exiles returned. General Ponce, one of the triumvirate, tried to install himself in Ubico’s place. In October

he faced another general strike and a student strike and was ousted by a *coup d’état*. Difficult times were still ahead.

The victory over Ubico was not well utilized to establish democracy. But it had been a victory, both for the people and for their type of struggle. Mario Rosenthal writes:

Energetic and cruel, Jorge Ubico could have put down an armed attack . . . He could have imposed his will on any group of disgruntled, military or civilian, and stood them up against a wall. But he was helpless against civil acts of repudiation, to which he responded with violence, until these slowly pushed him into the dead-end street where all dictatorships ultimately arrive: kill everybody who is not with you or get out.³⁸

The movement that brought Waterloo to Guatemala’s Napoleon was, fittingly, a peaceful, civilian action; the discipline, serenity and resignation with which it was conducted made it a model of passive resistance.³⁹

Rosenthal also paid tribute to the intelligence with which it was directed and to the solidarity shown by Guatemalans of all social classes, and ethnic and political backgrounds.

G. Risings against Communist regimes

Nonviolent forms of struggle have also emerged in several Communist-ruled countries. While always producing something less than total success and sometimes obvious defeat, these predominantly spontaneous corporate acts of defiance and resistance have sometimes shaken the regime to its core. The largely nonviolent East German Rising of June 1953 is a clear case in point.⁴⁰ During the Hungarian Revolution of 1956–57 the great variety of methods of nonviolent action applied, under severe conditions—methods such as the general strike, massive demonstrations, and the shifting of loyalty from the old government to the incipient parallel government of the workers’ councils—had a powerful impact, and together they constituted an extremely important component in the total combat strength. The general strike was able to continue in Budapest for some time after the Russians had crushed the military resistance. Today it is often forgotten that nonviolent methods of struggle were very important in the Hungarian Revolution.⁴¹

1. *Vorkuta—1953*⁴² There was also a significant wave of strikes in the prison labor camps, especially among political prisoners, in the Soviet

Union itself in 1953.⁴³ In some of these there was a great deal of violence. In all there was repression, though apparently it was less severe where the prisoners were predominately nonviolent. Perhaps the most important of these strikes was at Vorkuta.

Strikes against poor conditions had long been considered among the 250,000 political prisoners in the coal-mining camps at Vorkuta. The decision was precipitated just after Stalin's death in 1953 by the announcement of the M.V.D. (Ministry of Internal Affairs) at Vorkuta that political prisoners ought not to expect an amnesty, as their liberation would jeopardize State security.

Many waverers then cast their lot with those advocating nonviolent resistance; by the end of May, strike committees had been secretly established in several camps. They were mainly composed of three groups of prisoners: Leninist students, anarchists, and the *Monashki* (a postrevolutionary pacifist Christian group resembling the early Quakers), as well as some prisoners representing no group.

The fall of Beria, the head of the secret police, while the prisoners were organizing encouraged more waverers. Strike committees were set up in coal-mining pits where they worked. It was agreed that the strike was to demand abolition of the camps and change of the prisoners' status to that of free colonists under contract. Before the strike began the central leadership was arrested and removed to Moscow. A new central strike committee was elected.

On July 21 many prisoners remained in their barracks, refusing to work. They insisted on presenting their demands to the general who was commandant of all the Vorkuta camps. They did so two days later, after thirty thousand had joined the strike. After the demands were presented the general made a long speech containing vague promises and specific threats.

A week passed without decisive action; no clear orders came from Moscow. Food would continue only while existing supplies lasted, it was announced. A strike leaflet appeared by the thousands of copies, urging self-reliance to gain freedom and the strike as the only possible means of action. Sympathetic soldiers helped to spread these and to maintain contacts between the camps. Twenty big pits were shut down.

Russian-speaking troops were then withdrawn and replaced by soldiers from Far Eastern sections of the Soviet Union, who did not speak Russian. With the strike at its peak in early August, the State Prosecutor arrived with several generals from Moscow and offered minor concessions: two letters home a month (instead of two a year), one visitor a

year, and removal of identification numbers from clothes and iron bars from barracks windows.

In an open letter the strike leadership rejected these. The Prosecutor spoke at the camps, promising better food, higher pay, shorter shifts. Only a few wavered. The Strike Committee leaders went to an interview with the commanding general—but never returned. Some strikers were shot.

After the prisoners had held out for over three months the strike finally ended in the face of food and fuel shortages. However, considerable material improvements resulted. A spokesman of the International Commission on Concentration Camp Practices declared that the strike action in this and other camps was one of the most important factors in the improvement in the lot of the political prisoners.

H. American civil rights struggles

In the United States in the mid-1950s there emerged among Afro-Americans and civil rights workers a very significant, large, and reasonably effective movement of nonviolent action against segregation and discrimination against Afro-Americans. The nonviolent action took a variety of forms—bus boycotts, various economic boycotts, massive demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, freedom rides and others. This movement dates from the Montgomery bus boycott, which remains significant despite changes in resistance methods in recent years.

1. **Montgomery, Alabama—1955-56⁴⁴** On December 1, 1955, four Negroes in Montgomery were asked, as was usual, to give up their bus seats to newly boarded whites and stand. Three complied, but Mrs. Parks, a seamstress, refused.

A one-day boycott of the buses on December 5 in protest against her arrest was nearly 100 percent effective. It was decided to continue the boycott until major reforms were made. Evening mass meetings in churches overflowed. The response, in numbers and spirit, exceeded all hopes.

Negroes walked, took taxis, and shared rides, but stayed off the buses. A new spirit of dignity and self-respect permeated the Negro community. The whites were confronted by qualities they had not believed the Negroes possessed. The aim became improvement of the whole community. The appeal was to Christian love. The young Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., and his co-workers found themselves thrust into leadership and international prominence.

Negotiations failed. The use of taxis at reduced fares was prohibited.

A car pool of three hundred vehicles was organized. Money began to pour in, and a fleet of over fifteen new station wagons was added. Many Negroes preferred to walk to express their determination.

Unfounded rumors were spread about the movement's leaders, along with false reports of a settlement. Negro drivers (including Dr. King) were arrested for minor, often imaginary, traffic violations. Police intimidation became common. Over thirty threats a day reached the leaders. King's home was bombed; Negroes nearly broke into violence. Another home was bombed. Then nearly one hundred Negro leaders were arrested, charged with violating an antiboycott law.

Fear, long known by Southern Afro-Americans, was cast off. Many went to the sheriff's office, hoping to be among those "wanted." The trial of the arrested leaders, which received world attention, became a testimony of fearlessness and a recounting of grievances. The movement gained new momentum. On June 4 the Federal District Court, acting on a suit filed by the Negroes, declared the city bus segregation laws to be unconstitutional, but the city appealed. The bus protest continued, now to bring a full end to bus segregation. Insurance policies on the station wagons were canceled; a London firm issued new policies. City officials declared the car pool illegal. The same day, November 13, the United States Supreme Court declared bus segregation laws unconstitutional.

In the evening two simultaneous mass meetings emphasized love, dignity, and refusal to ride on the buses until segregation was abolished. That night the Ku Klux Klan rode through the Negro district. Instead of dark, locked houses of terrified Negroes, the K.K.K. found the lights on, the doors open and people watching the Klan parade. A few even waved. Nonplussed, the Klan disappeared.

With the car pool prohibited, each area worked out its own share-the-ride plan, and many people walked. The buses remained empty. In the mass meetings detailed plans were presented for resuming—after over a year—the use of the buses on an integrated basis. There must be courtesy. This was a victory, not over the white man, but for justice and democracy.

The Supreme Court's antisegregation order reached Montgomery on December 20. On the first day of integration, there were no major incidents. Then the white extremists began a reign of terror. Shots were fired at buses; a teen-age girl was beaten; a pregnant Negro woman was shot; the Klan paraded again and burned crosses. But the Negroes' fear had gone. The homes of more leaders and several Negro churches were bombed. This terrorism repelled many whites. The local newspaper, sev-

eral white ministers, and the businessmen's association denounced the bombings.

The Negroes kept nonviolent discipline. More bombs exploded. Although arrested whites were quickly found "not guilty," the terrorism abruptly ceased. Desegregation then proceeded smoothly, a compliance virtually inconceivable a year before.

CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT

Throughout the world there has also been other significant nonviolent action, some of which occurred before these examples and some of it since. Other important cases are likely to have occurred before this book is in print. Major strikes and nonviolent demonstrations in Franco's Spain are scarcely mentioned here, for example, and there appear to be a large number of unstudied Latin American, as well as African, cases.

In the non-Gandhian development of nonviolent action in the mid-twentieth century particular struggles were often tinged with violence. Sometimes the nonviolent action took place side by side with violence. Sometimes it occurred before or after the violence—both in the case of Hungary in 1956-57. Nevertheless, the power of these various struggles has been predominantly rooted in mass solidarity and popular nonviolent defiance. The reasons for this essentially nonviolent quality have varied. Sometimes people recognized the practical limitations of violence—for example, in 1968 Czechs and Slovaks recalled the violent phase of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution as a pattern not to be imitated. Sometimes people have felt a revulsion against cruelty and killing for political ends, having seen so much of it. For example, some East Germans in June 1953 shouted: "We want a *decent* revolution." More frequently, probably, people have simply seen methods of nonviolent action as ways to act, ways which gave them a sense of their own power and perhaps also offered a reasonable chance of success in gaining their objectives. This seems to have been the case, for example, in Norway in 1942 and in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1944.

The development of nonviolent action of various types continues throughout the world, arising from different roots, taking numerous forms in response to a multitude of situations and problems. Struggles against war, for civil liberties, for social revolution, against home-grown and foreign-imposed dictatorships, and for a determining voice in their own lives by people who feel powerless are now leading to a continuing ap-

plication of nonviolent action. This type of resistance is also likely to be used by persons and groups who find the direction or speed of change distasteful. In addition, as knowledge of this technique spreads, groups who attempt to suspend constitutional government gracefully or to destroy it blatantly may find themselves confronted with unexpectedly effective resistance.

The experiments made under Gandhi's political leadership, and also his thought and activities, still sometimes stimulate or strongly influence new nonviolent struggles. But even in such cases the Gandhian component has often been modified in new cultural and political settings. Frequently, as in anti-Nazi resistance movements and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, there is no clear link between the Gandhian experiments and new cases of nonviolent struggle. As those *satyagraha* campaigns recede into history they are less and less a direct factor in these new struggles. It is always possible, however, that this might be reversed if serious new interest should develop in Gandhi as a political strategist. It must be noted, however, that whatever may be the stimuli and motivations, in the twentieth century a remarkable expansion has taken place in the use of nonviolent struggle as a substitute for violence in a widening variety of political conflicts.

Needless to say, there have been setbacks in this development. At times there has appeared a clear trend toward the abandonment of nonviolent action in favor of violence. For example, the limited and sporadic use of nonviolent action both by nonwhites in South Africa⁴⁵ and by Afro-Americans in the United States was followed in each case by advocacy of violence. Nevertheless, when seen in historical perspective there has been a relative burst of development in this technique in the twentieth century. However unevenly, the process continues. One of the evidences for this was the unprepared use for some weeks of widespread and courageous nonviolent resistance by the Czechs and Slovaks following the invasion by the Soviet Union and her allies on August 21, 1968.

A. Czechoslovakia—1968⁴⁶

The Soviet leaders expected that the massive invasion of Czechoslovakia by more than half a million Warsaw Treaty Organization troops would overwhelm the much smaller Czechoslovak army within days, leaving the country in confusion and defeat. The invasion would also make possible a *coup d'état* to replace the reform-minded Dubček regime with a conservative pro-Moscow one. With this in mind, the Soviet

K.G.B. (State Police) kidnapped the Communist Party's First Secretary, Alexander Dubček; the Prime Minister, Oldřich Černík; the National Assembly President, Josef Smrkovský; and the National Front Chairman, František Kriegel. The Soviet officials held under house arrest the President of the Republic, Ludvík Svoboda, who was a popular soldier-statesman in both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. They hoped that he would give the mantle of legitimacy to the new conservative regime. The kidnapped leaders might have been killed once the *coup* had been successful, as happened in Hungary in 1957.

But the country was not demoralized as a result of military defeat, for it was a different type of resistance which was waged. Nor did a puppet regime quickly replace the kidnapped leaders. The Czechoslovak officials sent emergency orders to all the armed forces to remain in their barracks. The Soviet leaders had expected that the situation would be so effectively under control within three days that the invading troops could be then withdrawn. This did not happen, and as a result there were serious logistical and morale problems among the invading troops. Owing to resistance at several strategic points a collaborationist government was prevented, at least for about eight months—until April 1969 when the Husák regime came in.

Resistance began in early hours of the invasion. Employees of the government news agency (Č.T.K.) refused orders to issue a release stating that certain Czechoslovak party and governmental officials had requested the invasion. Also, President Svoboda courageously refused to sign the document presented to him by the conservative clique. Finally, it was possible through the clandestine radio network to convene several official bodies, and these opposed the invasion.

The Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress, the National Assembly, and what was left of the government ministers all issued statements similar to the emergency statement by the Party Presidium before the arrival of the K.G.B.—that the invasion had begun without the knowledge of party or governmental leaders; there had been no "request." Some of the bodies selected interim leaders who carried out certain emergency functions. The National Assembly went on to "demand the release from detention of our constitutional representatives . . . in order that they can carry out their constitutional functions entrusted to them by the Sovereign people of the country," and to "demand immediate withdrawal of the armies of the five states."⁴⁷

The clandestine radio network during the first week both created many forms of resistance and shaped others: it convened the Extraordi-

nary Fourteenth Party Congress, called one-hour general strikes, requested the rail workers to slow the transport of Russian tracking and jamming equipment, and discouraged collaboration within the Č.S.S.R. State Police. There is no record of any collaboration among the uniformed Public Police; indeed, many of them worked actively with the resistance. The radio argued the futility of acts of violence and the wisdom of nonviolent resistance. It instructed students in the streets to clear out of potentially explosive situations and cautioned against rumors. The radio was the main means through which a politically mature and effective resistance was shaped. Colin Chapman has observed that "each form of resistance, however ineffective it might have been alone, served to strengthen the other manifestations,"⁴⁸ and through the radio different levels of resistance and different parts of the country were kept in steady communication. With many government agencies put out of operation by Russian occupation of their offices, the radio also took on certain emergency functions (such as obtaining manpower to bring in potato and hops harvests) and provided vital information. This ranged from assuring mothers that their children in summer camps were safe to reporting meager news of the Moscow negotiations.

Militarily totally successful, the Russians now faced a strong political struggle. In face of unified civilian resistance, the absence of a collaborationist government, and the increasing demoralization of their troops, the Soviet leaders agreed on Friday, the 23rd, that President Svoboda would fly to Moscow for negotiations. Svoboda refused to negotiate until Dubček, Černík, and Smrkovsky joined the discussions. In four days a compromise was worked out. This left most of the leaders in their positions but called for the party to exercise more fully its "leading role," and left Russian troops in the country. The compromise seems also to have included the sacrifice of certain reform-minded leaders and reforms.

That first week the entire people had in a thousand ways courageously and cleverly fought an exhilarating battle for their freedom. The compromise, called the Moscow Protocol, created severely mixed feelings among the people. Observers abroad saw this as an unexpected success for the nation and its leaders; an occupied country is not supposed to have bargaining power. But most Czechs and Slovaks saw it as a defeat and for a week would not accept it. The leaders were apparently doubtful of the disciplined capacity of the populace for sustained resistance in the face of severe repression.

Despite the absence of prior planning or explicit training for civilian resistance, the Dubček regime managed to remain in power until April

1969, about eight months longer than would have been possible with military resistance. The Russians subsequently gained important objectives, including the establishment of a conservative regime. The final outcome of the struggle and occupation remains undetermined at this writing. Nevertheless, this highly significant case requires careful research and analysis of its methods, problems, successes and failures.

SEEKING INSIGHT

This brief sketch of the historical development of nonviolent action does not convey the extent and significance of the past use of this technique. Nevertheless, even this survey and the various illustrative cases cited throughout the remainder of this book are sufficient to call into question and even to refute some of the main misconceptions which have been widely accepted concerning this type of action.

Extensive use of nonviolent action has occurred despite the absence of attention to the development of the technique itself. Its practice has been partly spontaneous, partly intuitive, partly vaguely patterned after some known case. It has usually been practiced under highly unfavorable conditions and with a lack of experienced participants or even experienced leaders. Almost always there were no advance preparations or training, little or no planning or prior consideration of strategy and tactics and of the range of methods. The people using it have usually had little real understanding of the nature of the technique which they sought to wield and were largely ignorant of its history. There were no studies of strategy and tactics for them to consult, or handbooks on how to organize the "troops," conduct the struggle, and maintain discipline. Under such conditions it is not surprising that there have often been defeats or only partial victories, or that violence has sometimes erupted—which, as we shall see, helps to bring defeat. With such handicaps, it is amazing that the practice of the technique has been as widespread, successful and orderly as it has.

Some men and women are now trying to learn more of the nature of this technique and to explore its potentialities. Some people are now asking how nonviolent action can be refined and applied in place of violence to meet complex and difficult problems. These intellectual efforts are a potentially significant new factor in the history of this technique. It remains to be seen what consequences this factor may have for the future development of nonviolent action.

NOTES

1. For a fuller discussion of this theory of controlling the power of rulers, see Chapter One.
2. See, for example, Bart. de Ligt, *The Conquest of Violence: An Essay on War and Revolution* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1938, and London: George Routledge & Sons, 1937), pp. 26-27; Richard Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence* (Second rev. ed.; New York: Schocken Books, Schocken Paperback, 1966, and London: James Clarke & Co., 1960), pp. 93-94 and 98-100; Krishnalal Shridharani, *War Without Violence: A Study of Gandhi's Method and Its Accomplishments* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1939, and London: Victor Gollancz, 1939), U.S. ed., pp. 276-294; Br. ed., pp. 237-246; and T. K. Mahadevan, Adam Roberts and Gene Sharp, eds., *Civilian Defence: An Introduction* (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation and Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967) Appendices Four and Five (consisting of quotations on the point from R. R. Diwakar, N. K. Bose, K. Shridharani, and R. Gregg), pp. 249-254.
3. This is a revision of the definition first published in Gene Sharp, "The Meanings of Nonviolence: A Typology (revised)," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. III, no. 1 (March 1959), pp. 44-45. The definition is largely compatible with, although not based upon, that offered by Niels Lindberg, "Indledning og Problemstilling," in Karl Ehrlich (pseud. of Karl Raloff), Niels Lindberg and Gammelgaard Jacobson, *Kamp Uden Vaaben: Ikke-Vold som Kampmiddel mod Krig og Undertrykkelse* (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard, Ejnar Munksgaard, 1937), pp. 9-13.
4. See Gene Sharp, "The Origins of Gandhi's Nonviolent Militancy" (review-essay on *Gandhi's Truth* by Erik Erikson). *Harvard Political Review*, vol. II, no. 1 (May 1970), pp. 13-14 and 34-39.
5. F. R. Cowell, *The Revolutions of Ancient Rome* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, and London: Thames and Hudson, 1962), pp. 42-43. Cowell's account is based on Livy.
6. Theodor Mommsen, *The History of Rome*, trans. William Purdie Dickson, rev. ed. (London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1894), vol. I, pp. 346-350. An excerpt appears in Mulford Q. Sibley, ed., *The Quiet Battle: Writings on the Theory and Practice of Non-violent Resistance* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 108-110.
7. Daniel Dulany, *Considerations upon the Rights of the Colonists to the Privileges of British Subjects* (New York, 1766), p. 47, quoted in Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution* (Rev. ed.; New York: Collier Books, 1963), p. 118.
8. See esp. Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis*; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763-1776* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1966); and Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. X, *The Triumphant Empire: Thunderclouds Gather in the West, 1763-1766*, vol. XI, *The Triumphant Empire: The Rumbling of the Coming Storm, 1766-1770*, and vol. XII, *The Triumphant Empire: Britain Sails into the Storm, 1770-1776* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961-1965).
9. See Leo Tolstoy, *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, and "A Letter to A Hindu."
10. See Henry David Thoreau, *On the Duty of Civil Disobedience* (pamphlet; Introduction by Gene Sharp; London: Peace News, 1963).
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 11 and 13.
12. On the 1905 Revolution, see Sidney Harcave, *First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905* (New York: Macmillan, 1964, and London: Collier-Macmillan, 1964); Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Russian Revolution of 1905: The Workers' Movement and the Formation of Bolshevism and Menshevism*. Trans. by Gertrude Vakar, with a Preface by Leopold H. Haimson (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1967), esp. pp. 129-195. Also see Richard Charques, *The Twilight of Imperial Russia* (London: Phoenix House, 1958), pp. 111-139; Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1960, and London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1960), pp. 63-70 and 75; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and London: Methuen & Co., 1952), pp. 219-260; Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York: Dial Press, 1948, and London: Thames and Hudson, 1956), pp. 278-336; and Michael Prawdin, *The Unmentionable Nechaev: A Key to Bolshevism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), pp. 147-149.
13. See Wilfred Harris Crook, *The General Strike*, pp. 496-527; Goodspeed, *The Conspirators*, pp. 108-143 and 211-213; Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, pp. 168-188; Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. I, pp. 129-160; Karl Raloff (pseud.: Karl Ehrlich), "Den Ikkevoldelige Modstand, der Kvalte Kapp-Kupet," in Ehrlich, Lindberg and Jacobson, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*, pp. 194-213; and Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*, pp. 63-82.
14. Crook, *The General Strike*, p. 513.
15. Goodspeed, *The Conspirators*, pp. 211-213.
16. Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic*, vol. I, p. 154.
17. On the *Ruhrkampf*, see Wolfgang Sternstein, "The *Ruhrkampf* of 1923: Economic Problems of Civilian Defence," in Adam Roberts, ed., *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense: Nonviolent Action Against Aggression* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1968); British edition: *The Strategy of Civilian Defence: Nonviolent Resistance to Aggression* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), pp. 106-135. (Note: the paperback edition is entitled *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense* [Baltimore, Md. and Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1969] but all page references cited in notes in this volume refer to the hardbook editions.) See also Karl Raloff (psud.: Karl Ehrlich), "Ruhrkampen," in Ehrlich, Lindberg and Jacobsen, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*, pp. 181-193; Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*, pp. 102-109; Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, pp. 246-260 and pp. 288-289; and Eyck, *A History of The Weimar Republic*, vol. I, pp. 232-306 *passim*.
18. This account was originally published in Gene Sharp, "Creative Conflict in Politics," *The New Era*, January 1962; pamphlet reprint ed., p. 4 (London: Housmans, 1962). See Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 46-52; Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*; Ind. ed.: Satyagraha, pp. 177-203; and Mahadev Desai, *The Epic of Travancore* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1937).

19. M. K. Gandhi, *Indian Opinion*, Golden Number, 1914; quoted in Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 35; ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 35.
20. M. K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule*, p. 100.
21. Quoted in Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power*, p. 54.
22. Gandhi, *Young India*, 29 September 1921; quoted in Clarence Marsh Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, p. 392.
23. Gandhi, *Young India*, 4 August 1920; quoted in Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance* p. 127; Ind. ed., *Satyagraha*, p. 127.
24. Gandhi, *Young India*, 27 March 1930; quoted in Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 82.
25. All-India Congress Committee, *Congress Bulletin*, 7 March 1930, no. 5; quoted in Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 64. For a brief discussion of some popular misconceptions about Gandhi and his activities, see Gene Sharp, "Gandhi's Political Significance Today," in G. Ramachandran and T. K. Mahadevan, eds., *Gandhi: His Relevance for Our Times* (Berkeley, Calif.: World Without War Council, 1971, and New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, and Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967), pp. 137-157.
26. Ranganath R. Diwaker, *Satyagraha: Its Technique and History* (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1946), p. 55.
27. This account was also originally published in "Creative Conflict in Politics." See Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power*, pp. 37-226, and S. Gopal *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, 1926-1931* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 54-122.
28. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, p. 80.
29. See for example, Warmbrunn, *The Dutch Under German Occupation 1940-1945*. Further references are cited.
30. See, for example, Magne Skodvin, "Norwegian Nonviolent Resistance During the German Occupation," in Roberts, ed., *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense*, pp. 136-153; Br. ed.: *The Strategy of Civilian Defence*, pp. 136-153. Further references are cited.
31. See for example, Jeremy Bennett, "The Resistance Against the German Occupation of Denmark 1940-5," in Roberts, ed., *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense* pp. 154-172; Br. ed.: *The Strategy of Civilian Defence*, pp. 154-172. Further references are cited.
32. This sketch also was originally published in "Creative Conflict in Politics." See Sharp, *Tyranny Could Not Quell Them* (pamphlet) (London: Peace News, 1958 and later editions). Norwegian sources include: Magnus Jensen, "Kampen om Skolen," in Sverre Steen, general editor, *Norges Krig* (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1947-50), vol. III, pp. 73-105, and Sverre S. Amundsen, gen. ed., *Kirkenes Ferda, 1942* (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1946).
33. From Heinz Ullstein's memoirs *Spielplatz meines Lebens* (Munich: Kindler Verlag, 1961), pp. 338-340. This passage (translated by Hilda Morris) is reprinted from Theodor Ebert, "Effects of Repression by the Invader," *Peace News*, 19 March 1965.
34. This account is based upon Mario Rosenthal, *Guatemala: The Story of an Emergent Latin-American Democracy* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1962) pp. 191-214, and Ronald M. Schneider, *Communism in Guatemala 1944-1954* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 5-14.
35. Rosenthal, *Guatemala*, p. 201.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 201-202.
40. See, for example, Theodor Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" in Roberts, ed., *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense*, pp. 175-194; Br. ed.: *The Strategy of Civilian Defence*, pp. 175-194. Further references are cited.
41. See, for example, *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (New York: United Nations, General Assembly Official Records, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18-A/3592, 1957).
42. This sketch also was originally published in "Creative Conflict in Politics." See Brigitte Gerland, "How the Great Vorkuta Strike was Prepared," and "The Great Labor Camp Strike at Vorkuta," in the weekly *The Militant* (New York), 28 February and 7 March 1955, and Joseph Scholmer, "Vorkuta: Strike in a Concentration Camp," in Sibley, ed., *The Quiet Battle*, pp. 187-204, reprinted from Scholmer, *Vorkuta* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1955).
43. *Monthly Information Bulletin of the International Commission Against Concentration Camp Practices* (Brussels), no. 4 (August-November 1955); See especially Paul Barton's article "The Strike Mechanism in Soviet Concentration Camps."
44. This sketch was originally published in Sharp, "Creative Conflict in Politics." See, for example, Martin Luther King, Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1958, and London: Victor Gollancz, 1959).
45. For a discussion of strategic problems of resistance in South Africa, and the potentialities of nonviolent action there, see Sharp, "Can Non-Violence Work in South Africa?," "Problems of Violent and Non-Violent Struggle," "Strategic Problems of the South African Resistance," and "How Do You Get Rid of Oppression?," in the weekly *Peace News* (London) 21 June, 28 June, 5 July, and 25 October 1963.
46. This account is based on a draft prepared by Carl Horne. The following sources may be consulted for further details of this case: Robert Littell, ed., *The Czech Black Book* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969); Robin Alison Remington, ed., *Winter in Prague* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969); Joseph Wechsberg, *The Voices* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969); and Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, *Czechoslovakia 1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969 and London: Chatto & Windus, 1969).
47. Remington, ed., *Winter in Prague*, p. 382.
48. Colin Chapman, *August 21st* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), p. 44.