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Introduction to Part Three
&
Chapter 9

**INTRODUCTION
TO PART THREE**

An understanding of how nonviolent action “works,” of its dynamics in struggle, and of its mechanics of change is of extreme importance. Without that insight our extensive catalogue of its methods will lack the vitality which is characteristic of social change and political conflict, and the view of power upon which this technique rests will remain an exercise for specialists in political philosophy. But with awareness of the dynamics of nonviolent action, we can understand the operation of this technique in society and politics, and evaluate intelligently its potential utility in various types of conflict situations.

The dynamics of nonviolent action is a relatively uninvestigated phenomenon. There have been important pioneers in the field—especially Richard Gregg,¹ E.T. Hiller,² and Leo Kuper,³ and a few others who will be cited later. Certain activists in the application of the technique have also made significant observations on the subject, especially M.K. Gandhi.⁴

In these final six chapters we shall draw on the insights of these theorists and activists. But primarily we shall draw on the events in several significant cases of nonviolent action to construct, largely by an inductive approach, an analysis of how this technique works. This analysis contains many hypotheses awaiting further critical examination and testing, including the use of a wider selection of case material.

Throughout the exploration of this topic, it is essential to remember that the operation of nonviolent action in struggle is always a dynamic process. It involves continuous change in the various influences and forces which operate in that process and are constantly influencing each other. No discussion in static terms of how nonviolent action works can be valid. Also, the process is very complicated; for reasons which will become clear, it is more complicated than conventional military warfare or even guerrilla warfare.

NOTES

1. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*.
2. Hiller, *The Strike*.
3. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*.
4. See, for example, M. K. Gandhi, *Non-Violence in Peace and War* (two vols.; Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House, 1948 and 1949), and *Non-Violent Resistance*; Ind. ed.: Satyagraha.

Laying the Groundwork for Nonviolent Action

INTRODUCTION

Nonviolent action is a means of wielding social and political power, even though it does not involve its practitioners in the use of violence. If nonviolent action is capable of wielding power, it must be able with its power to act upon the power wielded by the opponent. This it does by means which differ radically from those involved in political violence, i.e., violence for political purposes. Nonviolent action can be viewed as acting against the opponent's power in two ways, either *indirectly* against it, or more *directly* than violence against it. We shall now see how this is the case.

CONFRONTING THE OPPONENT'S POWER

The opponent is frequently a government; where it is not, the opponent often has the support of the State machinery. In either case, the non-

violent group may find arrayed against it the government's troops, police, prisons and the like. In nonviolent action there is no attempt to combat these by using the same types of instruments, as would be the case if both sides were using violence. Instead, in strategic terms, the nonviolent group counters this expression of the opponent's power *indirectly*, in various ways. These weaken the opponent's relative power position rather than strengthen it by, for example, alienating existing support and undermining the opponent's ability (and at times weakening his will) to continue the policy and the repression. The opponent is usually well equipped to apply military and other violent means of combat and repression, as well as to fight violent and military means of struggle. Instead of meeting him directly on that level, where he is strong, nonviolent actionists rely on a totally different technique of struggle, or "weapons systems," which is designed to operate to *their* advantage. The whole conflict then takes on a very special asymmetrical character; the combatants are fighting but they are using very different types of weapons. Given an extensive, determined, and skillful application of nonviolent action, the opponent is likely to find that nonviolent actionists' insistence on fighting with their choice of "weapons system" will cause him very special problems which will tend to frustrate the effective utilization of his own forces.

A close consideration of the strategic problems of military conflict shows that frontal resistance or attack may not necessarily be the wisest course of action—precisely because this is where the enemy has concentrated his strength. Napoleon wrote, for example:

It is an approved maxim in war, never to do what the enemy wishes you to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it. A field of battle, therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitered, should be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to fortify and entrench. One consequence deductible from this principle is, never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning.¹

This approach to strategy has been developed by the late Sir Basil Liddell Hart, who argued:

. . . throughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent's unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological. In strategy the longest way round is often the shortest way home. . . .

To move along the line of natural expectation consolidates the opponent's balance and thus increases his resisting power. . . . In most

campaigns the dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance has been the vital prelude to a successful attempt at his overthrow.²

This indirect approach to conventional military strategy has been carried to a more extreme development in modern guerrilla warfare.

Nonviolent struggle carries indirect strategy still further, to the point where the military opponent is confronted not only with differing strategies but with a contrasting technique of struggle and a nonmilitary "weapons system." Nonviolent action involves opposing the opponent's power, including his police and military capacity, not with the weapons chosen by him, but by quite different means. (The possibility of both sides instead using nonviolent action is discussed briefly in Chapter Eleven.) The result of using nonviolent weapons against violent action may be a significant increase in the actionists' total combat effectiveness. In this special type of asymmetrical conflict, the opponent's violent action is always confronted indirectly, i.e., not by the same type of action in direct confrontation but by nonviolent resistance and intervention. This can be viewed as an extreme development of indirect strategy as discussed above. Repression by the opponent is used against his own power position in a kind of political *jiu-jitsu*, and the very sources of his power (analyzed in Chapter One) thus reduced or removed, with the result that his political and military position is seriously weakened or destroyed. The opponent's balance is thereby dislocated, his resistance power undermined, and in extreme cases his ability to continue the struggle eliminated.

There is also a sense in which nonviolent action impinges upon an opponent's power *more directly* than would violence. In varying degrees, depending upon a number of factors, nonviolent action is capable of striking at the availability of the sources of political power of the ruler: authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources, and even sanctions themselves. The ruler's power, as discussed earlier, is dependent upon these sources. Through various processes which take place in a large-scale nonviolent struggle, the supply of those sources may be threatened, curtailed, or cut off. The degree to which the sources of power are restricted in individual cases varies considerably, of course. This potential of the nonviolent technique is illustrated most clearly perhaps in strikes and mutinies. For example, nonviolent actionists may try to destroy the opponent's army as an effective force of repression by inducing deliberate inefficiency and open mutiny among the soldiers, without whom there can be no army. In contrast, military actionists would usually fight that army intact and attempt to defeat it by destroying its weapons and killing its soldiers. Such attacks on them would usually reinforce, not disrupt or destroy, their obedience patterns.

Therefore, in the sense that nonviolent action cuts off the *sources* of the opponent's power, rather than simply combatting the final power product of those sources, nonviolent action is a more direct attack on an opponent's power than is violence.

RISKS AND VARIATIONS IN NONVIOLENT ACTION

As a substitute for violence in political conflicts, nonviolent action also involves risks. The first risk is possible defeat. This technique is not foolproof. The simple choice of nonviolent action does not guarantee success, especially on a short-term basis. This should not be surprising, since this technique too involves the matching of forces and must be ably and skillfully used if it is to produce success. No technique of struggle can guarantee success every time; after all, in cases in which both sides use violence, one of them usually loses.

Nonviolent action is not a safe means of struggle; there is no such thing. People are liable to be hurt and to suffer in various ways, including economic loss, physical injury, imprisonment, and even death; this is the second risk. There are, of course, risks in passivity—especially in letting an oppressive regime go unchallenged—and in any type of alternative violent action which might be taken. It is claimed, however, that the injuries, deaths, suffering and destruction are significantly less—even on the resisters' side alone—when one side relies on nonviolent action than when both sides use violence.³

A third risk is that political violence may break out during the use of nonviolent action. Gandhi recognized this risk and took measures to prevent the outbreak of violence, and to isolate and eliminate such violence if it occurred. This risk did not in his opinion mean that the nonviolent campaign should not be launched. His view was that the outbreak of political violence (with its consequent detrimental effects on all concerned) was far more likely if he did nothing in a tense conflict situation than it was if people were offered a nonviolent substitute course of action. Gandhi wrote in 1920:

... the risk of supineness in the face of a grave issue is infinitely greater than the danger of violence ensuing from organizing non-cooperation. To do nothing is to invite violence for a certainty.

... the only way to avoid violence is to enable them to give such expression to their feelings as to compel redress. I have found nothing save non-cooperation.⁴

He felt that with greater experience and with the accumulation of visible successes in nonviolent struggle, the chances that people would turn to violence in such a situation would be considerably reduced.

No two cases of nonviolent action are alike, and they may indeed differ radically from each other, as the illustrations in Chapter Two and the examples of various methods in Part Two illustrate. There are other important variations which need to be kept in mind. The campaign may have been deliberately planned and prepared for, or it may have broken out spontaneously or "semi-spontaneously." There may be a clear leadership group, or not. The movement may start spontaneously and without leadership and end up organized and with leaders; or the process may be exactly the opposite. There may be general preparations which arouse the will to resist and give general ideas of how to do so, but the specific movement may start accidentally. Or the preparations may be for a very limited action, with people not knowing what to do in other situations. The range of methods applied may differ widely, as may the numbers of actionists involved and the intensity of the penalties they are willing to undergo. A given movement may avow "love" for the opponent or hatred as intense (at certain stages at least) as in many military conflicts. Nonviolent actionists may aim to convert or to coerce their opponent. The types of issues at stake and their relative importance to the contending groups may differ widely. Similarly, the composition and characteristics of the respective groups will differ from case to case, as will their resources, allies, strengths and weaknesses. The degree of severity of repression, too, will differ. Whether the police are partisan or neutral between the contending groups will be important. The extent and depth of understanding of the technique of nonviolent action among its practitioners will differ considerably, as will the degree and adequacy of the strategy and tactics used. Other important variables will add considerably to the difficulty of describing the various processes and mechanisms involved in the working of nonviolent action in conflicts.

Certain assumptions will therefore be made here in order to reduce somewhat the difficulties in the way of analysis. It is assumed, for example, that the methods used include those of noncooperation (not simply nonviolent protest and persuasion), and some methods of nonviolent intervention. The participation of fairly large numbers of people is assumed, which means that most of them are not believers in a creed enjoining nonviolence but are acting under a nonviolent discipline for the conflict's duration. It is also assumed that the struggle takes place where there are at least some civil liberties, although these may be reduced as the campaign continues. The use of nonviolent action against totalitarian systems requires separate discussion.

CASTING OFF FEAR

One of the prerequisites of nonviolent struggle is that the participants must cast off fear of acting independently and fear of the sufferings which may follow. A high degree of courage is required of nonviolent actionists. The accusation of cowardice, which has often been unjustly made against people who for conscientious reasons refuse to take part in war, cannot even be levelled against nonviolent actionists—except perhaps by those totally ignorant on the subject.

Indeed, Gandhi was most emphatic in his condemnation of cowardice, arguing that “cowardice and *ahimsa* [nonviolence] do not go together any more than water and fire.”⁵ The coward seeks to avoid the conflict and flees from danger, the nonviolent actionist faces the conflict and risks the dangers involved in pursuing it honorably. “Cowardice is impotence worse than violence,” concluded Gandhi.⁶ “Nonviolence cannot be taught to a person who fears to die and has no power of resistance . . .”⁷ “There is hope for a violent man to be some day nonviolent, but there is none for a coward,”⁸ “Fear,” argues Gregg, “develops out of an assumption of relative weakness.”⁹ The coward, being fearful, cannot use nonviolent action effectively. The nonviolent actionist must have confidence in the right and strength of his cause, in his principles, and in his technique of action.

The emphasis which Gandhi and other nonviolent actionists have placed on casting off fear has political roots and consequences. Despotism, they have insisted, could not exist if it did not have fear as its foundation. “The Government takes advantage of our fear of jails,” argued Gandhi.¹⁰ In the earlier theoretical analysis of the roots of political power, in Chapter One, it was emphasized that sanctions *themselves* do not produce obedience; but the *fear* of sanctions does. If there is great fear among the subjects, even minor sanctions may produce great conformity, while severe sanctions in face of a high degree of fearlessness may not secure the regime. This difference is crucial for the operation of nonviolent means of struggle in face of violent repression.

Nonviolent actionists have not been alone in pointing to the paralyzing political effect of fear and in arguing that liberation can only come after fear has been cast off. The nineteenth century Russian revolutionary Alexander Herzen, for example, devoted the first page of the first issue of his *Free Russian Press* (published in London in 1853) to this objective.¹¹

If fear, then, plays an important role in maintaining oppressive regimes, the liberation of the subjects by their own efforts requires a change in them toward fearlessness and self-confidence. This view is also shared by advocates of violent revolution. Bakunin, for example, linked “mental

liberation” with “socio-economic liberation.”¹² The Russian Jacobin Petr Tkachev, from whom Lenin learned so much, argued for the need of fearlessness if revolution were to be possible: “When the people see that terrible power that they dreaded and before which they were accustomed to tremble and to denigrate themselves, is disorganized, split and befouled, when they see that they need not fear anybody or anything, then the accumulated bitterness will break out with irresistible force.”¹³ There were others.¹⁴ Michael Prawdin writes that in Russia in early 1917 “the people had lost their fear of punishment and the bogey of the state had lost its power to terrify.”¹⁵

Gandhi repeatedly emphasized the importance of this inner psychological change from fear and submission to fearlessness and self-respect as a necessary prerequisite of real political freedom. In this context, his emphasis on the primacy of “inner conditions” over “external conditions” gains new significance. Speaking of India’s millions, Gandhi wrote: “We have to dispel fear from their hearts. On the day they shed all fear, India’s fetters shall fall and she will be free.”¹⁶ This is not to say that fear must initially be *fully* cast off, and that only then can nonviolent action follow. Fear may be cast off by degrees, and certain groups in the population may become less afraid than other groups. Also, participation in nonviolent action often seems to lead to a loss of fear.

Casting off fear is closely tied to gaining confidence that one possesses power and can act in effective ways to change a situation.¹⁷ This was apparently the case in Montgomery, Alabama, during the bus boycott. Martin Luther King, Jr. reported that when repression began, “a once fear-ridden people had been transformed. Those who had previously trembled before the law were now proud to be arrested for the cause of freedom.”¹⁸ It is clear that a great deal of the strength of the Norwegian teachers in their resistance to the Quisling regime lay in their open defiance and refusal to bow to fear.¹⁹

The qualities of bravery and courage are not, of course, limited to nonviolent action. They are present in other situations and certainly where people struggle heroically by violent means, as Gandhi often acknowledged.²⁰ He argued, however, that “the use of nonviolence requires greater bravery than that of violence”²¹ and that nonviolent struggle constitutes a weapon “of the stoutest hearts.”²² According to the theories of nonviolent action, violence is removed, not by yielding to it, but by remaining firm in its face. Courage in this technique is not simply a moral virtue; it is a practical requirement of the technique.

Assuming that the actionists maintain courage, the specific type of action possible will be determined by the *degree* to which the participants

have become fearless. As E.D. Nixon said at the beginning of the Montgomery bus boycott: ". . . if we are afraid we might just as well fold up right now."²³ If the groups which have been dominated by the opponent are afraid, there can be no nonviolent action, no challenge to the opponent, and no willingness to risk his sanctions. If the nonviolent actionists become fearful in the midst of the struggle, then the movement collapses.

Fear interferes with or destroys the operation of most of the processes of change upon which nonviolent action depends, whether these be conversion of the opponent by convincing him of a new, more favorable, image of the grievance group, or be paralysis of the system by the massiveness of noncooperation despite repression. Fear may also contribute to the continuation of brutalities rather than their diminution and cessation; *the shortest way to end brutalities is to demonstrate that they do not help to achieve the opponent's objectives*. Courage is required if the nonviolent struggle is to continue and to lead to the increasing strength of the nonviolent group and an undermining of the opponent's power.

Gandhi argued that bravery expressed nonviolently is more powerful than bravery expressed in violence.²⁴ The emphasis on fearlessness in Gandhian thought, and in various cases of nonviolent struggle, is well advised, for it is a casting off of one's fear—or at least the deliberate reduction and control of one's fear—which makes possible the challenge, the persistence in face of repression, and the capacity to bring into operation the sources of strength and change which can finally lead to victory. This courage makes possible nonviolent discipline in face of severe repression and provocation; and this nonviolent discipline is in turn necessary for the operation of the technique. The nonviolence in nonviolent action rests upon courage.

SOCIAL SOURCES OF POWER CHANGES

The total combat strength and military power of belligerents in conventional military wars are not determined solely by the leaders of the contending governments or even by the soldiers in the front lines. Actions of other sections of the populations, and at times the assistance of other countries in providing various types of necessary support, are also important. Because of this aid, combat strength in military war is variable and depends on the extent and type of support for and participation in the war effort. Similar variations occur in the combat strength of two contending groups when one of them relies on nonviolent action, but with important differences.

The variations in the respective power of the contending groups in

this type of conflict situation are likely to be more extreme, to take place more quickly, and to have more diverse consequences. In addition, the nonviolent group may, by its actions and behavior, control the increase or decrease in the relative strength of the opponent group, and this to a much greater degree than occurs in purely military conflicts.

On both sides the leadership groups are dependent on a variety of types of support from large numbers of people and groups, many of which provide specialized types of assistance and serve other essential social roles. The conflict is therefore not one between two clear-cut groups of fixed composition and strength. *Instead, the power of both groups varies*. The process by which their relative and absolute power is altered is complicated, but it can be simply illustrated. The strength of the nonviolent group will be strongly influenced by the people who are actually carrying out the action: the men and women who refuse to work in a strike, the volunteers who disobey laws in a civil disobedience campaign, the people who refuse taxes, who parade in the streets, and who leave boycotted goods on the shelves. If they participate fully, and persist despite the punishments meted out to them, the nonviolent movement is likely to be strong. If significant numbers of the nonviolent actionists decide, however, not to continue to take part, then the nonviolent movement will be weakened.

The opponent group's leadership—say, the government—is similarly dependent on the participation of many people on its side, such as administrators, civil servants, soldiers, policemen, members of the prison system, and the like. All of these may of course not be directly involved in the struggle at any given point. They are, however, the agents (the term is used in a morally neutral sense) on whom the opponent relies in carrying out his policies and countermeasures. If they support the opponent and carry out his policies and instructions fully and efficiently, they will help to maintain or increase his relative power position. But this is not necessarily the case. There are examples of persons in such positions who become lax in carrying out their duties—for example, by not passing important information up the hierarchy, by not relaying orders clearly to their subordinates, by not carrying out their own responsibilities efficiently, or by refusing outright to obey. Should this happen on a widespread basis, the opponent's relative power position is likely to be significantly weakened. There are indications that such laxness in carrying out measures for the regime and against the opposition is likely to occur more frequently, extensively and seriously when the opposition is using nonviolent means of struggle than when it is applying some type of political violence.

The degree to which the participants on *each* side give their whole-

hearted assistance in behalf of their group's objective varies, therefore. This instability and variability of general participation on *both* sides is an important characteristic of conflicts in which one side uses nonviolent action. The course of the struggle is significantly determined by the supporters of each side. It is they who wage the actual struggle. Without their participation and active assistance neither the leadership of the nonviolent group nor that of the opponent group could increase or even maintain its power. This is a first source of the constant variation in the strengths of each side. There are two others.

Rarely, if ever, does either the nonviolent or the opponent group include the whole "population," or group of people, whom they purport to represent or serve. In a given nonviolent campaign the active participants are usually a relatively small percentage of the whole population in whose interests the nonviolent group claims to be acting. On occasion, of course, participation may be extraordinarily high. The small percentage of actual combatants is not peculiar to nonviolent action. Generally it is even more so in violent struggles, whether international wars or violent revolutions. The attitudes and activities of that wider population associated with the nonviolent struggle are, however, highly important: its approval or disapproval of the nonviolent campaign may influence the morale and hence the behavior of the active participants. If sympathetic, the wider group may provide funds, facilities and supplies, take less dangerous symbolic actions of support, or provide new volunteers for the more militant action; on occasion the whole group may move toward noncooperation with and defiance of the opponent. Conversely, their disapproval of the struggle and withholding of assistance may seriously weaken or undermine the nonviolent actionists. The degree of sympathy and support from the larger group is likely to be influenced by many factors, especially by the issues at stake, the behavior of the opponent group, and the behavior of the nonviolent actionists.

A similar dependence exists for the opponent, for the attitudes and actions of his usual or potential backers are also likely to influence his relative strength. It is on this general population that he is likely ultimately to depend for his financial and material resources, and (in many cases) the operation of the economic system. So, too, he will have to rely on that population for new recruits for the army, police, civil service and the like, and for the general approval of his policies. That approval—or disapproval—may significantly influence the morale and behavior of the officials, police and soldiers who implement the policies and carry out the repression. In some situations a change in attitude in the general population could lead to changes in government policy, and even to a change in

government. Here, too, the degree of sympathy and support for the regime, its policies and its measures against the nonviolent actionists is likely to be influenced by the issues at stake and by the behavior of the opponent group and of the nonviolent group. As will become clear, there are important indications that the nonviolent group may be able directly and indirectly both to increase internal opposition to the opponent regime and also to encourage among that regime's general population sympathy and support for the nonviolent group; all this to a far greater degree than would be possible if the nonviolent group had used violence.

In summary, the degree to which the respective "populations" give or withhold their encouragement and assistance to the active protagonists is a very important factor in determining the relative strengths of the two protagonists and the outcome of the conflict. This is a second source of the constant variation in the relative strengths of the respective groups. There remains one more.

Usually this type of conflict occurs within a wider "universe." It may be national or international or both. The importance of national and world opinion to the outcome of the struggle varies considerably and can be highly exaggerated. Such opinion may at times, however, influence the morale of the respective groups, and hence the outcome of the conflict. Or, such opinion may at times take on more concrete expression: public statements by national leaders or pronouncements by international organizations, political intervention by national leaders, economic and other types of support for the nonviolent actionists, economic boycotts and embargoes against the opponent, diplomatic representations, severance of diplomatic relations, and various other forms, depending on the particular situation. These are often ineffective, but on occasion they may tip the scales to bring victory. As will be discussed briefly in Chapter Eleven, this factor was important in the 1963 Buddhist struggle in Vietnam and influential even in unsuccessful struggles.

Because of the variability of the strengths of the protagonists and the dependence of the leadership groups on various other groups, the objectives of the two groups, and their means of action, their wider strategies, tactics, specific methods, and behavior are all likely to have effects far beyond the particular time and place in which they occur. These effects will rebound to strengthen or weaken one group or the other. The ever-present potential for extreme variability in the power of the contending groups, and the widespread and complex character of the reverberations and influences of actions and their effects, are highly important in understanding how this technique of struggle works and why certain types of behavior may have consequences which would not otherwise be expected.

LEADERSHIP IN NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

Socially significant nonviolent action does not just happen. In every case—whether such action occurs spontaneously, “semi-spontaneously,” or is deliberately planned—considerable groundwork has prepared the way for the use of this particular technique of struggle. This groundwork may have been laid quite unconsciously as the result of a variety of influences. Frustration at the blocking of conventional channels of change, or at their uselessness in certain situations, may have finally led people to think of unorthodox ways of acting. The situation itself may have become unbearable or threatening, thus requiring radical action. Other types of action—such as violence—may have been defeated or may appear hopeless. An example of nonviolent action in some other place or time may suddenly be seen as relevant to the immediate situation. People may have grasped hope that something can be done to improve their lot and that they can do it. They may have lost their fear. New insights into accepted beliefs may have gained. The pleas or example of an apparently ignored minority may finally have produced results. New leadership may have arisen. There may have been other factors, but before socially significant nonviolent action can take place, *something* must have prepared the situation for it.

Unfortunately, we know very little of the conditions under which spontaneous cases occur and to what degree the groundwork for these can be consciously cultivated even though the actual resort to nonviolent action remains unplanned. Detailed comparative studies of cases of spontaneous nonviolent action might shed light on this and prove to be extremely important, especially for political situations which make it difficult to organize nonviolent action on a large scale. Such studies might also shed light on whether, and if so how, particular problems—such as strategy, discipline and tenacity—involved in spontaneous nonviolent action could be satisfactorily solved. For the sake of simplification, in these chapters we are assuming deliberate planning. We can therefore assume that some recognizable leadership for the movement exists.

The leadership group will usually initiate as well as plan and give continuing direction, at least in the early stages, to the nonviolent action, although in some cases it may be called to or assume its position after the action has begun. Leadership in such situations serves a very important role, especially where knowledge and understanding of the principles and practice of nonviolent action are not widespread and deep among the general population. Machiavelli pointed to the tendency of threats of disobedience to collapse if there is no effective leadership to assist in implementing them.²⁵ Recent struggles give evidence to support Machiavelli's

view. For example, Eugen Stamm has argued that the decisive shortcomings of the 1953 East German Rising were “lack of organizational preparations; lack of central leadership; the incapacity of local strike leaders to keep in touch with one another.”²⁶

It would be rash, however, to say that without central leadership nonviolent struggle can never be successful. Much depends on the extent and depth of understanding of the nature and requirements of this technique of struggle. There is evidence that, in the late stages of a campaign, a nonviolent resistance movement can continue even after all the central leadership has been imprisoned or otherwise removed. If so, there is no intrinsic reason why a movement which started without central leadership could not be effective, given wide popular understanding of this type of action. It is not necessarily true that the stronger the leadership the better. For example, it has been argued that during the British General Strike of 1926 the General Council of the Trades Union Congress (influenced especially by Ernest Bevin) attempted too much centralized control.²⁷

In most cases, however, some type of central leadership will be present and will be important for a variety of tasks. These would include working out strategy and tactics for action, negotiating with the opponent, encouraging willingness to resist, promoting discipline, choosing the best moment for action, and recommending continuing tactics and counterresponses as the struggle continues. Gandhi was, for example, convinced of the importance of strong leadership for a major movement using nonviolent action. He did not mean only the top leadership but also a larger band of well-trained volunteers “who thoroughly understood the strict conditions of Satyagraha. They could explain these to the people, and by sleepless vigilance keep them on the right path.”²⁸ Referring to the participation of many thousands in the 1930-31 campaign, Gandhi said: “Their belief in nonviolence was unintelligent. . . . But their belief in their leaders was genuine.”²⁹

The main tasks of leadership in conflicts have been listed by Miller: to serve as spokesmen for those who are less articulate, to offer solutions to the problems they face, and to organize the implementation of those solutions.³⁰ Also, in the course of a struggle there will arise a host of problems and situations in which decisions based on knowledge and experience are to be preferred to decisions based on little understanding, or to no decisions at all because there is no one to take them.

The origins and structure of leadership in nonviolent struggles have differed widely. Where an existing organization resolves upon a course of nonviolent action, that body can itself provide a considerable degree of the leadership and organizational framework for the ensuing conflict. The Trades Union Congress and other trades union bodies served such roles

in the British General Strike of 1926, for example (especially the General Council's Strike Organization Committee)³¹ and the Indian National Congress, with Gandhi in a strong role, composed most of the leadership in the Indian struggles. The leadership has also taken the form of a self-selected group which operates an underground giving instructions for open nonviolent resistance by the general population, as in Finland in 1901.³² A leadership committee may be elected by popular vote; a sixty-member committee to carry out the economic boycott against Great Britain was so elected at the City Hall in New York City on November 22, 1774.³³ In nonviolent action in support of the government, against invaders or *coups d'etat*, the top leadership may be the legal government and its ministers, as happened in the *Ruhrkampf* of 1923.³⁴

In other cases, a self-selected leadership group may be formed shortly before or immediately after conflict has broken out into the open. At other times the people directly involved in the action may elect a leadership committee: frequently several such committees may federate to form a wider leadership committee. For example, in Halle, East Germany, where strikers were able to fall back on a long trade union tradition, local strike committees joined together on June 17, 1953, to form an Initiative Committee, which called a mass meeting and conducted negotiations for the successful occupation of a radio station and newspaper office.³⁵ During the student sit-in movement in 1960, in Raleigh, North Carolina, students from two colleges joined to set up leadership committees, composed of persons who had emerged "by natural selection." Elsewhere student presidents stepped into leadership in the new situation. In Raleigh, students formed a central Intelligence Committee (executive committee) with four specialized subcommittees to deal with particular tasks.³⁶ In Atlanta, Georgia, the 1960 sit-ins were led by a policy-making board of about fifteen members from six colleges, the Committee on Appeal for Human Rights; there was a general staff, a top officer called "*le Commandante*," a "Deputy Chief of Operations," a field commander, deputy commander, and area commanders.³⁷ New leaders were also "thrown up out of the situation" in the bus boycott by the Africans of Alexandra Township near Johannesburg in 1957.³⁸ On May 20, 1917, mutinous French troops at the XXXIIInd Corps replacement depot elected three delegates to present the officers with an ultimatum, and others a few days later elected "deputies" on the style of the Russian Soldiers' Councils.³⁹

Top leadership in nonviolent action movements has so far taken one of three forms: group or committee leadership, an individual (especially Gandhi) acting much like a general in an army with all others carrying

out orders, or a combination of the two. There are advantages and objections to all.

The individual leadership system makes it possible for the most experienced person with deepest insight into the technique, the social and political situation, the condition of the expected volunteers and general population, and other factors to work out the plans and strategy as a comprehensive whole. This is important, for the particular actions and stages of the movement can only be most significant if they are seen in relation to the wider movement to which they contribute. Gandhi argued that if the movement in crisis situations were to avoid temptations to resort to violence, or to take actions which might lead to violence, the leadership of the movement must be in the hands of those who believed in nonviolence as a moral principle. Also, in the preparation for a struggle there is often time for only limited detailed discussions and arguments in committee. Depending of course on the composition of the specific committee, such bodies can help; but they can also involve "interminable" discussions and arguments on trivial or irrelevant points. Sometimes such meetings can fairly be described as sessions in which mutual ignorance is pooled. There would be times in which to have the direction of a large-scale struggle in such hands could prove disastrous.

On the other hand, if no individual obviously stands well above the group in the qualities needed for this leadership position, it could be dangerous to give power of overall direction to one not prepared for it. Consequently, the alternative procedure—usually followed in the West—is for the leadership and planning to be in the hands of a special committee. The members may bring to it various backgrounds, skills, knowledge and insights, which ideally will combine to give the committee as a whole the qualities, skills and information to fulfill its tasks. The presence on the committee of members who lack the ability to listen to others, who talk incessantly, argue over irrelevancies, are unstable, arrogant, or simply difficult persons must be avoided. If so, and suitable persons who are capable of working smoothly together and of recognizing useful insights and suggestions from other members are included, then the group leadership will possess advantages over individual leadership and may usefully contribute to the further training of top leadership personnel. It is arguable which could operate best in crisis situations.

Even in the case of individual leadership, however, the situation is not as authoritarian as it appears at first sight, for the leader would be selected by the group concerned with the grievance and given authority to prepare plans for the action. For example, Gandhi was authorized by the

Indian National Congress—the nationalist party—to plan the civil disobedience campaign in 1930. But the leader's continued authority would always be subject to the continuance of the group's voluntary recognition of it. There is likely to be—often there must be—a pyramid of leadership with two or three or more ranks. But despite this hierarchical leadership structure, the leader cannot force his will upon those unwilling to accept it. The group could decline to accept the leader's plans. Any individual could decline to volunteer for the struggle, and at any time he could withdraw from the group if he could no longer conscientiously support the movement and its actions. As long as the volunteer remains a volunteer, however, he should carry out instructions. As Gandhi put it, he "may not remain a unit in his regiment and have the option of doing or not doing things he is asked to do."⁴⁰ In Western practice, people usually do not volunteer for a long-term nonviolent campaign, but for a specific demonstration or action, usually because long-term campaigns are rarely planned. Hence there is very little or no chance of their being ordered into a specific action of which they may disapprove, thus having to withdraw from the movement. But if a campaign or a more limited action has been carefully planned it is extremely important that all participants be willing to abide by the plans if the action is to be coherent and disciplined.

The nonviolent leadership has only nonviolent sanctions at its disposal for the enforcement of its decisions and instructions. These sanctions will be discussed in more detail later, but their relationship to the character of nonviolent leadership requires attention here. One sanction is the disapproval by other members of the nonviolent group. Sometimes social boycotts have been used. The leader himself has sanctions which only he can impose. For example, Gandhi first fasted and then called off the 1919 campaign against the Rowlatt Act because some demonstrators had resorted to violence.⁴¹ When striking mill workers being led by Gandhi in Ahmedabad in 1918 began to go back on their pledges of behavior for the course of the strike, Gandhi's fast restored morale and adherence to their earlier promises.⁴² However effective such extreme sanctions may sometimes be, they are clearly of a different character than the extreme sanctions at the disposal of leaders in a violent struggle—imprisonment or execution. This difference in enforcement sanctions is only one of the factors which separate the operation of military leadership and even the most authoritarian forms of leadership in a nonviolent movement. In addition, nonviolent leaders have frequently emphasized that they did not wish people to follow them blindly, but to follow only if convinced of the policy and proposed actions.⁴³

One of the most important justifications for strong leadership in non-

violent struggles has been that only a few people had sufficient understanding of this technique to make wise decisions as to how to take action. It is very possible that widespread self-education and spread of knowledge about nonviolent action may facilitate the development of a more diffused system of leadership and increased self-reliance.

Whatever form it takes, the quality of the leadership for nonviolent action is very important in developing the movement along sound lines, gathering support, maintaining confidence, keeping up morale, and guiding it directly or with prepared plans through difficulties to a successful conclusion. The personal qualities of the leader or the leadership group and the perceived wisdom of their plans for action determine whether their guidance is accepted voluntarily by the participants in the struggle. If not, those "leaders" will be rejected and become unsuccessful claimants to leadership positions. Gregg lists as necessary qualities of nonviolent leaders a high degree of love, faith, courage, honesty and humility.⁴⁴ There are other qualities, however, which are highly important. Leaders for this type of struggle are likely to be most capable if they possess an active mind, have thorough expertise in the technique they are applying, are able to develop wise strategy, plans and actions, and understand the opponent's case, his psychology, resources, and the changing views and attitudes of his supporters. The nonviolent leader will need to understand the potentialities, limitations and nature of the volunteers, sympathizers and the population. His past record will also be important, especially his experience, service and integrity. He must be willing to accept sacrifice and to set an example for the movement.

In some cases the leadership will be more diffused and harder to locate—especially where the movement has been spontaneous rather than planned, and also in advanced stages of planned movements when the original leadership has been entirely removed. Leadership may then be provided by larger numbers of individuals and small groups who offer leads for action which are accepted and followed by others. The quality of this type of leadership is important too, for it must not lead in the wrong direction if the campaign is to be a success.

PREPARING FOR NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

Whether a campaign is to be massive, including many millions of participants, or small, with only a handful of volunteers or even a single person, careful planning and preparations are essential. Gandhi's careful attention to detail in laying plans for *satyagraha* and in solving organizational problems has been acknowledged as one of the reasons for his ef-

fectiveness. This has not always been the case in nonviolent struggles, of course. Lindberg pointed out in 1937 that military campaigns have almost always been carried out by disciplined men acting under trained leaders, while nonviolent campaigns have never taken place under such favorable conditions. "They have always been characterized by inadequate preparations." However, since the time of Gandhi's major experiments with this technique in India, there has been increasing emphasis on the need for preparations if the technique is to be effective. As Lindberg wrote: "Every form of nonviolent campaign of a merely spontaneous character is threatened either by death in indifference in the course of a short time, or is threatened by a much too rapid growth and blooming in a transition to violence."⁴⁵ Investigation may show ways to combine general preparations for nonviolent struggle with spontaneity as to the exact moment and form of action; this might be especially useful in political situations where open advance preparations and organization are impossible. However, Gandhi and others who have given considerable thought to the problem would come very close to full agreement with Lindberg.

The exact order in which various types of preparation or actions are carried out, or ought to be carried out, for greatest effectiveness will vary with the particular situation. The order of the topics discussed here ought not therefore to be identified with an unchangeable pattern.

A. Investigation

Where the use of nonviolent action is contemplated, the movement will be strengthened by an advance investigation of alleged grievances. Few things can weaken such a movement as much as the revelation that the actionists did not really know the facts nor have accurate information on the situation they were complaining about. Where full and accurate information is not readily available, some type of investigation will have to be undertaken. That investigation should be as accurate and as fair as possible; this will help in the wide acceptance of its results. The investigation should not be limited only to the facts as seen by the group with the grievances, but should include the facts as seen by the opponent group and by third parties. Following the investigation, a statement of desired changes should be formulated. The greater the accuracy and fairness in the statement of grievances and of facts, and the greater the restraint shown in concentrating on only the clearest and most important demands, it has been said, the stronger the appearance of the nonviolent group's case and the weaker that of the opponent. Furthermore, basic issues should not be confused with secondary ones.

Sometimes in rigid political systems the facts may come to light not

by an investigation—which might be impossible—but by simply "leaking out." For example, in Nazi Germany news of the gassing of mentally ill persons which began in September 1939 leaked out even though it was top secret; this led to significant protest from Roman Catholic church leaders until the euthanasia program was stopped in August 1941.⁴⁶

After the information has been gathered by investigation or other means, the widest possible publicity is to be given to the facts of the case, the grievances, and the aims of the nonviolent group. This publicity is not part of the investigation, which is normally done quietly, but belongs in the phase of "generating cause-consciousness" which is discussed below. This publicity may itself bring pressure for a change. Even if it does not, the dissemination of the results of investigation will contribute to a stronger position for the nonviolent group during the ensuing struggle.

B. Negotiations

At this stage of the conflict negotiations with the opponent are usually undertaken or intensified, through personal meetings and letters, often unpublicized. Initiation of nonviolent action, especially in its more radical forms, is a serious undertaking. Efforts to solve the problem before taking direct action are desirable. In addition an effort at negotiations—whether or not immediately successful—may also *contribute* to a satisfactory resolution of the conflict. Negotiations in this context are therefore not seen as a full substitute for nonviolent action, but as a step which might make it unnecessary in some cases and more effective in others.

Where the issues at stake are serious, especially where they affect the relative power positions of the groups, it should not be surprising if a solution satisfactory to the nonviolent group is not reached by negotiation. The effort may, however, serve other purposes. Negotiation is one channel for maintaining contact between the two groups, helping the opponent understand the grievances, and communicating to him why nonviolent action is going to be taken. In negotiations the nonviolent group can also explain the type of struggle which will be used. Very important in some cases, negotiations may also help the opponent and the negotiators to achieve a relationship between human beings as such. This may counterbalance or prevent the mutual distortions of each other's images which often occur in conflict and which may reduce the chances of a settlement.⁴⁷ It is also important that the nonviolent group should make, and be seen to make, every effort at a settlement before launching direct action. This greatly increases its moral position, in its own eyes and in those of the opponent group and of third parties. It will also aid the per-

ception that the more extreme action has been forced upon the nonviolent group and is therefore more justified.⁴⁸ When the nonviolent group begins direct action, that perception may influence various reactions and thus the relative support the two contending groups receive.

In negotiations, the representatives of the nonviolent group will make clear their minimum demands, as distinguished from secondary issues on which compromise may be possible, or which may even not be pressed. Where basic moral or political principles are involved they will not be subject to compromise, however. Once the demands are set, it is generally recommended that they be kept unchanged during the struggle, and not raised or lowered with variations in the nonviolent group's chances of victory. Usually, such changes in demands are likely to reduce sympathy and support for the nonviolent group, and lower its credibility.⁴⁹

Preparation for nonviolent action is likely to increase the chances of successful negotiations, for the mere possibility of such struggle may on occasion encourage the opponent to make concessions.⁵⁰ This relationship is important at this stage of the conflict. The practitioner of this technique is much more realistic about the role of power than is his more naïve friend who favors negotiations as a *substitute* for open struggle. Negotiations do not take place in a vacuum, and they are rarely resolved solely on the objective merits of the respective arguments and evidence. Behind every case of negotiations is the stated or silent—but mutually understood—role of the relative power positions of the negotiators; that is, what each can do if no agreement is reached. Gandhi said, for example: "I do not believe in making appeals when there is no force behind them, whether moral or material."⁵¹ The nonviolent actionists' capacity and willingness for further action distinguishes his approach from that of those who vaguely prefer peace and think that talking is a substitute for war. The nonviolent army, Gandhi said, "should be so well prepared as to make war unnecessary."⁵² Theodor Ebert has called "a credible determination to fight a prerequisite for negotiations."⁵³ Ebert has pointed out that on some occasions Indian leaders demanded not only concrete promises in negotiations, but some "advance deeds as proof that the promises would later be kept," such as the release of political prisoners.⁵⁴

All cases may not follow this pattern, of course. In actual events, negotiations may occur simultaneously with other actions, such as a strike or a civil disobedience campaign. Or the opponent may refuse to negotiate, demanding, for example, that the nonviolent group give up all plans for direct action, or, if such action has begun, declaring that he will not negotiate until it is called off. The nonviolent actionist will refuse to be

intimidated or sidetracked by such tactics. However, Gandhi and others have emphasized that as long as the opponent does not impose unreasonable preconditions for negotiations, the nonviolent group should be willing and even eager to negotiate at any stage of the conflict, in the hope of finding an acceptable settlement which will make continued direct action unnecessary.

C. Sharpening the focus for attack

Nonviolent action is a technique of struggle in which the participants are able to advance their cause in proportion to the degree that the opponent's desire and ability to maintain the objectionable policy are weakened, and that the nonviolent group is able to generate the will and power to give it the internal strength to effect the change. The skillful choice of the point of attack is important in this connection. In intellectual arguments one often concentrates on the weakest links in the opponent's case. In war, instead of attacking with equal force on the whole front simultaneously, one usually concentrates forces on what are believed to be the enemy's weakest points in the belief that a breakthrough there will lead to a weakening or collapse of other sections of the front. So in a nonviolent struggle the nonviolent leadership will show wisdom in concentrating action on the weakest points in the opponent's case, policy, or system. This will contribute to the maximum weakening of his relative position and the maximum strengthening of that of the nonviolent group.

In nonviolent action it is necessary to have a pivot point on which to place the lever which is to remove the evil. The selection of this pivot or issue is very important for the whole consequent campaign. One does not, in Gandhi's view, launch a nonviolent campaign for such general objectives as "peace," "independence," "freedom," or "brotherhood." "The issue must be definite and capable of being clearly understood and within the power of the opponent to yield."⁵⁵ In applying this technique of struggle under less than perfect conditions, success may depend, Miller writes, on "phasing strategy in such a way as to score a series of minor gains or to secure a single major victory in the most accessible sector, rather than trying for a cluster of major objectives at the same time."⁵⁶ Whether the specific objective(s) chosen is (are) highly limited or very ambitious will hinge in part on the nonviolent group's assessment of its relative strength and capacity for action.

In a study of the defeated campaign in Albany, Georgia, in 1962, Professor Howard Zinn wrote:

There has been a failure to create and handle skillfully a set of dif-

ferentiated tactics for different situations. The problem of desegregating Albany facilities involves various parties: some situations call for action by the city commission; some for decision by the Federal Courts; some for agreement with private businessmen. Moreover, there are advantages to singling out a particular goal and concentrating on it. This is an approach not only tactically sound for Negro protest but also creates a climate favorable to a negotiated solution. The community is presented with a specific concrete demand rather than a quilt of grievances and demands which smothers the always limited ability of societies to think rationally about their faults.⁵⁷

Martin Luther King, Jr., reached a similar conclusion in the same case:

... we decided that one of the principal mistakes we had made there was to scatter our efforts too widely. We had been so involved in attacking segregation in general that we had failed to direct our protest effectively to any one major facet. We concluded that in hard-core communities a more effective battle could be waged if it was concentrated against one aspect of the evil and intricate system of segregation.⁵⁸

Without question there were other serious causes of the Albany defeat, but those do not invalidate these observations.

Instead, then, of a campaign for some very general objective, Ebert writes: "In working out the staged plan, it is essential for the success of the campaign to find the correct point of attack or one flash-point among many in social relationships which symbolizes all the other conflicts."⁵⁹ In the Vykam campaign, sketched in Chapter Two, the issue was the right of people to use a road that led to their homes. In the 1930-31 independence movement the specific issue which initiated the campaign was that of the Salt Laws, which touched the lives of most of the people in India; other wider political aims were condensed into eleven demands.⁶⁰

This is not a matter of being moderate in one's aims, but of concentrating one's strength in ways which will make victory more likely. The planners choose the point of attack, the specific aspect of the general problem which symbolizes the "evil" which is least defensible by the opponent and which is capable of arousing the greatest strength against it. Success in such limited campaigns will in turn increase the self-confidence of the actionists⁶¹ and their ability to move effectively toward the fuller achievement of their larger objectives as they gain experience in the use of effective means of action to realize their aims.

The choice of the point of attack requires considerable understanding and a keen perception of the total situation. Amiya Chakravarty has described very well Gandhi's ability to combine short-run and long-run plans in the selection of a focal point for action. It sometimes happens, Chakravarty writes, that "in following one obvious remedial line we have hit upon a symptom which symbolizes, demonstrates and challenges a root situation." A series of attacks on these points makes it possible to move "from one total situation to another." The issue should be kept clear and clean, he continues, pointing out that, for example, segregation in opium parlors would be an erroneous choice as a point for attack on racial segregation, while the right to pray in unsegregated churches "would be an issue of overwhelming convergence." Repression against nonviolent actionists concentrating on such a point of attack could but strengthen their cause. "Again and again, Gandhiji showed an instinct, a spiritual instinct, for the right issue, for the converging issues which supported each other at a point."⁶²

This approach to political action has strong support from a quite different source, namely, Lenin, who wrote: "The whole art of politics lies in finding and gripping as strong as we can the link that is least likely to be torn out of our hands, the one that is most important at the given moment, the one that guarantees the possessor of a link the possession of the whole chain."⁶³

D. Generating "cause-consciousness"⁶⁴

During the stage of investigation, publicity will usually, but not always, have been avoided. After the information has been gathered, however, and the minimum demands determined, it is necessary to publicize the facts, the issues and the arguments advanced by the nonviolent group. "The investigation into the causes of the conflict, the documentation of actual grievances and the resulting demands of the oppressed must be widely disseminated in a form which is comprehensible to the public and to the oppressor," writes Ebert.⁶⁵ The need for such a period of motivational preparation has been long recognized as important to a well-supported and sustained nonviolent movement. For example, in 1769, in correspondence with George Washington about the details and implementation of a nonimportation plan, his neighbor James Mason argued that it would be necessary to publish "something preparatory to it in our gazettes, to warn the people of the impending danger and to induce them the more readily and cheerfully to concur in the proper measures to avert it."⁶⁶

This phase may begin prior to negotiations with the opponent, or it may occur simultaneously with negotiations, or follow them when they have failed. It may proceed by stages, moving from the effort to inform the public in general of the grievances, to encouraging people to feel that nonviolent action is needed to correct them, and finally to enlisting participants for the coming struggle. A very important part of this activity is aimed at arousing the feeling that something can and ought to be done, and at increasing confidence that this can and should be done along nonviolent lines.

A variety of means may be used for these purposes. Pamphlets, leaflets, books, articles and papers dealing with the issues and the implications of the dispute may be issued. Public meetings, speeches, debates, discussions on radio, television and before existing organizations may be held. Sometimes the cinema, theater, catchy songs, slogans and symbols may be used, as well as house-to-house canvassing, petitions and personal contacts. The degree to which specific means are used openly depends somewhat on the regime and political situation in the country. A properly conducted journal can be of immense help in such a campaign, as most leaders of political dissent, including Gandhi, have recognized.

The emphasis in this effort to arouse "cause-consciousness" must be placed on quality rather than on speed or quantity, and strict efforts must be made to avoid exaggerations, distortions and falsehoods. Neither should feelings of hatred or intolerance be aroused. Oppenheimer and Lakey write that, without compromising, it is important "to try to limit the amount of antagonism from potential allies." This involves both "cutting down on actions which can be misinterpreted to be hostile and negative" and also improving the interpretation of all activities. "Remember," they add, "that many people are only looking for an excuse *not* to support the movement."⁶⁷

The duration of this stage of the movement will vary with the situation and previous work.⁶⁸ Sometimes, some of the publicity efforts started when the grievance group had not yet considered taking nonviolent action will be continued. Sometimes, also, widespread individual discontent will coalesce into general awareness of collective dissent. For example, before the East German Rising of June 16-17, 1953, workers had become increasingly vocal about their dissatisfaction with working conditions and with an increase in the work norms, which reduced wages but not the amount of work. They had managed to discuss their grievances, and the Rising itself was preceded by some sixty local strikes during the first half of June.⁶⁹

Arousing "cause-consciousness" may be divided into several phases. Special efforts will be necessary to develop understanding of the issues. When the decision is finally made to launch nonviolent action and specific plans are announced, further efforts will be needed to inform the population and possible participants of the nature of the contemplated action, the requirements for its success, the importance of engaging or not engaging in particular acts, and similar points.

A variety of efforts may then be made to justify and legitimize resort to direct action. Persons about to launch nonviolent action may regard themselves as acting in defense of the constitution and the law, while the opponent's actions are regarded as having no legal basis.⁷⁰ Alternatively, the action may be taken in an attempt to restore a system or constitution which was illegally and violently overthrown by the opponent. Justification may also be made in terms of democratic popular will against minority or foreign oppression, or in terms of the basic rights of man or of religious principles. Frequently, too, reliance on the technique of nonviolent action will be regarded as adding legitimacy and justification to the cause, especially when various means of violent action are regarded as inappropriate or wrong for social and political as well as moral reasons.

The nonviolent leaders may also at this stage warn of the hardship and suffering which will be incurred during the struggle. They may seek to arouse confidence that those penalties will be worth incurring, because this type of action is more likely than any other to procure victory. Sometimes such leaders and participants believe that the combination of a just cause and the use of this technique of action will in the long run ensure victory. Frederic Solomon and Jacob R. Fishman argued that the confidence of civil rights workers in inevitable desegregation—coming from a just cause and use of nonviolent action—was psychologically useful because "it heightens [their] own strength and resolve" and also "undermines that of the opposition."⁷¹ Various types of symbolic action (among them methods described in Chapter Three) may be used at this stage to dramatize the issues, strike the imagination of the general populace, and arouse the will to take direct action.

E. Quantity and quality in nonviolent action

In planning and conducting nonviolent action very careful consideration must constantly be given to the relationship between the numbers participating in the conflict and the quality of their participation. This appears to be a more complex relationship than is recognized by those

who argue that *only quantity* or *only quality* is important. The way in which this relationship is resolved and expressed has a very significant effect upon the whole course of the movement and its consequences. Clearly both are important, but they are not always equally important. Within certain limits the relationship between numbers and quality may vary considerably, changing with the situation, the stage of the movement, and the methods which are to be used. Certainly in a technique of action which in large degree depends for its effectiveness on the withdrawal of consent, cooperation and obedience, the numbers of participants are significant to its relative impact. But to concentrate on numbers alone may prove unwise because the effectiveness and consequences of nonviolent action are not in simple proportion to the numbers involved. If large numbers are involved, the strength thus demonstrated must be genuine if the movement is not to collapse in crises and if it is to persist and grow. The genuineness of this strength is in turn related to such factors as the degree of fearlessness, discipline, willingness to persist despite sanctions, and wisdom shown in the choice of strategy, tactics and methods of action. These are all closely associated with the quality of the movement.

In a sense nonviolent action is by its very nature qualitatively different from other means of struggle. It requires, for example, fearlessness and determination, an ability to maintain nonretaliation, sometimes forgiveness, and always nonviolence in face of the opponent's sometimes brutal repression. At the same time it requires courageous persistence in the intended course of action, and selfless commitment to the cause of the grievance group.

The degree of quality required in a given movement may vary with conditions, especially those conditions which may make it difficult to use this technique, and also with the type of opponent being confronted. In a labor strike, for example, under normal conditions in Western countries today, as long as the men stay away from work, their chances of success are high. They usually have some form of financial assistance to help them through the strike. The chances of severe repression by police or the military are now slight. Strikebreakers are rarer than before. Provocation to violence is usually no longer extensive. Objectives are usually quite limited and do not threaten the opponent seriously. The duration of the strike is not likely to be long. Under such conditions, the actionists can "get away" with a lower overall quality in the movement than would be desirable or necessary if contrasting conditions existed. This certainly does not mean that increased quality in behavior of participants under

such conditions would not be desirable and even highly beneficial, but that it is no longer so necessary.

However, when the chances of success are not large, when repression may be severe, when the opponent provokes violence, when the objectives seriously threaten the opponent's ego or position, and the struggle may be a long one, then high quality in the movement becomes essential. The problem is how to achieve it. Sometimes people may out of desperation, newly gained confidence, courage, or intuition rise to the demands of the situation. On other occasions they may be willing to follow wise guidance from leaders who understand what is needed. Sometimes the development of quality behavior in large numbers of participants may follow a series of smaller demonstrations of brave and disciplined nonviolent action.

There is a tradition within nonviolent action, especially in the labor movement and among advocates of the general strike in achieving social revolution, which emphasizes the importance of numbers. So, too, there is another tradition (clearly expressed by Gandhi) which emphasizes the role of quality and the disproportionate effect which a small number of actionists may have. Gregg has argued that a minute force can lead to a large change and that frequently a weak stimulus may even be superior to a stronger one.⁷² He speaks of the "primary influential power of disciplined individual persons."⁷³ Bondurant relates Gandhi's concepts of the power of the individual to his concern for individual freedom within society and to Western concepts of the dignity of the individual.⁷⁴ Fewer numbers of volunteers with fuller understanding of the nonviolent approach are likely, she explains, to prove more reliable in crises. Lahey suggests that quality may be more important, even at the cost of numbers, when the nonviolent group aims at persuading or converting the opponent. He writes:

This may be explained by recourse to our view that communication of images is an important part of any conflict. The image which is presented by the nonviolent actor is more important than the number of persons comprising the image. In Goffman's terms, the person for whom nonviolence is a matter of faith is more likely to give a "consistent performance"—thereby presenting a clear-cut image of suffering and courageous humanity. The fewer "slips" there are into angry retorts or frantic retreats, the more likely it is that the opponent and public will perceive in the campaigner an important common quality and respond to it with a lessening of violence.⁷⁵

It may be useful briefly to survey Gandhi's views on the dependence of both success and numbers in nonviolent action on quality, since his conclusions differ considerably from the popular expectation. Numbers, Gandhi insisted, were not necessary in a just cause.⁷⁶ In a nonviolent struggle fewer *satyagrahis* would be needed than would regular soldiers in a violent conflict.⁷⁷ Nonviolent action of high quality and small numbers could have a powerful impact, he insisted.⁷⁸ "I attach the highest importance to quality irrespective almost of quantity . . ." ⁷⁹ "Even a handful of true *satyagrahis* well organized and disciplined through selfless service of the masses, can win independence for India."⁸⁰ "I am convinced that there is safety in fewness so long as we have not evolved cohesion, exactness and intelligent cooperation and responsiveness."⁸¹ Even a single perfect *satyagrahi*, Gandhi believed, could "defy the whole might of an unjust empire . . . and lay the foundation for that empire's fall or regeneration."⁸² Unfortunately, Gandhi admitted, such perfection was not possible, but this did not alter the general principle of the overwhelming importance of quality in a nonviolent movement.

It is clear that Gandhi saw this quality as influencing the opponent and making him more likely to accept the demands of the nonviolent group, as paving the way for larger numbers when, inspired by the example, more people learned to cast off fear and to rely on disciplined nonviolent action to remedy the grievance.⁸³ Quality would be contagious and multiply; the number of nonviolent actionists enrolled under Gandhi's leadership in South Africa, for example, rose from sixteen to sixty thousand.⁸⁴ In contrast, undisciplined numbers would fade away. Furthermore, the growth in numbers was important for another reason. Even if it were possible for a single individual or a very few nonviolent actionists by their own actions to achieve the desired change, it would be wiser, Gandhi felt, for them to use their abilities to educate the masses of the people in the means by which they themselves could right their wrongs. The maintenance of quality was important in this. "Mass instruction on any other terms is an impossibility."⁸⁵

In other words, the maintenance of high quality in nonviolent action is necessary at all stages; if this is done when the numbers are small, it will make possible a very considerable increase in the numbers of nonviolent actionists capable of the strength necessary for effectiveness. Large numbers not able to maintain the nonviolent discipline, the fearlessness, and other necessary standards of behavior could only weaken the movement,⁸⁶ but large numbers capable of maintaining the necessary standards and discipline become "irresistable."⁸⁷

In summary, because of the nature of the technique of nonviolent action itself, attention to the maintenance of the quality of the movement, including such factors as fearlessness and maintaining the nonviolent discipline, is always required. Large numbers may frequently be necessary to effect particular changes. However, such numbers can be obtained as reliable participants only by maintaining and not lowering the standards of the movement.

F. Organizing the movement

Some type of organization is usually helpful or necessary if the action campaign is to implement decisions and carry out specific tasks. Important jobs cannot be simply left to chance; they require efficient organization to ensure that they are done. Among the tasks of such an organization are those which relate to the public, the volunteers, the leadership and the movement as a whole. These tasks will include publicizing the facts and grievances, promoting sympathy for the nonviolent group and its aims, informing the public of the intentions of the nonviolent group and its plans for action, and mobilizing financial and other resources for the movement. Another group of tasks relating to volunteers includes recruiting participants for the campaign, preparing volunteers and potential participants for action, and training these volunteers for specific and immediate tasks. Also, when new sympathizers and supporters appear, it will be necessary to show them how to help the movement in specific ways and to incorporate them into groups of other active participants. Leadership and organization are related; the organization may provide in advance for several successive stages of leadership to replace immediately arrested leaders, and may determine the procedure for further selection of leadership as long as conditions permit its operation as a clear group. The organization may also provide the leadership with accurate information about the condition of the movement and various factors influencing it. Other tasks which the organization may tackle include steps to keep up the movement's morale, to maintain discipline, and to prepare participants to act without leaders in times of severe repression.

The degree to which such organization has been formal has in past campaigns varied considerably. The numbers involved, their understanding of the technique of action, whether they are used to working together, and the situation in which they are operating—all have an influence in this regard. Sometimes an organization may be set up on the spot, as by striking workers who have no trade union. Sometimes an existing organiza-

tion may be turned to the new task of nonviolent action; there are sometimes advantages to that, especially as the body may already be a legitimate group with a definite place in the society. Sometimes local or regional or even central government may become the resistance organization, especially if such government is responsive to popular will. Local and regional government may be involved when the opponent is the central government; together with the central government, local and regional governments may be involved in facing an internal usurper carrying out a *coup*, or a foreign invader. On other occasions a new action organization for the specific purpose may be set up before nonviolent action is launched. Both tried and respected persons and leaders of other groups and new and hitherto inexperienced and unknown persons may help to build and operate the organization.

An organization for nonviolent struggle should not be unwieldy, it must not be corrupted, it should be able to put its full weight into the struggle without pursuing any basically inconsistent further objective, and it should be able to operate under a voluntary formal or informal discipline.⁸⁸ An effective system of communication between the various branches and levels of the direct action organization will usually be required. If the opponent's police measures and control of communications and transportation make such communication difficult or impossible, then the planners will need to determine in advance the points and issues on which opposition will be launched and how this will be done. Then, despite lack of contact between resistance groups, they may still be able to act, even as part of a joint action for the same objectives.⁸⁹

Regardless of the precise form which organization takes in a particular conflict situation—and that subject itself merits detailed study⁹⁰—the importance of organization for effective nonviolent action remains of high priority. As Gandhi wrote in 1920:

But the greatest thing in this campaign of non-cooperation is to evolve order, discipline, cooperation among the people, coordination among the workers. Effective non-cooperation depends upon complete organization.⁹¹

Ebert has supported this view:

The fact that the state of organization and advance preparation has been so decisive in past nonviolent campaigns suggests that nonviolent resistance can develop into an alternative to violent resistance only in so far as it assumes visible organizational shape and is adequately prepared.⁹²

Sometimes part of the preparatory organizational work will include obtaining pledges to participate in the campaign. Such pledges will often include clauses committing the signer to abide by the movement's nonviolent discipline as a contribution to success. Pledges are not a recent innovation. Pledges, oaths and agreements to carry out resistance plans, especially for nonviolent economic resistance, were widely used during the struggle of the American colonists.⁹³ In 1775, for example, radicals in Virginia sought the signature of every inhabitant in the colony to the Continental Association resistance plan adopted by the First Continental Congress.⁹⁴ The Congress had in that document pledged continued adherence to the plan until repeal of the offending laws of Parliament had been achieved.⁹⁵

Mass meetings have often been used to contact possible volunteers and to stimulate their willingness to join the coming struggle. If formal pledges are used in the campaign, signatures may then be sought. In other cases there have been no formal pledges, with reliance being placed instead on adherence to the general principles of the movement, high morale and group pressures to ensure continued participation and discipline. Where volunteers have continuing confidence in the efficacy of nonviolent action, considerable understanding of and experience in the use of this technique, and also a good grasp of the planned course of action, then the need for formal pledges may not be so severe. However, in light of existing experience, strong commitment of the volunteers to participation and adherence to the campaign's plans and standards remain crucial. Effective means for promoting these are therefore important at this and other stages of the struggle. In preparing the volunteers and the general population for the struggle, extreme attention must be given to three closely related qualities of this technique: fearlessness, nonviolence, and their corollary, openness or nonsecrecy.

OPENNESS AND SECRECY IN NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

Secrecy, deception and underground conspiracy pose very difficult problems for a movement using nonviolent action. No matter from what ideological or philosophical position one starts there is often no easy solution to them.

Believers in nonviolence as a moral principle have often asserted that an associated principle—that of truthfulness—should also be accepted

by persons using nonviolent means; they have therefore concluded that nonviolent action movements must never use secrecy. When based simply on assertions of moral principles, these arguments have generally had little influence on persons not sharing them. The relative success of these believers in influencing nonviolent action movements to operate openly and to reject secrecy is probably rooted less in the impact of their arguments than in the evidence provided by various campaigns and action projects that openness worked.

Nevertheless, some persons taking part in nonviolent struggle have at times tried to get the action organization to use secrecy and conspiratorial behavior. This has happened not only where the movement was under political dictatorship, where such an approach might seem reasonable, but even under relatively liberal political conditions, as in Britain. Within the anti-nuclear weapons Committee of 100 in its heyday, there were, for example, members who were acting, or pressing the Committee to act, by secret and conspiratorial means. They argued that it was naïve and "emotional" to attempt to apply such moral principles as openness and truthfulness to the hard reality of political struggle. The choice of tactics and the decision whether to be open or secretive must not, they maintained, be unreasonably restricted by emotion, religion or prejudices; practical answers to practical problems had to be worked out solely in light of the demands of the situation. However, if one asks what the consequences of secrecy and deception for the movement and the society are, or their effects on the dynamics of nonviolent action, or what the practical alternative means to openness in building and conducting an effective movement are, the weaknesses of the intellectual case for underground conspiratorial means become apparent.

In this section we shall look at the relationship between openness or secrecy and the dynamics of nonviolent action. We are not here concerned with moral imperatives to openness and truthfulness, but with the psychological, social and political effects of such behavior. The basic conclusion of this discussion will be contrary to what might commonly be assumed: the dynamics of this technique require that, in most situations at least, nonviolent action movements operate openly if they are to achieve their maximum strength and advantage in the struggle.

Openness in nonviolent action means that the organization backing the action act openly: that the names and activities of their leaders be revealed to the public and the opponent, that written protests be signed by the person or groups making them, that actions of protest, resistance and intervention be taken openly without attempt at deceit or hiding the

behavior. Usually it has also even meant that the opponent and often the police be directly notified in advance, usually in writing, of the date, place, time, often the names of participants, and of the type of action to be taken. Gandhi was well known for this type of behavior, typified by his letter of March 2, 1930, to Lord Irwin, the Viceroy. In that letter Gandhi said that if his appeal for major political changes were not granted by March 11, he would, with his co-workers, begin his plan to disobey the provisions of the Salt Laws. On March 12, the names, ages, and identification of those who were to march with him to the sea to make salt were published in his paper, *Young India*; the plans included provision for immediate mass civil disobedience, should he be arrested at any point before he broke the law.⁹⁶ Similar plans for action in case openness led to early arrests were followed on other occasions. Similar openness has been used by American nonviolent civil rights groups. For a long period it was followed in South Africa by the African National Congress—for example, during the 1952 Defiance Campaign.⁹⁷ This openness in nonviolent action is not, however, something new introduced by Gandhi. Openness in defiance was a prominent feature of the Russian Revolution of 1905. Father Gapon himself told the Russian government of the plans for the march to the Winter Palace with a petition on January 9, 1905 (which became "Bloody Sunday");⁹⁸ liberals during the spring of 1905 were, in contrast to previous times, "operating virtually in the open";⁹⁹ instead of repeating the former practice of indoor and secret May Day celebrations in 1905, the socialists let it be widely known that they would conduct open demonstrations accompanied by political strikes (despite police arrests "the plans were carried out, with somewhat irregular success, in scores of places throughout the country").¹⁰⁰

The problems of openness and secrecy under extreme dictatorships, especially totalitarian regimes, require special consideration. In this analysis we assume that the movement is not operating under such extreme difficulties. Improved understanding of the conditions and consequences of secrecy and openness in these milder situations may assist later examination of the problem under totalitarian conditions. However, it is not these extreme situations with which opposition groups are usually faced, even under milder dictatorships and colonialism and where civil liberties are in decline. Further, the answer to the problem of secrecy and openness in nonviolent action against totalitarian regimes does not necessarily determine the answer in the far greater number of situations more frequently faced.

However, the fact that open protest and resistance have taken place even under extreme totalitarian situations, when the actionists were improvising without special knowledge and understanding of this technique, shows that the case against the open operation of nonviolent action against totalitarian systems is not as firm and closed as many might believe. Indeed, the courage involved in such open action may strike especially hard at totalitarian systems, which are characterized by the instillation of fear and submissiveness in the subjects. Open defiance was a major characteristic of the East German Rising, for example,¹⁰¹ and in the successful resistance in Berlin in 1943 to the deportation of Jews—especially those in mixed marriages—to the extermination camps, as described briefly in Chapter Two. In his study *The Final Solution*, Reitlinger cites Goebbels's entries in his diaries in March 1943 referring to these events, including the crowd demonstration against the evacuation of a home for aged Jews which resulted in the suspension of the whole action: "We can save it up for a week or two." Even Hitler's personal complaints to Goebbels at the continued presence in Berlin of Jewish intellectuals produced no results. Goebbels wrote: "After a terrific commotion in artistic circles, particularly among actors, a number of Jews married to Aryans had to be released."¹⁰² Reitlinger concludes that this attempt to deport the partners of mixed marriages and their children, "like the euthanasia programme for the insane and incurable, was one of Hitler's defeats."¹⁰³ In the history of Nazism these were minor defeats, but these instances illustrate the simple point that openness in successful resistance was possible under even the conditions in the Third Reich.

Discussions in favor of secrecy in nonviolent action often seem to assume that it is not difficult to keep the opponent or the government from finding out what is to be kept secret. In many situations this is a very naïve assumption, both for small and large movements. While it may be possible to keep certain matters secret for some time, it is likely that sooner or later the police will learn not only the most important general intentions, but often the detailed plans as well. Modern electronic devices of various types may be used in addition to the older methods of opening the mail, telephone tapping, volunteer informers, planting of agents, spying and the like. If there are no secrets and planned action is not dependent on secrecy, such measures are not likely to impede the movement seriously. But when the implementation of plans for action depends on maintenance of secrecy, then such police methods may pose serious threats. Even under the Russian tsarist regime—which was scarcely

as efficient as modern governments—police agents and spies penetrated the revolutionists' organizations continually, frequently rising to top positions of trust.¹⁰⁴ The British government apparently tried to have informers and agents in strike organizations during the General Strike of 1926.¹⁰⁵ In Nazi Germany opposition groups had immense difficulty in keeping resistance plans secret; informers and agents frequently penetrated underground groups and even operated inside concentration camps and prisoner-of-war camps.¹⁰⁶

However, the most powerful single objection to secrecy in a nonviolent action movement is that secrecy is not only rooted in fear but that it contributes to fear. Fear is often a block to action even when people are stirred to indignation. As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, willingness to use nonviolent action depends in large degree upon the casting off of fear.

To produce change, nonviolent action operates on much more fundamental psychological, social and political levels than other techniques of action, especially more so than the several types of political violence with which conspiratorial behavior is usually associated. These more fundamental levels of operation in nonviolent action, which may produce shifts of loyalties and invisibly undermine the power of a hostile regime, often operate more quickly than dramatic acts which might only be possible by secrecy. But the more basic changes will be far more important. Therefore, it is highly dangerous to threaten the operation of those sometimes less obvious but much stronger forces by a secret effort to produce a quick temporary victory on some subordinate point. If the nonviolent actionists are to maximize their strength, they must act in harmony with the dynamics of this technique and its requirements. Especially important in these requirements are the maintenance of fearlessness and nonviolent discipline.

If—because of an inadequate understanding of their own technique and its dynamics, or because of the temptations of shortsighted expediency, or because of undisciplined behavior—the nonviolent actionists introduce into their struggle qualities and means appropriate to a violent struggle, they reverse important processes necessary for their success. At the same time they strengthen the opponent. The introduction of secrecy into a nonviolent action movement operates strongly against the maintenance of fearlessness and nonviolent discipline. Thus openness—that is, being truthful in statements and frank with the opponent and the public concerning intentions and plans—appears to be a corollary of the requirements of fearlessness and nonviolent discipline.

The openness of the movement and even its effrontery in daring to state its intentions publicly will have a significant impact on the non-violent group itself, on the opponent, and on third parties. Conversely, resorting to secrecy, deception and underground conspiracy is likely to have a detrimental impact on all three groups.

Secrecy in a nonviolent action movement is likely to involve the leaders' going into hiding and seeking to avoid arrest. Whatever the leaders' motivation may be when this happens, the impression may spread that they are in fact seeking to avoid prison or other suffering. The lack of daring leadership by example is likely to have a disastrous effect on the willingness of others in lesser positions in the movement to do anything which might lead to danger or risks that the leaders are not taking. When such leaders are caught, sometimes the opponent may feel able to impose larger penalties on them under conditions which bring the leaders and movement less sympathy and support than if the punishments were imposed after open defiance. Leaders in hiding may even under some conditions become a liability to the movement. In contrast, imprisoned nonviolent leaders who have challenged the regime openly are more likely to be seen as heroes and martyrs, disturbing the complacent and inspiring the resisters.

When there are serious attempts to maintain secrecy in a nonviolent resistance movement, an atmosphere of fear spreads—fear that plans will be discovered, fear that hidden leaders will be captured, fear that the secret organization will be broken, fear that key members and masses of supporters will be imprisoned. As this happens among actual and potential supporters, the spirit of resistance is dampened. Instead of open non-violent action demonstrating that repression is powerless, fear that secrets and plans will be revealed and that personnel will be captured permeates the movement; this leads to a kind of degeneration, demoralization and weakening which inevitably tends to undermine the movement.

Gandhi charged that resort to secrecy during the Indian 1932-33 struggle had been a prime cause for that movement's collapse. He said: ". . . the secrecy that has attended the movement is fatal to its success . . ." "There can be no doubt that fear has seized the common mass. The ordinances have cowed them down and I am inclined to think that the secret methods are largely responsible for this demoralisation." ¹⁰⁷

Certain theorists and practitioners of nonviolent struggle thus blame fear and other factors associated with secrecy for producing a series of undesirable influences which weaken the movement. It is significant that

Nehru—who, it is emphasized, did not share Gandhi's philosophical or religious beliefs nor his ethical commitment to nonviolence—had a similar view of the effects of secrecy during the campaigns of 1930-31 and 1932-33:

Our experience of 1930 and 1932 showed that it was easily possible for us to organise a secret network of information all over India. Without much effort, and in spite of some opposition, good results were produced. But many of us had the feeling that secrecy did not fit in with the spirit of civil disobedience, and produced a damping effect on the mass consciousness. As a small part of a big open mass-movement it was useful, but there was always the danger, especially when the movement was declining, of a few more or less ineffective secret activities taking the place of the mass movement. ¹⁰⁸

Secrecy is most likely to be used by a movement to maintain itself when it feels too weak to operate openly. However, the secrecy may in fact lead to fewer participants rather than more, ¹⁰⁹ not only because of the above factors, but also because, in many situations at least, the movement which is "security conscious" will have to reduce the number of people who plan and carry out policy. Under some conditions, numbers may also be reduced by the alienation of persons who were becoming sympathetic to the movement when it operated openly, but who distrust a secret political organization; this is especially likely to be the case where the nonviolent action is being applied in a society with a liberal democratic form of government.

The use of police spies, agents and informers is likely to seem more justified against a movement organized and operating on the basis of secrecy than against one which is not. Openness will not necessarily eliminate such agents. However, whether people see the use of police spies as justified or not justified, and whether or not sympathy is given to the police or to the nonviolent actionists, may influence the outcome of the conflict. It has also been suggested that secrecy concerning plans for nonviolent action may increase the chances of more brutal reaction from the opponent's forces than might have been the case had they known what to expect and had time to consider their counteraction carefully.

Secrecy may also threaten the very capacity of the movement to remain nonviolent—and this is crucial to the success of such a movement. This threat is most clearly illustrated by the problem of how to deal

with an informer or police agent in possession of information which—it is believed—the opponent must not learn if the movement is to succeed. Various nonviolent types of persuasion and pressure might be used, plans could be changed, and the agent ostracized in the future once his identity is known (see Chapter Eight), but there is no nonviolent means of guaranteeing that the agent will not pass the information to the police or others. Past revolutionary and resistance movements using both secrecy and violence have not hesitated to murder the agent (or suspected agent, for it has sometimes proved later that the suspicions were unfounded). But resort to violence in a nonviolent action movement would reverse the operation of the mechanisms of change upon which that movement depends. The attempt to apply violence only on a very selective and restricted basis is likely to alter the conflict situation radically. It is likely to contribute to a major switch from the nonviolent technique to a violent one. In turn, that switch would enhance the opponent's relative power position, since he is better equipped to wage violent struggle.

In summary, a nonviolent movement which attempts to maintain a policy of secrecy concerning its planning, actions and organization faces problems and obstacles which are likely to prove insurmountable and which will, at best, severely threaten its requirements for casting off fear and the maintenance of nonviolent discipline. It is for such reasons that in their handbook for American civil rights demonstrators Oppenheimer and Lakey wrote:

It is possible to confuse and delay the obtaining of "secret" information by your opponents in various ways. However, if your opponents are determined, this is pointless. It results in *inefficiency* because you have to cover up much that you do from your own members, *authoritarianism* because you cannot tell your members what is going on, and *mistrust*. In any case, your opponents, if they are determined, will plant "informers" and/or modern electronic devices in such a way that your activities will be an open book. You may as well open the book and be fully honest about your plans to begin with. You should try to plan tactics . . . which do not depend on secrecy for their value.¹¹⁰

Openness concerning intentions, plans, organizations and the like will also, it is argued, produce certain positive results which will help to strengthen the nonviolent group. This certainly does not imply that the movement will not face difficult problems, but openness contributes

to the growth of *genuine* strength in the movement, as distinct from showy passing feats. In nonviolent action it is the buildup of genuine strength which is required; unreal appearances of strength are never lasting, and the movement may in fact be weakened if they are sought at the expense of undermining prerequisites of nonviolent power.

There are several specific ways, it has been argued, in which openness assists the nonviolent movement. Gregg, for example, feels that a policy of openness may promote wider knowledge of the existence, aims and activities of the resistance movement, and make the opponent's attempts at censorship and suppression of news more difficult.¹¹¹ It is true that open opposition is likely to become more difficult as the society becomes less democratic. But on the other hand, it also appears that the more monolithic a society, the greater the likely impact of any dissent. News of such opposition is likely to spread widely even when it is treated with silence in the official news media.

The contrast between the contending groups when one side relies upon nonviolent action is sharpened when that group also maintains a policy of truthful statements and openness concerning its intentions and plans. The contrast between the behavior of the conflicting groups is important in influencing the sympathies of third parties. Such sympathies are of course not decisive, but at times they may be important, especially when they take the form of concrete action against the opponent or in support of the nonviolent actionists. Sympathy and support may come as well from members of the broader grievance group who have not yet joined the struggle, and even from within the opponent's group itself. Therefore behavior which contributes to changes of perception and attitudes is very important. Here the visible contrast between the two groups plays a key role.

One side resorts to violence, brutality and repression; the other persists with courage in its action, accepts the suffering as the price of change, pledges itself anew to only nonviolent means, and refuses to retaliate. One group resorts to spies, deception, tricks and secrecy, while the other announces its intentions, plans, personnel and objectives publicly. One group demonstrates fear and uncertainty as to the present and future, while the other remains calm, determined, confident and fearless. In the process, the nonviolent group actively affects the power relationships between the groups. As the movement continues and the nonviolent actionists maintain their qualities and behavior, the perception that this movement differs qualitatively from the opponent group and from conventional political groups will gradually spread. This will, in

turn, tend strongly to increase support for the nonviolent group from all sources and to weaken that for the opponent. The distinguishing qualities between the nonviolent group and the opponent will not appear so sharp if deception is used by both sides. Suspicions concerning the movement's real intentions, objectives and plans will spread, and sympathy for the actionists from third parties will be less likely.

Because nonviolent action is based upon that view of power which claims that all governments, hierarchical systems, oppression and injustice are ultimately dependent upon the submission, cooperation and assistance of the multitude of the citizens, subordinates and victims, it follows that the key to change by this technique lies in psychological and attitudinal changes among the subordinates. Feelings of apathy, impotence, fear and submissiveness will need to be shattered and replaced by their opposites. Gandhi implied that openness in defiance was necessary to break the habit of submissiveness and that a great deal of the effect of nonviolent action lay in the indifference of its users to measures for self-protection and in their willingness to take severe risks.¹¹² In the struggle to attain freedom, it was necessary to behave like free men: "A free man would not engage in a secret movement."¹¹³ Openness, Gandhi argued, contributed to the morale of the rank and file of the movement, and enhanced their dignity and respect in their own eyes and in those of the opponent and third parties. A demonstration of confidence and daring is also often needed to inspire in others confidence and willingness to take risks. Gandhi insisted on this on several occasions:

No secret organization, however big, could do any good. . . . We have to organize for action a vast people that have been crushed under the heel of unspeakable tyranny for centuries. They cannot be organized by any other than open truthful means.¹¹⁴

No underhand or underground movement can ever become a mass movement or stir millions to mass action.¹¹⁵

Only open challenge and open activity is for all to follow. Real *Swaraj* [self-rule] *must* be felt by all—man, woman and child. To labour for that consummation is true revolution. . . . The millions of India would not have been awakened but for the open, unarmed struggle. Every deviation from the straight path has meant a temporary arrest of the evolutionary revolution.¹¹⁶

Once again Nehru's experience in open action showed him the psycho-

logically liberating effects of struggle without secrecy, and also how this affected the British agents:

Above all, we had a sense of freedom and a pride in that freedom. The old feeling of oppression and frustration was completely gone. There was no more whispering, no round-about legal phraseology to avoid getting into trouble with the authorities. We said what we felt and shouted it out from the house-tops. What did we care for the consequences? Prison? We looked forward to it; that would help our cause still further. The innumerable spies and secret-service men who used to surround us and follow us about became rather pitiable individuals as there was nothing secret for them to discover. All our cards were always on the table.¹¹⁷

Honesty, openness and lack of secrecy may also have certain effects on the opponent group, at least under certain conditions. These will be especially important where the nonviolent group aims at changes in attitudes in the opponent, most clearly where conversion is attempted. This has been emphasized by Ebert:

So long as the oppressor fears the resistance fighters, i.e., so long as he is not convinced of their nonviolent attitude, he will be inclined to strengthen his own position. Only an open resistance organization can convince the oppressor that its professed belief and the demands which arise from it correspond to the true aims of the campaign.¹¹⁸

This does not mean that the opponent will immediately interpret the nonviolent group's motives, aims, intentions and plans correctly; only that this is more likely under conditions of openness than under conditions of attempted secrecy. Direct contact with the opponent group may be repeatedly sought as a means of avoiding or correcting distortions in perception which could seriously affect the course of the conflict. Advance notice to authorities of demonstrations, for example, may not only help to reduce brutalities by surprised police uncertain of what may happen, but may be interpreted as "clean fighting" and chivalry. These perceptions may contribute to increased respect for the nonviolent actionists among members of the opponent group.¹¹⁹

Usually there will be a time lag in changes in the opponent's perception of the nonviolent group, but constant repetition of behavior inconsistent with the opponent's view of members of that group may eventually lead to a correction of his perception. As Irving Janis and Daniel

Katz point out, openness may affect the opponent's view of the actionists, e.g., his view of their moral status:

Revealing material that is ordinarily kept secret may influence the rivals' attitude concerning the *moral status* of the acting group (e.g., they may become suspicious that something more important is being kept secret, or they may become much more respectful of the sincerity of the group).¹²⁰

Openness may cause a distortion in perception of their strength in either direction:

Revealing tactical plans that will handicap the acting group may influence the rivals' attitudes concerning the *strength* of the acting group (e.g., admission of one's plans may be perceived as signs of weakness and ineptness in conducting the struggle or as signs of an exceptionally powerful movement that is capable of being successful without resorting to secrecy).¹²¹

Similarly, Janis and Katz write, telling the opponent in advance of the intended plans for nonviolent action "may have the effect of increasing or decreasing the magnitude of frustration and the intensity of the aggressive impulses aroused when the deprivations subsequently materialized."¹²² This refers to the opponent's *initial* response to the action. Specialists in this technique have not claimed that openness always reduces hostility in the initial stages of a conflict, but that it tends to do so over a period of time.

There may also be even more important long-term consequences for the society as a whole of an atmosphere of secrecy, distrust and fear, or conversely of open expression of views and intentions, but these have as yet received little attention.

BASIC ELEMENTS IN NONVIOLENT STRATEGY

The strategy and tactics of war have been carefully developed and studied, and major attempts have been made to develop underlying theory. Maxims, rules and systems for conducting war have been formulated in response to "urgent want."¹²³ In the field of nonviolent action there has been to date no comparable development. Gandhi made the most important conscious efforts to develop strategy and tactics in this technique of struggle. He was, however, neither an analyst nor a theorist; hence,

despite his contribution in practice and his passing observations, the analysis and formulation of strategy and tactics have been left to others. Only comparatively recently has attention been turned to the examination of the problems and possibilities of strategy and tactics in nonviolent struggle against would-be internal dictators or invaders.¹²⁴ Attention is needed both to the broad field of strategy and tactics and to the specific problems which are likely to arise in facing particular opponents and in achieving particular objectives.

Strategy and tactics are of course present in various forms and degrees in many aspects of social life. They are, however, especially important in military action and nonviolent action, which are both techniques by which social and political conflicts are conducted when they have developed to the point of open struggle and a pitting of strength. There appear to be some points at which insights from military strategy may be carried over into nonviolent strategy; and there are also points at which military insights must *not* be carried over, because the nature and dynamics of the two techniques of struggle differ radically. This section is therefore not purely descriptive or analytical of existing observations on strategy in nonviolent action; it also involves the incorporation of principles of military strategy where these seem valid for the nonviolent technique, and where the military sources are clearer and more explicit than observations from nonviolent actionists.

Here are some brief definitions of basic strategic terms: grand strategy is the broadest conception which serves to coordinate and direct all the resources of the struggle group toward the attainment of the objectives of the conflict. Strategy, a more narrow term, is the broad plan of action for the overall struggle, including the development of an advantageous situation, the decision of when to fight, and the broad plan for utilizing various specific actions in the general conflict. Tactics refers to plans for more limited conflicts within the selected strategic plan. Fuller definitions of these terms are provided in the author's *An Abecedary of Nonviolent Action and Civilian Defense*.

A. The importance of strategy and tactics

Strategy is just as important in nonviolent action as it is in military action. While military strategic concepts and principles cannot automatically be carried over into the field of nonviolent action, the basic importance of strategy and tactics is in no way diminished. Attention is therefore needed to the general principles of strategy and tactics appropriate

to this technique (both those peculiar to it and those which may be carried over from military strategy and other types of conflict). These aspects need to be considered, of course, within the context of the unique dynamics and mechanisms of nonviolent struggle.

People from a military background may find it strange to discover certain exponents of nonviolent means stressing the importance of strategy and tactics. And people from a background in religious or philosophical nonviolence may also be surprised to find strategy and tactics stressed instead of moral principles and conscience. Therefore, some brief discussion is needed of the function of strategy and tactics in nonviolent action.

In order to influence the outcome of a struggle, it is important to choose the course of action wisely and carry it out carefully and intelligently. It is quite inadequate simply to say that one will be moral and do what is right, for there may be several courses of action which are all morally "right"; what is "right" may involve maintaining or creating maximum opposition to "evil," and if so the problem is how to do this; in order to meet one's moral responsibility and maximize the effects of one's action, those actions must be carefully chosen and carried out at the right time. Specialists in the study and conduct of war have long since learned that the best results were not achieved simply by an uncontrolled outburst of violence and sacrifice. As Liddell Hart has said: ". . . the conduct of war must be controlled by reason if its object is to be fulfilled. . . . The better your strategy, the easier you will gain the upper hand, and the less it will cost you."¹²⁵ As in war, strategy and tactics are used in nonviolent action so that the courage, sacrifice, numbers, and so on of the nonviolent actionists may make the greatest possible impact.

The course of the struggle may take any of a wide variety of forms, depending on the strategies, tactics and methods chosen to meet the particular needs of the situation. The specific acts of protest, noncooperation and intervention in the course of a nonviolent campaign will be most effective if they fit together as parts of a comprehensive whole, so that each specific action contributes in a maximum way to the development and successful conclusion of the struggle. The optimal combination of specific actions is therefore best achieved where leaders with an adequate grasp of the situation and the technique are able to chart the course of the campaigns. "Only the general who conducts a campaign can know the objective of each particular move," wrote Gandhi.¹²⁶ Gandhi chose the issues, places, times and methods of action with extreme care, so that his movement was placed in the strongest position possible *vis-à-vis* the British, and so that the actions themselves conveyed the greatest under-

standing to his fellow Indians and aroused the maximum sympathy and support from everyone. Just as strategy is important in labor strikes,¹²⁷ so it is important in more highly developed types of nonviolent struggle—even more so when it is directed against extreme dictatorships.

There is ample historical evidence of the importance of strategy and tactics.¹²⁸ Sometimes this evidence is of a negative type, showing effects of the absence of strategy or of failure to make important decisions on strategic and tactical questions. Sometimes difficult problems which arose in the course of given conflicts could have been avoided or more satisfactorily resolved had there been greater understanding of the role and principles of nonviolent strategy. On other occasions, nonviolent campaigns have been continued after the point when achievement of almost all the objectives and demands was possible—far more than is usually the case in military conflicts; subsequent events then led to the defeat of the movement. Or in other cases the nonviolent movement *regarded* itself as defeated even though by normal standards it was victorious; as a result, that nonviolent action was eventually replaced by military action which was *believed* to be more effective. The American colonists' struggles against the British government can without difficulty be interpreted in this way. Considerable light would be shed on the problems and general principles of nonviolent strategy if careful strategic and tactical analyses were undertaken of a series of nonviolent struggles. It is also important to have acceptance by the grievance group of the strategy for the struggle; in the case of Finland in 1901, disagreement on *how* to deal with the opponent seems to have severely accentuated existing internal conflicts.¹²⁹

B. Some key elements in nonviolent strategy and tactics

Despite the relative absence of strategic analyses of past nonviolent struggles and the lack of systematic studies of basic principles of nonviolent strategy, it is possible to list certain fairly clear general principles which have taken concrete form in particular struggles. Clausewitz wrote that in the case of war it was easier to make a theory of tactics than of strategy.¹³⁰ Both theories are very difficult in nonviolent action, and the list of principles offered here is necessarily incomplete and provisional.

1. The indirect approach to the opponent's power The technique of nonviolent action can be regarded as an extreme development of "the indirect approach" to military strategy as formulated by Liddell Hart, and discussed earlier in this chapter.

Liddell Hart argued that direct strategy consolidates the opponent's

strength, while an indirect approach is militarily more sound; generally effective results have followed when the plan of action has had "such indirectness as to ensure the opponent's unreadiness to meet it." Therefore, instead of a direct attack on the opponent's positions of strength, Liddell Hart emphasized the importance of psychological factors; the purpose of strategy then becomes "to diminish the possibility of resistance . . ." "Dislocation" of the enemy is crucial, he insisted, in achieving the conditions for victory, and the dislocation must be followed by "exploitation" of the opportunity created by the position of insecurity. It thus becomes important "to nullify opposition by paralysing the power to oppose" and to make "the enemy do something wrong."¹³¹ These general principles are all applicable to the use of nonviolent action against an opponent using military means, so that the opponent's means of action are always confronted indirectly and his power of repression made to rebound against him in a kind of political *jiu-jitsu*. Finally, the very sources of his power are reduced or removed without having been confronted directly by the same means of action.

2. Psychological elements Some of the psychological elements in military war have equivalents in "war without violence." But the carry-over is not automatic. For example, surprise has been regarded as an essential element in certain types of military strategy. In nonviolent action, however, such objectives as throwing the enemy off guard, benefiting from his incapacity to meet the attack, and so on, which surprise has been intended to produce, are likely to a significant degree to be achieved simply by insistence on using a technique different from that of the opponent in the struggle. At times, however, the element of surprise in nonviolent action may operate to the detriment of the nonviolent actionists, by increasing the possibility of jumpiness among troops which may in turn mean more severe repression and less chance of disaffection among them.

Morale among the actionists will be important in nonviolent conflict just as it is in military conflict. It will be crucial for the population as a whole to understand well that the opponent's military might does not give him either control or victory. Confidence in nonviolent action would be fundamental, along with the qualities of "a warlike people" as described by Clausewitz: "bravery, aptitude, powers of endurance and enthusiasm."¹³²

3. Geographical and physical elements Neither possession of nor gaining of control over particular places is regarded even in military war as important for its own sake but as "intermediate links," as "means of

gaining greater superiority" so as finally to achieve victory.¹³³ While not to be *totally* ignored in nonviolent action, these elements assume a considerably lesser role, because the technique of struggle is dependent primarily upon the will and actions of human beings rather than on possession of geographical positions. It is possible, for example, for a territory to be physically occupied by troops without the regime which commands them having effective control over the population of the territory. Particular places, buildings and so on may on occasion become important in nonviolent action, especially where they have high symbolic value; in such cases, the methods of nonviolent obstruction, nonviolent raids and nonviolent invasion are likely to be applied. Even then, however, the physical possession of particular points is of secondary importance to the fulfillment of the conditions which make possible the operation of the mechanisms of change in nonviolent action. There are other geographical and physical elements; on occasion the terrain, time of day and weather may be important, and there may be "camps" for volunteers and hospitals to care for the wounded.

A careful nonviolent strategist is likely to be attentive to the choice of the place at which given acts of opposition are to be undertaken. Gandhi usually paid considerable attention to this point, as was illustrated by his plans for civil disobedience of the Salt Laws in 1930. As the place where he would make salt and spark the national struggle, Gandhi chose the little-known Dandi beach on the Gulf of Cambay, not significant in itself, but a point which allowed Gandhi and his followers to walk for twenty-six days—the now-famous Salt March—during which time he could arouse public interest and focus attention on his plans for civil disobedience.¹³⁴ Also during his investigation of the plight of the peasants in Champaran, Bihar, in 1917, when Gandhi expected arrest he went to Bettiah, preferring to be arrested among the most poverty-stricken peasants of the district.¹³⁵

4. Timing The timing of the implementation of tactics can be extremely important in nonviolent action. This timing may be of several types. For example, it is necessary to be able to judge when people are ready to take direct action, and also when a call for action would meet only a weak response or be ignored.¹³⁶ Timing needs to be considered in light of the whole situation; Nehru paid tribute to Gandhi's ability to do this when he wrote: ". . . he knows his India well and reacts to her lightest tremors, and gauges a situation accurately and almost instinctively, and has a knack of acting at the psychological moment."¹³⁷

It has been argued that the Irish "No-Rent Manifesto" would have been more successful if issued in February 1881—as the extreme wing of the Land League wanted—instead of six months later, after the leaders had been jailed and reforms were dampening the will to resist.¹³⁸

Sometimes the launching of nonviolent action may be timed to coincide with some significant day or occasion. The choice of April 6, 1930, as the start of the Indian civil disobedience campaign, for example, coincided with the beginning of National Week, which was observed in homage to the victims of the Amritsar Massacre of 1919.¹³⁹ Timing may also be important in another sense. The hour and minute at which given nonviolent actionists are to be at certain places and the synchronization of actions of various groups may be crucial; this has been the case in certain student actions in the U.S. South.¹⁴⁰

In still a different sense, timing may refer to the choice of the stage at which to resist an opponent who is attempting to impose or extend his control over a society. On occasion, the opponent's demands and action may require prompt reaction and resistance if his efforts to establish or extend control are to be thwarted. In the case of an invasion, for example, this may be particularly true at three points. The first occurs after the formal seizure of power and the occupation of the country. The second is at the stage when the invader seeks the collaboration and assistance of important groups, such as police, civil service and trade unions. The last is at the point where he attempts to destroy the independent social institutions, bring all organizations and institutions under his control, and atomize the population. When each of these attacks occurs, it will be important that resistance be undertaken without delay and that people do not "wait and see" or just drift. Only prompt action can be effective. In other conflict situations, the timing of action at various stages of the struggle may also be important.

5. Numbers and strength While numbers may be extremely important both in nonviolent action and in military action,¹⁴¹ they are certainly not the only important factor and do not guarantee victory. It is fallacious to attempt "to analyze and theorize about strategy in terms of mathematics" and to assume that victory is determined simply by "a superior concentration of force at a selected place."¹⁴² In nonviolent action—especially when nonviolent coercion is being attempted, as in a general strike or a mutiny—numbers may at times be decisive. But numbers must not be considered alone; large numbers may even be a disadvantage, either for tactical reasons or because discipline and reliability have been sacrificed to obtain them, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Particular

tactics and methods may in the given circumstances have their own requirements concerning the numbers of actionists. Large numbers unable to maintain nonviolent discipline and to continue action in face of repression may weaken the movement, but with the necessary standards and discipline they may become "irresistible."¹⁴³

6. The issue and concentration of strength If there are to be wise strategy and tactics for conducting nonviolent action most effectively, then a careful selection of the points on which to fight is crucial, as discussed above. In conventional military campaigns, such points may in large degree be determined by consideration of topography, supplies and the like. But in nonviolent campaigns they are almost exclusively determined by political, psychological, social and economic factors.

There is no substitute for genuine strength in nonviolent action. If this is lacking, then the attempt to fight for an objective which is too vast to be achieved may be unwise. To be effective, nonviolent action needs to be concentrated at crucial points which are selected after consideration of one's own strength, the objectives and position of the opponent (including his weaknesses), and the importance of the issue itself. Napoleon's maxim that it is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point applies here as well.¹⁴⁴ In selecting that point consideration must also be given to the probable consequences if that particular battle is either lost or won. This is very closely related to the first of the axioms of military strategy and tactics outlined by Liddell Hart:

Adjust your end to your means. In determining your object, clear sight and cool calculation should prevail. It is folly "to bite off more than you can chew," and the beginning of military wisdom is a sense of what is possible. So learn to face facts while still preserving faith: there will be ample need for faith—the faith that can achieve the apparently impossible—when action begins. Confidence is like the current in a battery: avoid exhausting it in vain effort—and remember that your own continued confidence will be of no avail if the cells of your battery, the men upon whom you depend, have been run down.¹⁴⁵

There may be particular circumstances, such as the attempt to atomize the population, which may require that action be taken despite weaknesses; but even then consideration of one's real strength is required, and in formulating strategy and tactics an attempt should be made to see if the existing strength can be used to best advantage and the weaknesses either bypassed or urgently corrected.

"The principles of war, not merely one principle, can be condensed into a single word—'concentration.' But for truth this needs to be amplified as the 'concentration of strength against weakness.'" ¹⁴⁶ This principle of military action applies also in nonviolent action and was stressed by Gandhi. Concentration in nonviolent struggles will primarily be on certain political, social or economic points which symbolize wider general conditions. This is related to another of Liddell Hart's axioms: "*Keep your object always in mind, while adapting your plan to circumstances. Realize that there are more ways than one of gaining an object, but take heed that every objective should bear on the object.*" ¹⁴⁷ Nonviolent actionists will seek to attack the specific aspect which symbolizes the "evil" they are fighting, which is least defensible by the opponent and which is capable of arousing the greatest strength among the nonviolent actionists and the wider population. Success on such a limited point will increase their self-confidence and ability to move forward effectively toward the fuller realization of their objectives. Having chosen the point for concentrated attack, they must not allow themselves to become sidetracked to a lesser course of action or a dead-end issue. ¹⁴⁸

7. The initiative In nonviolent action it is highly important—even in defensive phases of the struggle—for the actionists to obtain and retain the initiative. "An able general always gives battle in his own time on the ground of his choice. He always retains the initiative in these respects and never allows it to pass into the hands of the enemy," wrote Gandhi. ¹⁴⁹ One of the important distinctions indicated by Nehru between the 1930 campaign—which could be described at least as a "draw"—and the 1932 campaign, which was a clear defeat for the Indians, was that in 1930 the "initiative definitely remained with the Congress and the people" whereas "the initiative early in 1932 was definitively with the Government, and Congress was always on the defensive." ¹⁵⁰ The nonviolent leadership group needs to be able to control the situation and to demonstrate that it has that control. ¹⁵¹ Nirmal Kumar Bose writes that a leader of a nonviolent campaign ". . . should not allow the adversary to dictate or force any step upon him . . . [nor] allow himself to be buffeted about by every temporary event." ¹⁵² Wherever possible, then, the nonviolent group, not the opponent, will choose the time, issue and course of action and seek to maintain the initiative despite the opponent's repression. In cases where the conflict has been precipitated by the opponent, as in a *coup d'état* or invasion or when new repressive measures are imposed, the nonviolent actionists will endeavor to restore the initiative to themselves as quickly as possible.

C. The choice of weapons

In order to achieve optimal results, the choice of nonviolent weapons to initiate and conduct the campaign will need to be made carefully and wisely. It will be necessary to determine which of the specific methods of nonviolent action described in Part Two (and possibly other methods) are most appropriate to this particular conflict. This decision will need to be taken in the light of a variety of factors. These include the issues at stake, the nature of the contending groups, the type of culture and society of each, and the social and political context of the conflict. Other factors are the mechanisms of change intended by the nonviolent group (as to convert or to coerce), the experience of the nonviolent group, and their ability in applying nonviolent action. Finally, there are also the type of repression and other countermeasures expected, the ability of the nonviolent group to withstand them, and the intensities of commitment to the struggle within the nonviolent group. There are of course others.

The number of methods used in any single conflict will vary from only one to dozens. The choice of the specific methods to be used in a given campaign will be based on several factors. One of these is a judgment as to whether or not the basic characteristics of the method contain qualities desired for that particular conflict. For example, generally speaking, the methods of the class of nonviolent protest and persuasion (Chapter Three) are largely symbolic in their effect and produce an awareness of the existence of dissent. Their impact is proportionately greater under authoritarian regimes where opposition and nonconformity are discouraged and rare. Depending on the numbers involved, the methods of noncooperation (Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven) are likely to cause difficulties in maintaining the normal operation and efficiency of the system. In extreme situations, these methods may threaten its existence. The methods of nonviolent intervention (Chapter Eight) possess qualities of both groups, but in addition usually constitute a more direct challenge to the regime. This class of methods makes possible a greater impact with smaller numbers, providing that fearlessness and discipline are maintained.

Moving from the class of nonviolent protest and persuasion to that of noncooperation and thence to nonviolent intervention generally involves a progressive increase in the degree of sacrifice required of the nonviolent actionists, in the risk of disturbing the public peace and order, and in effectiveness. The methods of noncooperation can be interpreted as withdrawal of cooperation from an evil system, and hence as having connotations of a defensive moral action. The use of this class of methods, as

compared to nonviolent intervention, may also contribute to producing a *relatively* less explosive and dangerous social situation, in that they simply withdraw existing cooperation or withhold new forms of cooperation with the opponent.¹⁵³ The penalties and sufferings imposed directly or indirectly upon noncooperators, although severe at times, may be relatively less than those involved in nonviolent intervention. Also, the risk of such repression in any particular case may be less. It may also be easier to get people to refrain from doing something which has been ordered, i.e., to noncooperate, than to get them to do something daring which is prohibited.

For effective noncooperation, larger numbers of participants are usually required than for either symbolic protest or intervention, and the action usually continues over longer periods of time. Often a long duration is necessary for the noncooperation to achieve its impact. In 1930 Gandhi said that whereas the cooperation of three hundred million people would be necessary for a foreign-cloth boycott campaign to be successful, for the civil disobedience campaign an army of ten thousand defiant men and women would suffice.¹⁵⁴ Many of the methods of nonviolent intervention can only be practiced for limited periods of time. A continuous effect therefore is achieved only by constant repetition of the action. These methods therefore require more skilled, reliable and determined practitioners than methods of noncooperation. Because of this, the quicker methods of nonviolent intervention usually require considerable preparations in order to be successfully applied. Also, those methods are often best combined with other forms of nonviolent action. The movement using intervention methods, too, must be more highly disciplined and better led. "The quickest remedies are always fraught with the greatest danger and require the utmost skill in handling them."¹⁵⁵

Another important factor in the selection of the specific methods to be used in the campaign is whether the actionists intend to produce change by the mechanism of conversion, accommodation, or nonviolent coercion. Within that context, the specific inducements for change by the opponent which the nonviolent group is attempting to produce may be important; these may include, for example, economic losses, weakening of political position, guilt feelings, new perceptions, and the like. Where conversion of the opponent is sought, such methods as the general strike, mutiny and parallel government are obviously not appropriate. But where nonviolent coercion is intended these may be precisely the methods needed, whereas forms which rely for their impact on psychological and emotional effects on the leaders of the opponent group may be a waste of time and

effort. The problem is complicated, however, and frequently methods which apply differing pressures and use different mechanisms may be combined effectively within the same campaign. Fast rules are not possible.

In most cases more than one method will be used; then the order in which the methods are applied, the ways in which they are combined, and how they influence the application of other methods and contribute to the struggle as a whole become highly important. The methods to be used in a given situation must be considered not only for their specific and immediate impact on the conflict situation and the opponent. Also important is their contribution to the progressive development of the movement, to changes in attitudes and power relationships, to alterations in the support for each side, and to the later application and effects of more radical nonviolent methods.

Sometimes the combination of methods is relatively simple, especially in a local or limited type of action. Economic boycotts have been used, for example, in support of sit-ins against racial discrimination, and picketing is commonly used in support of strikes. When a general strike is used to support the mutiny of government troops, however, the situation begins to become more complicated, with larger numbers of methods likely to become involved quickly.

For large-scale planned campaigns against determined opponents the question of how to combine the use of several methods is not easy to answer; it must be considered in the context both of the overall strategy of the struggle and its more localized and restricted phases. In a long struggle phasing is highly important, and the choice and sequence of methods may be the most important single factor in that phasing. Was-kow speaks, for example, of the "escalation" of disorder without violence."¹⁵⁶ The importance of this phased development of a nonviolent campaign has been stressed by specialists in Gandhi's type of nonviolent action, such as Bose¹⁵⁷ and Bondurant. As one of nine "fundamental rules" of *satyagraha* Bondurant lists:

*Progressive advancement of the movement through steps and stages determined to be appropriate within the given situation. Decision as to when to proceed to a further phase of the satyagraha must be carefully weighed in the light of the ever-changing circumstance, but a static condition must be avoided.*¹⁵⁸

It may, therefore, be determined that certain methods must precede others, in order that it may be possible later to use more radical forms.

Gandhi frequently used the response of the volunteers and public to

some specific action as a means of testing whether or not some further, more radical, form of action were possible, in such terms as degree of commitment, willingness to act, ability to withstand the opponent's sanctions, degree of discipline, and ability to remain both fearless and nonviolent. In his testimony before the Hunter Committee in 1920, for example, Gandhi said:

Hartal was designed to strike the imagination of the people and the government. . . I had no means of understanding the mind of India except by some such striking movement. *Hartal* was a proper indication to me how far I would be able to carry civil disobedience.¹⁵⁹

He also used the consumer's boycott to test readiness for civil disobedience. Gandhi wrote in 1921: "It is my firm conviction that if we bring about a successful boycott of foreign cloth, we shall have produced an atmosphere that would enable us to inaugurate civil disobedience on a scale that no Government can resist."¹⁶⁰

In May 1920 Gandhi had reported in *Young India* that the organizers of the coming noncooperation movement had decided that it should take place in four stages: 1) relinquishment of honorary posts and titles, 2) progressive voluntary withdrawal from government employment, 3) withdrawal of members of the police and the military from government service ("a distant goal"), and 4) suspension of payment of taxes ("still more remote").¹⁶¹ The first stage involved the minimum danger and sacrifice,¹⁶² while the last two involved the greatest risks.¹⁶³

The 1930-31 movement was planned with a different strategy. It began with methods of nonviolent protest, such as the Salt March itself and mass meetings, and mild forms of political noncooperation, such as limited withdrawals from the provincial legislatures—all involving small numbers of people. The mass movement itself began directly with civil disobedience of a law regarded as immoral, and then developed to include both milder forms of noncooperation and more radical forms of noncooperation and nonviolent intervention.¹⁶⁴

D. Selecting the strategy and tactics

The general strategy, types of tactics, and choice of methods planned by the leaders in advance will usually determine the general direction and conduct of the campaign throughout its course. Their selection is therefore highly important. As in war, a large number of factors must be considered in the selection of strategy and tactics. However, the quite differ-

ent dynamics and mechanisms of nonviolent struggle appear to make the interrelationships of these factors more intimate and complex than in military struggle.

Fundamental to this task is careful consideration of the opponent's primary and secondary objectives, and the various objectives of the nonviolent group. It will be highly important to evaluate accurately the opponent's and one's own strengths and weaknesses, and to take these into account in the formulation of strategy and tactics. Failure to do so may lead either to overly ambitious plans which fail because they are not based on a realistic assessment of possibilities, or to excessively timid plans which may fail precisely because they attempt too little. Evaluation of the strengths and nature of the opponent group may assist the nonviolent leadership in formulating a course of action most likely to produce or aggravate weaknesses and internal conflicts within it. Correct assessment of the weaknesses of the nonviolent group itself may be used in the selection of strategy and tactics which are intended to bypass them, and which may possibly also contribute to strengthening them. Estimates as to the length of the forthcoming struggle will be needed and will be important for outlining the course of action. But provision must also be made for an error of judgment in such estimates and for contingency tactics if the struggle turns out to be long instead of brief.

Careful consideration of other factors in the general situation will be necessary to determine whether conditions are suitable for the launching of nonviolent action, and, if so, what the general and specific conditions of the situation mean for the planning of the campaign. Sibley has emphasized that

. . . the effective use of nonviolent resistance depends not only on adequate training and commitment, but also on the "objective" situation: external conditions must be ripe for effective campaigns, and if they are not, it is the part both of wisdom and of morality not to resort to nonviolent resistance.¹⁶⁵

Gandhi insisted that in formulating and carrying out the strategy and tactics of the struggle the leaders need to be responsive to the demonstrated qualities of their movement and to the developing situation:

In a satyagraha campaign the mode of fight and the choice of tactics, e.g. whether to advance or retreat, offer civil resistance or organize nonviolent strength through constructive work and purely selfless humanitarian service, are determined according to the exigencies of the situation.¹⁶⁶

Strategy and tactics are of course interdependent. Precise tactics can only be formulated in the context of the overall strategy, and an intimate understanding of the whole situation and the specific methods of action which are open. Skillful selection and implementation of tactics will not make up for a bad overall strategy, and a good strategy remains impotent unless carried to fulfillment with sound tactics: “. . . only great tactical results can lead to great strategical ones . . .”¹⁶⁷

Liddell Hart has suggested that the particular course of action should have more than one objective.

Take a line of operation which offers alternate objectives. For you will thus put your opponent on the horns of a dilemma, which goes far to assure the chance of gaining one objective at least—whichever he guards least—and may enable you to gain one after the other.

Alternative objectives allow you to keep the opportunity of gaining an objective; whereas a single objective, unless the enemy is helplessly inferior, means the certainty that you will not gain it—once the enemy is no longer uncertain as to your aim. There is no more common mistake than to confuse a single line of operation, which is usually wise, with a single objective, which is usually futile.¹⁶⁸

To a large degree this frequently happens in nonviolent action anyhow without particular planning, since the nonviolent group aims at achieving both particular objectives and more general changes in attitudes and power relationships within each group and between the contending groups. These more general changes are likely to be taking place during the whole course of the conflict, and may be achieved to a considerable degree even in instances where the particular political goal is not won. However, attention is also needed to the possibility of applying Liddell Hart's strategic principle to concrete limited goals, so long as this does not violate the principle of concentration discussed previously.

The progressive development of the movement, partially characterized by the staged introduction of new methods of action (as discussed in the previous section), will also benefit from careful strategic planning. Such development will help to ensure that the alteration of methods and new courses of action will contribute to the maximum utilization of the actionists' forces, facilitate an improvement in their morale, and increase the chances of victory. Without clear strategic insight, changes from one type of action to another may take place without good purpose or effect, and the discouraging results which may follow can lead first to increased uncertainty as to what to do, then to demoralization, and finally to disintegration of the nonviolent movement.

Strategic phasing of nonviolent campaigns is not new of course. However, greater understanding of the nature of the technique and of principles of strategy now make possible a fuller development and more effective utilization of such phasing than has been possible before. Three earlier examples of phasing are offered here. The provincial convention of Virginia, meeting in early August 1774, outlined a phased campaign of economic noncooperation to achieve its objectives. The convention set dates at which new phases of their campaign were to go into effect, subject to alterations agreed to by Virginia delegates in the Continental Congress. Starting at once, no tea was to be imported or used. If Boston were compelled to reimburse the East India Company for losses (as of tea in the Boston Tea Party), the boycott would be extended to all articles sold by the company until the money was returned. On November 1, an absolute boycott was to be imposed on all goods (except medicines) imported directly or indirectly from Britain, including all slaves from wherever they were brought. If colonial grievances were not corrected by August 10, 1775 (a year later), then an absolute program of nonexportation of all articles to Britain was to be imposed. The year interval before nonexportation took effect allowed for payment of debts to British merchants, and for Virginia tobacco growers to shift to crops which could be used at home.¹⁶⁹ This phased campaign drafted by Virginians foreshadowed the program adopted by the First Continental Congress.

A phased campaign of peasant action was issued in Russia by the Second Congress of the Peasants Union, meeting in Moscow in November 1905, during the revolution of that year. The Congress called for the use of methods of peaceful pressure (such as the peasants' collective refusal to buy or rent land from the landlords) to achieve the free transfer of land to the peasants. If these methods did not produce results, then the Union would call for a general agrarian strike to coincide with a general strike in the cities. If the tsarist government harassed the Union, it would call on the peasants to refuse to pay taxes or to serve in the armed forces.¹⁷⁰

The Pan-Africanists in South Africa had planned their campaign of defiance of the Pass Laws in the spring of 1960 as simply the first stage of a three-front long-range struggle: 1) *political*, with the international aim of isolating South Africa (including United Nations condemnation and expulsion from the British Commonwealth) and the domestic aim of ending collaboration and submission by the African people upon which the government depended; 2) *labor*, the withdrawal of cheap African labor would bring an economic collapse, and therefore stay-at-home strikes

were designed to induce industrialists to demand changes in government policies; and 3) *psychological*, the Africans "would discover the power they have even without weapons and they would never be the same again." Despite clear thought and certain planning for a phased campaign, however, the organization had not anticipated that the government would seize the initiative by declaring a state of emergency.¹⁷¹

While specific tactics for the later stages of the struggle cannot be formulated in advance, it is possible to explore a variety of general approaches for later consideration. Tactics for use in the early (and possibly intermediate) stages may, however, be successfully selected in advance if one has accurately anticipated the situation and form of attack.

A variety of approaches may be used in tactics, involving different fronts, groups, time periods, methods and other factors. For example, the brunt of the responsibility for carrying out the action may, after certain periods of time or certain political events, be shifted from one group to another, or different roles may be assigned to particular groups. The most dangerous tasks (involving, for example, the use of the most daring methods, such as those of nonviolent intervention) could be assigned to groups with especially high discipline, experience, skill, or training, while other important but less dangerous tasks could be undertaken by groups more typical of the general population. At times particular responsibilities would fall upon certain occupational or geographical groups because of the policies and actions of the opponent. Where the initiative lay with the nonviolent actionists, they could deliberately choose to undertake simultaneous actions on more than one front if their strength and the general situation were such as to make this wise. At times tactics could involve geographical fronts as well as political fronts, as in the use of nonviolent raids or obstruction; far more often, however, there would be no semblance of a geographical front and the resistance would be more diffuse and general, as in the case of a stay-at-home. The selection of tactics will be influenced significantly by the immediate and long-term political aims of the nonviolent actionists, and by the mechanisms through which change is sought. Various types of tactics will produce different problems for the usurper and have different effects on the nonviolent population.

Variation in tactics may be important in order to add variety and interest (and often newsworthiness) to the campaign. Such changes may serve other purposes, such as to involve new sections of the population, to augment psychological, political and economic pressures on the opponent, expand or contract the front and to test the discipline, morale and

capacity of the nonviolent actionists. Tactical changes may be designed to achieve a variety of effects on the opponent, leadership, bystanders, or police and troops charged with repression. For example, Ebert points to the deliberate use in some cases of small groups of demonstrators (instead of large ones) and time gaps between demonstrations (instead of continuous ones), as means of reducing brutality in the repression by making it easier for the opponent's police and troops to see the actionists as individual human beings, and by allowing them time for reflection and reconsideration between particular demonstrations.¹⁷²

The unrolling of the strategy and implementation of tactics in specific acts takes place in a context of a sensitivity and responsiveness to the developing conflict situation. Very careful and precise plans may have been prepared for commencing the attack. Following the beginning of the struggle, however, room must be allowed for flexibility in the further development, modification and application of the strategy and tactics.¹⁷³ Liddell Hart has emphasized the importance of flexibility in the formulation and implementation of the anticipated course of action:

Ensure that both plan and disposition are flexible—adaptable to circumstances. Your plan should foresee and provide for a next step in case of success or failure, or partial success—which is the most common case in war. Your dispositions (or formation) should be such as to allow this exploitation or adaptation in the shortest possible time.¹⁷⁴

The capacity to respond to unforeseen (or unforeseeable) events must be acutely developed. Especially important is the response, morale and behavior of the nonviolent actionists and potential supporters. If they have proved too unprepared and weak to carry out the plans, the plans must be altered, either by taking "some dramatic step which will strike the imagination of the people, and restore confidence in the possibility of full resistance through nonviolence," or by calling a temporary retreat in order to prepare for a future stronger effort.¹⁷⁵ There is no substitute for, or shortcut to, strength in a movement of nonviolent action. If the necessary strength and ability to persist in face of penalties and suffering do not exist, that fact must be recognized and given an intelligent response. "A wise general does not wait till he is actually routed; he withdraws in time in an orderly manner from a position which he knows he would not be able to hold."¹⁷⁶ The leadership will, just as in a military conflict, need to recognize frankly the weaknesses in their volunteers and potential supporters and find ways of correcting these.¹⁷⁷

The means for doing this will vary with the conditions of the given situation.

On the other hand, the struggle may reveal significant weaknesses in the opponent which may call for prompt alteration of the tactics and speeding up the tempo of the struggle. At times, too, the struggle may reveal the nonviolent actionists and the general population to be stronger than had been expected, and then it may be possible to make a more rapid advance on a sound basis than originally conceived.

THE ULTIMATUM

If negotiations with the opponent are not showing signs of producing satisfactory results, the strategy and early tactics must be settled, and various types of organizational preparations completed. In some types of nonviolent struggle—primarily Gandhian or neo-Gandhian—the next stage will be the issuance of an ultimatum to the opponent. In other traditions of nonviolent struggle there may be no ultimatum, because the idea is unknown, because the planners hope to take the opponent by surprise, because the conflict has already broken out spontaneously, or for some other reason. Where the ultimatum is used, however, it is very similar to ultimatums which in the old days used to be issued by governments before they declared war on their opponent: the demands are stated, and an offer is made to cancel plans for attack if the opponent grants those demands (or a major part of them) by a given day and hour.¹⁷⁸

Like negotiations, the ultimatum is intended to influence both the opponent and the general public. Negotiations are aimed not only at influencing the opponent to grant the demands of the nonviolent group through greater appreciation of their justice and for other reasons, including that granting them may be the better part of political wisdom. Negotiations—especially long, sincere negotiations which have really sought a solution short of open struggle—may also help to put the adversary in the wrong in the eyes of all concerned and to bring sympathy to the nonviolent group for attempting diligently and patiently to find a peaceful settlement. Similarly, the ultimatum may be intended to encourage the opponent to agree to the demands, by telling him in clear terms the consequences of a failure to achieve a mutually agreed change in the matters at stake. At the same time, however, the ultimatum is also a means of showing everyone who may be interested that, while maintaining firmness and dignity, the nonviolent group is giving the opponent one last chance

to settle the conflict peacefully. This may endow the nonviolent group with an aura of defensiveness—which may be psychologically advantageous in several ways—even while they are preparing for militant nonviolent action. An ultimatum may also be important in building up morale and willingness to act in the grievance group.

In its ultimatum the leaders of the nonviolent group list their grievances and demands without exaggeration. A time limit is set for the granting of these minimum demands. This ultimatum may be likened to a conditional declaration of war. The nonviolent group may in the ultimatum include assurances to the opponent intended to correct misunderstandings and remove fears he may have about the group and their objectives, and it may remind him that only nonviolent means are intended. Without compromising basic issues and principles, the ultimatum may be worded in such a way as to leave the opponent a way of saving face. The nonviolent group hopes that the opponent will grant the demands and that the threatened action will thus be avoided. If not, the time will have arrived for nonviolent action.

On occasion an ultimatum may take the form of a general public declaration—intended for the opponent and others—of what will happen if the demands are not met by a given date. This may be a part of a plan of escalation of resistance. This type of ultimatum was included in the plan for American colonial resistance, the Continental Association, adopted by the First Continental Congress. The nonimportation phase had already begun in late 1774, but the nonexportation phase was to be launched a year after the meeting of the Continental Congress—if victory had not by then been achieved:

The earnest desire we have, not to injure our fellow-subjects in Great-Britain, Ireland, or the West-Indies, induces us to suspend a non-exportation until the tenth day of September, 1775; at which time, if the said acts and parts of acts of the British parliament herein after mentioned are not repealed, we will not, directly or indirectly, export any merchandise or commodity whatsoever to Great-Britain, Ireland, or the West-Indies, except rice to Europe.¹⁷⁹

Ultimatums have also been issued in the course of unplanned nonviolent resistance, as during the French army mutiny in 1917 when defiant soldiers intended for the 162nd Regiment demonstrated on May 20 at the XXXIInd Corps replacement depot demanding more pay, more leave, and better food, and in the evening elected three delegates to present their ultimatum.¹⁸⁰

The 1952 Defiance Campaign in South Africa was preceded by an ultimatum to the government from the African National Congress, which stated:

At the recent annual conference of the African National Congress held in Bloemfontein from 15th to 17th December, 1951, the whole policy of the Government was reviewed, and, after serious and careful consideration of the matter, conference unanimously resolved to call upon your Government, as we hereby do, to repeal the aforementioned Acts, by NOT LATER THAN THE 29TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 1952, failing which the African National Congress will hold protest demonstrations and meetings on the 6th day of April 1952, as a prelude to the implementation of the plan for the defiance of unjust laws.¹⁸¹

The classic ultimatum in the tradition of Gandhian nonviolent struggle remains Gandhi's letter to the British Viceroy, Lord Irwin, written on March 2, 1930. He began the long letter by addressing the representative of the King-Emperor simply as "Dear Friend." Gandhi then went straight to the point: "Before embarking on civil disobedience and taking the risk I have dreaded to take all these years, I would fain approach you and find a way out." No harm was intended to any Englishman, Gandhi continued, although he held British rule to be a curse. As no significant steps toward independence had been taken, there was now no option, he wrote, but to carry out the 1928 Indian National Congress decision to declare independence if the British had not acted in that direction by the end of 1929. Gandhi then stated why, as he saw it, the British had not acted: "It seems as clear as daylight that responsible British statesmen do not contemplate any alteration in British policy that might adversely affect Britain's commerce with India or require an impartial and close scrutiny of Britain's transactions with India." Unless something were done, Gandhi predicted, the already severe exploitation would continue and India would "be bled at an ever increasing speed."

This Gandhi could not tolerate: ". . . if India is to live as a nation, if the slow death by starvation of her people is to stop, some remedy must be found for immediate relief." He then rejected the proposed Round Table Conference as a remedy. "It is not a matter of carrying conviction by argument. The matter resolves itself into one of matching forces. Conviction or no conviction, Great Britain would defend her Indian commerce and interests by all the forces at her command. India

must consequently evolve force enough to free herself from that embrace of death." Indians advocating political violence were gaining support, Gandhi pointed out, while British-organized violence was inflicted on India. The answer to both, he asserted, was nonviolent struggle.

Gandhi then turned to his plan of action: "It is my purpose to set in motion that force as well against the organized violent force of the British rule as the unorganized violent force of the growing party of violence. To sit still would be to give rein to both the forces . . ." The civil disobedience and noncooperation which were contemplated were intended to convert the British, he continued. The civil disobedience plan would include attacking a number of specific injustices which he had outlined in the letter. When these were removed, he continued, "the way to friendly negotiation will be open. If the British commerce with India is purified of greed, you will have no difficulty in recognizing our independence." Gandhi then invited the Viceroy "to pave the way for an immediate removal of those evils, and thus open the way for a real conference between equals."

Gandhi, however, did not expect the British Empire to give way so easily, and he turned to the plan of resistance: "But if you cannot see your way to deal with these evils and my letter makes no appeal to your heart, on the 11th day of this month, I shall proceed with such co-workers of the Ashram as I can take, to disregard the provisions of the Salt Laws." If the Viceroy were to arrest him first, Gandhi expressed the hope there would "be tens of thousands ready, in a disciplined manner, to take up the work after me, and, in the act of disobeying the Salt Act to lay themselves open to the penalties of a law that should never have disfigured the Statute Book." Gandhi offered to discuss the issues if the Viceroy found substance in the letter. "This letter is not in any way intended as a threat but as a simple and sacred duty peremptory on a civil resister."¹⁸² He signed the letter, "I remain, your sincere friend, M.K. Gandhi," and sent a young British Quaker to deliver it to Lord Irwin.

The nonviolent actionists are not naïve enough to expect that such an ultimatum will often lead to capitulation by the opponent. There may be various reasons for this. He may not, for example, see nonviolent action as a credible threat of which he need take notice. Even more often, however, the opponent is likely to see such a communication as an unjustified challenge to his authority, an affront to his dignity, and a usurpation of status, highly improper behavior for people of a subordinate position. The opponent may therefore become angry, he may break off

any negotiations in progress, he may totally ignore the communication, or he may say it should have been directed to some subordinate official. Or he may, as did Lord Irwin, have his secretary send a terse four-line acknowledgment of the letter.

In such a case, the time has come for action. The nonviolent actionists will then speak of courage, daring and sacrifice, and call on the people opposed to the opponent's policies to combat them in open struggle, as did Mr. Ahmed Kathrada at the beginning of the 1952 civil disobedience campaign in South Africa:

The time has come for action. For too long have we been talking to the white man. For three hundred years they have oppressed us . . . And, friends, after three hundred years I say that the time has come when we will talk to the white man in the only language he understands: the language of struggle.¹⁸³

NOTES

1. Napoleon, *The Officer's Manual or Napoleon's Maxims of War* (New York: James G. Gregory, 1861) Maxim XVI, pp. 58-59.
2. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. Br. ed.: London: Faber and Faber, 1954), p. 25.
3. See Lindberg, "Konklusionen: Teorien om Ikke-vold," p. 209 in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*; Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, pp. 116-117; and Frederic Solomon and Jacob R. Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities," *Psychiatry*, May 1964, pp. 91-99.
4. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, pp. 116-117; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, pp. 116-117. See also pp. 362-363; Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power*, pp. 83 and 87; and Nirmal Kumar Bose, *Studies in Gandhism* (Second Edition); Calcutta: Indian Associated Publishing Co., 1947, p. 171.
5. Gopinath Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan, 1962, (Third Revised Edition), p. 72.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73. See also Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. II, pp. 5-6.
9. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 50.
10. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 172; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 172.
11. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 92.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 432.
13. Prawdin, *The Unmentionable Nechaev*, p. 174.
14. There were several 19th century cases of such psychological and attitude changes among the peasants, some of them deliberately cultivated. See for example, Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, pp. 64, 214, 576.
15. Prawdin, *The Unmentionable Nechaev*, pp. 171-172.
16. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. II, p. 38.
17. See *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 12.
18. King, *Stride Toward Freedom*; U.S. ed., p. 119; Br. ed., p. 140.
19. See Sharp, *Tyranny Could Not Quell Them*.
20. See Sharp, "Gandhi's Defence Policy," in Mahadevan, Roberts and Sharp, eds., *Civilian Defence: An Introduction*, pp. 15-52.
21. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. I, pp. 131-132.
See also pp. 76 and 151, and vol. II, pp. 38, 133, 233, and 247; Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 51; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 51; and Krishna Kripalani, ed., *All Men Are Brothers: Life and Thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi as told in his Own Words* (Paris: Unesco, 1958), p. 101; Ind. ed.: (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1960), p. 135.
22. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. I, p. 109.
23. Quoted in King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, U.S. ed., pp. 46-47; Br. ed., p. 55.
24. See, e.g., Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. II, pp. 220-221.
25. See Machiavelli, *The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli*, vol. I, pp. 339-340.
26. Eugen Stamm and Helmut Kastner, *Juni 53: Der Volksaufstand vom 17 Juni 1953 in Ost-Berlin und der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone* (Bonn: *Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen*, 1961) p. 43. Quoted in Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" pp. 193-194. On the lack of leadership in that Rising, see Ebert's account, *ibid.*, pp. 177-179 and Brant, *The East German Rising*, pp. 73 and 113.
27. Symons, *The General Strike*, p. 137.
28. M. K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography or the Story of My Experiments With Truth*, (Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan, 1956) pp. 470-471.
29. Quoted in Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 139.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
31. Symons, *The General Strike*, p. 63.
32. Jutikkala, *A History of Finland*, p. 233.
33. Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. XII, *The Triumphant Empire, Britain Sails into the Storm, 1770-1776*, p. 179.
34. Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, pp. 251-259.
35. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?" p. 182.
36. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 307.
37. C. Eric Lincoln, "The Strategy of a Sit-in" p. 296, in Sibley, ed., *The Quiet Battle*.
38. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 179.
39. Watt, *Dare Call it Treason*, p. 185.

40. M. K. Gandhi, *Young India*, vol. II; quoted by Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 122.
41. See D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi* (Delhi: Government of India, Publications Division, 1960), vol. I, p. 255 and 261.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 219-221.
43. See for example, Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, pp. 30 and 301; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, pp. 30 and 301; and Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy . . .*, p. 120.
44. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 49.
45. Lindberg, "Konklusionen: Theorien om Ikke-vold," in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*, p. 208.
46. Guenter Lewy, *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany* (New York and Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1964, and London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964), pp. 263-267.
47. See Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 56, 76 and 123, and Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 145-147.
48. See Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, pp. 142-143.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.
50. See M. K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa* (Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan, 1950), p. xii.
51. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. I, p. 52.
52. Quoted in Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy . . .*, p. 216.
53. Theodor Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance: A Model of a Campaign," manuscript, p. 138. Unpublished English translation (by Hilda Morris) of a doctoral thesis in political science presented at the University of Erlangen, Germany, 1965. Published as *Gewaltfrei Aufstand: Alternative zum Bürgerkrieg* (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1968), and paperback abridgement (Frankfurt am Main and Hamburg: Fischerbücherei, GmbH, 1970).
54. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
55. Gandhi, quoted in Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 134. See also Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, pp. 30 and 174; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, pp. 30 and 174.
56. Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 168-169.
57. Howard Zinn, *Albany* (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1962), p. 19, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 328. Miller also cites on this Wyatt Tee Walker, "Achievement in Albany," in *New South* (Atlanta), June, 1963.
58. Martin Luther King, Jr., *Why We Can't Wait* (New York: The New American Library, Signet Books, 1964), p. 54.
59. Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS. p. 171.
60. See Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 56-57 and 59-60.
61. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa* (rev. sec. ed.; trans. from the Gujarati by Valji Govindji Desai; Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan, 1950), p. 46.
62. Amiya Chakravarty, *A Saint at Work: A View of Gandhi's Work and Message* (William Penn Lecture 1950; Philadelphia: Young Friends Movement of the Philadelphia Yearly Meetings, 1950), pp. 29-31.
63. V.I. Lenin, "What is to be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement," in V.I. Lenin, *Selected Works in Three Volumes* (New York: International Publishers, and Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), vol. I, pp. 232-233. Also in Lenin, *Selected Works in Two Volumes* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950) vol. I, p. 379.

64. The term is used by Shridharani, *War Without Violence*, U.S. ed., p. 7; Br. ed., p. 30.
65. Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS. p. 128.
66. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution*, p. 136. "Preliminary agitation" took place that autumn in Providence, Rhode Island. See *ibid.*, p. 153.
67. Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 50.
68. For other descriptions of this stage, see Shridharani, *War Without Violence*, U.S. ed., pp. 7-9; Br. ed., pp. 30-32 and Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, pp. 139-142.
69. Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?," pp. 176-177.
70. See, for example, Jutikkala, *A History of Finland*, p. 233, and Gipson, *The Coming of the American Revolution*, pp. 98, 182, 199 and 211.
71. Solomon and Fishman, "The Psychosocial Meaning of Nonviolence in Student Civil Rights Activities," *Psychiatry*, vol. XXVII, no. 2 (May 1964), p. 98.
72. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, pp. 114-120.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
74. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 29-30.
75. George Lakey, "The Sociological Mechanisms of Nonviolent Action," (M.A. thesis in sociology, University of Pennsylvania, 1962), p. 53; also published in *Peace Research Reviews* (Oakville, Ontario: Canadian Peace Research Institute), vol. II, no. 6 (Dec. 1968), p. 34.
76. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 33; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 33.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
78. See *ibid.*, pp. 91 and 294.
79. Gandhi, quoted in Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy . . .*, p. 225.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
82. Gandhi, *Young India*, vol. I, p. 262.
83. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 295; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 295.
84. Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy . . .*, p. 225.
85. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 129.
86. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 288; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 288, and Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy . . .*, pp. 224-225.
87. Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy . . .*, p. 225.
88. See Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 296; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 296.
89. For a discussion of difficult problems of organization in "civilian defence" — i.e., prepared nonviolent action for purposes of national defence — see Ebert, "Organization in Civilian Defence," in Roberts, ed., *Civilian Resistance As a National Defense*, Br. title: *The Strategy of Civilian Defence*, pp. 255-273.
90. For suggestions on methods of organization for U.S. civil rights groups, see Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, esp. pp. 42-55.
91. Quoted by Ebert in "Organization in Civilian Defence," in Roberts, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 256.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
93. See Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 360, 370, 501 and 521, and Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. XI, *The Triumphant Empire: The Rumbling of the Coming Storm 1766-1770*, pp. 143,

- 145, 181-182 and 187-188; and vol. XII, pp. 152-153 and 208.
94. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants* . . . , p. 513.
 95. *Ibid.*, p. 612.
 96. See Sharp, *Gandhi Wields* . . . , pp. 61-72.
 97. Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, pp. 117 and 160.
 98. Harcave, *First Blood*, p. 84.
 99. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
 100. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
 101. See Brant, *The East German Rising*, pp. 62, 66, 87-88, 91-95, 98-99, 104, 108, 111-112, 124, 136, and 140-141, and Ebert, "Nonviolent Resistance Against Communist Regimes?," MS. pp. 176-183.
 102. Reitlinger, *The Final Solution*, p. 161.
 103. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
 104. See, for example, Prawdin, *The Unmentionable Nechaev*, pp. 153-155, 157, 159 and 160-61, and Charques, *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*, pp. 70, 83, 176, 186 and 201-202. For an instance of how a worker informant gave the police information which enabled them to crush a whole organization, see Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 533. These are simply examples which could be multiplied from other cases also.
 105. Symons, *The General Strike*, p. 145.
 106. See Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power*, pp. 550, 565, 593 and 628, and Delarue, *The Gestapo*, pp. 127, 193-194, 210, 227, 239, 272, 297, 304-305 and 316.
 107. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, pp. 144-145.
 108. Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (New edition; London: The Bodley Head, 1953), p. 337.
 109. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism and Gandhi, Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. II, p. 3.
 110. Oppenheim and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, p. 48.
 111. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 80.
 112. See Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. II, pp. 2-3.
 113. Gandhi, quoted in Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 146.
 114. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, pp. 379-380; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, pp. 379-380.
 115. Quoted in Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy* . . . , p. 223.
 116. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, vol. II, pp. 50-51.
 117. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 69.
 118. Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS. p. 116.
 119. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, p. 80.
 120. Irving L. Janis and Daniel Katz, "The Reduction of Intergroup Hostility: Research Problems and Hypotheses," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. III, no. 1 (March 1959), p. 87.
 121. *Ibid.*
 122. *Ibid.*
 123. Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 96.
 124. This has been especially stimulated by examinations of how prepared nonviolent struggle might be used in national defence—i.e., "civilian defence". See, for example Sir Stephen King-Hall, *Defence in the Nuclear Age* pp.

196-205; (Nyack, N.Y.: Fellowship, 1959; Br. ed.: London: Gollancz, 1958), and Adam Roberts, "Civilian Defence Strategy," in Roberts, editor, *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense*, Br. ed.: *The Strategy of Civilian Defence*, pp. 215-254.

This chapter, however, is restricted to examination of basic principles of strategy and tactics in nonviolent action generally, and will not therefore examine how these principles might be applied in specific conflicts or for particular purposes.

125. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 369.
126. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, p. xi.
127. Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 126.
128. On strategic and tactical problems in the struggles of the American colonists, see Morgan and Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis*, pp. 174 and 240; Gipson, *The British Empire* . . . , vol. XI, pp. 265-271; and Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants* . . . , pp. 213-215, 218-220, 226-234, and 400-401.
On the lack of strategy in the East German Rising, see Brant, *The East German Rising*, pp. 73, 103 and 188-189.
On the lack of strategic planning for the *Ruhrkampf*, see Ehrlich (Raloff), "*Ruhrkampen*," p. 184, in Lindberg, Jacobsen and Ehrlich, *Kamp Uden Vaaben*. Lack of advance strategic planning for certain aspects of the 1926 British General Strike is mentioned by Symons, in *The General Strike*, p. 51. On strategic and tactical questions in the spontaneous 1905 Revolution, see Schwarz, *The Russian Revolution of 1905*, pp. 99-112, and (on conflicting views on whether strikes should lead to a violent rising) pp. 132-143, and Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 165-167, 175, 199-206, 209-210, and 215; p. 199 raises the question of when the optimum results might have been achieved by ending that particular struggle. On the tactical problem of what the *Duma* should have done when dissolved in February 1917, see Katkov, *Russia 1917*, pp. 293-294. On strategic and tactical planning of a sit-in campaign in Atlanta, see C. Eric Lincoln, "The Strategy of a Sit-in," in Sibley *The Quiet Battle*, pp. 296-297. On when to call off an African bus boycott in South Africa, see Luthuli, *Let My People Go*, p. 178.
129. See Jutikkala, *A History of Finland*, pp. 233-235.
130. Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 107.
131. See Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, pp. 340-41, 25, 337, 349, 359 and 350.
132. Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 183.
133. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
134. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields* . . . pp. 70-90.
135. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.
136. Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 150.
137. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, p. 253.
138. Sheehy-Skeffington, Michael Davitt, pp. 120-121. On debate in 1775 on the timing of the American Colonists' nonimportation and nonexportation movement, see Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants* . . . pp. 414-421.
139. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields* . . . p. 84.
140. See Miller, *Nonviolence*, p. 308; and Lincoln, "The Strategy of a Sit-in," p. 297.
141. Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 192.
142. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 342. See also Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 97.
143. M. K. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 288; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 288; and Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy* . . . , pp. 224-5.

144. Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 214.
145. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 348.
146. *Ibid.*, p. 347.
147. *Ibid.*, p. 348.
148. *Ibid.*
149. Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 202.
150. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, pp. 215 and 327-328.
151. Miller, *Nonviolence*, pp. 146 and 150.
152. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 152.
153. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 156; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 156.
154. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, p. 72.
155. Gandhi, *Nonviolent Resistance*, p. 173; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 173.
156. Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in*, p. 246.
157. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 176.
158. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, p. 38.
159. Gandhi, *Non-violent Resistance*, p. 25; Ind. ed.: *Satyagraha*, p. 25.
160. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
161. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.
162. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
163. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
164. Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 51-206.
165. Sibley, ed., *The Quiet Battle*, p. 371.
166. Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 202.
167. Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 241.
168. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 348.
169. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, pp. 369-370.
170. Harcave, *First Blood*, pp. 219-220.
171. Interview with Pan-Africanist representative Peter Molotsi in Accra, 26 April 1960; reported in Gene Sharp, "No Co-existence with Oppression," *Peace News*, 13 May 1960.
172. Ebert, "Theory and Practice of Nonviolent Resistance," MS pp. 313-314.
173. See Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, pp. 343-344 and Clausewitz, *On War*, vol. I, p. 166.
174. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, p. 349.
175. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 153.
176. Gandhi, quoted in Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 202.
177. See Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 38-39 and Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, p. 176.
178. On the nature and role of the ultimatum in satyagraha, see Shridharani, *War Without Violence*, U.S. ed., pp. 11 and 133-134, and Br. ed., pp. 33-34, 98 and 128, and Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence*, pp. 40 and 85.
179. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants . . .*, p. 609.
180. Watt, *Dare Call It Treason*, p. 185.
181. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 234; Appendix B, pp. 233-247, contains the full text of this exchange of letters with the government.
182. The full text is quoted in Sharp, *Gandhi Wields . . .*, pp. 61-66.
183. Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa*, p. 114.