

RESEARCH PROPOSALS FOR NONVIOLENT
DEFENCE: STRATEGY AND TACTICS. A REVIEW
ARTICLE OF *RESEARCH ON CIVILIAN-BASED
DEFENCE* BY GILIAM DE VALK*

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Therefore I suggest that the philosophy and strategy of nonviolence become immediately a subject for study and for serious experimentation in every field of human conflict, by no means excluding the relations between nations

Martin Luther King Jr.

For at least a quarter of a century calls have been made for research into nonviolent alternatives to military defence. Stark contrasts have been drawn between the colossal intellectual and technological effort which has gone into military research and development, particularly in the twentieth century, and the improvised nature of such nonviolent resistance as has occurred and been documented. Given this state of affairs, it has to be acknowledged that policy-makers will remain unlikely to consider non-military defence (or deterrence) as sufficiently developed to provide a realistic alternative to traditional military approaches. As Johan Niezing puts it, any inclination to give alternatives the benefit of the doubt turns to 'doubting the benefits', and funds, meagre as they were, dry up.¹

The publication last year of *Research On Civilian-Based Defence* is thus opportune, providing an immediate and valid heuristic alternative to the customary calls for research into historical examples. The book was written by Giliam de Valk in cooperation with Johan Niezing. De Valk wrote his Master's thesis at the University of Leiden on 'Strategy and Civilian-Based Defence'. Niezing, Professor of Peace Research at the Free University of Brussels, has published several studies and an important book on civilian-based defence as a system of deterrence. The book comprises two sections. De Valk provides a systematic and detailed overview of research proposals in terms both of formulation and relevance and of implementation. Niezing contributes some stimulating general observations on the programming of research into civilian-based defence. Here indeed is a considerable contribution towards Gene Sharp's call for 'specific problem-oriented research . . . to

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1. J.Niezing, 'Modeling Utopia: Some Notes on the Programming of Research on Civilian Defence'. Appendix D in G.de Valk, *Research on Civilian-Based Defence* (Amsterdam: SISWO, 1993), pp.76-85, at p.83.

develop the general principles and theoretical frameworks . . . , to produce models . . . '2

Non-military defence, as an alternative to traditional military defence, has various names, including civilian defence, nonviolent defence, social defence - and civilian-based defence, the name used in this book and abbreviated to CBD. Some argue that the concepts of defence (and to a lesser extent security) have been 'hi-jacked' by the military, making it very difficult to discuss defence outside the military paradigm. Discussion of alternative methods of defence is quite recent, and the first systematic presentation may be found in Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall's book *Defence in the Nuclear Age*. King-Hall wrote:

It seems to me obvious that a defence system of non-violence against violence must be as carefully planned, both tactically and strategically, as an attack which will be carried out by trained men, fortified by military tradition and directed by a highly intelligent general staff.³

In the 1975 Memorandum on Disarmament, the Dutch government referred to the desirability of research into non-violent conflict resolution in general and into civilian-based defence in particular, and an advisory committee of scientists and administrators, headed by Professor Niezing, was appointed. In the early 1980s the political climate changed and the committee was disbanded. (Only one of its ten proposals was implemented, and its budget was cut by nine-tenths.) In 1984 SISWO (the Inter-university Institute for Social-Scientific Research) set up a group to continue the work. This book draws together proposals from the Niezing Committee, the SISWO/CBD group and De Valk. The object is 'to establish a logical and integrated set of proposals that may contribute to further research' by providing a means of direction and evaluation (including 'falsification of postulated ideas'). Some of the questions raised by this comprehensive and rigorous study have hardly been studied previously, and many must draw largely on insights from other fields.

De Valk uses categories proposed by Niezing, who views CBD primarily as a system of deterrence. Any deterrent system stands on three legs: instruments or 'means of pressure', the intent to use them, and credibility in the eyes of an aggressor. In traditional military defence, there must be armies, navies, weapons and so on; the political will to deploy them; and an opponent who takes both seriously. If any one of the legs is shaky, the system totters. Similarly in civilian-based defence, J.D.Singer's tripartite formulation of deterrence holds: deterrence is the product of the estimated capabilities and the estimated intentions, both as estimated by the opponent.⁴

2. G.Sharp, *National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense*, (Omaha: Association for Transarmament Studies, 1985), pp.32-33.

3. S.King-Hall, *Defence In The Nuclear Age* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1958), p.190.

4. J.D.Singer, *Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament* (Columbus, Ohio, 1962), p.172. Cited by Niezing in de Valk, *Research, Appendix D*, p.7

De Valk uses five main headings based on Niezing's categories: There are instrumental capabilities (the equivalent of the weapons of a military system) and psychological capabilities (corresponding to intent or political will). Also there is the interaction between these two capabilities. Then De Valk considers CBD strategy in relation to an overall security policy, and finally security policy itself. At first reading the headings may seem cumbersome, but the categories lend themselves to revealing analysis.

Some instrumental capabilities are largely independent of the cooperation of people. Under this heading De Valk places research proposals on 'shadow structures', centralisation/decentralisation, repression technologies, information-explosion and data-bases. Other instrumental capabilities depend much more on people's cooperation, and under this heading De Valk places research into civil services, such as instructions in the event of an occupation, and identification of key personnel and positions.

Examining the research proposals in detail is informative. For example, among the projects on instrumental capabilities is a study on repression technologies. This would aim to obtain precise technical information and to survey existing technologies for repression and political control in order to find the most effective counter-measures. Its relevance lies in the preparation of CBD to defend against an attack which used such techniques and technologies. The proposed program is in three phases. Phase one makes an inventory of information from different groups and institutions working on the subject (for example, the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science, in London; the Policy Studies Institute in Washington; the Transnational Institute in the Netherlands). Relevant journals would also be scanned: *Securitech*, *Defence Attaché*, journals for the police and for producers of equipment, etc. Phase two applies this technical information to propose possible counter-moves. Phase three analyses the information, in cooperation with various centres of technology assessment (such as the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex University). This three-stage research proposal is labelled Category C, i.e. estimated to occupy one researcher for two to three years.

Two projects are described which concern an instrumental capability dependent on the cooperation of people. One proposal concerns the making of an inventory of different key people and positions in the civil service. Some may be in key-positions because of their possible (formal or informal) power and/or possibilities for coordination (top-down), others because of their access to information-flows (bottom-up). Some would be important to an opponent, some to a defender, and some to both. The relevance of this study for CBD is obvious: the civil service is important not only because it mediates between politics and citizens, but also because in a conflict it could be a catalyst and 'a motor for struggle'. Knowledge of key positions will provide an outline of an

inevitable focus of attention for both parties in a conflict. The research program involves firstly making an inventory of key people in formal and informal structures within the civil service, using insights from sociology and political theory. Secondly, the three fields of interest for CBD (opponent, defender and both) would be analysed more fully than has so far been the case in CBD literature. Combining the two areas would reveal key-people and key-positions for a CBD-security policy. This proposal is labelled category-A, i.e. estimated to occupy one researcher for less than one year.

In the category of psychological capabilities (existing and variable) dependent on people's cooperation, the reception of the idea of CBD is obviously crucial. This research proposal is labelled 'reach and reception of the idea of CBD in the Netherlands'. As CBD involves the participation of many sectors of the civilian population one must know 'which sections of the population are more and which are less prepared to accept the idea of CBD'. (However, the proposal acknowledges that belief in a certain form of defence proves very little about how people would behave in an actual emergency.) Who have been the social carriers of CBD and how did they propagate the idea? How were their activities received by the various social sectors (churches, army, political parties, media, trade unions etc.) and by the population in general? To what degree is the idea taken seriously and CBD seen as feasible? In particular, how did people in key-positions receive the idea?

Of course 'instrumental' and 'psychological' capabilities not only overlap but also interact, and De Valk's third category studies this interaction, which is the essence of a CBD system. One research proposal, for example, involves a study of sociological literature; another is a study of civilian resistance in the history of political thinking. It is noted that most writers on CBD have neglected results from other disciplines, and these proposals aim to fill this gap to some degree. Thus the study of sociological literature aims to clarify the problems and assumptions of CBD, making use of literature already summarised and clearly relevant, such as conflict sociology. Lists of questions which have remained unanswered, because of an absence of empirical studies or known analogies in other fields, would form a good starting point for such a literature search. These unanswered questions include, for example:

- how will stress and anger affect people suffering violence and having to restrain themselves from counter-violence?
- what should be the size of the social unit if CBD is to be feasible?
- how can CBD face the problem of collaboration?

Unexamined assumptions provide another starting point. These include, for example:

- people can be trained for CBD in a similar way as they are trained for military defence.

- the more democratic a social unit is, the more it will be able to defend itself in a non-violent way.
- a majority of the population can be mobilised for CBD in the event of an attack.

The first step in this proposal is seen as 'the formulation of unsolved questions and the tracing of the basic assumptions within the CBD literature', and the second stage is a search of relevant literature within conflict sociology.

The charge is often levelled at CBD literature that it is no more than 'so many "useful ideas" or "naive proposals" depending on one's point of view . . . really collections of "tactics", of methods for putting pressure on the opponent'.⁵ Many of de Valk's research proposals necessarily involve tactics, but his fourth main category is 'strategy and the relation to an overall security policy'. According to Boserup and Mack,

The lack of a general strategic conception is undoubtedly the gravest single shortcoming in the literature on nonviolence. It shares this shortcoming with current military defence thinking . . . This lack of an overall strategic analysis on both sides of the fence is the main factor which precludes a meaningful dialogue between the proponents of either, and - for the same reasons - prevents a 'pragmatic' comparison of these two modes of defence.⁶

Such is the situation outlined in the first paragraph of this review. But De Valk has already written a thesis stressing the need to develop a strategic frame for civilian-based defence, and the second research proposal in this section, concerning the centre of gravity of a civilian-based defence, leads at once into realms of Clausewitzian strategic theory. And possibly for this reason it also seems to lead into problem areas of idiom and translation, so that for the first time the reader may become aware of some difficulty with language. A concurrent reading of Boserup and Mack's chapter on 'Non-violent Defence in Classical Strategic Theory' in *War Without Weapons* is advisable, if only to assess De Valk's claim that these authors do not support their concept of 'unity of resistance' as a centre of gravity with historical proof or convincing argument.

The much quoted General von Clausewitz developed classical strategic theory in his major work *On War*, largely an analysis of the Napoleonic wars.⁷ An almost identical analysis is to be found in Mao Tse-Tung.⁸ Clausewitzian theory is not a set of rules but a method of analysing a struggle in order to distinguish between *effective* and less effective strategies.

5. A. Boserup and A. Mack, *War Without Weapons* (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), p. 148.

6. Boserup and Mack, *War Without Weapons*, pp. 148-149.

7. C. von Clausewitz, *On War* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982).

8. Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Military Writings*, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967).

In the first place he makes a clear distinction between the *aim* (military) and the *purpose* (political) of war. While the purpose varies from war to war, the aim of warfare ('victory') is always the same. On each side, battles are fought and campaigns waged towards one strategic target (victory, the *aim*). Secondly, defence and attack are not of equal strength, and where a war is concerned (rather than a battle), defence has the advantage over offence.

The conventional wisdom that attack is the best form of defence is true only if that attack is quickly victorious; otherwise time is on the side of the defence.

'The aim of war in conception must always be the overthrow of the enemy' writes Clausewitz.⁹ In his time this overthrow could be the destruction of the enemy's army, the conquest of its country, or its total disarmament, but Clausewitz declines to be dogmatic.

All that theory can here say is as follows: that the great point is to keep the overruling relations of both parties in view. Out of them a certain centre of gravity, a centre of power and movement, will form itself, on which everything depends; and against this centre of gravity of the enemy, the concentrated blow of all the forces must be directed.¹⁰

For many historical figures, from Alexander to Frederick the Great, the army was the centre of gravity, but Clausewitz lists several others:

. . . in states torn by internal dissensions, this centre generally lies in the capital; in small states dependent on greater ones, it lies generally in the army of these allies; in a confederacy, it lies in the unity of interests; in a national insurrection, in the person of the chief leader, and in public opinion; against these points the blow must be directed.¹¹

These various examples, it may be noted, are assembled by Clausewitz in the context of military struggles. De Valk maintains, however, that the military centre of gravity normally comprises armed forces.

The ability to direct the blow against the centre of gravity and to attack it 'with the greatest possible dispatch' is the criterion for a 'best' strategy. And the centre of gravity is determined when a defence mode is chosen. In the words of Boserup and Mack:

This centre of gravity is that point at the heart of the defence which, if it holds out, enables the defence to continue the struggle even if weakened, and which, if it falls, must necessarily lead to the collapse of the entire defence, whether for reasons of morale or for material reasons.¹²

9. Clausewitz, *On War*, p.388.

10. Clausewitz, *On War*, p.389.

11. Clausewitz, *On War*, pp.389-390.

12. Boserup and Mack, *War Without Weapons*, p.160.

In war the military aim displaces the political purpose, and the enemy's total efforts are directed towards the aim (annihilating the centre of gravity).

What then is the centre of gravity of a civilian-based defence? Boserup and Mack argue that it is 'the *unity* of the resistance' (although they apparently fail to convince De Valk).

It is against this point that the whole thrust of the attack must be directed and to its preservation that all efforts of the defence must tend. To attacker and defender alike, this unity above all else is crucial. It is the only standard by which specific weapons, means and actions can and must be weighed.¹³

These authors proceed to apply Clausewitz's theoretical principles to the case of nonviolent defence, including the principle that 'means, whatever they be – a conventional battle, a piece of artillery, a strike, an act of sabotage – have no intrinsic value whatsoever, except in so far as they relate to the centre of gravity'. For example, when the Warsaw Pact armies invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, they wrongly assumed that their main task was the occupation and subjugation of the country. In other words, they had wrongly identified the centre of gravity. In fact, the tanks in the streets of Prague

[created] the unity of the resistance, a unity which had not been there before, or had been so to a much lesser extent, and which completely silenced the orthodox wing in the party . . . These tanks were worse than scrap-iron, they were like the grenade which explodes in the hands of the thrower.¹⁴

The enemy will work to destroy the unity of resistance by different methods, and Boserup and Mack use the 1923 Ruhrkampf and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia as examples. In the latter case, once the invaders had removed the tanks from the streets and begun more appropriate political manoeuvres, they concentrated on a few leaders who had become important symbols of the unity of the resistance. A split developed between the conception of the resistance as uncompromising defiance and the compromising behaviour of the leaders. Thus the unity of the resistance was destroyed. To take another example, when France and Belgium occupied the Ruhr in 1923, different sectors of the population developed different methods of resistance, and also felt the effects of resistance differently. Shopkeepers and small businesses suffered in particular, and this situation was exploited by the occupying powers in splitting the unity of the resistance.

13. Boserup and Mack, *War Without Weapons*, p.163.

14. Boserup and Mack, *War Without Weapons* p.164.

If the centre of gravity holds, and counter-offensive becomes possible, then a second centre of gravity, for the counter-attack, must be determined. Whereas the defence mode more or less determines the first one, the second one depends on 'those political, ideological and other factors which ultimately determine the enemy's ability to pursue the offence', and the nature and relative importance of these factors varies from case to case. Mao Tse-Tung has described these as 'the internal contradictions in the enemy camp'.¹⁵

De Valk is not convinced that the centre of gravity for CBD is unity in resistance, and suggests that there may be a more 'material' constant to be discovered. He asks whether this will differ from situation to situation, and if there is a constant within these differences. Boserup and Mack maintain that abstract strategic principles 'do provide concrete answers when applied to concrete problems' and 'are also helpful when it comes to devising a strategy instead of simply drawing up a catalogue of things one could do when attacked.'¹⁶ Development of a correct strategy for a particular struggle must involve both general theoretical analysis, as summarised briefly above, and detailed study of the antagonists, their resources and so on. Such a study, using analogous historical situations, forms part of De Valk's research proposal on centre of gravity.

Finally in the section on strategy and security policy, De Valk turns to Habermas, in a research proposal labelled 'State of the CBD-discussion: strategic or communicative action?' While some may question whether the 'strategic action' of Habermas is strictly in the tradition of Clausewitzian strategy, it is noteworthy that he chooses war as one example of a 'strategic action'.¹⁷ (And on one occasion he described his theory of communicative action as 'not a continuation of methodology by other means'.¹⁸) For Habermas, strategic action is purposive-rational, concerned with the efficiency of technical means and the rationality of choice between these means. Certainly there are parallels here with a Clausewitzian pure 'frictionless' war. Communicative action, on the other hand, is directed more toward a process of reaching agreement, as in a Gandhian satyagraha. As de Valk points out, such a difference in orientation could lead to a totally different security policy. Military strategists stress the difference between the level of strategy and the higher political level - 'war is the continuation of politics by other means' - but does this difference hold within a communicative approach? Gandhian strategists stress the oneness of means and ends, but they do not assume that agreement will necessarily be reached without coercion. And while communicative action involves 'the cooperative negotiation of common definitions of the situation',¹⁹ when

15. See Boserup and Mack, *War Without Weapons*, p.170.

16. Boserup and Mack, *War Without Weapons*, p.167.

17. J.Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), p.119.

18. J.Habermas, *On the Logic of the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1988), p.xv.

19. J.Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol.1, 'Reason and the Rationalisation of Society' (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p.137.

'interactions cannot be coordinated through achieving understanding, the only alternative that remains is force exercised by one against others (in a more or less refined, more or less latent manner)'.²⁰

If nonviolent force is to be exercised, for example in a CBD system, obviously a majority of the community must feel concerned enough to bear the consequences. Although de Valk does not refer to them, Habermas's concepts of legitimation, system and life world may well be relevant here. 'Legitimacy means a political order's worthiness to be recognized. . . . legitimacy is a contestable validity claim.'²¹

One method of deflecting questions relevant to legitimation is the redefinition of 'practical' questions (*praktisch* – to do with ethics and politics) as technical matters of efficiency and expertise. Habermas argues that technocracy and bureaucracy have weakened and depoliticised the democratic public sphere which arose in the eighteenth century.²² Such a 'civil society' would seem to be essential both for civilian-based defence and for a reclamation of definitions of security in order to encompass much more than technological superiority and military efficiency.

In the fifth and final category, 'Security Policy and its Setting', De Valk returns to the strategic approach, examining the types of confrontation a CBD-security policy would have to deal with, the nature of contemporary occupations by military, the effects on the political level of the introduction of CBD, intelligence services as opponents of CBD, and last but not least the thorny issue of CBD-intelligence services.

The aim of the research proposal on CBD-intelligence services is to place the issue on the agenda of the CBD debate. Information is closely related to power, and the outcome of a CBD struggle concerns power control. On the one hand, it is necessary to know what counter-techniques and strategies an opponent has, and also how much the opponent knows about the CBD's own structure. On the other hand, there are concerns about democratic rules and human rights. There will be more debate about means and ends, a debate complicated by the possibility of an opponent infiltrating a CBD-defended society. In this case the field of action of the CBD-services could lie partly in its own territory. What if groups and individuals of the society become the subject of investigation? Who will be in control of the intelligence services of a CBD? What precisely will be the tasks of such a service? And at the same time De Valk reminds us that most of the information of intelligence services comes from documents that are openly accessible (that is, through the work of intelligence analysts rather than spies). Items such as 'tasks, structure, control, means, ends, ideological background and dynamics' of a CBD intelligence service are central to

20. J.Habermas, *Critical Debates*, edited by J.B.Thompson and D.Held, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1982), p.269.

21. Habermas, *Communication*, p.178.

22. J.Habermas, 'The Public Sphere' in S.Seidman (ed.), *On Society And Politics*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), pp.231-236.

this research proposal. (De Valk himself hopes to pursue Ph.D. research in this area.)

This sampler of the research proposals provides some indication of the mass of detail in the first part of the book. In addition there are four appendices and a bibliography. (Most of the entries in the bibliography are not in English.) Appendix A deals with 'coherence' between the projects and the degree to which any project is related to or dependent on others. Thus, 1G (key-positions) is related to 1F (instructions to civil servants) and 2A (reach and reception of CBD). And so on. Importantly, De Valk states that 'proposal 4-B (centre of gravity) has a high priority to be carried out at an early stage'. Appendix B lists the ten original projects of the Niezing Committee and their relation to De Valk's list, and Appendix C acknowledges the SISWO/CBD group proposals.

The really interesting appendix, however, is Appendix D; indeed it should perhaps be read first, before settling into De Valk's detailed catalogue. Here, Niezing provides some notes on the programming of research on CBD, elaborating on some previous 'sceptical remarks' on the methodology of CBD research.

According to Niezing, since civilian defence has no theory of its own, research into it must evaluate already existing and empirically verified knowledge from the social sciences. Epistemologically, there is nothing strange in this situation; new insights often occur by applying already existing insights to new fields. But to select relevant elements from a huge body of existing knowledge from other disciplines and place these elements into some common framework, CBD needs a selective and unifying concept, and Niezing suggests the idea of an 'effectiveness-model'. To consider a certain society as a CBD system, it must be modelled as a set of hypothesised relations between those variables (such as prerequisites, internal developments, external conditions and occurrences, etc) which may or may not make CBD an *effective* alternative to other defence systems.

To construct such an 'effectiveness-model' Niezing assumes that CBD is a system of deterrence, and starts with the basic principles of deterrence outlined above. In civilian-based defence, effective deterrence is the product of some instrumental prerequisites (or 'capabilities' - IC) and the intention to resist nonviolently (psychological capabilities - PC), as estimated and taken seriously by the opponent (ES). In modern strategic thinking the potential attacker is assumed to be making the following estimations: the expected gain from the attack; the possible losses from a retaliatory attack; and the likelihood of such a retaliation.²³ The deterrent is a fear of possible consequences - retaliation in the case of military (particularly nuclear) defence. In the case of CBD, the deterrent is a fear of failure and ignominy. Boserup and Mack argue that this perspective omits a

23. Boserup and Mack, *War Without Weapons*, p.129.

further estimation usually being made by the attacker, namely its *need to attack*.

Moves can be made to lower this perceived need, for example by attempts to solve conflicts by prior negotiation, or by confidence building and reducing the attacker's fear of being attacked. In order to include this factor, Boserup and Mack needed a new word, and settled for 'dissuasion', to describe 'all those endeavours which, in times of peace, serve to make the opponent desist from attacking'. Deterrence is 'that particular form of dissuasion which bases itself on the induced fear of the consequences of the attack.'²⁴

Niezing refers to Boserup and Mack's formulation of nonviolent defence as a system of dissuasion, and places Singer's tri-partite formulation alongside their discussion of credibility in order to evaluate the effectiveness of non-military defence. Effectiveness $E = (IC \times PC) \div ES$. With this static 'formula' (which, he says, is, after all, 'a mere truism') as a starting point, Niezing elaborates an intricate and convincing model.

IC and PC reinforce each other. Thus, the higher the level of instrumental preparation, the more people will be inclined to believe in, and to practise, CBD. Conversely, the greater the evidence that civilians would be ready to mobilise, the more willing the administration would be to invest in instrumental capabilities. Furthermore, the higher the level of mobilisation (IC and PC), the more it will be noted by the opponent (ES). Thus CBD is a dynamic system, although the interactions between the components have usually been ignored in CBD literature.

Both IC and PC are flexible to some extent, and at the same time rigid to some extent. Both are better regarded as collections of elements, some of which are more variable than others. Thus, some instrumental conditions are more or less independent of the will to resist, for example, degree of autarky and/or decentralisation of government. Others will succeed only if people are willing – for example, measures to facilitate non-collaboration of the administration. Conversely, some psychological elements may be regarded (with some difficulty) as more or less independent; for example, some personalities may be more disposed to peaceful resistance. But in general people will be more motivated to practise CBD if they can rely on some organisational infrastructure. In other words, PC varies with IC.

Niezing argues that these relations between instrumental and psychological conditions form the hard core of any CBD system, and hence 'research programs have to be built up along these lines rather than being catalogues of 'static' conditions'. Our ability to clarify the main problems, scientific and political, depends on thinking in terms of social dynamics, of relations between 'variable compounding parts of a system.'²⁵

24. Boserup and Mack, *War Without Weapons*, p.129.

25. Niezing, *Modeling Utopia*, pp.80-81

Thus 'transarmament' from a military system across to a CBD system should be viewed as a dynamic process of mutually stimulating instrumental and psychological conditions. Here, research could derive insights from the policy sciences. The process can be studied in many ways – as an example of strategic planning, as a sequence of steps of both an instrumental and psychological nature, as a process of planned change, with built-in feedbacks, etc.

Having located the core of a CBD system in the interaction of capabilities and intentions, Niezing turns to the third factor, the 'credibility-factor', the estimation by the opponent. This is itself a further dynamic component. A CBD system is an *open* system; its power to deter is political, and depends not only on the opponent's perception of the organisation and mental preparedness within the defending society; it also depends on internal processes within the opponent's political system. Thus, if that political system is becoming more hawkish, then in both societies the credibility of a CBD system will be lessened. If on the other hand the opponent's decision makers are more inclined to listen to their doves, then the credibility of a CBD system will increase. Furthermore, the very development of a CBD system will undermine the hawks' arguments in the opponent's system. And again, not only one's opponents but also one's allies will react to the transarmament process. If the reactions of one's allies are negative, this will further increase the CBD system's credibility for the opponent (ES). In turn, this may increase PC. If the reactions of allies are positive, this may assist in overcoming 'resistances to change' during the transarmament process, once again increasing the overall credibility of the CBD system.

Truly 'everything is hooked on to everything else', as the environmentalist John Muir observed in another context. The briefest consideration of such a complex set of variables underlines the need for research programs to focus on the dynamic relationships within a CBD system, and certainly illuminates the research proposals listed by Valk. This is a book that should be on every social defence researcher's bookshelf (next to Boserup and Mack's *War Without Weapons*).