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Chapter 5

The Methods of Economic Noncooperation: (1) Economic Boycotts

INTRODUCTION

Economic forms of noncooperation are much more numerous than the forms of social noncooperation, identified above. Economic noncooperation consists of a suspension of or refusal to continue specific economic relationships. The first subclass within the broad class of economic noncooperation is that of economic boycotts—the refusal to continue or to undertake certain economic relationships, especially the buying, selling, or handling of goods and services. The second subclass consists of various forms of the strike, which involves the restriction or suspension of labor. The next chapter is devoted to the strike, while our focus here is on economic boycotts.

Economic boycotts may be spontaneous, or they may be deliberately initiated by a particular group. In either case, they usually become organized efforts to withdraw, and to induce others to withdraw, economic cooperation in ways which restrict the buying or selling market of an

individual or group.¹ Although the word boycott did not come into use until 1880, when it originated with the name of a Captain Boycott against whom the peasants of Mayo County, Ireland, were protesting,² examples of this method of noncooperation go back much earlier. The boycott has been practiced on local, regional, national and international levels both by persons directly involved in the grievance and by sympathetic third parties. Motivations and objectives have varied from economic and political to social and cultural.

Economic boycotts have been practiced mainly in labor struggles and national liberation movements, although their use in other situations is not unknown. The economic boycott in industrial disputes had its origin in the American trade union movement,³ where it emerged in 1880 "almost without warning . . . to become for the next ten or fifteen years the most effective weapon of unionism. There was no object so mean and no person so exalted as to escape its power."⁴

Economic boycotts for nationalist objectives against foreign powers appear to have been most frequently used in China; those cases seem to have drawn upon earlier Chinese experience in economic noncooperation, as Professor John K. Fairbank suggests. He writes that "in Chinese life the boycott had been a widely used form of passive resistance, or non-violent coercion, by which organized groups such as merchant guilds could exert their influence upon officialdom. In the twentieth century they began to be used as expressions of anti-foreignism." As examples he cites the boycott of American products sponsored in 1905 by the merchant guilds of Canton in protest against the exclusion of Chinese from the United States, the boycotts of Japanese goods in 1908 and 1915 in protest against that country's policies, and the prolonged boycott and strike against the British which began in Hong Kong in 1925.⁵

One way of viewing economic boycotts is to divide them into primary and secondary boycotts. The primary boycott is the direct suspension of dealings with the opponent or a refusal to buy, use, or handle his goods or services (sometimes accompanied by efforts to persuade others to do likewise). The secondary boycott is the economic boycott of third parties in an effort to induce them to join in the primary boycott against the opponent. It occurs "where those who fail to support the original movement are themselves boycotted."⁶ Leo Wolman defines a secondary boycott as "a combination to withdraw patronage from a person in order to force that person in turn to withdraw his patronage from that individual or firm with whom the union is primarily at odds."⁷

A secondary boycott took place in the United States in 1921 when

the International Association of Machinists boycotted not only the Duplex Printing Co., with which it was involved in a conflict, but also all those firms which continued to use the products made by that company.⁸ Another American example of a secondary boycott occurred in period preceding the War of Independence, when merchants and other persons were themselves boycotted economically if they did not observe the boycott of English commodities which was part of the resistance to the Stamp Act and the Townshend Acts. Such action sometimes also affected economic relations between the colonies. In 1766, for example, a group in Charleston, South Carolina, agreed that no provisions should be shipped "to that infamous Colony Georgia in particular nor any other that make use of Stamp Paper."⁹ When the Boston town meeting heard in May 1770 that traders in Newport, Rhode Island, were importing goods from both England and the East Indies, it voted to sever all commercial relations with that town.¹⁰

The remainder of this chapter will not distinguish between primary and secondary economic boycotts because different criteria are used to distinguish the specific methods of economic boycotts. Frequently one method of economic boycott may be applied either as a primary or as a secondary boycott.

Since the term economic boycott covers a considerable variety of specific acts, it is desirable to subdivide the classification; this can most usefully be done in terms of the nature of the group responsible (at least primarily so) for conducting the boycott. This classification should not be regarded as rigid, however, for one type often blends into another, and frequently several methods, or action by several groups, may be combined. Economic boycotts may also be combined with a great variety of other methods of nonviolent action.

ACTION BY CONSUMERS

71. Consumers' boycott

The consumers' boycott involves a refusal by consumers to purchase certain goods or services. There may be many reasons for such a boycott: 1) the price may be regarded as too high; 2) the item may not be available to all persons and groups on equal terms; 3) the boycotted item may furnish a convenient symbolic point for expressing a wider grievance or a general discontent with the status quo; 4) the particular boycotted item may be regarded as having certain "immoral" qualities; 5)

there may be objection to the conditions, especially of labor, under which the item has been produced; 6) there may be objection to the use to which the profits from such sales will be put; and 7) there may be other less noble motives, including prejudices and political differences. The motives for economic boycotts may, therefore, vary considerably in their origin, which may be economic, political, social, or cultural, or a combination of these.

Examples of consumers' boycotts, taken almost at random, include the New York housewives' boycott of meat in protest against high prices in 1936;¹¹ the 1907 boycott initiated by U.S. trade unionists against the products of Buck's Stove and Range Co.;¹² the six-year boycott initiated in 1893 by the Knights of Labor against the products of the Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.;¹³ the Socialists' boycott in the late nineteenth century of German inns which refused to let rooms for meetings of the Social Democratic Party;¹⁴ the Berlin workers' boycott, in 1894, of beer produced by members of the Brewers' Employers' Association (this was so effective, Leo Wolman reports, that the secretary of the Association stated that the emergence of the boycott added a new and extraordinarily effective weapon to the methods of social and industrial warfare).¹⁵

Other examples are the 1934 boycott of "immoral" films, organized in the United States by Protestants and the Roman Catholic Legion of Decency;¹⁶ the fifteen-day bus boycott in Barcelona, Spain, in January 1957, to express dissatisfaction with the regime;¹⁷ the famous bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, by the city's Afro-Americans, which lasted 381 days (from 1955 to 1957);¹⁸ the boycott in 1959 by Africans in Buganda of all Asian shopkeepers and a few non-African goods;¹⁹ and the June-July 1959 boycott by British businessmen of a grill in Singapore whose name had been changed from "Elizabethan Grill" to "Epicurean" and from which the portrait of the Queen had been removed.²⁰

Numerous examples can be drawn from Nazi-occupied Europe, also. Patriotic citizens of Prague, for example, refused to buy German-controlled newspapers during the week of September 14-21, 1941. The call for this boycott (planned for several weeks by a patriotic organization in the city) was broadcast by the Czechoslovak government from London. "It proved to be a tremendous success," reports Josef Korbel, who was then working with the Czech government-in-exile.²¹ From time to time during the German occupation the streetcars in Prague were boycotted to such an extent that they traveled completely empty.²² As a means of testing the discipline of the Poles during the Nazi occupation,

during certain periods the underground forbade them to read on Fridays the German newspapers printed in Polish. This order was highly effective all over Poland. (It was often enforced, however, by hostile or even violent action. Sometimes abusive signs were placed on the purchaser's back or home; or after he left the newsstand a brick might be thrown at him.)²³

Various types of consumers' boycotts have also been used in South Africa by black Africans. Objecting to a slight increase in bus fares, Africans of the township of Alexandra outside Johannesburg on January 7, 1957, launched a total boycott of the bus line, choosing instead to cycle, accept rides with sympathetic motorists, or, most usually, walk (often eighteen miles a day). Despite severe police harassment and some fourteen thousand arrests, the boycott spread elsewhere, including to Pretoria, and eventually involved sixty thousand Africans. The boycott ended after twelve weeks when the Chamber of Commerce negotiated with the Joint Boycott Committee for a working compromise pending an investigation. Full victory for the boycotters came later with the passage in Parliament of an Act which doubled the employers' levy to subsidize African transport, so that fares were kept at the previous rate.²⁴ Encouraged, the African National Congress (which had not been involved in launching the bus boycott) called for a wide economic boycott of Nationalist-controlled firms and their products.²⁵ Also, Africans carried out a three-month boycott of their staple food, potatoes, which were largely grown in the Eastern Transvaal and elsewhere by the labor of African prisoners, many of them jailed for violations of the pass laws. The market was glutted with potatoes. Efforts to break the boycott were unsuccessful, and it continued until called off by Albert Luthuli.²⁶

Other examples which indicate the widespread use of this method are numerous. Peasant serfs in tsarist Russia in 1859 sought to express in economic ways their hatred for serfdom by "starting a temperance movement so as to deprive the State of its revenues from the vodka monopoly."²⁷ The German population in the Ruhr refused during the 1923 struggle to ride on the few trains that the occupation authorities managed to get rolling despite the workers' resistance.²⁸ In 1938, as part of a jobs-for-Negroes movement led by the Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, A. Philip Randolph, and the Rev. William Lloyd Imes, Negroes in Harlem, New York City, conducted a "blackout boycott" every Tuesday night by turning off electricity and lighting candles to induce Consolidated Edison Co. to hire Negroes in jobs above the unskilled level.²⁹ In Nashville, Tennessee, shortly before Easter 1960, Negroes supporting

a student sit-in to integrate lunch counters decided not to buy new Easter clothes as a means of influencing Nashville merchants. On May 10 the lunch counters of the six downtown stores were integrated.³⁰ During the summer of 1960 about 250,000 people in the Philadelphia area carried out a "selective patronage program" against the Tasty Baking Co. of Philadelphia, in order to obtain equal job opportunities for Negroes.³¹ Faced with further boycotts, the Pepsi-Cola Company and Gulf Oil in Philadelphia then quickly capitulated and hired Negroes for positions from which they had previously been excluded.³²

Consumers' boycotts may sometimes involve the publication of "unfair," "black," "closed," "we don't patronize," and "fair" lists or the use of a union label as a means of guiding purchasing power.³³ "Selective buying campaigns" encouraging patronage of named firms with nondiscriminatory hiring practices—as distinct from listing firms *not* to be patronized—have sometimes been used as means of sidestepping laws against boycotts in some American states.³⁴

72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods

Rejection of boycotted products may be extended to the point of not using them even though they are already in one's possession, when their use would therefore not involve any further purchase. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods cannot exist without a consumer's boycott, but the latter can exist without the former. The nonconsumption method facilitates social pressure against purchase of the goods, for no one can excuse himself by saying he already had the items. Although it is rare and is largely auxiliary to a consumers' boycott, this method has been regarded as a distinctive type of action—for example during the American colonial non-cooperation struggles. Nonconsumption was then listed with the nonimportation of British products and the various other "non's" in the program. For example, one of the clauses of the Continental Association, the plan of resistance adopted by the First Continental Congress at Philadelphia in September 1774, declared:

As a non-consumption agreement, strictly adhered to, will be an effectual security for the observation of the non-importation, we, as above, solemnly agree and associate, that, from this day, we will not purchase or use any tea, imported on account of the East-India company, or any on which a duty hath been or shall be paid; and from and after the first day of March next, we will not purchase or use any East-India tea whatever; nor will we, nor shall any person for

or under us, purchase or use any of those goods, wares, or merchandise, we have agreed not to import, which we shall know, or have cause to suspect, were imported after the first day of December, . . . [except for goods imported between December 1 and February 1 and sold at the direction of the local committee, with profits going to the relief of the poor suffering from the closure of the port of Boston].³⁵

73. Policy of austerity

The voluntary giving up of luxuries as part of a nonviolent action struggle contains elements of both symbolic nonviolent protest and of economic boycott. Such austerity may have one or more consequences. It may demonstrate to the opponent and to vacillating potential resisters the depth of the actionists' feelings. Austerities may also have certain psychological influences on the people practicing them, such as increasing the intensity of their commitment to the struggle. Very frequently too—and this is the reason for classifying this method among economic boycotts—giving up the use and purchase of luxuries may have a detrimental economic effect on the opponent.

One of the most important instances of the use of this method was by American colonists. Austerities were then very closely associated with various types of economic boycotts, especially the nonimportation of British goods. One prominent form which the policy of austerity took during the struggle against the Stamp Act in 1765-66 was the extreme simplification of the mourning practices, which at the time were very elaborate and involved expensive imported English goods. Costly mourning clothes for the widow or widower were abandoned, for example, as was the practice of handing out fancy gloves and scarves to other mourners. An agreement to practice this type of austerity, along with others, was signed by fifty Boston merchants in 1764 in anticipation of the enactment of the Stamp Act. Once this austerity was in operation, expensive mourning was soon abandoned in New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York and Philadelphia. Such renunciation was estimated at the time to have saved more than ten thousand pounds sterling a year.³⁶ Imported laces and ruffles were also discarded, and expensive lamb was given up in order to make mutton more plentiful. Native substitutes for tea were encouraged, and local manufactures, including American linen, were encouraged.³⁷

The use of American products and the adoption of austerities were recommended in another nonviolent campaign several years later: the Continental Association, adopted by the First Continental Congress. The

Continental Association document included a long paragraph on a policy of austerity:

We will, in our several stations, encourage frugality, economy, and industry, and promote agriculture, arts, and the manufacturers of this country, especially that of wool; and will discountenance and discourage every species of extravagance and dissipation, especially all horse-racing, and all kinds of gaming, cock-fighting, exhibitions of shews, plays, and other expensive diversions and entertainments; and on the death of any relation or friend, none of us, or any of our families, will go into any further mourning-dress, than a black crape or ribbon on the arm or hat, for gentlemen, and a black ribbon and necklace for ladies, and we will discontinue the giving of scarves at funerals.³⁸

Such recommendations were widely applied throughout the colonies, taking such forms as abandoning public college commencements, closing at least one puppet show, discouraging public dancing and feasting, refusing to use foreign liquors and imported beers, canceling public balls and fairs, discouraging gambling and horse racing, and encouraging considerable efforts to promote American manufactures.³⁹

74. Rent withholding

The withholding of rent is a form of economic boycott practiced by persons renting land or property who feel they have a just grievance against the landlord. Individually or collectively they may withhold payment of further rent until a satisfactory agreement has been reached. This is sometimes also called "rent refusal" or "rent strike." The withholding may be for only a short period, after which the back rent is paid up in full—in which case the withholding becomes a token demonstration. If the rent refusers intend to press the issue, however, they must be willing to face eviction and prosecution. In some states of the United States rent withholding has in recent years been legalized under some conditions to enforce housing codes and so on.

Withholding rent has been widely practiced: in colonial New York, Russia, Ireland, Wales, and modern New York City. In June 1766 between four and five hundred farmers from Dutchess County, Province of New York, and others from Albany and Westchester counties, resolved to refuse to pay rent. They went further and decided also to rescue the men already imprisoned for nonpayment of rent and threatened to march

on New York City.⁴⁰ When the Tsar decreed the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, many of them were highly disappointed at the decree's failure to acknowledge that the land belonged to them, as they believed, even though they had themselves been owned by the nobility. Many of them expected that a new, more liberal decree including this point would be forthcoming, and therefore refused to comply with certain new regulations imposed on them. This refusal included nonpayment of money due to their former masters in exchange for the land which the ex-serfs still used, as well as refusal to render further services to them or to sign agreements with them.⁴¹

Refusal by Irish peasants to pay "unjust rents" was one of the main methods of resistance adopted by the National Land League, founded in Dublin in October 1879, under the leadership of Charles S. Parnell, M.P., for the purpose of achieving "a reduction of rack-rents" and "to facilitate the obtaining of the ownership of the soil by the occupiers of the soil."⁴² A leaflet of the Land League addressed "TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND" read, in part:

The Government of England has declared war against the Irish people. The organization that protected them against the ravages of landlordism has been declared "unlawfully criminal." A reign of terror has commenced. Meet the action of the English Government with a determined passive resistance. The No Rent Banner has been raised, and it remains with the people now to prove themselves dastards or men,

PAY NO RENT.
AVOID THE LAND COURT.⁴³

Speaking widely throughout Ireland, Parnell stressed the self-reliance of the Irish and the need for persistence if victory was to be won:

Depend upon it that the measure of the Land Bill of next session will be the measure of your activity and energy this winter—it will be the measure of your determination not to pay unjust rents. . . . If you refuse to pay unjust rents, if you refuse to take farms from which others have been evicted, the land question must be settled, and settled in a way that will be satisfying to you. It depends therefore, upon yourselves, and not upon any Commission or any Government.⁴⁴

In early 1965 the owners of 234 house trailers renting sites from St. Donats Holiday Estates, in Nash, Monmouthshire, Wales, refused to pay their rents in protest against a rent increase, as well as deteriorating conditions and facilities.⁴⁵

The final example of rent refusal offered here began in 1963 in Harlem, New York City, as a protest against extreme slum conditions and the failure of landlords to make repairs; the rent strike was led by Mr. Jesse Gray. On November 1 the tenants of sixteen buildings were taking part, but by mid-January 1964, five thousand families in three hundred buildings were reported to be refusing to pay their rent. Furthermore, the strike was reported to have spread to the Lower East Side, Brooklyn and the Bronx. Early that month a New York City civil court judge ordered the tenants to continue withholding rent from landlords and to pay them to the court, which would in turn release the money to landlords only for the purpose of making repairs. Mayor Robert Wagner proposed legislation which would in effect make rent strikes legal in cases of substandard conditions if the money was paid into a special fund to be used for repairs and services—for which the landlord would be charged.⁴⁶

75. Refusal to rent

In contrast to refusal to pay rent for an existing tenancy, refusal to rent involves the refusal of the prospective tenant to rent a residence or land as part of a collective action of noncooperation. In the late 1870s, for example, in pressing for an improvement in their status, Russian peasants "collectively refused to rent even the most indispensable fields when offered at ruinous prices."⁴⁷ The Irish no-rent campaign, described in the previous method, included a refusal to rent land from which others had been evicted.

76. National consumers' boycott

The national consumers' boycott involves a refusal by a major part of the consumers of a single country to buy products or use services from another country with which they are in conflict. Such a boycott may be practiced by the people of an independent country, a colony, or an otherwise subjected country seeking to regain its independence.

Motivation for such a boycott may be 1) to weaken or refuse to strengthen the opponent economically; 2) to strengthen the home economy by increased use of home-produced products; 3) to seek self-purification for past preference for foreign goods which may have contributed to the loss of economic independence and hence of political independence; 4) to symbolize revolt against political suppression or injustices; 5) to supplement a broader noncooperation movement against the foreign power, aimed at a restoration of political independence; 6) to force the oppo-

nent to right specific wrongs and to desist from such wrongs in the future; or 7) a combination of these. The general motivation is thus national—to weaken the opponent country and to strengthen one's own country in order to achieve some national goal. The national boycott may be against specific goods or services, against all the goods and services of the offending country, or against foreign products in general. Several of the methods of the economic boycott described in this chapter may be used simultaneously.

As already noted, China is often regarded as the classic home of the national consumers' boycott. The Chinese boycotts against Japan in 1908, 1915 and 1919 are examples.⁴⁸ However, the Americans were doing very well at this type of boycott in the late eighteenth century. They quite effectively used the national economic boycott (along with nonimportation, nonexportation and nonconsumption of boycotted products) on a wide scale in several campaigns—achieving thereby the repeal of the Stamp Act and the Townshend Acts taxes (except on tea). A still more comprehensive plan for national economic boycott was contained in the Continental Association, adopted by the First Continental Congress in October 1774. This included refusal by the American colonials to import from Britain, export to Britain, or use British and certain other imported products. The Continental Congress declared that this program constituted "the most speedy, effectual and peaceable measures" for righting the colonists' grievances.⁴⁹ (The various measures were to be put into effect in stages, with the nonexportation provisions not becoming operative until September 10, 1775—by which time there had been a major shift toward violent rebellion, so that the plan was not fully implemented.)

The spirit behind national consumers' boycotts may vary considerably. This is clear from the cases mentioned and also is reflected in Gandhi's thinking about such boycotts during the Indian struggles. The Indian noncooperation movement of 1920 included a call for merchants and traders to sever foreign trade relations by boycotting foreign goods and actively encouraging home industries.⁵⁰ In the 1930-31 campaign Gandhi backed an immediate and complete boycott of all foreign cloth. However, Gandhi then still regarded an extensive economic boycott of the opponent as coercive and hence not permissible under his code of non-violence. With Gandhi in prison in 1930, however, the nationalist movement turned to a wider boycott of British goods and services than Gandhi would have sanctioned at the time. This included a boycott of almost all British goods, State-owned post offices, and British-owned or -operated telegraph systems, shipping lines, streetcars, and banking and

insurance institutions.⁵¹ In January 1932, after Gandhi had returned from the second Round Table Conference, the All-India Working Committee of the Indian National Congress once more sanctioned the extension and renewal of the extensive boycott of goods and services. Its resolution stated:

Even in nonviolent war, boycott of goods manufactured by the oppressors is perfectly lawful, inasmuch as it is never the duty of the victim to promote or retain commercial relations with the oppressor. Therefore, boycott of British goods and concerns should be resumed and vigorously prosecuted.⁵²

Gandhi gradually became more sympathetic to an extensive economic boycott of the opponent and eventually favored an economic boycott of an aggressor nation.

77. International consumers' boycott

A consumers' boycott operating in several countries against the products of a particular country because of a given grievance may be called an international consumers' boycott. In contrast to the above method, not only are consumers in several countries involved, but the issue itself is normally a broader humanitarian one of international concern. It is distinguished from government embargoes, which are discussed later in this chapter. Examples of the international consumers' boycott include the boycott of Spanish goods in 1909 in protest against the execution of Francisco Ferrer,⁵³ the boycott of Hungarian goods in 1920 in protest against the Hungarian government's repression of labor,⁵⁴ and the boycotts of South African goods from 1960 on.⁵⁵

ACTION BY WORKERS AND PRODUCERS

78. Workmen's boycott

This involves a refusal by workers to work with supplies or tools "which have been manufactured under conditions objectionable to organized labor and whose continued manufacture is interpreted by such labor as constituting a menace to its welfare."⁵⁶ This type of boycott has been used against foreign products, prison-made goods and materials, goods made by new machinery regarded as a threat to jobs, goods produced by nonunion men, and inferior goods produced under bad working conditions.⁵⁷ In 1830, for example, the journeymen stone cutters of New York imposed a boycott on convict-cut stone and also made ef-

orts to get others to refuse to work stone from the state's prisons.⁵⁸ In 1885 members of the Knights of Labor on the Union Pacific Railroad, its branches, and Jay Gould's Southwestern system refused to handle or repair the rolling stock of the Wabash Railroad Co. because of that company's hostility to the Knights of Labor.⁵⁹ About 1900 the U.S. Journeymen Stone Cutters Association required its members not to finish or set machine-cut stone, which was seen as contributing to the loss of jobs for the stone cutters.⁶⁰ From 1896 to about 1910 the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners refused to install building trim manufactured in nonunion mills which employed women and children.⁶¹

79. Producers' boycott

The producers' boycott, or "selling strike,"⁶² involves a refusal by producers to sell or otherwise deliver their products. It may even involve a refusal to produce the product, so that delivery becomes impossible. This form of noncooperation may be practiced by any type of producer, from farmers to manufacturers. The reasons may vary. In one case the motive may be a desire to boost prices by reducing available goods on the market. In another it may be a means of supporting boycotted fellow producers. At other times the producers' boycott may be part of a wider noncooperation movement directed against a hostile or occupying regime.

The examples offered here range from the days of the Roman Empire to Nazi-occupied Netherlands and Japanese-occupied China. Toward the end of the second century A.D., at Ephesus in Asia Minor, the shop managers of bakeries (most of whom were also owners) held meetings which were apparently concerned with common grievances, and collectively stopped making bread. These activities were the subject of an edict of the Roman Proconsul of Asia: he forbade them to hold meetings, demanded that they obey the regulations, and ordered them "to supply the city unflinchingly with the labour essential for bread-making."⁶³

Norwegian peasants in the eleventh century refused to deliver to the king either men or provisions for his military expeditions against Denmark, Sweden and England. As a consequence, the wars were brought to a complete halt.⁶⁴ In the American colonies a few American newspapers suspended publication after November 1, 1765, when the Stamp Act went into effect, in order to avoid the legal requirement to use such tax stamps on each newspaper.⁶⁵

In 1886 in the United States the Brewers' Association attempted to counter union-initiated consumer boycotts of particular breweries by ruling that no member of the association could sell "beer, porter or ale"

to any retail customers of another brewery in the association which was involved in a boycott; the aim was thus to force retailers to buy the boycotted beer by cutting off other supplies.⁶⁶ In 1932 there was widespread refusal by farmers in the United States to sell milk and livestock until prices had improved.⁶⁷

This type of economic boycott occurred also in Nazi-occupied Europe. In the Netherlands in late April 1943, in solidarity with striking anti-Nazi urban workers Dutch farmers refused to deliver milk to dairy factories.⁶⁸ And in Poland during at least the early years of the German occupation, despite many pressures, "the peasants developed many ways of outwitting them [the Nazis], managing by shrewd devices to save food for themselves and either to turn over to the Germans the most inferior produce or to destroy what they could not salvage."⁶⁹ In occupied North China it had proved impossible for the "Border Government"—which was a kind of resistance organization—*cum*—parallel government—to prevent the sale of the 1937 cotton crop to the Japanese. Therefore, it instructed peasants to reduce cotton production by about seventy percent and to use the land so released to produce food, which the peasants did—and hence there was less cotton for the Japanese.⁷⁰

ACTION BY MIDDLEMEN

80. Suppliers' and handlers' boycott

A suppliers' and handlers' boycott involves a refusal by workers or middlemen (wholesalers, jobbers and distributors) to handle or supply certain goods. The reasons for this refusal may include: 1) objection to the use to which the goods are to be put, such as by struck firms or in wars or by antipathetic regimes; 2) objection to the intrinsic nature of the goods; and 3) objection to the conditions under which the goods have been produced (slavery, *Apartheid* or oppression, or milder conditions deemed unfair to organized labor, such as sweatshops or employment of strikebreakers).

There are many examples of this form of boycott in support of strikes. In 1912 in Italy, for instance, a boycott was called in support of a marble quarry strike. By refusing to load sand destined for the boycotted quarry the workmen in neighboring towns made it impossible to cut marble, even had the firm successfully obtained strikebreakers.⁷¹ Also, trade unions have often made efforts to convince producers and suppliers to refuse supplies to firms against which they were conducting a consumers' boycott.⁷²

K.G.J.C. Knowles regards such a refusal to handle goods as a form of the sympathetic strike,⁷³ and there are situations in which the suppliers' and handlers' boycott and the sympathetic strike merge, primarily if the former is carried out on a large scale. In the summer of 1894, for example, the American Railway Union headed by Eugene V. Debs ordered its members to refuse to work on any train to which a Pullman car was attached, thus indicating their support for the striking employees of the Pullman Palace Car Co. This soon developed into a major sympathetic strike, as nearly all trains to Chicago included Pullman cars.⁷⁴

A handlers' boycott was imposed on coal in Britain in 1925. The owners of the coal mines had given a one-month notice of the termination of the National Wages Agreement of 1924—the end of which would have cut earned wages between ten and twenty-five percent. Unionists responded with a ban on the movement of coal after July 31, when the notice went into effect, imposed by the General Council of the Trades Union Congress.⁷⁵

In 1942 on the island of Lewis, also in Britain, dockworkers belonging to the same union as the island's spinners refused to handle not only imported weaving yarn sold at prices which threatened the economic welfare of the spinners, but also the finished cloth made from this cheap yarn.⁷⁶ British dockworkers in 1920 refused to load arms destined for use against Russian revolutionaries; in 1937-38 dockers at Liverpool, Glasgow and Southampton refused to load arms to be used by Japan against China; and in 1946 New Zealand and Australian trade unionists refused to load arms for use against the Indonesians.⁷⁷ In 1943 Portuguese cinema owners refused to show German films; ultimately Goebbels concluded that Germany would have to buy its own motion picture theatres in Portugal.⁷⁸ This method has also been given atypical expression on two occasions, when American brokerage firms refused to sell bonds from Southern states involved in brutal actions against civil rights workers. After June 1964—the time of the civil rights murders in Philadelphia, Mississippi—Baxter & Co. of New York and Cleveland refused to handle bonds from Mississippi and Alabama; and in the spring of 1965—after Governor Wallace had announced that the state did not have enough money to protect civil rights marchers from Selma to Montgomery—Childs Security Corporation informed the governor that it would not deal in the state's bonds since his statement had made clear that it was a poor financial risk.⁷⁹

A very different case of handler's boycott by paper mill workers, combined with a selective strike by linotypists, was applied by Communist-controlled trade unions in Czechoslovakia in the period before the

Communist *coup*. "Several times, as the result of an article critical of the Soviet Union or the policy of the Communist Party, workers in paper mills refused to deliver paper to democratic newspapers in Prague and Bratislava or to load or unload it, and linotypists refused to set up the paper."⁸⁰ In February 1948—still in the pre-*coup* period—similar action was taken again. "In Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, printers refused to run the Democratic Party presses. In Bohemia, workers in several paper mills refused to produce paper for National Socialist and Catholic newspapers; railwaymen refused to load and unload it."⁸¹

During the 1951-53 conflict which followed Iran's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., the international oil cartel gave notice that shipping firms which allowed their tankers to transport oil from Iran's newly-nationalized oil company would receive no more shipping business from companies affiliated with the cartel. As a consequence, no more than forty tankers dared to transport Iranian oil overseas during the whole period of Mossadegh's government (April 1951-August 1953).⁸²

ACTION BY OWNERS AND MANAGEMENT

81. Traders' boycott

The traders' boycott involves a refusal by retailers to buy or sell certain goods. Just as producers and suppliers may refuse to sell their products to particular firms in furtherance of their economic interests, so retailers may elect to make their purchases from particular producers and wholesalers for similar reasons.⁸³ Political motives or national grievances may also furnish reasons for such actions.

The traders' boycott may in addition involve a refusal to sell certain products even though they may already be in his possession. Such refusal may be carried out, for example, in support of widespread consumers' boycotts of foreign goods during wider national struggles. In 1930, in addition to canceling foreign orders, Indian cloth merchants sometimes refused to sell foreign cloth already on their shelves because of the extensive consumers' boycott of such cloth during the campaign for independence.⁸⁴ During the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in 1919, Chinese merchants also refused to buy or sell Japanese goods, even when they had them in stock.⁸⁵

The American colonists' Continental Association of 1774 pledged that from December 1 of that year traders would "... wholly discontinue the slave trade, and will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will we hire our vessels, nor sell our commodities or manufactures to those who are concerned in it."⁸⁶

82. Refusal to let or sell property

Owners of houses or other buildings or property may refuse to offer them for rent or sale to certain persons or groups for a variety of reasons. This method, which has been widely applied in the United States against Negroes and other groups, was also widely used in nineteenth century China against Christian missionaries—for Westerners were regarded as "barbarians" and "foreign devils." A missionary reported that in August 1868 efforts to rent some thirty different houses in Yang-chou, Kiangsu province, had failed before one was found which the owner would rent to the missionary; the house was later attacked by a mob.⁸⁷

83. Lockout

In a lockout the employer—not the workers—initiates the work stoppage when he temporarily closes down the operation of a particular firm or other economic unit as a means of forcing employees into line.⁸⁸ The shutting down of operations of this type is clearly within nonviolent action. However, the use of public or private armed police or troops in behalf of the management would introduce violence into the lockout, just as violence by workers or employers would bring violence into strike situations. In strikes, of course, it is the workers who bring the operations to a halt by withdrawal of their labor, as described in detail in the next chapter. In a particular industrial conflict it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the stoppage began as a strike or a lockout.

A lockout may be applied by a single firm. It has also been applied simultaneously by a large number of employers in an area or industry, using a kind of sympathetic lockout in an effort to deal with workers. For example, in England in the 1860s employers' associations instituted a general lockout of *all* men in a particular industry in order to bring under control dissident employees in one or two firms. This was particularly widespread in 1865 when Staffordshire ironworkers and shipbuilding operatives on the Clyde in Scotland were locked out.⁸⁹

The lockout is usually applied in industry but not always. In England when farm laborers attempted to form unions in 1833-34 the employers' response was frequently a lockout, such as one near the village of Chipping Norton in Oxfordshire. Similarly, in 1874, when the agricultural unions sought payment of thirteen to fourteen shillings for a fifty-four-hour week, there was an immediate widespread lockout in the Eastern and Midland counties, with over ten thousand union members put out of work.⁹⁰ These examples make clear that a lockout occurs when the employer suspends his activities as employer, not simply when certain doors are physically locked against the employees.

Lockouts were used in the United States against the Knights of Labor, especially in 1886. In New York State in that year fifteen thousand laundry workers were put out of work by lockouts in Troy, and twenty thousand knitters at Cohoes and Amsterdam, while in Chicago twenty thousand packinghouse workers were locked out.⁹¹ In Russia, as the tide of the 1905 Revolution ebbed, industrialists formed organizations to resist trade union advance by means of common action which included lockouts.⁹²

84. Refusal of industrial assistance

Economic or political opposition may under special circumstances be expressed by the refusal to provide desired economic and technical assistance and advice. For example, in 1936, in an effort to counter the demand by steel industrialists for a significant price rise, Göring sought to establish a new government steel plant, the Hermann-Göring-Works. The majority of steel producers in Germany, however, tried to defeat Göring's new project by proposing that "none of the private steel firms should lend any assistance" to the new government steel plant. (Krupp and Röchling, however, fully cooperated with the Göring-Works).⁹³

85. Merchants' "general strike"

Whereas a general strike involves a withdrawal of labor by workers, a paralysis of the economy of a city or region may also be caused by the simultaneous closing of stores and businesses by the merchants. Such action would not only affect small shops and stores run by a single person or family, but would also close larger businesses without the initiative of the employees. For example, in 1742 a general strike of merchants (*pa-shih*) took place in several districts of northern Kiangsu, China, in disapproval of the way the local official had conducted relief work following a flood.⁹⁴ When a merchants' "general strike" is combined with a general strike of workers, the result is an "economic shut-down," which is described in the following chapter on strikes.

ACTION BY HOLDERS OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES

86. Withdrawal of bank deposits

Money deposited in private or government banks or government savings systems may be withdrawn either as an expression of protest against the government or as a means of noncooperation intended to help overthrow an unsteady government. For example, the withdrawal of

bank deposits was called for at least twice during the 1905 Revolution in Russia—first by the All-Russian Peasant Union at its founding conference in midsummer 1905, in case the government should seek to repress the Union,⁹⁵ and second, by the St. Petersburg Soviet on December 2, 1905. This was designed to weaken foreign confidence in the Russian economy and government and thus prevent the government from obtaining a foreign loan to be used to combat the revolution. To the embarrassment of the government, there were extensive withdrawals of funds from banks in the following weeks, apparently as a result of the call.⁹⁶

In a very different context, in December 1966 a moderately successful appeal was made to depositors of the First National City Bank and the Chase Manhattan Bank, urging them to withdraw their deposits from those banks and to place them elsewhere, because of the banks' financial involvement in the South African economy.⁹⁷

87. Refusal to pay fees, dues and assessments

Individuals, groups, or governments may on occasion deliberately refuse to pay fees, dues, or assessments to a private organization, public institution, government, or international body. Norwegian teachers in 1942 refused to make voluntary payments to a new fascist-controlled teachers' organization.⁹⁸ Japanese students in 1947 used the refusal to pay university fees as a means of demonstration.⁹⁹ Probably the best-known example is the refusal of Soviet bloc countries, France, Belgium and Portugal to pay their share of the costs of the United Nations forces in the Congo, on the ground that *ad hoc* expenses of that special operation could not legally be regarded as "expenses of the organization" under the terms of the Charter, payment of which was obligatory for members.¹⁰⁰

88. Refusal to pay debts or interest

Nonpayment of debts (or, rarely, refusal to pay only the interest due) has also been used as a method of economic boycott. This primarily occurs when the debts are owed to an opponent or to persons or firms in a country whose government is the opponent. Sometimes an attempt has been made to apply this method to government debts; people have been urged not to pay taxes for government debts, or foreign creditors have been warned that if they loan money to a tottering regime, the debt will not be honored when the government falls. This was attempted in the Financial Manifesto of the St. Petersburg Soviet in December 1905¹⁰¹ and in the Vyborg Manifesto, signed by about two-

thirds of the members of the *Duma* after the Tsar and dissolved it on July 21, 1906:

Therefore, now that the Government has dissolved the *Duma*, you [the people] are justified in giving neither money nor soldiers. If the Government contracts loans to procure funds, these loans are invalid without the consent of the people's representatives. The Russian people will never recognise them and will not feel itself called upon to repay them.¹⁰²

Nonpayment of debts has been most demonstrably effective, however, where it was applied to private debts to private persons or firms in the course of a political struggle with a government, that is, in the American colonists' struggles against British rule from London. This method was used especially in 1765 and 1766, in the struggle against the Stamp Act. Most of the trade between Britain and British North America was on credit, with the latter a heavy borrower. Clearly, stopping trade would have had severe economic repercussions in England; but stopping payment of debts resulted in a more severe and a more rapid economic squeeze. Payment of debts was halted well before the Act went into effect, for by August 1765 a Bristol merchant already reported: "We have no Remittances, and are at our Witts End for Want of Money to fulfill our Engagement with our Tradesmen."¹⁰³

One of the reasons that English merchants were later unable to use the courts to collect debts, as usual, was that frequently the courts themselves closed rather than use the tax stamps on legal documents or operate without them in defiance of the law. Sometimes the decision to close the courts had been taken to prevent their being used to collect debts to English merchants. George Washington clearly suggested this tactic on September 20, 1765, several weeks before the Stamp Act went into effect:

Our Courts of Judicature must inevitably be shut up; for it is impossible . . . under our present Circumstances that the Act of Parliament can be complied with . . . and if a stop be put to our judicial proceedings I fancy the Merchants of G. Britain trading to the Colonies will not be among the last to wish for a Repeal of it.¹⁰⁴

Horace Walpole later described the situation which resulted:

But the weapon with which the Colonies armed themselves to most advantage, was the refusal of paying the debts they owed to our merchants at home, for goods and wares exported to the American provinces. These debts involved the merchants of London, Liverpool, Man-

chester, and other great trading towns, in a common cause with the Americans, who forswore all traffic with us, unless the obnoxious Stamp Act was repealed.¹⁰⁵

Gipson reports that the debts amounted to some four million pounds sterling and that these "were now wielded as a club with telling force."¹⁰⁶ In the summer of 1774, prior to the First Continental Congress, there was discussion in the newspapers of New York and Philadelphia as whether once again to use this method in the then current conflict.¹⁰⁷ Some local bodies had already begun to refuse to pay debts or to allow use of the courts for collecting them. For example, on May 25 of that year, following the British closure of the port of Boston, a meeting of inhabitants of Annapolis resolved that, in addition to a nonimportation and non-exportation agreement, no suit in law be brought "for the recovery of any debt due from any inhabitant of this province to any inhabitant of Great-Britain, until the said act be repealed."¹⁰⁸ One of the resolves passed by Westmoreland County, Virginia, under the leadership of men like Richard Henry Lee, the county's representative in the House of Burgesses, was that for the duration of the planned nonexportation agreement, the lawyers of the county should not "bring any writ for the Recovery of Debt, or push to a Conclusion any such Suit already brought."¹⁰⁹

An instance of refusal to pay interest on loans, while continuing to repay the principle of the loan, took place in Germany shortly before the Nazi rise to power, when the "Nazified leaders" of middle-class organizations organized not only campaigns against the foreclosure of farms, but also collective refusal by the farmers to pay interest on their bank loans.¹¹⁰

89. Severance of funds and credit

Economic pressures can also be exerted by cutting off the opponent's sources of money, such as salaries, appropriations, loans and investments. This may be done by individuals, firms, or governments. In certain American colonies, the assemblies withheld appropriations for the salaries of governors and judges as a means of keeping them from acting too much out of line with the assemblies' political wishes.¹¹¹

Segregationist whites in the southern United States have cut off bank credit as well as other types of credit to individual Negroes who have been active in abolishing segregation.¹¹² Also, when school officials in Prince Edward County, Virginia, were ordered in May 1955 to integrate the school system, in which fifty-three percent of the pupils were Negro, the officials immediately and unanimously cut off all funds

for the operation of public schools in that county. Without public schools, there could be no integration in public schools.¹¹³ When the Virginia legislature met in August 1956 to consider thirteen antiintegration bills, House Bill No. 1 proposed by Governor Thomas Stanley was to cut off state school funds from any school district which integrated. State money amounted to forty-two percent of operating costs. The bill passed both houses, though only narrowly in the Senate.¹¹⁴ Later, Prince Edward County officials resumed appropriation of funds to operate the schools, but not on the usual annual basis. Instead, appropriations were made on a monthly basis, "with a publicly declared intention of discontinuing that appropriation if schools in the county are mixed racially at this time," reported Federal Judge Sterling Hutcheson in a decision on January 23, 1957.¹¹⁵ Opposition to the abandonment of public education developed, however, and that form of resistance was discontinued.

Federal funds and contracts have been withheld or withdrawn from various types of activities—such as welfare and education—which did not conform to established federal standards or practices, especially where there was racial discrimination. James Farmer has described "the withdrawal of financial support from any discriminatory activity" as the "most powerful weapon" available to the federal government. "If the threat of economic withdrawal were made palpable, an army of Southern bigots would alter their ways."¹¹⁶ There have also been various calls for the withdrawal of foreign investments from South Africa as a means of abolishing *Apartheid*.¹¹⁷

90. Revenue refusal

This method involves a refusal by the resisters to provide the government with revenue voluntarily. Since such revenue is owed to a government, or an agency of it, and is required by statute or regulation, this method may also be classed as political noncooperation. Where this action is more than symbolic its most important characteristic usually is the withholding of financial resources from the government; where the political disobedience element is dominant, however, this method would fall primarily within political noncooperation. But it is both economic and political in form.

This method involves the refusal to pay various types of taxes—including income taxes, property taxes (rates), sales or purchase taxes—or the refusal to purchase certain required licenses (dog, car, radio, television, and the like) either as a protest against a particular injustice directly related to the license in question or as a symbol of a wider protest against the government. Revenue refusal might also involve the boycott

of goods on whose sale there is a sales or purchase tax. Where land or property rent is paid to the government, these may also be refused. A related way of denying funds to the government (though not technically revenue) is to refuse to purchase government loans and bonds, national savings accounts, and so on, and the withdrawal of such existing loans and deposits.

In advanced stages of a struggle, the resister may sell taxed items but refuse to collect or pay the tax. Whereas the refusal to purchase loans or to use national savings accounts as a means of providing revenue to the government is usually legal, the refusal to pay taxes or rents to the government is illegal—this is a direct refusal of supplies to the government. The refusal of revenue is usually regarded as a very strong expression of disapproval of the government. Where it is undertaken in large numbers it may become a severe threat to the existence of the government, either because of the threat to the State's treasury or because of the extent and depth of the population's refusal to submit to the regime, as indicated by the extremity of their resistance. Collective refusal of taxes is probably an ancient method, as reports from Egypt are frequent as early as the second century, for example.¹¹⁸

Norwegian peasants rebelled against greatly increased taxes demanded by the Danish King Christian II to support his war against Sweden from 1515. The peasants refused to pay taxes and killed tax collectors; in turn, they were severely repressed.¹¹⁹ Widespread peasant tax refusal, especially along the Norwegian coast around the 1630s, led to both repression and tax reform.¹²⁰ Another major tax rebellion occurred in Norway in 1764 and 1765 in protest against high taxes, presumed corruption of the tax collectors, and such practices as government seizure for tax payments of the farmers' and fishermen's indispensable tools. In Romsdal "the peasants absolutely refused to pay and drove the tax-collectors away. In 1764 there was unrest along the whole coast, and everywhere less and less of the tax went in," although the 1762 and 1763 taxes had been fully paid. There was a massive demonstration in Bergen and intimidation of officials. Even in the period after repression less than half the assessed taxes were collected in most places.¹²¹

Refusal to pay certain taxes by boycotting the taxed goods, especially during the Stamp Act struggle, was one of the methods of resistance used prior to the American War of Independence, as has been mentioned repeatedly in examples of other methods. During the French Revolution of 1789 refusal to pay taxes and feudal dues was very widespread.¹²² When the Third Estate, joined by some clergy, constituted itself as the National Assembly on June 17, 1789, it attempted to protect itself from

counterattack by the King by authorizing refusal to pay taxes; only future taxes approved by the National Assembly were legal, and existing taxes were payable only while it continued in session.¹²³ By the end of 1789 "everyone refused to pay former taxes and fees."¹²⁴

Both Hsiao Kung-ch'uan and Chang Chung-li report in their studies of their studies of nineteenth-century Chinese society that several cases of organized tax refusal occurred in China around 1860.¹²⁵ In Hungary in 1861 there was massive resistance to the collection of taxes under Austrian laws, the tax collectors being politely told that they were "illegal persons."¹²⁶ During the first two and a half years of the 1902 and 1914 tax refusal campaign in England that was directed against tax aid for parochial schools, 70,000 summonses were issued, and there were 254 imprisonments.¹²⁷

During the 1905 Russian Revolution payment of taxes was often refused by the populace seeking the overthrow of the tsarist regime. In Georgia, for example, neither taxes nor dues were paid.¹²⁸ On two occasions the revolutionaries officially launched refusal of taxes as a major part of a resistance program to topple the regime. The first was urged by the St. Petersburg Soviet on November 23 and December 2, 1905 (the Financial Manifesto), and was stimulated by Parvus' study of the regime's economic problems.¹²⁹ The second was the famous Vyborg Manifesto signed by about two-thirds of the members of the dissolved *Duma* on July 23, 1906. Since consent of the people's representatives gave government its right to tax and to conscript soldiers ". . . now that the Government has dissolved the *Duma*, you are justified in giving neither money nor soldiers Be firm in your refusal . . ." ¹³⁰

Tax refusal was also an important form of resistance during the Indian independence struggles, in both local and national campaigns.¹³¹ In Germany, prior to the Nazi rise to power, the pro-Nazi leaders of certain middle-class organizations used tax strikes (among other means) to oppose "unfair" competition, foreclosure of farms, and the like.¹³² Nonpayment of taxes was part of the nonviolent resistance program adopted in April 1953 by the Nyasaland African Congress to defeat the imposition of the Central African Federation despite united black African opposition.¹³³ In 1956 ten Welshmen were prosecuted for having refused to pay for their radio licenses because the British Broadcasting Corporation maintained the Welsh Service on a wavelength which was subject to serious evening interference from an East German station.¹³⁴ Africans were being arrested in Northern Rhodesia in September 1962 for refusing to pay the poll tax and for not having identity certificates,

which they had burned in 1961 as a sign of defiance against the government.¹³⁵

A case of tax refusal in 1966 has been reported from Eastern Angola, where it took place at a time when guerrilla warfare was the major means of African resistance to the Portuguese. This account, from the American peace worker James Bristol, is based on his conversations with an Angolan nationalist leader in Lusaka, Zambia:

Recently, he told me, they had been able to organize a tax refusal movement in a group of villages. Apparently, the system has called for the chiefs to collect taxes from the people and then turn the money over to the Portuguese. Twelve chiefs refused to demand the taxes from the people; they stated that there was unemployment on a large scale, and that as long as this unemployment continued and they could see no tangible benefits from the taxes they paid, they would refuse to give orders to their people to pay taxes. The 12 chiefs were arrested, and taken away by plane to another part of Angola. As they were in the plane, the Portuguese pointed out to them how powerful they, the Portuguese, were; they had weapons, they had these big planes; the Angolans had nothing. The chiefs replied that the Portuguese still could not force the people to do what they had decided not to do. They were put in jail; they were questioned; they were threatened, but still they refused to give the order for the people to pay the taxes. Finally, the Portuguese said that they would release them and take them back to their villages, on condition that the chiefs engage in no further subversive action. The chiefs replied that they *would continue to oppose* the payment of unjust taxes and other injustices imposed by the Portuguese. But after a time the Portuguese released them anyhow, and returned them to their villages. [The Angolan leader] . . . said that the Portuguese know how to handle the guerrillas, but not how to deal with this sort of united resistance by the villagers themselves.¹³⁶

Refusal of revenue can also take the form of refusing to pay fines and court costs. For example, in Americus, Georgia, in the fall of 1963, the local Sumter County civil rights movement announced: "Don't forget that our fines and court costs every morning are helping to pay for new police cars and extra policemen who are just here to intimidate Negroes." In consequence, for weeks the income from payment of fines, court costs, and bail bonds averaged only five hundred dollars weekly instead of the normal two to three thousand dollars.¹³⁷

91. Refusal of a government's money

This method is the refusal, as a political act, to accept a government's printed money, either completely or in all but minor transactions. In other situations the motives could be partly economic (in case of high inflation). Alternatives to the printed money might be gold, silver, barter, and the like. This method appears to have been deliberately used with the intent of undermining a regime only rarely. The Financial Manifesto of the St. Petersburg Soviet, referred to in the discussion of the preceding method, not only asked that gold be demanded when deposits were withdrawn from banks, but also urged people to demand gold in payment for wages and in all major financial transactions.¹³⁸

ACTION BY GOVERNMENTS

92. Domestic embargo

A domestic embargo may be briefly defined as an economic boycott initiated by the government to operate within its own country. This method of noncooperation was applied, for example, in Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1935 as part of the Nazi cartel program. In July 1933 two cartel laws were issued, one of which authorized the State to form compulsory cartels and to regulate investments, while the other authorized the Minister of Economics to supervise cartel prices and to deal with firms which were not cartel members. One way this supervision operated was to limit the firms allowed to trade in coal, both as wholesalers and retailers. No firm not a cartel member could expect delivery of coal. Dealers not on the approved list because they were deemed unsuitable or unnecessary were driven out of business, both by a boycott (apparently a consumers' boycott) and by the delivery embargoes imposed by the cartel court in accordance with the above laws, or, after a decree from the Minister of Economics, simply by the court's chairman. As a result of these and other government measures, approximately 2,000 of 54,000 coal dealers were put out of business in two years. Similar action occurred in the radio industry; in one year during this time the number of radio retailers was reduced from 60,000 to 37,000, and of radio wholesalers, from 1,500 to 750.¹³⁹

93. Blacklisting of traders¹⁴⁰

During wartime or during a policy of embargo, one government may seek to block indirect transfer of embargoed good through firms or indi-

viduals in a neutral country by prohibiting trade with them as well as with the enemy country itself. A blacklist of such traders is normally published, and transactions with them prohibited. At times, however, the blacklist remains unpublished, becoming a "graylist" which may cause a listed firm to "lose time waiting for a deal to go through before it realizes that it has been listed and seeks other arrangements," as Professor Thomas C. Schelling has written. These were standard United States practices during World War II.

94. International sellers' embargo

An international sellers' embargo is a refusal by government decision to sell certain or all products to another country. The action may be taken by one or several governments; it is normally national and the effect international. The motives may vary from objections to the existence of the regime itself (arising from its political orientation or from the means it used to come to power or to maintain itself) to objections to a particular policy or action of the country. In some cases, however, the international seller's embargo may be an attempt to halt or prevent a war or, under the guise of that objective, to assist one side by preventing sales of arms to the weaker side.

When the British King on October 17, 1807, proclaimed the right of impressment of neutral merchant vessels, measures stronger than the recent ban on importation of various articles of British manufacture were deemed to be necessary in the United States. In accordance with "Jefferson's doctrine, that foreign nations could be coerced by peaceable means into respect for neutral rights . . .," the President obtained from Congress the permanent Embargo Act, which was intended to coerce Europe by stopping supplies to West Indian colonies and by halting the export of cotton and corn to Europe. This was to be done by placing an embargo on all shipping owned by United States citizens to prevent them from transporting such supplies for sale. Jefferson was successful in getting the country to adopt "the experiment in peaceable coercion." (Various Republicans had argued that a standing army would be dangerous to popular liberties.) "In the scheme of President Jefferson's statesmanship, non-intercourse was the substitute for war—the weapon of defense and coercion which saved the cost and danger of supporting an army or navy and spared America the brutalities of the Old World." The embargo encountered widespread economic problems, and evasion and violation by Americans; the army and navy had to be used to enforce it at home. Jefferson and his policy became highly unpopular, and after the election of

Madison as President the embargo laws were repealed¹⁴¹ but replaced with a similar nonintercourse policy.

The embargo on arms during the Chaco War of 1933-36 between Bolivia and Paraguay is another example of this method.¹⁴² Attempts to apply economic sanctions against Italy during its attack on Ethiopia in 1935-36 constitute a further example.¹⁴³ In 1950 the United States government imposed an embargo on Communist China, prohibiting ships registered in the United States from calling at Chinese ports and banning United States exports to Communist China.¹⁴⁴ This remained in force without major relaxation for about twenty years.

95. International buyers' embargo

The international buyer's embargo involves the prohibition of general or particular purchases from a specific country. Again, the motives vary: the intent may be to produce a change in a particular policy, to force a broader modification in the regime, or to contribute to the downfall of the regime. Examples of an international buyer's embargo include the Non-Importation Act of April 18, 1806 (before the Embargo Act), which prohibited the import of various articles of British manufacture and made their possession illegal. As the historian Henry Adams put it:

The measure was in its nature coercive. The debates in Congress showed that no other object than that of coercion was in the mind of the American government; the history of the Republican Party and the consistent language of Jefferson, Madison, and the Virginian school proclaimed that the policy was their substitute for war. England was to be punished, by an annual fine of several million dollars, for interference with American trade to the continent of Europe.¹⁴⁵

Stronger measures were required, however, before this Act could really take effect, and the Embargo Act was pushed through Congress. It was repealed on March 1, 1809, by the Non-Intercourse Act, which also contained provisions to exclude all British and French vessels from United States waters and forbade the import of British and French goods.¹⁴⁶

96. International trade embargo

An international trade embargo is a combination of the international seller's embargo and the international buyer's embargo. It involves a total prohibition of trade with the opponent country, or a near-total ban, exempting perhaps medicines and the like. For example, after the news of the armed engagements at Lexington and Concord, the British govern-

ment passed the Prohibitory Bill, which barred all trade and commerce with the rebellious colonies, under the threat of the seizure of all ships and cargoes.¹⁴⁷ (Where this ban was effective because of voluntary acceptance or possible economic sanctions against British violators, it falls within this technique; however, the use of naval power to enforce the ban combines the economic sanction with military action.)

International economic sanctions have been seen by various American political leaders as alternatives to military action. Sometimes their recommendations have clearly referred to a complete cessation of all trade: at other times the extent and types of the embargoes recommended have been left more flexible. Halt to international trade of all types by government initiative was seen by Thomas Jefferson as an alternative to war sometime before the particular measures cited under the two methods above. As early as March 1793, in a letter to James Madison, Jefferson contemplated what action should be taken if the naval powers blockaded France, at the time of the French Revolution, stopping imports of supplies and provisions. Jefferson wrote:

Should this be formally notified I should suppose Congress would be called, because it is a justifiable cause of war, & as the Executive cannot decide the question of war on the affirmative side, neither ought it to do so on the negative side, by preventing the competent body from deliberating on the question. But I should hope that war would not be their choice. I think it will furnish us a happy opportunity of setting another precious example to the world, by showing that nations may be brought to do justice by appeals to their interests as well as by appeals to arms. I should hope that Congress instead of a denunciation of war, would instantly exclude from our ports all the manufactures, produce, vessels & subjects of the nations committing this aggression, during the continuance of the aggression & till full satisfaction made for it. This would work well in many ways, safely in all, & introduces between nations another umpire than arms. It would relieve us too from the risks & horrors of cutting throats.¹⁴⁹

Referring to the means of enforcing the antiwar provisions of the League of Nations Covenant, President Woodrow Wilson said in the autumn of 1919:

If any member of the League breaks or ignores these promises with regard to arbitration and discussion, what happens? War? No, not war but something . . . more tremendous than war . . .

Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force . . .

The boycott is what is substituted for war.¹⁴⁹

In 1932 John Foster Dulles, who later became Secretary of State, wrote:

The great advantage of economic sanctions is that on the one hand they can be very potent, while on the other hand, they do not involve that resort to force which is repugnant to our objective of peace.

If any machinery can be set up to ensure that nations comply with their covenant to renounce war, such machinery must be sought primarily in the economic sphere.¹⁵⁰

On February 3, 1962, the United States government applied an international trade embargo against Cuba. Under the Department of State declaration of October 1960, American exports to Cuba had already been prohibited. The Presidential proclamation of February 3, 1962, however, extended its scope by placing an embargo on *all* trade with Cuba.¹⁵¹

International embargoes of all three types have not produced many notable successes. Peter Wallenstein points to the small proportion of successes they had between 1933 and 1967.¹⁵² How much of this lack of success is a result of intrinsic limitations of these methods and how much is a consequence of insufficient care in their application and an unwillingness to apply them seriously remain to be investigated.¹⁵³

Wallenstein cites two successful cases during this period. British economic sanctions against the Soviet Union in 1933 ended with a negotiated agreement between the governments, removal of the sanctions, and release of arrested British subjects.¹⁵⁴ The other case involved the Dominican Republic in 1960-62, with economic action being imposed by the United States and the Organization of American States in condemnation of Dominican participation in an attempt to assassinate President Betancourt of Venezuela. The real objective, however, was condemnation of the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic itself. In May 1961 Trujillo was assassinated, but apparently this was unconnected with the economic sanctions, which were continued for six more months, until all members of the Trujillo family had left the country to ensure a real change in the regime.¹⁵⁵

A very large number of the methods of economic noncooperation involve the withdrawal of labor, and we now turn to the various methods of the strike.

NOTES

1. This definition is adapted from those offered by Harry Laidler, "Boycott," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1935, vol. II, pp. 662-66; Laidler, *Boycotts and the Labor Struggle, Economic and Legal Aspects* (New York: John Lane Co., 1913), pp. 27 and 55; Leo Wolman, *The Boycott in American Trade Unions*, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series XXXIV, No. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1916), pp. 11-12; and Clarence Marsh Case, *Non-violent Coercion: A Study in Methods of Social Pressure* (New York: Century Co., 1923), pp. 320-24.
2. See Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, p. 305.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 314-15; Wolman, *The Boycott in American Trade Unions*, p. 41.
4. Wolman, *The Boycott in American Trade Unions*, p. 24; see also Laidler, "Boycott," pp. 663-664; and Philip Taft, *The A.F. of L. in the Time of Gompers* (New York, Harper and Bros., 1957) pp. 264-266.
5. John King Fairbank, *The United States and China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958) pp. 167-168. I am grateful to Carl Horne for this reference.
6. Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, p. 316.
7. Wolman, *The Boycott . . .*, p. 14; see also Reynolds, *Labor Economics and Labor Relations*, p. 134.
8. Laidler, "Boycott," p. 665.
9. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, p. 82.
10. Gipson, *The Coming of the Revolution, 1763-1775*, p. 204.
11. L. L. Bernard, *Social Control in Its Sociological Aspects* (New York, Macmillan Co., 1939), p. 386.
12. Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, pp. 332-340; Taft, *The A. F. of L. in the Time of Gompers*, pp. 268-271; and Wolman, *The Boycott . . .*, pp. 80-82.
13. Wolman, *The Boycott . . .*, p. 28.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Bernard, *Social Control . . .*, pp. 393-395.
17. *The Times* (London), 31 January 1957.
18. Martin Luther King, Jr., *Stride Towards Freedom*. The boycott is reported to have cost the bus company between \$3,000 and \$3,500 a day, in addition to major financial losses to the white-owned businesses in the center of Montgomery. (William Peters, *The Southern Temper*, [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1959], p. 232.)
19. *Observer*, (London) 23 August 1959.
20. *The Times*, 6 July 1959.
21. Josef Korbel, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1948: The*

- Failure of Coexistence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 57. Also a personal letter dated 22 December 1966.
22. Josef Korbel, personal letter dated 22 December 1966.
 23. Karski, *The Story of a Secret State*, p. 259.
 24. Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 273-275, and Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, pp. 174-178.
 25. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 275.
 26. *Ibid.*, and Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, pp. 217-219.
 27. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 191.
 28. Sternstein, "The *Ruhrkampf* of 1923", p. 116.
 29. Arna Botemps, *100 Years of Negro Freedom*, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1962) p. 254.
 30. Louis E. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt* (New York: New American Library, Signet Book, 1963), p. 143.
 31. *Peace News*, 26 August 1960.
 32. Hannah Lees, "The Not-Buying Power of Philadelphia's Negroes," *The Reporter*, vol. 24, no. 10 (11 May 1961), pp. 33-35.
 33. Wolman, *The Boycott . . .*, pp. 33, 34 and 42; and Laidler, *Boycotts and the Labor Struggle*, pp. 60-63.
 34. Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in*, p. 239.
 35. Text quoted from Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 609.
 36. Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis*, p. 50. See also Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 77.
 37. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 73-74, 76-77.
 38. *Ibid.*, p. 610.
 39. *Ibid.*, pp. 483, 486, 492, 500-503, 508-509, 518-519, and 528.
 40. Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. XI, *The Triumphant Empire: The Rumbling of the Coming Storm, 1766-1770*, p. 49.
 41. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 101.
 42. G. Locker-Lampson, *A Consideration of the State of Ireland in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1907, and London: Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., 1907), p. 372.
 43. H. O. Arnold Forster, *The Truth About the Land League, Leaders and its Teaching* (pamphlet - London: National Press Agency, Ltd., published for the Property Defence Association, 1883), p. 57.
 44. From a speech at Ennis on September 19, 1880. Quoted in Patrick Sarsfield O'Hegarty, *A History of Ireland Under the Union, 1880-1922* (with an Epilogue carrying the story down to the acceptance in 1927 by the De Valera of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921) (London: Methuen Press, 1952) p. 491.
 45. *Peace News*, 5 February 1965.
 46. Nat Hentoff, *The New Equality* (New Edition; (New York: Viking Press, 1965) pp. 201-202. See also *New York Times*, 7 January 1964.
 47. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 576.
 48. Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, pp. 330-342.
 49. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 608. These boycott campaigns are highly significant, in terms not only of early American history, but of the history of nonviolent action generally and the potentialities of economic boycotts. For details of these campaigns, see the following studies, all of which

- contain references to original sources: Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, esp. pp. 78, 97, 104-121, 157, 179, 185, 194, 215-219, 300-301, 312-315, 324, 339-340, 344, 351-353, 356-357, 360-363, 366, 369, 398-399, 402, 414-419, 427 and 608-609. Gipson, *The Coming of the American Revolution*, esp. 104, 106-107, 114-115, 187-188, 196-198, 203-205, 208-209, and 230. Gipson, *The British Empire . . .* Vol. XI esp. pp. 84, 143, 145, 181-190, 242, 254, and 256n. *Ibid.*, vol. XII, *The Triumphant Empire, Britain Sails Into the Storm, 1770-1776*, esp., pp. 152-153, 207, 217, 251, and 254.
50. Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, p. 383.
 51. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power*, pp. 125-127.
 52. Pattabhi Sitamarayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1935*, vol. I, p. 870.
 53. Laidler, "Boycott," p. 666.
 54. *Ibid.*
 55. See William A. Hance, "Efforts to Alter the Future Economic Action" for a good discussion of international economic boycott and other economic sanctions in relation to South Africa, in Amelia C. Leiss, editor, *Apartheid and United Nations Collective Measures*, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965) pp. 95-130.
 56. Wolman, *The Boycott . . .*, p. 43.
 57. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-49.
 58. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
 59. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
 60. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
 61. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-52.
 62. Bernard, *Social Control . . .*, p. 385.
 63. W. H. Buckler, "Labour Disputes in the Province of Asia Minor", in W. H. Buckler and W. M. Calder, eds., *Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir William Mitchell Ramsay* (Manchester, England: The University Press, 1923), p. 31. See also, Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, vol. II, p. 621, no. 45.
 63. Andreas Holmsen, *Norges Historie Fra de Eldste Tider til 1660*, (Third Edition; Oslo and Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1964), p. 179. Professor Holmsen has written to me about this case: "What is maintained on p. 179 in my book about the farmers' opposition against Harald Hardråde's frequent raids against Denmark around 1050, is only a reasonable conclusion based on the fact that gradually the raids had to be abandoned. There are no sources specifically saying that this was caused by the farmers' opposition."
 64. Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis*, p. 241.
 66. Wolman, *The Boycott . . .*, p. 39.
 67. Bernard, *Social Control . . .*, p. 385.
 68. L. de Jong, "Anti-Nazi Resistance in the Netherlands," in *European Resistance Movements 1939-1945. First International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements held at Liege-Brussels-Breendonk, 14-17 September 1958*. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1960), p. 141.
 69. Karski, *The Story of a Secret State*, p. 255.
 70. Taylor, *The Struggle for North China*, pp. 114-115. I am grateful to Abraham Halperin for this reference and certain others on China.
 71. Wolman, *The Boycott . . .*, p. 42.

72. Laidler, *Boycotts and the Labor Struggle*, pp. 64-65.
73. K.G.J.C. Knowles, *Strikes - A Study in Industrial Conflict with Special Reference to British Experience Between 1911 and 1945* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954), p. 17.
74. Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, p. 315, and Wolman, *The Boycott in American Trade Unions*, p. 32, and Almont Lindsey, *The Pullman Strike: The Story of a Unique Experiment and of a Great Labor Upheaval* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1964 [orig. 1942]).
75. Symons, *The General Strike*, pp. 13-15.
76. Knowles, *Strikes*, p. 17.
77. *Ibid.*
78. Lochner, ed., *The Goebbels Diaries*, pp. 508-509.
79. James Farmer, *Freedom - When?*, p. 117.
80. Korb, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, p. 144.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
82. Bahman Nirumand, *Iran: The New Imperialism in Action* (New York and London: Modern Reader Paperback, 1969), p. 70. I am grateful to James Prior for this reference.
83. Laidler, *Boycotts and the Labor Struggle*, p. 49.
84. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 166.
85. Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, pp. 337-339.
86. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 608-609.
87. Hsiao, *Rural China*, pp. 488 and 496.
88. Fitch, "Strikes and Lockouts."
89. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *The History of Trade Unionism. Revised Edition to 1920* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), pp. 255-256.
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 332-334.
91. Joseph G. Rayback, *A History of American Labor*, (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 174.
92. Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, p. 228.
93. Arthur Schweitzer, *Big Business in the Third Reich* (Bloomington; Indiana University Press, 1964; London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964), p. 539.
94. Hsiao, *Rural China*, p. 247.
95. Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, p. 230.
96. Richard Charques, *The Twilight of Imperial Russia* (London: Phoenix House, 1958), p. 135, and Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 232.
97. "An Appeal" (leaflet), issued in New York City by the Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid and a list of sponsors.
98. Sharp, *Tyranny Could Not Quell Them*.
99. Shimbori, "Zengakuren," p. 247. Shimbori does not supply any details.
100. King Gordon, U. N. in the Congo: A Quest for Peace (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), p. 150, and Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 295 and 467.
101. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 232.
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- from 1789 to 1906 (New York, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Brothers, 1962), p. 391.
103. Gipson, *The Coming of the Revolution*, p. 106.
104. Quoted by Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. X, *The Triumphant Empire: Thunder-Clouds Gather in the West, 1763-1766*, p. 360.
105. Quoted by *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
107. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 404-405.
108. Quoted by Gipson, *The British Empire . . .*, vol. XII, p. 194.
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113. Benjamin Muse, *Virginia's Massive Resistance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), p. 13.
114. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.
115. Quoted by *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.
116. Farmer, *Freedom - When?*, p. 178.
117. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 210.
118. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, vol. I, p. 348.
119. Holmsen, *Norges Historie Fra de Eldste Tider til 1660*, pp. 386-387. See pp. 413-414 for a fairly localized case of tax refusal by Norwegian peasants in Gaudal, Trøndelag, from 1573.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 451.
121. Magnus Jensen, *Norges Historie Under Eneveldet 1660-1814* (Third Ed.; Oslo and Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1963), pp. 83-84.
122. Lefebvre, *The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793*, pp. 120, 127, 157-158 and 184, and Salvemini, *The French Revolution, 1788-1792*, pp. 120, 131, 165, 170 and 209.
123. Salvemini, *The French Revolution, 1788-1792*, p. 124.
124. Lefebvre, *The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793*, p. 134.
125. Hsiao, *Rural China*, p. 305, and Chang, *The Chinese Gentry*, p. 46.
126. Griffith, *The Resurrection of Hungary*, p. 32.
127. Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, pp. 230-231.
128. Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia*, p. 160.
129. *Ibid.*, pp. 240-241 and Charques, *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*, p. 135.
130. The full text appears in R. W. Postgate, *Revolution from 1789 to 1906*, p. 391.
131. See Desai, *The Story of Bardoli*, and S. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin 1926-1931*, pp. 19-34. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1935*, vol. I, p. 605, and Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .* pp. 106-211 *passim*.
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133. Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry Cmnd. 814 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1959), p. 11.
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144. See *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (Washington: Department of State, 1957), vol. II, p. 2595, and *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956* (Washington: Department of State, 1959), pp. 1085-1095.
145. Adams, *History of the United States During the Second Administration of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. II, pp. 165-166.
146. Adams, *The Formative Years*, vol. II, pp. 540-542.
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150. John Foster Dulles, "Practicable Sanctions," in Evans Clark, ed., *Boycotts and Peace* (New York and London: Harper & Bros., 1932), p. 21.
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152. Peter Wallensteen, "Characteristics of Economic Sanctions," *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo), 1968, no. 3, pp. 250-51.
153. The reader is referred to other literature specifically dealing with international economic sanctions, including the following: Baer, *The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War*, especially Chapter 12; Clark, ed., *Boycotts and Peace* (this report contains a bibliography); Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics*, vol. XIX, no. 3 (April 1967), pp. 378-416; Frederik Hoffmann, "The Functions of Economic Sanctions, A Comparative Analysis," in *Journal of Peace Research*, 1967, no. 2, pp. 140-60; Amy Leiss, ed., *Apartheid and the United Nations: Collective Measures* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965); Ronald Segal, ed., *Sanctions Against South Africa* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964); Rita Falk Taubenfeld and Howard J. Taubenfeld, "The 'Economic Weapon': The League and the United Nations," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1964, pp. 184-205 (this article is largely based on the cases of Italy, Cuba, Dominican Republic, China, and South Africa); Wallensteen, "Characteristics of Economic Sanctions," pp. 248-67; Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*.
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